On Tuesday (9 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its  1352^nd meeting to receive an update on the ‘Situation in Libya’. Since its last meeting in July 2025, the country has witnessed some political and security developments.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for May, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Libya, Ambassador Wahida Ayari, will also brief the Council. As a concerned country, Libya’s representative is expected to make a statement. As per the usual practice of the PSC, Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), is also expected to deliver a statement. A representative of Congo may also make a statement as Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya.

Libya’s political transition remains stalled, with key stakeholders continuing to disagree on the legal, constitutional, and institutional arrangements necessary for holding national elections. As a result, the elections originally scheduled for December 2021 remain indefinitely postponed, perpetuating the country’s political fragmentation and the existence of rival institutions.

Beyond the indefinite postponement of the elections that left Libya in a transitional limbo, the 2020 peace process that ended the civil war has not been able to overcome the political and security fragmentation that has become the characteristic feature of the political and institutional landscape of Libya. Libya continues to operate on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers.

In a renewed push for breaking the continuing political impasse, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has been exerting diplomatic efforts and has proposed a political roadmap aimed at helping Libyan stakeholders overcome their differences. The UN roadmap aims to facilitate the adoption of a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unify institutions under a new government; and pave the way for the holding of elections. To this end, the mission launched a structured dialogue among Libyan stakeholders in December 2025 to advance implementation of the roadmap. But there has been little progress toward meeting the major milestones set out in the roadmap to pave the way for the unification of institutions and the holding of elections. In her briefing to the UN Security Council, Tetteh reported the lack of tangible progress in implementing the political roadmap and announced a new ‘two-step approach’.

In a statement that he issued on 30 August 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, welcomed the UN-backed political roadmap. The statement emphasised ‘the importance of coordination between all regional, continental and international actors to ensure the necessary political support to implement the roadmap.’ While the signing of the Libyan Reconciliation Charter by some political actors in mid-February 2025, on the margins of the 38^th AU Summit and under the auspices of the AU’s High-Level Committee on Libya under the leadership of President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, constituted a milestone in efforts to restore peace and stability in the country, not all significant Libyan actors signed the Libyan Reconciliation Charter of February 2025. Despite the fact that the head of the Presidential Council was in Addis Ababa, he did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation charter. Indeed, the persistence of the fragility of the situation became evident when a military confrontation that erupted in Tripoli in May 2025, prompting the PSC to hold an emergency session.

During its last session of the 1291^st meeting, the PSC welcomed the adoption of the Charter and appealed to all signatory parties to ensure its full implementation. The Council also urged those stakeholders who had not yet endorsed the document to join the consensus without delay, emphasising the importance of an inclusive reconciliation process as a foundation for lasting peace and stability in Libya. A notable development occurred in January 2026 when the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed al-Menfi, formally signed and approved the Charter. In a press release issued on 14 January 2026, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, welcomed the decision, describing it as an important step towards advancing national reconciliation and achieving durable peace in Libya.

Tomorrow (18 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1347^th session to receive an update on the political transition and security situation in Guinea-Bissau.

The session will proceed in two segments. In the opening segment, an opening statement will be delivered by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, followed by introductory remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Patrice Émery Trovoada, AU Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau, is also scheduled to brief the Council, while the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is expected to make a statement. Ovídio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to Guinea-Bissau will make presentation during the closed segment.

This will be the second time the PSC meeting on the situation in Guinea-Bissau in less than three months, with the previous meeting having been convened on 5 March during its 1333^rd session. At that session, the PSC took note of the adoption of a Transitional Roadmap for the restoration of constitutional order, which provides for a one-year transitional period culminating in elections scheduled for 6 December 2026. In this context, the PSC urged the full, timely, inclusive, and transparent implementation of the roadmap in accordance with the agreed timelines, in order to create the necessary conditions for the successful organisation of credible elections. The PSC also called on the interim authorities in Guinea-Bissau to immediately and unconditionally release Mr Domingos Simões Pereira and all other political detainees, and to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens of Guinea-Bissau. In addition, the Council directed the AU Commission to sustain engagement with the transitional authorities, including through the provision of technical support to the National Election Commission, while stressing the importance of an inclusive national dialogue involving all political movements, civil society, women, and youth. Furthermore, the Council also expressed its anticipation for the AU-ECOWAS joint assessment mission and decided to undertake a field mission to the country during the course of 2026.

As noted in our Monthly Digest for March 2026, the PSC’s focus appears to have shifted from the position it adopted at its 1315th session — where the Council specifically urged the military leaders to allow the completion of the electoral process disrupted by the military coup of 26 November 2025 — towards supporting the country’s progression towards the envisaged elections in December 2026. Against this background, tomorrow’s engagement is expected to focus on ways of steering the country towards a timely, inclusive, transparent, and credible electoral process, while also assessing recent political and security developments that have taken place since the Council’s last session in March.

Political repression appears to have worsened following the November 2025 military coup, with conditions for media freedom and civil liberties also deteriorating. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights characterises the political environment in the country since the coup as reflecting a ‘progressive reduction in civic and democratic space.’ It has been noted that members of the opposition and human rights defenders have been arbitrarily detained, assaulted, harassed and intimidated, that demonstrations have been dispersed, and that radio stations have been suspended.

Two recent developments in particular underscore this characterisation of worsening political repression and the shrinking of political space, with serious implications for the creation of an enabling environment for the upcoming elections.

The first is the killing of Vigário Luís Balanta, a civil society activist and critic of Guinea-Bissau’s military authorities. His body was found on 31 March 2026 on the outskirts of Bissau, reportedly bearing signs of torture. The killing triggered protests in the capital following his funeral, which were subsequently dispersed by police. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed shock at the killing and called for an urgent, thorough, and impartial investigation and for those responsible to be brought to justice through fair trial proceedings. It further reiterated concerns that members of the opposition and human rights defenders have been arbitrarily detained, assaulted, harassed and intimidated, and that demonstrations have been dispersed.

The second concerning development is the reported crackdown on media outlets, particularly radio stations, allegedly linked to issues of licensing fees. The PSC may also wish to follow up on the status of Domingos Simões Pereira, leader of the opposition PAIGC, who was detained following the coup and, although reportedly released in late January, is still said to remain under house arrest.

As the elections are now less than seven months away, robust high-level diplomatic engagement by the AU Commission is imperative to keep the transition on course and ensure the successful completion of the transitional process through the holding of timely elections in a politically conducive environment. While the appointment of a Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau by the Chairperson of the AU Commission is an encouraging step towards sustaining diplomatic engagement with the country and accompanying it throughout the transition period, this should also be complemented by high-level political engagement, including a mission to the country at the level of the Chairperson of the Commission or the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, aimed at creating conditions conducive to competitive elections. Such engagement would be particularly effective if undertaken jointly with ECOWAS, in order to maximise leverage on the transitional authorities and ensure coherent messaging by both organisations.

Moreover, as highlighted during the PSC’s 1333^rd session, there is a need for the AU to provide technical support to strengthen the capacity of institutions relevant to the conduct of credible elections, including the National Electoral Commission and the independence of the Supreme Court, which serves as the ultimate judicial authority overseeing the electoral process in the country. To translate this into concrete action, the PSC may consider requesting the AU Commission to dispatch a technical assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau to evaluate the electoral environment and identify priority support needs.

Another issue of interest to the Council could be ensuring that the upcoming elections are conducted in line with the AU’s anti-coup norms, particularly article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections organised to restore constitutional order. This issue is particularly significant in light of the recent trend within the Council of retreating from strict adherence to article 25(4), as reflected in the lifting of sanctions on Gabon and Guinea in 2025 and 2026, respectively, despite elections in both countries conducted in apparent contravention of this provision. The PSC also omitted reference to the provision during its recent sessions on Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar held in March 2025. It is recalled that the AU Chairperson for 2025, Angola’s President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, emphasised during the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2026 that the restoration of constitutional order cannot be deemed complete where those who seize power unconstitutionally subsequently organise elections and legitimise their rule through electoral victory. In this regard, it remains important for the Council to stress the continued relevance of this provision and to clearly remind the transitional authorities of their ineligibility to participate in the upcoming elections.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may emphasise the importance of creating political conditions conducive to credible elections in Guinea-Bissau, as a prerequisite for the successful completion of the transition process. It may further underline the need to respect fundamental human rights and the rule of law in the country. In this regard, and echoing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Council may express concern over the deteriorating civic and democratic space following the November 2025 military coup. It may also condemn the brutal killing of civil society activist Vigário Luís Balanta and call for an urgent, thorough, and impartial investigation into the killing, as well as the prosecution of those responsible. The PSC may further reiterate the importance of strengthening electoral institutions and ensuring the independence of the Supreme Court in order to safeguard the integrity of the upcoming December elections. In this context, the Council may request the AU Commission to dispatch a technical assessment mission to evaluate electoral conditions and identify the necessary support needs. While emphasising the imperative of sustained and coordinated diplomatic engagement with the transitional authorities to ensure a successful transition, the PSC may request the Commission to undertake a high-level political mission led by the Chairperson of the Commission or the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, in coordination with ECOWAS. It may also follow up on its previous decision to undertake a field mission by specifying a clear timeline, as well as by establishing an AU monitoring mechanism to effectively track developments in the country.

Tomorrow (28 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1342nd session to consider the report on joint African Union–Federal Government of Somalia–United Nations progress against benchmarks and the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) configuration plan.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representatives of Somalia and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM, is expected to present the report on joint AU-FGS-UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan.

The last time the PSC considered AUSSOM was during its 1330th session, convened in February at ministerial level, but a more directly related session of relevance to the progress report and mission configuration plan is the PSC’s 1287th session, which was also held at ministerial level in July 2025. At that session, the PSC recognized the evolving security context since the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for AUSSOM and requested the Commission to provide updates regarding the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and their logistical support and aviation requirements, and to submit these new requirements within six weeks for consideration and transmission to the UN Security Council (UNSC), to enable continued United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) logistical support to AUSSOM on this basis. In line with this, UNSC Resolution 2809 (2025), which renewed AUSSOM’s mandate until the end of this year, encouraged the AU, jointly with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), to transmit to the Security Council updated plans for AUSSOM’s configuration by 30 April 2026. Further to that, the resolution, under its paragraph 27, requested the UN, jointly with the AU and FGS, and in consultation with donors, to continue regular, joint technical assessments of progress made, including against the benchmarks detailed in the joint AU-UN report of November 2024, and to provide an updated assessment of progress to the Security Council by 31 October 2026. The AU Commission is therefore submitting this joint report to the PSC for its consideration in light of the above requests.

The report has two components, merging the two requests above into a single document. The first is the report on progress against the seven benchmarks guiding the transition of security responsibilities in Somalia for the period from September 2025 to February 2026, while the second part provides a report on the AUSSOM configuration plan, which is shaped by the findings of the progress report against the seven benchmarks.

It is recalled that AUSSOM operations are to be undertaken in a four-phased approach (see below), starting from phase 1 of realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS, its predecessor, at the end of June 2025, to AUSSOM, through to phase 4, which envisages mission exit at the end of 2029. The first phase has been postponed twice by the PSC, during its 1287th and 1317th sessions, pending deployment by Egypt.

AUSSOM Head El Hadji is expected to brief the Council, highlighting key findings of the report. Among others, he is likely to highlight progress made against the seven benchmarks (preparation and planning for transition to AUSSOM; AUSSOM support to Somali Security Forces (SSF) offensive operations; progressive extension of state authority across recovered areas; development of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF)/Somali Police Force (SPF) in line with defence and rule of law white papers; enhanced logistics support and sustainment for SNAF and AUSSOM; AUSSOM and SSF enhanced accountability and compliance; and post-mission management), key challenges, and considerations as the mission transition phases advance. Similarly, the briefing is expected to cover the second aspect of the report that assesses progress against the AUSSOM mandate, the joint operational environment and coordination with the FGS, accountability measures and protection of civilians, UNSOS adaptability to provide support and sustainment capacity to AUSSOM and SSF, as well as funding modalities.

The report paints a mixed picture of AUSSOM’s operations, with measurable success registered in discharging its mandate but also facing key challenges, which, without being addressed, could result in a significant reversal of security gains. The report confirms measurable progress in joint operational coordination, institutional development within Somali security institutions, and increasing Somali-led operational initiatives. Joint planning and operational coordination mechanisms between AUSSOM and SSF, such as the National Joint Operations Coordination Centre (JOCC) and the SSF-AUSSOM Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), are now functioning more coherently and consistently and have moved beyond ad hoc practices, improving coordination, information-sharing, and alignment with Somali-led security priorities. AUSSOM-SSF joint operations have delivered some tactical gains, including territorial recovery and improved security along key Main Supply Routes (MSRs), disrupted Al-Shabaab’s command structures, and contributed to increased defections and reduced recruitment capacity in some areas. Somali forces are showing growing operational initiative, with partner-supported enablers such as air operations playing a critical role in sustaining momentum against the terrorist group, reinforced by bilateral troop deployments in line with the decision of the extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the troop-contributing countries to AUSSOM, held in Kampala, Uganda, on 25 April 2025, adopting a ‘whole-of-government’ approach integrating military operations with political engagement. The report also finds that state authority is gradually expanding in recovered areas, with SSF increasing their presence and building community confidence, particularly in HirShabelle, Galmudug, and Southwest States. Progress has also been recorded in strengthening compliance and accountability frameworks, including the implementation of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, enhanced training on international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and the operationalisation of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) and Boards of Inquiry, which enhance civilian protection, transparency, and operational legitimacy.

Despite these gains, the report highlights key challenges that make these gains fragile. Al-Shabaab remains resilient and adaptive, continuing asymmetric attacks, particularly through improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, and economic coercion. The territorial gains registered remain vulnerable to reversal, as the transition from ‘clear’ to ‘hold’ and ‘build’ is not consistently matched by government deployment, stabilisation efforts, and service delivery. AUSSOM is also constrained by structural and capability gaps. The mission is operating with reduced troop levels relative to its mandate, with current deployment in 49 locations against the envisaged 23 locations in the CONOPs. Critical capability gaps notably in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), mobility, aviation assets, and Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) persist. These gaps, together with the significant budget cuts of 25 per cent, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which remains the backbone of logistical support, have reduced operational support capacity, constraining mission sustainability and support to Somali-led operations. Most of all, the mission remains in an existential funding crisis.

As the report highlights, AUSSOM’s effectiveness and the success of the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces depend on many factors. First and foremost, the mission’s effectiveness heavily depends on closing critical capability gaps, ensuring full deployment of enablers, and aligning force configuration with operational demands to avoid overstretch and sustain gains. It also depends on the Somali forces’ capacity generation, without which the transition may outpace local absorption capacity, leading to reversals. Sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding, as well as logistical support, remain central to the effectiveness of the mission, requiring stronger AU-UN coordination and broader partner engagement to close the prevailing funding and logistics gap and ensure a smooth exit. The severity of the challenges facing AUSSOM also highlights the imperative for taking decisions on force configuration that align with realistically supportable sustainment capacity.

There are a few key strategic issues that the report did not address. The first of these relates to the growing confrontation between the Federal Government and Federal Member states, the political instability and uncertainty arising from the lack of consensus about major constitutional issues and related governance challenges and the resultant vacuum these conditions create for Al Shabaab to take advantage of and with respect to force generation and in the fight against Al Shabaab. The other concerns the lack of strategic clarity about the conclusive end of the AU mission in the form that it has run since 2007, and the creation of conditions for Somali actors to end the perpetual outsourcing of the full responsibility that they should bear for their political and security governance. Instead of operating as a gap-filling multilateral support measure, the AU mission is increasingly being seen as a regime security instrument, thereby becoming an excuse for Somali actors not to get their acts together. This is neither compatible with the objective of a multilateral peace support operation nor the pathway for the resolution of the underlying factors of the security crisis, which require the Somali government to deliver on its part of the bargain through both setting up and making fully functional the institutions for assuming security responsibility and securing political consensus and national reconciliation.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome the finalisation of the report on joint AU-FGS-UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan, adopt the same, and request the Commission to transmit it to the UN Security Council pursuant to the PSC’s 1287th session and UNSC Resolution 2809 (2025). Echoing the report, the PSC may welcome the operational momentum achieved against Al-Shabaab and the gradual strengthening of Somali institutions, but may also emphasise that the transition of responsibilities remains conditions-based and requires careful sequencing to ensure that drawdowns in AUSSOM do not outpace Somali absorption capacity or undermine recently consolidated gains. Beyond expressing concerns over the prevailing challenges that AUSSOM is currently facing, it may also emphasise the critical importance of sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding and logistical support for AUSSOM; the provision of adequate operational enablers such as aviation assets, ISR capabilities, and other force multipliers; accelerating capacity-building, force generation, and integrated operational planning mechanisms between AUSSOM and Somali forces; prioritising the security of key infrastructure and population centres to avoid overstretch; consolidating offensive operations with state presence through a ‘clear-hold-build’ approach; and adherence to the compliance and accountability framework. Again echoing the report, the PSC is also likely to establish an AU-FGS-UN monitoring and evaluation mechanism to track benchmark progress, operational conditions, and sustainment capacity.

Tomorrow (5 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in its capacity as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), may also deliver statements.

The PSC last considered Guinea-Bissau at its 1315th session on 28 November 2025, following the 26 November military seizure of power that interrupted the 23 November electoral process – a process that had been characterised as free, transparent and peaceful by election observation missions, including from AU and ECOWAS. At that session, the PSC determined that the military takeover constituted an unconstitutional change of government and suspended Guinea-Bissau from participation in all AU activities. Both the PSC and ECOWAS adopted an aligned position: restoration of constitutional order required the completion of the interrupted electoral process.

In the same vein, the extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, held on 27 November 2025, called on the coup leaders to respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of election results. Recognising the need for swift, high-level engagement, it mandated the Chair of the ECOWAS Authority to lead a high-level mediation mission to Guinea-Bissau to engage the military authorities.

Similarly, the PSC urged the military authorities to respect the popular will, finalise the tabulation and proclamation of results, and accompany the process through to the inauguration and assumption of office of the duly elected winner. It also decided to establish an AU Monitoring Mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and to convene a Summit-level PSC meeting on the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.

Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to assess steps taken towards restoring constitutional order and progress in implementing the PSC’s earlier decisions. ECOWAS is expected to brief on its diplomatic engagements with the transitional authorities of Guinea-Bissau in this regard. The session may also serve to explore a more coordinated approach between the PSC and ECOWAS in engaging the military authorities and securing a swift return to constitutional order. This includes ensuring compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from contesting subsequent elections, as well as adherence to the same commitment undertaken in the transitional charter.

Initially, both the PSC and ECOWAS were unequivocal that restoration of the constitutional order meant concluding the November elections rather than pursuing negotiations or interim arrangements for transition. These calls went unheeded. The military authorities consolidated their position, swearing in coup leader General Horta N’Tam as interim president for a one-year period and scheduling presidential and legislative elections for 6 December 2026. Although the transitional charter bars N’Tam and his prime minister from contesting, questions remain as to whether this commitment will be upheld, particularly in light of recent transitions elsewhere on the continent and the AU’s uneven application of Article 25(4) of ACDEG. In cases such as Gabon and Guinea, the PSC lifted suspensions following elections conducted in apparent contravention of this provision.

As noted in a recent analysis featured in Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba, the ECOWAS and, by extension, the AU did not follow through on their earlier decisions. Despite the firm and appropriate initial response from both ECOWAS and the PSC, neither was able to follow through on their initial demand nor on the warning from ECOWAS that it reserved the right to use all options ‘including sanctions on all entities deemed culpable of disrupting the electoral and democratic process.’ Thus, when the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government met in mid-December 2025, ECOWAS changed its approach from seeking the conclusion of the electoral process and safeguarding the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau to a short transition that will culminate in another election. Thus, despite reiterating its earlier decision and noting that the elections held on 23 November were free and fair, ECOWAS called for ‘institution of a short transition to be led by an inclusive government that reflects the political spectrum and society in Guinea-Bissau, with a mandate to undertake constitutional, legal, and political reforms and the organisation of credible, transparent and inclusive elections.’ Meanwhile, ECOWAS rejected the one-year transition timetable announced by the military authorities, calling for a shorter timeframe.

At its ordinary session of 14 December 2025, ECOWAS further requested its Chair to undertake another high-level mission to Guinea-Bissau and directed the immediate dispatch of a delegation from the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff to engage the military authorities. While intensifying diplomatic engagement, ECOWAS also reiterated its readiness to impose targeted sanctions on individuals or groups obstructing a return to constitutional order through an inclusive process. It called for the immediate release of political detainees and for their full participation in the country’s political processes.

Relations between the military authorities and ECOWAS appeared to deteriorate in December. The authorities requested the immediate withdrawal of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission and reportedly cancelled a planned visit by the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. In January 2026, however, the military authorities appeared to take steps aimed at easing tensions. In late January, they announced measures including the release of some political leaders and improvements in the detention conditions of former Prime Minister and PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira, who had been arrested following the coup. They also indicated plans to form a more inclusive transitional government by allocating three ministerial portfolios to the PAIGC and three to the political group led by Fernando Dias Da Costa, a candidate in the November presidential election. In addition, ten representatives from the two groups would be appointed to the National Transitional Council, the transition’s legislative body. It should be noted, however, that opposition leaders reportedly declined participation. The authorities also withdrew their earlier request for the departure of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau.

In its communiqué of 31 January 2026, ECOWAS welcomed the measures announced by the transitional authorities and urged all stakeholders to work collaboratively in support of a peaceful and credible transition leading to democratic elections. It further called for the full and effective release of Domingos Simões Pereira and for guarantees of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens.

It appears that both the AU and ECOWAS have stepped back from their earlier firm position that restoration of constitutional order required completion of the interrupted electoral process. As argued in the recent Ideas Indaba analysis, a range of options remained available to the continental and regional bodies. ECOWAS, for example, could have drawn on its experience in upholding the outcome of the December 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, including through the use of sanctions. Measures aimed at increasing the cost to the coup leaders—such as leveraging the West African Economic and Monetary Union, as it did in the Côte d’Ivoire case—were within its reach. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the AU could have initiated a process towards giving recognition of the outcome of the election results, as they did both in respect to Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia in 2011 and 2017, respectively. Such steps would have slammed shut any route for the military leaders in Guinea-Bissau to entrench their illegal usurpation of power. As a show of their seriousness about their zero tolerance for coups, ECOWAS and the AU could also have launched an investigation into the circumstances leading to the interruption of the electoral process and the attempt to frustrate the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

With the military authorities entrenching themselves in political power, and given that both the AU and ECOWAS failed to act swiftly in following up on their decisions, the issue before the Council at tomorrow’s session will be, first, securing a shorter transition timeframe in place of the proposed one-year period. The second will be to ensure that the military authorities do not contest the planned elections, in compliance with Article 25(4) of ACDEG. Third, reinforcing coordination between the AU and ECOWAS in order to exercise greater leverage on the military authorities and secure the country’s swift return to constitutional order.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome recent measures taken by Guinea-Bissau’s transitional authorities, including the release of opposition political figures, while echoing ECOWAS’s call for the ‘full’ and ‘effective’ release of Domingos Simões Pereira. It may urge the adoption of a shorter transition period led by an inclusive government and emphasise the need for a swift return to constitutional order through credible elections. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its earlier request for the AU Commission to provide the necessary support to Guinea-Bissau to facilitate a return to constitutional order, including through national dialogue, institutional as well as constitutional, legal and political reforms, and the organisation of credible, transparent and inclusive elections. It may also reaffirm the obligation to adhere to Article 25(4) of ACDEG, underscoring that the military authorities should not participate in the upcoming elections. Finally, the PSC may follow up on its previous decisions regarding the establishment of a monitoring mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and the convening of a Summit-level meeting dedicated to the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government.

Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet at ministerial level on the margins of the AU Summit to discuss the situation in Sudan, as agreed during its last meeting on the country in December.

The session commences with the opening address of Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February. This will be followed by the statement that the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, introducing his report on the situation. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations are also expected to deliver a statement.  While Sudan, as a country concerned, will not participate in the session due to its suspension, there was a plan for an informal consultation by the PSC with the representative of Sudan before this session. Among the issues expected to feature are PSC’s support for the National Initiative for Peace proposal presented by the representative of Sudan to the UN Security Council in December 2025.

Since the last PSC session in December, the war has intensified across multiple fronts, with both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seeking to gain the upper hand by consolidating territorial control. The latest round of fighting has centred on the Kordofan region, though clashes continue elsewhere in the country. Last month, the SAF reportedly captured Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, and Dilling, the region’s second largest and strategically important town, both of which had been under siege by the RSF for nearly two years.

The RSF has recently intensified its attacks on El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which remains under SAF control. It is also seeking to consolidate its hold over Darfur following its capture of El-Fasher in Northern Darfur in October, while the SAF is attempting to regain lost territory. Meanwhile, the security situation in Blue Nile State, bordering Ethiopia and South Sudan, has deteriorated as the RSF and its allied forces have increased their presence in an apparent effort to open a new front against the SAF, with the bordering region in Ethiopia reportedly being used for facilitating the movement of RSF and allied forces into the region.

The regional ramifications of the war have been a major concern since its outbreak three years ago. There have been reports of some neighbouring states implicated for allowing the use of their territories or supporting one of the sides. There have been reports of the use of Ethiopian territory in facilitating support to the RSF. In the aftermath of the seizure by the RSF of El Fasher and the resulting de facto division of Sudan, some countries, notably Egypt, expressed serious concern and objection to any threat to the territorial integrity of Sudan, deeming it a direct threat to their security. While it has allegedly provided logistical and technical support to the SAF, it has also reportedly conducted targeted air strikes against the RSF over the past six months.

External intervention has come to be a major driver of the conflict in Sudan, with the UAE in particular reported for its extensive supply of weapons to the RSF. With Mogadishu cancelling all its bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi and countries denying the latter flight permits, the UAE appears to be facing growing challenges in sustaining its support for the RSF. There are growing fears that the widening rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has transformed the war in Sudan into an intense proxy competition, with Riyadh backing the SAF and Abu Dhabi continuing to support the RSF. Riyadh has reportedly mobilised several countries from the region and beyond in an effort to shift the military balance. This dynamic has become more evident on the battlefield in recent months, with the SAF gaining the upper hand in the ongoing fighting in the Kordofan region.

At its last meeting, the AUPSC strongly condemned the involvement of external actors in the conflict and tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions, in close coordination with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), with identifying those actors and recommending appropriate measures for consideration by the AUPSC. However, almost two years after the PSC adopted a similar decision, there has been no progress.

As fighting in Sudan has escalated, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. On 5 February, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)—a global, multi-partner initiative that informs urgent humanitarian response—confirmed that famine-level malnutrition is spreading in North Darfur after nearly three years of conflict, warning of catastrophic, life-threatening, and man-made starvation conditions. According to humanitarian actors, some 21 million people across Sudan require emergency assistance, making it the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Over the past three years, the conflict has forcibly displaced an estimated 11.7 million people, including seven million internally displaced persons and 4.5 million refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.

The appalling human rights situation in Sudan has been another major concern, with serious atrocities and crimes allegedly committed by the parties to the conflict. During his visit to Sudan in January, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that ‘the war has plunged the country into an abyss of unfathomable proportions.’ He further noted that ‘the proliferation of advanced military equipment, in particular unmanned aerial vehicles—or drones—across Sudan has enhanced the military capabilities of both the RSF and the SAF to inflict vast damage, prolonging hostilities and deepening the crisis for civilians.’ At its last meeting, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) underscored the need to document atrocities being committed in Sudan and requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report on crimes across the country. It also commended the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Adama Dieng, with Sudanese authorities and national human rights entities in this regard. Despite the finalization of an investigation report undertaken by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights carried out upon the request of the PSC, there has been no reference to and consideration of this report which presented widespread and grave violations of human and peoples’ rights, indicating that the scale and nature warrants the invocation of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.

As Security Council President in February, the UK intends to focus on Sudan. The UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, who visited Addis Ababa earlier this month to consult with regional countries and the AU on steps to halt the fighting and alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people, will chair a Council meeting on Sudan on 19 February. In April, Germany and the UK are also expected to convene an international conference on Sudan in Berlin.

The humanitarian crisis was also the focus of a meeting convened by the United States on 5 February, aimed at mobilising $1.5 billion to respond to Sudan’s urgent humanitarian needs. At the meeting, the US reportedly indicated that it has been working with other members of the Quad on a Sudan peace plan. The Quad—comprising the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—has been advancing a roadmap first outlined in September last year, which called for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to enable the rapid delivery of aid across Sudan, followed immediately by a permanent ceasefire. At the time, the SAF rejected the initiative, citing concerns over the UAE’s involvement, while the RSF—widely condemned by the international community for committing mass atrocities and war crimes—welcomed it in what was widely seen as a tactical move to rehabilitate its image.

The peace plan, which is expected to be announced soon, reportedly includes measures to address the humanitarian crisis; protect civilians and coordinate their safe return; transition to a permanent ceasefire; launch a political process toward a civilian-led government; and support reconstruction. At its last meeting, the AUPSC welcomed the establishment of the Quintet—comprising the AU, UN, EU, and the League of Arab States—under AU leadership to enhance coordination of mediation efforts aimed at convening an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It also reiterated its call for the Quintet and the Quad to work closely together to avoid duplication and ensure a coherent approach to achieving a negotiated and lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan. At tomorrow’s meeting, Egypt, which presides over the AUPSC in February, may highlight the consultative meeting it convened in Cairo last month. The meeting brought together several bilateral and multilateral partners.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its grave concern over the escalating fighting in Sudan. It may condemn the atrocities being committed in the course of the escalating violence, including those perpetrated particularly by the RSF since the PSC’s last meeting. Welcoming the Fact-Finding report of the ACHPR and noting the mission undertaken by the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, the PSC may reaffirm the need for continuous documentation of the atrocities and violations being perpetrated in the course of the War in Sudan. including the AU, IGAD, the UN, and the EU, to discuss the situation in Sudan. The PSC may welcome the role of the Quintet and the AU’s leadership role in that context, particularly in advancing the convening of the political dialogue. The PSC may also take a decision to undertake a field mission to Sudan.

Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1330th session at ministerial level to receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), as one of its agenda items.

Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an introductory statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Statements are expected from the representatives of Somalia, as the concerned state, and Djibouti in its capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as from the representatives of the League of Arab States and the United Nations (UN). The representatives of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are also expected to deliver statements.

The consideration of Somalia and Sudan under a single session may signal a deliberate effort to frame the discussion around the growing risk of state fragmentation in the Horn of Africa and its broader implications for regional peace and stability. The ministerial session will also discuss progress in the operationalisation of AUSSOM, the challenges it continues to face, and ways forward. The discussions on AUSSOM are likely to build on PSC’s 1317th session held on 15 December 2025 and the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted to that session.

Tomorrow’s session is also likely to situate the discussion within the context of the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly following Israel’s recognition of the self-declared region of Somaliland in December, as well as the increasingly visible rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On 26 December 2025, Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland—a move that was strongly rejected by many states and regional and international organisations, including the AU and the League of Arab States. Beyond its legal and political ramifications, the decision has intensified regional geopolitical tensions. Emerging alignments among external and regional actors appear to be taking shape, with potentially serious consequences for peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Djibouti, and several other states firmly opposed the recognition. By contrast, the UAE— the first Arab state to formally sign the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020—is widely perceived as having facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

Against this backdrop, on 12 January, the Federal Government of Somalia terminated all agreements with the UAE relating to port operations, government institutions, and security and defence cooperation. This decision followed Somaliland’s recognition by Israel and the transit of a pro-UAE separatist figure from Yemen through Somali airspace without Mogadishu’s knowledge. Meanwhile, Israel’s Foreign Minister visited Somaliland in January to consolidate relations, while Somaliland authorities publicly expressed expectations of concluding a trade deal with Israel and indicated willingness to grant access to valuable mineral resources as part of a broader arrangement.

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has been simmering for some time and has become more pronounced amid divergences over developments in Yemen, now appears to be drawing countries of the Horn of Africa more directly into its orbit. In this context, Somalia risks becoming an arena within a wider geopolitical contest. The emerging alignment around Saudi Arabia appears particularly opposed to the normalisation of parallel political entities that undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It is recalled that the PSC convened its 1324th ministerial session on 6 January, dedicated to the preservation of Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and stability. The Communiqué adopted at that session strongly condemned and rejected Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland and called for its immediate revocation. The PSC further emphasised that such a declaration is null and void and without legal effect under international law, warning that it risks undermining peace and stability on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa.

Tomorrow’s ministerial session will therefore be confronted with the challenge of how to mitigate the growing risks posed by intensifying regional rivalries as they play out in Somalia. These external pressures are compounded by Somalia’s internal political and security challenges, especially as the current government mandates are set to expire in May 2026. Persistent disagreements over electoral models and proposed constitutional amendments—both among Somali political actors and between the Federal Government and some of the Federal Member States, notably Puntland and Jubaland—remain unresolved.

In December, district council elections were conducted peacefully in the Banadir region, including Mogadishu, marking the first implementation of direct elections in the capital in over five decades. This development aligns with the Federal Government’s stated objective of transitioning to a nationwide one-person, one-vote electoral model. However, while the Government has reiterated its intention to extend district elections to Federal Member State capitals and secondary cities, opposition leaders, along with the authorities in Puntland and Jubaland, continue to reject a shift toward direct elections and any extension of the current government’s mandate beyond May. In the absence of inclusive dialogue with Mogadishu, they have threatened to proceed with their own electoral processes, further heightening political uncertainty. Meanwhile, the Presidents of Puntland and Jubaland arrived in Mogadishu on 10 February for high-level talks on contentious issues, including the upcoming elections.

The second aspect of tomorrow’s discussions is expected to be AUSSOM. At its last session, held on 15 December, the PSC considered the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, which highlighted progress and challenges in the implementation of AUSSOM’s mandate during the period from July to December 2025 and outlined three options regarding the future of the Mission.

AUSSOM continues to face a range of serious complications. First, the Mission has been unable to secure multi-year, predictable, and adequate financing, despite the AU’s efforts to convince the UN Security Council to activate its Resolution 2719 for AUSSOM. Troops have gone extended periods without receiving stipends, likely to affect morale and operational readiness, while compelling troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to subsidise the Mission—an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable. The estimated budget for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 stands at approximately USD 190 million, in addition to substantial financial liabilities inherited from ATMIS, including unpaid troop allowances and outstanding reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE). While there are indications that the European Union (EU) may commit to covering up to 85 per cent of troop stipends, the sustainability of this support, as well as the availability of additional funding to address the remaining budget gap, remains uncertain. PSC members are therefore likely to seek clarification on the status of the disbursement of the USD 20 million allocated by the AU for the Mission, as a follow-up to its 1317th session, which directed the Commission to fast-track the release of these funds and report on their implementation at the subsequent meeting.

A second major complication arises from the United Nations’ liquidity crisis and its implications for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which is funded through the UN peacekeeping assessed budget and mandated to provide logistical and related support to AUSSOM. UNSOS has faced a 25 per cent budget reduction—approximately USD 130 million—from its approved USD 520 million budget for the current financial year (June 2025 to July 2026). This reduction is expected to have significant repercussions for AUSSOM’s core operational capabilities, particularly aviation support, COE management, force sustainment, and broader logistical support.

Operational challenges have also emerged in relation to troop realignment. The transition of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was expected to be completed by the end of June 2025 and required the repatriation of Burundian forces alongside the deployment of Egyptian troops. Pending the latter’s deployment, the PSC has been compelled to suspend the repatriation of Burundian contingents. The Chair of the PSC for the month may brief the Council on progress toward deployment, including the technical assessment conducted in August 2025 in preparation for deployment planning, as well as updates on AU-UN coordination efforts. Meanwhile, uncertainty over the future of the mission has been further compounded by a public statement posted on 26 January by Uganda’s army chief, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, indicating an intention to withdraw Ugandan forces from Somalia after 19 years of engagement. Although it remains unclear whether this reflects official government policy, the statement underscores growing uncertainty surrounding the Mission’s future.

Against this backdrop of financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in his report to the 1317th session, outlined three options for the PSC’s strategic consideration regarding the future of AUSSOM.

The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions, resulting in the continued accumulation of deficits with no certainty regarding resource predictability. The second option entails transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.

Rather than providing immediate strategic direction, the PSC requested the Commission to submit a more detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council also requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of AUSSOM TCCs and PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to deliberate on the three options and submit their recommendations for the PSC’s consideration. As highlighted above, the financial, logistical, operational, and political challenges confronting the Mission have reached a critical point, requiring serious consideration of the options proposed by the Chairperson of the Commission. Tomorrow’s engagement is therefore expected to follow up on PSC’s request for a detailed report by the Commission on these options.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to reiterate its condemnation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reaffirm its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia. It may further urge Member States and international partners to refrain from any action that undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The PSC may also express its concern over the geopolitical competition among regional and global powers in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and its potential in turning Somalia into a geopolitical theatre with serious repercussions to its peace and security. It may reiterate its call on the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and political actors to engage in an inclusive political dialogue to address outstanding issues on the election model and constitutional amendments and the importance of such dialogue for the conduct of a credible election. In this connection, the PSC may welcome the high-level talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States on the upcoming elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC is expected to follow up on its request for a detailed report on the three options outlined by the Chairperson of the Commission on the future of the mission, based on consultations with the TCCs/PCCs, and to provide strategic guidance on the way forward.