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		<title>Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/information-disorder-seriously-endangering-stability-amaniafrica-tells-the-psc/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 13:48:05 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>9 October 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/information-disorder-seriously-endangering-stability-amaniafrica-tells-the-psc/">Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 9 October 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-0" data-row="script-row-unique-0" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-0"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-1"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-24478" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon.jpeg" width="1280" height="800" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon.jpeg 1280w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-300x188.jpeg 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-1024x640.jpeg 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-768x480.jpeg 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-350x219.jpeg 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1280px) 100vw, 1280px" /></div>
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<p style="text-align: right;">Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD<br />
Founding Director, Amani Africa</p>
<h2><strong>Amani Africa Briefing to the 1372<sup>nd</sup> session of the Peace and Security Council on ‘Information Integrity and Peace and Security in Africa’  </strong></h2>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, Ambassador Churchill Ewumbe-Monono</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A very good morning.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is an honour for me to address you today, representing my organisation, Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an organisation that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security by contributing to<strong> the noble mandate of this august house</strong>, our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body, through policy research, technical support, policy dialogue and strategic communication.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I wish to commend the Chairperson and this Council for dedicating today’s session to a subject that carries enormous implications for peace and security, political stability, economic advancement and democratic governance on the continent. The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/information-integrity/global-principles">United Nations Global Principles for Information Integrity</a> warn that the erosion of the integrity of the information space hinders efforts to achieve peace, prosperity and a livable future on our planet. In what signifies this threat from disinformation, <a href="https://sahrc.org.za/index.php/publications/619-sahrc-human-rights-and-info-integrity-policy-brief-final/viewdocument/619">South Africa’s Human Rights Commission</a>, a constitutionally established independent body, observed ‘a growing pattern in which information disorder contributes to rights violations, including violence, discrimination, public health harms, and the erosion of democratic participation.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Poignantly, and as a result, the UN points out that the task of strengthening information integrity may present us with one of the most urgent challenges of our time. Experience on the continent suggest that disinformation and related forms of information disorder poses increasingly grave threat to institutional stability and peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Information integrity has always been critical to peace and security. In our digital and AI age, it has become the precondition for political stability, democratic governance and a functioning socio-economic order. There is almost no domain of public life or social or economic sector that does not get seriously endangered by the erosion of information integrity. This heightened importance of information integrity, in this digital and AI age, is particularly pronounced for peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As we have pointed out in the edition of <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/information-integrity-peace-and-security-in-africa/?omnisendContactID=6895e30a44131fed8eae7a92&amp;utm_campaign=campaign%3A+Information+Integrity%2C+Peace+and+Security+in+Africa+%286ac739033c8c79ac8a6c5aa4%29&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=omnisend"><em>Insights on the PSC</em></a> dedicated to this session, ‘quality of information affects both the behaviour of conflict parties and the context in which conflicts unfold.’ This makes the absence of information integrity detrimental to peace and security. ‘Without information integrity, it becomes difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In the absence of truth, there can be no trust. In the absence of truth and trust, war and conflict, division and violence thrive. The pursuit of peace is hugely impaired.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">For purposes of the mandate of the PSC, it is worth noting that disinformation gains particular saliency and exacts enormous costs in specific contexts. The experience from the continent shows that there are at least <strong>four contexts</strong> where disinformation proliferates and gets pervasive, driving violence and instability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Conflicts and war are the first and major context in which the integrity of information is endangered the most. There is indeed <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/">analysis</a> that indicates that African countries experiencing conflict tend to experience the highest levels of disinformation and information disorder. This is not a surprise. As the saying, ‘in war, the first casualty is often the truth’, clearly attests, conflicts have always been accompanied by a fog of competing narratives and propagation of manipulated information. <strong>In today’s digital and AI era, this fog has become constitutive of the war itself. </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sudan’s is a live case that illustrates the pervasiveness and impact of the erosion of information integrity. According to <a href="https://thomson-foundation.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Thomson+Foundation+-+Information+Manipulation+in+Sudan.pdf">a study on the war in Sudan</a>, a disinformation campaign (involving the warring parties, their supporters and external actors) has become a dominant feature of the war in Sudan. This emerged following the huge shift of Sudanese, inside and outside the country, to digital platforms and social media channels for accessing and sharing news and information after the destruction of Sudan’s established information infrastructure during the early stages of the war in April 2023. ‘The result is,’ the study held, ‘an information environment characterised by alternative ‘facts’, misleading narratives and information, and hate speech.’ This has not only endangered the lives of civilians and the operation of humanitarian actors but also undermined peace efforts through sowing division and polarisation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The second context in which African countries face intense levels of disinformation, including from cross-border operators, concerns elections. Apart from state-sponsored operators as reported in relation to the Sahel, it is<a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/"> reported</a> that a ‘private Israeli group, dubbed ‘Team Jorg,’ has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt 20 African elections since 2015.’ This is indicative of the growing vulnerability of elections to interference by profit-making cross-border operators.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is particularly when they are closely contested and take place in a context of trust deficit, weak independent media and polarisation along identity fault lines that elections attract the most disinformation. According to <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/EAR-49.pdf">a study on Kenya’s 2022 elections</a>, ‘Social media platforms, especially Facebook, Twitter, TikTok and Instagram, along with messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, became the dominant vectors through which election news and disinformation were transmitted during Kenya’s election.’ The study further noted that ‘there were many disinformation narratives that circulated during the election campaign season, some of which used deepfakes and cheapfakes or altered video.’ Lack of confidence in legacy media and polarisation along identity lines played a major role. The <a href="https://www.humanglemedia.com/nigerias-2023-elections-and-the-undercurrents-of-coordinated-internet-campaigns">2023 Nigerian elections</a> also attracted intense levels of disinformation as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The third context in which African states experience intense levels of disinformation and other forms of information disorder concerns situations involving political and social unrest. An experience that illustrates such a case is South Africa. According to the <a href="https://sahrc.org.za/index.php/publications/619-sahrc-human-rights-and-info-integrity-policy-brief-final/viewdocument/619">South African Human Rights Commission</a>, ‘South Africa’s experience shows that information disorder now affects public safety, health, equality, institutional trust and democratic participation.’ ‘The July 2021 unrest, public-health misinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic, racialised conspiracy narratives, gender-based disinformation and digitally mediated hostility toward vulnerable communities all show that disinformation can deepen social division, undermine public trust, distort participation in democratic processes and contribute to discrimination and violence.’ More specifically, in relation to the July 2021 unrest that affected two major provinces, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, in South Africa, the Commission noted that ‘more than 350 people died after incendiary WhatsApp voice notes and fabricated Facebook posts turned a political grievance into days of looting and violence.’ That unrest, induced and accelerated by disinformation, also exacted enormous financial and economic costs on South Africa, estimated at R50 billion.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Health emergencies are the other context in which disinformation and other forms of information disorder become pronounced, particularly in settings facing institutional fragility and weak public trust. This was prevalent on the continent during COVID-19. Today, it constitutes a major challenge in the context of the new Ebola outbreak in the DRC. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c79yj09nd4qo">BBC</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-disinformation-in-congo-is-worsening-ebola-epidemic/a-77434273">other media platforms</a> reported false claims circulating in affected areas include &#8216;allegations that Ebola doesn&#8217;t exist, that health workers are deliberately infecting people or harvesting their organs, and that the Ebola response is a money-making scheme.&#8217;  The result has been various cases of  &#8216;attacks on treatment facilities, assaults on health workers, and repeated attempts to interfere with safe burial procedures for people who died from the disease.&#8217;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It becomes clear from all these four contexts on the continent in which information disorder becomes acute that traditional approaches to securing peace, safeguarding democratic elections and ensuring political and social stability will be utterly inadequate in this era when digital platforms and AI are reconstituting the information ecosystem.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Responses to today’s conflicts, election contestation and social and political tension need to develop and use instruments that tackle disinformation and other forms of digital and AI-based manipulations. This requires understanding the factors that drive the proliferation of disinformation and information disorder in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are at least <strong>five major drivers</strong> for the proliferation of disinformation and the growing threat such information disorder poses in Africa. First and foremost is the impact of digital technology and AI on the information ecosystem. The scale, reach, speed and sophistication of digital technology mean that false, harmful, manipulated, misleading and synthetic information spreads and reaches a large number of people instantly. With generative artificial intelligence and synthetic media, the production of shallow or deep fakes has become easier and cheaper. Algorithmic systems used by digital platforms, which are wired to expand viewership and facilitate data-driven targeting, accelerate the dissemination of disinformation and enable cross-border influence operations (involving paid influencers, digital avatars and actors involved in geopolitical rivalry on Africa).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, more and more people are accessing, producing and exchanging information from and on these digital platforms. In Africa, where the demographic majority on the continent are the youth, they get their news predominantly from such platforms, <strong>in a context in which there is a lack of and/or slow pace of local language moderation and verification tools</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The third factor, which interfaces with the second, concerns the prevalence of weak media, digital and information literacy. According to UNICEF, Africa faces the most significant gap in integration of media, digital and information literacy into national curricula. The resultant weak media, digital and information literacy enables the reception of false, manipulated and synthetic information as reliable and its wide circulation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The fourth driver for the proliferation of disinformation and the growth of the threat it poses is the suppression of credible information. Beyond algorithmic bias, in Africa, credible information gets suppressed through censorship, internet shutdowns, closure of digital platforms and attacks on journalists or media operators.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The final and fifth driver is the inadequacy or lack of laws and institutions that set and enforce standards against disinformation and other information disorder for safeguarding information integrity through advancing access to reliable and accurate information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In view of the foregoing, here are some policy recommendations for consideration of the PSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">First, addressing the erosion of information integrity should be integral to the work of all the APSA frameworks across the conflict spectrum. For the PSC, this necessitates its consideration of conflict situations and analysis of trends in the nature, manifestations and scale of disinformation relating to each conflict situation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, there is a need to integrate digital monitoring, fact-checking and media analysis into the Continental Early Warning System and ensure information integrity indicators and analysis inform and form part of mediation support, peacemaking processes and peace support operations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third, there is a need for developing a continental framework on information integration and peace and security that set standards for advancing access to reliable information focusing on, among others, a) protection of freedom of opinion and access to information, b) promoting fact-checking and the functioning of free media and independent journalism, c) attributing legal obligation to social media and tech companies operating digital platforms on the continent, including for transparency and platform accountability, d) promoting the adoption of measures by states for advancing digital, media and information literacy, and e) ensuring that Member states establish laws that tackle information disorder and regulatory bodies empowered to enforce such laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fourth, in the context of elections, in addition to integrating media and digital platform analysis in assessing the election environment, <strong>one best practice that the AU could build on is the recent initiative of the Electoral Commission of South Africa</strong>. Only last month, on 4 September 2026, the Commission promulgated the Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections. It is therefore proposed that <strong>the PSC calls o</strong><strong>n</strong><strong> the AU Commission to use this best practice for promoting the adoption by electoral bodies of a code of conduct countering disinformation in countries heading to elections</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fifth and finally, while it organises and amplifies conflicts and undermines peace efforts, information disorder carries grave consequences for the safety of civilians, humanitarian actors, reporters &amp; human rights groups. Most notably, vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and minority groups, bear much of the brunt of the consequences of information disorder, as events in Sudan highlight. As such, <strong>advancing the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups and compliance with IHL rules should be central to the responses to disinformation and other forms of information disorder</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I thank you for your kind attention!</p>
<p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/information-disorder-seriously-endangering-stability-amaniafrica-tells-the-psc/">Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Remarques par M. El-Ghassim Wane : Session ouverte du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine sur le thème: « Les opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique », Addis-Abeba (Éthiopie), 27 avril 2026</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/remarques-par-m-el-ghassim-wane-session-ouverte-du-conseil-de-paix-et-de-securite-de-lunion-africaine-sur-le-theme-les-operations-de-soutien-a-la-paix-en-afrique-addis-abeb/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 08:44:08 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>27 avril 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/remarques-par-m-el-ghassim-wane-session-ouverte-du-conseil-de-paix-et-de-securite-de-lunion-africaine-sur-le-theme-les-operations-de-soutien-a-la-paix-en-afrique-addis-abeb/">Remarques par M. El-Ghassim Wane : Session ouverte du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine sur le thème: « Les opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique », Addis-Abeba (Éthiopie), 27 avril 2026</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="h2" ><span></p></span><span><h2 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Session ouverte du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>Union africaine sur le th</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>me: « Les opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique </strong><strong>»</strong><strong>, Addis-Abeba (</strong><strong>É</strong><strong>thiopie), 27 avril 2026</strong></h2></span><span><h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Remarques par M. El-Ghassim Wane, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et Chef de la MINUSMA, ancien sous-Secrétaire général des Nations unies aux opérations de maintien de la paix, et ancien Directeur du Département paix et sécurité de la Commission de l</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>UA</strong></h3></span><span><p></span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | <strong>27 avril 2026</strong></span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
</div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-3" data-row="script-row-unique-3" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-3"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-4"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding no-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Permettez-moi tout d’abord d’exprimer mes remerciements à la présidence éthiopienne du Conseil de paix et de sécurité pour m’avoir invité à participer à cette session sur les opérations de soutien à la paix.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cette discussion se tient dans un <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/lafrique-a-la-croisee-des-chemins-naviguer-entre-perils-et-opportunites-dans-un-ordre-mondial-en-pleine-mutation/">contexte particulier</a>, tant sur le continent qu’au niveau mondial.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Premi</em><em>è</em><em>rement, nous assistons à la persistance</em><em>—</em><em>et, dans certains cas, à l</em><em>’</em><em>aggravation</em><em>—</em><em>des conflits et des tensions à travers l</em><em>’</em><em>Afrique.</em> La situation au <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/LE-SOUDAN_-UNE-TRAGEDIE-AFRICAINE-QUI-EXIGE-UN-SURSAUT-COLLECTIF.pdf">Soudan</a> est sans aucun doute la plus alarmante. C’est une crise qui devrait tenir tous les Africains en alerte et susciter une mobilisation totale et concrète.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Deuxi</em><em>è</em><em>mement, l</em><em>’</em><em>implication d</em><em>’</em><em>acteurs extérieurs dans les conflits africains est de plus en plus manifeste, et ce dans un contexte d</em><em>’</em><em>intensification de la compétition géopolitique et des rivalités entre eux.</em> Si certaines de ces interventions peuvent être constructives, elles ont aussi pour effet de réduire la marge d’action des institutions africaines et d’amoindrir leur rôle dans la gestion des questions de paix et de sécurité. Les initiatives prises en dehors du continent déterminent de plus en plus la trajectoire des crises africaines.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Il s’agit là d’une rupture avec une période antérieure où les initiatives africaines étaient au cœur des efforts de règlement des conflits—une époque illustrée par des processus et accords portant le nom de villes africaines, de Sodore en Éthiopie et Arta à Djibouti à Accra, Pretoria, Ouagadougou et Libreville, en passant par Arusha, Alger, Machakos et Sun City, pour n’en citer que quelques-unes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Troisi</em><em>è</em><em>mement, et de mani</em><em>è</em><em>re plus générale, nous sommes confrontés à un affaiblissement du multilatéralisme.</em> Celui-ci se manifeste par la multiplication des mesures unilatérales et des atteintes croissantes au droit international.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Prises ensemble, ces évolutions sont préoccupantes pour l’Afrique.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Il ne peut y avoir de développement durable sans paix. Les tensions persistantes entre États compromettent l’intégration continentale. L’implication croissante d’acteurs extérieurs sape l’appropriation et le leadership africains. L’érosion du multilatéralisme et du droit international réduit la capacité du continent à défendre ses intérêts, en même temps qu’elle accentue la vulnérabilité des pays africains et les menaces à leur souveraineté.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Aussi l’Afrique doit-elle s’attaquer à ses défis internes avec une urgence renouvelée pour pouvoir faire face à l’environnement géopolitique actuel; à défaut, elle risque d’être façonnée par des dynamiques externes plutôt que de les façonner.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">C’est dans cette entreprise plus large visant à renforcer l’autonomie stratégique de l’Afrique que doivent s’inscrire les opérations de paix. Bien conçues et utilisées, elles peuvent jouer un rôle important dans la gestion des défis de paix et de sécurité du continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cependant, pour remplir efficacement cette fonction, quatre considérations sont essentielles.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Premi</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>rement, les opérations de soutien à la paix ne sont qu</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>un instrument parmi beaucoup d</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>autres dans la gestion et le r</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>glement des conflits.</strong> La prévention, la médiation et la consolidation de la paix—telles que prévues par le <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37293-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_f.pdf">Protocole relatif au CPS</a>—sont des outils tout aussi, sinon plus, importants.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Il convient de revenir ici sur l’architecture du Protocole. Si celui-ci a, sans ambiguïté, introduit les opérations de paix dans le cadre normatif de l’Union africaine, l’approche qu’il articule n’en reste pas moins beaucoup plus équilibrée qu’on ne le pense généralement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">En substance, le Protocole accorde une place centrale à la prévention des conflits et au rétablissement de la paix. Cette orientation se reflète dans ses objectifs et principes, ainsi que dans les pouvoirs importants conférés au Président de la Commission et au Groupe des Sages. Les règles de procédure du CPS renforcent cette logique: aucun État membre ne peut empêcher l’inscription d’une question à l’ordre du jour du Conseil, et les pays parties à un conflit ne peuvent participer aux délibérations y relatives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">La conclusion est claire: il faut se garder de surinvestir dans les opérations de paix au détriment de ces autres instruments, souvent plus accessibles et, dans bien des cas, plus efficaces pour l’UA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cette conclusion est d’autant plus fondée que le CPS et la Commission ont, au fil des ans, développé des outils non militaires innovants qui ont permis à l’UA d’affirmer son leadership dans la gestion de certains conflits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Parmi ceux-ci figurent les « communiqués-cadres », à travers lesquels le CPS énonce des éléments de sortie de crise, assortis d’échéances claires et d’attentes spécifiques à l’égard des parties concernées. Le communiqué du 24 avril 2012 sur le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud en est un exemple probant.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">L’UA a également efficacement recouru à des mécanismes ad hoc de haut niveau—souvent composés de chefs d’État et de gouvernement en exercice ou d’anciens dirigeants—pour interagir au plus haut niveau avec les parties concernées et des acteurs internationaux clés. Tel fut notamment le cas avec le Groupe de mise en œuvre de haut niveau sur le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud, le Groupe de haut niveau sur la Côte d’Ivoire et le Groupe de haut niveau pour l’Égypte.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Enfin, l’UA a mis en place des groupes internationaux de contact, pour coordonner les interventions extérieures et éviter des réponses fragmentées, notamment en Guinée, à Madagascar et en République centrafricaine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Ces expériences montrent que l’Afrique dispose déjà d’une boîte à outils diversifiée et éprouvée. Les opérations de paix en sont une partie intégrante, mais elles ne doivent pas en devenir l’élément dominant.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Deuxi</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>mement, les opérations de soutien à la paix ne sont pas une fin en soi.</strong> Elles sont des instruments au service de solutions politiques. Dans les conflits internes en particulier, elles ne peuvent réussir sans processus politiques crédibles. En leur absence, même les opérations les plus robustes peinent à produire des résultats durables.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">La réponse au terrorisme dans plusieurs régions d’Afrique l’illustre clairement. Si les mesures sécuritaires sont impératives, elles sont loin d’être suffisantes. Dans de nombreux contextes, ce fléau a été aggravé par une gouvernance déficiente, la marginalisation de segments de la société et les exactions commises lors des opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Là où des progrès ont été enregistrés, ils n’ont pas résulté uniquement de l’action militaire, mais plutôt d’approches combinant mesures sécuritaires, dialogue, réconciliation et réformes de gouvernance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">C’est pourquoi la tentation croissante à privilégier l’imposition de la paix doit être abordée avec prudence. Sans stratégie politique crédible en parallèle, ces approches ont peu de chances de produire des résultats durables.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Troisi</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>mement, les opérations de soutien à la paix sont, par nature, coûteuses et exigeantes sur le plan logistique.</strong> Cela explique pourquoi, pendant longtemps, les dirigeants africains ont hésité à les intégrer pleinement dans la panoplie des outils de l’OUA, comme en témoigne la <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9538-1993_ahg_res_218-227_xxix_f.pdf">Déclaration du Caire de 1993</a>, qui n’autorisait que des missions limitées dans leur portée et leur durée.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Le tournant est intervenu avec le Protocole relatif au CPS, largement influencé par l’échec—de l’OUA et, surtout, de l’ONU, alors présente sur le terrain—à prévenir et à arrêter le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Le cadre ainsi développé reposait sur deux postulats: les États membres de l’UA augmenteraient leur financement des activités de paix et de sécurité à la faveur de la dynamique générée par la nouvelle Union, et l’ONU répondrait favorablement aux demandes de soutien du continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Plus de vingt ans après, aucun de ces postulats ne s’est fondamentalement vérifié. Les États membres de l’UA n’ont pas mobilisé les ressources nécessaires, en particulier pour les opérations de grande envergure. Quant à l’ONU, son appui est resté en deçà des attentes. Si la résolution 2719 marque une avancée, elle souffre aussi de limites. Les récentes baisses de contributions au budget des Nations unies compliquent encore davantage la situation, contraignant à des réductions importantes dans les missions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">De fait, une approche plus réaliste est requise. L’UA devrait privilégier des opérations plus ciblées, de taille réduite et limitées dans le temps, adaptées à ses capacités financières et à l’environnement budgétaire mondial actuel. À cet égard, les modèles présentés dans <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/future_of_peacekeeping_report_f_29jan_1.pdf">l’étude des Nations unies d’octobre 2024 sur l’avenir du maintien de la paix</a> offrent des orientations utiles. Ils peuvent être mis en œuvre par l’UA seule ou conjointement avec l’ONU selon différentes configurations, y compris dans le cadre de la résolution 2719, et—du fait de leur portée limitée—prennent en compte les sensibilités politiques des États membres qui pourraient percevoir les déploiements de grande ampleur comme des atteintes à leur souveraineté.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Les grandes opérations multidimensionnelles devraient, en règle générale, relever de la responsabilité de l’ONU, qui dispose d’avantages comparatifs indéniables: un financement prévisible, une expertise avérée, des capacités logistiques robustes et des mécanismes de redevabilité bien établis. L’UA ne devrait s’y engager que lorsque l’ONU est manifestement incapable ou pas disposée à agir, notamment dans des situations extrêmes liées au terrorisme ou au crime de génocide, aux crimes contre l’humanité et aux crimes de guerre.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Quatri</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>mement, l</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>efficacit</strong><strong>é des opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique dé</strong><strong>pend d</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>un </strong><a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Future-of-United-Nations-African-Union-Peacekeeping-Partnership-Practical-Considerations-for-the-Berlin-Ministerial-Conference.pdf">partenariat étroit entre l’UA et l’ONU</a><strong>.</strong> Les opérations de l’UA et de l’ONU ne constituent pas des options concurrentes, mais des composantes complémentaires d’un même système multilatéral, chacune avec ses atouts propres. Pourtant, au regard des progrès accomplis par l’UA, l’idée d’un rôle accru de cette dernière, au point de reléguer l’ONU à une fonction d’appui, a progressivement gagné du terrain—en particulier face à des menaces comme le terrorisme, où le maintien de la paix traditionnel a montré ses limites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cette lecture est trompeuse. L’UA et l’ONU ne sont pas interchangeables: elles sont des partenaires complémentaires et indissociables. L’ONU conserve des atouts majeurs, comme indiqué plus haut, tandis que l’UA a démontré une inclination à intervenir dans des environnements complexes et à haut risque, malgré de lourdes contraintes capacitaires et financières.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Les performances des deux organisations sont étroitement liées. Des opérations onusiennes efficaces confortent les approches multilatérales, qui sous-tendent également l’action de l’UA. Les succès des missions de l’UA renforcent les solutions régionales, lesquelles participent de la sécurité collective telle qu’articulée par la Charte des Nations unies. À l’inverse, les échecs de l’une ou de l’autre de ces deux institutions fragilisent la confiance dans l’architecture globale de paix et de sécurité.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Dans ce contexte, l</em><em>’</em><em>UA et l</em><em>’</em><em>ONU doivent, à titre prioritaire, renforcer leur coopération, notamment en appui aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies en Afrique.</em> Il y va de leur intérêt mutuel. Les missions onusiennes tirent parti de l’influence politique de l’UA et de sa proximité avec les théâtres de crise, ainsi que du rôle des A3: lorsque les membres africains portent, au niveau du Conseil, les questions relatives aux missions, ils aident à recentrer les débats et à limiter l’impact des tensions géopolitiques globales. L’UA a, pour sa part, un intérêt direct dans l’issue des opérations onusiennes sur le continent, l’Afrique étant la première à bénéficier de leurs succès et la première à pâtir de leurs échecs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">À cette fin, l’ONU devrait systématiquement informer l’UA des activités de ses missions et des défis auxquels elles sont confrontées. Il en résultera une plus grande appropriation africaine et une capacité accrue de l’UA à apporter un appui rapide et déterminé.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Par ailleurs, il conviendrait d</em><em>’</em><em>envisager le déploiement d’équipes de liaison de l</em><em>’</em><em>UA aupr</em><em>è</em><em>s des missions des Nations unies.</em> Celui-ci permettrait à l’UA d’avoir une meilleure appréciation des opérations onusiennes et de leur apporter un appui plus ciblé. Dans le même esprit, l’ONU devrait associer plus systématiquement l’UA aux revues stratégiques de ses missions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Comme indiqué plus haut, pour être efficace, le maintien de la paix doit aller de pair avec une action plus soutenue de rétablissement de la paix.</em> D’où la nécessité d’une coordination plus étroite entre l’UA et l’ONU, notamment à travers la désignation d’envoyés conjoints ou la mise en place de groupes de contact co-dirigés, afin d’imprimer davantage de cohérence à des efforts de médiation de plus en plus fragmentés.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Enfin, la préservation des acquis du maintien de la paix exige un investissement accru dans la consolidation de la paix.</em> Cela implique un partenariat renforcé entre l’UA et l’ONU sur les questions de gouvernance, afin de pérenniser la paix et de prévenir la rechute dans la violence. L’objectif est de combiner le riche cadre normatif de l’UA en matière de gouvernance, de démocratie et de droits humains avec les capacités techniques et les ressources des Nations unies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Je voudrais conclure en soulignant à nouveau la complexité de l</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>environnement international dans lequel l</strong><strong>’</strong><strong>Afrique op</strong><strong>è</strong><strong>re.</strong> Cet environnement, bien que porteur de risques, offre également l’opportunité de promouvoir un système international plus inclusif et plus équitable, mais à condition que l’Afrique mette de l’ordre dans ses propres affaires. Cela suppose avant tout de faire taire les armes—par des actions concrètes, et non par des déclarations. Les opérations de paix constituent un levier important à cet égard.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">L’UA dispose déjà des outils nécessaires. L’urgence est d’assurer leur mise en œuvre, plutôt que de chercher à les perfectionner sans fin. Cela suppose une discipline collective accrue et une meilleure coordination à l’échelle de l’ensemble du système de l’UA, fondées sur l’indivisibilité de la paix et de la sécurité sur le continent, ainsi que sur un engagement renouvelé en faveur de la solidarité africaine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Dans ce contexte, la revue proposée des opérations de soutien à la paix de l’UA constitue une opportunité pour: renforcer la mobilisation en faveur de la mise en œuvre des instruments existants, avec la créativité et l’agilité requises; traiter la question cruciale du financement—qui exige des États membres qu’ils assumer pleinement leurs obligations; et libérer tout le potentiel du partenariat UA–ONU, y compris dans le cadre de la résolution 2719.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Je vous remercie.</p>
<p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/remarques-par-m-el-ghassim-wane-session-ouverte-du-conseil-de-paix-et-de-securite-de-lunion-africaine-sur-le-theme-les-operations-de-soutien-a-la-paix-en-afrique-addis-abeb/">Remarques par M. El-Ghassim Wane : Session ouverte du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine sur le thème: « Les opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique », Addis-Abeba (Éthiopie), 27 avril 2026</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane: Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: &#8220;Peace Support Operations in Africa&#8221;, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/remarks-by-el-ghassim-wane-open-session-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-on-the-theme-peace-support-operations-in-africa-addis-ababa-ethiopia-27-april-2026/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 08:42:14 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>27 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/remarks-by-el-ghassim-wane-open-session-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-on-the-theme-peace-support-operations-in-africa-addis-ababa-ethiopia-27-april-2026/">Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane: Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: &#8220;Peace Support Operations in Africa&#8221;, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-5"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding no-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="h2" ><span></p></span><span><h2 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Open Session </strong><strong>of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: &#8220;Peace Support Operations in Africa&#8221;, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, </strong><strong>27 April 2026</strong></h2></span><span><h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali and Head of MINUSMA and United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, and Former Director of the African Union Commission Peace and Security Department </strong></h3></span><span><p></span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 27 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Let me start by thanking the Ethiopian Presidency of the Peace and Security Council for inviting me to participate in this session on peace support operations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This discussion takes place against a <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/publication/evaluation-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-lessons-from-20-years-of-intervention-and-recommendations-for-the-future-2/?wpdmdl=46658&amp;refresh=69ef1a53bb8c41777277523">particular backdrop</a>, both on the continent and globally.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>First, we are witnessing the persistence—and in some cases escalation—of conflicts and tensions across Africa.</em> The situation in <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Sudans-Crisis-is-Africas-Crisis-And-Its-Responsibility.pdf">Sudan</a> is undoubtedly the most alarming. It is a crisis that should keep all Africans alert and prompt full and practical mobilization.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Second, the involvement of external actors in African conflicts is growing, in a context of intensifying geopolitical competition and rivalries among them</em><em>.</em> While some of this involvement can be constructive, it has narrowed the space for African institutions to act and reduced their role in addressing peace and security challenges. Processes led from outside the continent are now increasingly shaping outcomes in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This marks a departure from an earlier period, when African-led initiatives were at the forefront of conflict resolution—an era reflected in processes and agreements named after African cities, from Sodore (Ethiopia) and Arta (Djibouti) to Arusha (Tanzania), Algiers, Machakos (Kenya), Sun City (South Africa), Accra, Pretoria, Ouagadougou, and Libreville, to name but a few.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Third, we are confronted with a broader weakening of multilateralism.</em> This is reflected in the rise of unilateral measures, as well as in the growing frequency of breaches to international law.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Taken together, these trends are concerning for Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sustainable development cannot take place without peace. Persistent tensions between states undermine continental integration. Increased external engagement affects African ownership and leadership. The erosion of multilateralism and international law reduces the continent’s ability to advance its interests, while increasing the exposure of African countries and undermining the safeguards that protect their sovereignty.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Consequently, Africa must first address its internal challenges to navigate the current geopolitical environment; otherwise, it risks being shaped by external dynamics rather than shaping them.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is within this broader effort to strengthen African agency that peace support operations must be situated. Properly conceived and used, they can play an important role in helping address the continent’s peace and security challenges.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">However, for peace operations to effectively serve this purpose, four considerations are essential.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>First, peace support operations are only one instrument among many for conflict management and resolution.</strong> Prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding—as set out in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37293-treaty-0024_-_protocol_relating_to_the_establishment_of_the_peace_and_security_council_of_the_african_union_e.pdf">PSC Protocol</a>—are equally, and often more, important.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is useful to recall what the PSC Protocol actually did. While it firmly introduced peace operations into the African Union’s normative framework, it nonetheless established a far more balanced approach than is often assumed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At its core, the Protocol places strong emphasis on prevention and on peacemaking. This is reflected in its objectives and principles. It is also reflected in the significant powers given to the Chairperson of the Commission and to the Panel of the Wise. The PSC’s own rules of procedure reinforce this logic: no member state can block the inclusion of an item on the Council’s agenda, and countries that are party to a conflict do not take part in the related deliberations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The implication is clear. We should not over-invest in peace operations at the expense of these other tools, which are often more feasible and, in many cases, more effective for the AU.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This is all the more important because the PSC and the Commission have, over the years, developed innovative non-military instruments that enabled AU’s leadership in the management of some conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These include what could be termed as “framework communiqués”, through which the PSC sets out comprehensive pathways to resolve crises, with clear timelines and concrete expectations for the parties. A notable example is the 24 April 2012 communiqué on Sudan and South Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU has also made effective use of high-level ad hoc mechanisms—often composed of current or former heads of state and government—to engage both the parties concerned and international stakeholders at the highest level. Examples include the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan, the High-Level Panel on Côte d’Ivoire, and the High-Level Panel for Egypt.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, the AU has convened international contact groups, to coordinate external engagement and avoid fragmented responses. This approach has been notably used in Guinea, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These experiences show that Africa already has a diverse and effective toolbox. Peace operations are an important part of it—but they are not, and should not become, the dominant one.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Second, peace support operations are not an end in themselves.</strong> They are tools to support political solutions. In intrastate conflicts in particular, they cannot succeed without credible peace processes. Absent such a foundation, even the most robust operations are unlikely to produce lasting results.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The response to terrorism in several parts of Africa illustrates this clearly. While security measures are an imperative, they are not sufficient. In many contexts, the challenge has been compounded by weak governance, lack of inclusion, and abuses during counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Where progress has been achieved, it has not come from military action alone, but from a broader approach combining security efforts with dialogue, reconciliation, and governance reforms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This is why the growing tendency to valorize peace enforcement on the continent should be treated with caution. Without a parallel and credible political strategy, such approaches are unlikely to deliver sustainable outcomes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Third, peace operations are inherently resource- and logistics-intensive.</strong> This explains why, for a long time, African leaders resisted expanding the OAU toolbox to include such operations. This reluctance was clearly reflected in the 1993 <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-decl-3-xxix-e.pdf">Cairo Declaration</a>, which authorized only limited missions in both scope and duration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The shift came later with the PSC Protocol, influenced in large part by the failure—by both the OAU and, more significantly, the UN, which had a mission on the ground—to prevent and stop the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This framework rested on two key assumptions: first, that AU Member States—building on the momentum of the new Union—would provide increased funding for peace and security activities; and second, that the UN would respond positively when called upon to support AU operations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">More than two decades after the launching of the PSC, it is clear that neither assumption has truly held. AU Member States have been unable or unwilling to mobilize the level of resources needed to sustain peace operations, especially large-scale missions. At the same time, UN support has fallen short of expectations. While Security Council <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/nanna/record/4031070/files/S_RES_2719_(2023)-EN.pdf?withWatermark=0&amp;withMetadata=0&amp;registerDownload=1&amp;version=1">resolution 2719</a> represents progress, it did not go as far as the AU had hoped. Moreover, recent reductions in contributions to the UN have further complicated the outlook, forcing deep cuts in current missions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This calls for a more realistic approach. The AU should prioritize smaller, targeted, time-bound operations aligned with its financial capacity and the current global fiscal environment. In this regard, the models outlined in the October 2024 <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/the_future_of_peacekeeping_new_models_and_related_capabilities_-_nov1.pdf">UN study on the future of peacekeeping</a> offer useful guidance. They can be implemented by the AU alone or jointly with the UN in various configurations, including under resolution 2719, and—given their limited scope—also help address the political sensitivities of Member States that may view large-scale deployments as infringements on sovereignty.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a general rule, large multidimensional operations should remain the responsibility of the UN, given its comparative advantages: predictable financing, specialized expertise, strong logistics, and established accountability. The AU should undertake such missions only where the UN is clearly unable or unwilling to act, including in extreme situations such as terrorism or genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Fourth, the effectiveness of peace support operations in Africa depends on a very close </strong><a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Future-of-United-Nations-African-Union-Peacekeeping-Partnership-Practical-Considerations-for-the-Berlin-Ministerial-Conference.pdf">partnership between the AU and the UN</a><strong>. </strong>AU and UN operations are not competing options, but complementary parts of the same multilateral system, each with distinct strengths. Yet, with the progress made by the AU, a view has emerged that it could largely replace the UN, reducing it to a support role—especially in contexts such as terrorism, where traditional peacekeeping faces limits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This view is misleading. The two are not substitutes, but essential partners. The UN retains clear advantages, as noted earlier, while the AU has shown readiness to deploy in complex, high-risk environments despite capacity and funding constraints.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The performance of both organizations is closely linked. Effective UN missions strengthen multilateral approaches that benefit the AU. Successful AU missions strengthen regional solutions, as part of the collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter. Conversely, failure on either side weakens confidence in the broader peace and security architecture.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Against this backdrop, the AU and the UN should prioritize stronger cooperation in support of ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.</em> This serves both sides. UN missions benefit from the AU’s political influence and proximity, as well as from the role of the A3: when African members take the lead in raising mission-related issues, they help keep discussions focused and limit the impact of broader geopolitical tensions. The AU, in turn, has a direct stake in outcomes, as Africa bears the consequences of both success and failure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To this end, the UN should systematically share information on its missions activities and challenges with the AU. This would strengthen African ownership and make it more likely that the AU provides timely and proactive support.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Additionally, consideration should be given to embedding AU liaison teams in UN missions. </em>This would improve understanding of operations and allow the AU to provide more targeted support. In the same spirit, the UN should more systematically involve the AU in the strategic reviews of its missions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>As stressed above, effective peacekeeping must go hand in hand with enhanced peacemaking.</em> This calls for closer coordination between the AU and the UN, including joint envoys or jointly-led contact groups, to bring coherence to increasingly fragmented mediation efforts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Finally, sustaining peacekeeping gains requires greater investment in peacebuilding</em><em>.</em> This means closer AU–UN cooperation on governance to consolidate peace and avert relapse into violence. The aim is to combine the AU’s rich normative framework on governance, democracy, and human rights with the UN’s technical expertise and resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>I would like to conclude by underlining the complexity of the international environment in which Africa navigates</strong><strong>.</strong> This environment, while full of risks, also offers a chance to push for a more inclusive and fair system—but only if Africa first puts its own house in order. This starts with silencing the guns through concrete action, not rhetoric. Peace operations are an important part of that effort.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU already has the necessary tools. Focus should be on delivery, not on endlessly refining instruments. This requires stronger collective discipline and coordination across the AU system—Member States, the Commission, and other organs—grounded in the indivisibility of peace and security on the continent and in a renewed sense of African solidarity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this context, the proposed review of AU peace support operations can be a useful step to focus on implementing existing tools with greater creativity and agility, addressing the critical issue of financing with Member States fully meeting their obligations, and unlocking the untapped potential of the AU–UN partnership, including within the framework of resolution 2719.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I thank you.</p>
<p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/remarks-by-el-ghassim-wane-open-session-of-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-on-the-theme-peace-support-operations-in-africa-addis-ababa-ethiopia-27-april-2026/">Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane: Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: &#8220;Peace Support Operations in Africa&#8221;, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Amani Africa tells the UNSC to deploy preventive measures with urgency and decisiveness to pull South Sudan from the brink</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2025 12:27:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations/Briefings]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>11 November 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africa-tells-the-unsc-to-deploy-preventive-measures-with-urgency-and-decisiveness-to-pull-south-sudan-from-the-brink/">Amani Africa tells the UNSC to deploy preventive measures with urgency and decisiveness to pull South Sudan from the brink</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Amani Africa tells the UNSC to deploy preventive measures with urgency and decisiveness to pull South Sudan from the brink</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 11 November 2025</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-7" data-row="script-row-unique-7" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-7"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-8"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding no-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-22075" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2.jpg" width="1816" height="1020" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2.jpg 1816w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2-300x169.jpg 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2-1024x575.jpg 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2-768x431.jpg 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2-1536x863.jpg 1536w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Solomon-2-350x197.jpg 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1816px) 100vw, 1816px" /></div>
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<p style="text-align: right;">Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD<br />
Founding Director, Amani Africa</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Thank you, Mr President,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to thank you and Sierra Leon’s Presidency for the invitation extended to me to deliver this briefing representing my organisation, Amani Africa Media and Research Services.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to recognise with appreciation the previous briefers, Under-Secretary General Jean-Pierre Lacroix and UN Women Executive Director Sima Bahous.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Amani Africa, a pan-African policy research, training and consulting think tank that works on multilateral policy processes of concern and interest for Africa, is a leading source of information and analysis on conflict situations in Africa on the agenda of both the AU Security Council and this Council.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is therefore an honour for me to draw on Amani Africa’s work for my briefing today.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mr President</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">South Sudan is at a very dangerous crossroads. The country shows all the signs of a clear and present danger of relapsing back to full-scale violent conflict.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Political tension is mounting. Fighting and insecurity are spreading. The dire humanitarian situation is worsening. This Council should therefore heed the African Union (AU) <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/June-Monthly-Digest-2025.pdf">Peace and Security Council</a>’s warning of the potential of ‘full-scale civil war’ in South Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The escalation of political tension and armed fighting since the Nasir incident of March 2025 echoes some of the dynamics that precipitated the relapse of the country back to violent conflict in July 2016.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Similar to 2016 and as documented in the Secretary-General’s report, the deepening political tension manifests itself among others in the purges and replacement of senior officials and detention of others. Apart from aggravating political tension and constitutional uncertainty, these actions constitute, as in 2016, serious violations of the peace agreement, signifying the collapsing of the power-sharing arrangement under the 2018 peace agreement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), the body monitoring the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), observed in <a href="https://www.jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/270-rjmec-quarterly-report-on-the-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2025/file">its report</a> released last month that there is ‘systematic violation of the responsibility-sharing arrangements across all crucial bodies, including functionality of the executive and legislature.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The mounting political tension and constitutional crisis are in part a result of the breakdown of the relationship between the parties to the R-ARCSS and the failure of the international community to ensure its faithful implementation. Significantly, it is also a manifestation of a political scheme for taking a lead position for the elections South Sudan is set to convene at the end of the transition period in December 2026.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Alarmingly, as in 2016 and documented in detail in the Secretary-General’s report, the fighting that erupted between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has continued to escalate and expand.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With these conditions putting the peace agreement in grave peril, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/south-sudan-un-commission-urges-general-assembly-bolster-dialogue-and">UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan</a> concluded that ‘the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement — once seen as a roadmap to stability — risks total collapse, amidst political detentions and escalating conflict.’ It is thus imperative to act on RJMEC’s call that the violations of the peace agreement ‘must be addressed urgently to return the implementation process back on track in order to safeguard the gains of the peace Agreement and <strong>to prevent a relapse to violence in South Sudan</strong>.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tragically, as in 2016 and the Secretary-General’s Report presented today shows, the deteriorating political and security situation is having its heavy toll on civilians, aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation facing them. The spreading and escalating violence is precipitating significant civilian casualties and destruction of critical infrastructure, including health facilities, schools, and public buildings, as well as severe limitations of humanitarian access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2025">OCHA reported</a> that, in addition to the existing two million internally displaced persons, more than 497,000 people were newly displaced between January and September 2025, the vast majority of them, approximately 321,000, due to the renewed conflict. The alarming humanitarian and civilian protection situation is compounded by worsening economic conditions, corruption and disease outbreaks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This clearly attests that South Sudanese civilians are bearing the brunt of the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, underscoring a heightening need for reinforcing measures for the <strong>protection of civilians and humanitarian support</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Mr President, Excellencies, members of the Council </em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The state of the political, security, peace implementation and humanitarian situation indicates that there are at least <strong>three pressing issues</strong> that require the urgent policy action of this Council.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The first of these is <strong>arresting the downward political and security spiral and preventing the relapse of the country back to full-scale civil war</strong>. There is a need for deploying <strong>robust and prompt preventive diplomacy</strong>. This should not aim just at ending the escalating and spreading conflicts. It should also seek to avoid the December 2026 elections from plunging the country into conflict, given the fragility of the context in South Sudan and recent trends on the continent, in which political polarisation erupts into destabilising political crises and violent confrontation during elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The second pressing issue is <strong>restoring the commitment of parties to the 2018 peace agreement</strong> and accelerating the implementation of transitional tasks critical to the peaceful conclusion of the transition period with the convening of peaceful and credible elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third, the imperative to expand support to the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), particularly in terms of the implementation of the measures required for both enhancing <strong>protection of civilians</strong> and advancing sub-national peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Regarding <strong>conflict prevention</strong>, there are four actions available to this Council. First, I cannot emphasise enough the importance of this Council expressing and availing its full support to the role and ongoing efforts of <strong>the AU and the trilateral mechanism (UN-AU-IGAD)</strong> plus RJMEC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, and perhaps importantly, this Council needs to exercise its enormous influence to nudge the parties into both ending unilateral actions endangering the peace of the country and engaging in dialogue. The Council can accomplish this directly on its own <strong>by undertaking a field mission</strong> to South Sudan and engaging the parties, building on the AU Peace and Security Council&#8217;s field mission in August 2025.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third and complementing the foregoing, this Council may encourage the UN Secretary-General, together with the AU Commission Chairperson, to deploy a joint <strong>high-level preventive diplomacy</strong> initiative under the UN-AU Joint Framework Partnership for peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fourth, and to advance trust building between the parties to the peace agreement, this Council may call for an independent investigation of incidents of violations of the revitalised peace agreement, including the March 2025 incident in Nasir, through a mechanism that is put in place by the UN-AU-IGAD and hold perpetrators of the violations accountable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Regarding the <strong>protection of civilians</strong>, I urge the Council to take the following measures. First, to call on all armed actors involved in fighting in South Sudan to cease all hostilities and on the two parties to the revitalised peace agreement to restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, the Council should call for respect for all rules of international humanitarian law and human rights by all armed actors and demand that armed actors lift the humanitarian access restrictions they imposed and assure the safety of humanitarian workers to enable the urgent delivery of assistance to the affected communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third and finally, this august body should also expand, rather than cut down, support for UNMISS and task the Mission to elevate its preparedness for meeting the surge in the need for civilian protection in South Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mr President, Excellencies</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">South Sudanese endured so much suffering for far too long. They cannot afford the perpetuation of the status quo, let alone the addition to their suffering. They deserve some respite. The least of which that can be done in this respect is to spare them from yet another descent of the country into full-scale war.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Prevention of the continuation of the downward spiral of South Sudan is also a regional and international peace and security imperative. With neighbouring Sudan under the grip of a brutal war, the region and international peace and security cannot afford the relapse of South Sudan back to full-scale conflict.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the fact that current global and regional dynamics make your role unenviable, taking the measures listed above and putting South Sudan on a path of concluding its transition peacefully are not beyond your abilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I urge you to act with urgency and decisiveness, and deliver for South Sudanese civilians yearning to be spared from further suffering, by preventing South Sudan’s collapse back to full-scale civil war.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I thank you for your attention!</p>
<p>
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		<title>Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Miguel César Domingos Bembe Permanent representative of the Republic of Angola to the African Union and chairman of the committee of permanent representatives on the occasion of the African policy dialogue</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/statement-by-his-excellency-ambassador-miguel-cesar-domingos-bembe-permanent-representative-of-the-republic-of-angola-to-the-african-union-and-chairman-of-the-committee-of-permanent-representatives-on/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2025 10:25:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations/Briefings]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=20767</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>27 February 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/statement-by-his-excellency-ambassador-miguel-cesar-domingos-bembe-permanent-representative-of-the-republic-of-angola-to-the-african-union-and-chairman-of-the-committee-of-permanent-representatives-on/">Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Miguel César Domingos Bembe Permanent representative of the Republic of Angola to the African Union and chairman of the committee of permanent representatives on the occasion of the African policy dialogue</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-10"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<span class="btn-container" ><a role="button"  href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Statement-by-His-Excellency-Ambassador-Miguel-Cesar-Domingos-Bembe-Permanent-representative-of-the-Republic-of-Angola-to-the-African-Union.pdf" class="custom-link btn border-width-0 btn-default btn-icon-left"><i class="fa fa-file-pdf-o"></i>Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Miguel César Domingos Bembe Permanent representative of the Republic of Angola to the African Union and chairman of the committee of permanent representatives on the occasion of the African policy dialogue</a></span></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-10" data-row="script-row-unique-10" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-10"));</script></div></div></div>
</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/statement-by-his-excellency-ambassador-miguel-cesar-domingos-bembe-permanent-representative-of-the-republic-of-angola-to-the-african-union-and-chairman-of-the-committee-of-permanent-representatives-on/">Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Miguel César Domingos Bembe Permanent representative of the Republic of Angola to the African Union and chairman of the committee of permanent representatives on the occasion of the African policy dialogue</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ms Mu Letsie Deputy permanent representative of the Republic of South Africa on the occasion of Policy dialogue on The outcomes of the 38th AU Summit: Turning point for repositioning the AU for a new era?</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/ms-mu-letsie-deputy-permanent-representative-of-the-republic-of-south-africa-on-the-occasion-of-policy-dialogue-on-the-outcomes-of-the-38th-au-summit-turning-point-for-repositioning-the-au-for-a-new/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2025 10:02:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations/Briefings]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=20762</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>27 February 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/ms-mu-letsie-deputy-permanent-representative-of-the-republic-of-south-africa-on-the-occasion-of-policy-dialogue-on-the-outcomes-of-the-38th-au-summit-turning-point-for-repositioning-the-au-for-a-new/">Ms Mu Letsie Deputy permanent representative of the Republic of South Africa on the occasion of Policy dialogue on The outcomes of the 38th AU Summit: Turning point for repositioning the AU for a new era?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-11"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<span class="btn-container" ><a role="button"  href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Ms-Mu-Letsie-Deputy-permanent-representative-of-the-Republic-of-South-Africa-on-the-occasion-of-Policy-dialogue-on-The-outcomes-of-the-38th-AU-Summit-Turning-point-for-repositioning-the-AU-for-a-new-era.pdf" class="custom-link btn border-width-0 btn-default btn-icon-left"><i class="fa fa-file-pdf-o"></i>Ms Mu Letsie Deputy permanent representative of the Republic of South Africa on the occasion of Policy dialogue on The outcomes of the 38th AU Summit: Turning point for repositioning the AU for a new era?</a></span></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-11" data-row="script-row-unique-11" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-11"));</script></div></div></div>
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		<title>Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africa-briefing-to-the-1252nd-session-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-silencing-the-guns-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Dec 2024 15:18:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations/Briefings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=19964</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>18 December 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africa-briefing-to-the-1252nd-session-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-silencing-the-guns-in-africa/">Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-12"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 custom fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-jevc-color fontsize-213696-custom font-size-custom" ><span><strong>Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252<sup>nd</sup> session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 18 December 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD<br />
Founding Director, Amani Africa</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, Ambassador Abdi Mohamoud Eyeb,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A very good morning to you all.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is an honor for me to address you today representing my organization Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an organization that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security through <strong>supporting the noble mandate of this august house</strong>. our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Chairperson, Ambassador Adeoye, your excellencies members of the PSC,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to commend you for dedicating today’s session for reviewing the state of implementation of African Union’s (AU) flagship project of silencing the guns.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It cannot be disputed that silencing the guns is the most pressing policy agenda of the AU that demands the utmost attention and urgent collective action of the entire African Union system under the leadership of this Council.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">What informs the issues that are highlighted and the policy proposals presented in my address today are this urgency and supreme importance of achieving registering irreversible progress for silencing the guns in Africa.  In drawing attention to these issues and outlining the proposals, I will be drawing on our recent major research report titled <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/MEMO-TO-THE-NEW-AU-COMMISSION-LEADERSHIP.pdf">Memo to the new AU Commission leadership from the roaring guns on AU’s first decade of silencing the guns</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Before moving further, it is important to underscore the importance of the critical role of the AU and this Council for achieving progress towards silencing the guns. Without the AU and this Council, it is not difficult to imagine how dire the peace and security situation on the continent would have been and how untenable it would have been to even conceive of silencing the guns.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As we have pointed out in our study, the state of the peace and security situation on out continent ‘makes the AU and its standing decision-making organ, the PSC, more critical than ever. With rising global geopolitical tensions and a weakened multilateral system, the effective functioning of the AU and its PSC is now a strategic imperative for Africa.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The first key message of this major research report, a product of more than a year of research and analysis on the first ten-year of silencing the guns, is that <strong>silencing the guns is more deeply pressing today than a decade ago when it was adopted. </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the efforts of the AU and various AU stakeholders and the progress registered in some cases, our report established that conflicts and crises have shown exponential increase during the decade since the launch of Silencing the Guns in Africa. Our analysis of the number of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC during the decade since 2013 highlighted the increase in conflict and crisis situations in Africa by nearly threefold. This is further substantiated by our analysis of global conflict datasets, which adduce data showing the alarming spike in conflict events on the continent, with the compound annual growth rate of conflicts in Africa at a staggering 9.6%. While the level of increase is not the same, our study established that the increase is across conflict types, including state-based conflicts, one-sided conflicts, non-state conflicts and internationalised conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Not only has the number of conflicts alarmingly increased, but their geographic spread and humanitarian and socio-economic impacts have also exploded. Many more territories on the continent are affected by conflicts and crises today than when silencing the guns was launched. The number of people that bear the brunt of wars and crises on the continent has increased by many folds during the past ten years and reached a level larger than the highest number of people affected by conflict during the past six decades in absolute terms. Beyond and above the large number of lives these conflicts have claimed and displacements they have precipitated, Africa has lost enormous resources and treasures to the devastating impacts of these conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As our report put it, these conditions turned the first ten years of silencing the guns into <strong>the years of the roaring guns</strong>. The increase in the number of conflicts, their geographic spread and the severity of their impacts are making a mockery of AU’s agenda of STGs. There is no clear sign of this state of affairs changing as the AU embarked on the second phase of the STGs. The various sources of data and the accompanying analysis suggest that the approach to STGs pursued during the first ten-year period had largely failed. In his address to the opening session of the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 17 February 2024, the AU Commission Chairperson candidly painted the grim state of the situation when asking, ‘How should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries, without doing anything? How can we accept just watching African countries destroyed, entire Regions engulfed by tremours and Tsunamis, without doing anything significant?’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Our conclusion, excellencies from this bleak picture is not that silencing the guns is doomed. Nor is that we should give up on the agenda of silencing the guns.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Our conclusion is that the nature and scale of conflicts in some of the regions affected by these conflicts is such that they pose existential threat to the affected peoples and countries. This is <strong>particularly</strong> true today in the countries of the Sahel affected by conflicts involving terrorist groups and in Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Our conclusion is that the increase in the number of conflicts and the scale and consequences of the conflicts and crises has reached <strong>emergency levels</strong>. We are not being hyperbolic in making this assertion. It is how those affected experience these conditions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Our conclusion is that the business-as-usual approach to peace and security adopted thus far in pursuing the goal of silencing the guns is not working.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Our conclusion is that STGs has to entail a more effective mobilisation of collective action for ending violent conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones in order to register <strong>irreversible progress</strong> towards silencing the guns by 2030.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Our conclusion is that <strong>targeted policy action</strong> must be deployed in two ways: one <strong>for resolving ongoing violent conflicts</strong> and another for <strong>preventing</strong> the risks of eruption of new conflicts or relapse back to conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Excellencies,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this background, we outline below some of the recommendations distilled from our report:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify;">There is a need for a strategic review of the situation on the continent and the issues impeding the effective role of the AU and the APSA in pursuing the agenda of STGs. Such a strategic review should be one of the priorities of the AU for 2025, and it is our submission that such a review should be accompanied by a <strong>special summit of the AU</strong> under the new leadership of the AU Commission.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The PSC needs to designate the most serious conflict situations as reaching <strong>emergency levels and constituting existential threats to the affected peoples and states</strong>. This is particularly true with respect to conflicts in the Sahel and Sudan. This necessitates the establishment of <strong>an emergency situation room dedicated to these situations</strong> with a high-level task force with the responsibility for mobilising response measures that involve <strong>a mix of</strong> stabilisation, peace enforcement and peacebuilding capacities that leverage and are deployed along with livelihood supporting and economic opportunity enhancing development interventions as well as negotiation, mediation and reconciliation.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The PSC needs to call for <strong>the development of</strong> a conflict management and resolution strategy tailored to each conflict situation backed by the requisite technical, diplomatic and financial resources. The strategy needs not only to ensure the design and use of conflict resolution tools tailored to the specificities of each conflict situation informed by such strategy but also to provide guidance on the means and methods of ensuring the effectiveness of the use of such tools.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">There is a need to pay increasing attention to inter-communal conflicts that constitute the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa. This necessitates enhancing the development and use of peace and security tools tailored to addressing such non-state conflicts. Of interest in this respect is the need for enhancing the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends through the Continental Early Warning system. It also necessitates the enhanced use of interventions that target the impacts of climate change, enhance peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms between diverse communities and deliver livelihood-enhancing and other adaptation and resilience-enhancing support.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">There is clearly a need for a much forceful and proactive approach to conflict prevention if new conflicts are to be presented from erupting. This entails that the AU and RECs/RMs as well as international organizations such as the UN and partners are able to effectively map situations that face risks of violent conflict and initiate timely policy intervention to prevent such risks from materializing.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">There is also a need to reinvigorate the use of AU-led peace support operations on the basis of the ASF. Since the deployment of the last major AU-led peace support operations in CAR and Mali, a vacuum has emerged, leading to the proliferation of ad hoc missions which are not fully anchored on the APSA and have the unintended consequence of undermining the use of AU-led peace support operations. Accordingly, AU needs <strong>to assert its leadership role</strong> in deploying peace support operations as it did some years back and leverage Resolution 2719, which affirms AU’s leadership role in peace support operations.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">We also propose foregrounding political solutions and diplomacy as the primary means of silencing the guns and thus addressing the governance and institutional fragilities and weaknesses that create the conditions both for the expansion of the terrorist threat on the continent and the eruption of violent conflicts. The PSC and the AU need to reinvigorate the primacy of diplomacy and, to this end, call for the development and implementation of a strategy that clearly establishes the range of AU diplomatic instruments and, bolsters their effectiveness and enhances their use as primary means of advancing peace and security and pursuing silencing the guns.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The PSC may call for the development of <strong>guidelines on negotiation and dialogue for peace</strong> in conflict situations involving <strong>terrorist groups</strong>. Currently, the use of such peace and security tools (negotiation and dialogue) is frowned upon due to the exclusion of such tools in the context of the global war against terrorism. There is now a recognition that an approach that excludes negotiation and dialogue does not yield success. As such, the guidelines that the AU develops, using its well-established norm development role, help in providing guidance on how to pursue negotiation and dialogue with terrorist groups with regard to the delicate issue of de-radicalization, accountability for and reconciliation with affected members of communities.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The PSC and the AU broadly ill afford to continue the current path of sustaining the bare minimum of their functions and increasingly contested credibility. The PSC and the AU need <strong>to reinvigorate the assumption of their leadership role </strong>in not only outlining well-grounded political solutions for the resolution of conflicts but also in mobilising the level of consensus and support from member states and other key stakeholders necessary for advancing the implementation of such political solutions supported by relevant peace and security instruments of the APSA.</li>
</ol>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africa-briefing-to-the-1252nd-session-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-silencing-the-guns-in-africa/">Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Amani Africa&#8217;s UN Security Council briefing points out the need to rectify the inadequate state of AU-UN partnership</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africas-un-security-council-briefing-points-out-the-need-to-rectify-the-inadequate-state-of-au-un-partnership/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Oct 2023 05:09:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations/Briefings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=15920</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>12 October 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africas-un-security-council-briefing-points-out-the-need-to-rectify-the-inadequate-state-of-au-un-partnership/">Amani Africa&#8217;s UN Security Council briefing points out the need to rectify the inadequate state of AU-UN partnership</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-13"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter no-top-padding no-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-single" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Amani Africa&#8217;s UN Security Council briefing points out the need to rectify the inadequate state of AU-UN partnership</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 12 October 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD<br />
Founding Director, Amani Africa</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Thank you, Mr. President,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to thank Brazil’s Presidency for the invitation extended to me to deliver this briefing on behalf of my organization Amani Africa Media and Research Services.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to recognize with appreciation the previous briefers my dear brother SRSG Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Head of UN Office to the AU and H.E. Ambassador Fatima K. Mohammed, Permanent Representative of the AU permanent Observer Mission to the UN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Amani Africa, a pan-African policy research, training and consulting think tank that works on multilateral policy processes of concern and interest for Africa, is the leading source of information and analysis on matters of the African Union (AU) in general and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in particular, including AU’s strategic partnership with United Nations (UN).<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup>1</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is accordingly a particular honour for me to draw on our work for my briefing today.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mr President,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At this historic moment,<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup>2</sup></a> deepening the partnership between the UN and the AU is not a matter of choice nor is it just something nice to do. We believe that this is rather a pre-requisite for delivering on the peace and security and development objectives of the UN Charter.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There is a pressing and growing need both for more crisis management and for enhanced effectiveness of crisis management more today than earlier times. No single actor can meet these pressing demands alone. The continued relevance of the UN and the AU in the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa depends on them pulling their comparative advantages together and systematically coordinating their actions across files and portfolios.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN Secretary-General’s ‘Our Common Agenda’ affirms that regional organizations ‘fill a critical gap in our global peace and security architecture’. His report on UN-AU partnership highlights that there is no other organization that better reflects these attributes than the AU.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yet, the state of UN-AU partnership is far from adequate for the AU to effectively fill in this critical gap. As we pointed out in one of our <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/africa-and-peace-and-security-diplomacy-in-a-time-of-the-new-agenda-for-peace/">recent work</a>, one manifestation of this inadequacy is the lack of <strong>a systematic and institutionalized global arrangement</strong> for harnessing the full potential and role of the AU as part of the global collective security system anchored on the UN Charter.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Thus, despite the progress registered in UN-AU partnership, the mobilization of responses largely reflects ‘ad hoc and a case-by-case basis’ approach. They are unable to collaboratively institute ‘peace support operations that not only have stabilization and peace enforcement mandates and capabilities but also are willing and able to act on their peace enforcement mandates,’<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup>3</sup></a> that the security conditions warrant.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Critical to elevating the AU-UN partnership in this context is to establish <strong>a systematic and institutionalized arrangement, affirming the peace and security tools of the AU as part of the toolkit of the global collective security system under the UN Charter</strong>. This echoes the Secretary-General’s proposal for this Council to break new ground through ‘a new generation of African Union-led, United Nations- supported peace operations on the African continent that blend the respective strength of both organizations in a manner that prioritizes political solutions and maximizes the impact of both uniformed and civilian capabilities.’ A corollary to and an essential part of this institutionalized arrangement is the shift that this Council also has to make, as the SG put it, from considering the use of UN assessed contributions for AU -led PSOs ‘as exceptional circumstances’ to one that must be ‘considered in a more systematic manner’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mr President,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Today, elevating UN-AU partnership to a higher level is also a strategic imperative for the effective functioning of multilateralism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The deepening polarization in the world, particularly among major powers, is among the key factors for the increasing fracturing of the multilateral system. The AU, whose member state make up 28 % of the UN has unique reservoir of potential for playing a moderation role in the face of such polarization. Tapping into this moderating role of the AU (and Africa’s positionality as <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/survey-shows-most-people-still-want-to-live-in-democratic-countries-by-mark-malloch-brown-2023-09">the future of multilateralism</a>) through the UN-AU partnership is key not just for arresting the fracturing of the multilateral system but also for making it fit for purpose. Our <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/africa-and-peace-and-security-diplomacy-in-a-time-of-the-new-agenda-for-peace/">recent work</a> thus emphasizes the need to bring ‘regional multilateral organizations like the AU to the center of the global peace and security diplomacy in a systematic way rather than on an ad hoc basis.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, Mr President, the AU-UN partnership needs to enhance their focus on the socio-economic and development dimensions of the maintenance of international peace and security. It is now widely accepted that the SDGs and peace and security are deeply intertwined. Achieving the SDGs for member states of the AU is also directly tied to the reform of the multilateral financial system. Africa pays a 500% premium on borrowing from the market and a reform could save Africa as much as $56 billion, expanding access for much needed resources to meet the SDGs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On addressing immediate concerns, we wish to draw the attention of this Council to the urgent need to put in place a mechanism for addressing the growing and catastrophic humanitarian crisis occasioned by the raging war in Sudan. The UN’s humanitarian chief sounded the alarm with the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/war-and-hunger-could-destroy-sudan-statement-martin-griffiths-under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-enar#:~:text=A%20protracted%20conflict%20in%20Sudan,and%20psychological%20scars%20of%20war.">extraordinary warning</a> that ‘war and hunger could destroy Sudan.’ The situation continues to deteriorate with devastating consequences to civilians. We welcome the call that the UNSC and PSC made in the communique of their 17<sup>th</sup> annual consultative meeting. Yet, pending the emergence of an effective ceasefire and broader peace process, the UN and the AU need to put in place a mechanism dedicated to ameliorating the humanitarian emergency and the plight of civilians along the lines that we outlined in our briefing to the Peace and Security Council on 29 September 2023.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mr President, your excellencies members of the UN Security Council, I would like to express our appreciation for inviting us to brief you. Indeed, my briefing to you a testament to your willingness to leverage the perspectives of research organizations including those from the continent whose work is dedicated to the issues under your consideration, which I commend wholeheartedly.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I thank you for your kind attention!<a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"></a></p>
<p>
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<div class="uncode_text_column text-small" ><p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup>1</sup></a> Together with the Republic of Namibia, we are leading a high-level process on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’, see <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/events/africa-and-the-transformation-of-the-multilateral-system-side-event-at-unga-78/?occurrence=2023-09-26">https://amaniafrica-et.org/events/africa-and-the-transformation-of-the-multilateral-system-side-event-at-unga-78/?occurrence=2023-09-26</a> and <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Press-Release-Namibia-and-Amani-Africa.pdf">https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Press-Release-Namibia-and-Amani-Africa.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup>2</sup></a> Characterised by multipolarity and low level of trust among global powers, increasingly complex and deadlier conflicts and the growing to prominence of new and emerging threats to peace and security – See Amani Africa, Africa and Peace and Security Diplomacy in a time of the New Agenda for Peace, Policy Brief (June 2023) available on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/africa-and-peace-and-security-diplomacy-in-a-time-of-the-new-agenda-for-peace/">https://amaniafrica-et.org/africa-and-peace-and-security-diplomacy-in-a-time-of-the-new-agenda-for-peace/</a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup>3</sup></a> Amani Africa, ‘Seizing the New Momentum for UNSC Resolution on UN funding of AU Peace Operations’ (May 2023), available on: <a href="https://bit.ly/433Xsp6">https://bit.ly/433Xsp6</a></p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/amani-africas-un-security-council-briefing-points-out-the-need-to-rectify-the-inadequate-state-of-au-un-partnership/">Amani Africa&#8217;s UN Security Council briefing points out the need to rectify the inadequate state of AU-UN partnership</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Authorizing use of UN assessed contributions for AU PSOs is about fulfilling UN Charter&#8217;s most fundamental pledge, Amani Africa tells the UN Security Council</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/authorizing-use-of-un-assessed-contributions-for-au-psos-is-about-fulfilling-un-charters-most-fundamental-pledge-amani-africa-tells-the-un-security-council/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 May 2023 12:39:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations/Briefings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=14664</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>25 May 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/authorizing-use-of-un-assessed-contributions-for-au-psos-is-about-fulfilling-un-charters-most-fundamental-pledge-amani-africa-tells-the-un-security-council/">Authorizing use of UN assessed contributions for AU PSOs is about fulfilling UN Charter&#8217;s most fundamental pledge, Amani Africa tells the UN Security Council</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Authorizing use of UN assessed contributions for AU PSOs is about fulfilling UN Charter&#8217;s most fundamental pledge, Amani Africa tells the UN Security Council</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 25 May 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-14667" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNSC-image-1.jpg" width="1104" height="857" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNSC-image-1.jpg 1104w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNSC-image-1-300x233.jpg 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNSC-image-1-1024x795.jpg 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNSC-image-1-768x596.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1104px) 100vw, 1104px" /></div>
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<h3 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Amani Africa Statement delivered to the United Nations Security Council</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Thank you, Madame President.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to thank the Swiss Presidency for this invitation to address the Council on my behalf and on behalf of my organization Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Amani Africa is a pan-African policy research, training and consulting think-tank that works on multilateral processes on peace and security and democratic and constitutional rule in Africa with a focus on the role of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council (PSC). <sup>1 </sup>It is an honor for me to draw on and use the rich research work of my organization in addressing you today. <sup>2</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Madame President, distinguished members of the Council</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We would like to propose that at its core the subject of this session is not about money. Rather, it is first and foremost about the kind of arrangement that can best deliver on the pledge of the UN Charter of ‘saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ at a time when existing arrangements and tools for delivering on this promise have been found wanting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At various junctures in its 78 years history, this Security Council had to make bold decisions for adapting the arrangements and tools for the maintenance of international peace and security to the challenges of each era. Although not always successful, there is no doubt that they give the UN the fighting chance for doing better in its efforts towards ‘saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Considering the nature of the peace and security challenges facing Africa, which account for 60 % of the decisions of this Council, it is the moment to make the necessary decision for adapting the arrangement and the tools for the realization of the Charter’s most fundamental pledge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This the Council can achieve by heeding the UN Secretary-General’s call in the report presented today for the ‘Security Council to signal its clear support for providing African Union peace support operations with access to the United Nations assessed contributions.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As discussed in some detail in Amani Africa’s special research report <sup>3</sup>, the question of financing of AU PSOs has been an important part of the policy discourse on international peace and security in Africa for nearly fifteen years. At the turn of the century, the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council was cognizant of the necessity for resort to the use of UN assessed contributions. This was premised on the fundamental recognition that when the AU deploys peace support operations with UNSC Chapter VII authorization, it does so as part of the arrangement deemed necessary and in pursuit of the global public good for the maintenance of international peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The experiences witnessed in the use of AU PSOs under this Council’s authorization have made it clear that the full potential of this arrangement (AU led UN authorized PSOs) can only be realized if AU PSOs are provided with sustainable, predictable and flexible funding. This Council has on many occasions affirmed the imperative for such funding. <sup>4</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This Council has actually deployed assessed contributions for funding AU peace support operations, <sup>5 </sup>although in each instance as an exception. Following Resolution 2320 (2016) and Resolution 2378 (2017) as well as Presidential Statement of 31 August 2022 that requested the preparation of the Secretary-General’s Report presented today, I wish to indicate that the Secretary-General is spot on in stating that this is ‘an opportune, timely moment for the United Nations Security Council to rise to the challenge of laying the foundation for a new generation of African Union-led, United Nations-supported peace support operations on the African continent.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On whether the institutional and technical work accomplished is good enough for such action, solid enough progress has been made albeit with some areas requiring further consolidation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There is significant progress with respect to compliance framework for AUs peace support operations pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017). <sup>6</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU has also established a unit dedicated to compliance. <sup>7 </sup>This can be strengthened further.  The implementation of the compliance standards can also be enhanced with further support.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With respect to burden sharing, institutionally the most critical development is the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund dedicated to mobilizing funds from within the continent for financing AU’s peace and security work. <sup>8</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Although the question is framed narrowly in monetary terms, there are questions about giving considerations to the enormous price that AU personnel pay with their lives and limbs and the resultant financial, social and other costs that result from such loss to the families, communities and institutions that these personnel are part of.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The use of UN assessed contribution is the avenue for crafting, along the lines outlined in the Secretary-General’s report and the AU Consensus Paper, that arrangement and the accompanying combination of tools required for this era to give the UN, working in concert with the AU, the fighting chance to make meaningful effort towards the promise of the Charter to save ‘succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The conflict situations in various parts of the continent, including those in which the major UN peacekeeping operations are currently engaged, require the use of the combination of peace enforcement, stabilization and peacebuilding instruments. Lacking the combination of these tools and the doctrinal space for using some of these tools, UN missions in the CAR, DRC and Mali have come to face enormous challenges.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the progress made in Somalia, under AU’s mission there, clearly attests, AU PSOs are willing, and when properly resourced, able to use peace enforcement for creating conditions for peace. In similar conflict situations, AU PSOs financed through UN assessed contribution can be the necessary alternative to UN peacekeeping.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Madame President,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At a time when there is apathy to using UN peacekeeping, using AU PSOs offers this Council the avenue for preventing the emergence of such a dangerous vacuum for security arrangements that don’t operate on the basis of multilateral principles.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The future of multilateralism lies in Africa. The interest of the peoples of the African continent is best served under a multilateral system even when it is imperfect. As Nkrumah said 60 years ago ‘although confidence in the United Nations has suffered several shocks since its foundation, …, it remains the only world organization in which the many problems of the world have a chance of finding reasonable solution.’ His endorsement of multilateralism within the framework of the UN is so absolute that he was emphatic that the UN ‘must, therefore, be supported by all interested in the preservation of peace and the progress of human civilization.’ <sup>9</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Madame President, excellencies members of the Council</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The adoption of the framework resolution on the use of UN assessed contributions for AU PSOs will contribute materially to restoring Africa’s faith in the multilateral system as forcefully put by Nkrumah and facilitate the harnessing of the enormous reservoir of support for multilateralism in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Moreover, the use of UN assessed contributions within agreed institutional arrangement jointly worked out by the AU and the UN offers the best framework for AU’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security to be one that meets the expectations of the UN Charter. All indications are AU-led PSOs financed by UN assessed contributions are cost effective.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This is not about writing a blank cheque nor is it a matter of charity. Doing this is rather about this Council crafting the framework for shouldering its part of the responsibility in the shared global public good of maintaining peace and security in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Africa is looking up to this Council. It is our firm believe that this Council will rise to the occasion and muster the will for demonstrating, as the Secretary-General puts it, its ‘readiness to address a critical gap in the international peace and security architecture as well as strong reaffirmation of the willingness of this council to stem the scourge of armed conflict on the African continent.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I thank you for your kind attention!</p>
<p>______________________________________</p>
<p><sup>1 </sup> We are the leading source of information and analysis on matters the Peace and Security Council, including its role in projecting Africa’s voice, in concert with the three African members, in this august body. Some examples of Amani Africa’s products in this area include: ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/financing-peace-and-security-in-africa-breakthrough-in-increased-african-ownership/">Financing Peace and Security in Africa: Breakthrough in Increased African Ownership?</a>’ (July 2017); ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-internal-institutional-setup-and-working-processes-shaping-the-relationship-between-the-aupsc-and-the-unsc/">The Internal Institutional Setup and Working Processes Shaping the Relationship between the AUPSC and the UNSC</a>’ (December 2019); ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/making-africas-voice-matter-in-the-un-security-council-bridging-the-gap-between-ambition-and-reality-in-the-role-of-the-african-three-members-of-the-unsc/">Making Africa’s Voice Matter in the UN Security Council: Bridging the Gap Between Ambition and Reality in the Role of the African Three Members of the UNSC</a>’ (March 2021); and ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/seizing-the-new-momentum-for-unsc-resolution-on-un-funding-of-au-peace-operations/">Seizing the New Momentum for UNSC Resolution on UN funding of AU Peace Operations</a>’ (May 2023).</p>
<p><sup>2</sup> I will particularly draw on the report we launched the week before last titled ‘Seizing the new momentum for the adoption of UNSC Resolution on UN funding of AU PSOs’. As you can see from the sources cited in this latest special research report, Amani Africa closely followed the policy discussion on this file since the very first special research report it produced on this file in mid 2017.</p>
<p><sup>3 </sup>Amani Africa, ‘Seizing the New Momentum for UNSC Resolution on UN funding of AU Peace Operations’ (May 2023), available on: <a href="https://bit.ly/433Xsp6">https://bit.ly/433Xsp6</a></p>
<p><sup>4</sup> Various expert bodies established under the authority of this Council have also on several occasions indicated that one most viable, if not exclusive, option in this respect is the use of UN assessed contributions.  United Nations, “Note to the Secretary General: Follow up to the AU-UN Panel (Prodi Report)”, 5 May 2009 and Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (17 June 2015).</p>
<p><sup>5 </sup>It did so for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as part of the plan to facilitate its transition to the joint UN-AU mission. It has done so and still does for the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS).</p>
<p><sup>6 </sup>First, in addition to broad normative commitments, the AU adopted specific policy instruments including the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) for PSOs. Second, through the AU-UN-EU tripartite project, the AU has also developed its strategic framework for compliance and accountability, which was adopted earlier this month at a ministerial meeting, where the AU policy on selection and screening of PSO personnel was also adopted. There has also been deliberate integration of IHL in the various mission documents prepared by the AU Commission including Concepts of Operations (CONOPs), Rules of Engagement (ROE), Force commanders’ directives and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Police/Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs). At mission level, the AU developed the Indirect Fire Policy of AMISOM, which has contributed to the reduction of civilian harm, and through the establishment of no fire zones and setting up restrictions on the modalities of use of specific weapons. The Board of Inquiry and the Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) are the other tools critical to giving effect to the compliance policy of the AU. There are also instructive experiences of convening marshal courts for holding non-complying personnel accountable.</p>
<p><sup>7 </sup>At a time when our founding director led an assessment of AU’s experience with compliance through field mission including to AMISOM and MNJTF in 2018, one of the gaps identified was the absence of such a dedicated capacity.  See <em>report submitted by Solomon A. Dersso to AU PSOD on ‘Comprehensive Assessment of AU Mandated and Authorized Peace Support Operations (PSOs) Approaches to Compliance with Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Conduct and Discipline Standards: Towards a System Wide AU PSOs Compliance Framework’.</em></p>
<p><sup>8</sup> Three major developments are worth noting in this respect. First, unlike in the past, the scale of assessment of member states serves as a dedicated mechanism to resource the Fund. Second, significant progress has been made towards the operationalization of the Fund through instituting the governance and management structures of the Fund. With the recent appointment of the head of the PF Secretariat, the full operationalization of the Peace Fund is at its final stages. Third, the AU adopted the Consensus Paper on financing of PSOs presenting Africa’s position and the progress made in meeting Resolution 2320 (2016) and Resolution 2378 (2017).</p>
<p><sup>9 </sup><em>Africa Must Unite</em>.</p>
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		<title>Critical reflections on continental policy approaches to prevention of violent extremism and terrorism in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/critical-reflections-on-continental-policy-approaches-to-prevention-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-africa/</link>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>28 February 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/critical-reflections-on-continental-policy-approaches-to-prevention-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-africa/">Critical reflections on continental policy approaches to prevention of violent extremism and terrorism in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Critical reflections on continental policy approaches to prevention of violent extremism and terrorism in Africa</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 28 February 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ><p><strong>From presentation by Solomon Ayele Dersso at &#8216;Le Grand Rendez-vous 2023 &#8211; PVE in West and Central Africa: Realities and Perspectives held in Dakar, Senegal on 28 February &#8211; 2 March 2023</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would like to start by thanking the organizers of this event for the kind invitation extended to Amani Africa to be part of this important and timely convening. I also would like to thank the earlier speakers for their edifying address.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Amani Africa is a pan-African policy research, training and consulting thank tank that works on the promotion of effective policy responses to threats to peace and security in Africa through multilateral bodies on the continent, particularly the African Union (AU). The specific focus of our work on the role of African peace and security institutions, most notably the AU, means that the issue that is the subject of this conference has, over the course of the past several years, become a major area of preoccupation. We have produced analysis on the various peace support operations that are engaged in counter terrorism operations including those in West and Central Africa regions. We have also provided analysis on the AU Peace and Security Council meetings focusing on terrorism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is against this background that we produced one of our major policy research works in May 2022 as critical input to the extraordinary summit of the AU held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on terrorism and violent extremism.  Titled ‘<a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-Africa-A-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response.pdf">The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response</a>?’, this special research report serves as the basis for my remarks for this high-level panel.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Apart from the interest to inform the policy debate of the AU extraordinary summit on the issue, a major factor for this research work was the fact that the epicenter of terrorism shifted from other parts of the world to Africa. During the past decade terrorism has come to constitute the major threat to peace and security in Africa in two ways.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">First, the frequency and fatality of the violence of conflicts involving terrorist groups have been on the rise on the continent. Civilians are bearing the brunt of much of these the violence mostly from terrorist attacks and from counter terrorism operations as well. By the counts of AU’s Algiers based <a href="https://au.int/pt/node/24871">African Centre on the study of terrorism</a>, Africa witnessed a 400% and 237% rises in attacks and deaths respectively between 2012 and 2020.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This rise in the frequency and fatality of violence in conflicts involving terrorism is particularly the case in recent years in the Sahel and Central Africa regions, which are the focus of this conference. For the Sahel for example, the most current data shows that deadly violence has surged by 22 percent, with fatalities spiking by as much as 50% in 2022.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, geographically, the threat of terrorism was very limited, of not non-existent, in West and Central Africa regions until the late 2000s. When the AU Commission Chairperson produced the first report on the threat of terrorism in Africa, for example, the threat was confined to pockets of East Africa and North Africa. During the past decade, the threat of terrorism spread across the five regions of the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Today, West Africa and Central Africa have become main sites of conflicts involving terrorism. Demonstrating the continuing expansion of this threat, including emerging signs of terrorist activities in littoral states of West Africa, Ghana’s President <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/22/sahel-conflict-could-engulf-west-africa-ghana-president">warned</a> in a meeting last November that the ‘worsening situation …threatens to engulf the entire West Africa.’ Indeed, incidents of attacks have already been reported in Benin, Cot d’Ivoire, and Togo.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What were the policy responses to the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa?  </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in his address to the AU summit in Malabo last May, from Somalia to the Sahel, Lake Chad basin and Mozambique the AU and regional bodies deployed various military operations. According to our research report, analysis of the policy decisions of the AU both at the level of the AU Assembly and that of the PSC show that between 2010 and 2022, some <strong>nine hard security instruments</strong> <strong>or initiatives </strong>have been mobilized to deal with terrorism hotspots across the continent. This is without counting the various security initiatives of multilateral and bilateral partners of the AU and the regions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As Amani Africa’s report highlighted and the AUC Chairperson admitted, the threat of terrorism continues to grow despite the increase in the investment in and the use of these and other hard security tools including border control, intelligence exchange, and criminal justice measures. One explanation, AUC Chair highlighted in his address to the Malabo summit, is the lack of adequate support to make the use of these hard security instruments effective. Similarly, during his visit to West Africa, UN Secretary General said that the ‘operating in circumstances … call not for a peacekeeping force, but a strong force to enforce peace and fight terrorism.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Admittedly, as also recognized in our research report, there are indeed capacity gaps that limit the effectiveness of the hard security instruments used for countering terrorism on the continent. We agree that the use of hard security tools including military missions constitute essential component of any successful policy response to the threat of terrorism and they should be provided with the means to effectively execute their part of the responsibility.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One good example that demonstrates the importance of counter terrorism military operations is the experience of the AU Mission in Somalia. As my friend, the CEO and President of the International Crisis Group, Comfort Ero pointed out in her <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/speech-un-security-council-counter-terrorism-africa">address</a> to the Security Council last September, ‘[b]etween 2011 and 2012, and at great cost in Ugandan, Burundian, Kenyan and Somali partner forces’ lives, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ‘ended Al-Shabaab’s formal control of Mogadishu and Kismayo, the country’s second-largest city, prised swathes of territory out of militants’ hands and provided much-needed security for two electoral cycles.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yet, the experience of AMISOM and the various other regional initiatives including the G5 Sahel and MNJTF in the Sahel and Central and West African regions as well as the Accra Initiative illustrate, the conventional policy responses put premium on the use of hard security institutions. Despite the increase in the use and multiplication of security heavy response mechanisms, the threat is not declining. If anything, it is further deteriorating. Accordingly, our report posed the question:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What are the problems with the conventional policy response to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa? </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The research report revealed that the flaws in the conventional policy responses relate to both the diagnosis of and the policy response measures for countering the threat of terrorism in Africa. It highlights that, the dominant view about terrorism in Africa is based on a misdiagnosis of the nature of the problem.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to Amani Africa’s report, there are two aspects to the misdiagnosis. The first is that the conventional policy analysis considers groups identified as terrorists to be the core of the problem. Second, it also erroneously assumes that these groups are mainly ideologically driven by global jihad, a reading that is parachuted from experiences elsewhere in the world rather than being an accurate representation of the nature of such groups in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Contrary to these conventional views of the nature of terrorism, our report showed first that terrorist groups are the symptom of the main problem. Second, rather than being purely ideologically driven jihadist groups, they are complex socio-political entities that are embedded in and feed on local political, social and conflict dynamics.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Such misdiagnosis also led to faulty policy responses. Rather than focusing on approaches that address the underlying ‘political and socio-economic pathologies’, the conventional policy responses focused on ‘eliminating’ the symptoms of the problem. This is sought to be achieved by making hard security tools including military operations front and center of the response to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">They become both state security oriented and hard security based, hence too mechanical bereft of the fundamental political, social, cultural &amp; economic tools the context demands. Echoing this, in his address to the UN Security Council on 15 December 2022 Kenya’s Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs <a href="https://www.un.int/kenya/statements_speeches/statement-threats-international-peace-and-security-caused-terrorist-acts-global">Dr Korir Sing’oei</a> observed that ‘[t]oo much counter terrorism is too kinetic and narrowly technical.’ In the same vein Comfort also told the Security Council that ‘it’s rare – in fact, so far unheard of – that military operations alone can defeat movements that are quite deeply entrenched in parts of society, if not necessarily popular.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Indeed, as even the relatively successful experience of AMISOM in Somalia, to which we made reference earlier, shows, military operation by itself alone is utterly inadequate. And it can never become a substitute to a political strategy that makes socio-political, governance, development and reconciliation measures, supported by military measures, the core of the policy response tools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We thus call in Amani Africa’s research report for a shift in both the diagnosis of and the policy response measures to the threat of terrorism. As the report put it, ‘the political and socio-economic governance pathologies’ and the grievances and vulnerabilities that these pathologies produce on the part of affected communities are the major conditions that precipitate the emergence and proliferation of terrorist groups. Experiences from the Sahel to Mozambique provide rich data to illustrate this.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The report thus advocates for a human security-based approach that brings to the centre of policy analysis and intervention</p>
<ol>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ol style="text-align: justify;">
<li>affected communities and</li>
<li>the resolution of their grievances, and the conflict dynamics of which terrorist groups are only a part.</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What does this human security-based approach mean in practical terms? </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Drawing some of the instructive experiences on the continent including, for example, the Lake Chad Basin stabilization strategy, first and foremost, this policy shift advocates for addressing the socio-economic, cultural and environmental needs of communities in territories that are vulnerable to conflicts involving terrorist groups. As our report put it, this necessitates <strong><em>a socio-economic and political program</em></strong> that focuses on</p>
<ol>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ol type="a">
<li>promoting respect for human rights, and the (re)building of <strong><em>legitimate local</em></strong> governance structures and capacities,</li>
<li>the delivery of public services and social and economic provisions, and</li>
<li>facilitate the provision of required humanitarian and livelihood support as well as other assistance and support as well as rehabilitation programs supported by regional security cooperation.</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Additionally, this paradigm shift also necessitates the rebuilding of new state-society pact and public trust in the state and its governance institutions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of allocation of resources, this paradigm shift in the approach to the policy response to terrorism in Africa also necessitates that programming of counter-terrorism interventions should thus be reconfigured in a way that avails resources and capacity building support geared towards</p>
<ol>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ol style="text-align: justify;">
<li>building local capacities and governance structures for delivery of public services,</li>
<li>empowerment of local communities and marginalized members of such communities (youth, women, traditional or religious leaders and institutions)</li>
<li>strengthening of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes among local communities, and</li>
<li>reforming of national structures of governance for promoting the inclusion of marginalized communities in national decision- making processes.</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">‘Such reconfiguration of counter- terrorism programming,’ our report argued, ‘has a higher chance of creating the social conditions that deprive terrorist groups of the grounds that make it easy for them to extract support from local communities.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other element that cannot be emphasized enough for the success of this recalibrated policy approach is the critical importance of nurturing and supporting courageous <strong>national leadership</strong>.  Such is a leadership that has the political will, dexterity and imagination for acknowledging the existence of fragilities and the absence or fragility of state institutions in parts of the state and the accompanying complex challenges facing politically and geographically peripheral territories in those parts of the state, which terrorist or insurgent groups take advantage of.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As our report put it, the ‘other element of this new policy approach, in terms of its conflict settlement and peacebuilding dimensions, is its recognition, and advocacy for active use of, the peacemaking instruments of negotiation and dialogue with members of terrorist groups as part of the peace and security tools available in conflict situations involving the presence of terrorist groups with strong local base.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Explaining the importance of this, we stated that ‘[g]iven that the threat of terrorism in most part is primarily an outgrowth of governance and underdevelopment induced local conflict dynamics, the recognition of negotiation as part of the peace and security instruments necessary for conflict resolution in situations involving terrorist groups has the advantage of preventing current (hard security focused) policy options from condemning affected societies to perpetual conflict.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Particularly instructive for the African context in this regard is the wisdom that Somalia’s President in his article to <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/07/19/somalias-president-wants-help-to-fight-africas-terrorist-groups">The Economist</a> shared that ‘we must be realistic about how we bring about lasting peace and stability. It is simply too dangerous to stick to the idea that military defeats alone will miraculously produce ready-made peace. <strong><em>Talks are needed, too</em></strong>.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I thank you for your kind attention!</p>
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<p style="text-align: center;"><em>The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’</em></p>
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