






# MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

## AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

November, 2025

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				17th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods and Abuja Lessons Learned Forum, Abuja, Nigeria		
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17th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods and Abuja Lessons Learned Forum, Abuja, Nigeria		Youth, Peace and Security in Africa 			Youth, Peace and Security in Africa 	
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
	8th AUPSC/UNPSC Annual Consultative Meeting 			Situation in Madagascar 	Children Affected by Armed Conflicts  Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts	
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					Situation in Guinea-Bissau 	
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
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## THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In November 2025, under the chairship of Cameroon, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [programme of work](#) consisting of five substantive sessions, made up of three situation-specific sessions and two thematic sessions, as well as an informal consultation with countries in political transition. It also provided for the 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods, the Abuja Lessons-Learned Forum and the 8<sup>th</sup> Annual Consultative Meeting with the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). After the revision of the programme, the PSC held six substantive sessions, with only two dedicated to country-specific situations. All six sessions were convened at the ambassadorial level.



The PSC programme of work underwent three revisions. The first revision rescheduled the 'Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sudan)' from 13 November to 20 November. This revision also saw the session on the 'Briefing on the Situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)' being rescheduled from 19 November to 28 November, the session on the 'Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area' from 21 November to 19 November and the open session on 'Children Affected by Armed Conflicts,' was brought forward to 21 November from 28 November.

The second revision of the programme of work saw the postponement of the 'Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sudan)' and the session on the 'Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area.' On 20 November, the PSC added a session to its programme, focusing on the 'Situation in Madagascar.'

The third revision saw the eventual postponement, to a later date, of the 'Briefing on the Situation in the Eastern DRC.' Finally, the last update on the PSC's Programme of Work saw the addition of an emergency session on the 'Situation in Guinea-Bissau,' which was convened on 28 November following the military coup d'état in the country on 26 November 2025, just as the country was about to announce the electoral results.

## THE PSC TASKS THE AU COMMISSION TO UNDERTAKE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON MIGRATION, YOUTH, PEACE AND SECURITY

On 11 November, the PSC held its first substantive session on the theme 'Migration, Youth, Peace and Security in Africa.'<sup>1</sup> Coming in as the Council's 1310<sup>th</sup> meeting, the open session adopted a [Press Statement](#) as the outcome document.

As captured in our [Insights on the PSC](#) analysis of this session, the focus on migration put a spotlight on how the chronic development and governance challenges lead to increasing youth migration and the entanglement of migration with various threats to peace and security, including

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<sup>1</sup> Neema Chusi, Head of the PSC Secretariat, made the introductory statement on behalf of Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU, made a statement as representative of the AU Champion for Youth, Peace and Security in Africa. A statement was also made by the representative of King Mohammed VI of the Kingdom of Morocco, as the AU Champion for Migration. The meeting also received statements from the five African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAP), namely: Julien Vikenba (Central Africa); Nashiba Nakabira (East Africa); Arif Abdeljahil Moussa (North Africa); Mpule Kgetsi (Southern Africa); and Simone Mbode Diouf (West Africa) as well as a presentation by Mr. Walter Kasempa, AU-IOM Youth Ambassador on Migration for Southern Africa, representing the other AU-IOM Youth Ambassadors, namely: Damilola Adeniran (West Africa); Rose Kobusinge (East Africa); Sarah Badr (North Africa) and Bobuin Junior Valery (Central Africa). The meeting further received a presentation from Alice Kimani, Ag. Director of the IOM Special Liaison Office to the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); as well as the statements by the Representatives of AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and by the representative of the UN.

transnational organised crime, such as smuggling of persons and terrorism. Echoing these issues, the PSC expressed concern over 'persistent youth unemployment, marginalisation, poverty, despair, and socio-economic and political exclusion.'



Figure 1: 1310<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the PSC on 'Migration, Youth, Peace and Security in Africa,' 11 November 2025. (Source: X @AUC\_PAPS)

The session also expressed support for the outcomes of the [2023 Continental Youth Consultation on Migration](#) in Kigali, and integration of the African Labour Migration Advisory Committee into relevant platforms. It called for the incorporation of youth indicators in the AU Continental Early Warning System, and heeding greater attention to migration within the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda. Finally, the Council called for investments in youth peace and migration through a dedicated Youth Mobility Fund to enable African youth to pursue opportunities on the continent, alongside scaled-up financing for National Action Plans (NAPs) and urgent action to fund and operationalise AU migration governance structures in Bamako, Khartoum, and Rabat. It also welcomed past dialogues on youth and migration organised by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), congratulated the IOM for its work against irregular migration, and stressed the protection of migrants' human rights, alongside youth-centred repatriation, reintegration, and post-trauma support programmes.

## Relevant Previous PSC Decision:

1243<sup>rd</sup> Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1243 \(2024\)](#)]:  
The PSC:

- Directed the AU Commission to present the draft Continental Guideline for the Development and Implementation of NAPs on YPS to the PSC Committee of Experts for validation and ultimately to this Council for consideration and adoption within three months.

While the Council addressed the thematic nexus of migration, youth, peace and security in broad terms, the outcome of the session lacked depth. In particular, some emerging dynamics and strategic issues that were expected to sharpen the Council's framing and guidance did not feature prominently in the adopted outcome. Notably, the Press Statement omitted an explicit linkage between the surge in youth-led protests across the continent, underlying governance deficits, and the drivers of youth migration, thereby missing an opportunity to situate migration within broader dynamics of political participation, legitimacy and social unrest. Similarly, as captured in our [Insights on the PSC](#) analysis of the session, given the growing role of climate change as a significant driver of youth displacement and insecurity alongside conflict, the Press Statement made no direct reference to climate-induced migration or environmental stress.

Moreover, the anticipated advancement of discussions on a Common African Position on Migration and Development, particularly in response to recurring incidents of mass expulsions within Africa, was also absent, as was any reference to the African Migration Observatory and its role in strengthening harmonised migration data and evidence-based policymaking. While the Council generally encouraged consideration of

migration within the YPS agenda, it stopped short of explicitly calling for the integration of youth migration as a defined thematic pillar within NAPs on YPS. In addition, although the Press Statement requested the urgent submission of the AU Guidelines on the Development and Implementation of YPS NAPs, it did not acknowledge the earlier PSC directive setting a timeline for their adoption, nor did it address the delay or establish clear accountability mechanisms for finalisation.

## Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Recalled and reiterated its previous decisions on the appointment of an AU Special Envoy on Migration.
- Requested the AU Commission to urgently submit the Draft Guidelines for consideration of the AU Guidelines for the Development and Implementation of National Action Plans on YPS.
- Underlined the urgent need for the reactivation of the AU-UN-EU Tripartite Task Force on Migration in Libya as directed by the PSC at the Summit Level and report to the Council.
- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently commission a comprehensive study on migration, youth, peace and security in Africa and underlined the need to coordinate efforts aimed at addressing the scourge of irregular migration, including within the AU's Youth, Peace and Security agenda.

## Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- Open session on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in Africa, [Insights on the PSC](#), 10 November 2025.
- The Zohran Way: A New Dawn for Africa's Youth and Progressive Politics, [Ideas Indaba](#), 10 November 2025.
- [Amani Africa Briefing to the Peace](#)



[and Security Council](#), 17 September 2025.

- Briefing by the Panel of the Wise, FemWise, and WiseYouth on Their Activities in Africa, [Insights on the PSC](#), 10 March 2025.

## CONDEMNING VIOLENCE AGAINST JOURNALISTS, THE PSC CALLS FOR INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF SUCH VIOLENCE

On 14 November, the PSC convened its 1311<sup>th</sup> session on 'Media, Peace and Security,' marking the Council's most comprehensive engagement to date on the role of media within Africa's peace, security and governance landscape. Unlike earlier sessions that addressed media either through thematic lenses, such as Women, Peace and Security (2016) or emerging technologies (2022), this session sought to consolidate media as a **cross-cutting operational enabler of conflict prevention, early warning, peacebuilding and governance reforms**. The session was held against a backdrop of growing information disorder, the weaponisation of digital platforms, and persistent attacks against journalists in conflict and crisis settings.<sup>2</sup>



Figure 2: 1311<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the PSC on 'Media, Peace and Security,' 14 November 2025. (Source: X [@AUC\\_PAPS](#))

<sup>2</sup> During the session, statements were delivered by Adama Dieng, AU Special Envoy on Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities, and by Omar Faruk Osman, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ).

In the [communiqué](#) adopted by the session, the PSC acknowledged the 'inextricable link between Media, Peace and Security,' applauding the role of journalists and the media in contributing towards the promotion of peace, security, democracy and development of Africa. Building on the decision of the [1230<sup>th</sup>](#) session, the PSC strongly **condemned all forms of violence and attacks against journalists and called for investigations and prosecutions to end impunity**. The PSC also reiterated the relevance of existing continental instruments, including the [2013 AU Model Law on Access to Information](#) and the [2019 Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa](#), and urged Member States to align their national frameworks accordingly.

A notable development in this session was the explicit focus on gender-based threats against women journalists, particularly those facilitated by artificial intelligence and digital platforms. In welcoming the 2025 global theme of the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, *Chat GBV: Raising Awareness on AI-facilitated Gender-Based Violence against women journalists*, the PSC encouraged Member States and media organisations to develop gender-responsive protection frameworks, training and safety mechanisms.

Another significant outcome of the session was the PSC's emphasis on mainstreaming and integrating communication and media dimensions across all pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). In doing so, the Council highlighted the role of media across the full conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and transitional justice processes. The PSC further called for integrating media

analysis, digital monitoring, and fact-checking into the AU's early warning and preventive diplomacy efforts, reinforcing earlier decisions that recognised the role of information ecosystems in conflict dynamics.

By explicitly situating media and communication within the context of the ongoing APSA-AGA reforms, the PSC acknowledged that peace and security outcomes are shaped not only by political, military and diplomatic interventions, but also by information ecosystems, narrative framing, and public trust.

However, as with previous sessions, the communiqué does not clarify how this integration will be operationalised within existing mechanisms such as the Continental Early Warning System, nor does it assign institutional leadership for implementation.

Furthermore, consistent with the PSC's [1097<sup>th</sup> sessions](#), the Council highlighted the growing threat posed by misinformation, disinformation, hate speech, deep fakes and the malicious use of artificial intelligence. Another clear demonstration of continuity in the PSC's decisions is reflected in the communiqué's endorsement of the establishment of an **AU Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists in Addis Ababa**. This decision directly follows up on a recommendation first highlighted during the [1230<sup>th</sup> session](#), which underscored the absence of such a mechanism in Africa despite its presence in other global diplomatic hubs, thereby addressing a previously identified institutional gap.

### Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1230<sup>th</sup> Session [\[PSC/PR/PS.1230 \(2024\)\]](#), 2 September 2024:

The PSC:

- Encouraged the AU Member States to consider forming a Working Group

on the Protection of Journalists and National Coordination Mechanisms for the Safety of Journalists, as well as of Friends for the Safety of Journalists within the PRC.

In a notable departure from earlier sessions, the PSC requested the AU Commission to develop a Matrix of all PSC decisions and instruments on media and the protection of journalists, to be submitted before March 2026. This request implicitly acknowledges longstanding concerns about institutional memory and fragmented follow-up. Additionally, the Council reiterated its earlier call for a comprehensive study of the legal, institutional, and policy frameworks for the protection of journalists and access to information, noting that this decision, first articulated in 2024, remains outstanding.

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up: The PSC:

- Called for the development of a Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa to be expedited as directed earlier by the Council.
- Reiterated its call for a comprehensive study on the legal, institutional and policy framework and map for the protection of journalists and Access to Information in Cooperation with the relevant AU Organs.
- Requested the AU Commission to develop a Matrix of all PSC decisions and instruments on the role of the Media in popularisation of peace and security initiatives, as well as the protection of journalists, and to submit it to the Council before March 2026 for consideration.

Some of the conclusions of the session, such as that which calls for a continental media house, fall outside of the scope of the mandate of the PSC but also are an unrealistic pursuit that unnecessarily diverts

attention away from the focus on the role of media in peace and security and the fight against impunity for violence against journalists.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- Media, Peace and Security, [Insights on the PSC](#), 13 November 2025.

## PSC CALLS FOR BUDGETARY PROVISION FOR THE PCRD CENTRE IN THE UPCOMING FINANCIAL YEAR

On 17 November, the PSC held its 1312<sup>th</sup> meeting to mark the 'Launch of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Awareness-Raising Week.' The meeting, which was attended by Ambassador Obaida El Dandarawy, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU, as a representative of the AU Champion on PCRD, adopted a [communiqué](#) as the outcome, alongside the Annual [Report](#) of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on PCRD and Peacebuilding (January - December 2025).



Figure 3: 1312<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the PSC on the 'Launch of the AU PCRD Awareness-Raising Week,' 17 November 2025. (Source: X @AUC\_PAPS)

In the communiqué, the Council highlighted the positive strides made by the AU PCRD Centre through country-level initiatives aimed at rebuilding institutions, communities, and national resilience, including Quick Impact Projects

in Somalia, South Sudan, Madagascar, and Liberia. The [Report](#) of the Chairperson, in this regard, outlines some of the results and accomplishments made in different regions of the continent in 2025.<sup>3</sup> While recognising the vital role of the High-Level Working Group on PCRD and Peacebuilding in rolling out initiatives, particularly the triple nexus project linking peace, security, and development, absent in PSC's reflection was the adverse impact of the proliferation of institutions and structures in a context of extreme resource constraints. Not surprisingly, the Council also stressed the pressing need to provide the PCRD Centre with adequate resources and tools for effective mandate implementation.

3 These accomplishments included: Building Resilient National Institutions: Enhancing Governance and Rule of Law in Somalia's Post Conflict Transition, 14 - 16 April 2025, Mogadishu, Somalia. Inclusion of Women and Youth in Political Spaces and Peacebuilding in Madagascar, 28 - 30 April 2025, Antananarivo, Madagascar. AU Centre for PCRD Engagement with The African Ambassadors Group, May 28, 2025, Cairo, Egypt. Briefing to PSC Committee of Experts: Reactivation of the AU PCRD Sub-Committee, Debre Zeyit, Ethiopia, 25 - 26 July 2025. 3rd Coordination Meeting of the AU High Level Working Group (HWG), 27 August 2025. Awareness-Raising and Knowledge-Sharing between AU, RECs/RMs and relevant Stakeholders on the Implementation of the revised AU PCRD Policy, 11 - 13 September 2025, Kigali, Rwanda. Validation of the MHPSS Guidelines for affected persons in Pre-Conflict, Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings, 15 - 17 September 2025, Kigali, Rwanda. Youth in PCRD and Peacebuilding, 29 September - 1 October 2025, Cairo, Egypt. Launch of the 2nd Edition of the AU Journal on PCRD and Peacebuilding. The 5th Edition of the AU PCRD Awareness Week (flagship/statutory events), 16 - 23 November 2025, Addis Ababa and Cairo.





Figure 4: 8<sup>th</sup> Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC, 18 November 2025. (Source X @ [AUC\\_PAPS](#))

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to implement the existing PCRD activities/stabilisation strategies, taking lessons and best practices from the national and regional strategies.
- PSC directed the AU Commission to further engage and establish partnerships with African financial institutions and other partners with a view to developing innovative and smart mechanisms for incentive schemes to invest in countries emerging from conflicts to establish strong development infrastructures, as well as for the successful implementation of the AU PCRD Policy.

- Requested the AU Commission to budget for the AUPCRD Centre in the coming financial year.
- Requested the AU Commission to extend the period for the commemoration of the PCRD Awareness-Raising from one week to one month, effective from 2026.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD, [Insights on the PSC](#), 14 August 2025.
- High-level session on implementation of DDR and PCRD programmes for consolidation of peace, security and socio-economic activities: Challenges and way forward, [Insights on the PSC](#), 17 November 2024.

## VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD REMAIN THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF FUNDING, AUPSC - UNPBC

The second agenda item on 17 November was the 8<sup>th</sup> Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and members of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UN PBC), convened in Addis Ababa.<sup>4</sup> A [Joint Statement](#) was adopted.

<sup>4</sup> The meeting was co-chaired by the PSC Chair of November 2025, Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, and Ricklef Beutin, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Chair of the UN PBC. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for PAPS, and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU, and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), made statements during the meeting.

As captured in our [Insights on the PSC](#) of the session, the meeting was also held in the context of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), which offered a timely opportunity to both sharpen focus on operational effectiveness and measurable impact and to enhance close coordination between the AU and the UN in developing and implementing peacebuilding interventions in Africa. However, the UNPBC was not keen on discussing the PBAR, and accordingly, the PSC lost the opportunity to engage the PBC on the PBAR.

In terms of working methods, the two sides adopted a review of the outcome of the earlier consultative meeting as a point of departure. In this respect, they also 'underscored the need to regularise the sharing of outcomes of their annual joint meetings to strengthen coordination and collaboration on peacebuilding efforts in Africa and enhance the working methods for the conduct of their annual consultative meetings.' They 'further encouraged the systematic follow-up of recommendations arising from previous joint meetings.' The fact that they did not specify 'how' and 'by whom' may, however, undermine effective implementation of this ambition.

On financing of peacebuilding, they jointly emphasised the ongoing challenge of peacebuilding financing, recalling relevant General Assembly resolutions and **affirming voluntary contributions as the main funding source**, complemented by assessed contributions as a collective Member State responsibility. Praise was extended to the AU for initiating projects under Window II of the AU Peace Fund, including Quick Impact Projects and Institutional Capacity Building, which underscore shared dedication to preventing conflicts and fostering resilient, sustainable peace.

Reaffirming commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda - marking the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 - the meeting stressed stronger links between FemWise-Africa and the PBC's Gender Strategy to ensure women's full, equal, and meaningful involvement in peacebuilding, mediation, and recovery. On youth, it called for their active engagement in mediation, decision-making, and post-agreement implementation, bolstered by targeted capacity-building and respect for national ownership.

On country and region-specific cases, the meeting highlighted specific initiatives in regions such as South Sudan, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, urging efforts to tackle conflict root causes, enhance governance, and support programmes like the P-DDRCS with national leadership prioritised.



Figure 5: 1313<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the PSC on the 'Situation in Madagascar,' 20 November 2025.  
(Source: X @AUC\_PAPS)

Despite reaffirming a strong political commitment, the Joint Statement remains largely declaratory and reveals several notable gaps. It places heavy emphasis on partnership, coordination, and shared principles, yet falls short of translating these into time-bound, clearly assigned actions or measurable benchmarks, making follow-up

and accountability difficult.

References to women and youth are broad and aspirational, with limited guidance on how collaboration between mechanisms such as FemWise-Africa and the PBC Gender Strategy will be operationalised or assessed for impact. Country- and region-specific references, including the Sahel, South Sudan, and eastern DRC, remain generic and do not outline distinct priorities or coordination modalities tailored to the complexity of these contexts. Finally, although the statement calls for systematic follow-up of past recommendations, it does not establish a formal mechanism or reporting cycle to ensure continuity between meetings, risking repetition of commitments without demonstrable progress.

### Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC and UN PBC:

- Underscored the need to regularise the sharing of outcomes of their annual joint meetings to strengthen coordination and collaboration on peacebuilding efforts in Africa and enhance the working methods for the conduct of their annual consultative meetings.
- Underscored targeted capacity-building programmes designed to equip youth with the necessary skills and knowledge to contribute effectively in peacebuilding activities across the continent
- Encouraged the systematic follow-up of recommendations arising from previous joint meetings.
- Underscored the necessity of maintaining regular high-level engagements between the AU and the United Nations to enhance coherence across initiatives.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- Gambia's transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture, [Ideas Indaba](#), 18 November 2025.
- 8<sup>th</sup> Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC, [Insights on the PSC](#), 16 November 2025.

## PSC URGES THE MALAGASY AUTHORITIES TO URGENTLY DEVELOP A CONSENSUAL, CLEAR AND GENUINELY INCLUSIVE TRANSITION ROADMAP

On 20 November, at its 1313<sup>th</sup> session, the PSC considered the situation in Madagascar. This meeting constituted the third PSC session since the dramatic turn of events in October, when youth-led anti-government protests culminated in a military takeover of power in mid-October. The outcome of the session is a [communiqué](#).

The Council was briefed by Domitien Ndayizeye, Chairperson of the AU Panel of the Wise, and Mohamed Idris Farah, AU Special Envoy for Madagascar, both of whom had led the AU's diplomatic mission to Antananarivo earlier in November. The mission sought to engage the Malagasy authorities and national stakeholders in addressing the ongoing political crisis. These diplomatic deployments were undertaken pursuant to the decisions of the PSC at its 1305<sup>th</sup> and 1306<sup>th</sup> sessions, which requested that the Chairperson of the AU Commission immediately dispatch a high-level delegation to Madagascar. The representative of Malawi also briefed the Council as the chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on

Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

While these diplomatic engagements are encouraging, their effectiveness in persuading the Malagasy authorities to comply with the Council's demands remains unclear. In the previous sessions, the PSC called for 'a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.' During this session, the Council strongly urged the authorities to 'urgently develop a consensual, clear and genuinely inclusive transition roadmap with clear benchmarks and precise timelines aimed at a swift conclusion of the transition process.'

### Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1306<sup>th</sup> Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1306 \(2025\)](#)], 15 October 2025:

- The PSC directed the AU Commission, in close cooperation with SADC, to provide the requisite support to Madagascar to ensure a swift return to constitutional order.

1305<sup>th</sup> Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1305 \(2025\)](#)], 13 October 2025:

- The PSC requested the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a follow-up mechanism to support the reconciliation and dialogue process in Madagascar.

Meanwhile, the interim president who led the military seizure of power, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, unveiled his cabinet on 28 October and announced a six-step plan to address the political crisis. This plan includes drafting a new constitution, organising a constitutional referendum, and holding a presidential election within two years. As previously highlighted in our [Insights on the PSC](#), these measures do not amount to a 'swift and full restoration of constitutional

order,' but rather signal a consolidation of military authority cloaked in reformist rhetoric. Absent from the PSC's outcome document is also any reference to the rule that excludes those who participated in coups from becoming candidates for elections to be held for restoring constitutional order. In its engagement with Madagascar, the AU therefore risks the challenge of protracted transitions, characterised by shifting timelines, or scenarios such as Gabon, where coup leaders run for elections in contravention of the AU's anti-coup norm.

Beyond the restoration of constitutional order, the PSC outlined a range of additional measures that the transitional authorities are expected to undertake. These include addressing the structural and underlying root causes of the crisis; organising a credible and inclusive national dialogue; adopting confidence-building measures; refraining from arbitrary and politically motivated arrests; and taking on board the demands, grievances, and aspirations of the youth.

The session also underscored the AU's intention to remain engaged and to accompany Madagascar throughout the transition process. In this regard, the Council requested the AU Commission to include Madagascar among the countries eligible for support through the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), contingent upon the implementation of a Transition Roadmap. It further called for the mobilisation of technical and financial support for the national electoral commission and the constitution-drafting process; the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the AU Liaison Office in Antananarivo and the team of the AU Special Envoy for Madagascar; and the undertaking of a PSC Field Mission in early 2026.



Another key highlight of the session was its emphasis on the need for enhanced coordination, harmonisation, and complementarity of efforts between the AU and relevant regional bodies, notably SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission. This is particularly important in light of the evident policy divergence between the AU and SADC regarding the characterisation of the events of mid-October as a military seizure of power. In contrast to the PSC's position, SADC did not suspend Madagascar but instead opted to conduct a fact-finding mission, despite the apparent unconstitutionality of the takeover. At its most recent [Summit](#), however, SADC appeared to adopt a more decisive posture, directing Madagascar to submit a dialogue readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026, followed by periodic updates. It also agreed to deploy the SADC Panel of Elders by March 2026 and to engage Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique, as SADC's Special Envoy to Madagascar.

Going forward, it is imperative for the AU and SADC to effectively coordinate these initiatives to maximise their collective leverage over the military authorities, ensure a timely restoration of constitutional order, and facilitate a sustainable resolution of the country's political crisis.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar, [Insights on the PSC](#), 19 November 2025.
- Session on the situation in Madagascar, [Insights on the PSC](#), 15 October 2025.
- Emergency Session on the Political Unrest in Madagascar, [Insights on the PSC](#), 13 October 2025.

## CHILDREN AFFECTED BY ARMED CONFLICTS

On 21 November, the PSC convened its 1314<sup>th</sup> meeting, in an open format, focusing on the theme 'Children Affected by Armed Conflicts.'




Figure 6: 1314<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the PSC on 'Children Affected by Armed Conflicts in Africa,' 21 November 2025. (Source: X @AUC\_PAPS)

As captured in our [analysis of the session](#), the meeting took place just one day after World Children's Day (also known as Universal Children's Day), which is celebrated annually on November 20. It was on 20 November 1959 that the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and exactly 30 years later, on 20 November 1989, it adopted the landmark Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) - marking its 36<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2025. Additionally, 2025 marks the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), adopted on 11 July 1990.

It is worth noting that during the drafting of this segment, the outcome document for the session had not yet been released. However, according to the concept note of the session, the open session was specifically convened to address critical issues surrounding children's rights in conflict-affected areas across Africa. Its primary objectives included receiving an update on the current state of children's rights in situations of armed conflict across the continent, as well as agreeing on a set of



prioritised actions to enhance the AU's and its Member States' responses to the challenges faced by these vulnerable children.

### Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1296<sup>th</sup> Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1296 \(2025\)](#)], 13 August 2025:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to issue periodic Scorecards on the Elimination of Harmful Practices, tracking trends in child marriage and other violations in conflict-affected areas to enable data-driven interventions.
- Requested the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive and dynamic matrix listing all AU legal frameworks, strategies and initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive education for all, particularly ensuring continuity of education in times of conflict in Africa and to develop an action plan on activities to be undertaken in this area from 2025 onwards.

1290<sup>th</sup> Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1290 \(2025\)](#)], 22 July 2025:

The PSC:

- Reiterated the request for the Chairperson of the Commission to expedite the appointment of a Special Envoy on Children in Conflict Situations in Africa to facilitate effective implementation of the AU child protection agenda across the African Continent.

1262<sup>nd</sup> Session, [[PSC/PR/COMM.1262 \(2025\)](#)], 20 February 2025:

The PSC:

- Reiterated its call, from its 1202<sup>nd</sup> session held in February 2024, for 'the AU Commission, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, to expedite the development of a Continental Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Framework to address the psycho-

social needs of children affected by armed conflict, including those formerly associated with armed groups

Additionally, the session aimed to provide an update on the ongoing work of the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts, while reaffirming the collective commitment of stakeholders to protect and promote the rights and well-being of children impacted by armed conflict. This reaffirmation aligns with the principles outlined in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, alongside relevant AU and UN instruments.

### Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts, [Insights on the PSC](#), 20 November 2025.
- Education in Conflict Situations, [Insights on the PSC](#), 12 August 2025.
- Rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts, [Insights on the PSC](#), 21 July 2025.
- Fight against the Use of Child Soldiers, [Insights on the PSC](#), 19 February 2025.

## PSC DECIDES TO HOLD A SUMMIT ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT AS IT SUSPENDS GUINEA-BISSAU FOR A COUP

On 28 November, PSC held its 1315<sup>th</sup> session as the last substantive session of the month. The session was held as an emergency session to consider the situation in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, following the military's seizure of power two days earlier.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> During the meeting Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission made a statement, followed by Bankole Adeaye, Commissioner for PAPS. Maria Antonieta Pinto Lopes D'Alva, Permanent

Adopted as an outcome document, the [communiqué](#) constitutes a normatively forceful reaction by the PSC to the 26 November 2025 military takeover in Guinea-Bissau, which interrupted an election process that was sure to produce a fair and credible outcome. It explicitly characterises the events as a ‘seizure of power by the military’ and an ‘Unconstitutional Change of Government,’ grounding this determination in violations of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and the Lomé Declaration, and invoking Article 7(g) of the PSC Protocol and Article 25(1) of ACDEG to suspend Guinea-Bissau from AU activities. Structurally anchored in familiar references to the AU’s anti-coup toolkit and framed in consistently condemnatory and coercive language (‘strongly condemns,’ ‘totally rejects,’ ‘demands’), the communiqué stands out as among the firmer PSC outcomes in the current cycle of coups; yet it simultaneously reproduces a chronic gap between robust declaratory posture and the limited specification of enforcement measures.

The communiqué signals strong alignment with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It explicitly ‘fully supports the Communiqué of the Extraordinary Session of the Mediation and Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government’. That ECOWAS [communiqué](#) sets out immediate demands on the coup leaders. It called for the National Electoral Commission to announce the 23 November election results without delay. It demanded the release of all detainees, including President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, electoral officials and other political figures. It also required protection for civilians and

*Representative of Guinea-Bissau to the AU - as the country concerned - also made an intervention. Others included Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the AU, representing the Chair of ECOWAS, and Abdel-Fatau Musah, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.*

detainees, as well as the safe passage of ECOWAS and other international election observers. It mandated a high-level mediation mission to press for a return to constitutional rule. It also reserved escalation options, including sanctions against actors deemed responsible for disrupting the democratic process. In the same vein, the PSC further supported ‘the strengthening of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau,’ underscoring ECOWAS’s political and operational lead. Read plainly, this is subsidiarity in practice. ECOWAS provides proximity, mediation and stabilisation capacity. The AU adds continental legitimacy and a shared normative frame.

The proposed ‘African Union Monitoring Mechanism,’ to be established jointly with ECOWAS, is presented as a tool for sustained follow-up beyond episodic crisis meetings. Thus, the PSC’s role is cast as consolidation and continuity. It endorses ECOWAS-led measures, strengthens joint oversight and embeds the response in a broader commitment to constitutional order and stability. Yet, what constitutes the mechanism and how it can be operationalised leaves its implementation uncertain. Indeed, at the time of the deployment of the ECOWAS mission to Guinea-Bissau, the AU was conspicuously absent.

Another defining feature of the communiqué is how firmly the PSC anchors the crisis in electoral legitimacy. It ‘calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all detained electoral officials and all other political figures and those who participated in the elections,’ and insists that the National Electoral Commission must be allowed ‘to finalise the tabulation and proclamation of the results of the elections as well as accompany the electoral process to the end with the inauguration and assumption

of office of the winner.’ In plain terms, the PSC views the completion of the electoral process, rather than negotiations or interim arrangements, as the primary pathway to the restoration of constitutional order. In this regard, the communiqué is clear and purposeful. It positions the AU on the side of the electorate’s expressed will, makes the November elections the decisive reference point for political legitimacy, and translates that stance into a concrete expectation: the military should step back, allow the results to be concluded, and enable the declared winner to assume office.

The PSC warned that, if the ‘military leaders fail to urgently and unconditionally uphold the principle of constitutionalism’ and ‘refrain from further interference in the political process’, it will impose ‘targeted sanctions against all the actors involved in the military coup d’état.’ Yet, the PSC does not have a good record of following through on such threats. In the absence of time-bound demand, focusing on the release of the outcome of the elections and respecting the sovereign will of the people by recognising the winner of the election, PSC’s threat is nothing more than a bark that does not bite. Given the AU’s uneven record in enforcing targeted sanctions, there is a real risk that this remains a rhetorical warning rather than a credible deterrent.

The communiqué’s most salient feature is the PSC’s decision to convene a ‘Meeting at Heads of State and Government level, dedicated to discussion on the resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.’ This decision constitutes a clear political signal that the Council recognises the scale, persistence, and systemic character of the challenge, warranting attention at the highest level of continental leadership. It also implicitly situates Guinea-Bissau not as an isolated rupture, but as a manifestation of a wider pattern that is

testing the credibility and deterrent capacity of the AU’s constitutional order.

Finally, when measured against the four critical issues the PSC needed to address, as identified in Amani Africa’s [Insights on the PSC](#) prepared for the session, the communiqué delivers a mixed response. On the first two concerns: safeguarding the 23 November results and compelling the junta to allow the electoral process to run its course, the text does place the election at the centre of the AU’s response, notably when it calls as highlighted above, on the military to ‘allow the National Electoral Commission to finalise the tabulation and proclamation of the results’ and ‘calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all detained persons’ involved in the process. It reinforces this stance by deciding ‘to suspend the participation of Guinea-Bissau in all activities of the Union, its organs and institutions’ and urging states and partners not to confer any recognition on the ‘illegal regime’. Yet these are essentially normative and coercive signals: the communiqué offers no concrete mechanisms to protect the tally from manipulation, nor does it outline a credible off-ramp for the coup leaders in terms of guarantees or sequenced concessions, even as it threatens targeted sanctions. Likewise, while it ‘directs the AU Commission... to support national dialogues and reform of government institutions’, it stops short of explicitly naming or prioritising the constitutional design problems that the insight flagged as the fourth issue. In this sense, the communiqué affirms the right principles but only partially answers the pre-session questions about how, in practice, to reverse the coup and address the structural roots of Guinea-Bissau’s instability.

## Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- called upon the military leaders in Guinea-Bissau to respect the laws of the land, and the will of the people, and to this end, allow the National Electoral Commission to finalise the tabulation and proclamation of the results of the elections, as well as accompany the electoral process to the end with the inauguration and assumption of office of the winner;
- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to establish an inclusive AU Monitoring Mechanism in collaboration with ECOWAS and all other relevant stakeholders, to closely follow up on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, especially the implementation of the ECOWAS and PSC decisions.
- Agreed to hold a PSC Meeting at the Heads of State and Government level, dedicated to discussion on the resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.

## Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publication

- Emergency Session on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau, [Insights on the PSC](#), 28 November 2025.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

### 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods and Abuja Lessons Learned Forum

In addition to the aforementioned engagements, the PSC also convened in Abuja, Nigeria, from 6 to 9 November for its 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat on its working methods, which aimed to enhance the

Council's effectiveness in addressing the peace and security priorities of the African continent. This year's edition also featured the inaugural mock session on the [AUPSC Model](#), which involved youths from various academic institutions/universities in Abuja. Held under the theme 'Shared Solutions for Sustainable Peace in the Sahel,' the exercise and the discussions focused on insecurity, governance challenges and humanitarian crises in the Sahel, which sought to underscore the AU's efforts and commitment to African-led and youth-driven solutions to address insecurity, governance challenges and humanitarian crises in the region.



Figure 7: The 17<sup>th</sup> Annual Retreat of the PSC on its Working Methods, 6 - 9 November 2025, Abuja, Nigeria. (Source: X @AUC\_PAPS)



## MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


### ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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