9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC
9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSCDate | 4 November 2026
Tomorrow (5 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 9th informal joint retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ahead of their 17th annual joint consultative meeting on 6 November.
Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to co-chair the informal seminar. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and a representative from the EU are also expected to address the retreat.
The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat/seminar and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting.
Since 2015, the PSC and EUPSC have institutionalised informal retreats ahead of their annual consultations to address thematic peace and security issues. This year’s retreat will cover four items: maritime security; AU/EU efforts on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; AI governance, peace and security; and Women, Peace and Security.
Maritime Security
The agenda envisages that Spain, Greece and Romania will take the lead in delivering intervention on the side of the EU. It is to be recalled that this agenda featured in last year’s informal retreat. It is worth recalling that this item also featured in the AU-EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025, whereby the ministers in their Joint Communiqué ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’
As in the earlier retreat, the two sides are expected to review developments across Africa’s maritime domain, assess existing cooperation and identify priorities for strengthening joint responses. There are dynamic developments in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans that affect the maritime interests of African states and the maritime and trade route interests of European states. As choke point geopolitics intensifies and the maritime domain acquires increasing economic significance, there is a rising need in Africa to secure and invest in Africa’s maritime zones and in both Africa and Europe to enhance the security of global trade routes. In terms of recent developments, it is expected that the impact of agreements on ports and maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea may attract attention. The decline in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, supported by the Yaoundé Architecture and coordinated regional and international efforts, constitutes a major progress. Yet maritime insecurity has become increasingly complex, with persistent threats from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, trafficking, oil theft and transnational organised crime. In the Red Sea, some of the notable developments involve conflicts and geopolitical tensions, including the impact of the war between the US and Israel against Iran and the emergence of Houthi threats on the Red Sea, endangering major maritime corridors, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, forcing shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope and contributing to the resurgence of piracy activities off the Somali coast. The expansion of terrorist activities towards West Africa’s coastal states also raises concerns over maritime routes being exploited for arms trafficking, illicit financing and movement of fighters.
The PSC side may highlight continental and regional frameworks, notably the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, the Yaoundé Architecture and the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Particular attention may be given to progress towards operationalising the Combined Maritime Task Force in the Gulf of Guinea, which the PSC considers an important step towards an African-led, ready-to-deploy maritime security capability. For its part, the EUPSC is expected to highlight its maritime engagements, including Operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, both mandated until February 2027; the Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative in the Gulf of Guinea; and the various maritime capacity-building programmes across the continent. Another recent development that may feature under this agenda item is the July 2026 EU–Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement for ASPIDES.
Against this background, a key issue for the retreat is how to leverage and boost existing African-led maritime governance frameworks and security arrangements at continental, regional and national levels for enhancing the safety of maritime trade routes, coordination between existing AU and EU maritime initiatives, particularly through intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, joint operational planning and capacity-building.
AU/EU Efforts on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa
It is expected that Ethiopia, Cameroon, Somalia and Togo will take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Austria, Hungary and Slovakia from the EU side. Terrorism remains one of Africa’s most pressing security threats. Despite a global decline in terrorism-related fatalities, Africa has become the main epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for around 70–75 per cent of global fatalities, according to a report presented at the PSC’s 1354th session in July 2026.
The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters, as well as the operationalisation of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter Terrorism. However, mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorist threats. These challenges informed the PSC’s ministerial meeting on ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa,’ held on the margins of the 81st UN General Assembly in September. At its 1354th session, the PSC also expressed its grave concern about the ‘downturn in international cooperation, including the withdrawal of technical and financial support to peace support operations in Africa, attributed to the shift in national policies and escalating geopolitical fragmentation,’ a concern that the PSC is likely to raise during tomorrow’s engagement.
For its part, the EUPSC may highlight its extensive counterterrorism engagement in Africa, combining operational assistance with support for criminal justice institutions and prevention of violent extremism. According to EU figures, Africa receives 72 per cent of its €659 million counterterrorism and prevention programming. Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has supported AU missions in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the SADC mission in Mozambique, alongside bilateral military assistance. Its support also extends to counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, border security, countering terrorist financing and community-based prevention programmes, particularly in the Sahel, West African coastal states and East Africa. Recent initiatives include the €45 million SecFin Africa programme (2024–2028) targeting illicit financial flows and terrorist financing, and the €30 million Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme (2024–2028), supporting security and criminal justice capacities in West Africa.
In this context, the retreat offers an opportunity to address gaps in coordination and the sustainability of counterterrorism efforts, particularly amid declining international financing for African-led peace operations, including the AU mission in Somalia. Beyond sustaining operational support and coordination, as well as the role that natural resources exploitation is playing in fueling war economies in affected regions, there are also major issues, including how to address the trust deficit that affects policy coherence both on the continent and between the AU and EU and the need for a shift from security-heavy instruments to investment in long-term interventions that address underlying conditions of fragility.
AI Governance, Peace and Security
In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that Poland and Latvia will speak for the EU and Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC are expected to lead in making interventions on the side of the AU. Artificial intelligence (AI) has gained increasing prominence on the agenda of the PSC. During tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC may highlight its efforts to establish a continental AI governance framework and the progress made so far. Its engagement on AI governance, peace and security began at its 1214th session in June 2024, which recognised AI’s potential for conflict prevention, early warning and peacebuilding, while raising concerns over the risks associated with its rapid development in the absence of adequate regulation. At that session, the Council requested a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, and the establishment of a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and governance to propose continental governance options, including for military applications. The advisory group was established in March 2025.
At its 1267th session, held at the ministerial level in March 2025, the PSC called for mainstreaming AI in peace support operations, early warning and preventive diplomacy, alongside the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. At another ministerial-level meeting, its 1339th session in April 2026, the Council emphasised the need for Africa to shape, develop and control its own AI technologies to safeguard its sovereignty across the AI ecosystem. It also underscored the importance of digital and data sovereignty and requested the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of an African Fund for AI. Given Africa’s limited influence over the development of AI systems, the Council further stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in international norm-setting through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement in multilateral forums.
The retreat provides an opportunity for both sides to exchange experiences and explore practical areas of cooperation in AI governance, peace and security. Particular attention could be given to translating the AU’s growing policy commitments into institutional capabilities, including through capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and cooperation on the responsible use of AI in conflict prevention, particularly by exploring the integration of AI-enabled tools into the Continental Early Warning System. The discussions could also explore ways to strengthen coordination on emerging international AI norms, ensuring that African perspectives and priorities are adequately reflected in global AI norms and governance.
Women, Peace and Security
It is expected that South Africa and Uganda will lead the AU’s intervention on this agenda, and Ireland, Malta and Italy will take the lead on the side of the EU. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been a standing agenda item of the PSC since March 2010. Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Council held 28 dedicated sessions, progressively expanding its engagement from the protection of women in conflict to their meaningful participation in conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Key institutional developments include the Office of the AU Special Envoy on WPS, FemWise-Africa, the Continental Results Framework (CRF) for monitoring implementation, and the Swakopmund Process, a biennial, rotational platform for PSC engagement with WPS actors that has contributed to advancing gender parity policy for all AU-led and co-led mediation processes.
This is an area on which there has been growing collaboration between the AU and the EU. The EU and individual EU member states have provided and remain major sources of support to AU’s work on the WPS agenda, including the work of the AU Special Envoy on WPS. In the context of the emergence of some powerful currents against gender equality and the WPS agenda, tomorrow’s retreat is likely to highlight the impact these developments are having and the responses to the threat these developments pose. In the context of these developments, discussions may focus on deepening the convergence between the AU and the EU for safeguarding the gains registered over the years and supporting initiatives to this end, building on existing collaboration between the AU and the EU. In view of the growing focus on bridging the gap between normative commitments and implementation, the discussion on this agenda is also expected to focus on ways of enhancing steps to translate normative and institutional investment into operational reality, not least of all in enhanced women’s participation in peace processes. As Amani Africa’s fifteen-year review of the WPS agenda of the PSC underscores, the priority is to move beyond regular deliberations towards systematic implementation.