Transnational Threats Archives - Amani Africa

Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa

Amani Africa — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 05:53:37 +0000

Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa

Date | 22 September 2026

Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1369^th session at ministerial level in New York, on the margins of the 81^st United Nations General Assembly, to consider ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa.’ The session was initially envisaged at the level of Heads of State and Government but was subsequently changed to ministerial level in the revised programme of work.

Corinne AMORI BRUNET, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin and PSC Chairperson for September, is expected to deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks from Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. A statement is also expected from the representative of the United Nations.

The PSC discussed countering terrorism and violent extremism at its 1354^th session, held at ministerial level on 21 July. The Chairperson of the AU Commission is also expected to submit a report on counterterrorism next month. At its most recent session on countering terrorism and violent extremism, the PSC expressed concern over the expanding reach and growing sophistication of terrorist groups across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and parts of Southern Africa (northern Mozambique). According to the report submitted to the PSC’s 1354^th session, while global terrorism has decreased overall in recent years, Africa remains the principal epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for an estimated 70-75 percent of terrorism related fatalities globally. Six of the ten most terrorism-affected countries globally are in Africa: Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia. In the central Sahel, JNIM and Islamic State affiliates operate across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, while militant activity has spread towards the borderlands of Benin and Togo. Around Lake Chad, Boko Haram and ISWAP move through territory shared by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, while the emergence of Lakurawa has added to insecurity around the Nigeria-Niger border. In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat in Somalia and neighbouring countries, while the Islamic State in Somalia has still been active in Puntland despite the counterterrorism efforts. In eastern DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces originated in Uganda and remains active across a frontier affected by other armed groups. In Southern Africa, the insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province also persists nine years after it began. The groups and the dynamics may differ, but their use of borderlands, cross-border movement and transnational supply networks exposes the limits of responses organised within individual states.

The regional consequences of other conflicts also reinforce the same point. The crisis in eastern DRC has drawn in neighbouring countries and reignited inter-state tensions. Sudan’s war has also generated displacement and security pressures across its borders. As more states become entangled, the conflict risks escalating into a broader regional conflagration.

Africa has established several continental and regional mechanisms to address the scourge of terrorism. They include the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre, AFRIPOL and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa; the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes; the Accra Initiative; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin; and the AU mission in Somalia. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of states to cooperate through them. Fragmentation of regional arrangements and deteriorating relations among neighbours have made that increasingly difficult.

Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to move beyond a review of trends in the threat and the technical means in addressing it, such as the role of institutions such as the AU Counter Terrorism Centre. It is rather expected to focus on a political and strategic question: how the state of relations among neighbouring countries affects their ability to respond collectively to terrorism and other security threats? This question gives particular importance to the principle of good neighbourliness at a time when threats cross borders, but cooperation among affected states has deteriorated in various parts of the continent.

The 2004 Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADS Policy) provides a basis for the discussion. It affirms sovereign equality, respect for borders, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference and the prohibition of the use or threat of force. It also prohibits a member state from allowing its territory to serve as a base for aggression or subversion against another. The Policy goes further in recognising the indivisibility of African security: ‘the security of one African country is inseparably linked’ to that of other African countries and the continent as a whole. On this basis, it treats a threat to one country as a matter of concern for others.

Most notably, a key element of the objectives of the Policy is to ‘promote mutual trust and confidence among African states.’ This objective is critical to advancing good neighbourliness. The importance of this objective is emphasised in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1994 and serves as a pillar of the CADS Policy. The Declaration accordingly affirmed the resolve of African states ‘to develop and strengthen the amicable relations and cooperation existing among our States and to promote friendship among our peoples. The challenges facing us can be met only through concerted action, cooperation and solidarity.’ However, ‘concerted action, cooperation and solidarity’ in responding to regional or international threats to peace and security is possible only where mutual trust and good neighbourliness thrive. Thus, the Declaration asserts that ‘every cooperation effort is doomed to failure in an environment devoid of stability, trust and security.’

In West Africa, rising mistrust in the context of the response to the military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has disrupted the regional order. Amid the resultant mounting regional tension, the three countries withdrew from ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). As the threat to regional security continues to proliferate, regional responses such as the Accra Initiative have struggled to take off the ground. The relationship of individual members of the AES with some of their neighbours has led to diplomatic strains. Ties between Niger and Nigeria deteriorated after the 2023 coup, as did relations between Niger and Benin. Mali’s relations with Algeria have also suffered a blow. Relations between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire remain strained. Some of these relations have shown signs of improvement (Algeria-Mali, Benin-Niger), but restoring diplomatic contact is only a first step.

Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in 2025 has likewise raised concern about coordination in the Lake Chad Basin. The situation in the region is further aggravated by the geopolitical contestation involving Russia, France and increasingly Ukraine.

Apart from weakening the West African regional order, the resultant erosion of good neighbourliness and trust continues to fragment regional efforts for responding to various security threats, including terrorism. Where neighbouring governments distrust one another, intelligence sharing, joint border operations and cooperation against recruitment and illicit financial flows become harder to sustain. Armed groups and criminal networks can exploit the resulting gaps. As a result, the terrorism menace destablising the Sahel is creeping into the coastal states of West Africa.

Fragmentation fuelled by growing mistrust is evident elsewhere. Rwanda’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of Central African States in 2025 followed a dispute over the organisation’s rotational chairmanship against the backdrop of tensions over eastern DRC. In the Horn of Africa, tensions among member states have constrained IGAD’s political role, with Eritrea announcing its withdrawal from the struggling regional body. These developments reduce the capacity of regional organisations to bring states together around a common assessment of threats and a coordinated response.

Even where states agree to a common regional response through deployment of peace operations, strained relations can limit its effectiveness. In Somalia, tensions among neighbouring states have complicated the environment in which the AU mission operates. In Mozambique, lack of coordination and trust issues between Mozambican forces, Rwanda’s bilateral deployment and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) limited the scope for a unified response. Meanwhile, eastern DRC shows how divergent expectations can affect regional forces. Competing regional deployments by the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in November 2022 and the SADC deployment in DRC (SAMIDRC) in December 2023 also caused friction that led to the withdrawal of EACRF by December 2023 after Kinshasa declined to renew the Status of Force Agreement. The experience points to the need for shared understanding among the affected state, neighbouring countries and regional organisations on a force’s mandate, objectives and relationship to wider political efforts. A deployment cannot resolve political differences that its main stakeholders have left unsettled.

Beyond the Sahel, geopolitical rivalries and the growing involvement of middle powers are also reshaping Africa’s regional security arrangements and bilateral relations. As neighbouring states turn to different external partners, agreement on collective action against terrorism and other shared threats becomes harder to achieve. Indeed, one of the major factors behind the fragmentation of the Horn of Africa regional order is the intensification of the entanglement of various middle powers, including Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran and the emergence of competing alliances into which countries in the Horn of Africa are being sucked.

Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s session should consider how these political and strategic difficulties affect good neighborliness and trust among neighbors, which is critical both for achieving a shared perception of common threats and for developing a common strategy for deploying an effective response. As clearly articulated in the CADS Policy, good neighbourliness requires states to refrain from actions that threaten their neighbours. These necessitate keeping and constantly cultivating channels of exchange and communication as well as consultation, as envisaged in the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations.

Without trust among neighbouring countries, collective responses to terrorism and other security threats will remain limited. The session therefore offers an opportunity to reaffirm good neighbourliness as a practical condition for effective regional security response.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the fragmentation of regional arrangements, deteriorating bilateral relations among some member states, and the impact of geopolitical dynamics on collective security efforts. It may underscore the urgency of curtailing these developments for effectively deploying the relevant instruments and mobilizing the collective action necessary for effective response to threats to regional security and terrorism. The PSC may underscore the need for reaffirming the principles of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, including the indivisibility of security and the obligation of states not to allow their territory to be used against their neighbours. It may also reaffirm the commitment of Member States to the standards set in the OAU Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. In this regard, the Council may urge Member States to uphold the principles of good neighbourliness reflected in various AU foundational documents, including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Common African Defence and Security Policy; settle disagreements peacefully; and resolve their differences in a spirit of Pan-African solidarity. The Council may emphasise that effective regional responses to cross-border threats depend on member states honouring these commitments in practice. As a practical step, the PSC may task the AU Commission Chairperson, working in close coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and the United Nations, to initiate and deploy various confidence-building measures, engage in sustained shuttle diplomacy and present a report to the next AU Assembly in January 2027 on ways and means of deepening mutual trust, good neighborliness, amicable relations and cooperation among African states.

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Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Amani Africa — Mon, 20 Jul 2026 05:59:41 +0000

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Date | 20 July 2026

Tomorrow (21 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its virtual 1354^th ministerial-level meeting on ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa’.

The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July, Haruna Kyeyune Kasolo, will deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, and a representative of the United Nations (UN) will also deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session will build on and follows the PSC’s 1266^th meeting of March 2025 on ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa’ expressed grave concern over increased terrorist activity and the return or relocation of foreign terrorist fighters, highlighted structural drivers of radicalisation and called for counter-radicalisation measures to be incorporated into the AU action plan on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism. It also offers an opportunity to follow up on the PSC’s 1111^th meeting of October 2022, which emphasised national reconciliation and social cohesion, including dialogue and negotiation to facilitate voluntary surrender and rehabilitation, and requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African best practices.

The session is expected to assess recent trends and whether and how to adapt the mobilisation of effective response to the threat that terrorism continues to pose in various parts of the continent.

The more consequential test is whether the Council identifies practical follow-up measures. The AU does not lack frameworks. Its architecture includes the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), its Protocol (2004), and the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2022). These are the Nouakchott Process, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL, CISSA and the Djibouti Process (2015). The gap lies in implementation, coordination, institutional follow-through, and the political and socio-economic governance deficit-based diagnosis for anchoring responses.

Related to implementation and in terms of response, two issues stand out for tomorrow’s PSC session. The first relates to the impact of major power geopolitical rivalry, such as the rivalry between Russia and France in the Sahel, on regional and continental strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The second concerns the state of political cohesion at the regional and continental levels for advancing an effective strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism.

As a 2022 special research report observed, policy has remained disproportionately security-centred despite the political, governance, socioeconomic and environmental dimensions of the threat, particularly in marginalised territories with weak state–society relations, deficient local governance and absence of service delivery. Tomorrow’s session may therefore steer the PSC towards an implementation-oriented roadmap that combines the provision of capable and legitimate security institutions along with the consolidation of legitimate local governance, the delivery of essential services, development, and community-centred prevention and stabilization measures. The 13^th Africa Security Symposium, held in Accra from 7 to 9 July 2026, similarly underscored African-led solutions, inclusive partnerships, practical cross-border cooperation and translating diagnosis into action.

The first substantive issue for tomorrow’s session is the geography of terrorism in Africa. According to GTI 2026, despite a 28% global decline in terrorism deaths in 2025, Africa remained the principal geographic concentration of terrorism-related deaths and highly affected countries. Six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism worldwide were in the region. The Sahel alone accounted for more than half of global terrorism deaths, compared with less than 1% in 2007, while four African countries were among the five states that together accounted for 70% of global fatalities.

This persistence of the threat of terrorism nevertheless coexists with uneven and, in some respects, improving regional trends. Across much of Africa, terrorism deaths fell by 23.5% and incidents by nearly 28%. Eighteen countries improved their overall GTI scores, while only four deteriorated. These aggregate declines may, however, obscure the consolidation of territorial influence by some groups, such as through imposing economic blockades.

Thus, it is of particular significance for tomorrow’s session that account is given to recent developments illustrating terrorism’s regionalised and adaptive geography across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and Somalia. In Mali, coordinated attacks on 25 April struck Kati and several other locations, including Bamako, Gao, Kidal and Sévaré. The attacks also killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara when assailants targeted his residence in Kati. In Niger, the January IS-claimed attack on the airbase at Diori Hamani International Airport, the April spillover of fighting between JNIM and IS into Tillabéri, and the June attack on the airport and adjoining military airbase, which killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, demonstrated growing pressure on strategic infrastructure and centres of power. Chad’s Lake Chad region similarly illustrated Boko Haram’s continuing lethality. The May attack on the Barka Tolorom military base killed at least 23 soldiers and wounded 26, followed two days later by an ambush that killed two Chadian generals. Further analyses (here and here) point to the consolidation of jihadist activity across the Benin–Niger–Nigeria borderlands and the southward expansion of Sahel-based groups towards coastal West Africa.

In the Horn of Africa, the UN Panel identifies al-Shabaab as the most immediate threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the wider region, highlighted by its activities during 2025. Apart from the 18 March 2025 attempted assassination of the Somali President near the presidential palace, in the first quarter of 2025, the group’s monthly attacks increased by about 50% compared with 2024 in areas such as Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. It also averaged around six attacks per month in Kenya, while the estimated number of Ethiopian fighters within its ranks rose to approximately 600, highlighting the increasing regionalisation of the group’s reach.

The other issue that is also expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is how terrorist groups are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilise support, recruit, undertake reconnaissance operations and increasingly carry out attacks. Terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have leveraged the digital era by utilising a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organise their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example, as highlighted in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP, for instance, increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). In the Sahel too, drone use has increased in 2025. JNIM has conducted repeated drone-enabled attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo in 2025, often coordinating drone use with ground assaults. Attention should also be paid to the risk that such actors may employ cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks.

Another issue that tomorrow’s session is expected to address relates to the terrorism–transnational crime nexus. Terrorist groups sustain their operations through illicit taxation, smuggling, kidnapping, illegal mining, livestock theft, fuel trafficking and protection economies. It is worth recalling that the PSC’s 1345^th meeting warned of an ‘integrated, hybrid and transnational criminal ecosystem’ in which terrorism, trafficking, environmental crime, cybercrime and financial crime share corridors, financing mechanisms and logistics.’ The 2026 UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) report frames the relationship as a continuum from transactional cooperation and coexistence to, more rarely, organisational convergence. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are known for taking advantage of transnational criminal networks, including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members.

Counter-terrorism cannot therefore be effective without addressing the economic factors that enable and sustain terrorist groups, including arms trafficking, illicit financial flows and illicit natural resource extraction. The analytical report accompanying the PSC’s 1320^th meeting similarly presents terrorism and violent extremism as interconnected threats sustained by illicit economies, digital recruitment, cross-border financing and governance gaps. The resulting communiqué placed greater emphasis on institutional coordination, early warning and early action.

The prevention dimension should focus on conditions that enable recruitment rather than on treating radicalisation as predominantly ideological. UNDP’s ‘Journey to Extremism’ study shows that recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa is shaped by economic hardship, limited opportunities, fractured state–society relations and security-force abuses rather than religion alone. 17 % of voluntary recruits cited religious ideas as their primary motivation, while 25% identified employment opportunities. Among the 48% who experienced a specific tipping-point event, 71% cited government action, including the killing or arrest of family members or friends. These findings echo Amani Africa’s aforementioned assessment that terrorism has often been misdiagnosed primarily as a security threat, producing excessive reliance on militarised responses despite the political, governance and development conditions sustaining it. Strengthening state legitimacy, accountable governance, socioeconomic development and community resilience should therefore be treated as central components of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and the Horn of Africa. It may also express concern over their growing convergence with illicit economies, transnational organised crime, and the use of new technologies, including digital and drones. It may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counter-terrorism strategy that combines security measures undertaken by legitimate security institutions with prevention, deradicalisation, stabilisation, recovery, reconciliation, dialogue, service delivery, and the building of legitimate local governance infrastructure. The PSC may also emphasise the need for member states to put aside their difference when it comes to the mobilisation of collective action to address the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. In this respect, it may emphasise the need for AU, ECOWAS and UN to join ranks in support of the counter-terrorism efforts of the Sahel countries that are the major theatre of terrorist activities on the continent, with a growing threat of expansion into coastal West Africa. It may also call for strengthened coordination among the AU Commission, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, RECs/RMs and relevant regional mechanisms, particularly in advancing intelligence-sharing, border management, and investigations into terrorist financing. Furthermore, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to develop an implementation-oriented roadmap identifying priority borderlands, practical channels for operational cooperation, support for national and regional deradicalisation programmes, and stronger linkages between counter-terrorism operations, civilian protection, stabilisation and recovery.

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Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa

Amani Africa — Tue, 05 May 2026 05:52:19 +0000

Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa

Date | 5 May 2026

Tomorrow (6 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1345^th session on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).

In 2019, during its 845^th session, the Council decided to institutionalise an annual session on TOC as a standing agenda item. Beyond dedicated sessions, the Council has repeatedly expressed concern over TOC in conflict-specific and thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and small arms proliferation, and has acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism.

The last time the Council convened on this issue was at its 1279^th meeting, held on 14 May 2025, under the theme ‘Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.’ Unlike that meeting, tomorrow’s session is not region-specific, offering an opportunity to consider the trends and developments at a continental level and to follow up on key outcomes of the 1279^th session.

The Global Organised Crime Index 2025 provides an important evidence base on recent developments and trends relating to TOC. Its Africa-specific findings show steady growth in criminal markets and actors since 2019, with financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, counterfeit goods and arms trafficking among the most pervasive TOC markets on the continent. It also highlights regional diversity: human trafficking, arms trafficking and human smuggling in East Africa; financial crimes and cannabis trade, along with human trafficking in North Africa; non-renewable resource crimes in Central Africa; cocaine trafficking in West Africa; and wildlife crime in Southern Africa. This calls for tailored and regionally grounded responses.

A central issue for the PSC is that TOC is no longer merely a law-enforcement concern, but a structural peace and security threat that erodes sovereignty, weakens institutions, fuels corruption, sustains conflict economies and creates structures that undermine legitimate sources of authority. In various conflict settings from the Sahel, Sudan, Somalia and Great Lakes, terrorist armed groups, insurgents, and militias increasingly intersect with and draw on TOC networks and markets. In the Sahel, terrorist groups and criminal groups draw revenue from illegal gold mining, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping, fuel smuggling and drug trafficking, while exploiting livelihood vulnerabilities in a region where informal work and artisanal mining sustain millions. Similar dynamics affect the Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, Libya, Somalia, North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The PSC may therefore stress a multidimensional response to TOC that goes beyond criminal justice, combining borderland development, legitimate governance, service delivery, law enforcement and community resilience, including livelihood support.

The link between TOC and illicit arms flows is another major concern. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, described small arms proliferation as ‘a cancer’ driving instability across the continent, from the Sahel to the Great Lakes. In West Africa alone, around 12 million illicit arms are circulating, used by terrorist groups, vigilantes, self-defence groups, bandits and civilians who feel abandoned by the state. Their proliferation transforms local disputes into deadly conflict. Counter-TOC relating to illicit arms flows should therefore be linked to efforts at curbing SLW stockpile management, arms tracing, diversion control, and disarmament initiatives.

These include the call for an AFRIPOL-anchored continental criminal intelligence mechanism, criminal corridor mapping and tailored responses to criminal flows. It further requested the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on TOC, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations, and to present the study to the PSC.

It is of interest to the PSC that the networks and corridors of TOC are mapped to inform targeted response. In this respect, several criminal corridors have been identified. These include: the Lagos–Kano–Agadez–Tripoli route for migrant smuggling and Tramadol trafficking; the Bamako–Gao–Tamanrasset route for arms and fuel trafficking; the Dakar–Ziguinchor–Bissau route for cocaine from Latin America, the Diffa–Lake Chad–Maiduguri route linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) logistics, and the Port Sudan–Khartoum–Bangui corridor for arms trafficking. The Global Initiative-TOC Risk Bulletin on arms trafficking routes in Mali shows that disrupted routes pushed traffickers and armed groups to seek alternative routes and weapons sources. The Illicit Hub Mapping in West Africa 2025 report maps 350 illicit hubs across 18 countries and identifies five accelerant markets: kidnapping, cattle rustling, illicit arms, illicit gold and extortion/protection racketeering. The tracing and operation of these various routes highlights the importance of following up on one of the outcomes of the last PSC session on TOC. It is to be recalled that the PSC tasked the AU Commission to coordinate AFRIPOL and others in ‘developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’

Corruption and state-embedded criminality are also central to the discussion. TOC often thrives where institutions are weak, compromised or penetrated by criminal interests, enabling illicit networks to evade accountability, influence decision-making and undermine the rule of law. As Global Initiative-TOC’s analysis of the role of state actors and armed groups in the conflict in Eastern DRC shows, conflicts can become structurally criminalised where armed actors and state-linked networks benefit from illicit resource extraction. African strategies should therefore treat anti-corruption, institutional resilience, financial investigation, asset recovery, judicial cooperation and public integrity as core peace and security tools, integrating them into conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding, stabilisation, security sector reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

Given the transnational character of TOC, border governance remains a major issue. Borderlands are often areas of weak state presence, but also livelihood spaces where communities depend on cross-border trade, pastoral mobility, family networks and informal markets. Criminal networks exploit these same routes. The Niamey Convention remains relevant not only for border security but also for local development, cross-border governance and conflict prevention.

The session may also benefit from considering emerging and non-traditional forms of TOC, which are increasingly shaped by new technology and artificial intelligence (AI). African strategies should therefore address conventional trafficking alongside cybercrime, AI-enabled fraud, online exploitation, digital finance, crypto-enabled laundering and the criminal use of logistics and technology platforms, consistent with the 1279^th session’s concern over the co-option of new technologies by criminal actors.

Institutionally, addressing the transnational dimension of organised crime requires leveraging the role of AFRIPOL, CISSA and AUCTC. The 1320^th meeting on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Security Outlook adds an operational layer by calling for AUCTC–CISSA–AFRIPOL horizon-scanning briefings, a dynamic risk-mapping tool, stronger cyber and digital-threat monitoring, and a continental working group on illicit financing, including hawala/mobile-money networks used by extremist groups.

Another policy area concerns peace operations. Recent work on TOC and peacekeeping and TOC and UN peace operations underlines that organised crime can undermine peace operations by financing armed groups, distorting local economies and weakening political settlements. AU-led and AU-authorised missions, therefore, need a stronger analytical capacity to understand criminal economies without being transformed into anti-crime agencies.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the growing threat of TOC in Africa and its linkages with terrorism, illicit arms flows, corruption, illicit financial flows, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, illegal mining, cybercrime and environmental crime. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional African strategy that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. It may call for targeted enforcement, financial investigations, criminal justice cooperation, border governance, anti-corruption measures, livelihood alternatives, legitimate local governance, service delivery and community resilience as critical measures to address the underlying factors that make TOC possible. The PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention, improved weapons management, joint border management and strengthened coordination of police, intelligence, customs, border-control, financial intelligence and judicial institutions. It may further urge Member States to domesticate and implement relevant continental and international instruments, combat money laundering and illicit financial flows. The Council may also call for the AU Commission to present a comprehensive report on trends in TOC in Africa, including criminal corridors, sources of financing, links with armed actors and impacts on local populations. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole-of-AU system approach, emphasising coordination among AFRIPOL, CISSA, AUCTC, the AU Border Programme, the African Governance Architecture, the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), the PCRD Centre, the African Development Bank and RECs/RMs.

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Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD

Amani Africa — Thu, 14 Aug 2025 09:46:24 +0000

Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD

Date | 14 August 2025

Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1297^th session to consider the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism. Although not initially on the August 2025 programme of work, the PSC is also expected to consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make introductory remarks. Michael Wamai, Expert from Uganda and the Chairperson of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC for July 2025, is expected to make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on PCRD. In addition, Mohamed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert from Algeria and Chairperson of the CoE of the PSC for August 2025, will make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism.

Building on the CoE’s 78^th meeting on the ‘review of the Draft Terms of Reference of the Peace and Security Council Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism’ held on 1 August, the Sub-Committee’s establishment aligns with the Malabo Decision of May 2022, the 249^th PSC meeting of November 2010 and the 1182^nd PSC meeting of 2023, which emphasised the urgent need to activate this body to address the growing complexity of terrorism in Africa. The proposed ToR outlines the Sub-Committee’s objectives, mandate, composition and operational modalities, aiming to enhance the PSC’s ability to respond to terrorism through African-led strategies, coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and collaboration with AU bodies like the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL and CISSA. The Sub-Committee is tasked with monitoring PSC decisions, assessing trends in continental terrorism, and promoting a multidimensional approach to addressing the structural causes of terrorism.

Africa continues to face an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities, with the Sahel region emerging as the global epicentre of terrorism. According to the AUCTC, terrorist attacks increased by 99% and related deaths by 53% in 2023 compared to the previous year, with West Africa accounting for 45% of attacks and 62% of deaths in Q2 of 2024. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remain the most affected, with groups like Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Shabaab and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) expanding their reach. The spread of terrorism to coastal West African states like Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, alongside emerging links between piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea, underscores the evolving threat landscape. Initiatives such as the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism (AUMCCT) and the African Counter-Terrorism Coordination Task Force (A2CTF), as mandated in the 1237^th PSC meeting of October 2024, have been established to mitigate this. However, challenges such as the dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, political instability and foreign interference have hampered regional coordination. The 2024 Global Terrorism Index highlights Burkina Faso as the world’s most terrorism-affected country, emphasising the need for a shift from military-centric to holistic, governance-focused strategies.

The PSC and AU Assembly have issued several decisions to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts. The 2022 Malabo Declaration called for the immediate operationalisation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the establishment of the AUMCCT. The 1182^nd PSC meeting, on the other hand, urged the full activation of the Sub-Committee and the A2CTF, emphasising context-specific interventions. Additionally, the 1237^th PSC meeting welcomed the AU Commission’s report on combating terrorism, condemning foreign interference and calling for sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) under UNSC Resolution 2719. It also emphasised psychosocial support for victims and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism. Notwithstanding, The Abuja Process Declaration of 2024 reinforced the need for regional cooperation and institutional building to address terrorism’s evolving nature. Despite these decisions, implementation gaps persist, including delays in operationalising the Sub-Committee, limited funding for counter-terrorism initiatives, and weak coordination between AU bodies and RECs/RMs. The PSC further noted the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime, such as illicit resource exploitation, which remains inadequately addressed.

The draft ToRs provides a foundational framework for the Sub-Committee’s role in coordinating counter-terrorism efforts, monitoring PSC decisions, and promoting African-led solutions. However, several gaps warrant attention. First, there is ambiguity in the mandate scope: while the ToR outline broad functions such as recommending strategies and monitoring PSC decisions, they lack specificity on operational mechanisms, timelines and accountability frameworks. Funding mechanisms are also insufficiently addressed; although a proposed annual budget is mentioned, sustainable funding sources are not identified, despite the PSC’s call for predictable financing in its October 2024 meeting and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism remains stalled. In addition, while the ToR references a multidimensional approach to addressing structural causes of terrorism, it does not explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, or climate-induced insecurity, which the AU Commission’s 2024 report identified as key drivers. The framework does not also address the growing use of advanced technologies, including drones and digital platforms, by terrorist groups and finally, the need for psychosocial support for victims, particularly women and youth, is imperative. The ToR does not incorporate mechanisms to ensure gender-sensitive or victim-centered approaches.

To strengthen the ToRs and enhance the Sub-Committee’s effectiveness, the PSC and AU Commission should clarify operational mechanisms by defining specific procedures for punitive measures, intelligence sharing and strategy development, including timelines for reporting and decision-making and adopt a quarterly review mechanism to track progress on PSC decisions. In light of the increasing number of PSC Sub-Committees, the PSC should give due consideration to ensuring that the Sub-Committees receive the necessary support to execute their given mandates effectively and efficiently, while exploring partnerships with international donors without compromising African ownership. Regional coordination can be improved by establishing a formal framework with RECs and RMs, including joint task forces and regular consultations, to harmonise regional counter-terrorism strategies and address gaps left by the G5 Sahel’s dissolution. The mandate should explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, and climate resilience, potentially in collaboration with the AU Centre for PCRD, to address the root causes of terrorism. Emerging technologies should also be addressed by including measures to counter drones, cyberattacks and digital propaganda, leveraging technical partnerships with AFRIPOL and CISSA. Victim-centred approaches, on the other hand, should be prioritised through programmes for psychosocial support and reintegration, particularly for women and youth, with gender mainstreaming embedded in all activities. Finally, accountability should be strengthened by introducing a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, with regular reporting to the PSC and AU Assembly on progress and challenges.

On the other hand, the PSC will consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on PCRD. The establishment of the Sub-Committee on PCRD is rooted in the AU’s recognition of the evolving nature of conflicts in Africa, which demand coherent, coordinated and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction strategies. The AU’s Policy on PCRD, revised in 2024, emphasises holistic approaches combining peacebuilding, institutional capacity-building, socio-economic recovery and reconciliation. The Sub-Committee, established under Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, is designed to receive assignments and mandates on specific post-conflict situations from the PSC. It will monitor political, socio-economic, and security developments across the continent in collaboration with the relevant units of the AU Commission, the AU PCRD Center, AUDA-NEPAD, APRM, other AU organs, institutions, entities and RECs/RMs and make recommendations to the PSC on required interventions. The Sub-Committee will oversee the implementation of PCRD activities and decisions adopted or endorsed by the PSC, providing regular updates on progress. It will also seek, at a technical level, relevant information from AU Member States, RECs/RMs, and partners regarding actions taken to implement PCRD measures, and offer recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. Furthermore, it will identify key areas for capacity building, financial support and technical assistance needed by Member States in post-conflict situations, and propose appropriate measures for PSC consideration. Lastly, the Sub-Committee will advise on resource mobilisation strategies, including innovative financing solutions, to sustain long-term PCRD efforts and ensure lasting recovery and development.

Recent PSC and Assembly decisions underscore the urgency of this initiative. The 1293^rd PSC meeting on 4 August highlighted the worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Sudan, calling for enhanced PCRD efforts to address famine and conflict escalation. Similarly, the 1291^st meeting in July 2025 addressed the situation in Libya, emphasising the need for coordinated post-conflict strategies. The AU Assembly’s Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.(XVI)] and 1122^nd PSC meeting of November 2022 further reinforced the mandate for PCRD, stressing the prevention of conflict relapse through governance and socio-economic interventions. The Sub-Committee’s formation comes at a time when Africa faces persistent and emerging threats, including terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and complex political transitions. The PSC’s recent engagements, such as the July 2025 Joint Consultative Meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in Midrand, South Africa, emphasised enhancing institutional synergy to implement PSC decisions and promote post-conflict recovery.

To afford this sub-committee its relevance, institutional synergy is important. In this regard, the Sub-Committee should prioritise coordination with RECs/RMs, the PCRD Centre in Cairo, AUDA-NEPAD and the APRM to prevent fragmented efforts, while leveraging existing platforms like the I-RECKE Policy Sessions to share best practices. Tailored PCRD strategies are also essential, with the Sub-Committee developing country-specific frameworks to address unique post-conflict challenges. Finally, sustainable financing must be pursued, with the AU Commission exploring innovative funding models, including public-private partnerships, to ensure the long-term sustainability of PCRD initiatives.

It is also worth noting that the Sub-Committees will be composed of the fifteen (15) Member States of the PSC, represented at the level of experts. Given the nature of their work, each Member State on the Council—and therefore in each Sub-Committee—will designate two experts, with one serving as the main representative and the other as a substitute, though both will be able to participate in the Sub-Committees’ activities.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué or a summary record. The PSC may welcome and endorse the refined ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committees on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD, commending the Committee of Experts for their engagement in the process. Council is also likely to direct the AU Commission to utilise the ToRs on counterterrorism and PCRD in the mandating, implementation, management and oversight of all counterterrorism and PCRD efforts, with a view to enhancing institutional coordination between relevant AU Organs, as well as between the AU and AU-RECs/RMs in the prevention, response and resolution of conflicts on the Continent. Furthermore, Council may urge the prompt operationalisation of the Sub-Committees, encourage regular and robust monitoring and evaluation and call for sustainable and predictable financing.

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Briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments

Amani Africa — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 06:11:26 +0000

Briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments

Date | 3 June 2025

Tomorrow (4 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1281^st meeting for a briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments.

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Eric Kayiranga, Weapon and Ammunition Senior Advisor representing the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) in the Great Lakes Region, is also expected to make a presentation, followed by statements from representatives of the RECs/RMs. A representative of the UN is also expected to make a statement during the session.

This meeting is convened to explore the synergies and implementation of regional instruments on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) adopted by AU Member States, alongside the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA), in alignment with the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). It is worth recalling that the CADSP is a strategic framework adopted by Member States to promote a shared understanding of security needs, common defence and security threats and the necessity for collective action to address these challenges. It serves as a vital tool for AU Member States to coordinate their defence and security initiatives, advancing continental stability in alignment with Africa’s Agenda 2063 for sustainable development and peace. Furthermore, the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2030 emphasises the importance of addressing the illicit proliferation and circulation of arms, with a specific focus on controlling the flow of ammunition into conflict zones. The GFA, on the other hand, serves as a comprehensive political framework encompassing fifteen objectives and eighty-five measures designed to prevent the diversion, illicit trafficking, and misuse of conventional ammunition. It also seeks to mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions and promote the safe and secure management of ammunition across its entire lifecycle, from production to final disposal. The framework addresses a broad spectrum of ammunition, including both small-calibre and large conventional types. Of particular relevance to Africa, the GFA aligns with the continent’s pressing peace and security challenges, especially the widespread proliferation of SALW and their associated ammunition. This proliferation significantly contributes to the escalation of armed conflict, terrorism, and transnational organised crime across the region.

Regional arms and ammunition control instruments, on the other hand, are critical frameworks, agreements and protocols established by regional organisations to regulate the production, transfer, storage and use of conventional arms, including SALW and their ammunition. These instruments are designed to address the pressing challenges of illicit proliferation, trafficking and misuse, which often fuel armed conflict, violence and regional instability. Their primary objectives include preventing unauthorised manufacturing, trafficking and diversion of arms and ammunition, enhancing security by reducing armed violence, terrorism and conflict through improved stockpile management and promoting regional collaboration, information-sharing and joint action to tackle cross-border challenges. On the continent, several key instruments exemplify these efforts. The ECOWAS Convention on SALW, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, adopted in 2006, is a legally binding agreement that replaced a 1998 moratorium. It focuses on controlling SALW, ammunition and related materials through transfer controls, stockpile management and tracing, while encouraging Member States to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW, established in 2004, on the other hand, targets the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states. Coordinated by the RECSA, it mandates training, destruction of surplus firearms and cross-border cooperation to curb trafficking. The Central African Convention/Kinshasa Convention, adopted in 2010 by ECCAS, is legally binding and entered into force in 2017, covering SALW, ammunition and components for manufacture, repair and assembly, with a broader scope than other regional protocols.

At the continental level, there are no legally binding continent-wide instruments, but there are frameworks. The Bamako Declaration of 2000, a political Africa-wide instrument, establishes a common African position on illicit SALW proliferation, circulation and trafficking, strengthening regional and international cooperation. The AU is also guided by the AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW. The AU Commission also embarked on a process of coordination and alignment of the implementation of the GFA. A study titled ‘Synergies Between African Regional Instruments and Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management’ was conducted. This analysis explored the alignment between the four key African regional instruments highlighted above and the fifteen objectives of the GFA. Following a workshop held on 6 and 7 May 2025 in the AU Commission, gathering experts from RECs/RMs and RECSA, the zero-draft report of the study sets the stage for dialogue, reflection and a unified path forward.

Beyond mere assessment, the study illuminated gaps in the framework and proposed thoughtful areas for improvement, aiming to strengthen the execution of both regional instruments and the GFA itself. In terms of alignment and differences, it was noted that African regional instruments, with the exception of the Bamako Declaration, hold legal force, obligating their signatories, while the GFA operates on a voluntary basis, its guidelines backed only by political commitment, just like the Bamako Declaration. Additionally, the GFA addresses all types of conventional ammunition, from small-calibre rounds to artillery shells, whereas regional instruments limit their scope to ammunition for SALW. Consequently, the study’s comparison and analysis account for the binding legal responsibilities of State Parties to the regional instruments, but focus exclusively on SALW ammunition. At the same time, the GFA’s prioritisation of international cooperation and technical assistance, facilitated through mechanisms such as the United Nations SaferGuard Programme and the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), presents valuable opportunities for supporting AU Member States and RECs in strengthening stockpile security.

Tomorrow’s session will therefore provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage in a focused discussion on the challenges associated with aligning and coordinating the GFA with existing regional arms control instruments, as emerged from the aforementioned study. In terms of challenges, one major concern is the limited financial and technical capacity of many Member States, which may be further strained by the introduction of new frameworks such as the GFA. Council may also consider the imperative of updating regional instruments to incorporate standards like the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs), enhance risk reduction, improve inventory and tracing systems and strengthen gender mainstreaming and stakeholder cooperation.

Although the establishment of such legal frameworks at sub-regional levels helps respond to challenges specific to those regions and is a positive step, it has resulted in parallel legal regimes and has made responses fragmented. Even in regions that have instruments, implementation is still lacking. The fragmented response has also left regions such as the Sahel without an established instrument. As such, the PSC may follow up on the outcome of its 1085^th meeting. First, it called for the integration of arms control and Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) programmes into the broader framework of Africa’s peace, security, and sustainable development agenda. Second, the Council requested the elaboration of a continental strategy to combat the proliferation of illicit firearms, including emerging categories of weaponry.

The Council may use this session to brainstorm on practical and sustainable measures to effectively bolster arms control and promote peace across the continent, drawing on the GFA. It is recalled that the 860^th PSC session previously highlighted the persistent lack of reliable data on national stockpiles as a critical challenge. In response, the GFA’s call for transparency and systematic information-sharing—such as through the UN Register of Conventional Arms—can serve to enhance regional monitoring and auditing practices. Moreover, the PSC may revisit the conclusions of its 776^th session, which drew a direct connection between illicit arms flows and broader threats such as transnational organised crime and terrorism. In this light, the GFA’s holistic and lifecycle-based approach to ammunition management offers a valuable framework for advancing regional strategies that address these underlying security drivers, while simultaneously aligning with the objectives of Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, which seeks to significantly reduce illicit arms flows.

It is also worth noting that tomorrow’s meeting is also being convened just few weeks before the convening of the preparatory meeting of States on the ‘Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management’ which will be held from 23 to 27 June 2025 at the UN Headquarters, as communicated by the UNODA in January 2025. A meeting expected to ‘explore possible options for the development of the process to ‘prevent diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse of ammunition; mitigate and prevent unplanned explosions at munition sites; ensure the safety and security of conventional ammunition throughout its life-cycle from the point of manufacture; and contribute to lasting peace, security and sustainable development.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express deep concern over the growing illicit flow of SALW in Africa. The PSC is also likely to reiterate the imperative of Member States and RECs/RMs to scale up efforts towards the full implementation of the regional SALW instruments. The PSC may underscore the operational role of RECs and the RECSA in supporting the implementation of regional arms control instruments and advancing alignment between these instruments and the GFA. The PSC may also call for the establishment of systematic stockpile audits, improved coordination among regional mechanisms and the development of specialised training programmes. The Council may, in particular, propose the establishment of regional training initiatives grounded in the regional instruments, the AU frameworks and the IATG and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), in order to build capacity for effective weapons and ammunition management. The Council may call for leveraging the GFA’s provisions on export controls and risk assessments related to diversion to mitigate external illicit arms transfers, which remain a persistent threat to peace and security across the continent. PSC could urge the AU Commission, Member States, and RECs/RMs to engage in the preparatory meeting at the UN Headquarters in New York, scheduled for 23 to 27 June 2025, by sharing valuable experiences and best practices on the safe and secure through-life management of ammunition. The Council may also encourage Member States to use the key findings and recommendations from the study conducted by the Commission in close collaboration with the four regions as a reference in making their interventions during the preparatory meeting. The PSC may encourage Member States to integrate the objectives of the GFA into national and SALW strategies, in alignment with the AU Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030. The Council may request technical assistance from the UNODA, the AMAT, and the UNREC to support national authorities in implementing regional and continental instruments on marking, tracing, and stockpile management, based on the IATG and the ISACS. The PSC may request the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to develop a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework to track progress in GFA implementation, emphasising evidence-based interventions and sustained institutional coordination. The PSC may also reiterate its request from its 1085^th session and call on the AU Commission to follow up and report to the Council.

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Open Session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region

Amani Africa — Tue, 13 May 2025 06:34:14 +0000

Open Session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region

Date | 13 May 2025

Tomorrow (14 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1279^th session as an open session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are also expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).

Despite the Council’s decision in 2019, during its 845^th session, to institutionalise an annual session on Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) as a standing agenda item, the last time the Council convened a session dedicated to the theme was in May 2022 during its 1082^nd session. However, the Council had consistently shown concern over the rise of transnational organised crime in Africa in several sessions on conflict-specific situations and on thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Council has also acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism. During its 1237^th session, convened to consider the report of the AU Commission on combating terrorism in October 2024, the Council noted with deep concern the growing linkages between TOC and terrorism and called for the strengthening of international cooperation.

Tomorrow’s session is of particular importance given the accelerating pace at which organised criminal networks are expanding their operations across Africa and some countries and regions have become major sites of TOC. These include notably the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin. According to data from the Africa Organised Crime 2023 Index, countries in these regions exhibit some of the highest levels of organised criminality on the continent above the continental average of 5.25. Such is the case in Nigeria (7.28), Sudan (6.37), Cameroon (6.27), Mali (5.93), Burkina Faso (5.92), Niger (5.70) and Chad (5.50). Beyond trafficking in arms, TOC in these regions and beyond manifests in multiple forms: trafficking in narcotics, people, and fuel; cybercrime; and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, such as gold.

Another dimension of TOC is its deepening entanglements with terrorism, insurgency and broader instability. And the growing convergence between TOC and terrorism is increasingly evident in various parts of Africa, but more so in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, which are most affected by terrorism. While it does not account for it, TOC contributes to and is aggravated by the standing of the Sahel as the region that has become the epicentre of global terrorism. Illicit arms and weapons proliferation and trade is one example of TOC affecting the Sahel. In this context, the TOC and conflicts involving terrorist groups feed into each other, as criminal economies provide financial lifelines to extremist groups, while terrorist actors offer protection and enforcement mechanisms to illicit traders. These mutually reinforcing relationships allow both sets of actors to thrive in environments of weak state control, porous borders, and pervasive governance deficits.

The political economy of TOC goes beyond simply criminal economies in regions like the Sahel. It also creates an environment in which it is used as an informal survival strategy for marginalised communities, where state presence is weak and employment and livelihood opportunities are scarce. A 2024 UNODC report underscores this feature of TOC in the Sahel, both as intensifying violence and serving as a critical source of livelihood for economically marginalised communities. By distributing the benefits of illegal markets, non-state armed groups often gain accommodation from local communities, further entrenching their influence and ability to perpetuate the cycle of insecurity. Firearms trafficking, in particular, has played a catalytic role in triggering conflict across the Sahel. Additionally, the UNODC report notes that organised criminal networks provide financial and human resources to armed groups, thereby prolonging conflicts. Illicit economies are central to sustaining violence, as revenues are either directly or indirectly reinvested in weapons and logistical support, strengthening the operational and economic resilience of armed groups.

Given the role of unregulated borders in facilitating TOC, the other issue to be addressed in tomorrow’s session is the institutional weaknesses at the national level that create the vacuum for the emergence and expansion of TOC. This draws attention to some of the major underlying causes, including spaces with weak presence of state institutions and porous borders. Apart from addressing state fragility and expanding legitimate local structures of governance, this highlights the need for strengthening border control capacities through training, technology transfer, and joint operations.

In addition to receiving updates and reflecting on trends in TOC in the Sahel during the past few years and its intersection with insecurity and conflict, tomorrow’s session serves to follow up on PSC’s earlier engagements on the subject. In its communiqué from its 1082^nd session, the PSC had requested AFRIPOL to work in collaboration with the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) to develop two databases; one on persons, groups and entities involved in Transnational Organised Crimes, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters; and another regional database for guiding member states and RECs/RMs on their policy interventions for Transnational Organised Crimes. The PSC also requested AFRIPOL and INTERPOL to produce in-depth research on ‘regional information papers in the fight against transnational organised crime’. Given the two-year lapse, tomorrow’s session will provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on these mandates and renew calls for institutional synergy. Also of importance is the need to bridge the gap, which is the disconnect between policy pronouncements and operational coherence. Coordination among the various AU bodies tasked with countering TOC continues to suffer from resource constraints and insufficient horizontal integration.

In terms of policy, some of the notable instruments include the November 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking on Human Beings, especially Women and Children, the 2014 Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation, the August 2019 AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2019-2023 and the December 2018 Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational Organised Crimes Project. Institutionally, AFRIPOL is one of the recent institutional structures instituted at the AU as the continent’s law enforcement coordination mechanism to, among others, deal with TOC. An example of the contribution of AFRIPOL in this respect is the launch of ‘Operation TAPI’ in Benin, the first cross-border initiative that targeted a range of illicit activities, including the trafficking of drugs, pharmaceuticals, arms, counterfeit or smuggled goods and environmental crimes. The operation will engage six AU member states: Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, Chad, and Togo. It is also worth giving due consideration to deepen the role of the Nouakchott Process and the Djibouti Process in contributing to addressing the scourge of TOC. However, the AU has as yet to find ways of bringing counter TOC to the centre of its conflict prevention, management and resolution processes in view of TOC’s deepening entanglement with conflict dynamics. For example, it is rare that reference is made to the policy instruments cited above in responding to and dealing with specific conflict situations.

Beyond the continental frameworks, there is also the issue of how to mainstream response to and address TOC in international conflict management. In Mali, despite a 2018 mandate to address TOC, the UN’s mission, MINUSMA, focused primarily on terrorist financing rather than tackling the broader political economy that sustains organised crime. A similar pattern was noted in the Central African Republic under MINUSCA. These examples reflect a systemic challenge to treat TOC as a central concern of conflict dynamics. They also illustrate the broader problem of siloed mandates and loosely integrated strategies, an area where there is an increasing need for adaptation by peacekeeping missions.

Against this backdrop, in tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC also faces the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of TOC and terrorism and emphasise the need for a multidimensional response that combines intelligence-sharing, targeted enforcement, and community resilience-building. The Council is likely to revisit the importance of early warning systems, localised peacebuilding efforts, institution-building, and socioeconomic development interventions as tools for preventing recruitment into criminal and terrorist networks. The 17^th Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and the UNSC, convened on 6 October 2023, also underscored the necessity of a ‘multidimensional approach to tackle the structural root causes of insecurity’, while advocating for coordinated responses to the interlinked threats of terrorism and TOC in the Sahel. It also highlighted the importance of sustained international engagement. The need for stronger international partnerships is likely to be reiterated, as collaboration with global partners remains crucial for securing predictable and sustainable financing for regional initiatives. The PSC had emphasised the importance of cooperation with institutions such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), UNODC, and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) in previous sessions. The 17^th Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC reinforced the value of aligning AU-led responses with global strategies like the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel while calling for increased, predictable funding for regional initiatives. Tomorrow’s session is expected to echo these calls, pushing for greater international support while ensuring that responses remain context-sensitive and locally owned.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the increasing threat of the scourge of transnational organised crime in Africa. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional and multipronged approach that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. In this regard, it may call for increased use of livelihood support interventions, the rolling out of legitimate local governance structures and other peacebuilding and development support activities as critical measures to address not just the symptoms but also the underlying factors that make TOC possible. Given the transnational nature of TOC, the PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention and the lessons from AFRIPOL’s Operation TAPI. It may also reiterate the importance of the Nouakchott and Djibouti processes while underscoring the need for ensuring that those processes expand their lens beyond the security and law enforcement domain to integrate peacebuilding with a focus on advancing economic development and building of legitimate local governance structures that facilitate the delivery of social services. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole of AU system approach, emphasising both the need for coordination between AU security institutions such as AFRIPOL and CISSA, and importantly, the role of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), African Development Bank, AUDA/NEPAD, African Governance Architecture. The PSC may emphasise the need to develop counter TOC as a key area of joint action with the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). It may task the AU Commission to develop and present a comprehensive report on both the trends in TOC in Africa and importantly on how the AU contributes to addressing the growing scourge of TOC leveraging on its broader governance, regional integration and peace and security norms and instruments while enhancing the role of AFRIPOL and CISSA in this area. The PSC may also task the AU, working closely with RECs/RMs, to develop guidance on giving growing attention to TOC in developing and implementing peace and security initiatives in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. It may also call for greater international support and cooperation in developing responses to the threat posed by TOC.

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International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action

Amani Africa — Mon, 31 Mar 2025 06:28:22 +0000

International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action

Date | 31 March 2025

Tomorrow (01 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1271st session in commemoration of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Rebecca Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the stand-in Chairperson of the PSC for April, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). It is also expected that representatives from the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS), the European Union Delegation to the AU, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will address the PSC.

The International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action was designated by the United Nations General Assembly to be observed on 4 April to address the threats posed by anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on the continent. While not always convened yearly, the PSC has been marking the day with dedicated sessions since at least 2019.

The PSC last convened a dedicated session on this theme during its 1146th meeting on 3 April 2023. In that meeting, the PSC called for the establishment of a continental mechanism for mine action to coordinate and support Member States’ efforts, and organising an advocacy forum for Member States and stakeholders to exchange views and share experiences on addressing the threats posed by anti-personnel landmines in Africa. It also underscored the importance of including victims of anti-personnel landmines in its discussions on mine action. The session further agreed to hold future commemorations of the International Day as open sessions, bringing together Member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), partners, and other stakeholders to share experiences, lessons, and best practices.

While it remains unclear whether tomorrow’s session will follow this envisaged format, it affords the PSC the opportunity to follow up on these commitments and advance the mine action agenda. This year’s session is particularly important for stocktaking, as 2025 marks the final year to meet the deadline set by the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) and the 2014 Declaration of State Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Maputo Declaration) for a mine-free world.

Also of interest to the PSC is the protection of civilians from the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), given the increasing prevalence of armed conflicts in urban settings, as seen in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). ICRC’s intervention in tomorrow’s session is likely to highlight the devastating humanitarian consequences of EWIPA and the measures needed to mitigate them. It is worth recalling that the PSC dedicated its 859th session, held in July 2019, to this theme as part of the AU’s efforts to promote active African participation in the global process of developing a political declaration on the protection of civilians from the use of EWIPA. The declaration was subsequently developed with significant involvement from African countries. However, only 11 AU Member States have endorsed it so far, underscoring the need for broader endorsement among Member States.

Africa has been at the forefront of the global effort to ban anti-personnel landmines. In June 1995, the 62nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers adopted Resolution CM/Res 1593 on the ‘UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and Problems Posed by the Proliferation of Anti-Personnel Mines in Africa,’ which, inter alia, called for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines and the universalisation of relevant legally binding instruments. This was followed by the adoption of the Common African Position on Anti-Personnel Mines during the Second Continental Conference of African Experts in September 2004.

Currently, 93% of AU Member States are parties to the Ottawa Convention—the most widely recognised treaty in mine action—which seeks to end the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. The Convention obligates States Parties to never use, develop, produce, stockpile, or transfer anti-personnel mines and requires them to destroy existing stockpiles, clear mined areas, and assist victims. At the institutional level, the AU Commission is in the process of reviewing its Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework (2014–2017) and developing a Draft AU Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Strategy. The PSC has repeatedly called for the finalisation of the Counter-IED Strategy, including during its 837th, 1032nd, 1072nd, and 1146th meetings, and members are likely to be interested in receiving an update on the progress made in this regard.

Map 1: State parties to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Ban Convention (Source: https://www.apminebanconvention.org/en/membership)

Despite significant efforts and progress over the years, the continent continues to face serious challenges in mine action, which are likely to feature in tomorrow’s discussion. According to the latest 2024 Landmines Monitor Report, offering a comprehensive global overview of developments in mine ban and action since 1999, as of October 2024, 33 States Parties have yet to fulfill their mine clearance obligations,[1] including 14 AU Member States: Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Of these, eight countries face deadlines to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations by 2025, but none appear to be on track to do so. The remaining five countries—Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan—have clearance deadlines extending beyond 2025.

Map 2: State Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations as of October 2024 (Source: 2024 Landmines Monitor Report)

A concerning trend is the re-emergence of landmines in countries previously declared mine-free, including Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania. Mozambique, which was declared mine-free in 2015, also faces renewed threats due to the use of improvised mines by insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province. Ethiopia also reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination in 2023, with over 100 km² affected, while Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Mauritania reported contamination levels ranging from 20 to 99 km².

The continued use of anti-personnel mines particularly by non-state armed groups, such as terrorist organisations, remains a major concern. The PSC, in its 1072nd and 1146th sessions, expressed ‘serious concern’ over the use of anti-personnel mines and IEDs by such groups and called for compliance with international treaties banning their use. Reports also indicate that IEDs have become the weapon of choice for terrorist groups across the continent, particularly in regions affected by conflicts involving terrorist groups such as the Sahel, the Great Lakes, and the Horn of Africa.

The human toll of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remains high. In 2023, at least 5,757 casualties were recorded globally, with civilians bearing the brunt of the impact. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ethiopia were among the ten countries with the highest casualty rates, pursuant to the Landmines Monitor Report.

Another challenge is compliance with the transparency reporting obligation under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which requires each State Party to report on steps taken to implement the treaty. State Parties are obliged to submit annual reports by 30 April, detailing developments from the preceding calendar year. Despite this obligation, four of the five State Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations that have not submitted updated Article 7 transparency reports are AU Member States.

On a positive note, both globally and regionally, 2023 saw a record 281.5 km² of contaminated land cleared—the largest area cleared since the last review conference in 2019. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Chad were among the top ten countries conducting mine clearance, with Zimbabwe leading in the destruction of 37,330 landmines.

Progress depends on international cooperation and solidarity. As such, the increase in international funding for mine action, which surpassed $1 billion in 2023, is a welcome development. Yet, the allocation of the funds does not correspond to the need and scale of the burden of mines that countries have. Accordingly, while more than 40% of the 33 mine-contaminated States Parties are from Africa, no African country was among the top ten recipients of international support. Ukraine alone received $308 million—39% of all international donor funds—while African countries, including Chad, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, received a combined total of just $19 million over five years (2019–2023), representing less than 1% of global mine action funding. This disparity underscores the need for attaching greater significance to needs and the scale of burden of countries if global cooperation and solidarity is going to advance the effective implementation of the treaty.

With the U.S., Germany, and the European Union being the top donors for mine action, any shifts in policy or funding priorities in these regions could further reduce available resources, exacerbating the challenges faced by AU Member States. It is to be recalled that PSC’s 1146th session raised concerns over the mine action funding gap at national, regional, and continental levels and urged the AU Commission to work closely with Member States and partners to mobilise resources and technical expertise. During tomorrow’s deliberation, PSC members may explore concrete strategies to address the funding challenges that continue to hinder mine action efforts across the continent.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may acknowledge progress made over the years while expressing concern over the continued threat posed by anti-personnel landmines and ERW, including the increasing use of improvised explosive devices by terrorist groups and their use in some recent conflicts. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its call for the finalisation and submission of the draft AU Counter-IED Strategy for its consideration. In light of the upcoming international conference on the EWIPA political declaration, scheduled to be held in Costa Rica in November 2025, the PSC is expected to encourage AU Member States to endorse the declaration. The PSC may call for the AU to facilitate the mobilisation of technical, logistical and financial support including through experience sharing exercises to support the efforts of member states in mine clearance operations and in enhancing efforts for preventing the use of landmines and other explosive devices. The PSC may also call on all Member States to put in place institutional measures to comply with their obligations under international instruments related to mine action, particularly the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and urge those that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the treaty. It may also encourage States with Article 5 clearance obligations to enhance their efforts to meet their deadlines, including by strengthening technical capacity, demonstrating political will, and allocating sufficient funds for mine action. Furthermore, the PSC may request the AU Commission to ensure the implementation of previous Council decisions on mine action within a specified timeline, including the establishment of a Continental Mechanism for mine action, organising advocacy forum, the participation of landmine victims in PSC meetings on mine action, and the review of the AU Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework (2014–2017).

[1] Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties with contamination are required to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that country.

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Deradicalisation as Leverage for the Fight Against Violent Extremism in Africa

Amani Africa — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 06:58:00 +0000

Deradicalisation as Leverage for the Fight Against Violent Extremism in Africa

Date | 18 March 2025

Tomorrow (19 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1266^th session to discuss the theme of ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa.’

The Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March, Mohammed Arrouchi, will deliver the opening remarks, followed by a presentation from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is also expected to deliver a statement.

This is not the first time that the PSC has dedicated a session on deradicalisation as a strategy to fight terrorism and violent extremism. On 7 October 2022, during its chairship of the PSC, Morocco convened a ministerial-level session on the same theme, ‘Development and Deradicalisation as Levers to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism.’ The communiqué adopted at that session identified radicalisation and underdevelopment as key factors fostering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Emphasising comprehensive, multidimensional, and human rights-sensitive approaches, the PSC highlighted the need to address all structural root causes, drivers, and facilitators of radicalisation and violent extremism.

A major outcome of that session was the endorsement of reconciliation, dialogue, and negotiation as critical tools in countering terrorism. Relatedly, it underscored ‘the critical role of the media, religious institutions, educational and cultural institutions in countering terrorist narratives, deradicalisation, and in promoting inter-faith dialogue, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.’ These echo findings from our Special Research Report on the growing threat of terrorism in Africa, which highlights that ‘the recognition of the essentially political, governance, and development nature of the conflict dynamics in which insurgent groups identified as terrorists operate necessitates that negotiation and dialogue with members of such groups forms part of the political strategy for settling the conflict involving these groups.’ Furthermore, the PSC requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African national reconciliation best practices for the Council’s consideration. It also called for the inclusion of strategies to counter radicalisation and extremist ideologies in the envisaged review of the African Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity to follow up on progress in implementing these and other related decisions adopted by the PSC at various times to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the continent.

This session takes place against the backdrop of a persistent and escalating threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The Sahel region remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for 51 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024, according to the newly released Global Terrorism Index 2025, an annual report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The region has also witnessed a nearly tenfold increase in terrorism-related deaths since 2019. Six of the ten most affected countries are in Africa—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Cameroon. Despite a decline in both attacks and fatalities, Burkina Faso remains the most impacted country, accounting for one-fifth of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Meanwhile, Niger recorded the highest increase in terrorism-related deaths globally, rising by 94 per cent—highlighting the fragility of progress in countering terrorism.

Tomorrow’s discussion is important in spotlighting political, social, cultural and socio-economic approaches to counterterrorism, particularly given the dominance of hard security as the prevailing policy thinking and response. As outlined in our aforementioned special research report, an analysis of AU policy decisions—from the AU Assembly to the PSC—reveals particular emphasis on hard security measures in combating terrorism.

Building on the 1111^th session of the PSC and the increasing recognition in the AU Counter Terrorism Centre for a more comprehensive approach, tomorrow’s session can take forward the shift to a multidimensional strategy that prioritises the political governance, social, cultural and socio-economic, development dimensions. Given its focus on deradicalisation, the session is also expected to draw attention to public policy measures that facilitate social cohesion, reconciliation and inclusion, opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration, and religious teachings and practices that advance tolerance and moderation.

In terms of best practices, it is expected that the session may put the spotlight on Morocco’s success in deradicalisation programs. Morocco has been classified among the countries with ‘zero risk’ of terrorism worldwide, ranking first in North Africa according to the GTI 2025. The report, which assesses the impact of terrorist attacks across 163 countries, places Morocco 100th—marking significant progress from its 76th position in 2022 among countries affected by terrorism. This shift moves Morocco into the category of countries with ‘no impact’ from terrorism, making it one of the safest in the world, registering scores of zero, meaning the country had been free of terrorist activity for at least the past five years. This track record is not due to a lack of threats. In fact, Morocco remains a target for terrorist groups due to its location at the crossroads of Africa, Europe, and the Arab world. However, its success in containing the threat is largely attributed to its multidimensional counterterrorism strategy.

The 2003 Casablanca attacks marked a turning point in Morocco’s counterterrorism approach, prompting a comprehensive strategy—often described as a ‘tri-dimensional counterterrorism strategy’—that integrates security measures, socio-economic development, and religious oversight. Law 03.03, enacted shortly after the attacks, established a stronger legal framework, while from a security perspective, enhanced border security and intelligence capabilities have reportedly helped dismantle over 200 terrorist cells and arrest more than 3,500 individuals on terrorism-related charges over the past two decades, potentially preventing over 300 planned attacks.

A key pillar of Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy is its deradicalisation programs, notably the Moussalaha (Reconciliation) initiative, which has rehabilitated hundreds of detainees. As part of efforts to counter extremist narratives, Morocco’s Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has developed an educational curriculum for nearly 50,000 imams and female Islamic guides (mourchidates). As summarised in a contribution to the GTI 2022, key lessons from Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts include its deep understanding of the threat, the interconnectedness of its counterterrorism methods, the combined application of soft and hard measures, the facilitation of information-sharing practices, and the promotion of international cooperation as the sine qua non of counterterrorism.

As this experience attests and our research report established, while security measures remain essential in addressing immediate terrorist threats, they alone cannot fundamentally alter the continent’s terrorism landscape without addressing the underlying socio-economic and political conditions that fuel extremism. As highlighted in our special research report, governance deficiencies, community grievances, and structural vulnerabilities create fertile ground for terrorist groups to emerge and thrive. Given the limitations of a security-heavy approach, it remains imperative for the PSC to prioritise investments in socioeconomic development, governance reforms, and humanitarian interventions alongside security responses. Despite being in a neighbourhood that witnessed a major expansion of the terrorist threat, another country that largely shielded itself from the impacts of terrorism is Mauritania. As with Morocco, this is not attributable to the reliance on the security approach but also to the use of instruments that advance the prevention of violent extremism and deradicalisation.

Encouragingly, in recent years, PSC discussions have increasingly recognised the need to address the structural root causes of terrorism. For instance, the Declaration of the April 2024 High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting in Abuja, endorsed by the PSC during its 1219th session, emphasised the importance of complementing military action with political solutions. It called for policies to counter economic, religious, and cultural discrimination, promote inter-community dialogue, and strengthen social cohesion. The Declaration also underscored the need to invest in education, integrate counterterrorism efforts with SDG 16 and Agenda 2063, and adopt community-led approaches. Additionally, it highlighted the importance of countering terrorist propaganda that exploits inter-religious tensions and the clash of civilisation narratives.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counterterrorism strategy that integrates both hard and soft approaches, including security measures, legal frameworks, socio-economic development, and programs for countering radicalisation and deradicalisation. It may also emphasise the need for national reconciliation, social cohesion, and inter-community dialogue to address the structural challenges that fuel terrorism and violent extremism while highlighting the importance of facilitating platforms for lesson learning and experience sharing. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its call from the 1111th session for the AU Commission to develop a compendium of best practices on national reconciliation in Africa. Recognising the role of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Programme Office in Rabat in supporting Member States’ capacity-building efforts, the PSC may encourage Member States to effectively leverage its resources and enhance coordination with Nigeria’s recently upgraded Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre. Furthermore, the PSC may use this opportunity to follow up on the implementation of its previous decisions, such as the full operationalisation of the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the PSC’s Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism.

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Discussion on enhancing mechanisms for curbing illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups in Africa

Amani Africa — Mon, 25 Nov 2024 10:53:56 +0000

Discussion on enhancing mechanisms for curbing illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups in Africa

Date | 25 November 2024

Tomorrow (26 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1246th session to deliberate on enhancing mechanisms for curbing the illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups in Africa.

The session will commence with opening remarks from Jean Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Presentations are also scheduled from Marie-Antoinette Rose Quatre, Chief Executive Officer of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Continental Secretariat and representatives of other invited institutions.

The issue of illegal resource exploitation by armed groups is especially relevant to the DRC, making this session particularly fitting under the DRC’s chairship. According to a report from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and partners, each year, resources such as gold, minerals, timber, charcoal, and wildlife products, including ivory—valued at USD 0.7–1.3 billion—are illegally extracted and smuggled from conflict zones in eastern DRC. The report further reveals that this revenue sustains at least 8,000 armed fighters annually, allowing previously defeated or disarmed groups to reemerge and destabilise the region. Moreover, the income from these activities finances at least 25 armed groups, posing a continued threat to peace and security in eastern DRC. The most recent PSC-United Nations Security Council (UNSC) annual joint consultative meeting, held in October, recognised the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources, and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflict in eastern DRC.

The PSC has increasingly addressed this issue in recent years, recognising the link between the illegal exploitation of resources and conflict. Notably, PSC’s 575th session, held in February 2016, was dedicated to the issue of natural resources and conflicts in Africa, where the Council highlighted how natural resources, while essential for economic growth, have fuelled conflict in vulnerable countries. The PSC further underscored that in most of the protracted conflicts in the continent, the issue of access, control and distribution of natural resources constitute a major underlying cause that should effectively be neutralised. Further sessions, including 776th, linked illicit financial flows, transnational crime, terrorism, poaching, and weapons proliferation to the illegal exploitation of resources, particularly by non-state armed groups.

Reports by the AU Commission chairperson on combating terrorism have repeatedly underscored the role of natural resource exploitation as a key funding source for terrorist groups in Africa. For example, in a report to the 1040^th PSC session, it was noted that terrorist groups in Africa fund operations through the illegal exploitation of resources, extortion, and poaching, among other methods. Apart from the context of terrorism, the issue of sources of financing of conflict actors also prominently features in some of the country/region-specific files, notably in the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sahel region and Lake Chad Basin region.

On the part of the UN Security Council, it adopted several resolutions including 2195 (2014), 2462 (2019), and 2482 (2019), which recognised the illegal exploitation of natural resources as a source of funding for armed and terrorist groups as well as criminal networks. In October 2022, Gabon convened a high-level debate on strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources during its presidency of the UN Security Council.

The attention to the issue stems from its widespread impact across the continent. Illegal exploitation spans from gold, diamonds, coltan, and uranium in the Great Lakes region; to gold, diamonds, forest resources, and phosphates in the Sahel; to natural gas, fishing, and fuel trafficking in the Lake Chad Basin; to charcoal and livestock smuggling in the Horn of Africa. Control over natural resources has fueled numerous civil wars in Africa, particularly in the late 20th century, as seen in Sierra Leone and Liberia. With the shift in conflict dynamics in the new millennium, marked by the rise of terrorism and proliferation of poorly organised non-state armed groups, including in the mineral-rich Sahel, such non-state armed groups now exploit these resources to fund their activities.

Several factors contribute to the prevalence of illegal resource exploitation in Africa. One key factor, highlighted in the PSC’s 575th session, is bad governance affecting natural resources, where mismanagement and inequitable distribution are identified as major underlying causes requiring effective countermeasures. Additional factors include limited state presence, inadequate law enforcement capacity, porous borders, and insufficient legal frameworks for resource management, as well as strong ties between armed and terrorist groups and illicit trade networks some of which with links in the supply chains of multinational extractive companies.

This exploitation imposes a massive economic toll, with Africa estimated to lose $50-100 billion in revenue annually, which affects GDP growth and deprives the local population of revenue. The human rights impact on local communities and environmental degradation from unchecked exploitation are equally severe. Meanwhile, it has become a lucrative business for armed and terrorist groups. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that illicit wildlife trafficking alone brings in $400 million annually, with Al-Shabaab reportedly earning over $20 million from illegal charcoal sales. The lucrative income from such exploitation also creates powerful economic incentives that sustain armed and terrorist groups, perpetuating violence and complicating conflict resolution in the continent. It is anticipated that the illegal exploitation of natural resources may intensify in the context of the heightening global scramble for critical or transition minerals which are essential for green technology.

Various mechanisms at regional, continental and international levels have been put in place to address this challenge. Key in this regard includes the Kimberley process, an international certification scheme and a multi-stakeholder trade regime established in 2003 to prevent trade of conflict diamonds. Today, 99.8 per cent of the world’s diamonds reportedly come from conflict-free sources, highlighting the effectiveness of the mechanism. The Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights also criminalises the illicit exploitation of natural resources. At the regional level, the most cited initiative in the Great Lakes region is the Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (RINR), being coordinated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

Tomorrow’s session will also focus on mechanisms to curb the illicit exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups. An essential starting point is understanding the complex nature of this issue, including the roles of various actors involved. In response to the AU Assembly’s call during its 16th Extraordinary Session, the AU Commission could initiate a study to explore the link between illegal natural resource exploitation, and armed conflict, including terrorism across the continent, examine foreign interests, and recommend strategies to address the issue.

Second, it is important to recognise that natural resources themselves are neither a blessing nor a curse; rather, their impact depends on governance. As noted during the PSC’s 575th session, effective, transparent, and equitable management of natural resources that prioritises the interest of the local population, communities and the country at large is critical. This requires a robust legal and institutional framework governing access, control, and extraction of natural resources.

Third, tackling illegal exploitation also depends on strong regulatory frameworks backed by effective enforcement mechanisms. Member States should invest in enforcement capacities and strengthen state presence to secure resources from misuse by criminal networks and non-state armed groups. This should include not only a strong financial regulatory regime but also an adequately empowered legal and institutional regulatory system that criminally and financially punishes any engagement in the extraction of natural resources without a permit that is secured following due process including environmental, social and human rights impact assessment.

Fourth, due to the cross-border nature of illegal exploitation, regional cooperation and information sharing are vital to secure borders and prevent illicit resource movements. Finally, considering the asymmetry of power between individual states and multinational extractive companies, which at times enables a weak system of natural resources governance, at the continental level, the AU should also be tasked to develop a continental treaty on the governance of natural resources that builds on and covers not only the resources covered under the AU Mining Vision but also those that fall outside of it. In addition, it should strengthen its sanctions regime to target individuals, entities, and groups involved in illegal resource exploitation. The AU should leverage the work of AU bodies such as the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the AU Commission based Africa Mining Centre and the APRM as well as regional initiatives such as the ICGLR’s RINR.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. PSC is expected to express concern over the increasing illegal exploitation of natural resources by non-state armed groups including terrorist groups as a major source of funding for their activities. It may highlight the detrimental impact of such exploitations on the developmental aspirations of African states and its role in perpetuating violence in the continent. The PSC may warn that the situation may further aggravate in the face of the growing fierce global rush for access to and control of critical minerals which non-state armed groups may take advantage of. It may emphasise the importance of various initiatives both at the AU and regional levels including the Working Group on Extractive Industries of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Commission), the African Mining Centre at the AU Commission and the ICGLR’s RINR. It is also expected to outline mechanisms to combat this issue, including strengthening regulatory frameworks at the state level on the access, control, and extraction of resources; enhancing enforcement mechanisms such as financial monitoring systems; and increasing state presence to exercise effective control over natural resources. At the regional level, the PSC may underscore the need for fostering cross-border cooperation and information sharing considering that non-state armed groups and criminal networks use the territories of neighbouring states as channels for processing proceeds from the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The PSC may also task the AU Commission, working in consultation with relevant AU bodies including the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the APRM and the Africa Mining Centre, to develop a continental treaty on the governance of natural resources in Africa. Echoing the decision of the Malabo summit, the PSC may call on the AU Commission, or specifically the AU Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), to conduct a study on the illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups highlighting practical strategies for addressing this challenge.

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Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Countering Terrorism in Africa

Amani Africa — Tue, 22 Oct 2024 07:22:13 +0000

Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Countering Terrorism in Africa

Date | 22 October 2024

Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1235th session at an ambassadorial level to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on counter-terrorism. The session is envisaged to be held virtually.

Following the opening remarks by Mohamed Gad, the Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the Commissioner of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, will introduce the report of the Chairperson of the AUC on continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa. Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is expected to make a presentation on trends in the threat of violent extremism and terrorism on the continent which will be followed by a statement from Representative of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and Representative of the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).

The report of the Chairperson aligns with the decision made by the Assembly (/AU/Dec.311 (XV)) during its 15^th Ordinary Session in July 2010. The Assembly requested the Commission to provide regular reports on the progress of counterterrorism efforts and cooperation in Africa. Furthermore, the PSC, in its 249^th session in November 2010, urged the AU Commission to submit reports and briefings on the state of terrorism in Africa, as well as the efforts of the AU, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and member States to combat this issue.

The PSC last reviewed the AU Commission Chairperson’s report on counter-terrorism and related issues during its 1182nd session on 27 October 2023. The Council, based on the report of the Chairperson, highlighted troubling trends of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent including the geographical spread of terrorism across the continent, particularly in the Sahel region, alongside the rising risk of its expansion into the coastal states of West Africa. Echoing Amani Africa’s Special Report on the topic, underscored the imperative of prioritising political solutions alongside military and security interventions. It further emphasised the need for ‘context-specific interventions’ tailored to address specific security, governance, development and humanitarian needs of the affected countries and regions.

Tomorrow’s session offers the opportunity for the PSC to follow on the implementation of decisions from its previous session including: the establishment of the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism (AUMCCT), the operationalisation of the African Counter-Terrorism Coordination Task Force (A2CTF), activation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism, operationalisation of the Special Fund on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, pursuant to Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.614(XXVII)], conduct field research for purposes of gathering empirical evidence for policy response on the nexus between Transnational organised Crime (TNOC) and Terrorism and institute an annual roundtable on the alternative approaches countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, tapping into the expertise local actors.

As pointed out in our various research outputs including our landmark special research report, Africa has experienced a major spike in not only the proliferation of conflicts involving terrorist groups but also in their impact and geographic spread. According to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Africa witnessed a staggering 400% increase in attacks and a 237% rise in deaths between 2012 and 2020. According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), for the first time in 13 years, a country other than Afghanistan or Iraq has topped the GTI, with Burkina Faso now ranked first. Mali and Niger remain among the most affected by terrorism as well. The Sahel continues to hold the status of being the epicentre of terrorism not only in Africa but also globally.

Data from multiple sources highlights three key trends in terrorism across Africa. The first is the alarming increase in the number of terrorist attacks. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the Sahel region, where terrorism has surged dramatically over the past 15 years. The number of attacks has surged by 1,266% during 2023.

The second, equally concerning, is the rising number of fatalities resulting from these attacks. The same data source shows that deaths from attacks have skyrocketed by an astounding 2,860%. By the end of 2023, data from the Africa Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), now known as the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), revealed a 99% increase in terrorist attacks and a 53% rise in terrorism-related deaths compared to the previous year. On average, the data recorded eight terrorist attacks and 43 terrorism-related deaths per day during this period.

The third trend highlights the persistence of the geographic spread of terrorism, particularly in the Sahel and the West African coastal states. In terms of regional distribution, West Africa remains the most affected region on the continent, recording 1,455 attacks resulting in 8,409 deaths in 2023. This trend persisted into the second quarter of 2024, with, data from AUCTC showing that West Africa accounted for 45% of all attacks and 62% of the total deaths in Africa. East Africa ranks second, with 688 recorded attacks leading to 3,654 deaths. In contrast, North Africa was the least affected region in 2023.

Terrorist attacks and deaths in Africa per region 2023 (Source: ACSRT, PSC’s 1202nd Session Briefing Note)

According to the latest data from the AUCTC, the five countries most affected by terrorist attacks during the second quarter of 2024 (April-June 2024) were Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Mali, and Cameroon in decreasing order. The most active terrorist groups on the continent include Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Shabaab, Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP), Boko Haram, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

While no region of the continent is spared from conflicts involving terrorist groups, apart from the dire situation in the Sahel, particularly troubling, as noted by the President of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission is the expansion of terrorism into the coastal states of West Africa, including Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. Additionally, as these groups extend their reach towards the Gulf of Guinea, there is concern about a dangerous convergence of piracy and terrorism emerging.

Given the rise in the frequency and geographical spread of terrorism, it has become clear that the overreliance on hard security response measures is not delivering the expected outcomes. If anything, it has exacerbated the situation through its adverse impacts including abuses and collateral damages it inflicts on affected communities. This necessitates that the policy response achieves a shift towards enhancing and focusing on using non-security measures targeting the governance, institutional, socio-economic, environmental and development issues that create the conditions for the emergence and expansion of conflicts involving terrorist groups.

Beyond the geographic spread and growing prevalence of terrorist activities, the threat has become increasingly complex due to the interplay of geopolitics, external actors, and the breakdown of regional order in the Sahel and West Africa. Apart from the collapse of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S), a subregional arrangement initially composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, the three Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS.

The other issue that the Chairperson’s report may also highlight is the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, including the growing profile of ISIS in some regions. There are reports that the Islamic State’s Somalia Province has attracted attention due to reports of its global connections, including supplying funds to ISIS global networks. For terrorist groups in Somalia, the other major concern that emerged in the course of 2023/2024 is the possibility of close operational coordination, particularly between Al Shabaab and the Huthis in Yemen, who are in possession of weapons that have dramatically changed the security dynamics on the Red Sea.

As in the past, one other issue that has increasingly received attention in the Chairperson’s recent reports is the relationship between terrorism and transnational organised criminal networks. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are known for taking advantage of such networks including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members. In areas with predominantly informal economies, limited state resources and presence, and pervasive corruption, terrorist groups find it easy to levy taxes with little opposition from locals. This is particularly observed in territories experiencing the insurgence of JNIM and ISWAP.

The consideration of Chairperson’s report is also expected to consider how terrorist groups operating in Africa are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilise support, recruit, undertake reconnaissance operations and carry out their attacks. Organisations such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have adapted to the digital era by utilising a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organise their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example, as highlighted in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP for instance has increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). Attention should also be paid to the risk of such actors employing cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks.

Tomorrow’s session would also serve as an opportunity for reviewing the efforts made by the AU, its Member States, and RECs/RMs to contain the spread of and enhance concerted efforts in the face of the transnational and transregional character of the threat. As it did last time, the Chairperson’s report further emphasises that the predominant responses have been of a military nature, and ongoing attacks have resulted in increased militarisation of states’ reactions.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. The PSC may also request member states to enhance the implementation of applicable AU instruments and Decisions, specifically the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the 50th OAU/AU Anniversary Solemn Declaration. Furthermore, the PSC is expected to stress the need for efforts to combat transnational organised crime, especially the proliferation of illicit arms, including through enhanced intelligence-sharing mechanisms, border management cooperation, and control. The PSC may also reiterate its previous decision on the need to address the root causes of terrorism, including poverty and marginalisation, the weak or absence of presence of the state and legitimate local governance infrastructures, which create the conditions for the emergence and expansion of terrorism. It is important to collaborate with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and AU Organs to build community resilience and promote long-term recovery through post-conflict reconstruction and development programs.

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