

MAPPING AFRICAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2002–2024)

**Key trends and implications for the
governance-peace-security nexus**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a comprehensive mapping and analytical review of fifteen peace agreements concluded in Africa between 2002 and 2024. Drawing from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, the United Nations (UN) Peacemaker Database, the Kroc Institute's Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), the African Transitional Justice Hub and other primary repositories, the study examines fifteen selected case studies across the continent's five sub-regions. The analysis applies a five-tier implementation measurement framework (IMF) adapted from the PAM coding scale and aligned with African Union (AU) governance benchmarks to assess the degree of implementation of peace agreement provisions.

Several overarching findings emerged from the analysis:

- i. Across the fifteen case studies, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and governance/institutional reform provisions appear with near-universal frequency, confirming that African peace agreements have progressively expanded beyond purely military ceasefires toward comprehensive political settlements.
- ii. The most commonly unimplemented provisions tend to be transitional justice, anti-corruption frameworks, natural resource governance and civilian oversight of security forces. These deficits can be attributed to a combination of elite political resistance, inadequate financial resourcing, capacity constraints and the absence of binding enforcement mechanisms.
- iii. Applying a five-tier ordinal IMF adapted from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies' PAM coding scale and calibrated against AU governance benchmarks, this report finds that across all fifteen cases, the dominant implementation level is 'minimal' to 'initiated', reflecting widespread partial or stalled implementation. Cases such as Mozambique's 2019 DDR agreement and Liberia's 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) are outliers of relatively 'successful' implementation in specific provisions, while other cases such as the Libyan Political Agreement, Central African Republic (CAR) Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR) and South Sudan's Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflicts in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) score 'uninitiated' or 'minimal' implementation across most governance benchmarks.
- iv. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) offers an under-utilised avenue for governance-centred peace implementation support. By potentially integrating peace agreement governance commitments into APRM country review processes, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) can strengthen the interlinkages between implementation monitoring and broader governance accountability architecture, while simultaneously enhancing the institutional and programmatic synergies between the AU's African Governance Architecture (AGA) and African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The report concludes with targeted policy recommendations addressed to the AU PSC, the APRM Continental Secretariat, and the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department. These recommendations are centred on mainstreaming AU governance benchmarks and measurable indicators at the agreement-design stage, strengthening implementation monitoring mechanisms, leveraging the APRM's country-level review capacity and deepening the peace-security-governance nexus at both continental and sub-regional levels.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission (South Sudan)
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACDEG	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007)
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces (DRC)
AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission (Sudan CPA)
AGA	African Governance Architecture
APPR	Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (2019)
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APP	African Peace Processes (dataset)
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CENI	Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (DRC Electoral Commission)
CMA	Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (Mali armed movement coalition)
CN-PDN	Contact National pour la Paix et la Réconciliation Nationale (Mozambique civil society monitoring body)
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (DRC armed group)
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPC	Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CAR armed coalition)
CSA	Comité de Suivi de l'Accord (Mali Algiers Accord monitoring committee)
CTSAMVM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (South Sudan)
CVJR	Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation (Mali)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011)
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces

ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
EUTM RCA	European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic
FACA	Forces Armées Centrafricaines (Central African Armed Forces)
FAMA	Forces Armées du Mali (Malian Armed Forces)
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (DRC armed group)
GNA	Government of National Accord (Libya, 2016–2021)
GNC	General National Congress (Libya)
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoNU	Government of National Unity (Sudan CPA)
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HCSS	Hybrid Court for South Sudan
HoR	House of Representatives (Libya)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INC	Interim National Constitution (Sudan, 2005)
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ITSCI	International Tin Supply Chain Initiative
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit (Sudan CPA — joint armed forces provision)
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LPDF	Libyan Political Dialogue Forum
LNA	Libyan National Army
LPA	Libyan Political Agreement / Skhirat Agreement (2015)
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
M23	Mouvement du 23 Mars (DRC armed group)
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
MINUSCA	Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Centrafrique
MINUSMA	Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (terminated 2023)

MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (2000–2010)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010–present)
MSU	African Union Mediation Support Unit
MVCM AU	Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission (Ethiopia)
NOC	National Oil Corporation (Libya)
NPC	National Petroleum Commission (Sudan CPA)
NUF	Necessary Unified Forces (South Sudan R-ARCSS)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OIF	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PA-X	Peace Agreements Database (University of Edinburgh)
PAM	Peace Accords Matrix (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies)
PAPS	Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (African Union)
PC	Presidential Council (Libya LPA)
PPS	Peace Process Secretariat
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
PSC	Peace and Security Council (African Union)
PSRP	Political Settlements Research Programme (University of Edinburgh)
PULP	Pretoria University Law Press (African Law Repository)
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (2018)
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (DRC armed group)
REC	Regional Economic Community
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
RJMEC	Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (South Sudan R-ARCSS)
RTGoNU	Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (South Sudan)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCC	Special Criminal Court (Central African Republic)
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army – In Opposition
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSOA	South Sudan Opposition Alliance
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front

TRHC	Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Commission (South Sudan R-ARCSS)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of acronyms	3
1. Introduction	8
2. Background and Context of the Peace Agreement Report	9
3. Research Plan and Conceptual Approach	9
3.1. Research Questions and Objectives	9
3.2. Research Design and Methodological Framework	10
3.3. Scope and Limitations	10
3.4. Case study selection	11
3.5. Structure of the report	13
4. Key Insights on Peace Agreement Design and Implementation	13
4.1. Types of Peace Agreements	13
4.2. Approaches to peace agreement implementation	14
4.3. Metrics of success: How do we measure peace beyond implementation?	15
4.4. Inclusion in peace processes	15
4.5. Regional organisations and peace agreement implementation in Africa	16
4.6. Peace-as-Governance	17
4.7. Key Research Projects and Databases	17
5. Analysis of African Peace Agreements (2002–2024)	18
5.1 Overview of general trends and patterns	19
5.2. Overview of implementation status	22
6. Analysis of selected case-studies	23
6.1. Key Areas of Convergence, Divergence, unimplemented provisions	23
6.2. Implementation Gaps Across Major Thematic Categories	25
7. Application of the Implementation Measurement Framework	26
7.1. Methodological note on Measuring Framework: Five-Tier Scale	26
7.2. Case study analysis	27
7.3. Cross-Case Analysis of the Implementation Measurement Framework	40
7.3.1. Structural and Governance Challenges at the Agreement Design Level	40
8. Deepening the Peace-Security-Governance Nexus	41
9. Policy recommendations	41
For the AU Peace and Security Council	41
For the APRM Continental Secretariat	42
For the AU PAPS Department	42
For RECs	43
10. Conclusion	43
References	44

1. INTRODUCTION

The African Union (AU) boasts a prolific and sophisticated array of institutional and normative policy frameworks geared towards addressing conflict and insecurity across various phases – across conflict prevention, management and resolution. Since its establishment in 2002, the AU, in partnership with the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as part of its peacemaking mandate, has viewed peace agreements as key instruments to conflict management and security governance. Over the subsequent two decades, the AU and RECs have mediated or endorsed a number of peace agreements across the continent, ranging from comprehensive political settlements to ceasefire frameworks, power-sharing arrangements, disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) protocols and transitional justice frameworks (Adetula et al. 2018, 3). Despite this normative and institutional output, the AU's aspiration of 'Silencing the Guns' by 2020 (later extended to 2030) remains largely unrealised. The scale of peace and security challenges on the continent, including persistent armed conflict, violent extremism, political fragmentation and large-scale humanitarian and displacement crises, starkly illustrates the gaps between the ambition to rid Africa of conflicts and the realities on the ground.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the AU's main vehicle for developing sustainable peace and security, while also acknowledging the nexus between peace, security, governance and development. As part of its mandate, APSA engages in a range of activities that include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support and post-conflict reconstruction and development. This sustainable peace architecture also includes enforcement and compliance of peace agreements as key instruments of its broader conflict management and resolution mandate. While much scholarly and policy work has focused on negotiation dynamics and substantive content of peace agreements, less attention has been paid to the critical aspects of implementation, particularly a systematic, cross-case analysis and mapping of implementation outcomes in Africa.

In addressing this research and knowledge gap, this research entails a mapping of peace agreements in Africa (since the formation of the AU in 2002). This research by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and supported by ACCORD, is a response to the AU Peace and Security Council's (PSC's) call (PSC Communiqué 1298 (2025) para. 13) for the APRM to support the PSC foundational governance pillars of peace by undertaking a technical mapping of all existing peace agreements, using AU governance benchmarks to identify convergences, divergences and unimplemented decisions as well as developing an action-orientated roadmap to address those issues for the consideration of the PSC.

Hence, in addition to linking peace agreement provisions to AU governance benchmarks, this research also highlights the potential role of the APRM as a verification mechanism in monitoring peace agreement implementation.

This systematic analysis allows for a deeper review of continental peacemaking efforts; a crucial undertaking particularly because peace agreements are commonly used modes of conflict management in Africa. Indeed, since 2002, the AU and RECs have engaged in various roles including mediation and facilitation, acting as guarantors and monitoring implementation in many of the over 300 peace agreements in Africa (Aeby 2022a). Yet, despite considerable effort in developing peacemaking capacity, including normative policy frameworks and mediation guidelines, the frequency of agreement collapses within the first year of signing suggests a tendency of non-compliance. Furthermore, the conceptualisation and understanding of peace, wherein peace is the absence of conflict, known as 'negative peace', has left the structural drivers of conflict largely unaddressed, breeding grievances and leading to future conflict (Adetula et al. 2018).

2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The core objective of this report is an evaluation and review of the inclusion and implementation of governance benchmarks in peace agreements, aimed at building on the knowledge base and bridging the gap between policy and practice by integrating cross-case empirical information with policy-relevant, thematic analysis.

In addition to the broader objectives relevant to political governance, peace and security, this mapping exercise is informed by a range of foundational normative frameworks, policy dialogues and initiatives, which all share the common agenda of fostering sustainable peace in Africa. These include, inter alia: the AU's Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC); APSA; the Agenda 2063 (Aspiration 4); the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2030; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; and the Revised AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy Framework, among others. In its pursuit of continental peace, security and developmental objectives, the AU also acknowledges the linkages between Agenda 2063 and the United Nations (UN) global agendas, namely, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs) and the UN Secretary-General's New Agenda for Peace (UN 2023). Indeed, the APRM (2019) notes that the AU's Agenda 2063 and the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development agenda are approximately 90% congruent in their strategic objectives. In a similar vein, the institutional synergy between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and APSA reaffirm peace, security, governance and development as mutually reinforcing imperatives (Ronceray et al. 2021).

Based on this holistic understanding of interrelated policy issue areas, with specific reference to directives outlined in PSC Communiqué 1298, the main objectives of this report are:

- i. To conduct a comprehensive mapping of peace agreements concluded in Africa since the formation of the AU in 2002, categorised by agreement type, conflict nature, geographic distribution and thematic content.
- ii. To identify key areas of convergence and divergence across these agreements, with particular focus on governance standards, institutional reforms and conflict resolution mechanisms.
- iii. To examine unimplemented or partially implemented provisions, applying a five-tier implementation measurement framework (IMF) gauged alongside AU governance benchmarks.
- iv. To formulate evidence-based policy recommendations for the AU PSC, APRM, the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department and other relevant continental institutions.

3. RESEARCH PLAN AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

3.1. Research questions and objectives

The research is guided by the following questions:

(i) Mapping and scope

Which thematic areas (e.g., governance, security sector reform, power-sharing, justice, DDR/security sector reform) are addressed most frequently in African peace agreements?

(ii) Convergence and divergence

- To what extent do peace agreements across Africa converge on governance standards, institutional reforms and conflict resolution mechanisms?
- What are the key divergences, and what political, regional or contextual factors explain them?

(iii) Implementation gaps

- Which provisions in peace agreements remain unimplemented or only partially implemented?
- What structural or governance challenges have contributed to these implementation gaps?

(iv) Governance benchmarks

- How can AU governance benchmarks be best applied to measure the effectiveness of peace agreements?
- What lessons can be learnt from agreements that have been successfully implemented?

(iv) Policy implications

- What role can the APRM play to support AU institutions in addressing the identified gaps?
- What concrete, action-oriented recommendations should be made to the AU PSC and other relevant continental institutions?
- How can this review contribute to strengthening the governance pillar of peace and enhancing the sustainability of peace processes in Africa?

3.2. Research design and methodological framework

This report employs a qualitative comparative research approach, combining extensive desk-top research with case study analysis and a structured comparative assessment. With respect to data collection, primary sources used included; agreement texts from data repositories such as PA-X, UN Peacemaker, the AU Peace Observatory and the African Transitional Justice Hub; AU and UN institutional documents; peer-reviewed academic literature; and reports by leading think tanks and non-governmental organisations. The analysis further incorporated insights from key informant interviews with AU officials and regional experts to contextualise the challenges and successes of peace agreement implementation.

The methodological framework also entailed thematic content analysis to categorise agreement provisions and identify recurring patterns, alongside a rigorous application of a five-tier IMF to quantify progress against established AU governance benchmarks. This also included qualitative comparative analysis to identify patterns of convergence and divergence across the selected peace agreements for detailed case study analysis.

3.3. Scope and limitations

The temporal scope of this report encompasses all major peace agreements signed following the formation of the AU in 2002. Geographically, the scope covers all five African sub-regions: Central, East, North, Southern and West Africa. This also corresponds with the AU's recognised RECs, allowing for analysis of the engagement of regional inter-governmental organisations in peace agreements.

Three main limitations of this study should be acknowledged. One, the desk-top research component of this study, which relies on publicly available information on peace agreement provisions and implementation, could potentially reflect asymmetries, particularly in contexts where there is limited access to official records or where ongoing conflict restricts comprehensive data collection. Two, a challenge of directly linking causality between specific agreement provisions and subsequent peace outcomes exists, due to the range of variables in a complex implementation context. Three, the focus on English-language source materials could potentially overlook some nuances or details in Francophone or Arabic-language agreements, although efforts were made to consult translated versions where available.

3.4. Case study selection

The selection of peace agreements for detailed case study analysis follows explicit criteria designed to ensure geographic diversity, conflict type variation and analytical depth, while acknowledging limitations of time and space in practically undertaking such a comprehensive review.

The case study selection criteria is as follows:

	Criteria	Explanation
1	Timeline	Agreements signed post-2002 (after the AU's formation); chronological mapping (dates of the agreement's signing, implementation and any subsequent violations or re-negotiations).
2	Geographical diversity	Cases come from different sub-regions to capture regional variations (Central, East, North, Southern and West Africa).
3	Conflict type	Includes regional, interstate and intrastate conflicts, with emphasis on intrastate conflicts, which are predominant in Africa.
4	Parties involved	State actors (government authorities), non-state actors (including civil society groups and private entities) and international organisations, (particularly the AU and RECs).
5	Agreement type	Comprehensive, ceasefire, power-sharing or sector-specific protocols on issues such as DDR, security sector reform/governance (SSR/G), transitional justice, reconciliation or gender.
6	AU governance benchmarks	Presence or absence of AU benchmarks in provisions (rule of law, human rights, power sharing, inclusive governance, natural resource management, anti-corruption).
7	Implementation mechanisms (Technical Oversight)	Presence or absence of mechanisms to monitor progress, resolve disputes, and keep the process on track (including monitoring bodies, steering capacity, political forums, peacekeeping operations, civil society engagement, mediator and guarantor support).
8	Implementation measurement	Presence or absence of specific tools or measurable benchmarks and indicators to track progress of governance commitments or provisions.
9	Significance and Impact	Landmark peace agreements with substantial impact on national and regional stability.
10	Availability of Documentation	Accessible primary sources (the texts of the agreements themselves), reputable secondary analyses and international data repositories (AU, African Transitional Justice Hub, PA-X, Peace Observatory, UN Peacemaker Database).

Applying the ten selection criteria to the African peace agreements signed between 2002 and 2024,¹ the following 15 cases were selected for inclusion in this report (listed in chronological order on date agreement was signed).

	Agreement	Sub-Region	Conflict Type	Agreement Type	Key Mediators/peace process
(i)	Burundi Arusha/Pretoria (2000/2003)	East	Intrastate	Comprehensive and Power-sharing	OAU/AU, South Africa
(ii)	DRC Global and Inclusive (2002)	Central	Intrastate	Comprehensive	AU, UN (MONUC)
(iii)	Liberia Accra CPA (2003)	West	Intrastate	Comprehensive	ECOWAS, AU, UN
(iv)	Sudan CPA (2005)	East	Intrastate	Comprehensive	IGAD, AU, UN
(v)	Madagascar SADC Roadmap	Southern	Intrastate	Framework/Power-sharing	SADC, AU, UN, OIF, IOC.
(vi)	Darfur DPA/DDPD (2006/2011)	East	Intrastate	Framework/Sector-specific	AU, UN, Arab League
(vii)	Mali Algiers Accord (2015)	West (Sahel)	Intrastate	Framework	Algeria, AU, UN, ECOWAS
(viii)	Libya LPA/Skhirat (2015)	North	Intrastate	Framework/Power-sharing	UNSMIL
(ix)	South Sudan R-ARCSS (2018)	East	Intrastate/power rivalry	Comprehensive	IGAD, AU, UN
(x)	CAR APPR (2019)	Central	Multi-actor intrastate	Comprehensive	AU, MINUSCA
(xi)	Mozambique RENAMO DDR (2019)	Southern	Intrastate (residual)	DDR/sector-specific	SADC, CNPD
(xii)	Juba Agreement – Sudan (2020)	East	Multi-actor intrastate	Comprehensive	Sudan, armed movements
(xiii)	Libya Ceasefire (2020)	North	Multi-actor/fragmented	Ceasefire and SSR	UNSMIL, Turkey, Russia
(xiv)	Nairobi Declaration – DRC/M23 (2022)	Central/East	Intrastate and regional	Ceasefire/Framework	EAC, ICGLR, AU
(xv)	Ethiopia Pretoria CoHA (2022)	East	Intrastate	Ceasefire/Framework	AU, IGAD, UN

¹ The referenced data repositories include: PA-X, UN Peacemaker, PULP African Law Repository, Peace Observatory, and African Transitional Justice Hub databases,

The selected cases cover all five AU-recognised sub-regions, include agreements of different types (comprehensive, ceasefire, power-sharing, sector-specific), involve diverse mediation architectures (AU-led, REC-led) and have a range of implementation outcomes.

3.5. Structure of the report

Following the introductory section, this report proceeds as follows: Section 4 reviews the current state of research on peace agreement implementation, including a typology of peace agreements and the factors and variables that shape implementation. It also provides an overview of global and regional databases that are enhancing the academic and policy research on peace agreements. Section 5 presents a thematic analysis of convergences, divergences and implementation gaps across the case studies. Section 6 applies the IMF across the case studies to assess the level of implementation of governance-related commitments. Section 7 delves into a cross-case analysis of the IMF, identifying patterns of implementation failure, enabling factors for progressive implementation and lessons for bolstering the peace-security-governance nexus. The final section outlines policy recommendations for the AU PSC, RECs, APRM Continental Secretariat, other relevant AU institutions and pivotal stakeholders.

4. KEY INSIGHTS INTO PEACE AGREEMENT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

4.1. Types of peace agreements

In contemporary scholarship and practice, a peace agreement is fundamentally defined as ‘arrangements entered into by warring parties to explicitly regulate or resolve their basic incompatibility’ (Wallenstein and Sollenberg, 1997). An expanded view conceives of peace agreements as ‘any textual instrument produced in a process aimed at ending or preventing armed conflict between two or more parties’. These may take the form of protocols, memoranda, principles, ceasefire arrangements, partial agreements or comprehensive settlements. The PA-X Peace Agreement Database² provides a more procedural definition, describing them as ‘formal, publicly available documents produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed upon by some or all of them, with the specific view of ending the conflict’.

Types of peace agreements				
Pre-negotiation	Ceasefire	Framework-substantive (comprehensive)	Implementation /renegotiation	Renewal
sets ground rules, agenda and modalities for talks	sets ground rules, agenda and modalities for talks	outlines core political, security and institutional principles	translates commitments made on paper into practice	Extends, reaffirms or revises the settlement

Source: see Bell and Wise (2022. 386)

In practice, peace processes may move back and forth between these agreement types rather than following a strictly linear sequence. In this sense, peace agreements are not static documents but rather dynamic, multi-faceted instruments that evolve throughout the conflict resolution process in interaction with other political conflict and existing governance structures and processes.

² The PA-X Peace Agreement Database, one of most comprehensive collection of peace agreements, contains over 2,100 agreements from more than 170 peace processes between 1990 and 2024. It is managed by the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) at the University of Edinburgh Law School.

4.2. Approaches to peace agreement implementation

A study by Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2003) concluded that peace agreements, on average, last for less than five years. Implementation is often hampered by, inter alia institutional inertia, political resistance, lack of inclusivity and built-in ambiguities within the agreement text. Of the 183 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2011 in fifty different countries, sixty-eight failed, with violence resuming among the same actors (see Högladh 2011).

This requires an understanding of the implementation process as being a non-linear, complex, multi-faceted and iterative process, involving continued negotiation, renegotiation, sustained dialogue and continuous dispute resolution among belligerents and key stakeholders such as government actors and affected communities (Joshi and Quinn, 2015, 5).

Broadly, two predominant peace agreement implementation models can be deduced from the literature.

(i) **A constitutive/blueprint approach:** this model emphasises strict adherence to the blueprint specified in the settlement, drawing attention to the specific content of the peace agreement, international guarantees and the implementation of provisions as specified therein (Joshi and Wallenstein, 2018, 33)

☀ Peace agreements are not static documents but rather dynamic, multi-faceted instruments that evolve throughout the conflict resolution process in interaction with other political processes, conflict and existing governance structures and processes.

A prime example of this compliance-focused approach is the **2005 Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)** signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The 250-page agreement set out a detailed legal and institutional roadmap with timelines, power-sharing formulas, revenue-sharing, security arrangements and a referendum clause outlining an interim period leading to the secession of South Sudan (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011).

(ii) **An instrumental approach:** this model views peace agreements as flexible roadmaps that require adaptation to evolving political dynamics and realities, focusing on consensus-building through constant dialogue and gradual accommodation as implementation progresses (Schernbeck and Vimalarajah, 2017, p3).

The 2003 Sun City/Inter-Congolese Agreement typifies this institutional approach to implementation. It provided for the formation of a transitional institutional architecture (a Government of National Unity, transitional legislature, security-integration mechanisms and a roadmap to elections) that parties were expected to operationalise through institutional mandates rather than rigid execution of a pre-defined blueprint (ACCORD, 2009).

A substantial body of research points to the role of third-party actors in guaranteeing a peace agreement's implementation via monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, potentially improving prospects of successful outcomes by supporting confidence-building, trust and helping to positively alter the perceptions and behaviour of disputing parties. Third parties can include international organisations such as the UN, RECs, great powers,³ regional powers, and even groupings of smaller states (Hampson, 1996, 13).

At the same time, third-party involvement is not automatically beneficial. Monitoring and guarantor bodies can become politicised, be viewed as partial or lose legitimacy if they are perceived to be too closely aligned with one party or parties to the conflict. The challenge, therefore, is not only to ensure that monitoring mechanisms exist, but also to design them in ways that safeguard credibility, impartiality and ensure political buy-in (Molloy, 2018, 24).

³ Although there is enduring debate and contestations around the definitional criteria of what constitutes a 'great power' in International Relations scholarship, a broad, functional perspective defines great powers as states with superior military (and nuclear), economic, and technological capabilities, with clear global interests, combined with international recognition, such as a permanent seat at the UN Security Council (for more see Abbondanza and Wilkins 2022, 14)

4.3. Metrics of success: How do we measure peace beyond implementation?

While there is broad consensus of the imperative of a peace that is durable and sustainable, there remains considerable debate on how to *measure*, or even how to describe peace. A relevant question in this regard is how to measure less tangible aspects of peace, such as persistent structural inequalities or biases or peacebuilding initiatives and social change that are not directly linked to the implementation of the peace agreement. Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of peace, as well as the limitations of relying on only the binary rubric of failure/success in outcomes of peace processes, Joshi and Wallensteen (2018) posit the concept of 'quality peace'. This concept moves beyond the non-recidivism of armed conflict to one of peace that incorporates social, economic and political changes in postaccord societies. In essence, the *quality peace* framework evaluates peace processes abilities to produce durable change across five dimensions: *post-war security, governance, economic reconstruction, reconciliation/transitional justice and civil society* (Joshi and Wallensteen, 2018, 11).

 The **Quality Peace** framework provides a holistic, multi-dimensional view of peace across five dimensions: post-war security, governance, economic reconstruction, reconciliation/transitional justice and civil society.

In quality peace, the post-war security dimension focuses on security sector reform (SSR) and DDR of combatants as essential for the transition from war to peace. Security or military reforms can range from smaller sub-goals to broader provisions that are pivotal in not only enhancing the capacity of the state to provide security, but also in strengthening human security, which in turn fosters greater legitimacy and trust in governing institutions (Linke, 2020). In transitional contexts, a key element is the demilitarisation of politics – the transformation of warring parties into political parties. This shift from military to political competition can foster conditions for institutional transformation; simultaneously raising perceived costs of military strategies and elevating the perceived benefits of engaging in political processes (Lyons, 2018, 35). Hence, processes of demilitarising politics provides a strong foundation for democratisation and good governance, which are at the core of sustainable peacebuilding.

The governance dimension involves the creation of inclusive institutions and mechanisms for resolving future disputes related to power and resources. This dimension emphasises the role of local-level institutions and hybridity – incorporating both international and local actors, as well as structures and networks in the shaping of the peace process and peacebuilding outcomes (Mac Ginty, 2010, 11). Economic reconstruction prioritises the creation of equitable economic opportunities for marginalised segments of the population to address root causes of conflict such as poverty and resource mismanagement and includes delivering 'peace dividends' through job creation and infrastructure development (Wennmann, 2009). Reconciliation and transitional justice aims to address past transgressions and grievances through truth commissions, reparations and restorative justice. Integral to peacebuilding and reconciliation, transitional justice practices are necessary for transforming relationships at international, state-citizen and intergroup levels, strengthening social cohesion and forestalling a recurrence of armed conflict (Backer, 2018, 131)

Finally, the civil society dimension of quality peace emphasises the instrumental role that informal organisations, local actors and communities, grassroots groups and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) play in fostering sustainable peace through monitoring the implementation process, advocacy, reducing polarisation, facilitation and service delivery (Paffenholz, 2018,165).

4.4. Inclusion in peace processes

Another critical strand of research is inclusion as a key node between the input and outcome dimensions of a peace process. Empirical findings have re-affirmed the positive contribution of broad-based participation and inclusion of various stakeholders, particularly women and local actors, in enhancing the legitimacy and durability of peace agreements (Joshi and Wallensteen, 2018). For instance, Nilsson's (2012) analysis of eighty-three signed peace agreements drawn from forty different civil wars between 1989 and 2004 found that when civil society is included in a peace agreement, the risk of peace breaking down among the

signatories is reduced by 64%. Moreover, findings from the Geneva-based Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI) research indicates that inclusion can contribute not only to halting acute violence, but also tackling violence and addressing causes of conflict in the long-run (Paffenholz *et al.*, 2017).

Away from debates on who is included, when and how in negotiations, Paffenholz (2014) outlines the various modalities through which additional actors can be included in negotiation processes and the implementation of these agreements. These range from direct representation and observer status, to consultative bodies and high-level problem-solving workshops, all of which are aimed at enhancing the legitimacy, public ownership, transparency and expertise of the peace process.

In the main, the subject of inclusion in implementation processes – and in political transition processes as a whole – is a political endeavour and should be understood as a continuous process that can be adapted and re-invigorated during all phases of the process (Bramble and Paffenholz, 2020, 45). Inclusive processes can lead to inclusive outcomes, but such outcomes are not automatically guaranteed. This means embracing enabling factors to support inclusion such as early inclusion in the process; clear and detailed inclusion provisions in agreements; and meaningful inclusion beyond representation (Bramble and Paffenholz, 2020, 6).

4.5. Regional organisations and peace agreement implementation

In undertaking broader peace and security mandates, African regional organisations have assumed roles beyond solely *mediating and facilitating dialogue*. Regional organisations can also act guarantors who set implementation benchmarks and monitor the implementation phase to assess progress and verify compliance (Aeby, 2022b). Highlighting this nuanced approach to the implementation phase of peace processes, Aeby (2022) analyses how African organisations support peace agreements, via a comparative study of the roles of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the implementation of framework agreements in Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. The findings show that there was regional variation to the roles of mediation, guarantors and implementation monitoring. This was attributed to political imperatives, entrenched conflict management practices and organisational architectures. For example, in Kenya, the AU-mandated Panel of Eminent African Personalities acted as custodians to the process, using quiet diplomacy and prompting International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutions to enforce accountability. With respect to the guarantor role, IGAD adopted an interventionist, assertive approach in South Sudan, with Heads of States setting benchmarks and deadlines and issuing directives to warring parties. By contrast, in Zimbabwe, SADC took a more lenient approach – arguably a reflection of the entrenched liberation movement ethos in the sub-region, which has seen sovereignty and consensus privileged over direct criticism of errant parties. (Aeby, 2022b, 32).

☀️ Regional organisations can play meaningful roles as **mediators, guarantors or monitors**, but that their effectiveness is contingent on conflict context, political imperatives, established conflict management practices and organisational architectures.

The regional variation in engagement was also echoed by Coe and Nash (2020) in a systematic study of the frequency and capacity of regional organisations' engagement in peace agreements between 2002 and 2015. Their analysis showed significant variation in overall engagement levels, selectivity of engagement and patterns over time, as well as overlapping activities between the AU and RECs within single peace processes. In addition, the high degree of institutional overlap in conflict contexts also raises questions regarding division of labour and operationalisation of the principle of subsidiarity.

Maina and Melander's edited volume (2016) – spanning eight case studies⁴ – provides a comprehensive evaluation of the success and failure of African peace agreements finalised prior to 2010. They identify a range of factors and variables that determine the success or failure of peace agreements, while also critically examining the context-specific factors, provisions and evolving dynamics that influence the

⁴ The case studies analysed in the volume include: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

implementation process. Political will is highlighted as a crucial implementation variable as ultimately the successful implementation of an agreement is largely dependent on the commitment of parties to implement it. Additionally, the clarity of agreement provisions is equally important, as vague and expedient peace agreements can impair implementation due to uncertainty and ambiguity (Maina and Melander, 2016, 8).

Taken together, the growing body of Africa-specific literature serves to deepen understandings of peace agreement implementation, promoting multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary analyses attuned to contextual knowledge, experiences and institutional frameworks, with implications for both research and policy.

4.6. Peace-as-governance

A growing body of literature underscores the linkages between peace and governance, conceptualising peace as governance, extending the analytical focus beyond 'silencing the guns' to the establishment of a legitimate, functional and inclusive order capable of managing ordinary conflicts and societal incompatibilities without resorting to violence (Zartman, 1997, Khadiagala, 2015). Additionally, established scholarship increasingly points to governance deficits as a primary driver of violent conflict in Africa, evident in ineffective state-building, sectarianism, fragmentation and dysfunctional economic systems that continue to fuel violence and social discontent in many African countries. In this respect, governance as conflict management becomes a matter of rebuilding and strengthening institutions to ensure order, stability and development (Khadiagala, 2015, 5). Indeed, effective and stable governance as the bedrock of sustainable peace finds resonance in the AU's continental agenda, encapsulated in frameworks such as Agenda 2063, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns and the AU Policy Framework on PCRD, among others.

 The view of peace-as-governance transcends a narrow focus on 'silencing the guns', emphasising instead the establishment of a legitimate, functional and inclusive order capable of managing ordinary conflicts and societal incompatibilities without resorting to violence.

Adding to the governance discourse,⁵ understanding peace implementation as both state and institution building positions peace agreements as 'quasi-constitutional frameworks'. Peace agreements can craft a new power-map for the country, as provisions relating to elements such as governance, security sector reform, power-sharing and transitional justice are often included (Bell and Wise, 2022, 392). Hence, peace implementation is directed towards institutional reform and building systems of governance that promote quality peace, including resetting the relationship between the individual and the government in functional and legitimate terms.

4.7. Key research projects and databases

Several major research projects and databases provide the empirical data utilised in this study. These include:

i. PA-X Peace Agreements Database – *University of Edinburgh/PeaceRep*

PA-X is one of the most comprehensive global peace agreement databases, containing 2144 agreements across more than 150 peace processes from 1990 to 2024. Its typology of peace agreements includes pre-negotiation, substantive (partial and comprehensive) and implementation agreements are

⁵ For wide-ranging analyses of governance, see Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako, eds., *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building and Democratic Renewal in Africa* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002); G. Shabbir Cheema, *Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reform in Developing Countries* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'Reconceptualising Governance,' discussion paper, New York, UNDP, 1997; and World Bank, 'Governance and Development,' Washington, DC, 1992).

disaggregated by country, region, conflict type and agreement stage. Given its extensive breadth and scope, the PA-X database served as the foundational resource for identifying and classifying the peace agreements analysed in this research (Bell and Badanjak, 2019).

ii. The UN Peacemaker Database – *UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs*

The UN Peacemaker provides over 1 300 full-text peace agreement documents with primary-source access and the Language of Peace tool enabling comparative analysis across more than 75 000 provisions.

This database provides direct access to full agreement texts, thus complementing the PA-X coding approach, particularly for provision-level analysis. It also provides access to the UN Secretary-General's periodic reports on specific peace processes which are relevant secondary sources for implementation status assessments.

iii. The Peace Accords Matrix – *Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies*

The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), established by the Kroc Institute at the University of Notre Dame, provides the most systematic implementation data on comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs). Following its 2025 update, PAM tracks 42 CPAs and 236 associated partial agreements using a four-point ordinal implementation scale: 0 (not initiated), 1 (minimal implementation), 2 (intermediate implementation), and 3 (full implementation). The Barometer Initiative, applied to the 2016 Colombian accord, represents the most sophisticated real-time application of this methodology, examining 578 stipulations grouped into 18 themes and 70 subthemes. For the purposes of this report, the PAM methodology, particularly its implementation scale, offers a useful assessment framework that has applicability in the African context.

iv. African Transitional Justice Hub – *Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation*

The African Transitional Justice Hub (ATJH), established in 2020 to support implementation of the AU's 2019 Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP), maintains a database of peace agreements in Africa containing transitional justice components. Drawing on the AUTJP's definition of transitional justice, it includes truth-seeking, accountability mechanisms, political and institutional reforms, traditional justice, reparations and socio-economic measures. Its focus on national-level agreements involving state actors distinguishes it from databases that include subnational and non-state accords.

v. Pretoria University Law Press African Law Repository – *University of Pretoria*

The Pretoria University Law Press (PULP) compendium list of peace and ceasefire agreements in Africa, maintained by the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria, provides country-by-country documentation of AU legal instruments, REC protocols, national constitutional texts and human rights jurisprudence, cross-referenced from UN Peacemaker and PA-X. Its country-by-country structure and cross-referencing allowed for systematic verification of the agreements relevant to each case study and facilitated cross-database triangulation.

It should be noted that the aforementioned databases are not an exhaustive list of repositories dedicated to peace agreements. In the construction of African corpus of peace agreements for this study, a range of other databases and projects were consulted as supplementary sources. These include: African Peace Processes (APP) dataset, the AU Peace Observatory, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) project on effects of peace agreement implementation on women's security and empowerment and the DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance thematic mapping of SSR and DDR provisions in 301 peace agreements.


5. ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2002–2024)

The quantitative data presented below is based on a systematic cross-database review integrating PA-X, UN Peacemaker and the PULP datasets (see Appendix 1 for corpus reconstruction protocol). PA-X Version 9 (2024) served as the primary quantitative database, providing both the dataset of agreements and the coded thematic content across 225 categories. The database contains 2 144 agreements globally from 1990 to 2024, of which the Africa subset (filtered by PA-X's regional coding for agreements in African countries) yields approximately 655 agreements for the period 1990–2024. Applying the temporal filter (agreements signed from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2024), excluding

agreements coded as ‘IntraLocal’, and cross-referencing with the PULP compendium's country-by-country listings and the UN Peacemaker database, the integrated corpus comprises approximately 368 discrete peace agreements in Africa for the 2002–2024 period.


5.1. Overview of general trends and patterns

Figure 1: Distribution of peace agreements by type in Africa (2002–2024)



Author’s compilation using data primarily from PA-X, UN Peacemaker, supplemented by the African Transitional Justice Hub, and the AU Peace Observatory and the PULP datasets.

Figure 2: Frequency and implementation rate of provision thematic categories in peace agreements




Author’s compilation using data primarily from PA-X, UN Peacemaker, supplemented by the African Transitional Justice Hub, and the AU Peace Observatory and the PULP datasets.

☀️ Across the integrated African corpus of peace agreements ceasefire provisions are the dominant thematic category of provisions, reflecting the immediate priority of halting active violence as a precondition for any subsequent political settlement.

Across the integrated African corpus of peace agreements (n=368), an analysis of thematic content reveals a clear hierarchy of provisions (see Figure 2). Ceasefire provisions dominate the corpus appearing in 85% of agreements, reflecting the immediate priority of halting active violence as a precondition for any subsequent political settlement. Power-sharing and electoral/constitutional reforms are the second and third most frequent themes. Half of all African agreements (50%) contain power-sharing provisions, consistent with the global PA-X finding that 494 out of 1 518 agreements (32.5%) contain power-sharing provisions. This is affirmed by Mutisi (2011) who observes that power-sharing has become the most common modality of resolving political or governance disputes in Africa, especially in instances of protracted violence and where there appears to be no clear winner.

Reconciliation and nation-building provisions appear in 51.6% of agreements, underscoring the imperative of social cohesion and inter-group trust particularly in transitional and postaccord contexts. Transitional justice and SSR form a middle tier. By contrast, provisions for women, peace, and security (WPS) are less prevalent, appearing in only 31% of agreements, indicating a significant gap in the integration of gender-sensitive approaches within African peace processes.

Figure 3: Regional distribution of agreements



Author's compilation using data primarily from PA-X, UN Peacemaker, supplemented by the African Transitional Justice Hub, and the AU Peace Observatory and the PULP datasets.

Geographically, East and West Africa have the highest concentration of peace agreements during the review period, reflecting a distinctive combination of structural factors linked to the geography of conflict as well as the institutional capacities of regional institutions. In East Africa and Horn of Africa, notable factors include the persistence of protracted armed conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia;⁶ IGAD's high agreement output; and a proliferation dynamic in which unresolved conflicts generate successive rounds of agreements while the core structural drivers of conflict remain unresolved. Although IGAD has mediated conflicts in its geographic scope, including in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, its facilitation has tended to yield partial agreements that often call for successive renegotiation processes. Hence, IGAD's focus on brokering agreements rather than managing their implementation has been identified as a key limitation of its peacemaking model, alongside a prioritisation of elite bargains in its power-sharing frameworks and weak enforcement mechanisms (Magara, 2025).

In West Africa, the high number of peace agreements is informed by both institutional and geographic factors. Specifically, the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS') institutional architecture, underpinned by the 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, as well as military enforcement capability, sanctions architecture and constitutional governance norms, are

⁶ According to PA-x database, Somalia recorded 22 peace agreements, the highest single-country count within the IGAD sub-region, reflecting successive failed and partial national reconciliation processes from the 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement through to the post-2012 federal state-building framework.

the basis for a robust conflict resolution framework and mandate (Sesay, 2021, 127). The Mechanism not only deepens the mandate and institutionalisation of ECOWAS' peace and security architecture, but also highlights the strengths of its enforcement capability, demonstrated by ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troop deployments to Liberia (1990-1998), Sierra Leone (1997) and Guinea-Bissau (1999), and later as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in Côte d'Ivoire (2003), Mali (2013) and the Gambia (2017).⁷ These institutional capacities have enabled ECOWAS to mediate in diverse conflict types, promoting CPA-type, inclusive agreements that incorporate military factions, political parties and civil society, while also linking agreement implementation to ongoing ECOWAS monitoring and, where necessary, sanctions.

From 2012 onwards, the Sahel crisis significantly increased West Africa's number of agreements. Separatist activities in northern Mali led to the 2015 Algiers Accord and numerous subsequent ceasefire and implementation arrangements. Although the accord collapsed in 2024, when the Malian transitional government formally announced its termination, the agreement had become fragile within months of its signing, as key signatories pursued ad hoc arrangements outside the bounds of the agreement. These included a range of subsidiary agreements including ceasefire deals, implementation memoranda, Monitoring Committee for the present Agreement (CSA) priority timelines and DDR sub-agreements, each attempting to revive or re-interpret the original text (Devermont and Harris, 2020).

In Central Africa, most peace agreements are concentrated on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). The DRC conflict, involving dozens of armed groups and interventions by neighbouring states, has seen multiple processes across national and regional levels, resulting in a complex implementation landscape.

North Africa's peace agreement profile is notably distinct, characterised by fewer, yet often more complex, multilateral agreements, reflecting the unique geopolitical dynamics and external influences prevalent in the region. Southern Africa records a comparatively lower incidence of peace agreements, indicative of a period of relative post-conflict stability following earlier liberation struggles, although political crises occasionally necessitate negotiated settlements.

External influences on peace agreements⁸ in Africa have had varied outcomes across the sub-regions and different conflict contexts. In West Africa, France's colonial history and continued political and military presence as part of its *Françafrique* agenda has long been a subject of contestation. In Mali, for example, France played a leading role in security operations and counter-terrorism efforts in support of the Malian state authorities following the outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012. French influence in the region has changed since 2020, as coups in the Sahel have given rise to a number of military juntas in power, heralding shifts in geopolitical realignments across the regional security landscape. A notable development in the rupture of relations with France, was when military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad pushed for the expulsion of French troops, citing French interference in domestic politics and popular discontent with security outcomes despite decades-long Western-led military interventions.

In East Africa, external donors, including the European Union (EU), United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Norway (particularly as Troika members in Sudan), provided financial support for Sudan's CPA process and exercised significant diplomatic leverage in urging the parties to remain at the negotiating table. This highlights the positive role of external actors in mediation and negotiation processes.

In the DRC, multiple external actors, including the UN (MONUSCO), AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and, more recently, the US and Qatar, have engaged in the peace processes in various roles ranging from peace enforcement, mediation and as guarantors. In 2025, the US brokered the Critical Minerals for Security and Peace Deal, between the governments the DRC and Rwanda, leveraging security support in exchange for access to critical minerals.⁹ The deal has largely been perceived as an extension of Washington's transactional foreign policy under the Trump administration, securing access to critical mineral assets while countering Chinese dominance over the

⁷ See Aljazeera, 'Timeline: A history of ECOWAS military interventions in three decades,' <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/timeline-a-history-of-ecowas-military-interventions-in-three-decades>

⁸ External influence in the design, facilitation or monitoring of peace agreements can take various forms, including security sector assistance, financial and logistical support, guarantor roles and post-agreement implementation support.

⁹ The signatories of the deal, DRC and Rwanda pledge to launch a regional economic integration framework within 90 days and a joint security coordination mechanism within 30 days. The agreement calls for the complete neutralisation of FDLR, and a cessation of defensive action by Rwanda and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory within 90 days.

DRC's mining sector. Apart from the exclusion of the March 23 Movement (M23) – a significant military actor in the conflict in eastern DRC – the Washington peace agreement's focus on the minerals dimension overlooks the main drivers of conflict, including elite power struggles, historical grievances, poor governance and land and citizenship disputes (Dizolele, 2025). Overall, the DRC case is a good example of how external actors' engagement in peace processes are linked to geopolitical and geostrategic interests.

Libya also serves as an insightful case study of the negative role of foreign actors via proxy warfare and intensification of geopolitical competition in an increasingly internationalised conflict. When the civil war in Libya began in 2014 between factions aligned to Operation Dignity and Operation Dawn, foreign powers backed the warring factions in line with entrenched political and ideological fault lines, with counterterrorism and anti-Islamist agendas serving as key reference points for intensification of military and financial support to Libyan actors (Wehrey, 2020, 17). Along the east-west divide that undergirded the resultant competing centres of power, the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayeze al-Sarraj was primarily backed by Turkey and Qatar. Its rival, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, was backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France. Apart from prolonging the conflict, foreign actors also contributed to the ineffectiveness of the sanctions regime in Libya, particularly the systematic violation of the UN arms embargo. The UN Panel of Experts has identified a handful of states, namely the UAE, Turkey, Russia, Jordan and Egypt, who continue to funnel arms to local proxies via land, sea and aerial routes (UN PoE Report, 2021). Taken together, the dynamics in Libya underscore its profile as a key arena for geopolitical competition, a stark illustration of how external influence plays can play both a positive and negative role in the implementation of peace agreement provisions.

5.2. Overview of implementation status

For analysis of the implementation of the various provisions, average implementation rates are derived from three complementary data sources: (a) the Kroc PAM_ID dataset (Joshi *et al.*, 2025), which provides annualised implementation data for forty-two CPAs tracked over ten years using the 0–3 ordinal scale, from which aggregate implementation rates (as a normalised percentage) are calculable per provision type; (b) the Peace Agreement Implementation Measurement Tool (PAIMT) scoring methodology (0–10 scale); and (c) independent implementation assessments, AU PSC communiqués and relevant academic and policy literature.

☀️ External influences on peace agreements in Africa highlight varied outcomes across the sub-regions and different conflict contexts. Key factors include geopolitics, political and ideological alignment, history and evolving geostrategic interests.

Tracking ceasefire and security-related provisions across the corpus, these provisions demonstrate the highest average implementation rate at 62.8%, followed by power-sharing (54%) and electoral and constitutional provisions (45.3%). The relatively high implementation rates across these provisions can be attributed to what Sriram (2008, 181) terms 'governance incentives' offered during peace negotiations to entice armed groups to enter and uphold agreements. For example, former members of armed groups are offered direct participation in future political processes via political power-sharing which serves as a pathway to greater political capital, prestigious positions in government or even access to state-owned resources. A second incentive, linked to SSR, is the prospective inclusion of former combatants in the state security apparatus. This incentive not only helps alleviate an armed group's security concerns, but it also offers a pathway to professionalisation and integration into legitimate state structures, thus enhancing the perceived stability and legitimacy of the post-conflict state (Linke, 2020). Conversely, provisions such as those pertaining to WPS and transitional justice, exhibit significantly lower average implementation rates, at 19.5% and 23.6% respectively, reflecting persistent challenges in operationalising gender-inclusive and accountability-focused mandates within post-conflict settings (Adetula *et al.*, 2018).

Overall, the inclusion and implementation rates data reveals a pattern where provisions related to power dynamics and security arrangements are prioritised in both the negotiations and implementations phases, suggesting an inherent hierarchy between issues seen as ‘high politics’ versus ‘low politics’ such as socio-economic reforms and gender considerations.

6. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASE-STUDIES

This section explores specific country contexts through in-depth qualitative analysis, presenting insights aligned with the study's research objectives: identifying key areas of thematic convergence and divergence across agreements and examining unimplemented and partially implemented provisions.

6.1. Convergence, divergence and unimplemented provisions

6.1.1 Areas of convergence

Across the fifteen case studies, several areas of substantive convergence are identifiable:

Power-sharing is the most prevalent provision across the selected cases, appearing in all fifteen agreements in some form. Political power-sharing (the allocation of executive, legislative or administrative positions across conflict parties) is the most common modality, present in the Sudan CPA, Burundi Arusha Accords, DRC Global and Inclusive Agreement, CAR Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR), the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South (R-ARCSS), Darfur agreements, Juba Agreement, Mali Algiers Accord and Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Military power-sharing (integration of armed forces or allocation of command positions) appears in eight agreements, while territorial power-sharing (federalism, regional autonomy and decentralisation) features prominently in the Sudan CPA, Mali Algiers Accord, Juba Agreement, and Darfur agreements. The Sudan CPA (2005)¹⁰ established the most comprehensive power-sharing architecture, comprising political, military, territorial and economic dimensions. South Sudan's R-ARCSS¹¹ similarly institutionalised proportional power-sharing among the principal warring parties. The DRC Pretoria Agreement (2002)¹² established the ‘1+4’ formula of one president and four vice-presidents representing the government, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) and political opposition.

☀️ An emergent pattern from the implementation rates across the various categories is the prioritisation of provisions related to power dynamics and security arrangements, suggesting an inherent hierarchy between issues seen as ‘high politics’ versus ‘low politics’ such as socio-economic reforms and gender considerations.

The prevalence of power-sharing is reflective of the empirical reality that most intra-state conflicts are essentially governmental conflicts at their core (Maina and Melander, 2016, 286). However, empirical findings on the effectiveness of these arrangements are mixed, subject to variables such as the substance of the agreement itself, the inclusivity of the negotiation and implementation processes and the commitment of the political elites involved (Bramble and Paffenholz, 2020).

SSR and DDR provisions are a second major thematic convergence, present in fifteen agreements. However, the depth and operationalisation of SSR provisions varies significantly: the Sudan CPA (2005) and the R-ARCSS (2018) contain elaborate, legally specified integration frameworks for the national

¹⁰ Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Naivasha Agreement)

¹¹ Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)

¹² Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Political Parties (2002) Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC. Pretoria, 17 December 2002.

armed forces, while the Libya Ceasefire (2020)¹³ establishes a 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) with limited civilian oversight provisions. The Ethiopia Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) (2022) establishes monitoring mechanisms, deferring modalities of DDR to a specialised committee at the initiative of the conflict parties. A key pattern is that despite SSR and DDR conceptualisation as distinct processes with different actors, priorities, timelines and functions, they are typically negotiated as an interdependent package (Linke, 2020, 11). At the implementation level, however, DDR is typically prioritised in the early stages of implementation to stop immediate violence, whereas SSR is associated with long-term political questions addressed later in the process (Linke, 2020, 9).

Governance and institutional reform provisions appear in at least twelve of the fifteen agreements. These take various forms, including interim executives, parliamentary constitutional review commissions and electoral bodies. Overall, the focus on governance reflects a firm cognisance of peace agreements as roadmaps for conflict transformation and enhancement of democratic processes and institutions.

Transitional justice and human rights provisions also appear in nearly all of the agreements to varying degrees. For example, the R-ARCSS provides for a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) and a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS). The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (2020) likewise includes transitional justice provisions addressing decades of violations in Darfur and the Two Areas.

6.1.2. Areas of divergence

A notable structural divergence is **the comprehensiveness and specificity** of agreement provisions. On one hand, there are detailed agreements like the 2005 Sudan CPA, over 300 pages in length with elaborate frameworks for power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements and a self-determination referendum. On the other, the Ethiopia Pretoria CoHA (2022)¹⁴ and the Libya Ceasefire Agreement (2020) are more concise, centred on the immediate-term cessation of hostilities.

Another point of divergence is the **role of third parties** or external actors. The Liberia CPA benefited from a 15 000-strong UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) and a US-led SSR programme (ACCORD, 2009). The R-ARCSS is monitored by the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) with international participation (Oola, 2019). Conversely, agreements such as the Algiers Accord exhibit a more limited scope for external oversight, primarily relying on regional mechanisms for monitoring and verification. This variance stems partly from the range of roles that third parties can play (as guarantors or monitoring and verification, etc). A related variable is the degree of normative fit or alignment between external actors and regional or local conflict management parties, and whether they all interpret 'implementation' the same way. Proponents of strict adherence to liberal-democratic blueprints may interpret any deviations or hybridity as failures, yet the complexities of the local-international interface necessitates more nuanced perspectives (Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011).

At a broader level, the divergences in agreement contents and specificities are attributable to **sub-regional contextual factors**, including the predominant mediation actors, nature and duration of the conflict, and the political economy of the peace process. West African agreements (Liberia, Mali) reflect ECOWAS' formidable institutional role, established mediation norms and enhanced peacekeeping and monitoring capacity (Coe and Nash, 2020, 171). East African agreements (Darfur, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan) reflect IGAD's state sovereignty-centric approach, whereas the Central African context (DRC, CAR) illustrate a complex geopolitical landscape, marked by regional rivalries, proliferation of armed actors and layered political economies. The North African sub-region also reflects the influence of geopolitical factors and plurality of external actors in shaping both the peace process and implementation trajectory, evident in the Libyan case. These contextual factors, alongside variations in institutional mandates and capabilities of regional organisations, contribute to the observed heterogeneity in peace agreement design and implementation outcomes across the continent (Coe and Nash, 2020, 176).

¹³ Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya, 2020

¹⁴ Agreement for Lasting Peace through the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)

6.2. Implementation gaps across major thematic categories

Several categories of provisions that remain consistently unimplemented or only partially implemented exist across the fifteen cases.

Transitional justice provisions remain largely unimplemented across various agreements. For example, while the R-ARCSS stipulated the creation of a hybrid court and CTRH, these mechanisms have yet to be fully operationalised (Aeby, 2022b). Similarly, timeframes for accountability mechanisms in the Juba Agreement lapsed and were upended by the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

☀️ Mozambique's RENAMO DDR Agreement (2019) stands out as an instructive study of the conditions under which DDR implementation can succeed in the African context.

While DDR provisions are near-universal, implementation has been impeded by a persistent 'security dilemma', that is, the apprehension of armed groups that disarming will leave them vulnerable to government repression or other rival factions. To overcome this, robust third-party security guarantees or monitoring are often essential to convince rebels to disarm (Palik et al., 2025). In South Sudan, the R-ARCSS (2018) DDR and SSR provisions have been severely under-implemented. The cantonment and integration of Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) has proceeded at a dramatically insufficient pace, stalled by resource shortages, political disagreements over command structures and the strategic reluctance of armed factions to demobilise without credible security guarantees. The Sudan CPA similarly experienced significant DDR failures: the creation of joint integrated units was described by Sriram (2008, 186) as 'halting', with SPLM/A forces resisting redeployment into anticipated joint structures.

A notable exception is the DDR process under Mozambique's RENAMO DDR Agreement (2019) which saw 63% (3 267) of ex-combatants being demobilised by the end of the Swiss-supported project in 2024 (Switzerland EDA, 2024). A critical success factor behind this DDR process was the 'Basket Fund', a multi-donor pooled fund for the Peace Process Secretariat (PPS), administered through the UN Office for Project Services. The Basket Fund provided reinsertion kits to demobilised combatants which included a 12-month stipend, food rations, transportation costs, agricultural tools, tarps and basic construction materials and national ID cards, all of which served to facilitate a transition to civilian life (Maputo Accord n.d). Another key feature of the Maputo Accord process was the extension of pension rights to eligible DDR beneficiaries, strengthening the reintegration pillar of the DDR process (Sanghrajka, 2024, 8). Recognising the importance of reconciliation, the Ministry of Education has also led initiatives to incorporate peacebuilding materials into the national education curriculum, while the private sector supports employment and livelihood opportunities for DDR beneficiaries, their families and communities. The Mozambique case thus provides key lessons on the conditions under which DDR implementation can succeed, offering key insights relevant for other peacebuilding and post-conflict settings. The strategic design of the peace process embraced flexibility, national ownership and 'implementing while negotiating', or 'progressive implementation' as seen in the example of the pensions decree (Sanghrajka, 2024, 7).

WPS provisions are also a major unimplemented category in this study. Gender mainstreaming in peace agreements has improved over time but remains uneven, reiterating empirical findings that the mere inclusion of gender provisions in an agreement does not directly correlated with improved gender equality or achieving durable peace (Joshi et al, 2020). The sustained advocacy of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000), institutionalisation of gender advisers in UN peace operations and the growing involvement of women's civil society organisations as observers in mediation processes has largely contributed to an increase in agreements containing gender provisions.¹⁵ However, the inclusion of gender language in texts has not translated into genuine inclusion of women in processes. Many peace processes continue to be high-level, exclusive negotiations that produce gender-blind peace agreements, or, at best, rhetorical references to women (Wise and Campbell, 2025). Findings by the Political Settlements

¹⁵ Each year since 2018, the percentage of agreements referencing women, girls, gender, or sexual violence has ranged from between 20-30% of total peace agreements.

Research Programme (2019) establishes a positive correlation between power-sharing agreements and gender provision inclusion and implementation. This dovetails with Christien and Mukhtarova's (2020, 15) analysis that ceasefire agreements can be associated with a decline in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions compared with framework or comprehensive agreements. This tracks with the low-implementation rate of gender provisions in African peace agreements wherein ceasefires and partial agreements account for over half of the corpus. Overall, meaningful implementation of WPS provisions beyond tokenism requires the active participation of women throughout the process lifecycle, dedicated institutional infrastructure for gender-specific provisions, robust monitoring mechanisms and sufficient political will to override elite resistance to structural norm change.

7. APPLICATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK

This section introduces a five-level IMF, calibrated to AU governance benchmarks and applied to the fifteen selected case studies.

The AU governance benchmarks applied in this report are derived from AU foundational documents and relevant policy reference frameworks, inter-alia the: AU Constitutive Act (2000); PSC Protocol (2002); the ACDEG (2007); AGA Framework Document; Africa Governance Report 2019 (APRM/AGA); and Agenda 2063. Six benchmarks are applied: (i) Rule of Law; (ii) Human Rights; (iii) Power-Sharing; (iv) Inclusive Governance; (v) Natural Resource Management; and (vi) Anti-Corruption.

7.1. Methodological note on measuring framework: five-tier scale

The implementation measuring framework used in this report adapts the PAM coding scale developed by the Kroc Institute's Barometer Initiative¹⁶ to the African governance benchmark context. The five-tier scale is defined as follows:

Level	Category	Definition/Indicators
1	Uninitiated Implementation	No actions or observable steps toward implementation. No formal discussions initiated, no institutional steps, no allocation of resources or timelines.
2	Initiated Implementation	Observable early measures or steps. Parties have set a date for implementation or are holding formal or informal discussions about it.
3	Minimal Implementation	Some visible efforts but insufficient to meet implementation deadlines or substantively fulfil the provision. Parties have made some efforts toward implementing the benchmark(s). However, these efforts are not enough to meet the deadline or substantive obstacles remain.
4	Intermediate Implementation	Substantial efforts made. Implementation is on track to be completed, though residual gaps, disputes or delays persist. Key institutional steps have been taken.
5	Successful Implementation	Implementing the benchmark(s) is nearly or fully completed as specified in the peace agreement. Provisions have been translated into verifiable, durable institutional or policy outcomes.

¹⁶ The Peace Accord Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID) is a project of the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, which traces the implementation of 34 comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer/methodology>. The project recognises 51 different types of provisions that form the corpus of issues or topics found within peace agreements worldwide with qualitative and quantitative longitudinal data on the implementation of 34 CPAs negotiated between 1989 and 2012. It uses a four-point ordinal scale (0 = not initiated; 1 = minimal; 2 = intermediate; 3 = full implementation) The Barometer Initiative, developed in partnership with the Colombian peace process, extends this methodology to contemporaneous whole-of-agreement monitoring (Molloy et al., 2018, 12).

The implementation levels assigned in this study are determined through a triangulated assessment methodology incorporating three categories of evidence:

Primary agreement texts: each provision or article cited in the implementation measurement framework template is drawn directly from the text of the respective peace agreement, accessed through the PA-X, UN Peacemaker or PULP databases. The specific article numbers and provision descriptions correspond to the original agreement language.

Implementation data from monitoring bodies: where available, implementation scores draw on quantitative assessments by the Kroc Institute's PAM (Liberia, Sudan CPA, Mali, and South Sudan), RJMEC quarterly reports (South Sudan), Carter Center Independent Observer reports (Mali) and AU/REC monitoring reports.

Secondary analytical literature: scholarly assessments, think tank reports and policy analyses from ACCORD, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Africa, International Crisis Group (ICG), media reports and academic peer-reviewed journals and volumes provide contextual evaluation of implementation progress and obstacles.

The five-tier ordinal scale is applied as follows: **Level 1** (Uninitiated) is assigned where no documented evidence of implementation activity exists; **Level 2** (Initiated) where formal discussions, timeline-setting or initial institutional steps have occurred; **Level 3** (Minimal) where observable but insufficient progress has been made; **Level 4** (Intermediate) where substantive progress toward deadline compliance is evident; and **Level 5** (Successful) where implementation is nearly or fully completed as specified. Each assignment is accompanied by reference to the evidentiary basis, ensuring verifiability and replicability.

This methodology acknowledges several limitations: the ordinal nature of the scale does not capture non-linear or regressive implementation dynamics; some agreements lack systematic third-party monitoring data; and the framework cannot fully account for informal implementation or implementation through channels not contemplated in the original agreement text.

7.2. Case study analysis

Applying the implementation framework outlined above, each case study is preceded by a contextual overview and followed by a methodological note on indicator and level determinations. Cases are presented in chronological order of the primary agreement's signing.¹⁷

¹⁷ In this section, the case study applied implementation framework analysis to **ten out of the fifteen case studies**, accounting for regional diversity as well as assessment across the typology of peace agreements, including comprehensive, ceasefire, power-sharing, or sector-specific protocols on DDR and SSR/G, gender.

Case study 1: Burundi Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000/2003)

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, was signed on 28 August 2000, facilitated by former South African President Nelson Mandela, laying the foundation for an end to a decade-long civil war. The Agreement established a transitional power-sharing government, a nationally agreed constitution (2004) and a truth and reconciliation commission mandate. Although the main armed belligerents – National Council for the Defence of Democracy- Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and Palipehutu-FNL – did not sign the original agreement, they later signed the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power-Sharing on 8 October 2003, formalising integration of the CNDD-FDD and operationalising the ethnic quota system (60% Hutu/40% Tutsi) in the government, military and police. Burundi's 2005 elections, which produced a CNDD-FDD government under Pierre Nkurunziza, marked a successful political transition. However, the subsequent concentration of power by the CNDD-FDD, the 2015 constitutional crisis and Nkurunziza's third-term bid, widely viewed as a violation of the Arusha-inspired constitutional order, signify a regression of democratic governance benchmarks (Mthembu-Salter, 2016, 81).

Article/Provision/Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementation
Protocol I Art. 6–8: Constitutional Framework	Rule of Law	Permanent constitution replacing transitional charter; independence of judiciary	GoB, Constitutional Court, National Assembly	3 – Minimal
Protocol I Art. 9–12: Human Rights Commission	Human Rights	National Human Rights Commission establishment; protection of civil liberties	GoB, OHCHR, Civil Society, UN Col	2 – Initiated
Protocol II Art. 11–16: Ethnic Power-Sharing	Power Sharing	60/40 Hutu/Tutsi ethnic quotas in government, National Assembly, Senate and army	GoB, CNDD-FDD, FNL, FRODEBU, UPRONA, AU/ONUB	4 – Intermediate
Protocol II Art. 20: Inclusive Political Participation	Inclusive Governance	Civil society and small party inclusion in transitional legislature and processes	GoB, Political Parties, Civil Society	3 – Minimal
Protocol IV Art. 3: Wealth-Sharing	Natural Resource Management	Equitable resource distribution; anti-patronage provisions in resource governance	GoB, Ministry of Finance	2 – Initiated
Protocol III Art. 14: Transitional Justice	Anti-Corruption	International Judicial Commission; anti-impunity measures; accountability for conflict crimes	GoB, OHCHR, Civil Society, UN	2 – Initiated

Methodological note: Arusha implementation data are drawn from PAM provision-level entries, OHCHR reports on Burundi, UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur reports (2022–2023) and academic literature (Kroc Institute <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/minority-rights-arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-for-burundi>).

Case study 2: DRC Global and Inclusive Agreement (2002)

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue culminated in the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002. Brokered through multilateral African diplomacy involving the AU and SADC, and witnessed by the UN, it established the '4+1' executive formula: one president and four vice-presidents representing formerly warring factions. This power-sharing aimed to co-opt rival elites into a transitional governance framework, culminating in the 2006 elections.

Article/ Provision	AU Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementation
Global and Inclusive Agreement (plus PSC Framework 2013), Art. 3: Rule of Law	Rule of Law	Judicial reform functional; SSR including FARDC professionalisation; disarmament of illegal armed groups; extension of state authority to conflict-affected areas	Transitional Government; FARDC; MONUC/ MONUSCO; international community	3 – Minimal
Global and Inclusive Agreement, Art. 6: Human Rights Commission	Human Rights	National Human Rights Commission established and resourced; truth and reconciliation process initiated; accountability for atrocity crimes committed during conflict	Transitional government; human rights bodies; MONUC	3 - Minimal
Global and Inclusive Agreement, Art. 7: Transitional Institutions	Power-Sharing	4+1 executive power-sharing formula functional; transitional government with four Vice Presidents for full transitional period (2003-2006); integration of armed groups into reconstituted national army (FARDC)	Government of DRC; MLC; RCD; Mai-Mai; civil society; MONUC	4 – Intermediate
Global and Inclusive Agreement, Art. 5: Democratic Governance	Inclusive Governance	Transitional constitution adopted; independent electoral commission (CENI) established; free and fair national elections held within 24 months of agreement entering into force; decentralisation framework enacted	Transitional Government; CENI; MONUC; international community	5 – Successful

Global and Inclusive Agreement plus subsequent agreements on natural resources	Natural Resource Management	Transparent management of mining revenues; conflict minerals traceability scheme operational; illegal resource exploitation ceased in conflict areas	Government; provincial authorities; international monitors; ITRI/ITSCI	2 – Initiated
Nairobi Declaration (2022): anti-corruption and governance commitments	Anti-Corruption	Anti-corruption accountability benchmarks operative as precondition for M23 withdrawal; transparent resource governance mechanisms established under EAC-facilitated process	DRC government; Rwanda; EAC; ICGLR monitoring mechanism	1 – Uninitiated

Methodological note: Implementation levels for the DRC Global and Inclusive Agreement were determined through secondary analysis of PAM provision-level assessments, UN Panel of Experts reports on the DRC (2003–2006) and MONUC reports to the Security Council. The ‘1+4’ power-sharing structure (Art. IV) is rated Intermediate (4) because the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed and functional through the transitional period, culminating in the 2006 elections, although coalition governance was marked by persistent factional tensions. Rule of law is rated 3: security sector reform was repeatedly stalled across multiple reform cycles; illegal armed groups (CNDP, M23, FDLR, ADF, Maï-Maï) reconstituted, emerged, or persisted; MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade mandate (2013 PSC Framework) produced limited SSR gains. Some judicial reform measures enacted; FARDC restructuring programmes initiated with MONUC/MONUSCO support; some disarmament operations conducted; EUTM-RDC training provided. Evidential basis for Level 3: security sector reform was repeatedly stalled across multiple reform cycles; illegal armed groups (CNDP, M23, FDLR, ADF, Maï-Maï) reconstituted, emerged or persisted; MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade mandate (2013 PSC Framework) produced limited SSR gains. Judicial reform UN assessment reports consistently rated progress as superficial. Some efforts were made but at a pace demonstrably insufficient to meet agreed objectives. Anti-Corruption (Art. XII) is rated Uninitiated (1) on the basis that formal audit provisions were inscribed in the transitional constitution but no independent accountability institution was operationalised. Observable evidence: none constituting a step toward anti-corruption benchmarks specifically. Evidential basis for Level 1: the Nairobi process stalled in 2023; M23 withdrawal was not completed; the Congo River Authority, which was to carry resource governance transparency commitments, was not established; no anti-corruption benchmarks derived from the Nairobi Declaration were operationalised in any institutional form. ICGLR monitoring was not convened for this purpose. The complete absence of any observable institutional step toward the anti-corruption provisions specifically satisfies the evidential threshold for Level 1. Natural Resource Management (Art. VIII) received an Initiated (2) rating because the moratorium was formally declared but widely circumvented, as documented by the UN Panel of Experts. ITSCI conflict minerals traceability scheme partially rolled out in eastern DRC provinces from 2011; some Kimberley Process compliance measures for artisanal diamonds; provincial revenue sharing framework enacted in 2006 constitution. Human rights is rated (3). Observable evidence: National Human Rights Commission formally established and functional with some operational capacity; MONUC human rights division reported on its activities; some victim documentation undertaken. Evidential basis for Level 3: the Commission was demonstrably under-resourced and limited in geographic reach as documented by UN human rights reports throughout the transitional period. No truth and reconciliation process was initiated within the agreement’s timeline. No accountability mechanism for conflict-era atrocity crimes was established – ICC proceedings in the Lubanga and Katanga cases were initiated independent of, and outside, the agreement’s specified mechanisms. Inclusive governance rated at 5. Core electoral governance provisions – constitution, electoral commission and elections – were completed as specified. The decentralisation framework was enacted in the 2006 constitution. Level 5 is warranted for the specific electoral provisions; subsequent deterioration of democratic quality in 2011 and 2018 elections lies outside the agreement’s own transitional timeline and does not retroactively reduce implementation of the specified provision.

Case Study 3: Liberia Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2003)

The Accra CPA, signed on 18 August 2003, ended fifteen years of intermittent civil war in Liberia, involving the Government of Liberia (GoL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Brokered under the auspices of ECOWAS with support from the AU and UN, the agreement established the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and mandated comprehensive DDRR, SSR, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), economic governance reform through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) and a clear electoral sequencing process culminating in the 2005 elections (PAM 2003, Bekoe 2003).

Article/Provision/ Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implement- ation
Art. VII: National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration	Rule of Law	Cantonment, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of all armed factions; UNMIL deployment	NTGL; LURD; MODEL; UNMIL; ECOWAS	5 – Successful
Art. VIII: SSR — Armed Forces of Liberia reform	Rule of Law	Restructuring of AFL and national police under civilian command; vetting process	NTGL/GoL; AFL; LNP; UNMIL; US/ECOWAS, UN CIVPOL	4 – Intermediate
Art. XIII: Independent Human Rights Commission	Human Rights	INHCR established; operational with investigation mandate	GoL; INHCR; civil society; UNMIL	4 – Intermediate
Art. XXII: National Transitional Government	Power Sharing	NTGL formation; faction-based ministerial allocation; functioning transitional executive	NTGL; LURD; MODEL; political parties	5 – Successful
Art IX: Elections and Inclusive Governance	Inclusive Governance	NEC establishment; 2005 elections conducted; Carter Center/ECOWAS certification	IECOM; NTGL; Carter Center; ECOWAS	5 – Successful
Art. XVII: Establishment of a Contract and Monopolies Commission	Anti-Corruption	Economic Governance and Management Commission; co-management oversight of state finances	NTGL; IMF; World Bank; ECOWAS	4 – Intermediate

Methodological note: Implementation evidence for the Liberia CPA is drawn from UNMIL reports to the UNSC, the Kroc PAM Liberia dataset, UNDP/World Bank DDR monitoring reports and the Governance and GEMAP evaluations. DDRR (Art. VI) is rated Successful (5) based on PAM data confirming that more than 100 000 ex-combatants passed through the DDRR process, though reintegration quality was uneven. The NTGL power-sharing structure is rated Successful (5) because the transitional government functioned, culminating in the contested but peaceful 2005 elections won by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. The NEC and electoral provisions are rated Successful (5) on the basis of Carter Center and ECOWAS certification of the 2005 elections as credible. SSR (Art. VIII) is rated Intermediate (4) because the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was comprehensively restructured with US support and the Liberia National Police was reformed with UN CIVPOL assistance, though vetting processes were incomplete and some perpetrators of wartime abuses were retained. The TRC is rated Intermediate (4) because it completed its mandate and issued a final report (2009), though recommendations on prosecutions and barring of officials from office were not implemented (Jaye, 2009). GEMAP

anti-corruption provisions are rated Intermediate (4) because the programme functioned effectively during its operational period, reducing elite capture of state resources, but its sustainability depended on international presence (Daase, 2011)

Case study 4: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

The Sudan CPA, signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 9 January 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GoS/ NCP) and the SPLM/A, brought an end to Africa's longest civil war. The agreement comprised six protocols addressing power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements, and the statuses of Abyei, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile regions, along with an interim national constitution and a permanent ceasefire. Implementation was jointly monitored by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC). Power-sharing, and Government of National Unity (GNU), was substantially implemented, culminating in the January 2011 self-determination referendum and South Sudan's independence in July 2011. However, human rights, rule of law and anti-corruption provisions remained largely unimplemented, particularly in the north (Mutisi, 2011).

Article/Provision/ Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implemen- tation
Ch. I: Interim National Constitution	Rule of Law	INC promulgated; judicial independence; Sharia/civil law territorial separation	GoS; SPLM; NCRC; Constitutional Court	3 – Minimal
Ch. II section 1.6: Human Rights Commission	Human Rights	NHRC establishment; compliance with international Human rights treaties; state of emergency lifted	GoS; NHRC; OHCHR; Human Rights Watch	3 – Minimal
Ch. II Section 2.5: GNU Power-Sharing	Power Sharing	GNU established; SPLM 52%/NCP 48% revenue formula; SPLM First VP appointment	GoS/NCP; SPLM/A; UNMIS; AU	5 – Successful
Ch. IV: Government of Southern Sudan	Inclusive Governance	GoSS established; multi-party provisions; self-determination referendum mechanism	GoSS; SPLM; NCP; Carter Center; UNMIS	5 – Successful
Ch. III: Wealth-Sharing	Natural Resource Management	50/50 oil revenue split; National Petroleum Commission; land rights protections	GoS; GoSS; oil companies; World Bank	4 – Intermediate
Ch. VI: SSR and Security Expenditure	Anti-Corruption	Joint Integrated Units; oversight of security expenditures; anti-corruption obligations	SAF; SPLA; JDB; AU Commission	2 – Initiated

Methodological note: Key sources on implementation; AEC annual reports, UNMIS reporting and extensive academic literature. The GNU Power-Sharing provision is rated Successful (5) because the GNU was formed, SPLM representation was implemented, the GoSS functioned throughout the interim period and the self-determination referendum was successfully conducted (see <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/territorial-powersharing-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement>). The GoSS (Ch. IV) is similarly rated Successful (5) because GoSS institutions were established and functioned throughout the interim period, administering southern territory independently until secession. Wealth-sharing (Ch. III) is rated Intermediate (4) because the 50/50 oil revenue formula was implemented, though disputes over NPC composition, border demarcation (Abyei) and the management of the Permanent Court of Arbitration award persist. Human Rights and Rule of Law provisions are rated Minimal (3) because formal institutions were created but security laws remained incompatible with international standards, emergency powers were maintained in conflict-affected areas and the NHRC operated under political constraints. Anti-Corruption provisions related to JIU oversight (Ch. VI) are rated Initiated (2) because joint oversight mechanisms were agreed but never functionally operationalised, with the JDB and Technical Committee remaining largely ineffective (see <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement>).

Case study 5: Madagascar SADC Roadmap (2011)

The September 2011 Roadmap, facilitated by SADC, aimed to resolve a deep political deadlock and return the country to constitutional order in the aftermath of an unconstitutional change of government in 2009. It was the fourth agreement in broader Madagascar peace process, replacing the 2009 Maputo Agreement, the *Charte de la Transition* (August 2009) and the Addis Ababa Additional Act (2010), all of which were only partially implemented. It contained four main articles that stipulated provisions for power sharing, electoral framework, confidence-building measures and national reconciliation and monitoring mechanisms under SADC oversight, with support from the AU, UN, Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).

Article/ Provision	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actors Responsible	Level (Score)
Arts. 28–44: Implementation Mechanisms	Rule of Law/ Inclusive Governance	Follow-up Committee operational; SADC Mediation Office functional; AU-SADC Liaison established; regular PSC reporting	SADC; AU; UN; OIF; ICG-M; follow-up committee	Intermediate (4)
Arts. 16–17: Rule of Law and Confidence- Building	Rule of Law	End of politically motivated prosecutions; judicial independence; adherence to rule of law and civil liberties	HAT/transitional government; judiciary	Minimal (3)
Art. 18: Amnesty Law (2002– 2009)	Rule of Law/ Transitional Justice	Blanket amnesty law ratified before elections; amnesty process completed; political exclusions resolved	Transitional Parliament; special commission; CRM	Minimal (2)
Arts. 17–18: Human Rights Protection	Human Rights	Protection of human rights, freedom of expression, association, assembly, press; end of security force abuses	HAT; transitional government; security forces	Minimal (3)
Art. 20: Return of Political Exiles	Human Rights/ Inclusive Governance	Unconditional return of all exiles including Ravalomanana; security guarantees provided	HAT; Rajoelina administration	Initiated (2)
Art. 27: National Solidarity Fund	Human Rights/ Reconciliation	NSF established and operational; victims compensated	Transitional government; international community	Uninitiated (1)
Arts. 3–9: Transitional Institutions	Power Sharing	Establishment of GNU; consensus PM; proportional CT, CST, CENI-T with gender/ regional balance	President of transition; Malagasy political stakeholders; SADC	Intermediate (4)
Art. II (Arts. 10– 14): Electoral Framework	Inclusive Governance	CENI-T established; credible electoral framework with UN experts; elections held on time; free and fair certification	CENI-T; President of transition; UN; SADC	Successful (5)

Arts. 25–26: CRM and Reparations	Inclusive Governance/ Reconciliation	CRM established; reconciliation process initiated; victim compensation framework operational	Transitional Parliament; CRM; international community	Minimal (3)
Arts. 6–7: Gender Representation	Inclusive Governance/ WPS	Fair gender distribution in GNU, CT, CST, CENI- T; measurable women's participation	President of Transition; consensus PM; political stakeholders	Minimal (3)

Methodological note: Rule of Law is assessed as Minimal (3) on the basis of [AU PSC \(2013\)](#) confirmation that confidence-building measures were only partially applied; documented security force abuses by Amnesty International (2011) and evidence of ongoing politically motivated restrictions. Power-sharing is coded as Intermediate (4) because all mandated institutions were formally established (PM, GNU, CT, CST, CENI-T) per the AU PSC (2013), constituting substantial progress. Electoral Framework is assessed as successful (5) based on: CENI-T operationalisation; joint UN-CENI-T timetable adoption (August 2012); presidential and legislative elections held on schedule (October–December 2013).

Case 6: Mali Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation/Algiers Accord (2015)

The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, emanating from the Algiers Process, was signed in two phases by the Government of Mali (15 May 2015) and the Coordination of Azawad Movements/CMA (20 June 2015), with Algeria serving as chief mediator and the AU, ECOWAS, UN, OIC and EU as guarantors. The accord provided for extensive decentralisation, integration of armed groups into reconstituted armed forces (FAMA), wealth-sharing through a 40% national budget allocation to northern regions and a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. The Carter Center served as an independent observer from November 2017, providing systematic monitoring of the accord's seventy-eight individual commitments. By 2022, fewer than 30% of the provisions had been implemented. Implementation has been severely impeded by continued armed group activity, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) withdrawal in 2023, the 2020–2021 coups and Mali's subsequent break from Western security partnerships (ICG 2024).

Article/Provision/ Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementatio n
Title II Ch.2 Art. 16–19: DDR/SSR	Rule of Law	Cantonment; DDR; FAMA reconstitution; territorial police deployment	GoM; CMA; Platform; MINUSMA; DDR Commission	2 – Initiated
Title III Art. 28–32: Transitional Justice/ Reconciliation	Human Rights	CVJR establishment; victim reparations; accountability for conflict crimes	GoM; CMA; civil society; OHCHR	2 – Initiated
Title II Ch.1 Art. 11–15: Interim Authorities	Power Sharing	Interim authority installation in northern regions; ex-movement representatives in government	GoM; CMA; Platform; AU Mediation	3 – Minimal
Title II Ch.1 Art. 6–10: Decentralisation	Inclusive Governance	Regional assemblies with elected presidents; 42- competency devolution; interim authorities	GoM; CMA; Platform; MINUSMA; Carter Center	2 – Initiated

Title IV Art. 36: Northern Development Fund	Natural Resource Management	Consultative Council for Development Zone; 40% budget to north; development programming	GoM; regional authorities; international partners	2 – Initiated
Title I Art. 3: Good Governance	Anti-Corruption	Constitutional and legislative anti-corruption measures; governance reform commitments	GoM; National Assembly; CSA Monitoring Committee	1 – Uninitiated

Methodological note: Implementation levels for the Algiers Accord draw from on the [Carter Center](#) Independent Observer [reports](#) (2018–2022), which tracked the accord's seventy-eight individual commitments systematically, MINUSMA quarterly and annual reports, Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) reports and supplementary ISS and ICG assessments.

Case study 7: Libya Political Agreement/Skhirat (2015)

The LPA, signed in Skhirat, Morocco on 17 December 2015 under UN mediation (UNSMIL), sought to resolve Libya's post-2011 political fragmentation by establishing a GNA operating through a nine-member Presidency Council. However, the agreement faced immediate implementation hurdles as internal legitimacy disputes persisted, leading to a continued institutional divide between Tripoli and Tobruk. The LPA proved unable to unify the country's competing armed factions, leading to the 2019 civil war between the GNA and Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), and ultimately to the 2020 Berlin Process and Geneva Ceasefire (Lacher 2018, Mezran and Maggi, 2025).

Article/Provision/Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementation
Art. 9–14: Unified Security Forces	Rule of Law	Supreme Security Committee; constitutional review process; unified security forces	PC; HoR; High State Council; UNSMIL	2 – Initiated
Art. 15–20: Human Rights Guarantees	Human Rights	HR guarantees; SGBV protections; non-discrimination provisions in governance	PC; UNSMIL; OHCHR; civil society	2 – Initiated
Art. 1–8: Presidency Council/GNU	Power Sharing	PC formation; GNU to be approved by HoR; unified executive authority	UNSMIL; GNA/PC; HoR; High State Council	2 – Initiated
Art. 21–25: National Reconciliation	Inclusive Governance	National reconciliation process; inclusion of all political actors; dialogue forums	PC; civil society; UNSMIL	2 – Initiated

Art. 29–33: Economic and Oil Management	Natural Resource Management	NOC management; sovereign wealth fund accountability; unified economic institutions	PC; NOC; central bank; international community	2 – Initiated
Art. 26–28: Anti-Corruption Commission	Anti-Corruption	Anti-corruption commission; financial transparency; asset recovery mechanisms	PC; Anti-Corruption Authority; UNSMIL	1 – Uninitiated

Methodological note: Implementation levels for the LPA are based on UNSMIL reporting, specialised research analysis and academic literature on Libya's post-2015 political economy. The majority of provisions are rated Initiated (2) rather than Minimal (3) because, while the GNA was formed and formally took office in Tripoli, it never achieved unified sovereign authority. The agreement required the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) to approve the GNA executive, a condition that was never met. Despite provisions for enhanced transparency over resource distribution and economic governance, competition over resources and rents persists as a structural driver of conflict in Libya, marked by predation and elite capture (Eaton 2025).

Case Study 8: South Sudan Revitalised ARCSS (2018)

The R-ARCSS, signed on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa under IGAD mediation, revitalised the failed 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). The R-ARCSS established the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), mandating a permanent ceasefire, security sector unification, accountability mechanisms including the HCSS, a 35% women's participation quota, natural resource governance reforms and a constitution-making process. The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) provides quarterly implementation monitoring. As of December 2025, RJMEC reported significant political and security deterioration, and elections scheduled for December 2024 were postponed to December 2026.

Article/Provision/Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementation
Ch. III: NUF; DDR/SSR; integration timeline	Rule of Law	NUF design agreed; training at Luri Cantonment Centre; ~30% training completed by 2022; unified army not functional; SSPDF and SPLM-IO remain separate	DDR Commission; GRSS SSPDF; SPLM-IO; SSOA; UNMISS; IGAD; AU; NUF Training	2 — Initiated
Ch. V: Hybrid Court/Transitional Justice/Accountability	Human Rights	HCSS; CTRC; CR&R mechanisms; accountability for atrocities	RTGoNU; AU Commission; OHCHR; civil society	1 – Uninitiated
Ch. I: Transitional Government / Power-Sharing	Power Sharing	RTGoNU formation; 35% women quota; party-based ministerial allocation	RTGoNU; SPLM-IO; SSOA; OPP; RJMEC; IGAD	4 – Intermediate
Ch. I Art. 1.13–1.18: Inclusive Governance	Inclusive Governance	Civil society engagement; gender representation; inclusive government appointments	RTGoNU; civil society; women's groups; RJMEC	3 – Minimal

Ch. IV: Economic/ Natural Resource Reform	Natural Resource Management	Petroleum revenue review; Land Act reform; Oil Stabilisation Account; Future Generations Fund	RTGoNU; Ministry of Petroleum; World Bank	1 – Uninitiated
Ch. VI: Fiscal Accountability	Anti-Corruption	National Audit Chamber; Fiscal Decentralisation; anti-corruption commission	RTGoNU; National Audit Chamber; RJMEC; IMF	2 – Initiated

Methodological note: R-ARCSS implementation data is sourced from [RJMEC quarterly reports](#) (001/19 through 024/24), PAM provision-level data (overall score 50/100) and CTSAMVM ceasefire monitoring data. Power-sharing (Ch. I) is rated Intermediate (4) because the RTGoNU was formed, ministerial allocations were made and the 35% women's quota was substantially met in government appointments, though functional governance remains constrained by political competition. SSSR/DDR is rated Initiated (2) because although cantonment processes have commenced, SSANDF unification timelines have been repeatedly missed and violence by non-unified forces continued throughout the reporting period. The HCSS (Ch. V) is rated Uninitiated (1) because the AU Commission has not established the court and the RTGoNU has not enacted the necessary domestic legislation, constituting the most significant individual implementation failure of the agreement. Natural resource reform (Ch. IV) is rated Uninitiated (1) because, as documented in PAM provision-level data, no observable progress on petroleum revenue review, Land Act reform, the Oil Stabilisation Account or the Future Generations Fund was recorded between 2018 and 2024. Anti-Corruption (Ch. VI) is rated Initiated (2) because the National Audit Chamber exists but operates with severely constrained independence and resources, as documented in RJMEC quarterly reports.

Case study 9: CAR Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (2019)

The AU-facilitated Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR) was signed on 6 February 2019, in Bangui by the CAR government and fifteen armed groups. The agreement established a mixed government inclusive of armed group representatives, an Executive Monitoring Committee (CES), mandated DDR and SSR supported by MINUSCA and transitional justice provisions including the establishment of the Special Criminal Court (SCC). Implementation has been characterised by partial progress in the security and justice domains, although renewed hostilities by armed groups, a deteriorating human rights environment and political instability are enduring challenges.

Article/Provision/ Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementa- tion
Annex: Security Arrangements (DDR/ SSR)	Rule of Law	DDR of 14 armed groups; FACA integration; MINUSCA- supported SSR	CAR Government; 14 armed groups; AU; MINUSCA; Russia/Rwanda	3 – Minimal
Art. 3–7: Special Criminal Court/Transitional Justice	Human Rights	SCC operational; TJ provisions; SGBV accountability	CAR Government; SCC; OHCHR; MINUSCA	3 – Minimal
Art. 8–12: Mixed Government	Power Sharing	Mixed government including armed group representatives; ministerial allocations	CAR Government; armed groups; AU Commission	3 – Minimal

Art. 13–16: National Dialogue Platform	Inclusive Governance	Comité de Suivi operational; civil society participation; national dialogue platform	CAR Government; civil society; AU; Comité de Suivi	3 – Minimal
Art. 17–20: EITI and Natural Resources	Natural Resource Management	EITI implementation; transparent management of mining and forestry revenues	CAR Government; EITI; international partners	2 – Initiated
Art. 21–24: Financial Accountability	Anti-Corruption	Anti-corruption measures; financial accountability in armed group transition	CAR Government; civil society; EITI; MINUSCA	2 – Initiated

Methodological note: Implementation levels for the CAR APPR are based on the reports of the CES, UN Security Council reports on CAR (2019–2024), AU PSC communiqués and specialised research reports. The four Minimal (3) ratings reflect the APPR's paradoxical implementation trajectory: formal institutions were created and have been at least partially functional (the SCC, Comité de Suivi, mixed government), but sustained armed group defections, particularly by the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC) in 2020–2021, have reversed substantive gains. The SCC (Art. 3–7) is rated Minimal (3) because it has been operationalised, issued arrest warrants and conducted preliminary hearings, but the pace of proceedings is insufficient relative to the scale of impunity.

Case study 10: Mozambique RENAMO DDR Agreement (2019)

The Agreement between the Mozambican government (Frelimo) and RENAMO, signed on 1 August 2019, builds on previous peace agreements (1992 General Peace Agreement) and specifically addresses RENAMO's residual military wing. It established a dedicated DDR process for RENAMO's 5 221 combatants, a government security guarantee and a power-sharing framework for provincial governance in RENAMO strongholds following the 2019 elections. The monitoring framework, including the Military Advisory Committee (MAC) and the Joint Technical Group for DDR (JTGDDR), provided structured oversight. By the end of 2023, DDR had been substantially completed, with 3 267 ex-combatants (63%) formally demobilised by the mid-implementation period and the process finalised by end-2023.

Article/Provision/Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementation
Ch. II: Disarmament and Demobilisation	Rule of Law	5 221 ex-combatants through DDR; weapons collected; MAC/JTGDDR verification	Government of Mozambique; RENAMO; MAC; JTGDDR; Swiss mediation	5 – Successful
Ch. IV: Reconciliation and Peace Education	Human Rights	Reconciliation programme; peace education in national curriculum; SGBV protections	Government of Mozambique; Ministry of Education; RENAMO; civil society	3 – Minimal

Ch. I: Decentralisation	Power Sharing	Provincial governors elected from opposition; devolution of state authority	Government of Mozambique; RENAMO; Constitutional Court	4 – Intermediate
Ch. III: Reintegration	Inclusive Governance	Integration into police/military; civilian livelihood support; vocational programming	Government of Mozambique; RENAMO; UNDP; SDC/Switzerland	4 – Intermediate
Ch. V: Natural Resource Management	Natural Resource Management	Community-based NRM; forestry and land rights provisions for conflict-affected communities	Government of Mozambique; communities; RENAMO	3 – Minimal
Ch. VI: Anti-Corruption and Governance	Anti-Corruption	Anti-corruption obligations in reintegration; financial accountability for RENAMO transition	Government of Mozambique; RENAMO; civil society	3 – Minimal

Methodological note: Implementation assessment data is sourced from MAC monitoring data, Swiss government reporting and UNDP programme evaluation data providing systematic implementation evidence. DDR/Disarmament (Ch. II) is rated Successful (5) because the target of 5 221 combatants was substantially met by the end of the programme cycle in 2023, weapons were collected and the verification process was conducted by the MAC with Swiss facilitation. The reintegration process (Ch. III) is rated Intermediate (4) because police and military integration was initiated and civilian livelihood support programmes were operational, though absorption capacity limitations and geographic remoteness of some reintegration sites constrained full completion. Decentralisation (Ch. I) is rated Intermediate (4) because the October 2019 provincial governor elections resulted in RENAMO-affiliated candidates winning provincial governorships in six provinces, constituting the most tangible political dividend of the accord. Reconciliation and peace education (Ch. IV) is rated Minimal (3) because curriculum integration was approved at the policy level but implementation across all affected schools remained partial as of 2024. Natural resource management (Ch. V) and Anti-Corruption (Ch. VI) are rated Minimal (3) on the basis that enabling frameworks were established but institutionalisation remained incomplete.

Case study 11: Libya Ceasefire Agreement (2020)

The Libyan Ceasefire Agreement, concluded in Geneva under UNSMIL auspices on 23 October 2020, established the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprising five representatives each from the GNA and LNA, endorsed by the AU and the international community. It provided for a comprehensive ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces and a disengagement of forces. The agreement has largely held as a ceasefire instrument, though the withdrawal of foreign forces and the integration of armed factions have not occurred.

Article/Provision/Section	AU Governance Benchmark	Indicator	Actor(s) Responsible	Level of Implementation
Cl. 1–4: Ceasefire and Military Disengagement	Rule of Law	Nationwide ceasefire; frontline units returned to camps; Security and Operations Room	GNA; LAAF; 5+5 JMC; UNSMIL	4 – Intermediate
Cl. 6: Foreign Fighter Withdrawal	Rule of Law	Withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries within 90 days	GNA; LAAF; 5+5 JMC; UN Security Council	2 – Initiated

Cl. 10–12: Humanitarian Access and Human Rights	Human Rights	Prisoner releases; end of politically-motivated arrests; humanitarian access	GNA; LAAF; ICRC; UNSMIL	3 – Minimal
Cl. 8: DDR and Militia Reintegration	Inclusive Governance	Comprehensive DDR process for militias; armed group reintegration	GNA; LAAF; 5+5 JMC; UNSMIL	2 – Initiated
Cl. 5: Oil and Economic Normalisation	Natural Resource Management	Normalisation of NOC; resumption of oil production; revenue management	NOC; GNA; LAAF; international community	3 – Minimal
Cl. 9: Financial Transparency	Anti-Corruption	Financial transparency provisions; accountability for resource revenues during ceasefire	GNA; central bank; NOC; UNSMIL	1 – Uninitiated

Methodological note: Libya Ceasefire implementation data is drawn from UNSMIL reporting, the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, ICG analysis and published assessments of the 5+5 JMC process. Ceasefire and military disengagement (Cl. 1–4) is rated Intermediate (4) because, following the October 2020 signing, a de facto ceasefire has substantially held across most of Libya, frontlines have not substantially shifted since October 2020 and the 5+5 JMC meets regularly and has developed joint protocols, constituting concrete intermediate implementation. Foreign fighter withdrawal (Cl. 6) is rated Initiated (2) because, while formal discussions on withdrawal have occurred in multiple UN-facilitated forums, neither the Turkish-backed forces nor the Wagner Group (subsequently Africa Corps) withdrew, with both groups remaining deployed as of 2024, representing a fundamental violation of the agreement's core military provisions. Oil normalisation (Cl. 5) is rated Minimal (3) because oil production resumed substantially after October 2020, rising from near-zero to over 1 million barrels per day, though revenue distribution remains contested between eastern and western institutions and the provision's political economy dimensions remain unresolved.

7.3. Cross-case analysis of the implementation measurement framework

7.3.1. Structural and governance challenges at the agreement design level

(i) Several *design-level factors* correlate with implementation outcomes:

Specificity of provisions: agreements with detailed timelines, institutional mandates and measurable indicators (Liberia CPA, Sudan CPA) achieved higher implementation scores than those with vague or aspirational language (Libya LPA, Mali Algiers Accord).

The quality of implementation body design: agreements with credible, adequately resourced and politically independent monitoring mechanisms are strongly associated with higher implementation levels. The Liberia CPA achieved the highest overall implementation levels among the selected cases in part because the UNMIL provided a well-resourced, credible international monitoring and enforcement presence that altered the incentive structure for compliance.

(ii) National governance level

Political will: At the national governance level, political will is the most powerful single predictor of implementation outcomes. In Libya, Mali, South Sudan and Sudan there is substantial evidence that dominant parties have deliberately exploited implementation ambiguities or created bureaucratic obstacles to compliance with provisions that would constrain their power. This behaviour is consistent with Bell and Wise's (2022) observation that implementation is often treated by parties as an opportunity to 'win the peace' through selective compliance.

State capacity constraints: particularly the absence of functional bureaucratic institutions, technical expertise and public financial management systems are an additional systematic implementation barrier. Post-conflict societies are often confronted with a lack of material and financial resources, hence the need for realistic assessment of intended results against limited financial capacity (Bramble and Paffenholz, 2020).

(iii) Continental institutional level

Coordination gaps: AU and REC engagement with peace agreements is multidimensional and varies significantly across sub-regional contexts, however, there is a persistent gap between the normative frameworks the AU has developed and its operational capacity to ensure that those frameworks translate into implementation outcomes. The institutional merger under PAPS and the establishment of the joint AGA-APSA Secretariat are positive steps, but there is a need to find stronger and functional synergies between AGA and APSA (Khadiagala, 2015).

There is also a missed opportunity to utilise the APRM as an accountability mechanism for monitoring implementation progress. The APRM's country review process, which covers democratic governance, economic governance, corporate governance, socio-economic development and cross-cutting issues, could contribute to assessment of peace agreement governance provisions, enhancing accountability and monitoring of compliance in alignment with AU governance benchmarks.

Monitoring without enforcement: the AU's monitoring bodies issue communiqués and recommendations but lack effective enforcement mechanisms. The PSC's warnings against spoilers in the CAR context, for example, have not been backed by the implementation of sanctions.

8. DEEPENING THE PEACE-SECURITY-GOVERNANCE NEXUS

The key findings of this report underscore the peace-security-governance nexus as a key variable in peace agreement implementation and the quest for durable peace.

A recurring theme across the cases analysed is the impact of governance deficits as a major structural constraint of peace agreement implementation in Africa. Conflicts arise from governance deficits, such as political exclusion, resource capture, impunity and weak rule of law, which peace agreements seek to address through institutional reform commitments. When peace agreements fail to produce this governance transformation, due to vague provisions, exclusion of vital stakeholders or elite capture, the structural conditions for conflict recurrence remain in place (Adetula et al., 2018).

Second, inclusion can be a means of enhancing implementation rates and durability. The principle that civil society inclusion in a peace agreement leads to greater implementation because it increases accountability and legitimacy is reiterated in this report's findings. For example, the exclusion of civil society and local communities from the Algiers process in Mali meant that implementation was missing the grassroots legitimacy and monitoring capacity that broader inclusion would have provided, which in turn negatively impacted the implementation trajectory.

Enhancing resource governance dimensions is a key enabling factor. Across the cases, a key finding was under-implementation of the natural resource management governance benchmark. In the cases of CAR, DRC, Libya, Mali, and Sudan, the failure to implement natural resource management and revenue governance provisions has perpetuated the political economy of violence. Specifically, weak resource governance not only accounts for the onset of violence, but also heightens the risk of renewed violence and entrenched criminalisation in resource-rich post-war transition contexts (Massé and LeBillon, 2017).

9. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Drawing on the key findings of this report and core thematic analysis, the following recommendations are directed at the AU PSC, APRM Continental Secretariat, AU PAPS Department and other relevant continental institutions.

For the AU PSC

- (i). Develop a systematic, AU-led Implementation Assessment Framework. The AU PSC should commission and resource the development of a standing implementation monitoring and assessment capacity within the AU Commission's PAPS Department, applying the five-tier Implementation Measurement Framework adapted in this report across all active African peace agreements.
- (ii). Institutionalise the governance-security nexus in AU mediation and implementation architecture. The PSC should mandate that all AU-led or AU-supported peace processes include explicit governance reform provisions calibrated to AU governance benchmarks, and should ensure that

implementation mechanisms for agreements with significant governance dimensions include governance expertise alongside security and political monitoring capacity.

- (iii). Strengthen AU capacity to manage and sanction spoiler behaviour. The PSC should develop clearer protocols for identifying, documenting and responding to parties with spoiler behaviour through targeted sanctions, diplomatic isolation and engagement with regional and international partners.
- (iv). Pertaining to early warning, in line with its 901st Meeting (2019, PSC/PR/COMM. CMI) which called for strengthening the linkages between early warning and early response, the PSC should coordinate quarterly meetings of the PSC Committee of Experts with the plenary meetings of peace agreement monitoring bodies, which in turn can enhance their anticipatory capacity and bolster the political impact of their reports.

For the APRM Continental Secretariat

- (i). Integrate peace agreement implementation monitoring into APRM country review processes. The APRM Secretariat should develop a standardised module for assessing the governance dimensions of peace agreement implementation as part of its country review process for post-conflict and conflict-affected states. This module should use the AU governance benchmarks applied in this report and should produce country-level implementation assessments that can inform PSC deliberations and AU diplomatic engagement.
- (ii). Develop APRM-supported Peer Learning Networks on peace agreement implementation. The APRM Secretariat should facilitate structured peer learning exchanges among post-conflict states that have participated in APRM reviews, drawing on the governance lessons identified in this report. Cases such as the Liberia CPA, where governance reform commissions, anti-corruption institutions and extractive transparency mechanisms have been comparatively more successful, offer transferable lessons for states at earlier stages of implementation that can be facilitated through APRM peer exchange mechanisms.
- (iii). Mainstream the peace-governance nexus in APRM member state follow-up processes. The APRM Secretariat should ensure that for all member states with active peace agreements, the National Programme of Action (NPoA) developed through the APRM review process explicitly addresses peace agreement implementation commitments as governance benchmarks against which progress should be monitored and reported.

For the AU PAPS Department

- (i). Develop standardised AU Peace Agreement Implementation Guidelines. The PAPS Department should develop and disseminate standardised guidelines for the design of peace agreement implementation mechanisms, drawing on best practices identified in this report and in the broader literature. These guidelines should address: the composition of monitoring bodies; the specificity of benchmarks and indicators; the inclusion of civil society; the financial and technical sustainability of monitoring arrangements; and the conditions under which AU-mandated sanctions for non-compliance should be enacted.
- (ii). Establish a Dedicated Peace Agreement Implementation Support Unit. The PAPS Department should establish or strengthen a dedicated unit tasked with providing technical assistance to implementation mechanisms operating under AU-endorsed peace agreements. This unit should be able to deploy governance expertise, legal analysis, mediation support and conflict monitoring capacity in support of active implementation processes, strengthening the synergy between AGA and APSA.
- (iii). Drawing on the lessons and experiences of the RJMEC, PAPS should formulate an inter-institutional protocol to standardise monitoring across national, sub-regional and international levels. Such a protocol should stipulate roles, reporting lines, information-sharing obligations and escalation pathways between the national level (signatory level) and the regional level (guarantors), supported by international observers or partners.¹⁸

¹⁸ The RJMEC operates as a multi-level, vertically integrated monitoring architecture across the national level (the signatory parties and societal stakeholders, including civil society), the sub-regional/continental level (guarantors from the IGAD sub-region, the AU Commission and the AU High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee (C5)); and the international level ('IGAD Plus' partners, UNMISS).

- (iv). On deepening involvement of CSOs, PAPS should accelerate the institutionalisation of the Pan-African Civil Society Network on Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PANPAPS)¹⁹ as a pathway towards formalising engagement between the AU and CSOs in early warning, policy advocacy and implementation of peace agreements
- (v). Strengthen the integration of gender, transitional justice and natural resource governance into peace agreement design and implementation oversight. On WPS provisions, PAPS and the AU Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security should jointly develop a Women's Implementation Participation Protocol, providing operational guidance to parties and mediators on formulating substantive gender provisions.

For RECs

- (i). Enhance REC implementation support. RECs should establish dedicated peace agreement implementation units within their conflict prevention and peacebuilding departments, with standardised reporting mechanisms to the AU PSC and PAPS.
- (ii). RECs should work with the AU PAPS Department to develop clear protocols for the division of labour and information-sharing among stakeholders in implementation monitoring, ensuring that monitoring bodies provide consistent and complementary assessments.

10. CONCLUSION

This report has undertaken a systematic mapping and analytical review of fifteen peace agreements concluded in Africa between 2002 and 2024, applying AU governance benchmarks and an adapted IMF to assess the state of implementation and identify structural drivers of success and failure. A cross-cutting insight across the case studies is the pattern of implementation failure or partial implementation, underpinned by interacting structural deficiencies at the agreement design level, the national governance level and the continental institutional level.

Power-sharing provisions stands out as a nearly-universal provision across the case studies, but frequently produces elite-capture arrangements that undergird political conflict, while failing to address the structural drivers of conflict. DDR and SSR provisions are hampered by persistent security dilemma, resource deficits and strategic non-compliance by armed factions. Transitional justice, WPS and natural resource provisions record the lowest average implementation rates across the corpus, underscoring the need for more robust engagement on accountability and gender-responsive frameworks in bridging the gap between policy and practice.

The centrality of the governance-peace-security nexus, at the core of the AU's conflict management and resolution frameworks, affirms effective governance and durable peace and security as mutually reinforcing imperatives. Strengthening this nexus requires not only better designed agreements but more credible, adequately resourced and politically independent monitoring mechanisms, and an institutionalised role for the APRM as a governance accountability instrument in post-conflict contexts.

For future research and policy agenda, the necessity of well-designed, contextually-attuned agreements that are aimed at structural drivers of conflict requires a deeper understanding of the main variables that contribute to improved implementation outcomes. A potential consideration in this regard is the development of real-time, longitudinal implementation datasets for African peace agreements comparable to the Kroc Institute's Barometer Initiative. Additionally, the operationalisation of the APRM as an implementation monitoring mechanism for peace agreements represents an opportunity for deeper research and policy analysis in efforts to strengthen relevant peace-as-governance initiatives across the continental, regional and local levels.

¹⁹ PANPAPS, established in 2025, is a growing network of African CSOs which seeks to harmonise and coordinate the engagement and collaboration between CSOs and the AU PSC in addressing the continent's peace, security and governance challenges, see <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pr-au-information-network-of-csos-in-southern-africa-ew-eng-.pdf>

References

- ACCORD (2009) *Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa: Background paper for ACCORD Workshop*, Durban: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.
- Adetula, V., Murithi, T. and Buchanan-Clarke, S. (2018) *Peace Negotiations and Agreements in Africa – Why They Fail and How to Improve Them*. NAI Policy Note No 8:2018. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
- Aeby, M. (2022a) *How African Organisations Envision Peacemaking*, PeaceRep Research Project, University of Edinburgh. Available at <https://peacere.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/African-Report-Digital.pdf>
- Aeby, M. (2022b) *How African Organisations Support Peace Agreement Implementation*. PeaceRep Research Project, University of Edinburgh. Available at https://peacere.org/?sdm_process_download=1&download_id=17755
- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). (2019). *The Africa Governance Report: Promoting African Union Shared Values*. Available at <https://aprm.au.int/sites/default/files/files/2024-07/aga-report-english-online.pdf>
- Backer, D. (2018) 'Factoring Transitional Justice into the Quality Peace Equation', *Understanding Quality Peace*, Routledge (p, 121–134)
- Badanjak, S., Amaya-Panche, J., Beaujouan, J., Eppe, T., Farquhar, A., Henry, N., Wilson, R. and Wise, L. (2025) *Peace Agreements in 2024: Insights from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database*. Edinburgh: PeaceRep.
- Bekoe, D. A. (2003). Toward a theory of peace agreement implementation: The case of Liberia. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, 38(2-3), 256-294.
- Bell, C. and Badanjak, S. (2019) 'Introducing PA-X: A New Peace Agreement Database and Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(3), p, 452–466.
- Bell, C., and Wise, L. (2022). Peace processes and their agreements. In *Contemporary Peacemaking: Peace processes, peacebuilding and Conflict* (3rd edition), edited by R. Mac Ginty and A. Wanis-St. John. Cham: Springer International Publishing. (p, 381-406).
- Bramble, A. and Paffenholz, T. (2020). 'Implementing Peace Agreements: From inclusive processes to inclusive outcomes?' United Nations Development Programme, Oslo Governance Centre.
- Carter Centre. 2022. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process. Available at <https://www.cartercenter.org/publication/mali-independent-observer-report-nov-2022/>
- Christien, A. and Mukhtarova, T. (2020). 'Explaining trends in the frequency of gender provisions in peace agreements, 1990-2019'. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS).
- Coe, B. and Nash, K. (2020) 'Peace process protagonism: the role of regional organisations in Africa in conflict management', *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 32(2), p, 157–177.
- Daase, C. 2011. Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme – A New Model of Shared Sovereignty?, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht. Available at https://www.zaoerv.de/71_2011/71_2011_3_a_493_522.pdf
- De Waal A., (2015). *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Devermont, J. and Harris, M. 2020. 'Why Mali Needs a New Peace Deal,' Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) CSIS Africa Program Analysis. Available at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-mali-needs-new-peace-deal>
- Dizolele, M.P 2025. Critical Minerals, Fragile Peace: The DRC-Rwanda Deal and the Cost of Ignoring Root Causes,' CSIS Africa Program. Available at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/critical-minerals-fragile-peace-drc-rwanda-deal-and-cost-ignoring-root-causes>
- Eaton, T. 2025. 'Escaping the cycle of conflict in Libya- Why an enhanced 'economic track' must be integrated into political negotiations,' Chatham House. Available at <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/2025-12-17-escaping-cycle-conflict-libya-eaton.pdf>
- Hampson, F.O. 1996. *Nurturing peace: Why peace settlements succeed or fail*. US Institute of Peace Press.
- Hartzell, C. A., M. Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. 'Stabilizing the peace after civil war: An investigation of some key variables'. *International Organization* 55(1): 183–208.
- Högbladh, S. (2011). Peace agreements 1975–2011: Updating the UCDP peace agreement dataset. *States in Armed conflict*, 55, 85-105.
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2020a) 'Mali's Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm'. Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/qna/africa/mali/malis-algiers-peace-agreement-five-years-uneasy-calm>

- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2020b) 'Fleshing Out the Libya Ceasefire Agreement'. Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/middle-east-north-africa/libya/b080-fleshing-out-libya-ceasefire-agreement>
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2024) 'Northern Mali: Return to Dialogue'. Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/sahel/mali/314-nord-du-mali-revenir-au-dialogue>
- Jaye, T. 2009. 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Liberia,' The International Center for Transitional Justice, Policy brief. Available at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Liberia-ResearchBrief-2009-English_0.pdf
- Joshi, M., and Mason, T.D., (2011). "Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post-Civil War States.' *International Interactions*. vol. 37, no. 4, p. 388–413.
- Joshi, M., and Quinn, J. M. (2015). Is the sum greater than the parts? The terms of civil war peace agreements and the commitment problem revisited. *Negotiation Journal*, 31(1), 7-30.
- Joshi, M; Quinn, J.M and Regan (2015) 'Annualized implementation data on intrastate comprehensive peace accords', 1989-2012. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(4): 551- 562.
- Joshi, M., Lee, S., and Mac Ginty, R. (2017). Built-in safeguards and the implementation of civil war peace accords. *International interactions*, 43(6), 994-1018.
- Joshi, M. and Wallensteen, (eds) (2018) *Understanding Quality Peace: Peacebuilding after Civil War*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Kaldor, M., (2013). 'In Defence of New Wars'. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. vol 2, no. 1., p. 1-16.
- Khadiagala, G.M. (2015) *Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance to Prevent, Manage, and Resolve Conflicts in Africa*. New York: International Peace Institute.
- Kotzé, D. (2019). The Issue of Implementation Enforcement: SADC's Power Mediation in Madagascar. *Politeia*, 38(1), 24-pages. Available at <https://doi.org/10.25159/2663-6689/3246>
- Lacher, W. 2018. 'Libya: Getting Serious about Negotiations,' SWP Comment 2018/C 39. Available at <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libya-getting-serious-about-negotiations>
- Linke, J. (2020) *Provisions on SSR and DDR in Peace Agreements*. DCAF Thematic Brief. Geneva: DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.
- Lyons, T. (2016). Successful peace implementation: plans and processes. *Peacebuilding*, 4(1), 71–82.
- Lyons, T. (2018). Peace Implementation and Quality Peace. In M. Joshi and, Wallensteen (Eds.), *Understanding Quality Peace*, (29–43). Routledge.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2010) "Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace." *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 4 (2010): 391–412.
- Magara, E. 2025. 'Beyond Elite Bargains: The Legacy and Future of IGAD's Mediation in South Sudan,' IPI Global Observatory. Available at <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2025/07/beyond-elite-bargains-the-legacy-and-future-of-igads-mediation-in-south-sudan/>
- Maina, G., and Melander, E. (Eds.). (2016). *Peace agreements and durable peace in Africa*. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
- Mezran. K and Maggi, R. 2025. 'Beyond ceasefires: Reimagining stability and engagement in Libya,' *Atlantic Council*. Available at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/beyond-ceasefires-reimagining-stability-and-engagement-in-libya/>
- Mitchell, C. (2003) Mediation and the ending of conflicts. In: Darby, J. and MacGinty, R. (eds.) *Contemporary peacemaking: conflict, violence and peace processes*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Molloy, S. (2018). 'Assessing and Influencing Progress in Peace Processes Workshop Report- Progress in Peace Processes,' Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), University of Edinburgh. Available at www.politicalsettlements.org
- Mthembu-Slater, G. 2016. 'Peace and peace agreements in Burundi, in G. Maina and E. Melander (eds.), *Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa*, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. (p,47-84).
- Mutisi, M. (2011) Peace Implementation in the Post-2005 Era: *Lessons from Four Peace Agreements in Africa*. Policy and Practice Brief No. 13. Durban: ACCORD.
- Nilsson, D. (2012). 'Anchoring the peace: Civil society actors in peace accords and durable peace'. *International Interactions*, 38(2), 243-266.
- Oola, S. 2019. "The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission's Role and Perspective on the South Sudan Peace Process". Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 10 December. Available at <https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2019/12/10/the-reconstituted-joint-monitoring-and-evaluation-commissions-role-and-perspective-on-the-south-sudan-peace-process/>

- Ottaway, M and Hamzawy, A. (2011). 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement,' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Middle East. Available at <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2011/01/the-comprehensive-peace-agreement>
- Palik, J., Celestino, M. R., Gomez-Triana, D., Marsh, N., and Rødningen, I. (2025). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in peace agreements (1975–2021): Introducing the DDR dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 62(7), 2454-2465.
- Paffenholz, T. (2014) 'Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy,' *Negotiation Journal* 30(1): 69–76.
- Paffenholz, T., Hirblinger, A. T., Landau, D., Fritsch, F., and Dijkstra, C. (2017). 'Preventing Violence Through Inclusion: From Building Political Momentum To Sustaining Peace,' IPTI, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.
- Paffenholz, T. 2018. 'Is Civil Society Needed For Quality Peace?,' In M. Joshi and, Wallensteen (Eds.), *Understanding Quality Peace* (,163-177). Routledge.
- Peksen, D., Taydas, Z., and Drury, A.C., (2007). Tax and spend ... but don't fight: State building, public welfare spending, and civil war. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, 29 March 2007.
- Political Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh. 2020. *Key Findings: Gender in Peace Agreements*. Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, University of Edinburgh. Available at <https://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Gender>
- Quinn, J., and Echavarría Alvarez, J. (2022). 'Peace agreements'. In *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict studies* (p, 923-930). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Sanghrajka, N. 2024. Mozambique: 'A Classic Case of Mediation in Modern Times,' Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Strategic Security Analyses, Issue 39. Available at www.gcsp.ch
- Schernbeck, N and Vimalarajah, L (2017). 'Paving the Way for the Effective and Inclusive Implementation of Peace Accords. A Strategic Framework'. Berlin: Berghof Foundation. Available at www.berghof-foundation.org/publications
- Sesay, A. 2021. 'ECOWAS and the limits of peacemaking in West Africa,' in V. Adetula, R. Bereketeab and C. Obi (eds.), *Regional Economic Communities and Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons from ECOWAS and IGAD*, Routledge, pp. 125-142.
- Sriram, C. L. (2008). *Peace as Governance*. Palgrave Macmillan UK. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582163>
- Stedman, S.J., (1997). 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes'. *International Security*, vol. 22, No. 2, p, 32-36.
- Stedman, S. J., D. Rothchild, and E. M. Cousens, eds., (2002). *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Toft, M.D. (2009) *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thurston, A. 2020. *Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tshibambe, G.N 2016. 'Analysing the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo From war to uncertain peace,' in G. Maina and E. Melander (eds.), *Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa*, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. (p,161-190).
- Vandeginste, S., and Sriram, C. L. (2011). Power Sharing and Transitional Justice: A Clash of Paradigms? *Global Governance*, 17(4), 489–505. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01704006>.
- Wallensteen, and Sollenberg, M. (1997). Armed conflicts, conflict termination and peace agreements, 1989-96. *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(3), 339-358.
- Wennmann, A. (2009). Economic Provisions in Peace Agreements and Sustainable Peacebuilding. *Négociations*, 11, 43-61. <https://doi.org/10.3917/neg.011.0043>.
- Wise, L. and Campbell, F. (2025) 'Women, peace and security at 25: assessing implementation through gender provisions in peace agreements', PeaceRep Blog, 24 July 2025. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh. Available at <https://peacerep.org/2025/07/24/women-peace-and-security-at-25/>
- Zartman, I.W (ed). (1997). *Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Zartman, I. W. 2000. "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in Paul Stern, and Daniel Druckman (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. p, 225–250.

Databases and repositories

African Transitional Justice Hub (ATJH). 2025. Peace Agreements Database. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Available at <https://atjhub.csvr.org.za/peace-agreements/>

African Union Peace Observatory 2025. Implementation Monitoring Reports. Addis Ababa: AU Commission, Peace and Security Department. Available at <https://peaceobs.au.int>

PA-X Peace Agreements Database (2025) Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), University of Edinburgh. Available at www.peaceagreements.org

Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) Implementation Dataset (2025). Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2025). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame. Available at <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu>

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (2022) *From Hopeful Agreements to Disillusioned Peace? The Effects of Peace Agreement Implementation on Women's Security and Empowerment*. Project led by Louise Olsson. Oslo: PRIO. Available at <https://www.prio.org/projects/1786>

Ronceray, M, Tadesse, L.S and Staeger, U. (2021). 'Merging Peace and Politics: Drivers, Dilemmas and Options for the AU's New Governance Setup,' European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Discussion paper no.303

Svicevic, M. (Ed.). (2021). *Compendium of documents relating to regional and sub-regional peace and security in Africa (2021)*. Pretoria University Law Press.

United Nations Mediation Support Unit (MSU) (2025) *UN Peacemaker: Peace Agreements Database and Language of Peace Tool*. New York: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/areas-of-work/peace-agreements-database-and-language-of-peace-tool>

Peace agreements (case studies)

(Burundi) Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (2003). Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9168>

(DRC) Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Political Parties (2002) *Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC*. Pretoria, 17 December 2002. Available at <https://www.peaceagreements.org>

(Liberia) Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties Accra (2003). Available at https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag338_560147822ab3e.pdf

(Libya) Libyan Political Agreement (LPA/Skhirat Agreement). Skhirat, Morocco, 2015. Available at https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag1370_571f36a071558.pdf

(Libya) Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) (2020) Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya. Available at https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag2320_5faa7f7e8bb12.pdf

(Madagascar) SADC Political Roadmap 2011. Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9324>

(Mozambique) Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation. Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9950>

(Mali) Algiers Accord / Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali. Available at https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag1365_57d4474702839.pdf

(South Sudan) Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Available at <https://www.peaceagreements.org/agreements/2112/>

(Sudan) Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement 2005 (Naivasha Agreement). Available at https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag337_5616aeb31cf24.pdf

(Sudan) Government of Sudan (Transitional) and Peace Process Parties (2020) *Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Parties to the Peace Process*. Juba, 3 October 2020. Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org>

(Sudan) Government of Sudan/LJM and Transitional Authority (2011) Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Doha, 14 July 2011. Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org>

Primary documents

- AU. 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union. Addis Ababa: African Union.
- AU. 2002. 'Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union'. 9 July. Addis Ababa: African Union.
- AU. 2007. 'African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance'. African Union. Addis Ababa.
- AU. 2015. 'Agenda 2063: First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023'.
- AU. 2016. 'Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020'. Addis Ababa.
- AU, Peace and Security Council. 2025. Communiqué of PSC 1298th meeting, PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025)
- UN Security Council, Final report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2018/344
- UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Libya. 2021. Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, 8 March, S/2021/229
- UN, Security Council, 2022. Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2022/967
- UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Mali.2023, Final report of the Panel of Experts, 3 August, S/2023/578
- UN Security Council. 2024. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in South Sudan, S/2024/776
- UN DDR Bulletin Issue number 1 / 2023
- Government of Switzerland, 2024. 'Implementation Maputo Peace Accord'. Available at <https://www.eda.admin.ch/countries/mozambique/en/home/international-cooperation/projects.html/content/dezaprojects/SDC/en/2020/7F10547/phase2>

Appendix 1

Corpus construction coding procedure and parameters

Step	Action	Count	Source/Justification
1	PA-X V9 Global Universe	2,144	PA-X V9, April 2025 peacerep
2	PA-X Region Filter: 'Africa (excl. MENA)'	~580	PA-X Reg variable peaceagreements
3	PA-X Region Filter: 'MENA' → AU member states	~75	Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania v1-methodology-note.md
4	Combined PA-X Africa (all years)	~655	Merger of Steps 2 + 3
5	Temporal Filter: ≥ 1 Jan 2002	~398	AU Constitutive Act (2001); formal launch 9 July 2002
6	Exclude Agtp = 'IntraLocal'	–63	PA-X Codebook V9: local/communal agreements peaceagreements+1
7	Post-exclusion PA-X baseline	335	National-level and conflict-wide agreements only
8	UN Peacemaker Africa (post-2002, non-local)	352	peacemaker.un.org; excludes local/communal documents peacemaker.un
9	Cross-database overlap (PA-X ∩ UN PM)	298	89.0% cross-validation rate
10	UN PM unique additions	54	Interstate, North African, IGAD-mediated processes
11	Supplementary sources (PULP, TJ Hub, AU)	18	Gap-filling from regional repositories pul,u,ac+1
12	Pre-de-duplication combined total	407	Steps 7 + 10 + 11
13	De-duplication (3-step protocol)	–39	Exact → fuzzy → manual review
14	Final Integrated Corpus	368	88.3% in ≥2 databases; 11.7% single-database (validated)