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	<title>Gabon Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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	<title>Gabon Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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		<title>Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/review-of-the-political-transition-in-the-gabonese-republic/</link>
					<comments>https://amaniafrica-et.org/review-of-the-political-transition-in-the-gabonese-republic/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 2025 06:36:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gabon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2025]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=21001</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>29 April 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/review-of-the-political-transition-in-the-gabonese-republic/">Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-0"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 29 April 2025</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (30 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene for its 1277<sup>th</sup> meeting to review the Political transition program of the Gabonese Republic.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The meeting will begin with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to be present at the meeting to make a presentation, followed by remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives from ECCAS and the Gabonese Republic are also expected to make statements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s meeting is being convened as an additional agenda item to the programme, as the session was not on the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-april-2025/">initial </a>programme of work for April, having been proposed for May. This session also comes exactly two weeks after Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/13/gabon-military-leader-brice-oligui-nguema-wins-presidential-election">won</a> the presidential election, by about 90 per cent of the vote. Following the 2023 coup, the country progressed with a transition roadmap, in which Gabon’s Council of Ministers, following the adoption by Gabon’s parliament of a new electoral code, set out the rules and conditions for organising elections in the country, which declared the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/23/gabon-heads-for-april-12-presidential-polls-in-bid-to-end-military-rule">presidential elections</a> to take place on 12 April 2025. In addition, the Gabonese voters approved a new constitution in November 2024. The proposed new constitution introduced changes, including the establishment of presidential term limits and the elimination of the prime minister’s position.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is to be recalled that following the mission it undertook to Gabon on 12 to 14 September 2024, the PSC held a session for considering the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1241.Field-Mission-Report-Gabon.pdf">Report</a> of the mission, which sought to legitimise the coup stating that ‘[t]he [Gabonese] interlocutors mentioned that the coup d’état of 30 August 2024, which they described as a ‘Liberation Coup’, was a peaceful coup with no bloodshed.’ The PSC failed to communicate the AU rule on non-eligibility of those who participated in the military seizure of power under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Instead, the communique of its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1241.comm_en-Consideration-of-the-Report-of-the-Field-Mission-to-Libreville-Gabon.pdf">1241<sup>st</sup></a> session that considered the report of the field mission requested ‘the AU Commission to engage the Transition Authority of Gabon to identify areas of support and provide the needed technical and financial support to Gabon&#8230;’ In addition to this, the Council also requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to use his good office to engage with the leader of the Transition Authority to mediate the differences with the former President to ensure a smooth and peaceful transition in the country.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a follow-up to the foregoing, the AU deployed an election observation mission to Gabon. Following the election, it also welcomed the outcome of the election and expressed a congratulatory message. Tomorrow’s session comes as the presidential victory of Nguema would mark the end of the political transition in the country. The purpose of the meeting is accordingly to determine that the conclusion of the election marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of the suspension of Gabon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fact that Gabon’s military-led transitional government agreed to a transitional timeline and respected the timeline is notable. This together with the conclusion of the election on and of itself does not indicate that Gabon is witnessing a new dawn of democracy. Even then, the fact remains that the PSC determined that a coup happened in Gabon and suspended Gabon from participation in the activities of the AU. The nature of the process followed for restoring constitutional order does not vitiate or render inapplicable Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Even if the PSC proceeds with deciding to lift the suspension of Gabon, as it seems to be prepared to do, in the light of the outcome of its field mission, it needs to address the question of the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This is critical not just from the perspective of PSC’s credibility in the face of its policy position of zero tolerance to unconstitutional changes of government, particularly coups. It is imperative for at least two strategic considerations. The first of this is the precedent that the election of someone who led a military seizure of power sets for those involved in military usurpation of power in the other five countries with respect to the applicability of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The second strategic consideration is the message that such leniency in the enforcement of Article 25(4) sends to all militaries on the continent. If those who seize power through military coup can be legitimised through election that the AU endorses, why should not militaries across the continent feel that the benefits of engaging in a coup outweighs its risks and costs?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It emerges from the foregoing that the question before the PSC during tomorrow’s session is not a simple question of whether the ‘successful’ conclusion of the elections in Gabon marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of Gabon’s suspension. The PSC also has to address the question of the implications of the election of Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president in the face of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. As outlined in a <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/can-aus-anti-coup-norm-survive-a-scenario-in-which-the-military-leaders-of-all-suspended-countries-run-for-elections-following-the-precedent-in-chad-and-gabon/">recent analysis</a>, this necessitates that the PSC engages in thoughtful reflection by putting the case of Gabon in the broader context of all the countries under suspension and the applicable AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The process followed thus far by the PSC and the AU in relation to the transitional process in Gabon suggests that the PSC is unlikely to consider as an option non-recognition of the outcomes of the elections that marked the end of the transitional period as representing restoration of constitutional order in Gabon. If the PSC consequently lifts the suspension of Gabon, what can and should the PSC do about the implications of this with respect to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance? First, it should be recognised that there is a breach of Article 25(4). Second, the PSC needs to state clearly that it does not condone the breach. Third and relatedly, it needs to affirm the validity of the AU rule under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Fourth, the PSC also requires to state that the breach of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in some cases does not mean to set a precedent that overturns the application of the rule under Article 25(4) in other cases. Fifth and finally, the PSC needs to express its commitment to this provision and its application in future cases.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will lift the suspension of Gabon from participating in AU activities. It remains unclear if the PSC would take account of and pronounce itself on the lack of compliance in the Gabon election process with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. At the very least, it can indicate that it stands by Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and it does not consider any deviation from this article as negating the applicability of this provision, hence the prohibition of coups and the exclusion of coup makers from benefiting from their engagement in prohibited acts. It is worth noting that there will be a press conference by the PSC Chairperson, the AU Commission Chairperson, Gabon and the Commissioner for PAPS. It is expected that they will commend Gabon for concluding the transitional process within the agreed timeline and call on others to follow the example of Gabon in having a time-bound transitional process for restoring constitutional order.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/review-of-the-political-transition-in-the-gabonese-republic/">Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on political transitions in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-political-transitions-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 May 2024 09:43:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Guinea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burkina Faso]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Niger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mali and Sahel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gabon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=18174</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>19 May 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-political-transitions-in-africa/">Briefing on political transitions in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-3"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on political transitions in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 19 May 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (20 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1211<sup>th</sup> session to receive updates on countries undergoing political transitions, including Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Gabon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session will commence with opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May 2024. This will be followed by a statement by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). As the concerned regional economic communities (RECs), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) may participate in the session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC met to discuss political transitions was on 21 December 2023, when it engaged Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso in an informal consultation. On 23 October 2023, the PSC also received updates on the situation in Gabon and Niger at its 1180<sup>th</sup> session. During that session, PSC members emphasized the need for informal consultations with the member states undergoing political transition, in line with the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance to support them in restoring constitutional order and identifying issues that require timely interventions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Reports indicate that the security situation in Burkina Faso worsened since the coup in 2022 with an upsurge of terrorist attacks and an increasing number of civilian casualties. Burkina Faso is facing the twin challenges of constitutional crisis induced by the coup and even more worryingly the spike in conflict involving terrorist groups. Despite the grave threat that the expansion of terrorist violence poses both to Burkina Faso and the region, it receives no meaningful AU support in its efforts to contain this menace. While it is understandable, much of the focus of the policy engagement of the AU on Burkina Faso has a singular focus on restoration of constitutional order. The lack of adequate attention to the terrorism dimension makes the engagement on restoration of constitutional order disconnected from the totality of the reality in Burkina Faso. The coup leaders had agreed on a 24-month transition period with the ECOWAS to restore constitutional order. With the end of this transitional timeline fast approaching, however, the country did not make any preparations to organize elections. It comes as no surprise that the transitional government appears to have prioritized its offensive operations against terrorist groups and decided in September 2023 to postpone the elections indefinitely.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Burkina Faso aligned itself with Mali and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States in October 2023. This is aimed at coordinating their efforts in the fight against the threat of terrorism in the region and defending themselves from any possible external intervention. It happened against the backdrop of an ECOWAS decision to intervene militarily in Niger following the July 2023 coup. Subsequently, the three countries notified ECOWAS of their decision to withdraw from the community. In its extraordinary summit in February, ECOWAS examined the political, security, socio-economic, and financial implications of this decision and instructed the ECOWAS Commission to engage the AU, UN, and other partners on the matter to convince the three member states to remain in the Community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Additionally, Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) joining Mali which withdrew earlier. In a joint statement they issued in December 2023, the remaining two other members, Chad and Mauritania, expressed their readiness to dissolve the G5 Sahel following the decision by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the group. According to the G5 Sahel founding document, the alliance can be dissolved at the request of at least three member states. These developments continue to unfold in the context of deepening geopolitical tussle between western powers that historically exerted enormous influence on the region and Russia that is emerging as a significant player as the military administrations reportedly wish to chart a more autonomous path. France and the US are scaling back their military presence in the region, while Russia is increasing military cooperation with the three countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In January, the Malian authorities ended the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The decision was made after Malian forces with the support of the Wagner group, a Russian security company renamed recently as Africa Corps after the death of its leader, took over major cities and towns in northern Mali at the end of last year from Tuareg separatist groups following MINUSMA’s departure. The decision also came amid heightened diplomatic tension with Algeria, which played an important role in facilitating the Algiers agreement. Following recent attacks by Malian forces on southern Mauritanian villages pursuing Tuareg armed groups, it appears that tensions are also rising between Mali and Mauritania.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Malian authorities replaced the peace agreement with a national dialogue to promote peace and reconciliation. The month-long dialogue process concluded on 10 May with recommendations including extending the transition period for three more years and allowing the leader of the transitional government, Colonel Assimi Goita, to run for elections. However, armed groups were not involved in the process and the Malian opposition parties and civil society groups boycotted it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mali was expected to hold elections in February in line with the agreement reached with ECOWAS but, in September 2023, the Malian authorities postponed the elections indefinitely. This is the second time they postponed the election after their first promise to hold an election in February 2022 prompting ECOWAS to impose sanctions on the country. In February 2024, ECOWAS decided to ease the sanctions signaling its willingness to engage with the Malian authorities. In June 2023, Mali adopted a new electoral law and conducted a referendum, but the Malian opposition and civil society expressed serious concerns about the lack of credibility of the process. In April, the military leaders suspended all political activities and clamped down on opposition figures, journalists, and human rights activists.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the July 2023 coup in Niger, the coup leaders had proposed a three-year transition period but did not provide further details. They did not also agree on a transitional arrangement with ECOWAS similar to the one Burkina Faso and Mali did. ECOWAS, which imposed sanctions on Niger and threatened to take military action, subsequently lifted the economic and financial sanctions imposed on Niger in February. In an admission of the inadequacy of an approach that singularly focused on the coups and explaining the need for lifting the sanctions on the three central Sahelian states, Nigeria’s President in his address to the ECOWAS summit that lifted the sanctions pointed out that ‘the complexities of the issues at hand necessitate a comprehensive and collaborative approach.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In its last meeting on the situation in Niger in October, the PSC expressed deep concern over the lack of a clear, practical, and time-bound timetable for the implementation of the transition period in Niger, particularly the holding of a national dialogue and elections to facilitate the swift return to constitutional order.  It also requested the AU Commission to appoint a High-Level Representative for Niger and deploy a high-level mission to Niger to determine the country’s needs for the return to constitutional order and assist the transitional Government in organizing national dialogue which the Nigerien authorities announced in July 2023. The AU Commission has as yet to act on this decision of the PSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Like Mali and Burkina Faso, Guinea’s coup leaders agreed to a 24-month transition period with ECOWAS. Based on this agreement, the country is expected to organize elections by the end of this year. However, Guinea has not made the necessary preparations to hold elections. In February, ECOWAS decided to lift the financial and economic sanctions imposed on Guinea. Nevertheless, the Guinean authorities suddenly dissolved the transitional government indicating their intention to postpone the elections until at least 2025. Guineans have been holding protests against the authorities, expressing frustration over the lack of progress in restoring constitutional order, and the main Guinean opposition coalition strongly opposed postponing the elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Gabon’s transitional authorities have now announced plans to hold elections in August 2025. They also convened an inclusive national dialogue in April which saw the participation of more than 600 people, including opposition and civil society representatives. The meeting reportedly concluded with several recommendations, including a two-year transition period, and a seven-year presidential term renewable once.  It seems, however, that the proposal to suspend political parties until the issuance of stricter political rules was controversial.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Subsequently, a new constitution is expected to be submitted for a referendum to pave the way for elections at the end of the transition period. During the last quarter of 2023, the transitional government’s leader, General Brice Nguema was on a regional tour that took him to several ECCAS member states to seek their support for lifting the suspensions imposed by ECCAS and the PSC. In his campaign for the lifting of suspension and a clear attempt to achieve a treatment similar to that of Chad’s, the General met with the leadership in Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, two of which are members of the PSC. In its ordinary summit held in Equatorial Guinea on 9 March, ECCAS decided to lift the suspensions imposed on Gabon and temporarily relocate the ECCAS headquarters to Malabo. The summit also instructed the President of the ECCAS Commission to undertake an advocacy mission to the AU and the UN to explain this decision.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm AU’s zero tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government and urge all member states currently undergoing political transitions to pave the way for quick restoration of constitutional order, including through the adoption and proper implementation of clear transition timetables. The PSC may urge Mali to lift the ban on political activities and end repression against human rights activists. It may express concern over the repeated postponement of elections by a number of countries undergoing political transitions and call on the transitional leaders to commit to the timely conduct of elections to enable handover of power to a legitimate civilian leadership elected by citizens. It may also reiterate its call for the AU Commission to develop tailored support programs for the countries in transition, in conjunction with the relevant RECs, to provide the necessary political and diplomatic accompaniment and technical support with respect to issues related to national reconciliation, governance, security sector reform (SSR) and other relevant areas. It may further call on the AU Commission to undertake an assessment of how the fight against terrorism and the accompanying insecurity in the central Sahelian countries affects efforts for making progress towards constitutional order and submit a report outlining how the effort for restoring constitutional order can be pursued along with provision of support by the AU together with ECOWAS for the fight against terrorism.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-political-transitions-in-africa/">Briefing on political transitions in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situations-in-niger-and-gabon-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Oct 2023 14:14:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Niger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gabon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=16727</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>22 October 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situations-in-niger-and-gabon-2/">Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-4"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 22 October 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1180<sup>th</sup> session to receive updates on developments in Niger and Gabon following the recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in the two countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements on Niger and Gabon respectively as the concerned Regional Economic Communities (RECs).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At its 1168<sup>th</sup> session held on 14 August, the PSC decided to suspend Niger from all activities of the AU, and its organs and institutions until effective restoration of constitutional order. At its 1172<sup>nd</sup> emergency session convened on 31 August, the PSC also adopted a similar decision with respect to Gabon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Over the past several weeks, the situation in these two countries evolved quite differently. In Niger, the tension that ensued between the military junta and ECOWAS following ECOWAS decisions slapping raft of sanctions on Niger and threatening military intervention for reinstating the ousted government of President Mohammed Bazoum has persisted. Mali and Burkina Faso, two other West African countries being ruled by military leaders, pledged to come to Niger’s aid in the event of a military intervention by ECOWAS.  Accordingly, the three countries signed what they called the Liptako-Gourma charter to forge a collective defense and mutual assistance pact. The charter was named after the border triangle between the three countries which has been the source of instability in the Sahel. The fate of G5 Sahel remains unclear in the face of this development. G5 Sahel has been “paralyzed” for quite some time following Mali’s decision to withdraw after it was blocked from assuming the rotating chairmanship of the group. The security situation appears to have worsened in all these three countries with a significant surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists recently.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the moment, it appears that the possibility of an ECOWAS military intervention has lost steam in the face of division within West Africa but also lack of wider African support as illustrated by the decision of the PSC declining the request of ECOWAS for receiving endorsement for its decisions including for undertaking military intervention for reinstating the deposed President. ECOWAS maintained that it is keeping all options open for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In this regard, it sent delegations to Niamey on several occasions to engage in talks with military leaders who later <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/20/niger-coup-leader-proposes-three-year-transition-to-civilian-rule">proposed a three-year transition of power</a> and appointed a civilian prime minister. Although there were media reports about proposed timelines by ECOWAS for the transition in Niger, the organization refuted these claims and insisted that the military leaders in Niamey should restore constitutional order immediately.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Algeria, which shares a long border with Niger, has offered its mediation to resolve the crisis in that country. It reportedly proposed a six-month transition period with the participation of all parties in Niger. This proposal envisages the establishment of a consensual civilian authority accepted by all sides of the Nigerian political class to lead the transition and pave the way for the restoration of constitutional order. The military leaders in Niamey reportedly accepted Algeria’s mediation but insisted that the timeline for the transition should be determined by Nigerians themselves. Although there were expectations for follow-up engagement in Niamey, Algeria reportedly suspended its initiative because of concerns over public pronouncements by the Nigerian military leaders which seems to have cast doubts about their willingness to accept the mediation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Nigerian military leaders had altercations with France, the former colonial power which maintains a military presence in Niger, making Niger a major hub for its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region following the ejection of French troops from Mali.  France came out strongly in support of the ECOWAS decision on Niger which led the military leaders in Niamey to demand that the country withdraw its forces from Niger. Although it initially resisted to heed the demand disputing the legitimacy of the military junta to make such decisions, France has already started withdrawal. The United States also maintains a military presence in Niger and has sent its acting deputy secretary of state Victoria Nuland to engage in talks with the military leaders in Niamey. The US had refrained from characterizing the situation as a coup d’état, but on 10 October the state department issued a statement concluding that a coup d’état took place in Niger. While this would lead to freezing of security and related assistance, the implication of this announcement on its military presence in Niger remains unclear. The country has already suspended its assistance to Niger but said that it will maintain life-saving humanitarian, food, and health assistance to the Nigerian people.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN General Assembly in New York saw high-level engagement on the Nigerian issue, including a meeting between several ECOWAS leaders and the US Secretary of State.  There has also been tension between the UN and the Nigerian military leaders who wanted to take part in the General Assembly but were excluded from attending the meeting. In response to this development, they have ordered the UN resident coordinator in Niamey to leave the country within 72 hours.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In Gabon, the situation appears to have unfolded differently. While the military junta seems disposed to diplomatic engagements and expressed their commitment to restore constitutional order, they have not as yet indicated any timeline for the transition period. This lack of commitment for timeline is not totally surprising. Given that the opposition presidential candidate performed well in the elections but the military coup interrupted the electoral processes to play itself out to its logical conclusion, it may not be in the interest of the military junta to proceed to elections in a short period of time. There is indeed a risk that if elections were to be held in a short term, the leading opposition candidate may win the election and this may not settle well with those that would like to sustain the status quo.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Gabonese military also released the deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba but his wife, under house arrest since the coup, has now been reportedly charged with money laundering, forgery, and falsification of records. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa Abou Abarry was allowed to meet with the military leaders and the deposed president. The new prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima attended a Security Council high-level meeting in New York on 20 September that discussed the situation in Ukraine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Gabon happened to be the chair of ECCAS, the REC for the central Africa region, when the coup took place in Libreville. ECCAS suspended Gabon from all activities of the organization but stopped short of imposing sanctions on the country. The regional leaders also decided to temporarily move the ECCAS Headquarters from Libreville to Malabo until the restoration of constitutional order. The president of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was the Vice-Chair of ECCAS, assumed the rotating chairmanship of the organization, and the president of the Central African Republic Faustin Touadera was appointed as ECCAS facilitator to engage with the Gabonese military leaders to restore constitutional order in that country. Subsequently, Touadera traveled to Libreville in a bid to carry out his mandate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, who is the leader of the Gabonese military government, has been on a regional tour, which took him to Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and recently the Democratic Republic of Congo (he is also expected to travel to Cameroon). He is doing so to request countries of the region to allow Gabon back to the regional fold and seek their support for the lifting of the suspensions imposed by the PSC. Past week, he also undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi where he met with the presidents of the two countries as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may recall its previous decisions on Niger and Gabon urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed upon transitional civilian authority and reiterate its stand in that respect. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts and in that vein, urge military leaders in both countries to engage with initiatives led by the relevant regional organisations as well as the AU towards charting a proper transitional process for the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may decide that a dedicated mechanism is established that follows on the decisions of the 1168<sup>th</sup> session and meets the requirements of the Lomé Declaration which requires that the AU Commission Chairperson deploy robust diplomatic efforts involving the establishment of engagement with the perpetrators and enlisting of the contribution African leaders and personalities. With respect to Gabon, the PSC may reinforce the decision it adopted during its 1172<sup>nd</sup> session by calling for transfer of power by the military junta to a transitional civilian authority representative of the various political and social forces in the country and requiring that the transitional authorities specify the timeline for restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the deployment of a high-level mission to Gabon specified under paragraph 8 of the communique of the 1172<sup>nd </sup>session which is along the lines of what is required in the Lomé Declaration.</p>
<p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situations-in-niger-and-gabon-2/">Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situations-in-niger-and-gabon/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 22 Oct 2023 06:55:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gabon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Niger]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=15997</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>22 October 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situations-in-niger-and-gabon/">Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-5"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 22 October 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1180<sup>th</sup> session to receive updates on developments in Niger and Gabon following the recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in the two countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements on Niger and Gabon respectively as the concerned Regional Economic Communities (RECs).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At its 1168<sup>th</sup> session held on 14 August, the PSC decided to suspend Niger from all activities of the AU, and its organs and institutions until effective restoration of constitutional order. At its 1172<sup>nd</sup> emergency session convened on 31 August, the PSC also adopted a similar decision with respect to Gabon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Over the past several weeks, the situation in these two countries evolved quite differently. In Niger, the tension that ensued between the military junta and ECOWAS following ECOWAS decisions slapping raft of sanctions on Niger and threatening military intervention for reinstating the ousted government of President Mohammed Bazoum has persisted. Mali and Burkina Faso, two other West African countries being ruled by military leaders, pledged to come to Niger’s aid in the event of a military intervention by ECOWAS.  Accordingly, the three countries signed what they called the Liptako-Gourma charter to forge a collective defense and mutual assistance pact. The charter was named after the border triangle between the three countries which has been the source of instability in the Sahel. The fate of G5 Sahel remains unclear in the face of this development. G5 Sahel has been “paralyzed” for quite some time following Mali’s decision to withdraw after it was blocked from assuming the rotating chairmanship of the group. The security situation appears to have worsened in all these three countries with a significant surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists recently.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the moment, it appears that the possibility of an ECOWAS military intervention has lost steam in the face of division within West Africa but also lack of wider African support as illustrated by the decision of the PSC declining the request of ECOWAS for receiving endorsement for its decisions including for undertaking military intervention for reinstating the deposed President. ECOWAS maintained that it is keeping all options open for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In this regard, it sent delegations to Niamey on several occasions to engage in talks with military leaders who later <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/20/niger-coup-leader-proposes-three-year-transition-to-civilian-rule">proposed a three-year transition of power</a> and appointed a civilian prime minister. Although there were media reports about proposed timelines by ECOWAS for the transition in Niger, the organization refuted these claims and insisted that the military leaders in Niamey should restore constitutional order immediately.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Algeria, which shares a long border with Niger, has offered its mediation to resolve the crisis in that country. It reportedly proposed a six-month transition period with the participation of all parties in Niger. This proposal envisages the establishment of a consensual civilian authority accepted by all sides of the Nigerian political class to lead the transition and pave the way for the restoration of constitutional order. The military leaders in Niamey reportedly accepted Algeria’s mediation but insisted that the timeline for the transition should be determined by Nigerians themselves. Although there were expectations for follow-up engagement in Niamey, Algeria reportedly suspended its initiative because of concerns over public pronouncements by the Nigerian military leaders which seems to have cast doubts about their willingness to accept the mediation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Nigerian military leaders had altercations with France, the former colonial power which maintains a military presence in Niger, making Niger a major hub for its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region following the ejection of French troops from Mali.  France came out strongly in support of the ECOWAS decision on Niger which led the military leaders in Niamey to demand that the country withdraw its forces from Niger. Although it initially resisted to heed the demand disputing the legitimacy of the military junta to make such decisions, France has already started withdrawal. The United States also maintains a military presence in Niger and has sent its acting deputy secretary of state Victoria Nuland to engage in talks with the military leaders in Niamey. The US had refrained from characterizing the situation as a coup d’état, but on 10 October the state department issued a statement concluding that a coup d’état took place in Niger. While this would lead to freezing of security and related assistance, the implication of this announcement on its military presence in Niger remains unclear. The country has already suspended its assistance to Niger but said that it will maintain life-saving humanitarian, food, and health assistance to the Nigerian people.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN General Assembly in New York saw high-level engagement on the Nigerian issue, including a meeting between several ECOWAS leaders and the US Secretary of State.  There has also been tension between the UN and the Nigerian military leaders who wanted to take part in the General Assembly but were excluded from attending the meeting. In response to this development, they have ordered the UN resident coordinator in Niamey to leave the country within 72 hours.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In Gabon, the situation appears to have unfolded differently. While the military junta seems disposed to diplomatic engagements and expressed their commitment to restore constitutional order, they have not as yet indicated any timeline for the transition period. This lack of commitment for timeline is not totally surprising. Given that the opposition presidential candidate performed well in the elections but the military coup interrupted the electoral processes to play itself out to its logical conclusion, it may not be in the interest of the military junta to proceed to elections in a short period of time. There is indeed a risk that if elections were to be held in a short term, the leading opposition candidate may win the election and this may not settle well with those that would like to sustain the status quo.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Gabonese military also released the deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba but his wife, under house arrest since the coup, has now been reportedly charged with money laundering, forgery, and falsification of records. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa Abou Abarry was allowed to meet with the military leaders and the deposed president. The new prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima attended a Security Council high-level meeting in New York on 20 September that discussed the situation in Ukraine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Gabon happened to be the chair of ECCAS, the REC for the central Africa region, when the coup took place in Libreville. ECCAS suspended Gabon from all activities of the organization but stopped short of imposing sanctions on the country. The regional leaders also decided to temporarily move the ECCAS Headquarters from Libreville to Malabo until the restoration of constitutional order. The president of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was the Vice-Chair of ECCAS, assumed the rotating chairmanship of the organization, and the president of the Central African Republic Faustin Touadera was appointed as ECCAS facilitator to engage with the Gabonese military leaders to restore constitutional order in that country. Subsequently, Touadera traveled to Libreville in a bid to carry out his mandate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, who is the leader of the Gabonese military government, has been on a regional tour, which took him to Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and recently the Democratic Republic of Congo (he is also expected to travel to Cameroon). He is doing so to request countries of the region to allow Gabon back to the regional fold and seek their support for the lifting of the suspensions imposed by the PSC. Past week, he also undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi where he met with the presidents of the two countries as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may recall its previous decisions on Niger and Gabon urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed upon transitional civilian authority and reiterate its stand in that respect. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts and in that vein, urge military leaders in both countries to engage with initiatives led by the relevant regional organisations as well as the AU towards charting a proper transitional process for the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may decide that a dedicated mechanism is established that follows on the decisions of the 1168<sup>th</sup> session and meets the requirements of the Lomé Declaration which requires that the AU Commission Chairperson deploy robust diplomatic efforts involving the establishment of engagement with the perpetrators and enlisting of the contribution African leaders and personalities. With respect to Gabon, the PSC may reinforce the decision it adopted during its 1172<sup>nd</sup> session by calling for transfer of power by the military junta to a transitional civilian authority representative of the various political and social forces in the country and requiring that the transitional authorities specify the timeline for restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the deployment of a high-level mission to Gabon specified under paragraph 8 of the communique of the 1172<sup>nd </sup>session which is along the lines of what is required in the Lomé Declaration.</p>
<p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situations-in-niger-and-gabon/">Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Emergency session on the situation in Gabon</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-session-on-the-situation-in-gabon/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Aug 2023 10:18:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gabon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=15749</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>31 August 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-session-on-the-situation-in-gabon/">Emergency session on the situation in Gabon</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-6"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Emergency session on the situation in Gabon </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 31 August 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Today (31 August) at 3 pm East African Time, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene an emergency meeting on the coup in Gabon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 30 August military officers appearing on national television announced the ouster of the government of the incumbent President Ali Bongo. The coup was announced soon after the announcement of the results of the general elections that Gabon held on 26 August. In the early hours of 30 August, the Gabonese Election Centre (CGE) announced the results of the presidential elections, declaring that the incumbent Ali Bongo the winner of the Presidential Election with 64.27 % of the votes cast.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The processes leading up to the announcement of the results were clouded with uncertainties, disputations and concerns about the transparency and credibility of the elections. While the leader of the opposition coalition Albert Ondo Ossa claimed victory in the elections, in the days ahead of the announcement of the election the opposition camp reported that the election was a ‘fraud orchestrated by Ali Bongo and his supporters’. This allegation came after the imposition of a curfew and the shutting down of the internet in the country by the government, thereby raising concerns that these measures were taken to create conditions for tampering with the election results.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The elections were indeed held under circumstances that cast doubt on the possibility of ensuring the credibility and transparency of the elections in a manner that reflects the will of the electorate. Election observers, including AU observers, were not welcomed. Some media outlets were suspended. The government also cut internet service and imposed a night-time curfew nationwide after the poll.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is against this background that the military officers announced the seizure of power.  Explaining their action, the senior military officers, self-styled as the ‘Committee of the Transition and the Restoration of Institutions, who seized power said that ‘[i]n the name of the Gabonese people … we have decided to defend the peace by putting an end to the current regime.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some members of the government were also arrested including the son of the president, Noureddine Bongo Valentin, the chief advisor of the president and his deputy, two other presidential advisors and two top officials of the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG). The military also put the ousted president under house arrest. Following the coup, the internet was restored. Yet, the coup makers maintained the nightly curfew imposed in place.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the same day, the coup makers named General Brice Oligui Ngueme as the leader of the transition. General Ngueme, as head of the President’s Republican Guard, is not someone who is an outsider but very much internal to the regime. This signifies that while the coup removed the leader, the regime remains intact and in power.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As with other recent situations in countries that experienced coups, the ouster of Bongo was also greeted with celebrations from people. While the coup ushers in the end of a government that was in power for decades and opens a possibility for change, it does not provide a politically legitimate avenue for addressing the irregularities associated with the elections. In this respect, it would be of interest for the PSC to address the disputed elections including the convening of inclusive consultations with the opposition presidential candidates and the political parties for developing a roadmap for the convening of free and fair elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU Commission Chairperson issued a statement on the same day. Indicating that the chairperson was following the situation with great concern, the statement expressed his strong condemnation of ‘the attempted coup d’état’. He also encouraged ‘all political, civil and military actors in Gabon to give priority to peaceful political avenues and a rapid return to democratic constitutional order in the country.’ Similarly, the Secretary-General of the UN also firmly condemned ‘the ongoing coup attempt’ and expressed his ‘strong opposition to military coups.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC will make a determination on the application of Article 30 of the Constitutive Act within the framework of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol. In light of the electoral crisis that preceded the coup, one of the issues for the PSC is how to facilitate a process that leads to not only the convening of free and credible elections, but also the building of fully functioning constitutional rule in Gabon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may welcome the statement of the Chairperson of the Commission and express its condemnation of the coup pursuant to the AU norms banning coups including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The PSC may also decide to suspend Gabon from participation in the AU activities in accordance with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act and ACDEG. The PSC may express its concern about the recurrence of the holding of elections of questionable legitimacy and credibility and the need for African States to ensure that they create the space and mechanisms for ensuring that elections are held in accordance with the parameters set in ACDEG. With specific reference to the situation in Gabon, the PSC may call for the convening of consultation with the opposition political parties and presidential candidates to agree on a roadmap for the transition and the convening of free and fair elections. The PSC may also call for the removal of the military from politics and the establishment of an inclusive civilian transitional authority. It may also request in this respect that an AU high-level facilitator be designated with the responsibility of facilitating dedicated engagement for ensuring an inclusive civilian transition. The PSC may finally call for respect to ACDEG and respect for the rights of citizens including leaders and members of the opposition.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/emergency-session-on-the-situation-in-gabon/">Emergency session on the situation in Gabon</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 620th MEETING</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-620th-meeting/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Sep 2016 10:25:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[GABON]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2016]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gabon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=2630</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>2 SEPTEMBER 2016 </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-620th-meeting/">PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 620th MEETING</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/620th-gabon-2-sept-2016.pdf">https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/620th-gabon-2-sept-2016.pdf</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-620th-meeting/">PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 620th MEETING</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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