







MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

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
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THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In March, under the chairship of the Kingdom of Eswatini, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [Provisional Programme of Work](#) (PPoW) consisting of five substantive sessions. Following a revision to the PPoW, five sessions were held – although not in accordance with the initial PPoW, as one agenda item was added and another removed. The month also had the induction of the new members of the PSC.

Out of the five substantive sessions, two sessions focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All the sessions were held at the level of permanent representatives. It is also worth noting that, among all the sessions, only one was held in an open format.



Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent only one revision. The first change involved the postponement of the session, 'Briefing by Facilitators on their Activities on the Situation in Eastern DRC', which was originally scheduled for 12 March. The second change saw the change of the title of the session held on 10 March from 'Co-ordinated AU-SADC Support for Madagascar' to 'Update on the Situation in Madagascar.' The last change on the programme saw the addition of an agenda item, 'Engagement with the AU High Representative for Financing the Union and the Peace Fund pursuant to Assembly Decision 920 (XXXVIII)' on 10 March.

Except for the latter session on Engagement with the AU High Representative for Financing the Union, which was held as an informal session, the rest of the sessions adopted communiqués as outcome documents.

PSC SOFTENS POSITION ON RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IN GUINEA-BISSAU

The first session of the PSC was held on 5 March, as its 1333rd meeting, to receive an update on the 'situation in Guinea-Bissau.' The Council was briefed by the newly appointed AU Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau, Patrice Émery Trovoada, former Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe, based on his 19 and 20 February visit to the country and his engagement with political stakeholders on the country's political situation. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Guinea-Bissau, Ovídio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno—who has held the position since 2012—also briefed the Council, while the representative of the Chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delivered a

statement. A [communiqué](#) was adopted as an outcome document.



Figure 1: 1333rd Meeting of the PSC on the 'Situation in Guinea-Bissau,' 5 March 2026. (Source: X @[AUC_PAPS](#))

This marked the second time the PSC convened on the situation in Guinea-Bissau since the military coup of 26 November 2025, which disrupted the 23 November electoral process. During its [1315th](#) session, the PSC's initial response to the military seizure of power was to call on the military authorities to respect the popular will, allow the National Election Commission to complete the tabulation and proclamation of results, and ensure the continuation of the electoral process through to the inauguration of the winner. In essence, the PSC, as well as the ECOWAS, maintained that the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau required the completion of the November elections, rather than the pursuit of negotiated transitional arrangements.

Notwithstanding this position, the military authorities—the High Military Command—adopted a transitional political charter in December. Rather than facilitating the completion of the electoral process, this framework consolidated its hold on power by establishing a 12-month transition. The charter provides for a transitional president appointed by the military leadership, designates the High Military Command as the top political authority, and establishes a 65-member National Transitional Council alongside a transitional government led by a prime minister. Earlier, on 27 November 2025,

Major-General Horta N'Tam was installed as interim president for a one-year term, with presidential and legislative elections now scheduled for 6 December 2026.

Against this backdrop, the PSC, at its 1333rd session, appears to have shifted from its earlier position for the completion of the interrupted electoral process. Instead, the Council took note of the adoption of the transitional roadmap, while calling for their full, timely, inclusive, and transparent implementation, and for the creation of conditions conducive to credible elections in December 2026. The communiqué adopted at the session indicates that the Council's focus has transitioned toward supporting the country's progression to the envisaged elections.

In this context, the PSC requested the AU Commission to sustain engagement with the transitional authorities of Guinea-Bissau, including through the provision of technical support to the National Electoral Commission aimed at enhancing its independence, transparency, and institutional integrity. The Council also underscored the importance of addressing structural challenges, particularly through security sector reform to promote healthy civil-military relations. It further called for technical assistance in combating drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime that contribute to instability and undermine the political and security environment.

On the political front, the Council urged the interim authorities to immediately and unconditionally release the leader of the PAIGC party, Domingos Simões Pereira, who was detained following the coup and, although reportedly released in late January, still remains under house arrest.

In terms of coordination, the Council urged continued and coordinated support from ECOWAS, the United Nations, and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), including in mediating between competing political actors in the country, through a joint monitoring mechanism that aligns diplomatic initiatives, political demands, and applicable measures. It is to be recalled that, during its 1315th session, the Council requested the Chairperson of the Commission to establish an inclusive AU monitoring mechanism, in collaboration with ECOWAS and other relevant stakeholders, to closely follow developments in Guinea-Bissau and the implementation of decisions adopted by ECOWAS and the PSC.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1315th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1315 \(2025\)](#)], held on 28 November 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to establish an inclusive AU Monitoring Mechanism in collaboration with ECOWAS and all other relevant stakeholders, to closely follow up on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, especially the implementation of the ECOWAS and PSC decisions.
- Agreed to hold a PSC Meeting at the Heads of State and Government level, dedicated to discussion on the resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.

Finally, the Council decided to undertake a field mission to the country in the course of the year, without specifying a timeline. It also expressed anticipation for an AU–ECOWAS joint assessment mission. Notably, however, the Council did not reiterate the relevance of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government

from contesting subsequent elections. This omission is significant, particularly in light of the Council's recent practice in cases such as Gabon and Guinea, where sanctions were lifted following elections conducted in apparent contravention of Article 25(4).

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to provide technical support in combating drug trafficking and other criminal activities, which fuel instability and undermine political and security situations in the country.
- Directed the AU Commission to sustain engagements with the transition government of Guinea-Bissau, including providing technical support to the National Election Commission with a view to promoting its independence, transparency and institutional integrity.
- Decided to undertake a field mission to Guinea-Bissau during the course of 2026.
- Called on the interim Guinea-Bissau authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Domingos Simões Pereira and all other political detainees.
- Called for expeditious development of an integrated plan for security sector reform, with the support of the AU Commission and international partners.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Update on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau, Insights on the PSC](#), 4 March 2026.
- [Guinea-Bissau, Not Benin, the Real Test of the Efficacy of ECOWAS's Response to Coups](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 31 December 2025.

THE PSC PUTS A SPOTLIGHT ON THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

On 9 March, Council held its second substantive session, its 1334th session, on the theme ‘Women, Peace and Security in Africa: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence.’ A meeting which represented both a continuation and a notable evolution of its long-standing engagement on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The PSC has, since its institutionalisation of WPS as a standing agenda item in 2010, demonstrated a pattern of thematic expansion. This session was imperative as it fits within that trajectory, extending the scope of WPS to explicitly engage with artificial intelligence (AI) and technology-facilitated violence. This thematic broadening reflects responsiveness to emerging global and continental dynamics.



Figure 2: 1334th Meeting of the PSC on ‘Women, Peace and Security in Africa: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence,’ 9 March 2026 (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

From the adopted outcome document of the session, a [communiqué](#), it stands out that the central strength is the Council’s recognition of the growing centrality of digital technologies and AI within peace and security dynamics. The PSC clearly

frames emerging technologies not merely as enablers of development but as active drivers of insecurity, particularly for women. By identifying technology-facilitated gender-based violence, misinformation, disinformation, and digital exclusion as structural barriers to women’s participation, the Council effectively redefined the WPS agenda in a rapidly evolving digital era. It also reflects the Council’s shift beyond traditional WPS narratives that have largely focused on physical violence and political exclusion, and it demonstrates an important step toward acknowledging the multidimensional nature of contemporary insecurity. This conceptual framing is significant for two reasons: one, as it aligns with evolving conflict realities in which digital platforms are increasingly weaponised to shape political narratives, undermine credibility, and silence women leaders. Two, because these risks are situated within broader structural inequalities, including the digital divide and unequal access to ICT infrastructure.

From the communiqué, the PSC clearly highlights an awareness of the need to **embed digital threats within existing peace and security instruments**, including early warning systems and National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS. The call to integrate AI-related risks into the Continental Early Warning System and national frameworks reflects an important shift toward anticipatory governance. It suggests that the PSC is beginning to recognise digital threats not as peripheral concerns but as integral to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Similarly, the reaffirmation of continental instruments, such as the AU Digital Transformation Strategy, the Malabo Convention, and emerging AI governance processes, points to an effort to anchor new challenges within an evolving normative architecture.

However, the communiqué stops short of fully addressing the **implementation gaps that have historically characterised this architecture**. While Africa has developed an extensive set of frameworks relevant to WPS and digital governance, including recent advances such as the criminalisation of cyber violence, their impact has been constrained by weak domestication, limited ratification, and insufficient resourcing. The outcome reiterates commitments to these instruments but provides limited guidance on how to overcome these structural constraints. In particular, it does not engage in detail with identified gaps such as the absence of technology-related indicators in monitoring frameworks like the Continental Results Framework or the need for systematic digital impact assessments in peace operations.

Additionally, the communiqué's focus on protection from technology-facilitated violence is another notable highlight, particularly its strong condemnation of online harassment, digital sexual violence, and AI-driven attacks against women in public life. The emphasis on developing gender-responsive legal and policy frameworks and strengthening protection mechanisms indicates an awareness of the severity of these threats. Yet, the communiqué does not fully engage with the scale and sophistication of these challenges, and it does not fully address the role of state and non-state actors in producing and amplifying these threats. For instance, while it calls for safer digital environments, it does not sufficiently address the role of global technology platforms, algorithmic accountability, or cross-border regulatory coordination, all of which are critical in tackling digitally mediated harm. This results in a framing that leans toward technical and programmatic solutions, potentially underestimating the political dynamics that underpin both conflict and technological

harm.

Another area where the communiqué reflects both progress and limitation is in its treatment of digital inclusion and capacity-building. This dual framing, recognising women as both vulnerable to and capable of addressing digital threats, is an important corrective to narratives that portray women solely as victims. While the communiqué acknowledges the importance of women's participation in digital governance, it does not sufficiently grapple with the **structural barriers limiting such participation**. Persistent gaps in internet access, digital skills, and representation in the technology sector continue to constrain women's ability to engage meaningfully in AI governance and digital innovation. Although the outcome calls for increased investment in ICT and capacity-building, it does not articulate how these efforts will be scaled or tailored to contexts with limited infrastructure and resources. This raises questions about the feasibility of some of the proposed measures, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

The communiqué's treatment of emerging technologies in conflict contexts also remains **partially developed**. While it addresses digital information threats, it gives comparatively less attention to the growing role of AI-enabled technologies in the conduct of warfare, including the proliferation of drones and other autonomous or semi-autonomous systems. Given the documented impact of such technologies on civilian populations, particularly women and girls, this represents a missed opportunity to more comprehensively address the intersection between AI, conflict dynamics, and gendered vulnerabilities. Integrating these dimensions would have strengthened the linkage between technological change and the evolving nature of armed conflict on the

continent.

On the institutional front, the communiqué's emphasis on strengthening the Office of the AU Special Envoy on WPS, enhancing early warning mechanisms, and engaging multi-stakeholder partnerships reflects a recognition that effective implementation requires both capacity and coordination. The inclusion of actors such as FEMWISE, civil society, and the private sector is particularly relevant in addressing digital threats that cut across traditional governance boundaries. However, as with other areas, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on sustained financing and clearer operational frameworks. While the communiqué calls for increased resource mobilisation, it does not provide detailed strategies for ensuring predictable and adequate funding, which has been a persistent challenge for WPS initiatives.

The emphasis on partnerships and multi-stakeholder engagement is another positive feature, reflecting an understanding that addressing digital threats requires collaboration across governments, civil society, and the private sector. This aligns with the complexity of the issues at hand and the transnational nature of digital technologies.

In a nutshell, while the session succeeds in elevating the discourse and expanding the conceptual boundaries of the WPS agenda, its impact will ultimately depend on how much the PSC and AU Member States can address structural inequalities, invest in capacity building, integrate digital indicators into monitoring systems, and ensure sustained political and financial commitment. Without such follow-through, the risk remains that the positive outcomes of the session will fall back into the ritualistic and performative policy pronouncements,

rather than serving as a catalyst for meaningful change in advancing women's leadership in an increasingly digitalised peace and security landscape.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the Office of the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, in collaboration with relevant AU departments and Member States, to support the operationalisation of strategies, programmes, and initiatives that strengthen women's leadership, protection, and preventive mechanisms in digital and governance spaces.
- Requested the AU Commission, in particular the AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security, to ensure the inclusion of issues relating to women in the development of the Common African Position on AI Governance, Peace and Security.
- Requested the AU Commission to organise the second edition of the High-Level Seminar known as the 'Swakopmund Process' in the course of 2026.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Women's Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 8 March 2026.
- [Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 29 October 2025.

PSC OMMITS REFERENCE TO NON-ELIGIBILITY OF COUP MAKERS FOR ELECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 (4) OF ACDEG

The third substantive session of the month was the Council's 1335th meeting held on 10 March, to get an update on the 'Situation in Madagascar.' The initial title of the meeting was, however, 'Co-ordinated AU-SADC Support for Madagascar,' as captured in our [March 2026 Programme of Work](#) Insight. The session was convened to get an update on the political and humanitarian evolutions in the country, as well as AU efforts in supporting the political transition process, according to the [briefing note](#) of the session. The adopted outcome was a [communiqué](#).




Figure 3: 1335th PSC Meeting on 'Situation in Madagascar,' 10 March 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Following the briefings by the invited speakers on the evolution of the socio-political situation in the country and the efforts undertaken by the Malagasy national authorities to stabilise the political and socioeconomic landscape of the country, the PSC welcomed the [Programme for the Re-foundation of the Republic of Madagascar](#) announced on 28 February 2026, noting its four-phase approach comprising a Sovereign National Consultation, the re-foundation of governance to ensure the credibility of the next elections, the drafting of the Constitution(s) of the Fifth Republic, and the organisation of elections. It noted with appreciation the launch of the National

Consultation, to be led by the Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches of Madagascar (FFKM), aimed at developing a new Constitution, as well as the establishment of a Steering Committee for the Re-foundation tasked with preparing a strategic plan to ensure effective coordination and the smooth conduct of the consultation process.

At the same time, the PSC underscored the importance of discipline and inclusivity in the transition process, urging the Malagasy authorities to 'fully respect the stipulated transition timelines of twenty-four (24) months' while ensuring that the national dialogue is as broad-based, and that it is fully inclusive and involves all stakeholders. This call was made against the backdrop of concern following the dismissal of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet on 9 March 2026, an action the Council warned could undermine the fragile transition. In response, it emphasised the need for a transition that is 'all-inclusive, plural, multiparty, progressive and transparent', anchored in respect for human rights, the rule of law, and sustained efforts for mutual trust and confidence building. Particular importance was placed on ensuring the meaningful participation of women, youth, and all segments of Malagasy society, especially in shaping a consensual national dialogue capable of addressing the country's challenges. It is worth noting that this PSC meeting also took place in the wake of 'interim president' Michael Randrianirina [dissolving](#) the entire cabinet unexpectedly. This was followed, barely a week later, by the [appointment](#) of Mamitiana Rajaonarison (the country's anticorruption chief) as the prime minister, after Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo was dismissed. He then later named a [30-member Cabinet](#), replacing the previous administration.

Yet, as in the case of Guinea-Bissau, the PSC again omitted any reference to the non-eligibility of coup makers to contest elections

under Article 25(4) of the ACDEG, signalling a growing pattern in which the Council appears to be retreating from actively upholding and defending this provision. This omission is particularly striking in light of the position [articulated](#) by the AU Chairperson for 2025, Angola's President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, during the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2026, where he stressed that the restoration of constitutional order cannot be deemed complete if those who seize power unconstitutionally subsequently organise elections and legitimise their rule through electoral victory.

The Council further called for the unconditional release of all political detainees and urged the Malagasy authorities to fully cooperate with the AU and SADC. In addition, it commended the Chairperson of the AU Commission for ongoing efforts to support the political transition in Madagascar, including the dispatch of a high-level delegation in November 2025 led by Domitien Ndayizeye, former President of Burundi and Chairperson of the AU Panel of the Wise, as well as the subsequent mission in February 2026 led by Mohamed Idris Farah, AU Special Envoy for Madagascar. The Council also welcomed the appointment of the Special Representative for Madagascar and encouraged the intensification of these efforts, including the deployment of a multidisciplinary technical team to support the Steering Committee of the National Dialogue and preparations for the electoral process.

Furthermore, the PSC acknowledged the efforts of SADC in supporting Madagascar's return to constitutional order and reiterated the importance of enhanced cooperation, coordination, harmonisation, and complementarity among the AU, SADC, the Indian Ocean Commission, and other international partners. It stressed the

need for unified messaging and common approaches in addressing the situation in Madagascar. As captured in our [insight](#) analysis of the session, the meeting happened just as a number of deadlines had approached regarding efforts to ensure support in the political transition in the country. In essence, the [Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government](#), held in December 2025, directed the Transitional Government of Madagascar to submit a dialogue-readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026.

The Summit further approved, by March 2026, the deployment of the SADC Panel of Elders, led by former President Joyce Banda of Malawi, and called for coordination with the AU and broader international partners to avoid fragmentation of efforts. This came in light of the divergence between the PSC and SADC regarding the characterisation of the October 2025 military seizure of power and the response adopted. It was clear that while the PSC, at its [1306th](#) session, decided to suspend Madagascar on the grounds of unconstitutional change of government, SADC opted instead to dispatch a fact-finding mission. Despite this, however, Paragraph 5 of the PSC's [1313th session Communiqué](#) - the last PSC session on the situation in the country, held on 20 November 2025 - and Paragraph 13 of the [SADC Communiqué](#) adopted during its December 2025 extraordinary summit, both stressed the imperative of 'enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity of efforts.'

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1313th Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1313 \(2025\)](#)], held on 20 November 2025:

The PSC:

- Urged the Malagasy authorities to urgently develop a consensual, clear and genuinely inclusive transition

roadmap with clear benchmarks and precise timelines aimed at a swift conclusion of the transition process.

- Requested the Chairperson of the Commission to include Malagasy youth and women in the various AU efforts in Madagascar and in all initiatives aimed at accelerating the transition process.
- Requested the AU Commission, working in collaboration with SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission, as well as the partners and rest of the international community to continue to provide the necessary support, including through financial resources mobilisation and technical support to the national elections commission and for the drafting of a new Constitution, in order to facilitate the transition process; as well as to include Madagascar among the countries eligible for support through the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT).
- Tasked the Chairperson of the Commission to expedite the processes for the assumption of duty of the newly appointed Special Representative for Madagascar.
- Tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently reinforce the institutional capacities of the team of the AU Special Envoy for Madagascar.

Regarding resources, the PSC requested the AU Commission to scale up resource mobilisation in support of the political transition in the country, including through the AFSIT. Finally, Council took note of the dire humanitarian situation resulting from recent cyclones and expressed its solidarity with affected populations, reaffirming the AU's readiness to assist Madagascar in disaster risk reduction and management. It emphasised the importance of continued close monitoring of the implementation of its decisions and of the Programme

for the Re-foundation of the Republic of Madagascar, and expressed its anticipation for the convening of the next Accra Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government.

Key Actionable Decision Requiring follow-up:

The PSC:

- Tasked the Chairperson of the Commission to dispatch a multidisciplinary technical team of experts to support the Steering Committee of the National Dialogue and the preparations for the electoral process in Madagascar.
- Tasked the AU Commission, particularly the AU Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, to mobilise necessary resources to assist the Government of Madagascar and the affected population, including through strengthening national capacities for disaster risk reduction and disaster management and mitigation; providing humanitarian assistance and dispatching a team of humanitarian specialists.
- Requested the AU Commission to further strengthen the institutional capacities of the AU Liaison Office (AULO) in Madagascar, including through the deployment of adequate human resources to enable the Office to more effectively discharge its mandate.
- Decided to undertake a field mission to Madagascar to engage with all stakeholders in supporting the swift return of constitutional order in the country.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Update on the Situation in Madagascar, Insights on the PSC](#), 9 March 2026.
- [Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar, Insights on the PSC](#), 19 November

2025.

- [Session on the Situation in Madagascar, Insights on the PSC](#), 15 October 2025.
- [Emergency Session on the Political Unrest in Madagascar, Insights on the PSC](#), 13 October 2025.

AU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR FINANCING THE UNION CALLS FOR FINANCIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EQUITABLE ACCESS TO UN-ASSESSED CONTRIBUTION

On the same day, 10 March, the PSC added a second agenda item to its programme in which it [held](#) consultations with Donald Kaberuka, the AU High Representative for Financing the Union and the AU Peace Fund. The discussion focused on enhancing the utilisation of the Peace Fund and advancing efforts to secure sustainable and predictable financing for peace operations in Africa. On the preceding day, the High Representative also [met](#) with the Chairperson of the AU Commission for consultations on advancing the reform agenda of the AU.



Figure 4: PSC's engagement with Donald Kaberuka, AU High Representative on Financing the Union and the Peace Fund, 10 March 2026. (Source: X @[AUC_PAPS](#))

These engagements took place against the backdrop of [decisions](#) adopted by the AU Assembly at its 39th Ordinary Session on financing the Union. The Assembly adopted several key measures aimed at strengthening the Union's financial

sustainability. Among others, it:

- Requested the High Representative for Financing the Union, with the support of the Commission, to undertake further consultations with Member States to strengthen consensus on key strategic financing issues.
- Requested the High Representative to expedite consultations on progress made in the overall financing of the Union.
- Directed the Executive Council to convene an Extra-Ordinary Session, bringing together Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance of Member States to strengthen the Financing of the Union and the Peace Fund, in line with Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.687 (XXX) of January 2018, not later than November 2026.
- Requested the AU High Representative for Financing the Union to present a report to the above-mentioned Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council.
- Decided to leverage internal financial resources and the support of African Financial Institutions to complement Member States' contributions in financing the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
- Directed the Executive Council to invite Chief Executive Officers of African Financial Institutions to participate in the Extraordinary Session to consider funding modalities for the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
- Requested the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU High Representative for Financing, in close consultation with the Bureau of the Assembly, the PSC and the three African Members of the UN Security Council (A3+), to re-engage and advocate for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on predictable and sustainable financing

for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

During his engagement with the PSC, Kaberuka underscored the imperative for the AU to rely more decisively on its own financing mechanisms, including the Peace Fund, while expanding partnerships with the private sector and African financial institutions. He also emphasised the importance of equitable access to UN-assessed contributions through fair burden-sharing arrangements to support African-led peace operations. While the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023 marked a breakthrough in AU–UN partnership on financing, challenges related to its operationalisation remain a major concern.

In recent years, the Peace Fund Secretariat has made commendable efforts to expand and diversify its financial base, particularly through engagement with the private sector, financial institutions, and high-net-worth individuals. These efforts have yielded some gains, including an increased share of private sector contributions relative to those from Member States. High-level pledging events convened in 2024 and 2025 mobilised significant commitments. For instance, in 2024, Afreximbank pledged [\\$210 million](#) over three years, while Standard Bank Group and Ethiopian Airlines committed \$1 million each. In 2025, additional contributions were secured from institutions such as Africa Reinsurance (Africa Re) ([\\$1 million](#)), United Bank for Africa (UBA) ([\\$500,000](#)), and the African Trade & Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI). Despite these contributions, available resources remain inadequate to meet the continent's growing peace and security needs. In this context, the recommendation by the High-Level Panel on the Review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to increase the Peace Fund endowment from \$400 million to \$1 billion underscores not only the enormous needs but also the urgency of

further diversifying funding sources.

Across his engagements at the AU in March, Kaberuka stressed the broader objective of strengthening the Union's financial sovereignty, particularly in light of shifting geopolitical dynamics that are placing increasing strain on the financial position of multilateral institutions. In his meeting with the Chairperson of the Commission, he highlighted the importance of ensuring sustainable and predictable Member State contributions to safeguard the Union's financial sovereignty. In his [X post](#), Kaberuka further noted that while international solidarity remains important, the AU should fund itself, characterising the financing challenges as 'longstanding' but now requiring resolution. One of the important avenues for advancing the aspiration of self-financing lies in the implementation of decision AU/Dec.605(XXVII) of July 2016, which instituted the 0.2% import levy on eligible imports as a sustainable financing mechanism for the Union. However, progress in this regard has been limited. In 2018, the AU [reported](#) that only 16 Member States were implementing the Kigali Decision on the 0.2% levy; by 2025, that number had [increased](#) by only one.

While discussions focused on practical pathways for mobilising adequate resources to address Africa's peace and security challenges, Bankole Adeoye, PAPS Commissioner, emphasised the need to strengthen resource mobilisation from the private sector, African financial institutions, and partners. He also called for greater utilisation of the Peace Fund in accordance with its policy framework.

Overall, Kaberuka's engagements with both the PSC and the AU Commission are expected to inform preparations for the forthcoming Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council on financing the Union.

PSC SEEKS TO TRANSFORM ITS REGULAR ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE PANEL OF THE WISE INTO A PLATFORM FOR STRATEGIC REFLECTION ON CONTINENTAL PEACE, SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE TRENDS

The last substantive meeting of the PSC was held on 17 March to receive a briefing on the activities of the Panel of the Wise. Coming in as Council's 1336th meeting, the session served both as a review of the Panel's work over the past year and as an occasion for the Council to reaffirm the Panel's place within the AU's peace and security architecture. Although the PSC's [665th](#) session of March 2017 provided for quarterly briefings by the Panel, engagement between the two has in practice remained largely annual.

The [communiqué](#), adopted as the outcome document, reaffirmed 'the central role of the Panel of the Wise as the AU's primary mechanism for preventive diplomacy.'



Figure 5: PSC 1336th meeting, 'Briefing by the Panel of the Wise on its Activities in Africa,' 17 March 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

The PSC notably highlights the question of effectiveness and the institutional constraints affecting the Panel's work. It takes note of 'the capacity challenges facing the effectiveness of the Panel' and, on that basis, stresses the 'importance of further enhancing the institutional capacity

of the Panel, including by mobilising predictable, adequate and sustainable financial resources.' This points to a concern that the Panel's recognised role has not been matched by the operational capacity required for timely and sustained engagement. The emphasis on predictable and sustainable financing is particularly significant, as it suggests the Council's awareness that ad hoc support is inadequate for a mechanism tasked with early warning and preventive diplomacy. At the same time, the communiqué does not indicate how such resources are to be mobilised, through which institutional mechanisms, or within what timeframe. As a result, one of its core concerns is clearly identified, but not matched by concrete implementation pathways.

The communiqué also signals that the PSC wants its engagement with the Panel to evolve beyond routine reporting. It emphasises that regular PSC engagements with the Panel 'should serve not only as briefings on activities undertaken, but also as opportunities for collective strategic reflection on continental trends in peace, security and governance.' This is an important shift. It repositions the Panel not merely as an implementing or reporting body, but as a strategic interlocutor for the Council. The intention appears to be to use these engagements to interrogate broader structural patterns, anticipate emerging crises, and sharpen the AU's preventive posture in relation to governance deficits, political tensions and early indicators of violent conflict.

Within that strategic framing, the communiqué gives particular emphasis to the preventive diplomacy dimension of the Panel's mandate. The PSC underscored 'the importance of timely preventive diplomacy efforts and use of good offices, through the Panel of the Wise,' and highlighted

the need for such efforts to be undertaken ‘in coordination with the Member States concerned and similar institutions or entities of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), particularly in situations that can potentially trigger violent conflicts, and on issues relating to unconstitutional changes of government.’

The Council also encourages a more strategic use of the Panel’s limited capital. The PSC calls on the Panel ‘to be selective in its approaches and to engage more in situations or cases where the Panel has comparative advantages, in order to be more impactful.’ This suggests that the Council is not simply asking for more engagement, but for more targeted and differentiated engagement. The Panel is expected to focus on where its stature, flexibility and convening power can add distinct value. Yet this direction remains underdeveloped as an operational guide. Beyond capacity constraints, this also raises a strategic question about role clarity. As Amani Africa noted in its [analysis](#) of the PSC’s 1204th session on the same agenda item, ‘it is critical that the Panel is not encumbered with roles that spread it thin,’ because over-expansion risks weakening its effectiveness in its primary conflict prevention role. This suggests that the Panel’s comparative advantage lies less in assuming multiple adjacent roles than in undertaking focused preventive diplomacy on the basis of early warning and in coordination with other AU mechanisms. The communiqué does not define what these comparative advantages are in practical terms, nor what criteria should guide prioritisation among the growing number of crises, thematic issues and requests being placed before the Panel.

Relevant Previous Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

1264th PSC Meeting, held on 11 March 2025, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1264 \(2025\)](#)]:

The PSC requested the AU Commission to:

- Reinforce the Panel’s work in South Sudan by allocating necessary resources and strengthening the AU’s presence on the ground to provide continuous engagement with national and regional stakeholders.
- Strengthen the provision of frequent early warning analysis to the Panel of the Wise and to conduct joint scenario building with experts, including those from the African Union Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace).
- Avail resources to enable the Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary Mechanisms to timely support the activities of the PSC on conflict prevention, through mediation and dialogue in Africa.

1204th PSC Meeting, held on 13 March 2024 [[PSC/PR/COMM.1204 \(2024\)](#)]:

The PSC requested the AU Commission to:

- Facilitate the provision of mission reports of the Panel of the Wise to the Council.
- Ensure the Panel of the Wise receives early warning information and analyses to enable the Panel to proactively deploy preventive diplomacy efforts.
- Conduct strategic reviews of the Panel of the Wise’s activities to evaluate the effectiveness of the Panel’s interventions, identify areas for improvement, and adjust strategies in alignment with the dynamic nature of conflict.
- Support and facilitate joint deployments of the Panel of the Wise with similar regional bodies, particularly in contexts requiring urgent attention, leveraging the collective expertise

and resources for conflict prevention and management efforts.

Moreover, the PSC gave considerable attention to South Sudan. It underscored 'the importance of sustained engagement of the Panel in South Sudan,' particularly in supporting 'inclusive dialogue, trust and confidence-building measures, coherence across the political transition related processes, and stronger linkages with the efforts of the grassroots, particularly the affected communities.' It further encouraged the Panel 'to follow up on the priorities identified jointly with the South Sudanese civil society actors from the different regions of the country,' with a view to 'further strengthening support for grassroots peace efforts, community-level dialogue, early warning and localised peacebuilding measures.'

It is to be recalled that members of the Panel undertook a high-level engagement in South Sudan from 31 March to 2 April 2025 to promote calm, sustain dialogue among key national stakeholders and strengthen confidence in nationally agreed political processes.

Relatedly, the communiqué also gives direction regarding Sudan. The PSC requested the Panel 'to engage with the key stakeholders, including undertaking a field mission to the Republic of Sudan with a view to exploring avenues to bring to an end the ongoing conflict.' Given the plethora of actors involved in mediation processes—both within the AU and beyond—the Panel's value addition, as well as its division of labour with existing mechanisms such as the High-Level Panel and the AU-led Quintet Initiative, remains unclear. Moreover, considering that the Panel of the Wise has a primarily preventive mandate, its engagement in the Sudan crisis may amount to an unnecessary broadening of its scope.

Beyond South Sudan and Sudan, the communiqué broadens the thematic scope of the Panel's expected activities. The PSC encouraged the Panel 'to include in the scope of its activities, preventive diplomacy engagements on border disputes, including community-based dialogue, cross-border confidence and trust building measures, building on the outcomes of the Brazzaville Retreat held from 26 to 27 November 2024.' It is recalled that the inaugural joint [retreat](#) of the AU Panel of the Wise and the ECCAS Committee of Elders in Brazzaville in November 2024 strengthened cooperation on border and territorial disputes in Central Africa and adopted a six-point resolution aimed at advancing coordinated preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts. By referring to community-based dialogue and cross-border trust-building, the Council also signals support for locally anchored prevention approaches in situations where formal interstate diplomacy alone may be insufficient.

The Council similarly highlights follow-up on the 'implementation of the outcomes of the Dakar Consultation with religious and traditional leaders from West Africa and the Sahel, held from 15 to 16 November 2024,' including through 'sustained outreach programmes and structured engagement with community level actors in order to improve mutual understanding of the role of the AU and its preventive diplomacy mechanisms.' This underscores the PSC's recognition of the role of religious and traditional leaders in mediation, social cohesion and local legitimacy. It also reflects a growing appreciation that preventive diplomacy is not only an elite or state-centric process, but one that depends on social legitimacy and engagement with trusted local actors. Yet when read together with the requests on South Sudan, Sudan and border disputes, these provisions point to a widening scope of expected activity that is

not matched by equal clarity on sequencing, responsibility or benchmarks for follow-through.

On the institutional side, the Council underlines ‘the need for the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Panel of the Wise and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Durban, South Africa, during the 30th Anniversary of the APRM.’ This is noteworthy because it points to the PSC’s interest in better linking governance assessment and political risk analysis with preventive diplomacy. The Council reinforces this broader institutional logic by calling for ‘the strengthening of working synergies among the African Governance Architecture (AGA), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the Panel of the Wise in enhancing conflict prevention, management, and resolution,’ and by underscoring ‘the imperative of further strengthening the Continental Early Warning System to enable the Panel to more effectively deploy preventive diplomacy efforts, such as mediation and facilitation, before crises escalate.’

The PSC further places emphasis on inclusion. It underlined ‘the need for the Panel to include women and youth in its engagements, mindful of their critical role in peace processes.’ This is an important point because it indicates that the Council expects the Panel’s work to reflect wider AU commitments on women, peace and security and on the role of youth in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. Rather than treating inclusion as peripheral, the communiqué frames it as integral to the effectiveness and legitimacy of peace processes. Unlike some earlier PSC meetings on the Panel, including the 1264th and 1204th sessions, this communiqué does not explicitly emphasise mechanisms such as FemWise Africa or WiseYouth in its operative

provisions. This leaves less clarity on how the inclusion agenda is to be institutionalised.

Another institutional issue highlighted in the communiqué is the composition of the Panel itself. The PSC stressed the ‘urgent need for the appointment of the representative of the North Africa region to ensure equitable regional representation and also to ensure that the Panel is fully constituted.’ This may appear procedural, but it is politically significant. Full regional representation is important not only for formal completeness, but also for the credibility, legitimacy and reach of the Panel in undertaking continent-wide engagements. In the context of the AU’s need to strengthen preventive diplomacy, Amani Africa’s [special research report](#) of September 2025 highlights that the effectiveness of the Panel depends not only on its formal mandate but also on the stature, credibility, and moral authority of its members.

The communiqué also includes a more procedural request that the Panel ‘submit to Council, the Indicative Annual Programme of its Activities for 2026.’ This suggests that the PSC wants more structured planning and likely seeks to align its own work more closely with the Panel’s anticipated activities.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC tasked the Panel of the Wise to:

- Continue engaging the leadership of South Sudan and to coordinate its efforts with other key stakeholders with a view to contributing towards the de-escalation of the situation and paving the way towards a lasting consensual solution to the current crisis.
- Engage with the key stakeholders, including undertaking a field mission to Sudan with a view to ex-

ploring avenues to bring to an end the ongoing conflict.

- Submit to Council, the Indicative Annual Programme of its Activities for 2026.
- The council also stressed the urgent need for the appointment of the representative of the northern Africa region to ensure equitable regional representation and also to ensure that the Panel is fully constituted.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

[Briefing by the Panel of the Wise on its Activities in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 16 March 2026.

[Re-Energising Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa: A Quest to Salvage the APSA?](#), *Special Research Report*, September 2025.

[Making the Panel of the wise fit for purpose is critical for effectively delivering on AU's preventive diplomacy role](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 9 May 2024.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

Committee of Experts (CoE) Meetings

Council's subsidiary body, the CoE, also met two times during the month. On 6 March, the experts met for the 'Consideration of the PSC Budget and AU Peace Fund priorities for 2027.' In addition, on 19 March, they also met to prepare for the PSC induction programme, which came as the last activity of the Council during the month.

Capacity-building of the CoE

On 26 to 28 March, the PSC CoE travelled to Matsapha, Eswatini, for a workshop which preceded the PSC Induction. The workshop, chaired by Patrick Vusani Nkosi, Chairperson of the PSC CoEs for March 2026, focused on strengthening implementation, monitoring and evaluation of PSC decisions while building capacity for incoming Council members.



Figure 6: Capacity-building of the CoE, held on 26 to 28 March 2026, Matsapha, Eswatini. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Induction of Newly Elected Members of the PSC

Following the CoEs workshop, still in Matsapha, on 29 and 30 March, the PSC held the induction/orientation for its new members following their election during the 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in February 2026. The induction was held to equip the new PSC members with knowledge of the Council's mandate and its working methods ahead of assuming office from 1 April 2026. Their mandate will end in March 2028.



Figure 7: 2026 Induction of the sixteenth cohort of the PSC, held on 29 and 30 March 2026, Matsapha, Eswatini. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

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
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