

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

June, 2026

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
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THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In June, under the chairship of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, standing in for the Republic of Sierra-Leone, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [Provisional Programme of Work](#) (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering five agenda items. Following the revision of the PPoW, three substantive sessions took place, covering four agenda items. Out of the four agenda items, only one focused on a country-specific issue, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All the substantive sessions during the month were held at the level of ambassadors.



Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent two revisions. The first revision saw the postponement of a session on the 'Situation in Guinea,' from 3 to 4 June and the removal of a session of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC, planned for 5 June, to prepare for the Joint Consultative

Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS MSC. The next revision moved the date of the 'Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC' from 11-12 June to 30 June and postponed the 'Induction of the Military Staff Committee' from 15-16 June to 29-30 June. Moreover, a session with two agenda items, 'Briefing on the 10-Year CSVRA Review' and 'Update on Compliance and Accountability Framework', was brought forward to 12 June from the initial schedule of 30 June.

The second revision, on the other hand, saw the session on the 'Situation in Guinea,' which had already been moved from 3 June to 4 June, postponed to a later date. Following this, the session on the 10-Year CSVRA Review and the Compliance and Accountability Framework update, which had been set for 12 June, was removed from the PPoW altogether. It was later reinstated, however, to take place on 25 June.

It is worth noting that, as of the drafting of this edition of the Monthly Digest, only three communiqués had been released following those PSC engagements.

PSC GREENLIGHTS TABLING OF AN AU DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FOR THE LUANDA SUMMIT

The first session of the PSC during the month was convened on 2 June 2026, as its 1350th meeting, dedicated to the theme of 'Refugees, IDPs and Humanitarian assistance in Africa.' The session reviewed the state of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian assistance in Africa, drawing on assessments from relevant AU organs and perspectives shared by AU member states, Regional Economic Communities, and representatives

of the wider humanitarian community.¹ The meeting culminated in the adoption of a [Communiqué](#).



Figure 1: 1350th Meeting of the PSC on refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and humanitarian assistance in Africa, held on 2 June 2026
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#)).

Apart from the symbolic value, both the deliberation and the outcome of the session hardly carry much **new** substantive content. Thus, the words that dominate the outcome document include ‘deep concern,’ ‘appeals,’ ‘urges,’ ‘condemns,’ calls upon or ‘reiterates.’

Apart from the fact that the briefings revealed some of the concrete interventions of the AU, including the solidarity missions and the symbolic monetary provisions for affected or host countries, one of the symbolically significant aspects of the session was the fact that it put a spotlight on the growing humanitarian crisis. The AU Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development told the PSC that ‘humanitarian needs and forced displacement are increasing in

¹ The Council received briefings from the AU Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, the Acting Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees, IDPs and Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), alongside interventions from AU member states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), international organisations and humanitarian partners.

scale, complexity and duration,’ with data highlighting the scale of the crisis. In addition to expressing deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation, the PSC also admitted the grim reality that Africa is host to ‘majority of humanitarian and economic needs emanating from forced displacement, including refugees.’

Echoing previous sessions on the theme, the statements and the deliberation during the session and the outcome, without specifying how and AU’s role, focused on normative language on what needs to be done, highlighting both early warning, prevention and preparedness on the one hand and the response dimension of the equation to addressing the crisis. The need for strengthening capacities for anticipating and preventing humanitarian crises, including through strengthening early warning and disaster risk reduction mechanisms.

Humanitarian financing emerged as the dominant theme of the deliberations, with briefers warning that shrinking international assistance is increasingly accelerating existing constraints and thereby limiting efforts to ensure food security, health services, protection programmes and prospects for durable solutions. As the AU Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development told the PSC during her briefing at the session, ‘of the estimated eleven billion United States Dollars (USD 11 billion) required for humanitarian response plans in Africa, less than 27 per cent was funded. While underscoring the need for adequate, flexible and sustainable funding, the PSC affirmed the centrality of ‘international cooperation’ and ‘more equitable sharing of burden’ and ‘responsibility.’ In this context, in addition to calling on donors to provide additional support, the PSC, cognizant of the increasing need for increased responsibility,

reiterated its request for the AU to expedite the study on humanitarian financing and to present concrete proposals for sustainable and predictable funding. Cognizant of the contribution of climate change to the humanitarian crisis in Africa, the PSC called for enhanced efforts for mobilisation and access to climate finance, although it did not attach this to the loss and damage fund, immediately relevant for the humanitarian impacts of climate change.

Rather than advancing concrete directions on domestic resource mobilisation, innovative financing or private-sector engagement, the PSC again limited itself to urging the AU Commission to expedite the already requested study on humanitarian financing. Given the scale of the financing crisis, the Council could have gone further by providing political guidance for the study and requesting an accompanying implementation roadmap for its recommendations.

Another central theme in both the discussions and the Communiqué was the recognition that humanitarian crises cannot be solved by relief alone. Most briefers stressed that displacement is increasingly protracted, requiring links between humanitarian action, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. The Communiqué reflects this by emphasising the humanitarian ,development, peace nexus and urging efforts to tackle structural drivers such as poor governance, lack of economic opportunity, and weak resilience.

The outcome document also placed particular emphasis on strengthening the AU's humanitarian architecture. In addition to reaffirming support for the African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), the Council welcomed the newly established African Humanitarian Coordination Platform and

its 2026-2027 Joint Implementation Plan, encouraged increased contributions to African financing instruments such as the Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF), Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) and the Continental Mechanism of Civil Capacity for Disaster Preparedness and Response (3CMDPR), and called for closer coordination among AU institutions and humanitarian actors. These decisions indicate a recognition that strengthening Africa's own institutional capacity is indispensable at a time when international humanitarian financing is becoming increasingly unpredictable. Yet the Communiqué offers little indication of how these institutions will move from political endorsement to operational delivery.

With regard to normative frameworks and the protection of civilians, the Council, in addition to reaffirming the need for full compliance with international humanitarian and human rights, condemned violence, exploitation, trafficking and abuse against refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups. Most notably, the PSC acknowledged Sierra Leone's initiative, in concert with the ICRC, as highlighted in the ICRC's briefing, to develop an AU Declaration on Strengthening International Humanitarian Law and encouraged the AU Commission to submit the draft for consideration at the August 2026 Extrordinary AU Summit in Luanda. This represents a willingness on the part of the PSC to inject high-level political support for reaffirming commitment to IHL and strengthening the AU's normative architecture in a time of major regression, as documented [here](#).

It is worth noting that, beyond the elements captured in the PSC communiqué, there were some themes highlighted during the session that did not find their way into the outcome document. Most notably, the discussions highlighted the

growing risk of extremist recruitment and radicalisation within displacement settings, the importance of accountability and transparency in humanitarian financing, the integration of refugees and IDPs into national development planning, the challenge of statelessness, and broader migration governance issues such as trafficking, border management and labour mobility. Several delegations also drew attention to foreign interference and geopolitical competition as factors exacerbating conflict and displacement. The omission of some of these issues matters because these issues go directly to the evolving nature of displacement and the refugee crisis in Africa.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Reiterated the request for the AU Commission to expedite the study on humanitarian financing and to present concrete proposals for sustainable and predictable funding mechanisms.
- Requested the AU Commission, working in collaboration with relevant AU organs, RECs/RMs and partners, to continue supporting Member States in implementing continental development, integration, humanitarian and human mobility and displacement-related frameworks and to provide regular updates to the Council on the humanitarian situation across the Continent.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Open Session on Refugees, IDPs and Humanitarian Assistance in Africa, Insights on the PSC](#), 2 June 2026.
- [Briefing by the ICRC on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa, Insights on the PSC](#), 23 October 2025.

- [Open Session on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa, Insights on the PSC](#), 30 June 2025.
- [75th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: Preserving Our Common Humanity in a Time of Major Crises of Compliance](#), Policy Brief, 7 April 2025.

PSC BLAMES INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION AND EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE FOR STALLING LIBYA'S TRANSITION

On 9 June 2026, the PSC convened its 1351st session to get an update on the 'Situation in Libya.'² The outcome of the session was adopted as a [communiqué](#).³




Figure 2: 1351st Meeting of the PSC on an 'Update on the Situation in Libya,' 9 June 2026.
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The session built on its previous one, the [1291st Meeting](#) held in July 2025 at the Summit level, marking one of the nearly thirty sessions the PSC has held since it was seized of the situation in Libya in [February 2011](#)³ (as

² Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU, as the Stand-In Chairperson of the PSC for June 2026, made the opening remarks followed by a briefing by Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Libya. Statements were further delivered by the representatives of the State of Libya, a representative of the Republic of Congo as the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Libya.

³ The 1291st Meeting held in July 2025 was the

highlighted in an [infographic](#) prepared for the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to this session).

From the outcome document of the 1351st session, it can be discerned that the peace process and the transition in Libya remain stalled with marginal progress and incidents of regression. The outcome document reveals two major factors, along with a thriving shadow economy, behind the stalled peace process and transition in Libya.

The first of these factors is the political rivalry among Libyan political actors that sustains the institutional fragmentation, pitting the internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli, against the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, based in Eastern Libya. Thus, the PSC called on 'all Libyan stakeholders to jettison their personal ambitions, refrain from actions and statements that could escalate tension' and emphasised the need for 'national cohesion,' 'the reunification of the Libyan defence and security institutions under legitimate civilian authority' and 'unification of all state institutions. It was also in this context that the PSC welcomed both 'the signature, on 11 April 2026, of the agreement on a unified budget by representatives of the High Council of State (HCS) and the House of Representatives (HoR) under the auspices of the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL)' and the joint military exercise of 15 March 2026 in Sirte that brought together military personnel from the West and the East of the country.'

The other major factor identified in the PSC session was external interference. The PSC accordingly expressed its 'strong rejection'

first time since the PSC's 294th session in September 2011 that Libya was discussed at the level of Heads of State and Government.

of 'any form of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Libya' and urged 'all external parties to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Libya.'

There were two notable new elements in the PSC session on the situation in Libya. The first is the attention given to the shadow economy, fueling the internal and external rivalry and the economic situation in Libya. Expressing concern over 'illicit fuel exports and the erosion of frozen Libyan assets due to mismanagement,' the PSC called for 'the establishment of an accountable and transparent mechanism to be entrusted with the management of the country's economy.' It also emphasised 'the need for preventing any misuse of Libya's frozen assets as well as ensuring proper use of the unfrozen assets.' The outcome document also highlights how the shadow economy involving illicit fuel exports, proliferation of illicit weapons, trafficking networks, and transnational organised crime and the protracted political and security crisis in Libya reinforce each other.

The second relatively new element relates to the role of the AU and specifically its office for Libya. First, the PSC decided that the relocation of the AU office should happen no later than the end of 2027. Second, the PSC tasked 'the next session of the Joint Sitting of the Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative matters (GSCBFAM) and the Technical Experts of the Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15) to ensure that this issue is budgeted for.' Further on the role of the AU, in addition to welcoming the 'adoption of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation,' — which was earlier [welcomed](#) by the AUC Chairperson — and encouraging 'all parties yet to do so to sign and implement it,' the PSC welcomed the '[Report of the UN Support Office for Libya](#)' and called for enhanced collaboration

between the AU, the UN and other partners accompanying the peace process.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1291st PSC Session [[PSC/HoSG/COMM.1291 \(2025\)](#)] held on 24 July 2025:

The PSC:

- Tasked the AU Commission to continue to provide political support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to fully implement the cease-fire agreement.
- Reiterated its decision to undertake a Field Mission to Libya.
- Requested the AU, UN and EU to re-activate the Tripartite Task Force on migration.
- Tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission (again) to appoint a Special Envoy on Migration to coordinate migration issues on the continent.
- Tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to accelerate the implementation of Assembly Decision 815 adopted by the Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in February 2022, in Addis Ababa, regarding the relocation of the AU Liaison Office to Tripoli.

1280th PSC Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1280 \(2025\)](#)] held on 23 May 2025:

The PSC:

- Reiterated the decision to undertake a Field Mission to Libya to enable the PSC to interact with various stakeholders on the ground.
- Requested the AU Commission, based on the security situation on the ground, to accelerate the relocation of the AU Liaison Office to Tripoli, in accordance with Decision 815 of the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in February 2022.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Called for the establishment of an accountable and transparent mechanism to be entrusted with the management of the country's economy, in response to the economic challenges facing Libya.
- Requested the AU, UN and the EU to work together, including to reactivate the Tripartite Task Force on migration, and taking into consideration the seriousness of the issue of migration in Africa.
- Reiterated its previous requests, Chairperson of the Commission, subject to the availability of resources, to appoint a Special Envoy on Migration.
- Reiterated the decision to undertake a Field Mission to Libya.
- Tasked the AU Commission, in particular the Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs, and Social Development, to liaise with partners to provide humanitarian support to the country and all migrants in vulnerable situations in Libya.
- Reiterated the request for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure the relocation of the AU Liaison Office to Tripoli, not later than the end of 2027 and requested the next session of the Joint Sitting of the Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative matters (GSCBFAM) and the Technical Experts of the Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15) to ensure that this issue is budgeted for.

From an analytical perspective, this communiqué and the 1291st Meeting of July 2025 [communiqué](#) read almost entirely side by side. The two communiqués illustrate a

pattern common to protracted AU peace processes: the repetition of near-identical language and demands across successive sessions, with only marginal indicators of forward motion. Several action items, including the Field Mission to Libya, the relocation of the AU Liaison Office to Tripoli, the appointment of a Special Envoy on Migration, and full implementation of the Reconciliation Charter, appear in both texts as unfulfilled requests, suggesting both a lack of AU Commission follow-through and the absence of a more effective strategy capable of shaping the political and security trajectory of Libya in a fragmented geopolitical landscape involving intense external rivalry over and interference in Libya.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on the Situation in Libya, Insights on the PSC](#), 8 June 2026.
- [AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya, Insights on the PSC](#), 23 July 2025.

THE 10-YEAR CSVRA REVIEW

On 25 June 2026, the PSC held its third substantive session, its 1352nd meeting, covering two agenda items. The first was a 'Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.'




Figure 3: 1352nd Meeting of the PSC on the '10-Year Review of CSVRA,' 25 June 2026.
(Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

This session builds on the PSC's [1251st session](#), held on 17 December 2024, in which it tasked the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to the threats to peace and security.

Although this 1352nd session's outcome document was not yet available at the time of this publication, updates shared via the [X account](#) of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) indicate that the meeting aimed to review the progress on the 10-Year CSVRA and its accompanying mitigation strategies. In doing so, the PSC took the opportunity to commend Member States, RECs/RMs and partners, including the APRM, Germany, UNDP and ACCORD, for their support in this regard.

The AU has, over the years, built up a suite of normative and policy tools aimed at preventing conflict before it takes root. Chief among these is the APRM, which has proven effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities among AU Member States. Complementing this, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) has given rise to instruments designed to flag a country's structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage, most notably the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and its accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).

As captured in our [analysis](#) of this session, as well as our [previous analysis](#) providing further background on CEWS and the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) and its tools — the CSVRA and CSVMS — the CSVRA was developed following the PSC's [360th session](#) in March 2013, and sits within the broader CSCPF, a Commission-wide, coordinated approach to identifying and addressing

structural weaknesses before they escalate into violent conflict.

The PSC's [1251st](#) session of December 2024 tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the APRM, 'to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVMS into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.' It further urged the AU Commission 'to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval,' which eventually led to the AU Commission being assigned to 'undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS.'

Further updates of the 1352nd session shared via the [X account](#) indicate that over the past decade, the AU's CSCP has strengthened Africa's shift from reactive conflict management to proactive prevention, with five Member States, namely Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, Malawi and Kenya, having voluntarily completed or advanced the CSVRA/CSVMS process. Council noted that key achievements have included stronger national ownership, country-specific mitigation strategies, enhanced peace infrastructures, deeper AU–Member State engagement, and greater recognition of resilience factors in preventing conflict.

Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for PAPS, highlighted the importance of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework, noting that conflict prevention remains the AU's most effective investment in peace and stability, and remains key to addressing the root causes of conflict across Africa. The PSC Chairperson, Nasir Aminu, on

the other hand, emphasised that stronger coordination among the AU institutions, the RECs/RMs and Member States, coupled with national ownership, is essential to identifying and addressing structural vulnerabilities early and advancing a peaceful, secure and resilient Africa.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1251st PSC Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1251 \(2024\)](#)] held on 17 December 2024:

The PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake the following:

- Undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to the threats to peace and security.
- Establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.
- Establish a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the implementation of an early warning mechanism through existing tools.
- Mobilise sustainable funding, including through the Peace Fund, to support CSVRA/CSVMS processes, ensuring adequate resources to support Member States for stakeholder engagement and the effective implementation of identified mitigation strategies.
- Provide half-yearly reports on the implementation of the CSVRA and CSVMS to the Council and regular updates to the PSC on the progress made in the implementation of these decisions.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment \(CSVRA\) Review](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 24 June 2026.
- [Briefing on Enhancing the AU Continental Early Warning System \(CEWS\) and Early Action and Review of the CSVRA and CSVMS](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 16 December 2024.
- [Memo to the New AU Commission Leadership from the Roaring Guns on AU's First Decade of Silencing the Guns](#), *Special Research Report*, 15 October 2024.

THE PSC EMPHASISES FULL AU OWNERSHIP OF THE COMPLIANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK

On 25 June 2026, the PSC convened its 1352nd meeting, during which it considered an update on the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework as the second agenda item and subsequently adopted a [communiqué](#). The meeting took place against the backdrop of the launch of the next phase of the AU–EU–UN Tripartite Partnership Project on the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework for the period 2026-2030 and the upcoming review of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) in December, under which compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework is one of the operational necessities for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions.

The session provided the PSC with an opportunity to review the current status of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, assess progress made in strengthening and operationalising it,

and identify further measures required to consolidate and institutionalise the Framework. In this regard, the communiqué recognises that compliance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, and conduct and discipline standards is fundamental to the effectiveness, legitimacy, credibility, and sustainability of AU-led PSOs.

In addition to outlining a number of measures for the AU Commission to strengthen and further institutionalise the Framework—which are highlighted below under the section ‘Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up’—the communiqué requests the Commission to undertake periodic reviews of the implementation of the Framework and provide the PSC with regular updates on progress made, challenges encountered, lessons learned, and recommendations for further strengthening compliance and accountability within AU-led PSOs.

To promote greater institutional coherence and a more integrated approach within the AU, the communiqué also encourages the Commission to strengthen coordination between the Compliance and Accountability Framework and the AU’s broader human rights, governance, conduct and discipline, and civilian protection architectures.

Another notable outcome of the session is its emphasis on the need for the AU to assume full ownership of the Compliance and Accountability Framework. As highlighted in our [pre-session analysis](#), one of the principal challenges facing the Framework is its continued reliance on project-based support, which raises concerns regarding its long-term sustainability and institutional continuity. Our analysis observed that, ‘while external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the Framework, its long-term institutionalisation will require

predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity.’

Echoing this concern, the communiqué stresses the need to scale up the mobilisation of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financial resources and to explore practical options for mainstreaming the Framework’s activities into the regular programmes and budget of PAPS, thereby ensuring its sustainable implementation. The communiqué also encourages Member States to demonstrate greater ownership by strengthening national implementation and, where feasible, providing financial support.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC requested the Commission to:

- Further institutionalise the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework through effective dissemination, implementation, and monitoring of adopted policies, guidelines, tools, and operational mechanisms, both at the Headquarters and within AU-mandated and AU-authorized PSOs.
- Continue strengthening and expanding the normative and operational framework for compliance and accountability, including through the development and implementation of policies, guidelines, training programmes, and operational tools aimed at preventing, responding to, and addressing misconduct and violations of applicable legal and policy standards.
- Maximise the utilisation of the AU Case Management System (CMS) as a strategic tool for the registration, tracking, analysis, and management of compliance-related cases across PSOs, while continuing to further strengthen mission-level investigative and accountability capacities.

- Prioritise the operationalisation of the remedial pillar of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, including the development and implementation of policies, procedures, and mechanisms relating to victim assistance and support, protection of victims, witnesses, and whistle-blowers, reparative and compensation measures where appropriate, and initiatives aimed at restoring confidence and addressing reputational harm arising from misconduct or violations.
- Continue promoting the integration and mainstreaming of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, including but not limited to all the relevant AU organs, RECs/RMs, National Institutions, and Peace Support Operations.
- Explore practical options for mainstreaming the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework activities within the regular programmes and budget of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department to ensure predictable and sustainable implementation of the initiative.
- Develop a roadmap for the next phase of the implementation of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 24 June 2026.

THIRD ANNUAL JOINT CONSULTATIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE AU PSC AND ECOWAS MSC

On 30 June 2026, the PSC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council

(MSC) convened their Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. The joint outcome document, however, had not been published as of the time of drafting this segment.



Figure 4: Third Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, 30 June 2026, Abuja, Nigeria. (Source: X [@ecowas_cedeao](#))

Held under the theme ‘Deepening Regional Collaboration Towards Attaining More Effective Financing for Peace Support Operations in Africa,’ this year’s joint consultation brought together PSC members, members of the ECOWAS Permanent Representatives Committee and technical experts. It continued the mechanism [inaugurated](#) in April 2024 and renewed at the [second](#) annual meeting in May 2025.

It emerges from the available agenda that the discussion centred on four connected issues: the peace and security situation in West Africa, particularly terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and political transitions; more effective financing of peace support operations in the region; stronger coordination and coherence between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC within APSA and AGA; and implementation of commitments arising from the joint consultation process. Post-session [reporting](#) indicates that the meeting also reviewed emerging security threats and ongoing peace initiatives, explored practical measures for strengthening continental–

regional cooperation, and discussed sustainable financing and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023).

Amani Africa’s [insight](#) dedicated to the session stressed that the consultation needed to focus not only on identifying common priorities but also on advancing the implementation of the extensive commitments adopted at the previous meeting. These included sustained engagement with the AES countries, development of an AU–ECOWAS security-cooperation framework involving them, closer coordination between continental and regional early-warning systems, and operationalisation of the proposed counter-terrorism coordination platform and Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell. The meeting thus offered an opportunity to assess progress, address implementation gaps and translate previously agreed institutional arrangements into practical cooperation.

A notable development after the consultation was the acceleration of AU political outreach to the AES countries. This was most clearly reflected in AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf’s official visit to Bamako on 13 July, where he [met](#) Transitional President Assimi Goïta and reiterated AU support for counter-terrorism, stability, national cohesion and a return to constitutional order, stressing that terrorism ‘knows no borders’ and requires sustained collective action. He also [visited](#) the headquarters of the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), reaffirming support for its mandate to promote peace, dialogue, stability and sustainable development across the region. The outreach continued on 15 July through his [meeting](#) with Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister, Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré, where he conveyed AU support for efforts to restore peace and combat terrorism. It indicated that the AU High

Representative for the Sahel would pursue regional dialogue and cooperation.

On financing, available reporting indicates that the consultation emphasised sustainable, predictable and timely financing, stronger African ownership and increased mobilisation of continental resources. Ethiopia's delegation [described](#) Resolution 2719 as the most viable existing mechanism for achieving sustainable and predictable financing and called for its full implementation and stronger mobilisation of resources from within the continent. In a separate engagement with the AU PSC delegation following the consultation, Nigeria [highlighted](#) the ECOWAS Community Levy as a successful regional financing model and suggested that similar approaches could be adapted at the continental level. The urgency of reducing dependence on individual external partners was subsequently illustrated by the United States' [decision](#) not to support UNSOS beyond the end of 2026 and to oppose any renewal arrangement under which AUSSOM continued to receive UN logistical or operational support, thereby exposing the vulnerability of African-led missions to external financing decisions.

Resolution 2719 provides a framework for UN-assessed contributions to Security Council-authorized AU peace-support operations, but its application remains subject to case-by-case approval and requirements relating to planning, accountability, human-rights compliance and burden-sharing; it therefore may not automatically extend to every ECOWAS or other regional deployment. The MNJTF presents a potentially relevant test of the scope and adaptability of the Resolution 2719 framework. At its [1347th](#) meeting, the PSC requested the AU Commission to consult the A3 on the possible application of Resolution 2719 to the force's activities.

Subsequently, the [69th](#) Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority, held in Lungi, Sierra Leone, on 19 July, gave high-level political reinforcement to several issues reportedly considered during the consultation. The Authority endorsed a revised roadmap for activating the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Brigade; directed the ECOWAS Commission to deepen engagement with the AES countries towards establishing a pragmatic security-cooperation mechanism; and reiterated its call for a coherent and coordinated international response through the AU and UN Security Council, supported by UN-assessed contributions in line with Resolution 2719. Although the communiqué does not link these decisions formally to the 30 June consultation, their adoption 19 days later reinforces the policy relevance of its reported focus on terrorism, engagement with the AES, sustainable financing and AU–ECOWAS coordination.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

The **Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting** of the PSC and ECOWAS MSC:

- Underlined the urgent need for reviewing the existing AU instruments for the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa, including the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its 2004 Additional Protocol, as well as the 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa.
- Once again, agreed to urgently explore innovative ways and means of upscaling resource mobilisation from within the Continent, including through constructive engagements with the private sector, continental financial entities and philanthropists.

The **Inaugural Annual Joint Consultative Meeting** between the PSC and ECOWAS

MSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to finalise the conduct of the comprehensive study on the financing of terrorism in Africa, as requested by the Malabo Declaration.
- Agreed to urgently explore innovative means of internal resource mobilisation, including special levies and engagement with the private sector and continental financial entities.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 29 June 2026.
- [From estrangement to engagement: PSC and ECOWAS MSC call for a co-operation framework for engaging AES States](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 9 July 2025.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

Induction of the PSC Military Staff Committee

On 29 and 30 June, the PSC's subsidiary body, the Military Staff Committee (PSC MSC), travelled to Abuja, Nigeria, for an induction programme following their election to the PSC during the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2026.



Figure 5: 2026 Induction of the PSC Military Staff Committee.
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The two-day Induction/Orientation/Capacity-Building programme for the MSC comprised the Defence Advisors/Attaches of the fifteen Members of the PSC, namely: Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa and Uganda.

The Induction was officially opened by Air Vice Marshall I. Sani, on behalf of the Chief of Defence Staff of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Chaired by Brigadier General Abu Bakr Conteh, the Defence Advisor of Sierra Leone to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC MSC for June 2026.

The programme aimed to further strengthen the institutional capacity of the Committee to enable it to effectively discharge its mandate, which includes advising the PSC on all military and security matters or questions relating to the promotion of peace and security in Africa.



MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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