Beyond Communiqués: Charting the path for making the PSC fit to restore AU’s agency in peace & security

Date | 30 March 2026

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Ahead of the 1 April 2026, when the states elected during the 39^th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly, including Somalia, which was elected for the first time, assume their seats in the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU is holding the induction of newly elected and returning members of the PSC in the Kingdom of Eswatini, starting today, 30 March 2026. In view of the expansion and entrenching of conflicts and crises on the continent and the need for a more effective role for the AU, a pressing issue for the newly constituted PSC is how to shift from the failing business-as-usual approach to its work and make itself fit for the peace and security needs of the continent in a time of major global shifts.

As extensively documented in, among others, the review of the PSC for 2025, the PSC did not garner a meaningful level of influence in either limiting the dynamics of conflicts on its agenda or in shaping peace processes relating to those conflict situations. As a result, the PSC and the AU are ignored or otherwise displaced. Such is the case in Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel and the DRC. For example, the six sessions that the PSC held on Sudan were of no consequence either in avoiding the de facto partition of Sudan or in contributing to the emergence of a credible civilian process that the AU is meant to lead on. Even in terms of the mechanisms it decided to institute, neither the mechanisms for investigating external interference in Sudan nor the presidential committee came into operation. In DRC, AU’s role in advancing peace got displaced, with the Luanda process giving way to the Washington DC and Doha processes.  

The declining effectiveness of the PSC mirrors a broader erosion of political commitment to continental collective security. It is also importantly a product of PSC’s work, becoming more performative than consequential, at times its engagement dominated by thematic issues and often no effective action on specific conflict situations. Poor agenda setting and the reduction of PSC activities into a routine ritual-like processes are among the factors that account for this state of affairs in which the dire conflict situations are not approached with the urgency and seriousness they deserve.

Making the PSC fit for purpose and relevant to the peace and security situation of the continent requires changing these conditions. The agenda setting of the PSC and the policy deliberation of the PSC should prioritise and deploy the limited diplomatic institutional resources exclusively for addressing existing conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones. The PSC should thus have as a standing agenda on the most critical conflict situations, such as Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel, DRC and Somalia at least, on a quarterly if not on a monthly basis, during which the AU Commission presents reports for adapting AU engagement to the rhythm and needs of the conflict dynamics.

In the interest of optimising its very finite resources and ensuring sustained engagement on addressing these priority conflict situations with resolve and impact, the PSC should also adopt a moratorium on having thematic issues on its agenda.

Further to the foregoing, the PSC should also use its sessions for substantive deliberations rather than the ritualistic process of making formulaic statements, issuing communiques and meeting again to repeat the same cycle. It is necessary for the PSC to review its working methods on its decision-making process for making it results-oriented rather than the current focus on output, involving the adoption of a communique for every meeting. Not every PSC meeting has to result in the adoption of a communique, but it provides a platform for building consensus and negotiating on actionable decisions, deliberating on advancing implementation and undertaking strategic review. It is also necessary that PSC members focus on negotiating and adopting actionable decisions as opposed to the declaratory ones that dominate outcomes of PSC deliberations. To this end, they should negotiate on the actionable decisions required to respond to new developments, either in the conflict situation or in the peace process relating to that conflict situation. They should also use such negotiation sessions for clarifying on the financial and institutional implications of such decisions as well as on the modalities of implementation and clear assignment of responsibility for implementation and timelines for reporting back on follow-up and implementation.

Additionally, the effectiveness of the PSC is also affected by the willingness and ability of its members to shoulder the responsibilities of PSC membership as set out in Article 5, particularly its sub-paragraph 2. The current approach to PSC membership that puts a premium on rotation to the detriment of Article 5(2) criteria is undermining the effectiveness of the Council. It has limited the PSC’s normative and political weight, creating an enormous gulf between PSC decisions and their effective follow-through.

A criteria-based approach is essential to the PSC’s credibility, ensuring members demonstrate commitment, diplomatic capacity, and adherence to AU norms, preventing deliberations from becoming mere symbolism. Eroded standards have also diminished peer accountability, fostering weak enforcement, selective engagement, and inconsistent follow-through, much like past consensus-driven arrangements lacking commitment. Restoring effectiveness demands recommitment to criteria-based membership rooted in political credibility, capacity, and norm respect, bolstering authority and collective responsibility.

Not any less important for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is the need to align its current posture and practice with the statement of commitment it adopted during its solemn launching in 2004. Of significance in this respect is the commitment that ‘we shall ensure that the authority vested in the Peace and Security Council is fairly and proactively exercised.’ (emphasis added) The lack of alignment in recent times between the practice of the PSC and this commitment is one of the factors for the erosion of the credibility of the PSC. This has manifested itself not only in inconsistent application of AU policies and norms, such as in relation to unconstitutional changes of government, but also in the lack of fairness in the attention given in dealing with various conflict situations.

The PSC should also be proactive in its engagement with key peace and security events on the continent. This entails that the PSC operates as the first to speak on African peace and security issues and to ensure that it occupies the space for holding a leadership role. These (speaking first and holding the policy space) are necessary both for setting the agenda and exercising agency in peace and security decision-making on the continent.

All of the foregoing, however, requires the recommitment of PSC member states to the values and principles of the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. It also requires reestablishing the primacy of collective responsibility and solidarity over individual national interest in setting the program of work of the PSC and steering the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Council. Not any less important is the need for exercising a higher sense of responsibility both on the part of member states and the AU Commission, such as through making the requisite preparations for PSC sessions, upholding and ensuring respect for AU norms and principles and respecting decisions of the PSC, including in the timely submission of reports or updates.