




MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

May, 2026

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
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THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In May, under the chairship of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, standing in for Sierra Leone, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [Provisional Programme of Work](#) (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering six agenda items. Following the revision of the PPoW, which included the addition of three more agenda items, a total of nine agenda items were considered during the month.

Activities of the AU Peace and Security Council and its Subsidiary Bodies May 2026



Out of the nine agenda items, two focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All the substantive sessions during the month were held at the level of permanent representatives.

Over the course of the month, the PSC PPoW underwent two revisions. The first revision saw the addition of 'Informal Consultation between the PSC and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali,' held on 14 May and 'Commemoration of the International Day of Living Together in Peace,' marked on 18 May through the release of a Press Statement. The second revision introduced the 'Adoption of the Conclusions of the 5th Joint Retreat of the PSC and the APRM held from 29 to 30 April 2026,' which was carried out via email.

The sessions held during the month led to the adoption of seven Communiqués, a Press Statement and the Conclusions of the joint retreat of the PSC and the APRM.

PSC'S THEMATIC AGENDA ON CLIMATE, PEACE AND SECURITY MAKES A REGION-SPECIFIC TURN

The first session of the PSC during the month was convened on 4 May, as its 1344th meeting, dedicated to the theme, 'Impact of Climate Change on the Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel.'¹ In doing so, the

¹ The 1344th meeting received statements from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS); Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE); Mamadou Tangara, AU High Representative and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Mali/Sahel; and Marie Jose Samba Ovono Obono, Special Representative of the Chairperson and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Chad. In addition, representatives

PSC took the climate, peace and security agenda a step further by giving it region-specific focus.

The [communiqué](#) adopted following the session reaffirmed many of the themes that have become familiar features of PSC deliberations on climate, peace and security. These include recognition of climate change as a 'threat multiplier,' the importance of climate adaptation and resilience, the need for stronger climate financing, the integration of climate considerations into early warning systems, and the urgency of finalising the Common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security (CAP-CPS). Yet beyond these recurring themes, the session introduced several decisions that suggest an effort to move from conceptual discussions towards more operational and region-specific responses.




Figure 1: 1344th Meeting of the PSC on the 'Impact of Climate Change on the Crisis Situations in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel Regions,' 4 May 2026.
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also delivered statements.

In a step that signalled tailoring the policy thinking and action on climate, peace and security to region-specific dynamics, the session and the outcome emphasised the need for responses specific to climate-related security challenges in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. Thus, the PSC requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive mapping of climate change impacts and vulnerabilities in the two regions. It also asked for the development of a matrix of practical recommendations aimed at strengthening regional responses and community resilience.

These requests can be understood as a recognition that climate-security challenges manifest differently across regions and therefore require context-specific responses. The Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel are often discussed together within climate-security debates, yet the drivers and manifestations of vulnerability vary considerably. While climate variability, insecurity, weak governance and livelihood pressures are common features, the political economies of conflict, mobility patterns, ecological conditions and institutional capacities differ significantly across the two regions.

In view of the broad thematic-focused engagement of the PSC, which led to the development of the African Climate Security Risk Assessment study and the ongoing process for developing the common African position on climate, peace and security, the Council's decision to request a new comprehensive mapping exercise invites some questions. Does this indicate that existing assessments are considered insufficiently granular to inform operational responses in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel? Or does it suggest a desire for a more needs-based region-specific assessment capable of informing resource mobilisation and targeted interventions?

The significance of these questions lies not merely in the production of another assessment but in what the PSC intends to do with the findings. The value of the mapping exercise will ultimately depend on whether it serves as a foundation for concrete interventions rather than becoming another addition to an already expanding body of climate-security analysis.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1331st Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1331 \(2026\)](#)], held on 19 February 2026:

The PSC:

- Called for the finalisation of the CAP-CPS by national experts of all Member States prior to its validation by the Council, before its finalisation, preferably during the second half of 2026.
- Called for the finalisation of the study on the assessment of climate-related security risks and the implementation of the PSC Matrix of threats to peace and security on the continent, adopted in August 2025.

1301st Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1301 \(2025\)](#)], held on 17 September 2025:

The PSC:

- Reiterated its call for the AU Commission to expeditiously develop the CAP on the nexus between Climate, Peace and Security in consultation with Member States to ensure their ownership.

1263rd Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1263 \(2025\)](#)], held on 6 March 2025:

The PSC:

- Looked forward to the finalisation of the Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace and Security, following due process and taking into consideration the contributions from all AU Member States, the AGN and RECs/RMs, or subsequent incorporation in the national and regional poli-

cies and frameworks.

1079th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1079 \(2022\)](#)], held on 21 April 2022:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Study on the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Continent, pursuant to the Press Statement adopted at Council's Open Session held on 21 May 2018.

1051st Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1051 \(2021\)](#)], held on 26 November 2021:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of a climate-related security risks assessment study, in consultation with Member States and to define the varying security impacts of climate change on the African continent while taking steps towards mobilising a common African position towards climate change and security.

774th Session [[PSC/PR/BR. \(DCCLXXIV\)](#)], held on 21 May 2018:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to undertake a study on the nexus between climate change and peace and security on the continent.

Closely linked to the mapping exercise is the PSC's decision to develop a comprehensive matrix of practical recommendations. This decision arguably represents one of the most consequential outcomes of the session.

Previous PSC engagements on climate, peace and security have largely focused on agenda-building, deepening policy understanding and nurturing common ground. The current session appears to

signal an effort to move beyond diagnosis and conceptual refinement toward policy action and implementation.

The request for a matrix of practical recommendations suggests recognition that climate-security challenges require not only analytical understanding but also coordinated policy responses, as the Council directs that the matrix be developed jointly by the AU Commission, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the LCBC.

Yet the effectiveness of such a matrix will depend on several factors. The first concerns institutional ownership. Multiple frameworks already exist at continental and regional levels, including the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan, the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, and various regional stabilisation and resilience frameworks. A key question, therefore, is how the proposed matrix will complement rather than duplicate existing initiatives.

Another notable aspect of the session is the attention given to the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR) in Boko Haram-affected areas and the Council's call for reviewing the AU Strategy for the Sahel in light of lessons drawn from the Lake Chad Basin experience.

This decision is significant because it reflects a deepening recognition that security responses alone are insufficient for addressing complex crises shaped by the intersection of governance deficits, socio-economic vulnerabilities, and climate pressures. The RS-SRR has increasingly been cited as an example of a more integrated approach that combines security interventions with recovery, including expansion of state authority, service delivery, development and resilience-building efforts. Additionally, the Council's reference to the

environmental sustainability pillar within the RS-SRR suggests a growing appreciation of the need to integrate environmental considerations into stabilisation frameworks.

Similarly, the Council's call for a review of the AU Strategy for the Sahel also comes at a time when regional security architectures and partnerships are undergoing significant transformation, creating an opportunity for the AU to reassess the relevance and responsiveness of its policy instruments to the changing realities of the Sahel.

The emphasis on strengthening transhumance systems and cross-border resource governance is particularly notable. Unlike narratives that frame mobility primarily as a security threat, the communiqué recognises the importance of managing mobility as an adaptation strategy.

The session concludes by stressing the need to finalise and implement the Common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security (CAP-CPS). The PSC has been calling for the CAP-CPS since 2021. The reiteration comes after a target of completing validation in the second half of 2026 was set in February and constitutes a recognition that the process remains incomplete.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Reiterated its call for the AU Commission to review its strategy for the Sahel to incorporate emerging dynamics, drawing from good practices of the LCBC Strategy for stabilisation, recovery and resilience against Boko Haram, which incorporates environmental sustainability within its sixth pillar of intervention.
- Requested the Chairperson of the

Commission to undertake a comprehensive mapping of the impact of climate change in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region, covering the specific nature of climate-related disasters and a precise assessment of the needs of the affected population resulting from climate change-induced vulnerabilities.

- Directed the AU Commission, working in close collaboration with ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, to urgently develop a comprehensive matrix of practical recommendations aimed at addressing the multifaceted impact of climate change in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel region, with a view to further strengthening coordinated regional responses and enhancing the resilience of the affected communities.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [The Impact of Climate Change on the Crisis Situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 3 May 2026.
- [Open Session on Climate, Peace and Security](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 18 February 2026.
- [Amani Africa Briefing to the PSC](#), 17 September 2025.
- [Open Session on the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace, and Security in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 16 September 2025.
- [Climate Change: Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 5 March 2025.

PSC PROPOSES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MECHANISM

On 6 May 2026, the PSC convened its 1345th session to discuss 'African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crimes (TOC) in Africa.'² The outcome of the session was adopted as a [communiqué](#).




Figure 2: 1345th Meeting of the PSC on 'African Strategies to Combat Transnational Organised Crimes in Africa,' 6 May 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

2 The PSC received the opening remarks from Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May 2026. An introductory statement by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), was read on his behalf by Neema Chusi, Head of the PSC Secretariat, followed by statements by Jalel Chelab, Acting Director of the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), read on his behalf by Mohamed Benaired. Jackson Hamata, Executive Secretary of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), and Precious Obonetse Thabiwa, Special Representative of the International Police Organisation (INTERPOL) to the AU, also made statements.

The briefing segment appears to have set the tone for the communiqué's treatment of TOC as a complex and evolving continental peace and security threat. The Commissioner's remarks highlighted [two](#) urgent concerns: the 'evolving nature of organised crime' and the 'growing use of emerging technologies for criminal activities.' Presentations by representatives of AFRIPOL, CISSA and INTERPOL further provided key findings and institutional perspectives on combating TOC across Africa, underscoring the importance of coordination, intelligence sharing and joint action.

The PSC expressed concern over 'the emergence of an integrated, hybrid and transnational criminal ecosystem' and warned that criminal networks increasingly intersect with 'terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking of persons, environmental crime, cybercrime and financial crime.' A major focus of the communiqué, as in previous sessions on this theme, is the growing nexus between TOC, terrorism and violent extremism. The Council identified the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) as areas facing 'very high to critical threat levels' and noted that terrorist and non-state armed groups increasingly rely on criminal networks for financing, logistics and territorial influence, including through 'the organisation, protection and taxation of trafficking activities.' The communiqué's more detailed treatment of the digital transformation of organised crime is notable. The 1279th meeting of May 2025 had already flagged the growing use of new technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), by criminal actors. In the present meeting, Council goes further by identifying the convergence of 'cyber-fraud,' 'cryptocurrency-based money laundering,' the exploitation of 'mobile money platforms,' and the documented use of cryptocurrency. It specifically notes the use of cryptocurrency

and encrypted communications by JNIM, Ansaru and ISWAP for 'financing, recruitment and operational coordination.'

The session also addressed illicit financial flows, money laundering, environmental crime and trafficking in persons. The PSC in particular noted the 'high money-laundering risk profile' of Central, West and East Africa and called for 'advanced financial investigation capabilities,' stronger internal controls, improved audit and integrity mechanisms within key institutions, including customs, police and banks, and better traceability of seizures and financial flows.

Notably, the session treated environmental and natural resources crime as part of the continent's criminal ecosystem, citing illicit gold trafficking from Ituri through Central African corridors, ivory trafficking along the East African corridor, illegal, unreported and unregulated(IUU) fishing in East Africa, taking note of the annual losses from such fishing in East Africa alone estimated at USD 415 million. The communiqué further highlights the connection of trafficking of persons with cybercrime, noting that some African nationals are recruited 'under false pretexts' for online scam operations and identifying Libya as a hub where migrants face 'systemic abuse, debt bondage and extortion.' However, given the regional variations of the phenomenon of TOC as noted in Amani Africa's edition of [Insights on the PSC](#) dedicated to this session, the session could have gone further to recognise the need for region-specific responses.

Council's treatment of synthetic drugs and the emerging production capacity of such drugs on the continent is also noteworthy. The dismantling, in 2025, of a clandestine laboratory in Khartoum capable of producing up to 100, 000 tablets per hour, the seizure of 93 kg of crystal methamphetamine at

the port of Benghazi, were cited as signs of the emergence in Africa of a synthetic drug production zone. These incidents also highlight the link between conflicts, the collapse or weakening of state authority and the emergence of organised criminal operations.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1279th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1279 \(2025\)](#)], held on 14 May 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.
- Recommended the establishment of a continental mechanism, anchored by AFRIPOL, to continuously map, update, and analyse criminal flows and networks and disseminate this intelligence securely to law enforcement bodies.

1082nd session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1082 \(2022\)](#)], held on 6 May 2022:

The PSC:

- Requested AFRIPOL, working in close collaboration with CISSA and INTERPOL, to urgently develop a comprehensive database of persons, groups and entities involved in TOC, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters, as well as regional databases on TOC in order to guide Member States and Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in the formulation of necessary policy interventions.

A notable outcome of the Council's session that took previous sessions on this theme was the decision to mandate AFRIPOL, working in coordination with the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, to establish, following due process, a **Continental Criminal Intelligence Mechanism**. Not only does this build on the 1279th meeting, but it also provides an institutional anchor to that meeting's proposal for AFRIPOL-anchored continental mapping and analysis of criminal networks. The mechanism is also expected to deliver a 'consolidated continental threat assessment' to the PSC on an annual basis. While the communiqué rightly calls for 'mutual trust-based and integrated approaches,' sharing could limit its practical value unless supported by clear protocols, safeguards and sustained political commitment.

Another major innovation in the communiqué is the request for an African 'continental warrant' framework inspired by the INTERPOL system of notices. Similar to the intelligence mechanism, this requires addressing differences in national capacities, sovereignty concerns, lack of trust between states, weak data protection systems and political sensitivities around intelligence sharing or enforcement of warrants. In this context, the communiqué's appeal to RECs/RMs that have not yet done so to consider adopting mechanisms for mutual legal assistance and extradition of criminal elements is important because a continental warrant framework would only be effective if supported by regional and national arrangements that enable lawful cooperation across borders.

The communiqué also goes further than the previous meeting in linking TOC to AU early warning and conflict prevention tools. The 1279th communiqué requested a comprehensive study on TOC in the Sahel, including its nature, origins, financing

sources and impact on local populations. In the present meeting, Council expands this into a continental early-warning agenda by requesting the AU Commission, in collaboration with AFRIPOL, AUCTC, CISSA and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), to finalise, before the end of 2026, a **'Matrix of Risks and Threats to Peace and Security in Africa'** as a tool of the Continental Early Warning System. It also requests a study on the financing sources of criminal networks in Africa, with a view to considering targeted measures aimed at 'drying up these sources.' The shift here is from a Sahel-specific knowledge product to broader continental risk mapping and early-warning integration.

The communiqué's early-warning provision is complemented by a broader call to integrate TOC analysis into AU mediation efforts, sanctions regimes, peace support operations, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction and development processes.

The communiqué further calls for stronger national security presence and surveillance capacity along major corridors, particularly in the Sahel, Gulf of Guinea and Horn of Africa, while also calling for strengthened cross-border operations targeting criminal networks.

In addition, while the communiqué gives major attention to law enforcement, intelligence and institutional mechanisms, it also recognises the importance of addressing structural drivers, but only in passing. This reflects the Council's recognition that TOC is sustained not only by criminal networks, but also by root causes and structural factors linked to governance, infrastructure and socio-economic conditions.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission, working in close collaboration with the AFRIPOL, AUCTC, CISSA and the APRM, to finalise, before the end of 2026, a Matrix of Risks and Threats to Peace and Security in Africa, as a tool of the Continental Early Warning System.
- Mandated AFRIPOL, working in coordination with the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, to establish, following due process, a Continental Criminal Intelligence Mechanism for the continuous mapping, analysis and dissemination of criminal flows, corridors and networks, within the available resources, and to deliver a consolidated continental threat assessment to the PSC on an annual basis.
- Directed the AU Commission, working in collaboration with the relevant AU structures, to undertake a study on the financing sources of criminal networks in Africa, within the available resources, with a view to considering targeted measures aimed at drying up these sources and consequently reducing the operational capacity of such criminal networks.
- Directed the AU Commission, working in close collaboration with AFRIPOL, to establish a structured and integrated continental mechanism inspired by the INTERPOL system of notices, coupled with an African 'continental warrant' framework.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 5 May 2026.
- [Open Session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in](#)

[the Sahel Region](#), *Insights on the PSC*,
13 May 2025.

CONTINUING THE ELUSIVE PURSUIT OF THE FULL OPERATIONALISATION OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE, PSC ASKS FOR A DASHBOARD ON CRITICAL OPERATIONALISATION GAPS BY JULY 2026

On 15 May 2026, the PSC held its third substantive session, covering two agenda items. The first one being on an 'Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF),' coming in as Council's 1346th meeting. The session adopted a [communiqué](#) as the outcome document.³




Figure 3: 1346th Meeting of the PSC on an 'Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force.'
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The Council welcomed the adoption of the ASF Strategic Review recommendations by the 17th Ordinary Session of the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS), as well as the request for the Commission to develop an operational work plan to enhance the readiness and effectiveness of the ASF. Cognisant of the

³ Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of May 2026, made the opening remarks, followed by an introductory Statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Statements were later delivered by the representatives of RECs/RMs.

adoption by the 39th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in February 2026 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Utilisation of the ASF, the Council called for its timely operationalisation through clear implementation modalities, stronger coordination mechanisms, and sustained political commitment.

Relevant AU Assembly Decision on ASF:

- The 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Union [[Assembly/AU/Dec.969\(XXXIX\)](#)] adopted the MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs on the use of the ASF and directed the Commission to expedite its signing and operationalisation, as well as to report regularly on the status of its implementation to the STCDSS.

Relevant Executive Council Decisions on ASF:

- The 48th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council [[EX.CL/Dec.1323-1351\(XLVIII\)](#)] held in February 2026 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia recalled Assembly Decision [[Assembly/AU/Dec.918\(XXXVIII\)](#)] of February 2025 regarding the need to finalise the Draft MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs on the use of the ASF to be completed during the 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in February 2026, and in this regard, requested the adoption of the Draft Memorandum along with the Report on the Strategic Review of the ASF.
- The 45th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council [[EX.CL/Dec.1265-1278\(XLV\)](#)] held in July 2024 in Accra, Ghana, had requested the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive and inclusive roadmap for the extensive review of the ASF and submit the outcomes and recommendations of the review to the 17th Ordinary Meeting of the STCDSS.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1159th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1159 \(2023\)](#)], held on 22 June 2023:

The PSC:

- Requested the Commission to expedite the assessment exercise of pledged strategic lift aircraft as part of efforts to enhance strategic lift capability and the finalisation of the MoUs for the utilisation of these assets to enable ASF rapid deployment of troops, reinforcement of troops, casualty evacuations and timely logistic supplies in conflict zones.
- Underscored the need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.
- Underscored the importance of expediting the establishment of a Counter Terrorism Unit within the ASF pursuant to communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (CMLX)] adopted at its 960th meeting held on 28 October 2020.
- Requested the Commission to expedite the implementation of decisions of the 15th meeting of the STCDSS, particularly, the strategic review of the ASF.

Signifying the particular interest of some regions and Nigeria's championing of the ASF, the Council also noted ongoing efforts to strengthen the maritime component of the ASF, highlighting the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea and the need to operationalise the Combined Maritime Task Force within the framework of the ASF.

Stressing the need for a harmonised planning, decision-making, readiness verification, and mission support systems, the Council called for stronger coordination

between the AU and the RECs/RMs, including under the principle of subsidiarity and through joint AU–UN planning mechanisms.

Regarding financing, the PSC further emphasised the need for predictable, adequate and sustainable funding for ASF's readiness and deployment, reiterating, as it did in its 134^{1st} session on Peace Support Operations (PSOs), that the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) remains crucial for securing sustainable resources for AU-led Peace Support Operations. Finally, the Council expressed its anticipation for the successful organisation of the next Abuja Lessons Learnt Forum.

It, however, remains uncertain that any of these steps would guarantee the full operationalisation of the ASF as initially conceptualised and organised. Apart from the shift in the dynamics that informed the original conceptualisation of the ASF, AU's experience with PSOs may need to shift the focus of the debate about the operationalisation of the ASF into a mechanism for preparing the deployment of PSOs rather than as a mechanism through which PSOs are deployed. Given the trends identified in terms of PSOs in the 134^{1st} session and the global shifts in both funding and diplomatic support, the approach taken in the session appears to be out of sync. Thus, in a context in which member states and international partners are struggling to sustain funding for sustaining existing commitments, the appeal of the PSC to contribute to the budget of USD 4,717,606.45 for staffing of the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) and the regional logistic depots sounds not only performative but also completely misplaced.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Appealed to the international partners and AU Member States, in a position to do so, to support efforts aimed at mobilising the required budget of USD 4,717,606.45 for the approved structures of the Continental Logistics Base and regional logistic depots approved by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
- Requested the AU Commission to continue consultations with Member States, RECs/RMs and relevant stakeholders towards the finalisation and implementation of the operational work plan emerging from the ASF Strategic Review process.
- Requested the Commission, working in coordination with the RECs/RMs, to provide an updated briefing to Council on technical, logistical, and operational requirements and gaps to be urgently addressed through a clear and detailed dashboard by July 2026.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force \(ASF\), Insights on the PSC](#), 14 May 2026.
- [Peace Support Operations in Africa, Insights on the PSC](#), 26 April 2026.
- [Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force \(ASF\), Insights on the PSC](#), 29 January 2025.
- [Briefing on the Status of Implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and Other Relevant Defence and Security Instruments on the Continent, with Specific Focus on Update on Operationalisation of the African Standby Force, Insights on the PSC](#), 22 June 2023.

PSC URGES SUPPORT OF AU STATES FOR FULL OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CMTF AS AFRICA'S FIRST READY TO DEPLOY MARITIME FORCE

The PSC then discussed the second agenda item of its 1346th meeting, still on 15 May, on efforts towards the 'Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG).'⁴

The [communiqué](#) adopted at the session addresses the progress towards operationalisation of the CMTF, the present maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, the link between maritime security and continental development priorities, and legal harmonisation and prosecution.




Figure 4: 1346th Meeting of the PSC on the efforts towards the 'Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,' 15 May 2026. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#)).

A central focus of the session was the assessment of concrete progress in operationalising the CMTF as Africa's

⁴ The session was opened by Nasir Aminu, Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the AU, with statements delivered by AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Bankole Adeoye, and AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), Moses Vilakati. Additional presentations were made by representatives of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the CMTF, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), ECCAS, and ECOWAS.

first standing, ready-to-deploy maritime force. The Council welcomed significant milestones that have accumulated since the 1275th session that took place in April 2025, including Nigeria's pledge to provide three ships, one helicopter, eight vehicles, and temporary headquarters facilities in Lagos, as announced at the 6th ECOWAS Sub-Committee of Chiefs of Naval Staff in February 2026. These commitments were complemented by the formal endorsement of Nigeria's offer to host the CMTF headquarters, which was formalised by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government at its 67th Ordinary Session held in June 2025.

The Council also acknowledged that the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) has now been adopted by ten Gulf of Guinea countries. Six countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, The Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) confirmed operational readiness, and São Tomé and Príncipe [expressed](#) the same days before the flag-off. The PSC formally took note of the proposed flag-off event for 1 June 2026 in Lagos, reiterating its decision to be represented at the event.

Collectively, these developments were seen as tangible evidence of momentum from conceptual design toward actual deployment. Since the Council's first call for a maritime task force at its 1012th session in July 2021, each successive session has added incremental layers of institutional specificity, from conceptual endorsement to CONOPS adoption, to operational readiness confirmation, and now to the ceremonial flag-off. This evolutionary pattern is a positive indicator of sustained political commitment.

The role of Nigeria as chair of the PSC during the session was emblematic of how individual state leadership can catalyse continental action. However, the communiqué's relative silence on the

division of responsibilities among the Member States and the absence of a clear burden-sharing matrix risk deepening structural asymmetries if not addressed early in the CMTF's operational life.

In the call it made for more predictable financing and burden sharing, the heavy reliance on Nigeria's political and logistical leadership, while it demonstrates admirable commitment, was implicitly acknowledged as a matter that should be balanced by broader burden-sharing by member states and broader financial support, including from the international community. However, one notable innovation that could strengthen the sustainability of the CMTF is the establishment of Mission Support Components (MSCs), which bring together representatives of the Organised Private Sector (OPS) and government-appointed diplomatic representatives from participating Member States.

By leveraging private-sector financing and maintaining a standing governmental mechanism to provide the necessary legal and diplomatic backing for operations and prosecutions, the MSCs offer a potentially durable framework for sustaining both operational activities and accountability processes. Nevertheless, the extent to which this model can generate sufficient and predictable resources remains to be tested in practice. If the CMTF is to avoid replicating the limitations of the Yaoundé Architecture, finding dedicated funding sources is a necessity.

In addition to the persistent maritime security threats beyond piracy that it found concerning, the Council also expressed concern over the growing threat of terrorist groups seeking to expand their activities into the Gulf of Guinea littoral states, reflective of trends of southward spread of violent extremism from the Sahel in recent

years. The emphasis the session placed on measures that go beyond marks a continued and welcome evolution from the more narrowly military-focused discussions in earlier sessions.

In recognising the link between maritime security on the one hand and Africa's Blue Economy initiative and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the session showed recognition of the need for anchoring maritime security governance within Africa's broader development agenda.

Highlighting the challenge of institutional fragmentation and the need for more coherent coordination, the Council underscored the importance of enhanced collaboration between the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, regional maritime coordination centres, and national maritime structures. The session also emphasised the need to strengthen the structures of the Yaoundé Architecture, including the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, and CRESMAO, recognising these as indispensable partners for the CMTF rather than rival structures.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1275th Session: [[PSC/PR/COMM.1275 \(2025\)](#)] held on 23 April 2025:

The PSC:

- Reiterated the request for the AU Commission to take practical steps towards ensuring stakeholders' participation, including the formal inauguration of the Committee of African Heads of Navies and Coast Guards (CHANS) as enshrined in the AIMS 2050.
- Requested the Commission to expedite the establishment and operationalisation, within the AU Commis-

sion, of a Coordination Mechanism, or Maritime Security Unit, without any financial implications, pursuant to paragraph 12 of Communiqué [[PSC/PR/COMM. 1174 \(2023\)](#)] adopted by the PSC at its 1174th meeting held on 18 September 2023.

1174th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1174 \(2023\)](#)], held on 18 September 2023:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to expedite the activation of the Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS), critical to provide strategic advice to the AU, including considering the convening of its inaugural meeting.

On the question of the AU Commission's role for maritime security, the Council reiterated its 2023 request (from the 1174th session) for the AU Commission to establish, without financial implications, a Maritime Security Coordination Mechanism or Unit within the Commission. This call was already made in at least three previous sessions: 1174th in 2023, 1275th in 2025, and now the 1346th in 2026. Its reiteration highlights the gap between ambition and implementation that continues to haunt the PSC. Similarly, the call for CHANS has been a recurring theme since the 1174th session. The current communiqué sets a deadline of 'before the end of 2026,' without clarifying whether the factors that get in the way of implementation will be resolved during the remainder of 2026.

The session gave notable attention to the legal dimensions of maritime security. The Council urged strengthened judicial cooperation, extradition arrangements, and prosecution mechanisms for maritime crimes, including piracy, trafficking, oil theft, and IUU fishing. This legal dimension, frequently underdeveloped in operational discussions, represents an important component of the Council's approach to

responding to maritime threats holistically.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC requested:

- The AU Commission to collaborate with the CMTF in the Gulf of Guinea and to provide the Force with the necessary support, including logistical support and materials, from the Continental Logistic Base (CLB).
- The AU Commission to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of the Committee of African Heads of Navies and Coast Guards (CHANS), and to facilitate the participation of relevant stakeholders in its inauguration as enshrined in the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy, before the end of 2026.
- The AU Commission to expedite the establishment and operationalisation, within the Commission, of a Coordination Mechanism and/or a Maritime Security Unit, without any financial implications, pursuant to paragraph 12 of Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM.1174 (2023)] adopted at its 1174th meeting, held on 18 September 2023.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force \(CMTF\) in Addressing Piracy and Other Maritime Crimes in the Gulf of Guinea \(GoG\)](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 14 May 2026.
- [PSC Shaping a New Maritime Security Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 5 June 2025.
- [The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 22 April 2025.

PSC WELCOMES OPERATION LAKE SANITY III LAUNCH AS IT EXPLORES 2719 FUNDING FOR MNJTF

On 18 May, the PSC convened for its fourth substantive session of the month, covering two agenda items. Coming in as its 1347th meeting, the first agenda item was an 'Update on the Stabilisation Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB).' The session appears to be the first dedicated PSC meeting on the MNJTF after the Council renewed the Force's mandate for another 12 months at its 1318th meeting, held on 15 December 2025. The meeting adopted a [communiqué](#) as its outcome document.




Figure 5: Figure 5: PSC 1347th Meeting on an 'Update on the Stabilisation Activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against the Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin,' 18 May 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

A notable development is the communiqué's reference to the 'Launch of Operation Lake Sanity III on 19 April 2026.'⁵ This marks a progression from the

⁵ It is to be recalled that the first Operation Lake Sanity ran from April to June 2022, while Operation

previous session, during which the Council welcomed ‘the commencement of planned operation Lake Sanity III aimed at degrading the activities of Boko Haram in the LCB.’ The session appears to have framed Operation Lake Sanity III as an ongoing campaign whose gains, including degrading Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) logistics hubs, require consolidation.

The communiqué also avoids presenting operational gains as a strategic victory. Thus, despite the gains registered, the PSC ‘reiterates its deep concern’ over the continued threat posed by Boko Haram, ISWAP and other armed and terrorist groups, which continue to undermine regional stability, socio-economic recovery, sustainable development and humanitarian efforts.

Indeed, it appears that the militant terrorist groups continue to adapt much faster than the pace of successful military operations of the MNJTF. Africa Centre [reporting](#) in April 2026 indicated that fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in the LCB rose by 28 per cent over the preceding year, from 3,734 to 4,779 deaths, the deadliest year for the theatre since 2015. This volatility was further illustrated when Boko Haram militants [attacked](#) a Chadian military post on Barka Tolorom island in early May 2026, killing 23 soldiers and injuring 26 others, and by the [killing](#) of two Chadian generals in a Boko Haram ambush on 6 May 2026. Yet the communiqué gives limited attention to Boko Haram and ISWAP’s adaptive capacities, including their use of difficult terrain, local

Lake Sanity II was conducted from April to July 2024 after its postponement from 2023. The second operation focused on degrading terrorist capacity around the Lake Chad islands, strengthening local support and encouraging surrenders, [resulting](#) in the neutralisation of 344 terrorist fighters and the recovery of weapons, including RPG-related equipment and anti-aircraft guns.

networks, cross-border movement, illicit economies and governance vacuums.

The communiqué gives prominent space to the stabilisation track through the adjusted Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience 2.0 (RS-SRR 2.0). It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 1282nd session, endorsed and validated the revised five-year RS-SRR, which had been adopted by the 70th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held on 27 February 2025 in Niamey, Niger. The present communiqué ‘welcomes the outcomes’ of the 7th Steering Committee Meeting of the RS-SRR, held on 27 March 2026 in N’Djamena, which approved the 2026 Regional Priorities, Regional Action Plan, Territorial Action Plans and Results Framework. It also ‘welcomes the convening’ of the Regional Stabilisation Facility meeting held in Yaoundé on 23 April 2026 and ‘underscores the importance of sustainable financing and strengthened coordination mechanisms’ for the effective implementation of the adjusted RS-SRR 2.0. This emphasis on the stabilisation strategy aligns with the call in the communiqué of the session for a ‘balance between military and non-military approaches,’ as well as ‘whole-of-government and whole-of-society’ approaches.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions

1318th Meeting [[PSC/PR/COMM.1318 \(2025\)](#)], held on 15 December 2025:

The PSC requested the AU Commission:

- to support the mobilisation of resources that include air, amphibious assets, anti-drones and anti-IEDs before the commencement of Operation Lake Sanity III.
- in consultation with the UN, to consider the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to fund the MNJTF activities.

1282nd Meeting [[PSC/PR/COMM.1282 \(2025\)](#)]
held on 10 June 2025 :

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission and international partners to support MNJTF with modern knowledge and equipment relevant to Boko Haram Terrorists' current capabilities, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.

1254th Meeting [[PSC/PR/COMM.1254 \(2025\)](#)],
held on 13 January 2025:

The PSC:

- Called on the LCBC to continue engaging Niger to ensure its full return and cooperation with the Force and to promote a comprehensive, multi-sectoral and inclusive approach and civil-military cooperation for creating conditions for the return of displaced persons.

The communiqué 'underscores the importance of sustained diplomatic engagements' for regional cohesion and 'reiterates its deep concern' over the security vulnerabilities arising from Niger's suspension of participation in the MNJTF, particularly for border security, arms proliferation and the free movement of foreign fighters. It is to be recalled that at its 1254th meeting, the PSC called on the LCBC to continue engaging Niger to ensure its full return and cooperation with the Force. In the present communiqué, the Council 'underscores the importance of sustained diplomatic engagements' for regional cohesion. It also 'reiterates its deep concern' over the security vulnerabilities arising from Niger's suspension, particularly for border security, arms proliferation and the movement of foreign fighters. The communiqué urges Niger to resume 'full

participation,' including the redeployment of military staff officers to MNJTF headquarters in N'Djamena.

Niger's absence is consequential because the threat is inherently cross-border, making MNJTF cohesion and cross-border cooperation operational necessities rather than merely political commitments. Although Niger does not appear to have been formally restored following its March 2025 withdrawal, recent [reporting](#) around the Nigeria-Niger border suggests continuing operational coordination. While the communiqué calls for sustained engagement with Niger, it does not indicate who should lead this diplomatic effort, leaving the practical pathway for restoring full MNJTF cohesion insufficiently defined.

As was the case in the 1318th and 1282nd sessions, Council further expressed 'deep concern' over chronic MNJTF capability gaps. However, the Council's request for the AU Commission to support the MNJTF with 'critically needed force enablers from the Continental Logistics Base' is more concrete than a generic call for assistance. Yet, it remains unclear whether the CLB has the required assets, how quickly they can be deployed, or how scarce enablers will be prioritised.

Financing remains a central unresolved issue. The PSC expressed concern over significant funding gaps affecting RS-SRR 2.0 implementation, including regional coordination mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation systems, technical support deployment and cross-border stabilisation initiatives, and reminded stakeholders to mobilise predictable, flexible and sustainable support. While the AU Commission's USD 1 million allocation from the Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility signals AU's ownership, it is unlikely to match the scale of MNJTF operational and stabilisation needs. Seen

against the 1318th meeting, where Council had already requested the AU Commission, in consultation with the UN, to consider the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to fund MNJTF activities, the present request for the AUC to liaise with the A3 represents a notable shift to a more politically directed follow-up track.

Yet this support seemed to reflect a pragmatic willingness to test the applicability of the 2719 framework, rather than confidence in the existence of a politically and operationally viable pathway for activating UNSC Resolution 2719 to support MNJTF. The communiqué does not provide a roadmap on eligibility, division of responsibilities, reporting, compliance safeguards or financial accountability, leaving important practical questions to be addressed before the financing option can be translated into an actionable plan.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to enhance its support and collaboration with the LCBC and the MNJTF in the implementation of the adjusted RS-SRR 2.0 and the conduct of operations against Boko Haram and other armed groups, and to support the MNJTF with the critically needed force enablers from the Continental Logistics Base.
- Requested the AUC to liaise with the A3 to explore the possibility of applying UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to fund MNJTF activities and to timeously report back to the Council.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Consideration of the Report of the Commission on the MNJTF Mandate, Insights on the PSC](#), 14 December

2025.

- [Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area, Insights on the PSC](#), 18 November 2025.
- [Update on the Activities of the Multi-national Joint Task Force \(MNJTF\) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience \(RS-SRR\), Insights on the PSC](#), 9 June 2025.

PSC EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER THE RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND DETERIORATING SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN GUINEA-BISSAU

The second agenda item of Council's 1347th session of 18 May was an 'Update on the Political Transition and Security Situation in Guinea-Bissau.' The PSC was briefed by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Guinea-Bissau, Ovídio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, and adopted a [communiqué](#) as the outcome of the meeting.




Figure 6: 1347th PSC Meeting on an 'Update on the Political Transition and Security Situation in Guinea-Bissau,' 18 May 2026. (Source X @AUC_PAPS)

The session focused on two major developments since the military junta seized power in November 2025: the shrinking of civic and political space and the deterioration of the security and human rights situation. In this regard, the PSC

expressed concern over restrictions imposed on political parties, civil society organisations, and private media outlets, including the forced closure of the headquarters of several political parties and private radio stations. The Council underscored the adverse implications of these measures for political inclusion, democratic participation, and freedom of expression, and called for the restoration of political and civic space. The Council also reiterated its call for the 'immediate and unconditional' release of Domingos Simões Pereira, leader of the opposition PAIGC, who has remained under house arrest since January.

The PSC further expressed concern over the deteriorating security and human rights environment, marked by incidents of politically motivated violence and intimidation. It specifically condemned the abduction and killing of political activist Vigário Balanta and called for a transparent, independent, and credible investigation into the incident. These concerns echo those raised by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which in April [highlighted](#) the 'progressive reduction in civic and democratic space' in Guinea-Bissau since the coup. The OHCHR further reported arbitrary arrests, assaults, harassment, and intimidation of opposition members and human rights defenders, as well as the dispersal of demonstrations and suspension of radio stations.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1333rd Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1333 \(2026\)](#)], held on 5 March 2026:

The PSC:

- Decided to undertake a field mission to Guinea-Bissau during the course of 2026.

1315th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1315 \(2025\)](#)], held on 28 November 2025:

The PSC:

- Agreed to hold a PSC Meeting at the Heads of State and Government level, dedicated to discussion on the resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.

The transitional authorities have set 6 December 2026 as the date for general elections aimed at restoring constitutional order. However, given the prevailing political climate, there are serious concerns regarding the prospects for conducting genuinely inclusive, credible, and competitive elections. Unless meaningful measures are taken to reopen civic and political space and guarantee fundamental freedoms, the electoral process risks serving more as a mechanism for legitimising military rule than as a pathway to democratic restoration. It is against this backdrop that the PSC urged the transitional authorities and military leadership to refrain from actions that may fuel political tension, undermine public confidence and compromise the credibility and inclusiveness of the political transition process. The Council also reiterated the importance of an inclusive national dialogue involving all political stakeholders to foster national reconciliation, political consensus, and social cohesion ahead of the December elections.

Although the PSC urged the military authorities to uphold the principles of constitutionalism and refrain from interfering in the country's political affairs, it once again stopped short of referring to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections organised to restore constitutional order. Moreover, while the Council reiterated its earlier call, made during its [1333rd](#) session, for strengthening the National Electoral Commission and the

Supreme Court to ensure a credible electoral process, it failed to articulate specific pathways that facilitate such reforms as part of a comprehensive strategy for an inclusive transitional process.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to continue sustained engagement with the authorities and all relevant stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau, including through the Office of the Special Envoy and in coordination with ECOWAS and other international partners.
- Urged the AU, ECOWAS, the UN and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) to continue coordinating their actions in their engagements and support for the mediation efforts and the peaceful restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau.
- Strongly urged the military leaders of Guinea-Bissau to uphold the principle of constitutionalism and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country.
- Called on the transitional authorities to fully cooperate with the AU, ECOWAS and CPLP in creating conducive conditions for an inclusive political transition, including by upholding due process, ensuring constitutional safeguards and the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all citizens of Guinea-Bissau without exception.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- [Update on the Political Transition and Security Situation in Guinea-Bissau, Insights on the PSC](#), 17 May 2026.

PSC CALLS FOR AFRICA-WIDE ANNUAL OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL DAY OF LIVING TOGETHER IN PEACE EVERY 16 MAY

On 18 May, Council added another item to its agenda on the annual 'International Day of Living Together in Peace.' A [Press Statement](#) was released as an outcome document.

This commemoration happened against the backdrop of UN General Assembly Resolution 72/130, adopted on 8 December 2017, which proclaimed 16 May of each year as the 'International Day of Living Together in Peace.'

From the Statement, Council expressed deep concern over the increasingly complex governance, peace, and security landscape across Africa, and urged Member States to address the structural root causes of conflict, including political, ethnic, religious, and socio-economic marginalisation. It also emphasised the need to uphold the AU's principles of good neighbourliness, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference, peaceful dispute resolution, and the right of peoples to self-determination. In addition, the PSC called for the commemoration of the International Day on 16 May each year through national events and educational campaigns, fostering the culture of peace, tolerance, and Pan-Africanism.

In addition, the Council encouraged the African Members of the UNSC (A3), in close collaboration with the AU Permanent Observer Mission in New York, to lead the organisation of annual commemorative events at the UN Headquarters. The Council concluded by reaffirming its decision to retain the International Day of Living Together in Peace as a standing item on its Annual Programme of Work.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

Joint Retreat of the PSC, the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Subcommittee on General Supervision and Coordination (GSC) on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters, and the Board of Trustees (BoT) of the AU Peace Fund

On 8 May, there was a joint retreat on the financing of the Union. This brought together different stakeholders for a discussion which focused on the alignment of perspectives, strengthening collaboration, and reinforcing the link between political decision-making and financial implementation. The session saw the participation of PSC Members, the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the High Representative for Financing and Peace Fund, members of the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund, and members of the Bureau of the PRC Subcommittee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters. The AU High Representative for Financing the Union and the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, briefed the meeting, highlighting the progress made in the capitalisation of the AU Peace Fund.



Figure 7: Joint Retreat with the PRC GSC Bureau, and the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund, 8 May 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Informal Consultations with the Foreign Minister of Mali

On 14 May, the PSC had an informal consultation with Abdoulaye DIOP, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Mali, to discuss the evolution of the security situation in the country, which involved terrorist attacks in several locations across Mali. In attendance was also Mamadou Tangara, High Representative and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Mali/Sahel.



Figure 8: Informal Consultation between the PSC and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali, and SRCC MISAHEL, 14 May 2026. (Source: X @AUC_PAPS)

Counter-Terrorism Subcommittee Meeting

Council's subsidiary body, the Counter-Terrorism Subcommittee, met on 13 May for discussions on the 'Draft 5-year AU Continental Counter Terrorism Strategic Plan of Action.'

Adoption of the Conclusions of the 5th Joint Retreat of the PSC and the APRM, held from 29 to 30 April 2026

On 21 May 2026, the PSC released a [communiqué](#) on the consideration of the Conclusions of the 5th Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) held from 29 to 30 April 2026, under the theme, ‘Governance, Early Warning, and Preventive Diplomacy: Strengthening Institutional Synergies for a Peaceful Africa.’

As earlier captured in our [April 2026 Monthly Digest](#), the PSC and the APRM convened for their 5th Annual Retreat in Burayu, Ethiopia, on 29 and 30 April, which led to the adoption of the [Joint Burayu Declaration](#) on Five Years of Engagement between the PSC and the APRM (2021–2026).

The retreat gave an opportunity for the two bodies to review progress made since their inaugural 2021 retreat in Durban, including institutionalising annual collaboration, integrating APRM governance assessments into the APSA, and enhancing preventive diplomacy through governance-focused early warning tools. The language in the Declaration saw the two bodies reaffirming commitments to democracy, constitutionalism, human rights, and good governance as foundations of peace and security, while outlining future priorities such as formalising APRM country reports within the Continental Early Warning System, improving coordination among AU governance and mediation bodies, strengthening member-state implementation capacity, and enhancing data-sharing and rapid response mechanisms.

17th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa

On 21 and 22 May, the Chairperson of the PSC participated in the AU Commission Chairperson’s 17th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa, in Libreville, Gabon. This year’s Retreat, which brought together high-level stakeholders to advance dialogue, reconciliation and sustainable peace efforts across the continent, was held under the theme, ‘Powering Ceasefire, National Dialogue and Reconciliation for Durable Peace.’

The PSC Chairperson, Nasir Aminu, delivered a [statement](#), followed by Sinikka Antila, Ambassador of Finland to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the AU, representing Finland as the main partner for the convening of the Retreat and for the AU’s broader preventive diplomacy and mediation initiatives. The outcomes of the Retreat, which included a [Fireside Chat](#) on ‘Leadership Perspectives on the State of Peace and Security in Africa,’ will inform ongoing efforts by the AU Commission, working with the Panel of the Wise, AU organs, RECs/RMs, Special Envoys and High Representatives, Member States, partners and relevant stakeholders, to strengthen conflict prevention, mediation, reconciliation and durable peace across the continent.



Figure 9: 17th High-level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa, 21 and 22 May, Libreville, Gabon. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

Induction of the PSC Committee of Experts, and Engagement with the National Counter Terrorism Centre

On 25 and 26 May, the PSC's subsidiary body, the Committee of Experts (CoE), travelled to Abuja, Nigeria, for a series of activities, beginning with an induction programme. Following their election to the PSC during the 39th Ordinary Session of the Union in February 2026, the CoE members participated in an induction and orientation programme [hosted](#) by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). As the sixteenth cohort of the CoE to be inducted, they will serve on the PSC until 2028. Following the induction, the CoE also engaged with NCTC staff to strengthen strategic partnerships and enhance collaboration, particularly with the PSC Sub-Committee on Counterterrorism.



Figure 10: The Sixteenth Cohort of the PSC Committee of Experts, following their Induction/Orientation and engagement with the NCTC, held from 24 to 27 May 2026, Abuja, Nigeria. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

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
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We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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