Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The candidacy of former Senegalese President Macky Sall for the top United Nations (UN) job has unleashed enormous controversy both in his homeland and at continental level since Burundi, the 2026 Chairperson of the African Union (AU), submitted his name as a candidate to the UN on 2 March 2026.

This issue almost plunged Africa and the AU into a major diplomatic and institutional crisis.

In a development that raised serious questions about the scope of discretion of the Chairperson of the AU and the Bureau and after reports claiming AU support for Sall’s candidacy were exposed, At the behest of Burundi in its capacity as AU Chairperson, the Bureau of the AU Assembly (made up of Burundi, Ghana, Tanzania and Angola, minus a North African representative yet to be agreed by the region) convened on 26 March 2026 to consider the proposal for endorsement of the candidacy of Sall through a silent procedure outside of AU’s established process for on candidatures. At the bureau meeting, two out of four members of the Bureau, including Burundi, reportedly supported the motion. One member reportedly did not participate. The lack of objection meant that Burundi’s motion to table a draft decision of endorsement for AU member states carried the day.

As a follow-up to the Bureau meeting and under the direction of Burundi’s President as AU Chairperson, the AU Commission sent out a letter on the same day, 26 March, addressed to AU Member States carrying a draft decision for endorsing Sall’s candidacy. The letter, referencing Rule 19(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly on decision-making by consensus or by two-thirds majority, presented the draft decision for adoption through a silent procedure. The letter offered no explanation as to why the established process of considering candidatures through the Ministerial Committee on African Candidatures within the International System on the basis of the AU Executive Council decision EX.CL/213(VIII) was circumvented. Neither was there any compelling reason for displacing the role of the Ministerial Committee nor any consultation that established that AU member states are disposed to support Sall’s candidature and outside of the regular process.  Additionally, in an unprecedented departure from established practice, the letter gave AU member states only 24 hours to communicate their views. Also unprecedentedly, it set a threshold of one-third of member states to breaking the silence for the draft decision to be considered as not adopted.

By the close of business on Friday, 27 March, 20 AU member states, representing more than the unprecedently high threshold of 1/3^rd majority, broke the silence. The total number of countries that broke the silence increased to 21 after receipt of a communication from Tunisia apparently after close of business on the same day. As a result, the AU Commission stated, in a letter dated 27 March, that the draft decision ‘on UN Secretary General candidacy of H.E. Macky Sall…has not been adopted.’ The fact that more than 1/3^rd of AU members broke the silence within the very tight (less than) 24hrs time limit highlighted the resolve of AU member states to avert the institutional crisis the situation posed.

‘Gross breach of AU rules’ and ‘jettisoning of …established practice’ of regional rotation 

Both substantive and procedural irregularities led to this outcome. First and substantively, the draft decision would have led to the flouting of the AU’s rules and regular processes on the endorsement of African candidatures in the international system. Not surprisingly, member states that broke the silence, including South Africa, thus observed that ‘the established rules…for submission of States Candidacies appear to have been bypassed.’ This outcome also reflected concerns about the lack of transparency and due process, which are guaranteed under the AU Ministerial Committee on Candidatures. Thus, for Nigeria, as stated in its letter responding to the AU Commission letter of 26 March, the proposal to present Sall as an AU consensus candidate came ‘as a surprise as the candidate is being fielded for such a coveted position…without subjecting it to the scrutiny of the Ministerial Committee of the African Union.’ Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs went further and stated that ‘a direct rush to a 24-hour “silence procedure”, through which the AU Chairperson would wish to force a 2/3 “silent” majority endorsing his solo and irregular decision, without any attempt to seek an open discussion and a consensus on the African candidate for the position of UNSG, is also a gross breach of AU rules and regulations.’

Second, and procedure-wise, unless the plan was to constrain member states, there was no justification for limiting the timeline for the silence procedure to 24 hours rather than the established standard of at least 48 to 72 hours. Burundi’s Permanent Representative publicly acknowledged that the AU Legal Counsel and the Secretariat objected to the 24-hour timeline. Yet their objection was apparently overruled despite there being no compelling reason for not heeding the opinion of the Legal Counsel and the AU Commission, who are duty-bound to defend and ensure respect for established AU rules and processes. Additionally, as pointed out in the letter by South Africa, ‘the standard practice is that silence procedure is broken if one or more members raise an objection within the designated timeline.’ South Africa’s letter thus held that the requirement that silence can only be broken by one-third of the majority ‘is not standard practice within the international system.’

Third, there is an established, albeit legally non-binding, informal rule and practice of regional rotation that allows alteration of the position of the Secretary-General to candidates from various regional groups of the world. According to this rule and practice, the turn for taking the position of the Secretary-General is for a candidate from the Latin America and Caribbean group. As pointed out in Nigeria’s response, ‘…Africa considers the Caribbean as the sixth region of the continent. By jettisoning this established practice (of regional rotation), the Federal Republic of Nigeria believes the African Union is putting its position and interest in jeopardy now and in the future.’

It is worth noting that the 21 March Declaration of the summit of Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC), with whom Africa held the first joint high-level forum co-chaired by Burundi and Colombia on the same day committing to strengthen ties between the two regions, affirmed that ‘the time has come for a national of Latin America and the Caribbean to assume the responsibility of holding the position of Secretary- General of the United Nations, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical balance and diversity in the leadership of the Organization.’ Under the circumstances, let alone endorsement by AU member states Sall’s candidacy on its own undermines the spirit of the CELAC-Africa high-level forum and South-South cooperation as well as the principle of regional rotation. This is never in the interest of Africa, as it will be the turn of the Africa group for the next round of the election of the Secretary-General.

A win for Africa and AU’s institutional stability

The outcome rejecting the proposed endorsement by AU of Sall’s candidacy is a major win for Africa’s diplomacy and AU’s established rules and processes. It prevented the emergence of an unjustifiable precedent that would have scuttled established AU rules and processes on the consideration and endorsement of candidates for leadership positions within the UN and the international system writ large.

Through this decision, AU member states saved from collapse the most important diplomatic device that was in place since the time of the Organisation of African Unity and served Africa well in putting Africans in leadership roles within the international system, including such important UN agencies as WTO, WHO, ILO and UNESCO.

Equally important is the rejection of the draft decision that saved Africa from breaching the informal rule of regional rotation, hence from undermining its own ‘current and future’ interests.

No –the silence of the rest of the AU members is not a signifier of support for Sall

Despite the collapse of the proposal for AU endorsement and Africa’s interests at stake, Sall’s candidacy and campaign continue to be imbued with misinformation and deceitful propaganda. Indeed, Sall’s campaign is doubling down on the claim of having wide support from AU member states, arguing that only a minority of countries registered their objection. Yet, the claim that ‘the silence’ of those who did not respond to the silence procedure is a signifier of wide support for Sall could not be far from the truth. First, even Senegal, from where Sall hails, distanced itself from his candidacy. Second, if Sall was confident about the support from this ‘silent’ majority, he would have subjected his candidacy to the scrutiny of the AU Ministerial Committee.

Despite the fact that the planning for his candidacy started in 2025 and he had the possibility of even having his candidacy considered during the AU summit in February 2026, he did not opt for it. There was no other reason for opting for an irregular and rules upending route for securing AU support other than Sall’s fear that he would not succeed in securing the support of the so-called ‘silent’ majority that his supporters claim he continues to enjoy even after the rejection of his endorsement by the AU.

Honourable path – Withdrawal of Sall’s candidacy

These dynamics, together with the candidacy’s ethically questionable practices involving both misinformation and the bending or circumventing of AU rules and established multilateral practice of particular interest for Africa warrant the reconsideration of the continuation of the candidacy. As chairperson of the AU and the country that sponsored the candidacy, Burundi has a responsibility to take a lead in this regard for reaffirming respect for established AU rules and the practice of regional rotation. In view of all the foregoing and the fact that the next round in the regional rotation for the position of the Secretary-General is for Africa, it is incumbent on Burundi, as Chairperson of the AU, to reconsider its stance and press on Sall that the most honourable path is to withdraw his candidacy. Burundi supported him to the point of leveraging its role as Chairperson. And it stumbled but not irredeemably. By reconsidering Sall’s candidacy, it can restore the erosion of its credibility as AU Chairperson and safeguard Africa’s collective interests, including the multilateral norm of regional rotation.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Ahead of the 1 April 2026, when the states elected during the 39^th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly, including Somalia, which was elected for the first time, assume their seats in the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU is holding the induction of newly elected and returning members of the PSC in the Kingdom of Eswatini, starting today, 30 March 2026. In view of the expansion and entrenching of conflicts and crises on the continent and the need for a more effective role for the AU, a pressing issue for the newly constituted PSC is how to shift from the failing business-as-usual approach to its work and make itself fit for the peace and security needs of the continent in a time of major global shifts.

As extensively documented in, among others, the review of the PSC for 2025, the PSC did not garner a meaningful level of influence in either limiting the dynamics of conflicts on its agenda or in shaping peace processes relating to those conflict situations. As a result, the PSC and the AU are ignored or otherwise displaced. Such is the case in Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel and the DRC. For example, the six sessions that the PSC held on Sudan were of no consequence either in avoiding the de facto partition of Sudan or in contributing to the emergence of a credible civilian process that the AU is meant to lead on. Even in terms of the mechanisms it decided to institute, neither the mechanisms for investigating external interference in Sudan nor the presidential committee came into operation. In DRC, AU’s role in advancing peace got displaced, with the Luanda process giving way to the Washington DC and Doha processes.  

The declining effectiveness of the PSC mirrors a broader erosion of political commitment to continental collective security. It is also importantly a product of PSC’s work, becoming more performative than consequential, at times its engagement dominated by thematic issues and often no effective action on specific conflict situations. Poor agenda setting and the reduction of PSC activities into a routine ritual-like processes are among the factors that account for this state of affairs in which the dire conflict situations are not approached with the urgency and seriousness they deserve.

Making the PSC fit for purpose and relevant to the peace and security situation of the continent requires changing these conditions. The agenda setting of the PSC and the policy deliberation of the PSC should prioritise and deploy the limited diplomatic institutional resources exclusively for addressing existing conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones. The PSC should thus have as a standing agenda on the most critical conflict situations, such as Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel, DRC and Somalia at least, on a quarterly if not on a monthly basis, during which the AU Commission presents reports for adapting AU engagement to the rhythm and needs of the conflict dynamics.

In the interest of optimising its very finite resources and ensuring sustained engagement on addressing these priority conflict situations with resolve and impact, the PSC should also adopt a moratorium on having thematic issues on its agenda.

Further to the foregoing, the PSC should also use its sessions for substantive deliberations rather than the ritualistic process of making formulaic statements, issuing communiques and meeting again to repeat the same cycle. It is necessary for the PSC to review its working methods on its decision-making process for making it results-oriented rather than the current focus on output, involving the adoption of a communique for every meeting. Not every PSC meeting has to result in the adoption of a communique, but it provides a platform for building consensus and negotiating on actionable decisions, deliberating on advancing implementation and undertaking strategic review. It is also necessary that PSC members focus on negotiating and adopting actionable decisions as opposed to the declaratory ones that dominate outcomes of PSC deliberations. To this end, they should negotiate on the actionable decisions required to respond to new developments, either in the conflict situation or in the peace process relating to that conflict situation. They should also use such negotiation sessions for clarifying on the financial and institutional implications of such decisions as well as on the modalities of implementation and clear assignment of responsibility for implementation and timelines for reporting back on follow-up and implementation.

Additionally, the effectiveness of the PSC is also affected by the willingness and ability of its members to shoulder the responsibilities of PSC membership as set out in Article 5, particularly its sub-paragraph 2. The current approach to PSC membership that puts a premium on rotation to the detriment of Article 5(2) criteria is undermining the effectiveness of the Council. It has limited the PSC’s normative and political weight, creating an enormous gulf between PSC decisions and their effective follow-through.

A criteria-based approach is essential to the PSC’s credibility, ensuring members demonstrate commitment, diplomatic capacity, and adherence to AU norms, preventing deliberations from becoming mere symbolism. Eroded standards have also diminished peer accountability, fostering weak enforcement, selective engagement, and inconsistent follow-through, much like past consensus-driven arrangements lacking commitment. Restoring effectiveness demands recommitment to criteria-based membership rooted in political credibility, capacity, and norm respect, bolstering authority and collective responsibility.

Not any less important for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is the need to align its current posture and practice with the statement of commitment it adopted during its solemn launching in 2004. Of significance in this respect is the commitment that ‘we shall ensure that the authority vested in the Peace and Security Council is fairly and proactively exercised.’ (emphasis added) The lack of alignment in recent times between the practice of the PSC and this commitment is one of the factors for the erosion of the credibility of the PSC. This has manifested itself not only in inconsistent application of AU policies and norms, such as in relation to unconstitutional changes of government, but also in the lack of fairness in the attention given in dealing with various conflict situations.

The PSC should also be proactive in its engagement with key peace and security events on the continent. This entails that the PSC operates as the first to speak on African peace and security issues and to ensure that it occupies the space for holding a leadership role. These (speaking first and holding the policy space) are necessary both for setting the agenda and exercising agency in peace and security decision-making on the continent.

All of the foregoing, however, requires the recommitment of PSC member states to the values and principles of the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. It also requires reestablishing the primacy of collective responsibility and solidarity over individual national interest in setting the program of work of the PSC and steering the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Council. Not any less important is the need for exercising a higher sense of responsibility both on the part of member states and the AU Commission, such as through making the requisite preparations for PSC sessions, upholding and ensuring respect for AU norms and principles and respecting decisions of the PSC, including in the timely submission of reports or updates.

Abdul Mohammed

I write this with a heavy heart, but also with deep gratitude for a life that gave so much to the cause of peace, justice, and human dignity.

Nicholas “Fink” Haysom was not just another senior United Nations diplomat. He belonged to a fading breed — those who approached diplomacy and peacemaking not as a profession, but as a vocation. For him, diplomacy was not about position or protocol; it was about purpose, conviction, and an enduring commitment to humanity.

He was shaped in the crucible of the anti-apartheid struggle — a defining historical experience that produced a generation of leaders who understood injustice intimately and resisted it with both moral clarity and political discipline. From that struggle, Fink carried forward a rare combination: a principled legal mind, grounded in public service, and a political sensibility anchored in justice.

I first encountered Fink during the negotiations of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement. From the outset, I found myself under his wing. His style was neither loud nor imposing. He did not dominate the room; he stabilized it. He did not rush to solutions; he cultivated them patiently, with care and respect for complexity.

What distinguished him most was his discipline of listening.

Fink listened not as a formality, but as a moral act. He understood that conflicts are not merely technical problems to be solved, but historical and human realities to be understood. He gave conflict — and those shaped by it — the respect it deserved. He was meticulous in defining the problem before attempting to resolve it, a quality that is increasingly rare in today’s fast-paced and often superficial diplomatic engagements.

I later had the privilege of working closely with him again when he succeeded Haile Menkerios as the United Nations envoy during the final and most delicate phase of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. This was a moment without precedent in Africa — a negotiated separation of two states. The stakes were immense, the tensions acute, and the risks of failure catastrophic.

In that moment, Fink’s experience and judgment proved invaluable.

He played a supportive role not only in the negotiations themselves but also in managing the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. Under his stewardship, cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council reached a level of alignment and effectiveness that remains a benchmark in multilateral peacemaking.

He enjoyed the trust of President Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. Their relationship — forged in the shared experience of the anti-apartheid struggle — brought both political depth and personal trust to a process that required both in equal measure.

Fink was, in every sense, a diplomat’s diplomat.

But more than that, he was what I would call a people’s negotiator.

He was accessible, persuasive, and deeply grounded in the political realities of the conflicts he engaged with. He was never confined by the narrow boundaries of job descriptions. He worked tirelessly. He made time to listen. He was consistently — and quietly — the adult in the room.

In today’s landscape of mediation and diplomacy, there is a discernible deficit of such qualities.

Much of contemporary diplomacy has become procedural, transactional, and at times detached from the human realities it seeks to address. Even where technical competence exists, it is often not accompanied by the deeper attributes that defined Fink — care, moral seriousness, intellectual discipline, and a genuine commitment to the human consequences of conflict.

Fink was not an elitist negotiator. He did not practice diplomacy from a distance. His approach was people-centered. He remained constantly aware that behind every negotiation were lives at stake — communities disrupted, futures uncertain, and human dignity in peril.

He ensured that all parties remained mindful of the consequences of failure. Not through grandstanding, but through quiet, persistent reminder of what war does to people and societies.

Beyond the negotiating table, I recall with great fondness the many conversations we shared — political, reflective, and often filled with humor. There was laughter, even in the most demanding circumstances. There was ease without loss of seriousness.

Those of us who worked with him did not only grow professionally; we became better human beings.

Fink had a way of addressing those he held in regard: he would call you “comrade.”

In his usage, this was not a casual term. It was not merely a friendly gesture. It carried weight. It signified a shared commitment — to justice, to fairness, and to the collective struggle for a better world. It reflected a relationship grounded not just in familiarity, but in shared purpose.

In this, he embodied what we, as Africans, understand as Ubuntu — the idea that our humanity is bound up with one another.

He often spoke with admiration of President Mbeki’s “I Am an African” speech. And indeed, though South African by birth, Fink was, in the truest sense, a quintessential African diplomat and statesman.

As his friend in struggle observed, His life traced a seamless arc — from the struggle against apartheid, to service in democratic South Africa, to global peacemaking through the United Nations. There was no rupture, no loss of moral center. The values that defined him in struggle remained intact in power.

“This continuity is what made him rare.”

In a world where proximity to power often alters individuals, Fink remained anchored. He reminds us that leadership is not about office, but about the consistency of values across time and circumstance.

His passing invites not only reflection, but also introspection.

It compels us to ask whether the current generation of diplomats and mediators is equipped — not only technically, but morally — to meet the demands of our time. It challenges us to recover a diplomacy that is grounded in humanity, not merely in process; in substance, not only in form.

Fink did not simply practice diplomacy.

He dignified it.

His legacy will endure — in the peace processes he helped advance, in the institutions he strengthened, and in the lives he touched.

But more importantly, it endures as a standard.

A standard of what diplomacy can be at its best.

Farewell, Comrade.

May Allah grant him eternal peace, and may we find the courage to carry forward the work to which he devoted his life.

J. Kayode Fayemi *
Visiting Professor, King’s College, London, UK | Former Governor, Ekiti State, Nigeria | Former Minister of Mines & Minerals Resources Development, Nigeria

 

It is both a privilege and an urgent necessity that we gather here, under the auspices of ACCORD, to speak plainly about a relationship that has shaped our continent for centuries — and that is, right now, at a genuine inflection point.

The post-Cold War settlement — in which Africa was largely a recipient of rules written elsewhere — is visibly dismantling. A new geopolitical architecture is being assembled, and the question before us is whether Africa will help design it or merely inherit it.

Let me be direct: we have been here before. We have gathered in elegant rooms and produced eloquent communiqués. And then the world moved on, and Africa remained in the same structural position. So, the burden of this moment is not just analysis — it is commitment to action that changes the terms of engagement.

Understanding the Turning Point

Three convergent forces are reshaping the global order in ways that create genuine leverage for Africa — if we choose to use it.

First, the return of strategic competition. The West — Europe and North America — no longer operates in a unipolar comfort zone. China’s rise, Russia’s revisionism, the assertiveness of the Global South: these have reminded Western capitals that Africa’s 54 nations, 1.4 billion people, and disproportionate share of the world’s minerals are not a charity case but a strategic asset. That shift in perception matters. It means Africa now has suitors, not just donors.

Second, the resource reality. The green energy transition has placed Africa at the centre of the global economy in ways the extractive economy of the 20th century never did. Cobalt, lithium, manganese, coltan, copper — the raw materials of the clean energy future are largely concentrated on this continent. Having already surrendered the oil century with little to show for it, Africa must not repeat that mistake with the minerals of the 21st century. At least now we know that the world cannot go green without first going African!

Third — and perhaps most consequentially — is Africa’s demographic weight. By 2050, one in four people on Earth will be African. The continent’s working-age population will exceed that of China and India combined. In an ageing world, Africa is the growth engine. That is not rhetoric. That is arithmetic. And it changes the negotiating calculus entirely, particularly as it concerns the migration discourse — if we build the institutions to leverage it and retool the young ones for the inevitable change.

The Honest Reckoning: What the West Has Gotten Wrong

Let me speak about the Western side of this relationship — not to lecture, but because an honest reset requires honest diagnosis.

For too long, Africa-Europe/West relations have been organised around a paternalistic logic: development aid as generosity, conditionalities as wisdom, and African instability as a justification for continued tutelage. The frameworks have been built in Washington, Brussels, and London — and Africa has been expected to comply rather than co-design.

The trade architecture has been particularly damaging. Africa exports raw materials and imports finished goods. We are rewarded for poverty and penalised for aspiration. Every African government that has tried to add value to its own resources — to process its own ore, to refine its own oil, to manufacture its own goods — has faced trade barriers, financial headwinds, or political pressure.

The debt architecture has compounded this. African governments are charged risk premiums that bear no rational relationship to actual default rates. The cost of capital for infrastructure in Africa is three to four times what comparable projects cost in Europe. This is not a market outcome — it is a structural imposition that keeps Africa in a permanent state of fiscal vulnerability.

I want to be fair: there are genuine partners in Europe who understand this and want a different relationship. And many steps initiatives hint at a re-ordered relationship. Only last November, the EU – Africa Summit held in Luanda, Angola and Europe reaffirmed its commitment to Africa as a strategic partner. Before then, EU has come up with many strategies and plans – the Global Gateway Strategy, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (on serious concerns regarding the adverse impacts of this policy on Africa discussed during the AU-EU summit check here and here), the Critical Raw Materials Act and the various National Action Plans, to name a few. Indeed, speaking a few days ago at the annual conference of EU ambassadors in Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed that Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order and opined that radical changes are inevitable. But good intentions within a flawed architecture produce flawed outcomes. That is why structural reform, not incremental goodwill, must be the goal of any serious reset.

Africa’s Non-Negotiables

As we approach any new bargain, Africa must be clear about what is non-negotiable. Let me name five out of the many that came out of our reflection yesterday.

The first is value addition and beneficiation. Africa should no longer accept arrangements in which our resources leave our shores as raw commodities and return to us as expensive imports. Any new partnership framework must be anchored on industrialisation, local processing, and technology transfer. Our own Global Gateway must now recognise the place of an African Minerals Consortium, primarily modeled on the global south hydrocarbons consortium – OPEC and preserving the rights of mineral endowed countries to harness their endowments for inclusive growth, fair pricing negotiations, unlocking investment in exploration, promoting local community participation and supply security on a fair and equitable basis.  This is not anti-Western sentiment — it is basic economic logic that the West itself applied during its own development.

The second is sovereign debt restructuring and a fair cost of capital. The current credit rating system penalises African countries in ways that are empirically unjustified. Africa is not capital starved; Africa is capital trapped. On illicit financial flows alone, over $88 billion was trapped in 2024. And yet, when the Africa Group at the UN took the Mbeki report on illicit financial flows and capital flight to the United Nations in pursuit of the global tax reform agenda, it was European countries alongside the United States that opposed the reform of the global financial architecture. We need a fundamental reform of the Bretton Woods credit architecture, new mechanisms for development finance, and an end to the punishing premiums that make it cheaper to borrow in Paris than in Lagos.

The third is genuine technology partnership. Artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and the platform economy are already reshaping global productivity. Africa cannot be a passive consumer of technology built elsewhere and governed by rules written without us. We must replace the extractive capitalism masquerading as untrammelled artificial intelligence with data sovereignty, capacity for digital industrialisation, and a voice in the governance frameworks that will define the next technological epoch.

The fourth revolves around labour migration. True, Africa as a continent is experiencing a significant shift in migration flows, both within our continent and towards Europe. Evidently, well managed migration holds a substantial positive impact both for countries of origin as well as significant benefits to destination countries, and more importantly for global stability and security. EU and the African Union need an honest conversation and a coordinated plan on population flows and labour dynamics considering the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the world.

The fifth — and most foundational — is the right to determine our own development pathways. Africa is not asking to be left alone. We are asking to be treated as equals in designing the frameworks that govern our participation in the global economy. Development conditionalities that make aid contingent on policy choices Africa has not made must give way to genuine partnership in which African institutions lead African solutions, one that is focused on domestic resource mobilisation and not overseas development assistance.

What Africa Must Change

I would be less than honest if I placed all the responsibility on Europe and the West. Our reflection yesterday also looked inward.

The truth is that Africa’s negotiating weakness is partly self-inflicted. We arrive at global tables divided, speaking in fifty-four competing voices, making it easy for partners to play us against each other. The African Continental Free Trade Area is an extraordinary achievement on paper — but its implementation is still slow, and intra-African trade remains embarrassingly low as a share of our total trade. We cannot demand to be treated as a bloc if we do not act as one.

Our institutional capacity for strategic economic negotiation is inadequate. The European Union arrives at trade talks with battalions of economists, lawyers, and technical experts. Many African delegations are outgunned before negotiations begin. Building that institutional depth — the analytical capacity, the negotiating expertise, the legal architecture — is not optional. It is the precondition for sovereign agency.

And we must address governance. Weak rule of law, and institutional fragility are not just moral failings — they are economic costs that our people bear and that undermine our credibility at the negotiating table. The new bargain with the West is inseparable from the new bargain we must strike with our own citizens.

The Architecture of a New Bargain

What would a genuinely new bargain look like in practice?

On trade, it means a fundamental renegotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements — moving from market access frameworks that entrench Africa’s commodity dependence to industrial partnership agreements that incentivise manufacturing, value addition, and skills transfer. Europe should welcome African processed goods, not just raw materials. Europe should reform lopsided partnership agreements such as the ones signed by many coastal states that deplete our oceans, marine life, and community livelihoods, compounding the migration crisis. Europe should accept reforms to global tax rules. That is the test of genuine partnership.

On finance, it means a reformed development finance architecture in which African-led institutions like the African Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank have greater capitalisation and mandate, in which sovereign debt carries risk-adjusted pricing that reflects reality rather than perception, and in which climate finance arrives as grants and concessional lending — not additional debt for countries that contributed least to the problem.

On security, it means an end to arrangements in which African countries pay for security cooperation with political compliance. Security partnerships must be transparent, mutually accountable, and consistent with African sovereignty and the decisions of the African Union.

On governance of the global commons — AI, digital infrastructure, climate rules, pandemic response — it means Africa having a genuine seat at the design table, not just the implementation table. The G20, the IMF, the WTO: all of these must be reformed to reflect the actual weight of the Global South in the 21st century world and Europe must support reforms to the UN Security Council to ensure greater African representation. Our European friends must also eschew the notion that only European values are central to defining new partnerships. We must also acknowledge that Europe has interests, and it’s important to understand and engage these.

And on restoration of dignity, Europe must acknowledge historical atrocities against the African continent and agree on reparations – including the return of looted African assets and artifacts and genuine rebates on African diaspora remittances.

From Dialogue to Compact

Mama Graca, we joyfully celebrated your 80^th birthday last night. In your lifetime, you have seen Africa at its most oppressed and at its most liberated. You have seen what is possible when Africans refuse to accept the terms handed to them and insist on writing their own. That spirit — the spirit of agency over victimhood, of bargaining from strength rather than dependency — is what this moment demands.

Let me close with this: the turning point we face is not a gift from the changing global order. Turning points only become transformations when they are seized. They need not just the right analysis but the right institutions, the right leadership, and the right collective will.

Africa has the resources. Africa has the population. Africa has — at long last — the geopolitical leverage and the critical mineral advantage. What we need now is the strategic coherence to convert that leverage into a new bargain: one in which partnership replaces patronage, co-creation replaces conditionality, and African agency is not a talking point but a lived reality.

The generation watching us right now — the 400 million young Africans who will enter the labour market in the next decade — cannot afford for us to produce another beautiful document that changes nothing. They are watching. Let us make this turning point count.

 

* Address delivered during the high-level dialogue of African leaders organised by ACCORD and hosted by Graça Machel, Chairperson of the Board of ACCORD held on 13-14 March at Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The news of Former Senegalese President, Macky Sall’s nomination as a candidate for the position of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General came as a surprise for many. One of the notable aspects of the nomination relates to the confusion on whether Sall received the support of the continental body, the African Union (AU). On 4 March 2026, one media report stated ‘[N]ow the official candidate of the African Union in a race to succeed António Guterres as UN Secretary-General, Macky Sall is currently in Paris, where he is expected to meet with the French president.’

Rather than the merit of Sall’s candidature (which is worthy of interrogation as a matter of public interest), the issue that this media report raises is the factual question of whether Sall’s candidacy was processed through the AU’s established mechanism regarding the nomination of nationals of African states as candidates for positions on international bodies. It is thus necessary to address two questions: How is Sall nominated? What are the established processes for AU endorsement of such a nomination?

It was through a letter of the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the UN in New York, dated 2 March 2026, addressed to the Presidents of the UN General Assembly and the March 2026 President of the UN Security Council, that Sall was nominated as a candidate for the UN’s top job. In the most relevant part, the letter states, ‘…my government, current Chair of the African Union, nominates His Excellency Macky Sall, former President of the Republic of Senegal, for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations.’ What this makes clear is that Sall, who is a Senegalese, is a nominee of the Government of Burundi, which happened to be the Chairperson of the AU Assembly for 2026.

It is clear from the letter that the Government of Burundi did not submit Sall’s nomination in its capacity as Chairperson of the AU. It is, however, clear that Sall made a ‘smart’ move in approaching Burundi, rather than any other country, including his own Senegal. What is significant about Burundi as the country nominating him is its current role at the AU, which undoubtedly Sall sought to leverage.

Considering the strategic importance of candidatures for positions in international organisations, both for member states and in advancing Africa’s agency, the AU has established a process and mechanism for nomination for such positions. The process ordinarily entails the submission of the nomination by the nominating member states of the AU through a Note Verbale addressed to the AU Commission. After review of the submissions within the regional groups, usually through the Permanent Representatives Committee, to avoid fragmentation through competitive bidding from several candidates from the continent, the list is submitted for further consideration to the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System, a standing subsidiary body of the Executive Council of the AU. Then, the list is presented by the Committee to the Executive Council for endorsement or for noting, as the case may be.

This is the Committee that processed the endorsement of many of the African nationals leading various international bodies, such as the WTO and the WHO. The most recent of such nominations that the Committee endorsed, which led to a successful election for the position of Director-General of UNESCO, was the candidacy of Dr Khaled El-Enany, a known Egyptologist and former Minister of Antiquities of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This Ministerial Committee presented its report during the 39^th AU Assembly, when Burundi assumed the role of chairing the AU, to the 48^th ordinary session of the Executive Council. The report contains a list of candidatures of individuals submitted by governments for endorsement, including, for example, for the post of Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for the period of 2027-2032 or for noting which is the case, for example, for the post of Director General of FAO. Conspicuously absent from the Ministerial Committee’s report list is the name of Macky Sall for the most important of post in the international system.

Not only is his name absent from the report of the Ministerial Committee, but Sall also made no attempt to have his name considered during the AU Assembly, which took place only two weeks before the submission of his name as a candidate to the UN. He was even spotted during the summit. The proximity of the time between the 39^th ordinary session of the AU Assembly and his nomination as a candidate (two weeks) raises important questions of both process and transparency around his candidacy.

Does not the approach he took undermine AU’s established process? Doesn’t it show contempt for following a process? Is such contempt also reflective of a trend on the part of Sall, who plunged Senegal into a constitutional crisis in attempting to circumvent the constitutional process ahead of Senegal’s last election? Or why seek nomination by a government, which happened to be the Chair of the AU, if not interested in following the AU process, unless the intention is to leverage the status of AU Chairperson for his candidacy?

There are reasons why processes exist and why AU’s process on candidatures for positions in international bodies matter. First, it is to provide equal opportunity for all who may seek leadership positions in international bodies. Second, such a process also provides member states of the AU the opportunity to exercise their sovereign prerogative and satisfy themselves that the best candidate receives the endorsement of the wider membership. Third, it also ensures transparency. Sall’s approach to his candidacy flies in the face of all of these important public policy reasons for the process. It unnecessarily risks creating confusion and, as a news report noted, division in the AU.

This process should apply to everyone. It applied to many statespersons previously. Sall cannot and should not be the exception, irrespective of his view of himself or the support he may have from his friends or states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, such as France, as a news report indicated.

Contrary to what Sall would like many to believe and the news report referenced above, there is no basis, even from the letter nominating him, that suggests that Sall is an official candidate of the AU. After reporting that Sall’s candidacy sparks division in the AU, the same news entity qualified him as an official candidate of the AU, while there is no official AU endorsement of Sall’s candidacy. It should be stated plainly and clearly that such a categorical report represents misinformation. The hard truth is that Macky Sall is not an official candidate of the AU!

Désiré Assogbavi

Advisor at the Open Society Foundations

Across Africa, what once appeared as isolated crises are now merging into a broader continental conflict belt stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, through Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and increasingly toward parts of coastal West Africa.

These conflicts are complex and interconnected (see here). Violent extremism, unconstitutional changes of government, transnational crime, communal tensions, and intensifying geopolitical competition are combining to reshape the continent’s security landscape, representing the ‘crystalisation of new era of insecurity’.

A Peace Architecture Designed for Another Era

Over the past two decades, the African Union has built one of the most ambitious regional security frameworks in the world, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), anchored on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), AU’s premier standing peace and security decision-making body. APSA is made up of the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund and represented the most significant step towards the realization of the longstanding quest for Pax-Africana.  Yet today’s crises look very different from those of the early 2000s.

Conflicts are now more transnational, and more intertwined with economic and environmental pressures. Security responses alone cannot address conflicts whose roots lie in governance failures, demographic pressure, economic fragility, and climate stress. It is now long overdue that the tools that are deployed for addressing twenty‑first century crises fully embrace and systematically integrate the full range of governance, institution building and development instruments as envisaged in both the PSC Protocol and the Solemn African Common Position on Defense and Security.

The decision by African leaders to convene an Extraordinary Summit on Conflicts later this year in Luanda therefore represents a critical opportunity, not just to discuss ongoing wars, but to rethink how Africa organizes and pursues its collective security.

The Structural Drivers of African Conflicts

Africa’s conflicts cannot be understood purely through a military or security lens.

Governance deficits remain central. Weak institutions, contested political transitions, and declining public trust in the state create fertile ground for instability. Youth marginalization is also reshaping political dynamics. Africa is the youngest region in the world, with roughly 60 percent of its population under the age of 25.

Economic fragility and rising debt pressures reduce governments’ capacity to invest in social stability. At the same time, climate pressures are intensifying competition over land, water, and natural resources in fragile regions.

Taken together, these drivers show that peacebuilding must link governance, development, and economic transformation. They also signify the necessity of sustained high-level collective push for the reform of international financial system.

Critical Minerals, Strategic Competition, and Conflict Risks

Another structural factor that deserves far greater attention is the growing connection between critical minerals and conflict dynamics in Africa. The global energy transition has sharply increased demand for minerals such as cobalt, lithium, manganese, graphite, rare earths, and platinum group metals, many of which are concentrated in African countries.

This surge in demand is turning parts of Africa into frontlines of global geo-strategic competition. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and parts of the Sahel, mineral-rich regions are increasingly exposed to armed group activity, illicit trade networks, and external geopolitical interests seeking to secure supply chains. Without strong governance frameworks, the race for these resources’ risks reinforcing patterns long associated with the ‘resource curse,’ where wealth beneath the soil fuels instability rather than prosperity.

Illicit mineral trafficking already finances armed groups in several conflict zones. In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, control of mining sites and smuggling routes continues to sustain armed movements, inter-state tensions and criminal networks. Similar risks are emerging in other regions where weak state presence, corruption, and fragile institutions intersect with rapidly rising mineral demand. For this reason, the upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Luanda should also examine the security implications of Africa’s critical mineral boom. If managed strategically, these resources could help finance development, industrialization, and economic transformation across the continent. But if governance remains weak, the global scramble for minerals could deepen local grievances, empower armed actors, and intensify geopolitical rivalry on African soil.

The challenge therefore is not simply about resource extraction. It is about building governance systems that prevent mineral wealth from becoming a driver of conflict. This includes strengthening transparency, ensuring local communities benefit from resource revenues, securing mining areas from armed exploitation, and promoting regional cooperation against illicit mineral trafficking.

In this sense, the debate on peace and security cannot be separated from Africa’s broader economic transformation agenda. How Africa governs its critical minerals may become one of the defining security questions of the next decade.

Africa in the Middle of Global Power Competition

Africa’s conflicts are increasingly shaped by external geopolitical dynamics (See here). Global powers are expanding their presence across the continent as security partners, investors, or strategic competitors.

The question is not whether Africa should work with international partners. The real question is who sets the strategic direction. Africa must remain firmly in the driver’s seat of its own conflict resolution processes.

The Need to Redefine Unconstitutional Change of Government & Adopt an effective Sanction Regime

Since 2020, Africa has experienced several military coups, concentrated largely in the Sahel. The African Union’s primary response, suspension from AU activities, has not been sufficient to deter unconstitutional changes of government.

Africa therefore needs a stronger and more credible sanctions regime including against coup administrations that return to power through self-organized elections.

Today, democracy in Africa is threatened not only by soldiers entering presidential palaces, but also by leaders quietly rewriting the rules of the game. This happens through manipulation of constitutions and the gradual capture of democratic institutions. In several countries, constitutional amendments have been used to remove or weaken presidential term limits, allowing incumbents to prolong their stay in power while maintaining the appearance of legal legitimacy. Electoral processes themselves are sometimes undermined through the politicization of electoral commissions, the misuse of state resources, or restrictions on opposition and civil society. In this context, defending constitutional order must go beyond reacting to military coups alone. The African Union and our regional economic communities must also address what could be described as ‘constitutional coups’, situations in which the letter of the law is manipulated to undermine its democratic spirit. Protecting constitutional governance therefore requires stronger norms, more credible political pressure, and a renewed commitment to democratic accountability across the continent.

Preventing Conflicts Before They Explode

Preventive diplomacy remains one of the most underutilized instruments within the African Union system (see here and here). Strengthening the political authority and operational capacity of the AU Commission (as extensively outlined in the final part of African Union floating adrift) could significantly improve the continent’s ability to prevent crises before they escalate.

Making the Extraordinary Summit Matter

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Angola represents an important moment. But its success will depend on whether it avoids the trap of business as usual. Communities living in conflict‑affected areas, women peacebuilders, youth networks, civil society organizations, and traditional mediation structures must be included in the conversation. Across Africa, local communities possess rich traditions of mediation and reconciliation that should be integrated into continental peace strategies.

In closing

Peace and security are no longer standalone policy domains. They are deeply connected to governance legitimacy, economic resilience, and geopolitical shifts.

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit offers an opportunity to rethink how Africa organizes its collective security and rebuilds strategic agency in a fragmented world.

Africa does not need incremental adjustments. It needs bold thinking, institutional renewal, and political leadership capable of confronting the new realities of instability on the continent.

Ambassador Tareq AlBanai,

Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations in New York

Co-Chair of the IGN

 

The question before us is not new. For decades, Member States have recognized that the composition of the Security Council no longer fully reflects contemporary geopolitical realities or the expectations of the wider membership. Yet what has changed in recent years—and particularly during the current phase of the Intergovernmental Negotiations—is the emergence of more structured and concrete approaches to reform.

A particularly important turning point occurred during the 77th Session of the General Assembly, when the IGN process—under the co-chairmanship of Kuwait and Austria—introduced, for the first time, a structured discussion of reform models. This development marked a significant evolution in the process. For many years, the debate had largely remained at the level of principles: discussions about representation, legitimacy, and effectiveness. While these principles remain vital, the introduction of models shifted the conversation from the conceptual to the concrete.

This transformation has allowed Member States to engage with reform in a far more substantive manner. Instead of speaking in generalities, delegations have increasingly begun to articulate specific institutional designs and operational arrangements for a reformed Council. As a result, positions have become clearer, and the debate has gained the level of precision that any meaningful negotiation requires.

Across the IGN, we now have a set of concrete proposals on the table—from the G4, L.69, CARICOM, the Uniting for Consensus group, Liechtenstein and Mexico—that differ along clear fault lines. One is composition: some models call for expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership, while others reject new permanent seats and instead support the expansion of elected seats only, including longer-term, renewable seats to improve continuity. Another is the question of the veto: approaches range from extending the prerogatives of the P5 to any new permanent members, to non-extension and various forms of veto restraint and transparency, including stronger accountability and transparency around veto use.

These proposals collectively represent an important step forward. They demonstrate that Member States are increasingly willing to engage in structured thinking about the architecture of a reformed Council. At the same time, we look forward to the long-anticipated African model, which I was pleased to hear was endorsed by the C-10 Heads of State and Government last month.

The model will be a critical contribution to the ongoing discussion, given Africa’s longstanding and legitimate call for enhanced representation within the Security Council. In parallel, the broader political momentum for reform has also been reinforced by the Pact for the Future, which explicitly mandates the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations to work toward the development of a consolidated model. This mandate reflects a growing recognition among Member States that the process must gradually move from the presentation of multiple proposals toward identifying areas of convergence.

However, we must also acknowledge the reality of the negotiations as they stand today. At this stage, we are not yet in a position where the wider membership can rally behind a single model. The fundamental division between those advocating for an expansion of the permanent category and those favoring an expansion limited to non-permanent seats remains deeply entrenched.

This polarization has been one of the central obstacles to progress in the reform debate. It is precisely within this context that the idea of fixed regional seats has emerged as a possible bridge between these two positions. The concept is relatively straightforward but potentially transformative. Under this approach, the Security Council would be expanded by approximately six to seven additional seats, allocated on a regional basis. These seats would be fixed to specific regions, ensuring that the major regional groupings of the United Nations receive more equitable representation within the Council. Importantly, these seats would not be permanently assigned to specific states. Instead, they would be elected through the General Assembly, ensuring that the selection process remains democratic and consistent with the broader membership’s role in shaping the Council. States occupying these seats would serve longer, renewable terms, and could be reelected up to two additional times. This structure would provide greater continuity and institutional memory within the Council while still preserving accountability to the wider membership.

In terms of privileges, these seats would carry the same prerogatives of the P5, including the veto. While this aspect of the proposal may generate debate, its purpose is to address the structural imbalance between different categories of membership while avoiding the creation of new permanently entrenched seats.

In many ways, this approach seeks to bring the Council closer to the principle of sovereign equality of states, which remains a foundational principle of the United Nations. While no reform model can perfectly realize this principle, fixed regional seats offer perhaps the closest approximation within the institutional framework of the Council.

To ensure both effectiveness and accountability, the model would also include a review clause, allowing Member States to periodically assess how the new structure is functioning and whether adjustments may be deemed necessary.

Finally, careful attention must be paid to the overall size of the Council. Any expansion should avoid creating a body that becomes too large to operate effectively. For this reason, this proposal envisions a Council of no more than approximately 22 members, balancing the need for broader representation with the imperative of maintaining operational efficiency.

In closing, the reform of the Security Council remains one of the most complex negotiations within the United Nations. Yet the developments we have witnessed in recent sessions—particularly the move toward structured models—suggest that the conversation is gradually entering a more mature and constructive phase. However, if we are to translate this momentum into real progress, we will need greater flexibility and a stronger willingness to explore bridging options. Too often, entrenched positions—held as absolutes rather than starting points for negotiation—have kept us locked in familiar debates instead of moving us toward workable compromise.

Our collective task now is to build on this momentum, identify areas of convergence, and continue working toward a reform that strengthens both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Security Council.

Dr Wafula Okumu, Executive Director, The Borders Institute

The recent military escalation in the Middle East, initiated by a joint US-Israeli strike on Iran and followed by Tehran’s regional retaliation, has presented the international community with a profound crisis. For the African Union (AU), however, this is more than a distant geopolitical tremor. First, as an instance of what the Solemn Declaration on the Common African and Defence Security Policy (CADSP) calls ‘international conflicts and crises with adverse effects on African regional security’, this constitutes what the Policy calls common external threats. Second, it is a direct and uncomfortable test of AU’s identity as a principled actor committed to speaking in defence of the UN Charter on the world stage. The AU’s bifurcated response through the statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission—a vaguely worded initial statement on the invasion followed by a sharp condemnation of Iran’s reaction—has ignited a difficult but necessary debate: is the Union a consistent defender of international law, or is it succumbing to the very practice of ‘selective Charterism’ it has long criticized in others?

At stake is the AU’s most significant asset: its normative power. The Union’s mandate, enshrined in its Constitutive Act, is not merely to observe global events but to actively ‘promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’, ‘defend African common positions on issues of interest,’ and ‘establish necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role’ in global affairs. Global instability, whether in Eastern Europe or the Middle East, directly impacts African economies, maritime security, and food systems. These are conditions explicitly identified as ‘external threats’ by the CADSP. Silence is not a viable option. The question, therefore, is not whether the AU should speak, but whether it speaks with the disciplined legal consistency that its own history, recent experience, and principles demand.

An unsettling silence on the primary breach

The joint US-Israeli invasion of Iran, which reportedly included the assassination of its Supreme Leader, represents a grave challenge to the post-1945 international order. The foundational pillar of this order is Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which unequivocally prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This prohibition is the bedrock of peaceful coexistence.

The only clear exception to this rule, absent a UN Security Council authorisation, is the inherent right to self-defence under Article 51. However, this right is not a license for discretionary warfare. The threshold for its invocation, particularly in an anticipatory sense, is exceptionally high, requiring a demonstrably imminent armed attack. As Professor Marc Weller, Director of Chatham House’s International Law Programme, has affirmed, the doctrine of self-defence does not permit a ‘preventative war’ launched to neutralise a potential, long-term threat. It is a measure of last resort, constrained by the principles of necessity and proportionality.

The justifications offered for the invasion have yet to meet this stringent legal standard. Vague assertions of an ‘existential threat’ or a desire to ‘obliterate’ Iran’s military potential fall short of the evidence required to legitimise such a profound breach of another state’s sovereignty. This is the critical context in which the AU’s first statement, issued on February 28, 2026, must be judged. The statement expressed ‘deep concern,’ called for ‘restraint and urgent de-escalation,’ and urged all parties to act ‘in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter.’

While well-intentioned, this language was critically deficient. It failed to name the initial act as a violation of Article 2(4). It failed to question whether the high bar of Article 51 had been met. By adopting a posture of neutrality between an aggressor and a victim of that aggression, the AU’s statement inadvertently weakened the very legal norms it purported to uphold. It created a false equivalence, treating the violation of sovereignty and the subsequent reaction as morally and legally indistinct parts of an ‘escalation.’

A tale of two statements: The glaring inconsistency

The AU’s reticence was thrown into stark relief by its second statement, issued shortly after Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against the territories of several Gulf states. Here, the language was anything but vague. The statement held that the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, ‘strongly condemns’ Iran’s actions, defining them as a ‘clear violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and expressing ‘full solidarity with the governments and peoples of the affected states.’

This is where the charge of unjustifiable legal inconsistency becomes undeniable. The AU correctly identified Iran’s retaliation as a violation of sovereignty. Yet it failed to apply the same legal standard to the precedent-setting invasion that provoked it. This selective application of principle is precisely what Africa has long decried when powerful global actors have used international law as an à la carte menu to justify their interests.

The contradiction is made more acute when contrasted with the AU’s own robust defence of sovereignty within Africa. Just weeks prior, at its annual summit, the AU fiercely condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, reaffirming its ‘unwavering support for the Federal Republic of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ This principled stand was a powerful reaffirmation of the AU’s core tenets. How, then, can the Union so resolutely defend Somalia’s sovereignty from a diplomatic action while remaining circumspect about the violation of Iran’s sovereignty through military force?

This dissonance strikes at the heart of the AU Constitutive Act. Article 4 is unambiguous in its commitment to principles such as ‘sovereign equality,’ ‘respect of borders,’ the ‘prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States,’ and ‘non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.’ While these principles apply to intra-African relations, the AU’s moral and political authority depends on championing them universally. When the Union fails to do so, it not only undermines its credibility abroad but also risks eroding the normative consensus that underpins peace and security in Africa.

Reclaiming normative authority

This critique is not a call for the AU to take sides in a complex geopolitical conflict. It is a call for the Union to side with the law. During the recent AU summit, the AU Assembly agreed to a proposal on the elaboration of a common foreign policy to help the continent manage with principled consistency the challenges from the changing global context (see here). The only way the AU can stand a chance of becoming an effective foreign policy actor on the global stage is if its actions are firmly grounded in the rules of international law and in a consistent defence of the UN Charter. A more credible and influential AU position would not have been pro-Iran or anti-West; it would have been unequivocally pro-rule-of-law. Such a stance would involve three clear steps:

1. Explicitly reaffirm Article 2(4): The starting point for any statement must be the clear and unambiguous reaffirmation of the prohibition on the use of force as the cornerstone of international law.
2. Scrutinise claims of self-defence: The AU should publicly and consistently insist that any claim to self-defence under Article 51 be rigorously scrutinised against the high standards of necessity, proportionality, and imminence.
3. Condemn all violations consistently: The AU must apply the same legal and moral standard to all breaches of sovereignty, regardless of the actor. Condemning Iran’s retaliation is legitimate, but it is legally and morally incoherent without a prior, and equally strong, condemnation of the initial invasion.

Africa’s voice on the global stage matters now more than ever. As the world fragments and great power competition intensifies, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the non-use of force are the primary shields for less powerful states. The AU has a historic opportunity and a profound responsibility to be the world’s leading champion of these norms. To do so, it must avoid the trap of political expediency and embrace the disciplined legal consistency that is the true source of its authority. The choice is not whether to speak, but whether to speak with a clear, principled, and unwavering voice.

In terms of timing, today’s discussions are both propitious and challenging! We have a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that must save itself from paralysis in the face of complex conflicts. Hence, the compelling need to expedite action in ongoing negotiations to reform it.

In this, the role of ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, that is Non-State Actors and citizens of the world, would be crucial. I would therefore like to commend Amani Africa for creating this platform which enables us to cross-fertilize ideas as practitioners in government and non-governmental spaces.

As the UN Secretary-General has repeatedly warned, including during the 80^th Session of the General Assembly, the reform of the Security Council is no longer optional; it is urgent. The global order is changing faster than our institutions are adapting. Africa has been at the forefront of this reform movement.

Africa remains the only region that has articulated a unified institutional framework for the Security Council reform. For decades, our continent has insisted on a more representative Council, as articulated in the African Common Position, The Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration which unveiled Africa’s demand for fair representation which is at least two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for African States in a reformed Security Council. Africa’s position has not changed. This is not a mere aspiration but a prescription for justice.

On the Continent our ongoing focus is driven by the following approaches:

1. Right to development;
2. Building of strong and capable States;
3. Peace and reconciliation as basis for viable African society;
4. Primacy of politics, including a greater role for Women and Youth in governance;
5. Peace enforcement not mere peacekeeping; and
6. SMART partnerships (Inclusive of African Regional Actors).

Against this background, we seek in our common African position to be a strong united, resilient and influential global player and partner. On the global scene we hope to work with partners to:

1. Promote global identity and representation in rich diversity;
2. Global shared values;
3. Global platforms for experience and good practice sharing; and
4. Global peace and development as shared public goods.

It is important to recall that at the UN Summit of the Future, African leaders campaigned successfully to include Africa’s issues as a top priority (See here). The resulting Pact explicitly frames reforming the Council as a task of justice.

This support must translate into text-based negotiations. Text must translate into amendment, and amendment must translate into ratification. The intergovernmental negotiations process cannot remain an annual ritual of repetition.

These are not yet breakthroughs but they are not stagnation either. The momentum must be seized and turned into progress.

How do we sustain the momentum when global politics are so polarized?

We must be honest about the nature of this process. The Security Council Reform is not stalled because the arguments are weak. It is stalled because power is entrenched. The Charter amendment requires ratification by the Permanent Members, giving each of them decisive influence over the outcome. Support for the reform would seem to exist in principle while remaining limited in practice. Intermediate proposals that exclude veto equality or permanent status, continue to circulate in diplomatic discussions. Such proposals risk institutionalizing a hierarchy in which Africa is permanently represented but never equal. This is incompatible with the Common African Position.

Critical Questions we must answer:

• Is the current and apparent consensus that reforms are necessary real?
• Are reforms a matter of justice/global peace enhancement or mere procedure in a political chess game.
• Are the reforms a matter of when, how and to what effect, or a ritual of inconsequential efforts.
• Are we moving on the track of negotiated reform in the context of sober peace time or drifting towards reform on the back of devastating war like happened after WW2?
• Are We the People’s taken along, differently from 1945?

Recommendations:

To keep the Security Council Reform at the top of the global agenda, we must pursue at least four lines of efforts:

• Reinvigorate the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) process with the AU Model:

The IGN process has produced areas of convergence that can serve as a foundation for text-based negotiations. The African Model on the UNSC Reform, our unified proposal of 2 permanent (with equal rights) and 5 non-permanent seats for Africa, has been endorsed by all 55 AU Member States. It was formally tabled in the UNGA’s negotiations. The Pact itself calls for such a consolidated model to guide talks. As negotiations continue, let us reiterate the moral logic that without Africa’s inclusion, there can be no truly legitimate Council. Africa’s unity under C10 negotiating leadership, remains key in maintaining coherence, and this leadership must continue. Our think tanks and other non-state actors would need to align and support.

• Expand the coalition of support:

Africa cannot do this alone. We must sustain outreach to key partners and regional groups. Africa’s position is one among several competing reform frameworks including the G4 proposal, the Uniting for Consensus model, incremental expansion models, and intermediate membership proposals. These competing visions divide support among UN Member States and slow convergence. Africa must therefore focus not only on defending principles but on building a winning coalition. This should include intra and intercontinental platforms for advocacy and sharing ideas like the one AMANI provides.

Leadership of the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government in negotiations must be supported based on the African common position which necessarily includes no discussion at this time of who the two Members would be. We will cross the bridge when we get there.

• Leverage UN informal mechanisms.

While negotiations continue, we need to also keep an eye on low hanging fruits especially addressing Security Council Working Methods through membership of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group of Friends. This should contribute to the nature and quality of anticipated and substantive reform.

• Emphasize urgency and fairness.

In all our messages, we must highlight that reform is not a luxury but a necessity. We will remind colleagues that peace operations now often rely on African troops and that sustainable security solutions increasingly come from African initiatives. If the Council fails to evolve, it risks losing credibility in Africa and beyond. As the UN’s High-Level Advisory Panel warned, without meaningful reform, the Security Council risks irrelevance. Consequentially, the very survival of multilateralism and global peace would be unpredictably and dangerously compromised.

Geopolitical volatility makes reform harder, but also more compelling. If the multilateral system does not evolve, fragmentation will be deepened. Parallel coalitions and alternative governance structures will proliferate. Reform, therefore, is not only about justice for Africa. It is about preserving the relevance of the United Nations itself and global peace.  Inclusive and constructive dialogue with a sense of urgency, is the way to go.

El-Ghassim Wane

Africa today faces not simply a difficult moment, but a structural turning point. The issue is not whether the world is becoming more unstable and messy — it clearly is. The real question is: What does a disorderly world mean for African security?

My core argument is straightforward: The erosion of the global order is transforming Pan-Africanism from a political aspiration into a security imperative.

Let me start with few remarks on the changing global environment and why this matters specifically for Africa.

Many of the trends now worrying the world are not new to Africans and to the Global South more broadly. For decades, stakeholders in the Global South warned about selective application of international law, unilateral action, and power politics.

For Africa, this carries a host of consequences.

First, frequent violations of international law and the increasing use of coercion, including force, in pursuit of national interests affect all states, but weaker states are affected more severely. African countries depend disproportionately on rules because they lack comparable hard power. When rules weaken, their vulnerability increases.

Second, while the current multilateral system is imperfect and unbalanced — and was designed with very little African input — it has nonetheless provided some clear advantages: coalition-building, forums to address global challenges, mediation frameworks, peacekeeping operations. As multilateralism weakens, Africa loses diplomatic leverage to advance its interests and conflict-management tools simultaneously.

Third, declining external support is not just a development issue. It is a security issue. Peace operations, DDR programmes, elections support, humanitarian assistance and even state administration in some fragile states have depended heavily on external financing.

Fourth, with heightened geopolitical competition inside Africa, the continent’s conflicts are becoming increasingly internationalized (see also here). External actors increasingly shape battlefield dynamics, while African institutions struggle to influence outcomes.

Clearly, Africa is entering a period in which it is more exposed to instability while simultaneously losing the external mechanisms that had so far contributed to manage instability. In other words, the trends described earlier do not merely create a more dangerous world — they remove the external pillars that helped African mechanisms function.

It is important here to keep in mind that Africa’s conflict management system was designed as part of a cooperative international security framework — one only needs to look at the provisions of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, especially those concerning its relationship with the United Nations and other international partners. That framework is now less predictable, less available and, in some cases, internally divided.

This raises an important question: Can African institutions maintain stability if external stabilisers become inconsistent or absent? That is the crossroads Africa is now approaching — not a philosophical choice about Pan-Africanism, but a practical challenge of collective security.

Pan-Africanism has often been treated as history, memory, or political sentiment. Today it is becoming a functional necessity. In many ways, this vindicates Kwame Nkrumah. In the early 1960s, he argued that unity was not primarily ideological — it was a condition for sovereignty in an unequal international system.

Howard French, the author of the book Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World, 1471 to the Second World War and of the more recent book The Second Emancipation: Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, and Global Blackness at High Tide, captures this well. He writes: ‘With no one in the world serving up favors to the continent, Nkrumah’s insight about the gains to be had through federation is as salient as ever. What is lacking is sufficient action. The time has come for a continent cut loose in the world to take the next step.’

And this is precisely the issue. At the very moment when the international environment is becoming more hostile, African states are not acting with the level of collective cohesion that the situation requires. And more broadly, we see a weakening reflex of continental solidarity.

The result is predictable: fragmented bargaining power, unequal deals, and diminished leverage (see also here). In peace and security, this situation also complicates the search for lasting solutions that require engagement within a coherent continental framework.

Against this backdrop, what collective security actually requires in practice?

The starting point is simple: unity is no longer an emotional or rhetorical ideal. It is strategic necessity. It determines the continent’s negotiating power, its ability to manage conflicts, and ultimately its political survival in a more competitive international environment.

So what does that mean concretely for African countries?

First, it entails deepening our collective investment in the institutions we have created. Our leaders cannot be more present at summits with external partners than at AU meetings. That sends a message — to others and to ourselves. As Désiré Assogbavi recently remarked, ‘As the world order shifts, summits in foreign capitals make the continent look like a guest at its own table.’

Second, it means cooperating fully with African conflict-management institutions. Africa already has one of the most elaborate peace and security architectures in the world: norms, institutions and expertise exist. The PSC Protocol is explicit — Member States are expected to support and cooperate with African efforts to resolve conflicts. This does not mean excluding external partners. Our crises are connected to global dynamics. But external support must reinforce African leadership, not replace it.

Third, it means honoring a commitment our leaders themselves made at the launch of the Peace and Security Council in May 2004: No African conflict should be ‘out of bounds’ for the AU, and when grave abuses occur ‘Africa should be the first to speak and the first to act.’ If we do not act when crises unfold on the continent, we should not be surprised when others step in.

Fourth, collective security does not mean isolation. It requires close partnership with the United Nations and other international stakeholders. Already in 1990, Salim Ahmed Salim, then OAU Secretary-General, argued that while Africa must strengthen its ‘inner strength’, it should continue to prioritize the UN as the principal multilateral forum through which it defends its interests internationally. That remains true today. Africa should be at the forefront of efforts to reinforce the UN and make it more fit for purpose.

Finally, collective security is also a question of responsibility. Everyone in the AU ecosystem — governments, institutions, and officials — must recognize the seriousness of the moment. Africa is entering a more demanding international environment. Routine approaches will not suffice (see here). This period requires commitment, discipline and steadfastness.

How, then, do we operationalize this ambition? What role should the AU Commission play in moving it forward ?

Stronger political commitment will clearly be required. At present, the level of collective resolve does not fully match the demands of the moment. This is a reality we must acknowledge.

But paradoxically, this makes the role of the AU Commission — which is not only an administrative body (the Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and several other instruments are clear in this respect) — more important, not less. Political will does not simply appear. It has to be generated, encouraged, nurtured.

In periods of geopolitical transition, tensions among Member States and inward-looking approaches as countries focus primarily on their domestic challenges, institutions matter more than ever. The Commission must act as the engine of collective action. It must engage proactively, build coalitions around sensitive issues, and create the conditions in which states feel both empowered and compelled to act.

To conclude, the world is becoming more dangerous and less structured. For Africa, the consequence is clear: external stabilizers are weakening at a time of rising internal vulnerabilities. Therefore, the question before us is not ideological. It is whether African states will face insecurity individually or manage it collectively.

Pan-Africanism, in this context, is about survival and agency. Africa can either become an arena where global competition plays out or an organized actor capable of shaping its own security environment. The decisions taken in the period ahead will determine which of the two it becomes.