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UNIÓN AFRICANA

African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC/CAUCT)

B.P. 141 Bureau Poste El-Mohammadia Alger – ALGERIE

Tel. +213 215201 10/00 83 Fax : +213 21520378

Email: acsrt-sitroom@africanunion.org

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CONTINENTAL THREATS ASSESSMENT AND RISKS MAPPING TOOL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
II. INTRODUCTION	2
III. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT	3
IV. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS.....	4
V. EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL THREAT TEMPLATES, RISK INDICATORS AND DATA COLLECTION TOOLS	6
VI. PROPOSED UNIFIED CONTINENTAL THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK.....	13
VII. CONTINENTAL RISKS MAPPING TOOL DEVELOPMENT.....	22
VIII. PROTOTYPE DYNAMIC CONTINENTAL RISK MAPPING TOOL	27
IX. IMPLEMENTATION AND NEXT STEPS.....	29
X. CONCLUSION	32
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS	32

TABLES

Table 1: Terrorism and Violent Extremism Data Collection Indicators – AUCTC	9
Table 2: Incidents Collection Indicators- AFRIPOL.....	10
Table 3: Indicators Basket for Data Collection – CEWS Situation Room PAPS	11
Table 4: Continental Risk and Threat Indicators - CISSA.....	12
Table 5: Threat Types Currently Assessed by AU Institutions	13
Table 6: Proposed Harmonised Threat Types.....	15
Table 7: Proposed Harmonised Threat Types Data Collection Indicators	20
Table 8: Proposed Framework for Assessing Confidence Methodology.....	21
Table 9: Proposed Threat Assessment Template	25
Table 10: Proposed Risk Matrix	25
Table 11: Proposed Continental Threshold for Early Warning for Early Action	26
Table 12: Proposed Color Coding for Continental Risk Mapping Tool	26
Table 13: Sample Country Risk Level Across All Threat Type	27
Table 14: Implementation and Operationalisation of Risks Mapping Tool.....	30

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Africa's peace and security landscape is increasingly characterized by interconnected, transnational, and multidimensional threats that transcend traditional security boundaries, as threats interact and converge, amplifying existing vulnerabilities and creating new emerging threats. Terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crime, armed conflicts, governance challenges, economic instability, public health emergencies, climate-induced disasters, cyber threats, and external interference continue to evolve in complexity and geographic spread, requiring integrated approaches to early warning and preventive action.

2. Recognizing the persistent gap between early warning and early action, the PSC, at its 1298th meeting held on 27 August 2025, welcomed the establishment of a Continental Security Cartography as a decision-support tool and directed the AUC, working together with the AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, and APRM, to establish and institutionalize a dynamic and continuously updated continental risk mapping tool. Subsequently, at its 1320th meeting held on 16 December 2025, the PSC reiterated this request and called for strengthened collaboration among AU institutions, and RECs/RMs to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and support evidence-based preventive action.

3. In response to these decisions, H.E. the Commissioner for PAPS, established a Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising relevant AU institutions and specialized bodies. The TWG held three meetings between April and June 2026, culminating in the development of a proposed Continental Threat Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool. The review of existing institutional frameworks revealed that considerable analytical capabilities already exist within AUCTC, CEWS, AFRIPOL, CISSA, and APRM. However, these capabilities remain fragmented and characterized by duplication of efforts, uneven methodologies, differing indicators, and limited interoperability among institutions supporting CEWS.

4. To address these gaps, the TWG proposes ten harmonized continental threat categories to serve as the common analytical framework for continental risk assessment: Terrorism and Violent Extremism; Transnational Organized Crime; Inter- and Intra-State Armed Conflicts; Governance and Political Instability; Youth Restiveness from Political Exclusion and Structural Unemployment; Economic and Financial Vulnerability; Public Health and Human Security Risks; Environmental and Climate-Induced Disasters; Cyber Insecurity, Misuse of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies; and Mercenarism, External Interference, Foreign Forces, and Foreign Fighters.

5. The proposed framework introduces standardized methodologies for data collection, source validation, information credibility assessment, threat assessment, risk scoring, and early warning reporting. The model combines likelihood, impact, vulnerability, target value, and coping capacity to generate weighted risk scores and risk indices capable of supporting cross-country comparisons and evidence-based decision-making. The framework further establishes early warning thresholds linked to pre-defined authorized menu of diplomatic, security and stabilization tools, thereby strengthening Early Warning for Early Action. The proposed system also introduces color-coded risk levels ranging from minimal to critical risk

and links these levels to corresponding preventive, diplomatic, security, and stabilization measures. The proposed dashboard would enable the monitoring of country-level risks across all threat domains.

6. The Risk Mapping Tool complement and serves as input for the AU Trigger Model. The Continental Threat Assessment and Risk Mapping Tool provide the analytical function: it assesses, scores and maps threats to determine the level and severity of risk. The AU Trigger Model on the other hand, takes that assessment a step further by establishing when the identified risk reaches a threshold that should trigger a corresponding AU response. In simple terms, the Mapping Tool tells us, “How serious is the threat?”, while the Trigger Model tells us, “At what point should the AU act, and what action should follow?” Together, they strengthen the link between early warning and early response.

7. This report should therefore be considered as **Phase I of the implementation process**. The next phases require the institutionalization, operationalization, piloting, and gradual deployment of the Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool in support of the Continental Early Warning System and the operationalization of Early Warning for Early Response. The proposed implementation roadmap consists of eight phases: PSC consideration and adoption of the proposed framework and methodologies; Establishment of a permanent inter-agency security and risk assessment mechanism; Development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and information-sharing protocols; Development of the digital platform, dashboard, and integrated database; Pilot implementation in selected regions; Capacity-building and analyst development programmes; Gradual continental rollout; and Periodic reporting and annual review.

8. The report emphasizes that the effectiveness of the proposed Dynamic Continental Risks Mapping Tool will depend not only on technology but also on institutional coordination and analytical capacity. Accordingly, the TWG recommends the establishment of a continental Early Warning Analyst Development Programme to strengthen analytic tradecraft, structured analytical techniques, strategic foresight, horizon scanning, and the use of low-cost open-source analytical tools across AUCTC, CEWS, AFRIPOL, CISSA, APRM, and other relevant AU entities.

9. The successful implementation of these recommendations will significantly strengthen the African Union’s ability to anticipate emerging threats, support preventive diplomacy, enhance evidence-based decision-making, and operationalize the principle of Early Warning for Early Response in accordance with the decisions of the Peace and Security Council.

II. INTRODUCTION

10. Africa continues to face a complex and evolving security landscape characterized by interconnected and transnational threats that affect peaceful co-existence, human security, stability, national resilience, governance, and sustainable development across the continent. Traditional security challenges such as armed conflict, terrorism, and violent extremism increasingly intersect with emerging and existing threats including cybercrime, public health emergencies, climate change and environmental degradation, transnational organized crime

(TOC), and other human security risks. These threats often transcend national borders, undermine state resilience, and require coordinated responses at national, regional, and continental levels.

11. The growing convergence of these risks underscores the importance of strengthening continental early warning systems, through integrated risk analysis, structural conflict prevention, strategic foresight, horizon scanning, and evidence-based decision-making. Effective prevention and response mechanisms depend not only on the timely identification of emerging threats, but also on the continuous monitoring of structural vulnerabilities, resilience factors, and potential conflict triggers that may evolve into crises.

12. In this context, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) mandated the African Union Commission (AUC) working together with the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to develop a Continental Threat Assessment and Risk Mapping Tool. This was with the view of institutionalising a dynamic and continuously updated risks and threats mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning and early response (EWER), by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities, catalysts and potential triggers.

13. The PSC further underscored that the proposed framework should build upon and complement existing African Union early warning and conflict prevention instruments, including the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the AU Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF), the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA), Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), in order to avoid duplication and promote institutional coherence.

14. To undertake this assignment, H.E. the Commissioner for PAPS established a Technical Working Group composed of experts and practitioners from relevant AU institutions. The Working Group convened three technical meetings to review existing continental practices of AU technical agencies, identify key risk indicators and analytical variables, and develop a practical and adaptable framework capable of supporting continental early warning and strategic security assessments. The consultative process enabled the integration of diverse perspectives and expertise, ensuring that the proposed tool reflects Africa's evolving threat environment and the interconnected nature of contemporary risks.

15. This report presents the outcomes of the technical process undertaken by the TWG, including the deliberations and recommendations of the Technical Working Group, the proposed continental threats assessment and risks mapping tool, and considerations for its implementation and operationalization. The report contributes to the African Union's broader efforts to strengthen continental EWER, enhance preventive diplomacy, and promote integrated approaches to peace, security, and resilience across Africa.

III. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

16. The PSC, at its 1298th meeting held on 27 August 2025 during the briefing on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) on “**Mapping Risks and Threats**,” highlighted the persistent gap between early warning and early action. The Council urged Member States to strengthen joint analysis mechanisms and adopt evidence-based preventive measures to address conflicts, terrorism, and other emerging security threats.

17. Through Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025), particularly paragraph 17, the Council welcomed the establishment of a Continental Security Cartography as a decision-support tool for prevention and early action. The Council further directed the AUC, in collaboration with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, and the APRM, to establish and institutionalize, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool.

18. The proposed tool is intended to strengthen the PSC's capacity to promote early warning for early action by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential triggers across the continent. The tool is expected to incorporate color-coded risk levels,  linked to a pre-authorized menu of diplomatic, security, and stabilization responses, as well as an annual review of acted-upon and missed alerts to facilitate lessons learned and continuous improvement of continental early warning architecture.

19. Subsequently, at its 1320th meeting held on 16 December 2025 on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Security Outlook in Africa, in a Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1320 (2025), particularly paragraph 12, the PSC reiterated its request to the AUC, in collaboration with the AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, and APRM, to introduce and institutionalize a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the Council through Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025) of 27 August 2025. The Council emphasized that the tool should strengthen its capacity to undertake early warning for early action and enhance conflict prevention efforts across the continent.

20. The Council further called for strengthened collaboration between the African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), including harmonized methodologies, interoperable data systems, joint analysis, and routine information exchange in order to improve the operational effectiveness of the CEWS, particularly with respect to information collection, analysis, and data-sharing mechanisms.

21. Furthermore, the Council directed the AUCTC, CISSA, and AFRIPOL to submit regular horizon-scanning briefings to the PSC covering emerging and escalating risks, indicators requiring preventive action, cross-border contagion dynamics, and scenario-based options requiring the guidance and consideration of the Council. These directives underscore the importance of integrated risk analysis, enhanced strategic foresight, and coordinated early warning mechanisms to support timely preventive action and informed decision-making by the PSC and other AU organs.

22. On 16 April 2026, through Memorandum Ref. No. CPAPS/B3/367.26, H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for PAPS, established a Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising representatives from the PAPS Department (PSC Secretariat, CEWS, Office of CPAPS, and Regional Desk) and relevant AU institutions and specialized bodies comprising of AUCTC, AFRIPOL, APRM and CISSA to work out the mapping tool on threats and risks to peace and security in Africa.

IV. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS

23. The TWG convened three meetings, which culminated in the development of the Unified Threat Assessment Template and the proposed framework for the Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool. The meetings provided a platform for technical deliberations, exchange of expertise, and the consolidation of perspectives from the participating AU institutions.

24. The first meeting of the TWG was held on 28 April 2026 and focused on launching the coordination process for the development of the continental risk and threat assessment template and

the associated risk mapping tool. The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss the mandate arising from the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, agree on the scope and objectives of the initiative, and outline the methodology and work plan for the TWG.

25. During the meeting, participants deliberated on the scope and expected deliverables of the assignment and agreed on the development of a conceptual framework and a prototype of the Continental Risk Mapping and Threat Assessment Tool rather than a fully operational system. The meeting further reviewed existing risk assessment methodologies, analytical tools, and indicators currently utilized by the participating institutions. Participants emphasized the importance of identifying areas of complementarity, avoiding duplication of efforts, and exploring opportunities for the integration and harmonization of existing frameworks and analytical approaches, while preserving the comparative advantages and mandates of the participating institutions.

26. On 06 May 2026, TWG convened its second meeting as a follow-up to the inaugural session held on 28 April 2026. The meeting focused on the review of existing threat assessment templates, data collection tools, and risk mapping indicators utilized across various AU institutions and relevant entities.

27. The session provided an opportunity for participating institutions to present their respective methodologies, indicators, and analytical frameworks relating to early warning, risk assessment, threat analysis, and security monitoring. Discussions focused on identifying common indicators, assessing complementarities among existing tools, and exploring opportunities for harmonization and integration within the proposed Continental Risk Mapping and Threat Assessment Framework.

28. The meeting further examined potential thematic areas and categories of risks and threats to be incorporated into the continental framework, including armed conflict, terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crime, cyber threats, public health emergencies, environmental and climate-induced disasters, governance deficits, electoral risks, human rights concerns, constitutional crises, and other emerging threats affecting peace and security on the continent.

29. On 26 June 2026, the TWG convened its third meeting to review and validate the proposed harmonized methodology for the collection, analysis, and reporting of security-related data across Africa. The meeting represented the culmination of the technical consultations and focused on consolidating the various proposals and analytical frameworks developed during the previous sessions.

30. The TWG reviewed and agreed on the proposed harmonized methodology for data collection on peace and security issues across the continent, including common data collection and collation indicators covering the various categories of risks and threats. The meeting further examined and endorsed a Unified Threat Assessment Template designed to serve as the principal analytical framework for generating standardized assessments and feeding information into the proposed Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool.

31. In addition, the TWG considered and agreed on the proposed risk scoring index and assessment matrix, including the methodology for risk classification, prioritization, and the assignment of threat levels. The meeting also reviewed the indicators and thresholds for early

warning reporting to facilitate timely identification of emerging risks, support evidence-based analysis, and strengthen early warning for early action.

32. The outcomes of the third meeting provided the technical basis for the development of the prototype Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool and the associated analytical framework intended to support the PSC, AU organs, the AUC leadership, Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in monitoring, assessing, and responding to emerging and evolving threats to peace and security across the continent.

V. EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL THREAT TEMPLATES, RISK INDICATORS AND DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

33. As part of the TWG's efforts to develop a harmonized Continental Risk Mapping and Threat Assessment Framework, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, and Situation Room (PAPS) submitted their existing threat assessment templates, risk indicators, analytical methodologies, and data collection tools. This offered an opportunity to examine the various approaches currently employed across AU institutions in monitoring, assessing, and reporting risks and threats to peace and security. It also demonstrated significant complementarities among existing institutional methodologies while highlighting opportunities for harmonization without replacing specialized institutional mandates.

34. AUCTC: The AUCTC uses a robust CT data collection workflow that follows a recognizable intelligence cycle: collection, validation, processing, storage, analysis, intelligence production, and dissemination. The workflow includes mapping, trend analysis, and threat assessment rather than relying solely on incident counting. The Centre currently uses the African Media Monitor (AMM) for OSINT information and relies on a host of networks across the continent, including national and regional focal points, to ensure source credibility, information reliability, and data validity. It also uses other operational tools, including GIS and QGIS, for the risk mapping of incidents.

35. The centre's data collection and processing are limited to only Terrorism and Violent Extremism Incidents. The AUCTC uses the African Media Monitor (AMM) for OSINT incidents collection and supplemented by other armed conflict databases that the centre has subscribed to. AUCTC holds the Africa Terrorism Database which stores terrorism and violent extremism incidents, terrorist groups and their structure, as well as individuals involved in acts of terrorism. Below are the Data Collection Indicators.

36. AFRIPOL. The AFRIPOL Risk Indicators Framework is a well-structured proposal for integrating law enforcement and criminal intelligence into the African Union's Dynamic Continental Risks and Threats Mapping Tool. Rather than simply mapping threats, it seeks to transform operational police intelligence into early warning, risk scoring, and actionable decision support. The framework provides a clear and standardized indicator architecture, integrates policing with continental early warning systems, thereby aligning operational intelligence with strategic AU decision-making. The framework identifies the major criminal-security ecosystems within AFRIPOL's mandate as terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crime, financial crime, and cybercrime. AFRIPOL's incident collection

and analytical processes are primarily informed by data and intelligence provided by Member States through operational activities, case feedback mechanisms, threat intelligence exchanges, law enforcement cooperation channels, and direct submissions from National Central Bureaus, National Focal Points, and competent law enforcement authorities.

37. To complement these primary sources, AFRIPOL utilizes secondary data obtained from recognized conflict, security, and event-monitoring databases, including platforms such as GDELT and ACLED, as well as open-source intelligence (OSINT) derived from analytical products, assessments, and published reports produced by strategic partners and international organizations, including INTERPOL, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the African Union, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). In addition, AFRIPOL incorporates third-party incident reporting derived from reputable news agencies and media monitoring services to corroborate and validate information obtained from primary and secondary sources. This multi-source approach enhances situational awareness, strengthens analytical rigor, and supports the production of evidence-based criminal intelligence assessments and strategic threat analyses. The indicators used by AFRIPOL for incident collection are presented below.

38. CEWS Situation Room: The CEWS Situation Room within PAPS submitted a comprehensive and methodologically robust framework for Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Its principal strength lies in integrating field observations, open-source intelligence, and structural risk indicators to support preventive action. Although it lacks key threat areas such as cyber threats, AI-enabled information operations, and more explicit predictive methodologies, the framework remains a valuable foundation for conflict early warning, which could be strengthened if adapted to contemporary technological and geopolitical realities. One of the strongest features of CEWS is that it rejects the idea that conflict is driven solely by security issues. Instead, the framework assesses conflict risk across 19 thematic baskets, with the understanding that violence emerges through interactions among governance deficit, socio-economic stress, identity politics, environmental pressures, and security dynamics. The CEWS framework is designed to support conflict prevention through a multidimensional assessment of structural, proximate, and triggering factors. It combines structural vulnerability analysis, field reporting, media monitoring, and analytical forecasting to support preventive action rather than merely documenting security incidents.

39. The CEWS Situation Room uses customized tools for data collection from various sources. These tools include the Africa Reporter, Africa Media Monitor, and Africa Prospects. The Africa Reporter facilitates structured reporting from civil society organizations and other field-based networks, thereby complementing open-source monitoring with verified field observations by facilitating the submission of incident and situation reports from the field. The Africa Media Monitor tracks over 700 categories and more than 50,000 keywords, automating data gathering and analysis from online sources and subscribed news wires. Africa Prospects, however, is designed to forecast the risk propensity or vulnerability of countries to violent conflict with respect to structural influences and constraints. While CEWS maintains a database for storing its early warning products, it currently does not have a database for storing collected incidents that would allow for the quantitative monitoring of armed conflicts.

40. CISSA: CISSA's Continental Risk and Threat Indicators Framework capture risks across the security/political, socio-economic, environmental, and health domains, thereby providing a broad and multidimensional continental perspective on emerging risks and threats. The framework distinguishes between hazards/threats, vulnerabilities, and coping capacity, allowing for a more comprehensive assessment of both the drivers of insecurity and the resilience of affected states and communities. This approach enables the framework to assess not only the existence of threats but also the conditions that increase susceptibility to risks and the capacity of institutions and societies to respond effectively. Consequently, it offers valuable insights into the interconnected nature of security challenges across the continent.

41. However, the framework does not adequately address cybersecurity and emerging technologies as distinct areas of risk. This omission represents an important gap, given the growing influence of digital technologies on peace, security, governance, and socio-economic stability. The cyber domain has become increasingly significant, as cyber incidents now have direct implications for national security, governance systems, economic stability, critical infrastructure, and public trust. Furthermore, the rapid advancement of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and digital information platforms, presents new risks associated with disinformation, cybercrime, malicious cyber activities, and the exploitation of digital technologies by criminal and extremist actors. Incorporating cybersecurity and emerging technology indicators into the framework would therefore strengthen its relevance and enhance its ability to respond to contemporary and evolving threats facing the continent.

42. APRM: APRM indicated that its early warning framework is still under development and is expected to be validated in 2026, with the full set of indicators to be presented following the validation process and subsequent adoption by the Member States of the Mechanism.

Table 1: Terrorism and Violent Extremism Data Collection Indicators – AUCTC

What	When	Where	Who	How	Why	Impact	Source	Confidence
• Type of attack • IED • Armed assault • Kidnapping • Arson • Assassination • Sabotage • Suicide attack • Cyber attack • Propaganda event	• Date • Time • Duration • Season • Holiday • Election period • Religious event	• Country • Region • District • Village • GPS coordinates • Critical infrastructure • Border proximity • Urban/Rural	• Victims • Perpetrators • Affiliated group • Leader • Support network • Nationality • Age • Gender • Occupation	• Weapons • Explosives • Vehicles • Communication methods • Entry routes • Escape routes • Tactics • Target selection	• Ideology • Political objective • Religious motive • Ethnic motive • Retaliation • Economic motive • Recruitment • Propaganda • Unknown	• Fatalities • Injuries • Hostages • Property damage • Economic impact • Psychological impact • Operational disruption	• Media • Police • Military • Witness • NGO • Hospital • Community • Social media • Multiple independent confirmations	• High • Medium • Low • Unknown

Table 2: Incidents Collection Indicators- AFRIPOL

Focus Area	Core Indicator	Location	Time period	Source type	Confidence
Terrorism and Violent Extremism	• Incidents & operational activity • Recruitment & propaganda • Weapons, explosives & logistics • Financing & facilitation	• Country • Border zone • Corridor • Port • Airport or • Online space	• Weekly • Monthly • Quarterly • Event-based	• Police report • Seizure data, • FIU referral, • Cyber alert, • OSINT, • Partner alert	• Low • Medium • High
Organized Crime	• Routes & criminal corridors • Criminal markets & illicit economies • Network sophistication • Violence & intimidation				
Financial Crime	• Illicit financial flows & laundering • Terrorist & conflict financing • Fraud & cyber-enabled financial crime • Asset recovery & prosecution gaps				
Cybercrime	• Cyber incidents & attacks • Critical infrastructure targeting • Online fraud infrastructure • Exploitation & extremism online				

Table 3: Indicators Basket for Data Collection – CEWS Situation Room PAPS

Thematic Baskets	Indicator Event Type for Africa Reporter	Indicators Categories for Africa Media Monitor	Indicator Datasets for Africa Prospects
• Agriculture • Demography • Economy • Education • Humanitarian Emergencies • Environment • Gender • Governance • Health • Human Rights • Infrastructure • International Relations • Labour • Natural Resources • Military • Peace Support • Politics • Security • Society	• Armed attacks • Assassinations • Suicide attacks • Kidnappings • Demonstrations • Riots • Boycotts • Gender violence • Banditry • Human trafficking • Natural disasters • Disease outbreaks • Political polarization • Election intimidation • Hate speech • Terrorism • Food security • Humanitarian crises • Natural disasters • Gender issues • Communicable diseases	• Deep-rooted or antagonistic political polarization • COVID-19 • Gender Peace and Security • Human Rights • Natural Disasters • Man Made Disasters • Terrorist Attack • Communicable Diseases • Conflict • Development • Food Security and Aid • Society • Ecology • Humanitarian Aid • Political Unrest • Security • Countries • RECs/RMs • African Union focus areas	• World Bank • Freedom House • Fund for Peace • Mo Ibrahim Foundation • Transparency International • V-Dem Institute • United Nations • Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research • Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies • Global Terrorism Database

Table 4: Continental Risk and Threat Indicators - CISSA

Risk/Threat Type	Indicators		
	Hazards	Vulnerabilities	Coping Capacity
Security/ Political	Presence and activities of armed/TOC groups, humanitarian crises Occurrence of politically motivated violence, civil unrest/armed confrontations	Institutional fragility, conflict intensity	Institutional stability Regime and institutional legitimacy
Socio-Economic	Economic (In)Stability	GDP, inflation and unemployment variability	Institutional regulatory capability; infrastructure robustness
Environmental	Climate-induced disasters – flooding, heat stress, drought, famine Environmentally-induced threats to livelihoods and assets – wildfire	Food and water insecurity, wildfire exposure and extreme fire danger	Policy and institutional mitigating frameworks
Health	Mortality rate, Life Expectancy, Doctor-to-patient ratio	Infectious disease outbreak and spread, environmental pollution	Institutional availability/stability Capacity to detect, assess, report, and respond to outbreaks

VI. PROPOSED UNIFIED CONTINENTAL THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

43. Duplication, fragmentation, uneven methodologies, and ineffective coordination exist among the various AU entities that are expected to work together to ensure the effectiveness of the CEWS. AUCTC focuses on one security issue, AFRIPOL assesses four security issues, CISSA tracks four threat types, and CEWS monitors 19 baskets of threats. While institutional mandates differ, existing AU mechanisms provide complementary analytical perspectives that can be integrated within a common continental early warning architecture.

44. In addition, the PSC, at its 1233rd meeting at the ministerial level on "New Security Threats in Africa and the Future of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union," held on 25 September 2024 in New York, United States of America, identified ten composite threats that should guide continental monitoring, early warning, and preventive action by the African Union. Specifically, paragraph 1 of Communiqué, PSC/MIN/COMM.1233.2 (2024), expressed deep concern that Africa continues to battle a myriad of threats, both new, emerging, and pervasive, to peace, security, and stability.

45. Table 5, containing the various Threat Types currently being assessed by the different institutions, is therefore harmonized. The Threat Types contained in Table 6 are now proposed as the harmonised Threat Types. Table 7 and Table 8 are proposed as data collection indicators for the various threat types.

Table 5: Threat Types Currently Assessed by AU Institutions

AUCTC	AFRIPOL	CEWS	CISSA	PSC 10 COMPOSITE THREAT
Terrorism and Violent Extremism	Terrorism and Violent Extremism, Financial crime, cybercrime, organized crime	• Agriculture • Demography • Economy • Education • Humanitarian Emergencies • Environment • Gender • Governance • Health • Human Rights • Infrastructure • International Relations • Labour • Natural Resources • Military • Peace Support	• Security/ Political, • Socio-Economic, Environmental, and Health	• Exponential growth of terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organized crime, especially human trafficking and the proliferation of weapons, as well as maritime Insecurity/piracy; Unprecedented Inter-State tensions and disputes; Renewed cold war-like geopolitical and ideological competition; • Governance deficit; Resurgence of UCG; • Youth Restiveness resulting from political exclusion and structural unemployment; Post Covid-19 Pandemic cascading effects of economic crises and unsustainable external debts; Prolonged Humanitarian crises, forced displacement and the

		• Politics • Security • Society		weaponization of sexual/gender-based violence; • Acute competition for natural resources and climate Insecurity as threat-multiplier; and, New technologies and cybersecurity;
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Table 6: Proposed Harmonised Threat Types

No	Threat Type	Threat Indicators	Alignment with PSC 10 Composite Threats	Institutional Responsibility
1	Terrorism and Violent Extremism	• Growth of terrorism and violent extremism. • Expansion of extremist networks. • Cross-border terrorist activities. • Terrorist attack frequency • Sophistication of attacks and increased use of emerging technologies • Fatalities and casualties • Territorial control by armed groups • Recruitment trends	a) Exponential growth of terrorism, violent extremism, human trafficking, proliferation of weapons, maritime insecurity and piracy	Primary: AUCTC Collaborators: AFRIPOL, CISSA
2	Transnational Organized Crime	• Trafficking in persons. • Smuggling of migrants • Illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms. • Cybercrime • Corruption • Maritime insecurity and piracy. • Criminal-terrorist linkages. • Drug trafficking • Illegal mining and illicit trafficking in precious stones and minerals • Maritime piracy • Wildlife trafficking • Organized fraud		Primary: AFRIPOL Collaborators: AUCTC, CISSA

3	Inter and Intra State Armed Conflicts	• Interstate tensions and disputes. • Internal armed conflicts. • Geopolitical competition. • Escalation over borders • Forced displacement. • Conflict-related sexual violence. • Forced recruitment	b) Unprecedented inter-State tensions and disputes c) Renewed cold war-like geopolitical and ideological competition	Primary: CEWS Collaborators: CISSA
4	Governance and Political Instability	• Governance deficits. • Unconstitutional changes of government. • Political exclusion and Youth unrest. • Ideological polarization. • Corruption levels • Rule of law • Declining public trust in state institutions • Election-related tensions • Judicial independence • Occurrence of politically motivated violence • Civil unrest and Armed confrontations • Constitutional amendments affecting democratic governance • Electoral integrity • Civic space • Judicial independence • Political polarization • Disinformation	d) Governance deficit e) Resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government	Primary: CEWS Collaborators: APRM, CISSA
5	Youth restiveness resulting from political exclusion and	• Youth-led unrest • recruitment into violent extremist groups and associated tensions	f. Youth restiveness resulting from political exclusion and structural unemployment	Primary: CEWS

	structural unemployment	• youth exclusion from political activities • Hate Speech • Economic shocks and instability • Structural unemployment		Collaborators: AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, APRM
6	Economic and Financial Vulnerability	• Economic crises. • Debt vulnerabilities. • Structural unemployment. • Economic shocks. • Inflation • Food insecurity • Currency instability • Public debt sustainability	g) Post-COVID-19 economic crises and unsustainable external debts	Primary: APRM Collaborators: CISSA, CEWS
7	Public Health & Human Security Risks	• Humanitarian crises. • Public health emergencies. • Forced displacement. • Laboratory capacity • Disease surveillance systems • Emergency response capability • Vaccine availability and stock-outs • Health infrastructure resilience • Mortality rate and Life Expectancy • Doctor-to-patient ratio	h) Prolonged humanitarian crises, forced displacement, and weaponization of sexual and gender-based violence	Primary: CISSA Collaborators: CEWS
8	Environmental & Climate-Induced Disasters	• Resource competition. • Environmental degradation. • Climate-change as a threat multiplier	i) Competition for natural resources and climate change as threat multipliers	Primary: CISSA Collaborators: CEWS

		• Land degradation • Desertification and Coastal erosion • Resource competition • Environmental migration • Climate-induced disasters – flooding, heat stress, drought, famine • Environmentally-induced physical threats to livelihoods and assets – wildfire		
9	Cyber Insecurity, Misuse of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies	• Cybercrime. • Cybersecurity threats. • Malicious use of emerging technologies. • Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure • Ransomware incidents, Data breaches • Disinformation and influence operations • Digital infrastructure vulnerabilities • AI-enabled malicious activities • Use of emerging technologies by terrorist groups • AI-enabled disinformation • Deepfake campaigns • Election interference • Critical digital infrastructure disruption	j) New technologies and cybersecurity	Primary: AFRIPOL Collaborators: AUCTC, CISSA, CEWS
10	Mercenarism, external interference, foreign forces and foreign fighters	• Growing foreign interference • increased presence of foreign forces in African conflicts • Growing reliance by governments on foreign private or state-owned companies to recruit foreign fighters, and • Involvement of foreign mercenaries in internal conflicts. • Political instability and government destabilization	c) Renewed cold war-like geopolitical and ideological competition d) Governance deficit e) Resurgence of UCG	Primary: CEWS Collaborators: CISSA, AFRIPOL, AUCTC

		• Weakening of State institutions and governance • Threats to national sovereignty, • Undermining regional security cooperation and triggering proxy conflicts • Human rights violations • Increase dependency on foreign military assistance		
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Table 7: Proposed Harmonised Threat Types Data Collection Indicators

What	When	Where	Who	How	Why	Impact	Source	Confidence	Trend
• Type of attack target • Attack on critical infrastructure • Armed assault • Kidnapping • Arson • Assassination • Sabotage • Suicide attack • Cyber attack • Propaganda event	• Date • Time • Duration • Season • Holiday • Election period • Religious event	• Country • Region • District • Village • GPS coordinates • Critical infrastructure • Border proximity • Urban/Rural	• Victims • Perpetrators • Affiliated group • Leader • Support network • Nationality • Age • Gender • Occupation	• Weapons • Explosives • Vehicles • Communication methods • Entry routes • Escape routes • Tactics • IED • Suicide attack • Target selection	• Motivation • Objective • Ideological motivation • Political objective • Religious motivation • Ethnic motivation • Retaliation • Economic objective • Recruitment • Propaganda • Unknown	• Fatalities • Injuries • Hostages • Property and critical infrastructure damage • Population Displacement • Economic impact • Humanitarian and Psychological impact • Territorial Control Implication • Cross-border spillover • Operational disruption	• RECs/RMs • Established Media • Police • Military • Witness • Civil Society Organisations (CSO)/NGO • health authorities/Health institutions • Community • Social media • Multiple independent confirmations	• Very High • High • Medium • Low • Unknown	• Recurring/resurgin g • Escalatin g • De-escalatin g • Emerging • Cross-border/ regional

**This content is more suitable for Threat Types 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10. This will be enhanced to ensure adequate coverage for 4,5,6,7 and 8. The proposed indicators would be further expanded to adequately capture governance, socio-economic, humanitarian, environmental and structural conflict prevention dimensions.*

Table 8: Proposed Framework for Assessing Confidence Methodology

Source Reliability	Information Credibility	Information Validity		Collaboration Level		Timeliness	
		Validity	Justification	Level	Criteria	Level	Criteria
A – Completely reliable	1 – Confirmed by independent sources	1 – Confirmed / No doubt about accuracy:	Information is known personally to the source, Logical and consistent, and agrees with other available information.	5- Very High	Information independently confirmed by 3 or more reliable and independent sources or trusted partners.	5- Very High	Information received or updated within 24 hours
B – Usually reliable	2 – Probably true	2 – Probably true:	Information is known personally to the source but has not yet been fully confirmed, Appears logical and credible.	4-High	Information confirmed by 2 independent reliable sources or one highly authoritative source and one independent corroborating source.	4-High	Information received 1-3 days
C – Fairly reliable	3 – Possibly true	3 – Possibly true / Corroborated indirectly:	Information is not personally known to the source but is supported by other recorded information.	3- Moderate	Information supported by one reliable source with some indirect corroboration.	3- Moderate	Information received 5-7 days
D – Not usually reliable	4 – Doubtfully true	4 – Unconfirmed:	Information is not personally known to the source and cannot be independently corroborated.	2- low	Information comes from a single source with no independent corroboration, or corroboration comes from sources of questionable reliability.	2- low	Information is 8-30 days old
E – Unreliable	5 – Improbable			1- Very low	No corroboration. Information is isolated, contradictory, or based solely on unverified claims or rumors.	1- Very low	Information is more than 30 days old
F – Reliability cannot be judged	6 – Cannot be judged						

VII. CONTINENTAL RISKS MAPPING TOOL DEVELOPMENT

46. **THREAT ASSESSMENT:** Following data collection, validation, and processing, a threat assessment is conducted for each threat type by each of the AU institution with primary responsibility to identify threat actors, as well as their capabilities and intentions. The threat assessment is critical for determining the risk score required for the risk mapping tool. Vulnerabilities, impacts, targets, and coping mechanisms are all assessed during the threat assessment stage. Table 9 is proposed to serve as a guide for threat assessment across the ten (10) strategic threat types proposed.

47. **RISK ANALYSIS.** Risk Analysis for the mapping tool is done using a standardised risk matrix. The matrix combines impact (criticality), likelihood (probability), vulnerability, asset value (target) and capacity deficit. This ensures that countries with strong resilience mechanisms receive lower overall risk scores than countries facing the same threat but with weaker response capacity.

48. The basic formula for risk is **Likelihood x Impact**. This is the most widely used conceptual formula in determining risk and have remain the foundation for risk analysis. However, in **risk assessment frameworks**, especially in security, cybersecurity, disaster-risk, and counter-terrorism contexts, the formula can be expanded. This expansion helps to cater for other indicators that remain essential in ensuring a wholistic security risk and response mechanisms.

49. Therefore, Risk is also often expressed as a product of Vulnerability, Threat and Asset Value. Where threat is assessed separately as in the case of this framework (**See table 9**), the risk formula could exclude threat. Hence risk = **Vulnerability x Impact x Asset Value x Likelihood**. Risk do not exist in vacuum, as countries put in place measures to reduce risk.

50. The implication is that countries coping capability must be considered why determining their risk exposure. therefore, the risk is divided by the coping capability. A higher coping capability means that the same risk is likely to produce less severe impact. The Risk formula therefore becomes = **(Vulnerability x Impact x Asset Value x Likelihood)/ Coping Capability**.

51. In order to avoid division in the risk formula, the Coping Capability is converted to Capacity Deficit. This matters mathematically, as it makes the Capacity Deficit consistent with other risk factors. This also ensures that countries with strong resilience receive lower overall risk scores, prioritizing action where vulnerabilities are highest. **Capacity Deficit = 6- Coping Capability**. The Risk Score is therefore calculated using the formula: **Risk Score = Likelihood (L) x Impact (I) x Vulnerability (V) x Asset Value (A) x Capacity Deficit (C)**. A five-point Likert scale is used to determine each risk score indicator (See Table 10).

52. **RISK SCORING:** Each risk score indicator is weighted. The purpose of the weighting approach is to ensure that the Risk Score Model becomes more stable, easier to validate statistically, **and more suitable for dashboards and cross-country comparisons**. **Table 10** is proposed as the Risk Matrix with each risk score indicated and appropriately weighted. The Risk Score indicators multiplied by the weighted values then becomes the Weighted Risk Score. In weighting the risk score, Impact and Likelihood (Probability) are considered the

most important risk factors. They are therefore assigned the highest weight because the two directly determine the seriousness and consequence of adverse event.

Table 9: Standardized Metrics for the Risk Scoring

No	Indicator	Weight (%)	Meaning	Justification
1	Likelihood (L)	30%	Probability of occurrence.	Given equal weighting with impact because risk fundamentally depends on both probability and consequence.
2	Impact (I)	30%	Criticality of consequences	Giving this one of the highest weights reflects the fact that a low-frequency event can still constitute significant risk if its consequences are catastrophic
3	Vulnerability (V)	20%	Existing weaknesses.	The weight recognizes its importance without allowing vulnerability to overwhelm likelihood and impact.
4	Asset Value (A)	10%	Target importance.	Asset value is intended to be a contextual modifier, rather than the principal determinant of risk.
5	Capacity Deficit (C)	10%	Lack of coping ability.	Capacity Deficit captures the gap in the ability to prevent, absorb, respond to and recover from the risk. The weight is appropriate without unnecessarily reducing risk profile

53. **ANALYTICAL MODEL:** The Weighted Risk Score Formula becomes:

$$\text{Weighted Risk Score} = 0.3(L) + 0.3 (I) + 0.2 (V) + 0.1 (A) + 0.1 (C)$$

The value of the Weighted Risk Score ranges from 1-5 and can be converted to Risk Index (0-100) by the Formula:

$$\text{Risk Index} = (\text{Weighted Risk Score Value} - \text{Minimum Weighted Risk Value}) / \text{Maximum Weighted Risk Value} - \text{Minimum Weighted Risk Value} \times 100$$

$$\text{Risk Index} = (\text{Weighted Risk Score} - 1) / 4 \times 100$$

54. Let for instance determine a risk score for a country on the threat of Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Let assume the likelihood an attack is 4, impact of the attack when it happens is determined to be 3, the vulnerability is determined to be 5, the asset value is 3 and the Capacity Deficit of the country is 3.

$$\text{Weighted Risk Score} = 0.3(4) + 0.3 (3) + 0.2 (5) + 0.1 (3) + 0.1 (3)$$

$$\text{Weighted Risk Score} = 1.2 + 0.9 + 1 + 0.3 + 0.3$$

$$\text{Weighted Risk Score} = 3.7 \approx 4$$

$$\text{Risk Index} = (3.7-1)/4*100$$

$$\text{Risk Index} = (2.7/4)*100$$

$$\text{Risk Index} = 67.5\%$$

So, for this scenario, the risk score is approximately 4, and the Risk Index is between 61-80% indicating the risk is Significant, a serious risk that require high alert priority action.

Table 10: Proposed Threat Assessment Template

Threat Type	Threat Actor	Actor Capability	Vulnerability	Target/Asset Value	Likelihood	Impact	Coping Capability
Terrorism and Violent Extremism							
Transnational Organized Crime							
Inter and Intra State Armed Conflicts							
Governance and Political Instability							
Youth restiveness resulting from political exclusion and structural unemployment							
Economic and Financial Vulnerability							
Public Health & Human Security Risks							
Environmental & Climate-Induced Disasters							
Cyber Insecurity, Misuse of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies							
Mercenarism, external interference, foreign forces and foreign fighters							

Table 11: Proposed Risk Matrix

Likelihood (Probability)	Impact (Criticality)	Vulnerability	Asset Value	Coping Capability	Capacity Deficit	Indicator Weight
5 – Highly Likely	5- Very High	5- Very High	5- Very High	5- Very Strong	1- Very Low	0.3= Likelihood
4- Likely	4- High	4- High	4- High	4- Strong	2- Low	0.3= Impact
3- Unlikely	3- Moderate	3- Medium	3- Moderate	3- Moderate	3- Medium	0.2= Vulnerability
2- Highly Unlikely	2- Minor	2- Low	2- Minor	2- Weak	4- High	0.1= Asset Value
1- Uncertain	1- Low	1- Very Low	1- Low	1- Very Weak	5- Very High	0.1= Capacity Deficit

Table 12: Proposed Continental Threshold for Early Warning for Early Action

Weighted Risk Score	Risk Index (100%)	Risk Level	Alignment with AU Trigger Model	Meaning of Risk Level	Priority Action
1-2	0-40	Minimal	Minimal	Limited risk. The threat may occur but is unlikely to cause significant disruption.	Monitor, Verify and report
3	41-60	Elevated	Elevated	Noticeable risk. The threat is credible and could cause operational or localized impacts.	Early Warning Alert
4	61-80	Significant	Significant	Serious risk. The threat is likely or imminent and could cause major disruption, casualties, or economic losses.	High Alert
5	81-100	Critical	Critical	Extreme risk. The threat is imminent or ongoing and could have catastrophic consequences.	Escalate

Table 13: Proposed Color Coding for Continental Risk Mapping Tool


Weighted Risk Score	Risk Index (100%)	Risk Level	Color	Hex Code	Sample Color	Meaning
1-2	0-40	Minimal	Yellow	#FFD966		Minor concerns
3	41-60	Elevated	Orange	#F4B183		Elevated risk
4	61-80	Significant	Red	#FF0000		Serious risk
5	81-100	Critical	Dark Red	#8B0000		Extreme or imminent threat.




VIII. PROTOTYPE DYNAMIC CONTINENTAL RISK MAPPING TOOL


Table 14: Sample Country Risk Level Across All Threat Type

No	Threat Type	Risk Level			
		Minimal Moderate	Elevated	Significant	Critical
1	Terrorism and Violent Extremism				
2	Transnational Organized Crime				
3	Inter and Intra State Armed Conflicts				
4	Governance and Political Instability				
5	Youth Restiveness from Political Exclusion and Structural Unemployment				
6	Economic and Financial Vulnerability				
7	Public Health & Human Security Risks (PHHS)				
8	Environmental & Climate-Induced Disasters				
9	Cyber Insecurity, Misuse of Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies				
10	Mercenarism, external interference, foreign forces and foreign fighters				
Overall Country Risk Level Across All Threat Domains					

Dashboard of A Sample Continental Threat Mapping







IX. IMPLEMENTATION AND NEXT STEPS

55. The PSC should consider this report as Phase I of the implementation process of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and request the AUC, through PAPS, to initiate next Phases, consisting of the institutionalization, operationalization, piloting, and gradual deployment of the Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool in support of the Continental Early Warning System and the operationalization of Early Warning for Early Response. Table 14 provides for the next step of operationalisation.

Table 15: Implementation and Operationalisation of the Risks Mapping Tool.

Phase	Activity	Activity Description	Timeline
Phase I	TWG conceptual framework and prototype	This report effectively provides for the initial phase of the implementation of continental risk mapping tool	Completed
Phase II	PSC consideration and adoption by Committee of Experts (CoE) and PSC Ambassadors of the proposed prototype framework	The immediate next step is for the PSC to consider the report and its recommendations including endorsing the nine harmonized threat categories, approve the proposed risk methodology, early warning thresholds, and color-coded risk system and direct the AUC to operationalize the Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool.	Q3 2026
Phase III	Establish permanent inter-agency mechanism	The current TWG should be transformed into a permanent AUC mechanism for continental threat assessment and risks mapping. Membership is suggested to include, AUCTC, CEWS, AFRIPOL, CISSA, APRM, Africa CDC, PAPS, and other relevant AU bodies. Its mandate expected to include quarterly risk assessments, continental security outlook reports, methodology review, indicator updates, and validation of risk scores.	Q3 2026
Phase IV	Develop SOPs and data-sharing protocols	The TWG identified the existence of fragmentation and duplication among existing AU institutions with CEWS mandate. It is recommended for the leadership of PAPS to task the TWG to develop information-sharing protocols, data classification guidelines, source validation standards, analytical standards, early warning alert issuance procedures, and institutional roles and responsibilities. This will help operationalize the CEWS principle of Early Warning for Early Action.	Q4 2026
Phase V	Build digital platform and dashboard	The current report provides threat categories, indicators, risk matrix, scoring methodology, thresholds for early warning trigger, and a prototype dashboard. This is just the first phase. After developing SOPs and protocols, the next technical step is therefore the development of the actual platform, including central database, dashboard, GIS interface, country profiles, automated risk scoring, alert generation, heat maps, and trend analysis. This could initially be developed using low-cost technologies such as, QGIS, ArcGIS, Power BI, or	Q1 2027

Phase	Activity	Activity Description	Timeline
		Tableau before moving toward a fully integrated system.	
Phase VI	Pilot implementation	Rather than one time implementation of continent-wide risk mapping immediately, a pilot phase is recommended. Possible pilot regions could include The Central Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, and Coastal West Africa. This would help validation of the proposed methodology through testing indicators, validating risk scores, modifying and adjusting methodologies.	Q2 2027
Phase VII	Continental rollout	The effectiveness of the risk mapping tool will largely depend on the quality of analysis. The report repeatedly identifies uneven analytical methodologies across AU institutions. The TWG is recommending to PAPS leadership to immediately implement a continental Early Warning Analyst Development Programme for institutions composing the TWG. The programme could cover analytic tradecraft, structured analytical techniques, intelligence analysis, leveraging low-cost OSINT tools and technologies for structured analysis.	Q3 2027
Phase VIII	Periodic PSC reporting and annual review	The proposed Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool are envisioned to support monthly horizon scanning reports, quarterly continental risk outlooks, annual continental security assessments, PSC briefings, AUC Chairperson's strategic early warning products. These products would provide the PSC with a consolidated security picture rather than multiple disconnected reports. However, effective implementation would require dedicated budget lines, technical personnel, software and infrastructure, training resources, and data-sharing arrangements. The PSC could therefore request the AUC to prepare a resource mobilization strategy and annual budget allocation for the operationalisation of the tool.	Continuous

X. CONCLUSION

56. Africa's evolving peace and security environment is characterized by increasingly interconnected, transnational, and multidimensional threats that transcend traditional security boundaries. Terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crime, armed conflicts, governance challenges, economic instability, public health emergencies, climate-induced disasters, and cyber threats continue to interact in complex ways, requiring integrated and coordinated approaches to early warning and early response (EWER).

57. The work undertaken by the Technical Working Group has demonstrated that significant analytical capacities, risk indicators, and data collection methodologies already exist within various African Union institutions. However, these capacities remain fragmented, characterized by duplication of efforts, uneven methodologies, and limited coordination among institutions mandated to support the Continental Early Warning System. The absence of a harmonized framework has limited the ability of the African Union to produce a consolidated continental security outlook and to operationalize early warning for early action.

58. The proposed Unified Continental Threat Assessment Framework, harmonized threat categories, standardized data collection indicators, risk scoring methodology, and early warning thresholds provide an important foundation for the development of a Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool. The proposed framework seeks to integrate the comparative advantages of the AUCTC, CEWS, AFRIPOL, CISSA, APRM, and other relevant institutions into a common analytical architecture capable of supporting evidence-based decision-making.

59. The Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool will strengthen the capacity of the Peace and Security Council, the African Union Commission, Member States, Regional Economic Communities, and Regional Mechanisms to identify emerging risks, monitor evolving threats, undertake strategic foresight, and support timely preventive, diplomatic, security, and stabilization responses. Its successful operationalization will require sustained institutional collaboration, information sharing, harmonized methodologies, and adequate technical and financial support.

60. The report therefore provides a technical foundation for the implementation of the decisions of the Peace and Security Council regarding the establishment and institutionalization of a dynamic and continuously updated continental risks and threats mapping tool in support of early warning for early action.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS

61. The Technical Working Group (TWG) recommends that the PSC adopt and institutionalize the proposed nine harmonized continental threat categories as the common analytical framework for the Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool and for continental early warning reporting.

62. The AUC through the PAPS Department should convert the TWG into a permanent Inter-Agency Security and Risk Assessment Working Group composed of AUCTC, CEWS, AFRIPOL, CISSA, APRM, and other relevant AU entities to coordinate risk analysis, share

information, conduct joint assessments, and produce periodic continental threat outlook reports.

63. The AUC should facilitate interoperable data-sharing among AU institutions by leveraging existing CEWS platforms, including the Africa Media Monitor, Africa Reporter, Africa Prospects, and other approved analytical systems, while also strengthening information exchange with RECs/RMs, AU Liaison Offices, Member States, and other authorized partners.

64. The AUC should develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and information-sharing protocols to clarify institutional roles and responsibilities, strengthen coordination mechanisms, and establish clear reporting lines for early warning alerts.

65. The PAPS should expand the TWG in line with the recommendation in paragraph 56 to include additional specialized institutions, particularly Africa CDC, AfCFTA, NEPAD and relevant environmental and climate institutions, in order to strengthen the assessment of public health emergencies, climate-induced disasters, environmental threats, and other emerging security challenges.

66. The PSC may request the AUC to mobilize the necessary technical, financial, and technological resources to support the development and operationalization of the Dynamic Continental Risk Mapping Tool, including the establishment of an integrated database, geospatial mapping capabilities, automated data collection systems, and analytical dashboards to support decision-making by the Peace and Security Council.

67. The PSC may request the AUC, through PAPS Department, to mobilize and make funds available to conduct technical training of Analysts to strengthen analytical capacities across the AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, APRM, CEWS, and other relevant AU entities. Such support should facilitate regular training programmes for analysts on intelligence analysis and analytic tradecraft, structured analytical techniques, strategic foresight, horizon scanning, and the effective use of low-cost open-source intelligence and analytical tools. Strengthening these capacities will enhance the quality, timeliness, and consistency of continental risk assessments and support the regular production of early warning and horizon-scanning reports for the Council.