



## JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

## SIXTEENTH ANNUAL JOINT CONSULTATIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE AND THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL BRUSSELS, 9 OCTOBER 2025

- 1. The European Union Political and Security Committee (EU PSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) held their sixteenth (16<sup>th</sup>) Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in Brussels on 9 October 2025. The meeting was preceded by the eighth (8<sup>th</sup>) EU-AU PSC Joint Retreat that focused on Peace Support Operations, maritime security and hybrid threats.
- 2. H.E. Ambassador Delphine Pronk, Permanent Chair of the European Union Political and Security Committee, co-chaired the meeting with H.E. Ambassador Tebelelo Alfred Boang, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Botswana to the African Union and PSC Chairperson for October 2025. Also in attendance were H.E. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and H.E. Patricia Llombart, EEAS Managing-Director for Africa.
- 3. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *appreciated* the regular convening of PSC to PSC consultations and underscored the importance of these exchanges as a valuable platform to reinforce dialogue and cooperation between the AU PSC and EU PSC.
- 4. Both sides *underscored* their strong belief in effective multilateral cooperation and in the need to reform international institutions to collectively address shared global challenges. They *reaffirmed* their unwavering commitment to act in accordance with international law, with the Charter of the United Nations and its Purposes and Principles at its core, including the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the prohibition of the threat, or use, of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state, as stated in the Joint Communique adopted at the 3<sup>rd</sup> EU-AU Ministerial Meeting on 21 May 2025.
- 5. Both parties *reiterated* their support to a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the occupied Palestinian Territory, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel and in other major wars and conflicts around the globe, including Syria.
- 6. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *commended* the joint EU-AU efforts for a peaceful and stable African continent, including EU support to the African Peace and Security Architecture, EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) engagements, EU support through the European Peace Facility, and cooperation and technical assistance on peace and security matters. They also *welcomed* the financial contributions to AU-led peace efforts made by the AU Peace Fund.
- 7. Both parties *reiterated* their support to the use of UNSC Resolution 2719 on access to UN-assessed contributions. They *emphasised* that maritime security remains high in their priorities. Safeguarding free passage through critical waterways is essential for international shipping. They also *expressed deep concern* over new security threats.
- 8. Both parties *held extensive discussions* on the situation in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia and Sudan, the situation in the Great Lakes Region, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.



- 9. On **Somalia**, the EU PSC and the AU PSC *expressed grave concern* over the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the region. The EU PSC and AU PSC *paid* tribute to the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Troop/Police-contributing countries (T/PCCs), and Somali Security Forces for their enduring commitment and sacrifices; and *expressed* condolences to the families of the AUSSOM personnel who have paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace and stability in Somalia and wished speedy recovery to the wounded. They commended all the TCCs who have deployed additional troops on a bilateral basis to address the prevailing security situation in Somalia.
- 10. **Both sides** *welcomed* the launch of the AUSSOM and *encouraged* the AU to fully deploy its new mission, completing the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM. They noted that AUSSOM is critical for the peace, security and stability in Somalia and stressed that without adequate, predictable and sustainable funding including the provision of sufficient force multipliers and enablers, the Mission may have major difficulties executing its mandate. They *reiterated* the call for diversification of support by international partners in order to guarantee the long-term financial stability of the mission and to ensure the effective implementation of its mandate, as illustrated at the High-level AUSSOM financing event on 25 September 2025. In this regard, both sides *welcomed* the AU contribution to the financing of AUSSOM, the pledges made by both traditional and non-traditional donors at the said High-Level financing Event held on 25 September 2025 in New York, and the EU's commitment to support the Mission. In this regard, the AU PSC applauded the EU for the long-standing support to the peace and security of Somalia.
- 11. The two sides *underlined* that Article 24 of the Charter of the UN accords the UNSC the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security; in this regard, they *stressed* the need to fully and effectively implement UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) to ensure predictable, sustainable and adequate financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations including AUSSOM as the only viable way of securing the gains that have been made so far.
- 12. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *reaffirmed* their strong commitment and support for Somalia's political, economic and security transition as well as preserving Somalia's unity, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. They *encouraged* the Federal Government of Somalia to continue working towards political inclusivity in Somalia, including in strengthening its relationship with the Federal Member States through the National Consultative Council, and to advance the ongoing electoral process with a view to holding successful general elections in 2026. In addition, they *underscored* the importance of sustained and coordinated capacity building support to the Somali Defence and Security Forces.
- 13. **On the situation in Sudan**, the EU PSC and the AU PSC *reaffirmed* their strong commitment to respect the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Sudan.
- 14. Both sides *expressed deep concern* over the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). They *called on* the belligerent parties to immediately cease hostilities and establish a sustainable, permanent ceasefire to return to negotiations followed by an inclusive national dialogue and political transition. They further urged the parties to establish a humanitarian truce to allow for humanitarian access and protection of civilians, so as to provide relief to the population in need.
- 15. They **strongly condemned** the indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population, including the extensive use of force, sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children. They also **expressed grave concern** over the proliferation of weapons, looting of humanitarian supplies, attacks against humanitarian personnel, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals,

schools and power stations. They *called* for the full implementation of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians and *warned* that the perpetrators will be held accountable.

- 16. Both sides *expressed grave concern* over the dire and deteriorating humanitarian situation across Sudan. They *called on* all parties to end all obstruction to humanitarian assistance and *demanded* the RSF halt the siege of El-Fasher. They *appealed* to the international community to expedite availing the funds pledged during the Geneva, Paris and London Conferences. They *recognised* the impact of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan on its neighbouring countries. They *appreciated* the immense efforts of neighbouring states hosting large numbers of Sudanese refugees, and *welcomed* the significant regional support provided by the EU and its Member States. They welcomed the High-Level Humanitarian Conference for the People of Sudan held on 14 February 2025 on the margins of the 38<sup>th</sup> Assembly of the African Union Heads of the State and Government, held in February 2025.
- 17. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *welcomed* the engagements of the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), neighbouring countries and the EU, notably the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, as well as the efforts exerted by the Quad to end the conflict in Sudan. Both sides expressed concern over the lack of coordination between the multiple peace initiatives on Sudan. In this regard, they *called for* the reinvigoration of the central role of the AU in the peace efforts towards a viable, inclusive and lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan. They *welcomed* the outcome of the High-Level Ministerial meeting on Joint Efforts for De-escalation in Sudan co-chaired by the EU, the AU, DE, FR and UK on 25 September 2025.
- 18. The EU PSC and the AU PSC **strongly condemned** all forms of external interference by state and non-state actors in Sudan which is fuelling the Sudanese conflict in flagrant violation of UNSC resolutions in particular Resolution 1556 (2004) and **called on** all responsible actors to cease doing so immediately and that all actors including state and nonstate entities cease all military and financial support to the warring parties.
- 19. **On the Great Lakes Region**, both sides *reaffirmed* the imperative obligations to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC towards resolving the long-lasting conflict in the country. They *expressed grave concern* over the military operations and territorial expansion by the March 23 Movement (M23), which exacerbated insecurity and the humanitarian crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); in this regard, they called for the dismantlement of the so called "parallel administration" by the rebel Movement of M23.
- 20. They *strongly condemned* the M23 and other armed groups, notably the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), and the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), for their destabilisation activities and human rights abuses. They *called for* the armed groups to immediately cease hostilities and for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw in line with UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025). They *called for* all Congolese armed groups to participate in the Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS) and international partners to provide the necessary support for the efficient implementation of P-DDRCS.
- 21. They **strongly condemned** all attacks against the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) as well as the use of heavy weapons in the vicinity of UN peacekeepers' bases. They **called upon** all parties to allow MONUSCO freedom of movement.
- 22. Both sides *applauded* the AU, the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for having jointly established an African-led framework for resolving

the security crisis in eastern DRC. They **welcomed** the efforts deployed by the AU Mediator and Facilitators, as well as by the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region.

- 23. The EU PSC and the AU PSC **noted** the peace agreement signed by the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025 in Washington, including its provision to neutralize the FDLR and to withdraw Rwanda's "defensive measures". They urged all parties involved to respect the ceasefire agreement. They furthermore **noted** the ongoing efforts by Qatar to mediate between the M23 and the DRC, and called on all parties to continue earnest negotiations and accelerate the implementation of their commitments in the Peace Agreement.
- 24. The EU PSC and the AU PSC **stressed** the need for continued political processes to address the root causes of conflict in the region. They **recognised** the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as conflict drivers.
- 25. The EU PSC and the AU PSC condemned the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in eastern DRC, and *urged* all companies operating in the mining sector, including importers, processing industries, commodity traders and consumers of the Congolese mineral products to exercise due diligence, including by implementing regional mechanisms such as the ICGLR regional certification mechanism; and *highlighted* the importance of promoting regional economic integration, including but not limited to projects such as the Lobito Corridor.
- 26. They *expressed concern* over the dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC. They emphasised the importance of sustained international humanitarian assistance. They *urged* all parties to allow and facilitate full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access.
- 27. **On the Sahel**, the EU PSC and the AU PSC *expressed concern* about the myriad threats to the security situation and its destabilizing effects on neighbouring coastal countries, and reiterated their commitment to remain engaged and coordinated in facing those threats together
- 28. Both sides **strongly condemned** all terrorist attacks, particularly those targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, and **expressed** the need for accountability for any violations. They **underlined** the importance of sustained efforts to comprehensively address the structural root causes and drivers of insecurity in the region.
- 29. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *expressed* deep *concern* over the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government and attempted coups d'état in the Sahel. They *emphasised* the importance of supporting countries that are taking concrete and tangible steps towards democratic transition.
- 30. Both sides *expressed concern* over the illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) into the region and *called for* concerted efforts to curb the illicit flow of SALW including through the provision of the requisite capacity building for countries in the region to enable them to curb the illicit flow of SALW. They furthermore *underscored* the importance of fighting against the supply of sophisticated weapons to terrorist groups and financing terrorism, including illicit financial flows and exploitation of natural resources that facilitates the proliferation of SALW in the region, through targeted and coordinated actions aimed at preventing, tracing, recovering and ensuring the return of proceeds of illicit financial flows to countries of origin.
- 31. In this regard, they **welcomed** the non-binding guiding principles on preventing, detecting and disrupting the using of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes as adopted by the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee in January 2025.

- 32. They also *raised concern* about the destabilizing presence of transnational criminal organisations, mercenaries and irregular private military companies connected to the third states and the spill-over of insecurity towards West African coastal countries.
- 33. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *expressed grave concern* about the worsening humanitarian situation across the Sahel region. They *recalled* the need for full, safe, rapid and unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian aid to all persons in need.
- 34. They *underscored* the need for enhanced coordination of collective efforts in the region, including with ECOWAS. They *encouraged* the promotion of dialogue, information and intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations.
- 35. Both parties *encouraged* coordination and cooperation between the Special Envoys to the region to facilitate international efforts aimed at establishing peace, security, stability and sustainable development in the region. In this regard, they *welcomed* the recent appointments of the Special Envoy of the African Union for the Sahel region, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) and the EU Special Representative for the Sahel.
- 36. They **strongly condemned** all terrorist attacks and **commended** regional mechanisms and initiatives established to address security challenges, particularly sub-regional security arrangements, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).
- 37. The EU PSC and the AU PSC **welcomed** the EU long-standing support to MNJTF and **appealed** to partners and other stakeholders to enhance their support to the mission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. In this regard, they **welcomed** the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Development Programme and the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
- 38. Both parties *emphasized* their commitments to break the cycle of violence in the African continent and *reiterated* their pledges to support efforts in the area of Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) to maintain sustainable peace and security. In this context they applauded the role of the AU PCRD centre.
- 39. **On Lake Chad Basin**, the EU PSC and the AU PSC *expressed concern* over the insecurity in the region, mainly due to the terrorist attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups; and *expressed deep concern* about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin region. They *underscored* the need to combine political dialogue with socio-economic development, community-based initiatives, and climate resilience.
- 40. They **commended** the significant progress in the implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR) and **expressed gratitude** to the EU for its continued support over the years. They **committed** to pursuing their efforts to expedite the full and successful implementation of the strategy; Furthermore, they **appealed** to the international community to further increase its multifaceted support in this regard.
- 41. The EU PSC and AU PSC *expressed concern over* the harmful and devastating effects of climate change, including in the Sahel region and Lake Chad Basin region, linked amongst other things to desertification and the drying of Lake Chad.

- 42. They *emphasised* the importance of close collaboration between the AU, UN, and its agencies, as well as all regional mechanisms in West Africa and the Sahel.
- 43. Both sides had an informal exchange on Women Peace and Security in the context of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000). The EU PSC and the AU PSC *reaffirmed* their commitment to advancing women's leadership and participation in peacebuilding efforts.
- 44. The EU PSC and the AU PSC *agreed* to convene their 9<sup>th</sup> Informal Joint Retreat and the 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa on dates to be jointly agreed by the two sides in due course. They *welcomed* the outcome of the EU-AU Ministerial meeting on 21 May in Brussels and *renewed* their commitment to conducting the EU-AU Summit on 24-25 November in Luanda.