

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

AMANI AFRICA

Media and Research Services

October, 2025

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
			1	2	3	4
			Commemoration of the AAM 2025, Kampala, Uganda			
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
		AUPSC-EUPSC 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting and the 8th Informal Joint Retreat, Brussels, Belgium				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
	Situation in Madagascar 		Situation in Madagascar 		AUPSC-UNSC 19th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting and 10th Annual Joint Informal Seminar, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 	
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
					Briefing by the ICRC on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa 	
26	27	28	29	30	31	
		Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan and Sudan 		Open Session on Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325 		

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE.....1

AU AND EU CONDEMN M23, CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL
OF UNINVITED FOREIGN ARMED FORCES FROM THE DRC.....2

SEEKING TO PREEMPT UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, THE PSC URGED
‘IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO ENGAGE STAKEHOLDERS’.....5

PSC DECIDES TO SUSPEND MADAGASCAR FOR ANOTHER
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT.....6

THE PSC-UNSC MEETING ENDED WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME DOCUMENT.....8

COUNCIL CALLS FOR A COMMON AFRICAN POSITION ON IHL AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN WARFARE.....11

EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT RELAPSE INTO CONFLICT,
THE PSC CALLS FOR AN ALL-INCLUSIVE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE.....13

PSC MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO BEYOND REHASHING PREVIOUS DECISIONS
AND INVOKE ARTICLE 4(H) OF THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT.....15

PSC REQUESTS FOR INDEPENDENT SHADOW REPORTS TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE CONTINENTAL RESULTS FRAMEWORK (CRF).....19

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH.....21


 Amnesty Month Commemoration in Uganda.....21

 CoE Meetings.....22

 MSC Meeting.....22

THE MONTH AT A GLANCE

In October 2025, under the chairship of Botswana, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled [programme of work](#) consisting of three substantive sessions, made up of two thematic sessions and one session on a conflict situation. Additionally, it provided for the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month and the Council's annual statutory meetings with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC). After the introduction of three sessions on crisis/conflict situations and the revision of the programme of work, the PSC held six substantive sessions. Out of the six, four focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All six sessions were convened at the ambassadorial level.



The PSC programme of work underwent two revisions. The first revision introduced several changes to the programme. This includes the addition of an emergency session on 13 October, on the situation in Madagascar, following the widespread Generation Z (Gen-Z) protests and the political crisis that emerged in the country. At the time this session was held, no change of government took place. Following the seizure of power by the leader of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) in the wake of the mass anti-government protests in the country, the Council convened yet another session on the situation in Madagascar on 15 October. The revision also saw the session on the 'Briefing by the ICRC on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa' being moved from 18 October to 24 October, followed by the session on the 'Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan' being moved from 30 October to 28 October. The last change from the first revision on the programme saw the open session on 'Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSC Resolution 1325' being rescheduled from 28 October to 30 October.

The second revision, on the other hand, led to the addition of an emergency session on the 'Situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities in El Fasher,' which was held on 28 October.

The changes to the programme demonstrated a PSC that is able to be responsive to and alive to emerging developments in situations that are on its agenda. Such responsiveness to developments on the ground should be the modus operandi of the PSC. It would make the PSC not only agile but also able to set the policy agenda in responding to conflicts/crises on the continent, which is critical to the AU's leadership in dealing with conflicts and crises on the continent.

In terms of the outcome of the six PSC sessions in October, five sessions resulted in communiqués, and one session produced a press statement. Additionally, the annual joint consultations of the PSC with the EUPSC and the UNSC resulted in a joint communiqué and joint press statement, respectively. The commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month, however, had a Report as the outcome document of the activity. On average, it took approximately 8 days for the outcome documents to be released.

AU AND EU CONDEMN M23, CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF UNINVITED FOREIGN ARMED FORCES FROM THE DRC

On 9 October, EUPSC and the AUPSC held their 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in Brussels, Belgium, which was preceded by the 8th Informal Joint Retreat between the two bodies.¹ As discussed in the edition of *Insights on the PSC* dedicated to the meeting, the consultative meeting addressed developments in the Horn of Africa (AUSSOM and Sudan), the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and the Great Lakes Region, as well as broader geopolitical issues discussed under 'Any Other Business.' As examined in the edition of *Insights on the PSC* dedicated to the retreat, the informal joint retreat focused on Peace Support Operations (PSOs), maritime security and hybrid threats.

¹ Delphine Pronk, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, co-chaired the meeting with Tebelelo Alfred Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October 2025. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Patricia Llombart, European External Action Service (EEAS) Managing Director for Africa, were also in attendance at the consultative meeting.



The 16th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the EUPSC and AUPSC, 9 October 2025, Brussels, Belgium.
(Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

A notable breakthrough in this year's consultative meeting was the adoption of a [joint communiqué](#), after three consecutive years during which the PSC and EUPSC were unable to do so owing to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. This breakthrough was made possible by relying on verbatim formulations from the joint communiqué of the [3rd AU–EU Ministerial Meeting](#) held in May 2025. The joint EUPSC-AUPSC communiqué drew directly from the Ministerial Meeting text, expressing support for 'a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the occupied Palestinian Territory, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel, and Syria.'

In relation to the agenda items, there are two observations worth highlighting. First, the communiqué's inclusion of situations beyond Africa - such as Ukraine, the occupied Palestinian Territory, and conflicts in other parts of the world, including Syria - reflects a growing view in some quarters that AU–EU engagements should not focus exclusively on African crises. Rather, Africa is increasingly expected to take positions on global crises, and itself is moving in

that direction. However, for Africa to take principled positions that advance its interests, it needs to ground the adoption of such a position on a unified African foreign policy, which currently does not exist but needs to be developed, as argued ([here](#) and [here](#)). Second, the consultative meeting reveals a striking omission: South Sudan does not appear among the situations considered by the consultative meeting, despite the country's crisis being, by any reasonable measure, [an issue of major concern](#).

On the situation in the **Horn of Africa**, the two parties held extensive discussions on Somalia (AUSSOM) and Sudan.

Regarding **Somalia**, they acknowledged AUSSOM's critical role in supporting peace, security and stability, while underscoring that 'without adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, including the provision of sufficient force multipliers and enablers, the Mission may have major difficulties executing its mandate.' They further welcomed AU's contribution to the financing of AUSSOM (\$20 million for 2025), as well as the pledges made by both traditional and non-traditional donors during the High-Level Financing Event held on 25 September 2025 in New York.²

The two sides also emphasised the need to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2719 in relation to AUSSOM - despite the slim likelihood of this occurring under current U.S. policy during the Trump administration - and reiterated calls for broader diversification of financial support from international partners. AUSSOM is currently confronting a severe and existential financial crisis, with an annual budget of nearly USD 200 million. The EU has been the Mission's single largest

² The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each appeared to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, contributions are also anticipated from Japan and the Republic of Korea.

donor, contributing nearly [€2.7 billion](#) to AU missions in Somalia since 2007. It is anticipated that it may announce further contributions in the context of the 7th AU-EU summit scheduled to be held on 24-25 November 2025 in Luanda, Angola.

On **Sudan**, the joint communiqué offers little that is substantively new, largely reiterating familiar language regarding the crisis. The two parties reaffirmed their strong commitment to respecting Sudan's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. However, no reference was made in rejecting the establishment of parallel governing structures in Sudan, developments that pose a significant risk of a de facto partition of the country. At the same time, the two parties condemned indiscriminate attacks on civilians and all forms of external interference by state and non-state actors. They further expressed concern over the proliferation of weapons, the looting of humanitarian supplies, attacks against humanitarian personnel, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the dire and deteriorating humanitarian conditions and the lack of coordination among the multiple peace initiatives on Sudan. **Regarding multiple peace processes, the joint communiqué urges the reinvigoration of the AU's central role in peace efforts aimed at achieving a viable, inclusive and lasting solution to the conflict.** However, it provides no clarity on how such a reinvigorated role should be operationalised or what mechanisms would ensure coordination among the fragmented mediation initiatives currently underway.

Where the joint communiqué articulated a particularly strong policy stance going beyond rehashing existing language was in relation to the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**. It thus carried some of the strongest language regarding the role of the M23. Much of this is not new, but built on the [previous](#) consultative meeting between

the PSC and the UN Security Council, held in New York in October 2024, as well as in UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). Still, the joint communiqué carried a markedly stronger formulation than was used in earlier outcomes on the DRC.

First, in relation to the M23, the communiqué, reaffirming the imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC as essential to resolving the country's conflict, expressed grave concern over M23's military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the 'dismantlement of the so-called 'parallel administration' by the rebel Movement of M23.' This is in addition to 'strongly' condemning M23 - alongside other armed groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) - for their destabilising activities and human rights abuses.

Second, the joint communiqué called 'for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw in line with UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025).' While the EUPSC-AUPSC avoided naming who 'uninvited foreign forces' refers to, the reference to UNSC Resolution 2773 leaves very little doubt about who it refers to. UNSC Resolution [2773](#) not only implicates Rwanda for providing direct support to M23 and for participating in M23-led offensives in North and South Kivu in January and February, but also explicitly urges the Rwanda Defence Forces to cease such support and to immediately withdraw from DRC territory without preconditions.

In relation to the peace processes, the two sides **noted** the peace agreement signed by the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025 in Washington. It is notable that they specifically singled out provisions of the agreement signed in Washington'

to neutralise the FDLR and to withdraw Rwanda's 'defensive measures.'

Similar to the 2024 consultative meeting between the PSC and the UNSC, the EUPSC-AUPSC consultative meeting expressly recognised the linkages between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in those resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as major drivers of the conflict. In this context, and echoing UNSC Resolution 2773, the two parties condemned the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in eastern DRC and urged all companies operating in the mining sector to exercise due diligence. Yet, this fell short of instituting an oversight and enforcement mechanism with investigation, documentation and reporting mandate.

On the **Sahel**, the consultative meeting drew attention to the illicit proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the region. It also underscored the importance of fighting against the supply of sophisticated weapons to terrorist groups and the financing of terrorism through targeted and coordinated measures. In this regard, the two sides welcomed the non-binding guiding principles on preventing, detecting, and disrupting the use of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes, adopted by the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee in January 2025. They further expressed concern about the destabilising presence of transnational criminal organisations, mercenaries, and irregular private military companies linked to third states - an apparent allusion to the Africa Corps.

In relation to the **Lake Chad Basin**, the two sides underscored the need to combine political dialogue with socio-economic development, community-based initiatives, and climate resilience, while expressing concern over the devastating effects of

climate change in both the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EU PSC and AU PSC, Insights on the PSC](#), 8 October 2025.
- [Will the AU and the EU peace and security organs once again fail to adopt a joint communique of their annual consultative meeting?](#), *Ideas Indaba*, 20 November 2024

SEEKING TO PREEMPT UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, THE PSC URGED 'IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO ENGAGE STAKEHOLDERS'

The PSC convened its 1305th session as an emergency session on 13 October to deliberate on the escalated political unrest in Madagascar.³ As noted in the edition of [Insights on the PSC](#) dedicated to the session, the '1305th session of the PSC has been called following the escalating tensions and signs of a military coup in the wake of the widespread protests that gripped the island nation for the past few weeks.' This is one of the few instances in which the PSC proactively convened a session before the occurrence of a coup, indicative of possibilities for the PSC's responsive and agile engagement in emerging crises. The session featured the AU Commission Chairperson, signifying concern at the highest level about the risk of the military seizing power. The day before the session, he issued a statement

³ During the meeting, the Council heard briefings from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the AU Special Representative in Madagascar, and the representative of Madagascar.

in which he emphasised the need for adherence to the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.



1305th Meeting of the PSC on the 'Situation in Madagascar,' 13 October 2025. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

The outcome of the session was a [communiqué](#). It emerged that stability was the prominent preoccupation underpinning the PSC's approach to the situation. The PSC strongly condemned 'all acts of violence' and called on both civilians and the military 'to exercise calm and restraint, and to prioritise peaceful and consensual solutions.' In an act presumptive of the existence of responsive and effective processes for addressing citizens' grievances, the PSC urged protesters to channel grievances through legal mechanisms.

Signifying the concern of members of the Council about a creeping coup, the PSC categorically rejected any attempt at unconstitutional change of government (UCG). It also emphasised the need for the Malagasy Armed Forces 'to uphold their constitutional mandate, and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country.'

In a hint of recognition of the need for addressing the demands of protestors, the PSC called for an all-inclusive political

dialogue as the only viable path towards restoring stability. Along the same lines, the PSC further urged the government to adopt a whole-of-society approach to addressing structural governance challenges, including the socio-economic grievances that partly fueled the protests, and stressed the importance of respecting the rights and freedoms of all citizens.

Seeking to preempt further deterioration of the situation, the PSC requested the immediate dispatch of a high-level AU delegation to engage with stakeholders and recommended the urgent appointment of a Special Envoy on Madagascar. Echoing the intervention from SADC, the PSC encouraged the reactivation of the [2011 Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar](#), codified into national law. The Council underscored its commitment to strengthening coordination and collaboration with SADC in managing the ongoing situation.

Cognisant of the need for continuing presence on the ground, the PSC's call to strengthen the AU Liaison Office in Madagascar marks an interesting development when viewed against its own earlier [decision](#) at the 1297th session held on 15 August 2025, during which the Council, after considering the Report of the Committee of Experts on the Review of AU Liaison Offices, endorsed the closure of several offices, including those in Côte d'Ivoire, Chad and **Madagascar/Comoros**. The new directive to reinforce the mandate and operational role of the Liaison Office therefore raises an important question: does this decision implicitly reverse or suspend the earlier decision to close the office, or does it reflect a shift in the PSC's assessment of the situation in Madagascar, signaling that the political environment now warrants a renewed on-the-ground presence despite the broader institutional streamlining agenda?

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission:

- To urgently appoint a special envoy on Madagascar, to work closely with the Panel of the Wise, and to strengthen the mandate of the AU Liaison Office in Madagascar, with the view to reinforcing facilitation, mediation and stabilisation efforts in the country, in close collaboration with SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission.
- To establish a follow-up mechanism to support the reconciliation and dialogue process in Madagascar.
- To provide regular updated briefings to Council on the evolution of the situation.

PSC DECIDES TO SUSPEND MADAGASCAR FOR ANOTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT

Before the AU Commission acted on the decision of the PSC from its 1305th session for the immediate dispatch of a high-level delegation to preempt further escalation, the situation fundamentally changed. On 15 October, during its 1306th emergency session, the PSC considered the rapidly evolving political situation in Madagascar, following the seizure of power by the elite Army Corps of Administrative and Technical Personnel and Services (CAPSAT) the day before.⁴

During the session, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, delivered a statement, followed by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Madagascar, who briefed the Council. Additionally, Statements were delivered by the representative of Madagascar, as the concerned country and by the representative of Malawi, in its capacity as Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

This followed the High-Constitutional Court's 'invitation' for the leader of the CAPSAT to 'exercise functions of head of state', which it did **without any constitutional foundation and hence exceeded its mandate.**

As examined in the edition of [Insights on the PSC](#) for the session, it was not crystal clear to all PSC members that the change of government was actually unconstitutional. During the deliberations, some members were reluctant to support the automatic application of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, with some echoing the proposal from SADC for a fact-finding mission. But for many others, including PSC members from SADC, the key facts necessary to make a determination on the occurrence of unconstitutional change of government were in place, and there was no need for undertaking a fact-finding mission. The only issue of material policy significance on how to proceed in responding to the situation was the question of whether it was a case of popular uprising, which does not exactly fit into what constitutes an unconstitutional change of government. Despite the recognition of the popularity of the protests and the legitimacy of their grievances, the nature of the military's seizure of power and the announcement to rule for two years seemed to reflect a case of opportunistic hijacking of the situation. As such, for many in the PSC, there was no compelling reason for not automatically applying Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol and suspending Madagascar.

In the [communiqué](#) adopted as the outcome of the session, the PSC strongly condemned the coup and rejected the military's takeover as a 'blatant violation' of AU norms. In line with Article 7(g) of the PSC Protocol and Article 25(1) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the Council decided to 'immediately suspend the Republic of Madagascar from

participation in all activities of the Union, its Organs and Institutions, until constitutional order is restored in the country.'

Besides the suspension, the Council urged Madagascar's Armed Forces to uphold constitutionalism and cease interfering in politics; 'failing which, the Council will institute targeted sanctions against all the actors involved in the military coup.'

With regards to alignment and coordination with SADC, the PSC welcomed the decision of the Chairperson of SADC 'to dispatch a High-Level delegation of the Panel of Elders to Madagascar' which was endorsed during the Extraordinary [Summit](#) of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, held virtually on 16 October 2025. The Council further emphasised 'the need for closer collaboration of the AU and SADC efforts.' However, while the Council unequivocally condemned the 14 October 2025 military seizure of power and activated the AU's zero-tolerance instruments through immediate suspension and the threat of targeted sanctions, its position diverged notably from SADC.

Despite five SADC member states in the PSC, including the PSC Chair for October, participating in the 1306th session that collectively deemed the development as an unmistakable military takeover contrary to Madagascar's constitutional order, SADC itself avoided characterising the crisis as a UCG. Instead, at its 16 October Organ Troika Extraordinary Summit, SADC adopted a more cautious posture, urging inclusive dialogue and mandating a fact-finding mission led by its Panel of Elders under the leadership of former President Joyce Banda, with no explicit acknowledgement that the military's actions constituted a violation of constitutional processes.

Despite the divergence between the AU and SADC positions, the PSC reiterated its recommendation for the Chairperson of the Union, supported by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, to urgently deploy a high-level delegation to Madagascar to engage key stakeholders. The Council also requested the AU Commission to fully operationalise the decisions of its 1305th meeting, which includes the appointment of a Special Envoy on Madagascar.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1305th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1305 \(2025\)](#)]:

The PSC requested the AU Commission Chairperson:

- To urgently appoint a special envoy on Madagascar, to work closely with the Panel of the Wise, and to strengthen the mandate of the AU Liaison Office in Madagascar, with the view to reinforcing facilitation, mediation and stabilisation efforts in the country, in close collaboration with SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission.
- To establish a follow-up mechanism to support the reconciliation and dialogue process in Madagascar.
- To provide regular updated briefings to Council on the evolution of the situation.

Key Actionable Decisions from the session Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Directed the AU Commission, in close cooperation with SADC, to provide the requisite support to Madagascar to ensure a swift return to constitutional order.
- Reiterated its recommendation to the Chairperson of the Union, with the support of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, to immediately dispatch a high-level delegation to Madagascar to engage with the stakeholders con-

cerned with a view to addressing the challenges in the country.

- Requested the AU Commission to fully implement the PSC Communiqué [[PSC/PR/COMM.1305 \(2025\)](#)] adopted at its 1305th meeting, held on 13 October 2025.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Session on the situation in Madagascar](#), Insights on the PSC, 14 October 2025.
- [Emergency Session on the Political Unrest in Madagascar](#), Insights on the PSC, 12 October 2025.

THE PSC-UNSC MEETING ENDED WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME DOCUMENT

The PSC and the UN Security Council (UNSC) convened their 19th annual consultative meeting on 17 October 2025, following their 10th annual informal joint seminar on 16 October in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.⁵

These engagements were preceded by consultations between the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) and the UNSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, held in Addis Ababa from 14 to 15 October 2025.



The 10th Annual Informal Joint Seminar and the 19th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNSC, held on 16 and 17 October 2025, respectively. (Source: X [@AUC_PAPS](#))

⁵ The meetings were co-chaired by Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN and President of the UNSC for October 2025; and Ambassador Tebelelo Alfred Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chairperson of the AUPSC for October 2025.

This year's informal joint seminar had three agenda items: commemorating the 25 years of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 within the context of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; AU-UN Joint efforts in addressing terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism; as well as the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023). And, the 19th annual joint consultative meeting, structured around four key agenda items: enhancing and supporting AU-led PSOs, particularly the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM); the Sahel Region and Lake Chad Basin, including technical assistance to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea in countering challenges affecting maritime security; on Horn of Africa (Sudan and South Sudan); and the Great Lakes Region (Eastern DRC).

The most consequential feature of the October 2025 engagement between the PSC and the UNSC was not the content of the discussions but the absence of a substantive outcome document. The outcomes of this year's informal joint seminar and the 19th annual joint consultative meeting are captured only in a [joint press statement](#).

The joint statement released after the meeting, which was concise, formal and procedural, represented a clear departure from the substantive communiqués of earlier years. Its minimalist character indicates that negotiations on the main draft, which extended to 58 paragraphs, reached an impasse rather than consensus.

A closer look at the negotiation process suggests that the disagreements are a product of a confluence of factors. As Amani Africa's [insights](#) on the PSC note, financing for AU PSOs again became a contentious issue. The PSC sought to revisit it in connection with resolution 2719 and AUSSOM in Somalia, even though the agenda item faced opposition in the Security

Council from Somalia itself, while European members pushed for its inclusion. In the end, the UNSC folded it into a broader item on AU PSOs, but PSC members continued to call for specific mention of AUSSOM's deployment and funding, even if explicit mention of Somalia was dropped, noting that its personnel have gone without allowances for about 15 months. Somalia ultimately [accepted](#) the PSC's proposal, and the joint consultative meeting agenda included a session on 'enhancing and supporting AU PSOs, particularly AUSSOM.'

The core and most persistent fault line remained predictable financing for AU-led peace operations. The PSC entered the meeting expecting the communiqué to advance implementation of Resolution 2719 as a path to UN-assessed contributions for AU missions. The United States (U.S.) firmly opposed applying this framework to AUSSOM. Some Council members were open to other financing options, but not to the binding and institutionalised arrangement the AU sought. Financing, therefore, became the issue around which negotiations for substantive outcomes hardened and finally collapsed.

Beyond the funding of AUSSOM and the financing of AU-led PSOs, the Security Council [Report](#) captured several contentious debates around conflict-specific language, particularly regarding Sudan and the eastern DRC within the Security Council itself. In the case of Sudan, there was disagreement in describing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a 'paramilitary group.' In the DRC case, some UNSC members insisted on referencing Rwanda's role in the conflict; PSC members and the A3 Plus grouping (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) opposed naming Rwanda. These disagreements may illustrate contrasting diplomatic approaches: the UNSC favours explicit attribution while the PSC prioritises political pragmatism and

regional relationship management. As the negotiations became entangled in these disputes, it grew increasingly difficult to craft a language acceptable to both sides without diluting clarity or undermining regional diplomacy.

Normative differences amplified these tensions. Disagreement emerged over references to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), opposed by the U.S., and over China's proposal to include a language marking the 30th anniversary of the [Beijing Declaration on Women's Rights](#), to which some members objected. These disputes may appear marginal, but they demonstrate how global geopolitical contestation unfolds within AU–UN cooperative mechanisms. Far from being neutral spaces, these joint consultations have become microcosms of broader rivalries that complicate even otherwise routine elements of diplomatic drafting.

Procedural misalignments further exacerbated the tensions. UNSC experts received the draft communiqué only after arriving in Addis Ababa. PSC experts countered that the revised agenda from New York had reached them equally late. When several UNSC members proposed adopting a shorter, generic communiqué as a fallback option, the A3 Plus group and the PSC rejected the idea. After the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group finalised their internal negotiations, the A3 Plus then tried to persuade PSC experts to accept the revised draft communiqué, but the PSC side chose to first review the changes internally before resuming talks. When it became clear that consensus was out of reach, the issue was referred to ambassadors, who extended expert-level negotiations until 24 October.

Amani Africa also learned that how negotiations at the level of experts were

steered did not help in terms of facilitating flexibility and finding common ground. With Russia as the President of the UNSC, existing fault lines in the UNSC were also part of the dynamics that shaped the context in which negotiations on the adoption of substantive as opposed to procedural outcomes unfolded.

The fact that the decision to continue negotiation beyond the conclusion of the meeting did not yield a substantive joint communiqué is indicative of how geopolitical dynamics and differences over some substantive issues frustrated a substantive communiqué. The fact that this happened despite the fact that such a substantive communiqué actually lacks any reference value is illustrative of the low state of relations in the UNSC and how even symbolic processes could become victims of this dynamic.

The eventual adoption of a procedural outcome and one taking the form of a joint press statement is nothing more than face-saving. It is also meant to avoid a failure to adopt any outcome document.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Annual Joint Informal Seminar and Consultative Meetings between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council](#), Insights on the PSC, 15 October 2025.
- [Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?](#), Ideas Indaba, 23 May 2025.
- [Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the PSC and UNSC](#), Insights on the PSC, 17 October 2024.
- [AU's take on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on financing of PSOs](#), Ideas Indaba, 1 March 2024.

COUNCIL CALLS FOR A COMMON AFRICAN POSITION ON IHL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN WARFARE

On 24 October 2025, the PSC convened its 1307th session at the ambassadorial level to receive a briefing by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa, which was initially meant to be delivered by the President of the ICRC for the first time since her ascent to the role but fell on the Vice President.⁶ The outcome of this session was a [communiqué](#).

The PSC, condemning persistent violations in conflict zones, demanded full respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including the ‘protection of civilians, humanitarian workers, medical personnel and civilian infrastructure.’ It called for the opening of humanitarian corridors and the guarantee of safe, unhindered and sustained access for populations in dire need of humanitarian assistance.

The PSC welcomed the ICRC’s newly launched [Global Initiative on International Humanitarian Law](#) and encouraged all AU Member States to lend active support in the lead-up to the [2026 High-Level Meeting to Uphold Humanity in War](#). In the same spirit, Council urged concerned states to review and

⁶ The briefing was delivered by Dr Gilles Carbonnier, Vice-President of the ICRC, alongside Professor Julio Rakotonirina, Director, Humanitarian Affairs, Health and Social Development, on behalf of Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah, Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, AU Commission. Ambassador Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU, represented Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PRC Subcommittee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons during the meeting.

strengthen domestic legislation protecting healthcare facilities and personnel, in line with UNSC Resolution 2664, to prevent and address violence against medical and humanitarian workers in armed conflict. Further recommendations included encouraging the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to support affected Member States in establishing National Alliances for Missing Persons and pressing for regular joint ICRC-IFRC briefings to the PSC, accompanied by more concrete assistance from the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.

Recognising the fragmentation that too often hampers relief efforts, the PSC stressed the importance of stronger synergies among humanitarian agencies and deeper collaboration between the PSC, the PRC Subcommittee on Refugees, the AU, the ICRC, UN agencies and regional mechanisms to ensure swift and effective responses. It also highlighted the growing nexus between climate change, environmental degradation and forced displacement and called for ‘the need for the promotion of climate-sensitive humanitarian strategies.’

Finally, Council underlined the need to expedite the full operationalisation of the African Union Humanitarian Agency and the continental Mechanism on Civil Capacity for Disaster Preparedness and Response, strengthening their institutional capacities to lead a more coordinated, African-owned humanitarian response.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1286th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1286 \(2025\)](#)]:
The PSC:

- Reiterated its request for the AU Commission to expedite the operationalisation of the African Humanitarian

Agency and advocate for its predictable and sustainable financing by AU Member States.

- Reiterated the request for the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying the financial shortfalls and making concrete and practicable proposals on how to address the financial challenges for meeting Africa's humanitarian needs.

1239th Session [[PSC/PR/COMM.1239 \(2024\)](#)]:
The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying the financial shortfalls and making concrete and practicable proposals on how to address the financial challenges for meeting Africa's humanitarian needs.
- Reiterated the request for the AU Commission to lead efforts for an all-Africa mega pledge modelled after the post-Malabo 10-year Plan of Action in the following areas: Addressing Humanitarian challenges in Africa. Climate Change, Disasters and Forced Displacement in Africa; Food Security and Nutrition in Humanitarian Situations in Africa; Health Challenges in Humanitarian Space in Africa; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa; and Resource Mobilisation and Financing for Humanitarian Action in Africa.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission Chairperson to develop a dashboard of all material, technical and financial assistance received from the AU international partners and their deployments on the continent.

- Called for the expedited development of the Common African Position on IHL and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare and the importance of promoting humanitarian diplomacy, including the development of an AU Humanitarian Diplomacy Framework.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Briefing by the ICRC on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 23 October 2025.
- [Open Session on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 30 June 2025.
- [75th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: Preserving Our Common Humanity in a Time of Major Crises of Compliance](#), *Policy Brief*, 7 April 2025.
- [Prioritising Protection of Civilians in Peace and Security Diplomacy in Sudan: Challenges and Opinions](#), *Special Research Report*, 18 November 2024.
- [Briefing by the ICRC on the Humanitarian Situation in Africa](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 28 October 2024.

EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT RELAPSE INTO CONFLICT, THE PSC CALLS FOR AN ALL-INCLUSIVE HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE

On 28 October, the PSC convened its 1308th session to discuss the situation in South Sudan.⁷ The session was held amid renewed

⁷ Briefings were given by Abdiwell Ali, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Juba. Statements were also delivered by the representatives of South Sudan, as

hostilities between the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and affiliated militias.

The PSC's [communiqué](#), adopted by the session, also captures the persistent fragility characterising South Sudan's transitional process, marked by fighting between SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO along with various allied militias, and violations of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The Council's call for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities echoes similar calls from earlier PSC sessions on South Sudan, signifying the lack of effective initiative for achieving such an outcome. It also reaffirms the R-ARCSS as the sole viable framework for peace, as persisting violations continue, threatening to unravel the peace agreement.

On the breakdown of relations between the leaders of the parties to the R-ARCSS that in part account for the current situation, unlike previous sessions, which explicitly confronted the underlying political rupture between President Salva Kiir and the First Vice President, Riek Machar Teny, this session adopted a more generalised diplomatic tone, calling for an all-inclusive high-level political dialogue as the only viable path. It also urged the parties to prioritise national interest and 'to peacefully address all challenges facing the implementation of the R-ARCSS within the terms of the Revitalised Peace Agreement.' While the PSC had previously called for the immediate and unconditional release and reinstatement of Machar and other SPLM-IO officials, viewing such measures as essential to de-escalating tensions and preventing

the concerned country; South Africa, as Chair of the AU High-Level Ad hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat; and the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission; and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

the collapse of the agreement, its insistence on addressing all challenges strictly within the parameters of the R-ARCSS suggests that accountability measures, including the prosecution of Machar and other opposition leaders, should fall under the Agreement's transitional justice architecture, particularly the Hybrid Court for South Sudan.

Another aspect of the session is the Council's push towards expedited training and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUFs) as part of the implementation of R-ARCSS. But this time, the PSC coupled this insistence with explicit acknowledgement of the direct link between security reform and the feasibility of conducting credible elections slated for December 2026.

Furthermore, recognising that credible elections will require a rapid acceleration of institutional readiness, security stabilisation, and civic space protection, the PSC called on the Trilateral Mechanism to work with the Revitalised Transitional Government to revive the Joint Task Force and reassess feasible timelines and mechanisms for holding credible elections in December 2026. It also urged the RTGoNU to ensure that key institutions, the National Elections Commission, the National Constitutional Review Commission, and the Political Parties Council, function effectively.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1297th PSC Session ([PSC/PR/COMM.1297.1 \(2025\)](#)):

The PSC:

- Directed the AU Commission to urgently deploy a Technical Assessment Team to South Sudan to engage the Transitional Government of South Sudan and other relevant stakeholders with a view to identifying the technical and financial needs by of South Sudanese authorities regarding se-

curity sector reform, constitution making process and elections organization, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) among other, and make comprehensive recommendations aiming at addressing all political, security, socio-economic and humanitarian challenges in South Sudan,

- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently appoint an AU High-Level Representative to South Sudan, preferably a former Head of State, to maintain regular engagements with the South Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders aimed at addressing the challenges in the country with the view to working with the Parties towards the conclusion of the Transition.

1283rd PSC Session ([PSC/PR/COMM.1283 \(2025\)](#)):

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission, working in collaboration with the IGAD Secretariat, to further strengthen political engagement and mediation support to the South Sudan peace process, including through the continued use of the Panel of the Wise.
- Encouraged the Trilateral Mechanism to work with the RTGoNU 'to reactivate the Government Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) and facilitate the implementation of pending R-ARCSS provisions, including constitution making and electoral processes.'
- Reiterated its call on 'the RTGoNU to continue working with the AU Commission - Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) - to develop the Guidelines for the Establishment of the Hybrid Court of South Sudan and the modalities for the truth, reconciliation, compensation and reparation processes.'

Recognising the deep interlinkages between economic instability, governance deficits, and conflict relapse, the PSC's reference to macro and microeconomic reforms suggests a holistic approach to peacebuilding, broadening the PSC's framework beyond security and politics, embodying a comprehensive view necessary for sustainable peace and development.

Regarding regional and multilateral diplomacy, while previous communiqués recognised IGAD's role, this session, in a departure from the established approach, specifically called for an IGAD Council of Ministers meeting, activation of the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee on South Sudan, and renewed effort toward political de-escalation. Additionally, the AU Commission Chairperson was requested 'to continue advancing peace efforts by leveraging his good offices and the Panel of the Wise.' The PSC also requested the Panel to continue its preventive diplomacy efforts and encourage the South Sudanese political stakeholders to work together. Additionally, **the PSC retreated its request for the AU Commission to urgently appoint an AU High-Level Representative**, which is, according to sources, one of the recommendations of the High-Level Panel following its mission to Juba. The Mandate of the representative will be 'to support the implementation of the outstanding aspects of the Revitalised Peace Agreement, and also to further enhance the institutional capacity of the AU Mission in South Sudan/ Liaison Office in Juba.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to continue providing technical assistance to the RTGoNU to expedite the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan with a view to pro-

moting transitional justice, fighting impunity and laying the ground for durable peace and national reconciliation in the country.

- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to continue advancing peace efforts by leveraging his good offices and the Panel of the Wise, in close coordination with IGAD's ongoing efforts.
- Reiterated its request to the Chairperson of the AU Commission to appoint an AU High Representative to support the implementation of the outstanding aspects of the Revitalised Peace Agreement, and to further enhance the institutional capacity of the AU Mission in South Sudan/Liaison Office in Juba to enable it to more effectively deliver on its mandate.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Amani Africa tells the UNSC to deploy preventive measures with urgency and decisiveness to pull South Sudan from the brink](#), *Briefing to the UNSC*, 11 November 2025.
- [Update on the situation in South Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 27 October 2025.
- [Update on the situation in South Sudan](#), *Insights on the PSC*, 11 June 2025.
- [A fragile peace under fire](#), *Amani Africa Dispatch*, 25 April 2025.

PSC MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO BEYOND REHASHING PREVIOUS DECISIONS AND INVOKE ARTICLE 4(H) OF THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT

The PSC met on 28 October for an emergency session to receive an update on the situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities in El Fasher.⁸ This meeting - constituting the PSC's 1308th session - was convened against the backdrop of the fall into the hands of RSF of El Fasher, the last remaining SAF stronghold in Darfur and the capital of North Darfur, on 26 October, following an over-year-long siege (since May 2024) and amid reports of widespread atrocities committed during and after its takeover. The fall occurred despite the Council's repeated calls for the lifting of the RSF's siege of the town.

Although the atrocities reported to have been committed by the RSF during and after the fall of El Fasher are of a scale and nature that could trigger Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, the Council's response largely rehashed decisions adopted more than a year ago, with the only addition of specifying unrealistic timelines for their implementation. The emergency session, while commendable in putting a spotlight on the situation, can be characterised as a missed opportunity for the Council to take bold decisions, including the invocation of Article 4(h).

In the [communiqué](#) adopted during the emergency session, the Council strongly condemned the 'criminal activities against

⁸ Briefers of the session included Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa and Chair of the High-Level Panel on Sudan; Adama Dieng, Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities; and Mohamed Belaiche, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Sudan.

Sudanese civilians and the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, perpetrated by the paramilitary RSF.' It further demanded an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities, the opening of humanitarian corridors to allow life-saving aid to reach affected populations in El Fasher, and warned that perpetrators of such heinous acts will be held accountable. As international mediation actors such as the Quad (U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE) continue working toward securing a humanitarian ceasefire - which the RSF has reportedly announced its acceptance of - this moment presents an opportunity to advance discussions on the potential deployment of a protection force, as proposed in one of our [special research reports](#) a year ago. A deployment in Sudan would also stand a greater chance of garnering the necessary support for the operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1213th Session [[PSC/PR/BR.1213 \(2024\)](#)]:

The PSC requested:

- The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) to urgently investigate the human rights situation in El Fasher and other areas in Darfur and to report back to the Council, including recommendations to hold perpetrators accountable.
- The AU High-Level Panel to work with the AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide, to develop proposals on how to address ongoing atrocities and to prevent further escalation in Darfur, as well as to develop a plan for the protection of civilians.

1218th Session [[PSC/HoSG/COMM.1218 \(2024\)](#)]:

The PSC:

- Mandated the AU and its relevant Organs, in collaboration with the High-Level Panel on Sudan and IGAD, to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, as well as develop a plan for the protection of civilians.
- Directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently set up a PSC Ad-hoc Presidential Committee led by Uganda's President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni to facilitate face-to-face engagements between the leaders of the SAF and the RSF, at the shortest possible time.
- Directed the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions to liaise with the AU Commission and CISSA to identify all external actors supporting the warring factions militarily, financially and politically, as well as make proposals on how to contain each of them within a stipulated timeframe not exceeding three months from June 2024.
- Requested the AU Commission, in coordination with the ACHPR, to investigate and make recommendations to the PSC on practical measures to be undertaken for the protection of civilians.
- Proposed the convening of an extraordinary summit of the AU to consider the situation in Sudan.
- Requested the AU Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Union, to consult on the date and venue of the aforementioned extraordinary summit.

The Council also took several decisions, among which was a request for the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and

Other Mass Atrocities, Adama Dieng, to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back within three weeks with recommendations. According to sources, this decision appears to have originated from Dieng himself, who, during his intervention, advised the Council to deploy an AU rapid protection and fact-finding mission. Pursuant to this request, the Special Envoy has [reportedly](#) been in Port Sudan since 16 November for a four-day mission.

However, this decision is problematic on several levels. First, it is unclear what the scope and nature of this fact-finding mission will be, and it risks duplicating efforts, given that a comprehensive fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in Sudan has already been conducted - and its [report](#) recently released - by the ACHPR, in collaboration with the AU Commission's Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), pursuant to the PSC's [1213th](#) session. The PSC could simply have taken forward the findings and recommendations of that mission. Second, the feasibility of conducting a meaningful fact-finding mission and reporting back within three weeks is highly questionable, particularly if the mission is expected to assess the scope and scale of human rights violations.

In addition, the Council requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report on the heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan; develop proposals on how to address them to prevent further escalation; and prepare a plan for the protection of civilians, with recommendations to be submitted to the PSC within three weeks. These tasks are not new. They were first mandated more than a year ago - during the [1213th](#) session held in May 2024 and the [1218th](#) session held in June 2024 - but were never followed up on. While the attachment of a clear timeline

is a positive development, the deadline for submitting these proposals has already lapsed, and Sudan did not even feature on the Council's [agenda](#) for November 2025.

Similarly, during this session, the Council reiterated its call for the PSC Subcommittee on Sanctions, in collaboration with CISSA and AFRIPOL, to identify all external actors providing military, financial, or political support to the warring factions and to recommend measures for PSC action, again within a three-week deadline. This, too, echoes one of the decisions taken during the June 2024 summit-level session of the PSC, where the Subcommittee was tasked to report within three months - a deadline that passed more than a year ago.

Another decision reiterated during the session was the direction to the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently engage with members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee, formed in June last year, with the mandate to facilitate negotiations between the leaders of the SAF and RSF. Efforts to convene the Committee's first meeting have failed to materialise on three separate occasions.

The Council also reiterated its June 2024 decision requesting the AU Commission to facilitate the convening of an AU Special Summit on Sudan. Finally, it requested the urgent convening of a meeting between the AU, UN, IGAD, and the Quad on the situation in Sudan to ensure coordination of efforts and establish an effective coordination mechanism. Yet the AU's ability to play this coordinating role - despite being the most legitimate body to do so - remains questionable, given its inability to initiate a credible mediation or coordination process despite multiple attempts, including through the Expanded Mechanism on Sudan and the Core Group of the Expanded Mechanism it initiated.

Meanwhile, the AU's role in facilitating political dialogue among Sudanese actors appears to be facing setbacks. The planned meeting of civilian actors scheduled for October did not materialise. The AU High-Level Panel had previously convened three consultations with Sudanese civilian and political stakeholders (in July 2024, August 2024, and February 2025) to lay the groundwork for an inter-Sudanese political dialogue. Although the Council reiterated its call during this session for the resumption of such dialogue, the High-Level Panel's leverage to effectively steer this process remains uncertain.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the AU Commission to:
 - Regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan;
 - Develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation;
 - Develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks; and
 - Urgently convene a meeting of the AU, UN, IGAD and Quad on the situation in Sudan, to ensure co-ordination of efforts, and to put in place a coordination mechanism.
- Reiterated its call for the PSC sub-committee on Sanctions, in collaboration with CISSA and AFRIPOL, to identify all external Actors supporting the warring factions militarily, financially and politically, and recommend measures to be taken by the PSC within three weeks.

- Directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to urgently engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee to facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the SAF and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan.
- Requested the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Prioritising Protection of Civilians in Peace and Security Diplomacy in Sudan: Challenges and Options](#), Special Research Report, 18 November 2024.

PSC REQUESTS FOR INDEPENDENT SHADOW REPORTS TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE CONTINENTAL RESULTS FRAMEWORK (CRF)

The PSC held its 1309th meeting on 30 October 2025 in a virtual format, dedicated to the theme 'Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSC Resolution 1325.'⁹

Framed as a commemorative moment, the session sought to situate the African WPS agenda within broader continental and global normative frameworks. The meeting also coincided with the 15th anniversary of the

⁹ Briefers of the 1309th session included Liberata Mulamula, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women, Peace and Security; Justice (Rtd) Effie Owuor, Co-Chair of FemWise-Africa; and representatives of Member States, the RECs/RMs, UN Women and the EU.

PSC's decision at its [223rd](#) meeting in March 2010 to institutionalise WPS on its agenda.

The outcome document was a [press statement](#), foregrounding AU's Agenda 2063, the Maputo Protocol, AU gender strategies and the 25-year legacy of UNSCR 1325, while celebrating the [Windhoek+25 Declaration](#) and Namibia's leadership in global WPS diplomacy. In doing so, it positions AU rather than a passive recipient of the WPS agenda.

While the celebratory and self-referential nature of the content is not a problem on its own, the text engages only superficially with how these norms are reshaping conflict dynamics in Sudan, the Sahel, eastern DRC, the Lake Chad Basin or the Horn of Africa, where women continue to face extreme violence and exclusion from formal peace processes. As noted in Amani Africa's [insights](#) on the PSC prepared for the session, the AU has a strong normative foundation in legal instruments, and the 'major gap has nothing to do with a lack of normative policy and institutional frameworks but the lack of implementation and disregard of the commitments thereunder.'

At the same time, the statement commendably points to concrete achievements in expanding women's leadership in Africa, such as the integration of FemWise-Africa into AU missions and deployments in various conflict-affected settings. Women mediators now feature as standard components of 'AU preventive diplomacy and electoral missions,' with FemWise credited for mainstreaming women's participation in high-level processes in 'Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Madagascar, Chad and the Central African Republic.' Despite these 'achievements' and the 'empathy, moral authority and sustainability' that women's engagement brings to peace efforts, the proportion of their representation remains very low.

At the same time, two substantive gaps stand out. First, the Protection pillar is treated in generic terms. While the commitment to 'strengthening regional survivor-centred mechanisms to ensure justice, reparations, and psychosocial support for survivors of gender-based and conflict-related sexual violence' is welcome, the statement does not reference the scale, gravity or patterns of abuses in current theatres such as Sudan, South Sudan or eastern DRC, nor does it reflect on specific protection failures in AU-led or supported operations. This absence risks rendering the Protection pillar formulaic and detached from lived realities. In this respect, it is notable that the statement called for 'promoting Positive Masculinity in Leadership and to End Violence against Women and Girls.'

Second, on the pillar of participation, the everyday structural barriers to women's participation are under-analysed. Little is said about political repression, shrinking civic space, backlash against women human rights defenders or the securitisation of civic activism – all of which routinely undermine 'full, equal and meaningful participation.' The deployment of women mediators at the elite level is presented almost as sufficient in itself, without addressing how local and grassroots women can obtain safe, sustained influence over peace processes. The praise for FemWise-Africa overlooks wider concerns that women's participation in peace processes often remains selective and tokenistic within male-dominated negotiating formats. As the aforementioned insight noted, available [reporting](#) shows that women's participation globally continues to fall far below agreed targets. In 2024, women accounted for only 7 per cent of negotiators and 14 per cent of mediators; nearly 90 per cent of negotiation tracks and about two-thirds of mediation efforts included no women at all. It is a welcome that the statement underscored

'youth representation within national peace councils, mediation platforms, and peacebuilding initiatives'

The reference to 'positive masculinity' and 'youth representation' remains at the level of exhortation. There is no indication of how 'positive masculinity' will be embedded in security sector reform (SSR), education curricula, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes or broader governance reforms. Nor is there any requirement that future AU missions or mediation teams include joint youth-WPS mechanisms. An intersectional lens is also missing: the statement does not seriously consider how class, rural marginalisation, disability, displacement or other axes of inequality shape which women and which young people can participate. Without operational detail, 'positive masculinity' risks becoming a slogan rather than a programmatic pillar.

Substantively, the idea of a 'continental coordination platform' under the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS (OSE-WPS) addresses a real problem: fragmentation. RECs/RMs, AU organs and agencies run parallel WPS initiatives with differing indicators, reporting cycles and templates. A focal-point network anchored in the OSE-WPS could possibly reduce duplication, align the Continental Results Framework (CRF) with REC frameworks and National Action Plans (NAPs) and create a predictable channel for data, lessons and joint planning. Harmonised indicators and templates would also make it easier to compare progress across regions and to identify systemic gaps—for example, where participation is advancing, but protection or financing is lagging.

Closely linked to this is the question of monitoring, transparency and accountability. The commendation of the Annual Report

and the CRF signals an important effort to track NAP implementation across member states, and the emphasis on grassroots involvement and 'civil society shadow reports' is particularly noteworthy. **The Council's request to the Chairperson of the AU Commission to establish a mechanism for complementary civil society reporting under the CRF is one of the statement's most promising elements.** If properly designed, such shadow reporting could expose gaps between official state narratives and realities on the ground, elevate grassroots women's voices into continental monitoring processes and generate data to inform conflict-specific PSC decisions. Yet this potential depends heavily on political space at the national level and the existence of avenues for ventilating such reports within the AU framework.

Finally, the statement's call for predictable financing from the AU budget points to the structural question of institutional sustainability, particularly regarding the OSE-WPS. While the need for 'predictable resources' is acknowledged, it does not specify amounts, timeframes or diversified sources beyond the AU budget – itself chronically underfunded and heavily reliant on external partners. Even the appeal to 'reinforce' this office is framed as a request to the AUC Chairperson rather than as a firm Council decision to ring-fence resources within the regular budget and require periodic reporting. In the absence of hard financial commitments and clear follow-up obligations, institutional strengthening remains aspirational.

Relevant Previous PSC Decisions:

1268th Meeting, 21 March 2025 [[PSC/PR/COMM.1268 \(2025\)](#)]

The PSC:

- Underscored the need for the AU Commission to carry out an assessment that will assist AU Member

States to develop a national policy on promoting women, peace and security.

- Emphasised the need to establish clear indicators and robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to report regularly on the status of commitments relating to the WPS Agenda.

Key Actionable Decisions Requiring Follow-up:

The PSC:

- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to develop a mechanism for complementary civil society reporting under the CRF to enable grassroots women's organisations and networks, in cooperation with Member States, to produce independent shadow reports that strengthen transparency and accountability.
- Requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to reinforce the institutional capacity of the OSE-WPS through adequate and predictable financing, including from the AU regular budget.

Recent Relevant Amani Africa Publications

- [Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325](#), Insights on the PSC, 29 October 2025.
- [Women, Peace and Security in Africa](#), Insights on the PSC, 20 March 2025.
- [Ministerial High-Level Meeting on Women, Peace and Security in Africa](#), Insights on the PSC, 22 March 2024.
- [Briefing on Women, Peace and Security Interlinkage](#), Insights on the PSC, 30 October 2024.
- [10 Years Review of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda of the AU Peace and Security Council](#), Special Research Report, 16 October 2020.

OTHER ACTIVITIES OF THE PSC AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES DURING THE MONTH

Amnesty Month Commemoration in Uganda

In addition to the substantive sessions held during the month, the PSC also undertook a field mission. On 2 and 3 October 2025, the PSC visited Uganda to launch and commemorate the Africa Amnesty Month 2025. This was pursuant to Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.645 (XXIX)], which declared the month of September of each year, till 2020, as 'Africa Amnesty Month' (AAM) for the surrender and collection of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the subsequent decision adopted by the Assembly of the Union, at its 14th Extraordinary Session, held on 6 December 2020, through which the Assembly extended the annual commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month to 2030.

From the [Report](#), this year's 9th commemoration of the AAM aimed to achieve several key objectives. It sought to raise public awareness and popularise the AAM while encouraging civilians to voluntarily surrender their illegally owned weapons to designated state authorities without fear of disclosure, arrest, or prosecution. Additionally, it aimed to inspire Member States to develop programmes that effectively address the root causes and drivers behind the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) and related criminal activities.

The commemoration also encouraged continued support from the international community for DDR programmes as part of broader efforts to curb the spread of illicit SALW. Furthermore, it emphasised the importance of engaging civil society to actively promote the voluntary surrender of

illicit weapons during the AAM, ensuring that such actions occur without fear of exposure or legal consequences.

CoE Meetings

In addition to the aforementioned engagements, the Council also held a session at the Committee of Experts (CoE) level. On 6 October, they met to discuss preparations for the 16th Joint Consultative Meeting between the EUPSC and AUPSC. A week later, on 13 October, they also met for the final preparations for the Joint Consultative Meeting between the UNSC and AUPSC.

MSC Meeting

Moreover, the Council also held a session at the Military Staff Committee (MSC) level. The MSC held its session on 27 October, where it had consultations with the AU Commission's Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) on the Strategic Review of the African Standby Force (ASF).



MEDIA AND RESEARCH SERVICES


ABOUT AMANI AFRICA

Amani Africa is an independent African based policy research; training and consulting think tank with a specialization and primary focus on African multilateral policy processes, particularly those relating to the African Union.

We support the pan-African dream of peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa through research, training, strategic communications, technical advisory services, and convening and facilitation.

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