Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Ahead of the 1 April 2026, when the states elected during the 39^th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly, including Somalia, which was elected for the first time, assume their seats in the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU is holding the induction of newly elected and returning members of the PSC in the Kingdom of Eswatini, starting today, 30 March 2026. In view of the expansion and entrenching of conflicts and crises on the continent and the need for a more effective role for the AU, a pressing issue for the newly constituted PSC is how to shift from the failing business-as-usual approach to its work and make itself fit for the peace and security needs of the continent in a time of major global shifts.

As extensively documented in, among others, the review of the PSC for 2025, the PSC did not garner a meaningful level of influence in either limiting the dynamics of conflicts on its agenda or in shaping peace processes relating to those conflict situations. As a result, the PSC and the AU are ignored or otherwise displaced. Such is the case in Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel and the DRC. For example, the six sessions that the PSC held on Sudan were of no consequence either in avoiding the de facto partition of Sudan or in contributing to the emergence of a credible civilian process that the AU is meant to lead on. Even in terms of the mechanisms it decided to institute, neither the mechanisms for investigating external interference in Sudan nor the presidential committee came into operation. In DRC, AU’s role in advancing peace got displaced, with the Luanda process giving way to the Washington DC and Doha processes.  

The declining effectiveness of the PSC mirrors a broader erosion of political commitment to continental collective security. It is also importantly a product of PSC’s work, becoming more performative than consequential, at times its engagement dominated by thematic issues and often no effective action on specific conflict situations. Poor agenda setting and the reduction of PSC activities into a routine ritual-like processes are among the factors that account for this state of affairs in which the dire conflict situations are not approached with the urgency and seriousness they deserve.

Making the PSC fit for purpose and relevant to the peace and security situation of the continent requires changing these conditions. The agenda setting of the PSC and the policy deliberation of the PSC should prioritise and deploy the limited diplomatic institutional resources exclusively for addressing existing conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones. The PSC should thus have as a standing agenda on the most critical conflict situations, such as Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel, DRC and Somalia at least, on a quarterly if not on a monthly basis, during which the AU Commission presents reports for adapting AU engagement to the rhythm and needs of the conflict dynamics.

In the interest of optimising its very finite resources and ensuring sustained engagement on addressing these priority conflict situations with resolve and impact, the PSC should also adopt a moratorium on having thematic issues on its agenda.

Further to the foregoing, the PSC should also use its sessions for substantive deliberations rather than the ritualistic process of making formulaic statements, issuing communiques and meeting again to repeat the same cycle. It is necessary for the PSC to review its working methods on its decision-making process for making it results-oriented rather than the current focus on output, involving the adoption of a communique for every meeting. Not every PSC meeting has to result in the adoption of a communique, but it provides a platform for building consensus and negotiating on actionable decisions, deliberating on advancing implementation and undertaking strategic review. It is also necessary that PSC members focus on negotiating and adopting actionable decisions as opposed to the declaratory ones that dominate outcomes of PSC deliberations. To this end, they should negotiate on the actionable decisions required to respond to new developments, either in the conflict situation or in the peace process relating to that conflict situation. They should also use such negotiation sessions for clarifying on the financial and institutional implications of such decisions as well as on the modalities of implementation and clear assignment of responsibility for implementation and timelines for reporting back on follow-up and implementation.

Additionally, the effectiveness of the PSC is also affected by the willingness and ability of its members to shoulder the responsibilities of PSC membership as set out in Article 5, particularly its sub-paragraph 2. The current approach to PSC membership that puts a premium on rotation to the detriment of Article 5(2) criteria is undermining the effectiveness of the Council. It has limited the PSC’s normative and political weight, creating an enormous gulf between PSC decisions and their effective follow-through.

A criteria-based approach is essential to the PSC’s credibility, ensuring members demonstrate commitment, diplomatic capacity, and adherence to AU norms, preventing deliberations from becoming mere symbolism. Eroded standards have also diminished peer accountability, fostering weak enforcement, selective engagement, and inconsistent follow-through, much like past consensus-driven arrangements lacking commitment. Restoring effectiveness demands recommitment to criteria-based membership rooted in political credibility, capacity, and norm respect, bolstering authority and collective responsibility.

Not any less important for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is the need to align its current posture and practice with the statement of commitment it adopted during its solemn launching in 2004. Of significance in this respect is the commitment that ‘we shall ensure that the authority vested in the Peace and Security Council is fairly and proactively exercised.’ (emphasis added) The lack of alignment in recent times between the practice of the PSC and this commitment is one of the factors for the erosion of the credibility of the PSC. This has manifested itself not only in inconsistent application of AU policies and norms, such as in relation to unconstitutional changes of government, but also in the lack of fairness in the attention given in dealing with various conflict situations.

The PSC should also be proactive in its engagement with key peace and security events on the continent. This entails that the PSC operates as the first to speak on African peace and security issues and to ensure that it occupies the space for holding a leadership role. These (speaking first and holding the policy space) are necessary both for setting the agenda and exercising agency in peace and security decision-making on the continent.

All of the foregoing, however, requires the recommitment of PSC member states to the values and principles of the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. It also requires reestablishing the primacy of collective responsibility and solidarity over individual national interest in setting the program of work of the PSC and steering the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Council. Not any less important is the need for exercising a higher sense of responsibility both on the part of member states and the AU Commission, such as through making the requisite preparations for PSC sessions, upholding and ensuring respect for AU norms and principles and respecting decisions of the PSC, including in the timely submission of reports or updates.

Abdul Mohammed

I write this with a heavy heart, but also with deep gratitude for a life that gave so much to the cause of peace, justice, and human dignity.

Nicholas “Fink” Haysom was not just another senior United Nations diplomat. He belonged to a fading breed — those who approached diplomacy and peacemaking not as a profession, but as a vocation. For him, diplomacy was not about position or protocol; it was about purpose, conviction, and an enduring commitment to humanity.

He was shaped in the crucible of the anti-apartheid struggle — a defining historical experience that produced a generation of leaders who understood injustice intimately and resisted it with both moral clarity and political discipline. From that struggle, Fink carried forward a rare combination: a principled legal mind, grounded in public service, and a political sensibility anchored in justice.

I first encountered Fink during the negotiations of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement. From the outset, I found myself under his wing. His style was neither loud nor imposing. He did not dominate the room; he stabilized it. He did not rush to solutions; he cultivated them patiently, with care and respect for complexity.

What distinguished him most was his discipline of listening.

Fink listened not as a formality, but as a moral act. He understood that conflicts are not merely technical problems to be solved, but historical and human realities to be understood. He gave conflict — and those shaped by it — the respect it deserved. He was meticulous in defining the problem before attempting to resolve it, a quality that is increasingly rare in today’s fast-paced and often superficial diplomatic engagements.

I later had the privilege of working closely with him again when he succeeded Haile Menkerios as the United Nations envoy during the final and most delicate phase of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. This was a moment without precedent in Africa — a negotiated separation of two states. The stakes were immense, the tensions acute, and the risks of failure catastrophic.

In that moment, Fink’s experience and judgment proved invaluable.

He played a supportive role not only in the negotiations themselves but also in managing the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. Under his stewardship, cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council reached a level of alignment and effectiveness that remains a benchmark in multilateral peacemaking.

He enjoyed the trust of President Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. Their relationship — forged in the shared experience of the anti-apartheid struggle — brought both political depth and personal trust to a process that required both in equal measure.

Fink was, in every sense, a diplomat’s diplomat.

But more than that, he was what I would call a people’s negotiator.

He was accessible, persuasive, and deeply grounded in the political realities of the conflicts he engaged with. He was never confined by the narrow boundaries of job descriptions. He worked tirelessly. He made time to listen. He was consistently — and quietly — the adult in the room.

In today’s landscape of mediation and diplomacy, there is a discernible deficit of such qualities.

Much of contemporary diplomacy has become procedural, transactional, and at times detached from the human realities it seeks to address. Even where technical competence exists, it is often not accompanied by the deeper attributes that defined Fink — care, moral seriousness, intellectual discipline, and a genuine commitment to the human consequences of conflict.

Fink was not an elitist negotiator. He did not practice diplomacy from a distance. His approach was people-centered. He remained constantly aware that behind every negotiation were lives at stake — communities disrupted, futures uncertain, and human dignity in peril.

He ensured that all parties remained mindful of the consequences of failure. Not through grandstanding, but through quiet, persistent reminder of what war does to people and societies.

Beyond the negotiating table, I recall with great fondness the many conversations we shared — political, reflective, and often filled with humor. There was laughter, even in the most demanding circumstances. There was ease without loss of seriousness.

Those of us who worked with him did not only grow professionally; we became better human beings.

Fink had a way of addressing those he held in regard: he would call you “comrade.”

In his usage, this was not a casual term. It was not merely a friendly gesture. It carried weight. It signified a shared commitment — to justice, to fairness, and to the collective struggle for a better world. It reflected a relationship grounded not just in familiarity, but in shared purpose.

In this, he embodied what we, as Africans, understand as Ubuntu — the idea that our humanity is bound up with one another.

He often spoke with admiration of President Mbeki’s “I Am an African” speech. And indeed, though South African by birth, Fink was, in the truest sense, a quintessential African diplomat and statesman.

As his friend in struggle observed, His life traced a seamless arc — from the struggle against apartheid, to service in democratic South Africa, to global peacemaking through the United Nations. There was no rupture, no loss of moral center. The values that defined him in struggle remained intact in power.

“This continuity is what made him rare.”

In a world where proximity to power often alters individuals, Fink remained anchored. He reminds us that leadership is not about office, but about the consistency of values across time and circumstance.

His passing invites not only reflection, but also introspection.

It compels us to ask whether the current generation of diplomats and mediators is equipped — not only technically, but morally — to meet the demands of our time. It challenges us to recover a diplomacy that is grounded in humanity, not merely in process; in substance, not only in form.

Fink did not simply practice diplomacy.

He dignified it.

His legacy will endure — in the peace processes he helped advance, in the institutions he strengthened, and in the lives he touched.

But more importantly, it endures as a standard.

A standard of what diplomacy can be at its best.

Farewell, Comrade.

May Allah grant him eternal peace, and may we find the courage to carry forward the work to which he devoted his life.

J. Kayode Fayemi *
Visiting Professor, King’s College, London, UK | Former Governor, Ekiti State, Nigeria | Former Minister of Mines & Minerals Resources Development, Nigeria

 

It is both a privilege and an urgent necessity that we gather here, under the auspices of ACCORD, to speak plainly about a relationship that has shaped our continent for centuries — and that is, right now, at a genuine inflection point.

The post-Cold War settlement — in which Africa was largely a recipient of rules written elsewhere — is visibly dismantling. A new geopolitical architecture is being assembled, and the question before us is whether Africa will help design it or merely inherit it.

Let me be direct: we have been here before. We have gathered in elegant rooms and produced eloquent communiqués. And then the world moved on, and Africa remained in the same structural position. So, the burden of this moment is not just analysis — it is commitment to action that changes the terms of engagement.

Understanding the Turning Point

Three convergent forces are reshaping the global order in ways that create genuine leverage for Africa — if we choose to use it.

First, the return of strategic competition. The West — Europe and North America — no longer operates in a unipolar comfort zone. China’s rise, Russia’s revisionism, the assertiveness of the Global South: these have reminded Western capitals that Africa’s 54 nations, 1.4 billion people, and disproportionate share of the world’s minerals are not a charity case but a strategic asset. That shift in perception matters. It means Africa now has suitors, not just donors.

Second, the resource reality. The green energy transition has placed Africa at the centre of the global economy in ways the extractive economy of the 20th century never did. Cobalt, lithium, manganese, coltan, copper — the raw materials of the clean energy future are largely concentrated on this continent. Having already surrendered the oil century with little to show for it, Africa must not repeat that mistake with the minerals of the 21st century. At least now we know that the world cannot go green without first going African!

Third — and perhaps most consequentially — is Africa’s demographic weight. By 2050, one in four people on Earth will be African. The continent’s working-age population will exceed that of China and India combined. In an ageing world, Africa is the growth engine. That is not rhetoric. That is arithmetic. And it changes the negotiating calculus entirely, particularly as it concerns the migration discourse — if we build the institutions to leverage it and retool the young ones for the inevitable change.

The Honest Reckoning: What the West Has Gotten Wrong

Let me speak about the Western side of this relationship — not to lecture, but because an honest reset requires honest diagnosis.

For too long, Africa-Europe/West relations have been organised around a paternalistic logic: development aid as generosity, conditionalities as wisdom, and African instability as a justification for continued tutelage. The frameworks have been built in Washington, Brussels, and London — and Africa has been expected to comply rather than co-design.

The trade architecture has been particularly damaging. Africa exports raw materials and imports finished goods. We are rewarded for poverty and penalised for aspiration. Every African government that has tried to add value to its own resources — to process its own ore, to refine its own oil, to manufacture its own goods — has faced trade barriers, financial headwinds, or political pressure.

The debt architecture has compounded this. African governments are charged risk premiums that bear no rational relationship to actual default rates. The cost of capital for infrastructure in Africa is three to four times what comparable projects cost in Europe. This is not a market outcome — it is a structural imposition that keeps Africa in a permanent state of fiscal vulnerability.

I want to be fair: there are genuine partners in Europe who understand this and want a different relationship. And many steps initiatives hint at a re-ordered relationship. Only last November, the EU – Africa Summit held in Luanda, Angola and Europe reaffirmed its commitment to Africa as a strategic partner. Before then, EU has come up with many strategies and plans – the Global Gateway Strategy, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (on serious concerns regarding the adverse impacts of this policy on Africa discussed during the AU-EU summit check here and here), the Critical Raw Materials Act and the various National Action Plans, to name a few. Indeed, speaking a few days ago at the annual conference of EU ambassadors in Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed that Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order and opined that radical changes are inevitable. But good intentions within a flawed architecture produce flawed outcomes. That is why structural reform, not incremental goodwill, must be the goal of any serious reset.

Africa’s Non-Negotiables

As we approach any new bargain, Africa must be clear about what is non-negotiable. Let me name five out of the many that came out of our reflection yesterday.

The first is value addition and beneficiation. Africa should no longer accept arrangements in which our resources leave our shores as raw commodities and return to us as expensive imports. Any new partnership framework must be anchored on industrialisation, local processing, and technology transfer. Our own Global Gateway must now recognise the place of an African Minerals Consortium, primarily modeled on the global south hydrocarbons consortium – OPEC and preserving the rights of mineral endowed countries to harness their endowments for inclusive growth, fair pricing negotiations, unlocking investment in exploration, promoting local community participation and supply security on a fair and equitable basis.  This is not anti-Western sentiment — it is basic economic logic that the West itself applied during its own development.

The second is sovereign debt restructuring and a fair cost of capital. The current credit rating system penalises African countries in ways that are empirically unjustified. Africa is not capital starved; Africa is capital trapped. On illicit financial flows alone, over $88 billion was trapped in 2024. And yet, when the Africa Group at the UN took the Mbeki report on illicit financial flows and capital flight to the United Nations in pursuit of the global tax reform agenda, it was European countries alongside the United States that opposed the reform of the global financial architecture. We need a fundamental reform of the Bretton Woods credit architecture, new mechanisms for development finance, and an end to the punishing premiums that make it cheaper to borrow in Paris than in Lagos.

The third is genuine technology partnership. Artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and the platform economy are already reshaping global productivity. Africa cannot be a passive consumer of technology built elsewhere and governed by rules written without us. We must replace the extractive capitalism masquerading as untrammelled artificial intelligence with data sovereignty, capacity for digital industrialisation, and a voice in the governance frameworks that will define the next technological epoch.

The fourth revolves around labour migration. True, Africa as a continent is experiencing a significant shift in migration flows, both within our continent and towards Europe. Evidently, well managed migration holds a substantial positive impact both for countries of origin as well as significant benefits to destination countries, and more importantly for global stability and security. EU and the African Union need an honest conversation and a coordinated plan on population flows and labour dynamics considering the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the world.

The fifth — and most foundational — is the right to determine our own development pathways. Africa is not asking to be left alone. We are asking to be treated as equals in designing the frameworks that govern our participation in the global economy. Development conditionalities that make aid contingent on policy choices Africa has not made must give way to genuine partnership in which African institutions lead African solutions, one that is focused on domestic resource mobilisation and not overseas development assistance.

What Africa Must Change

I would be less than honest if I placed all the responsibility on Europe and the West. Our reflection yesterday also looked inward.

The truth is that Africa’s negotiating weakness is partly self-inflicted. We arrive at global tables divided, speaking in fifty-four competing voices, making it easy for partners to play us against each other. The African Continental Free Trade Area is an extraordinary achievement on paper — but its implementation is still slow, and intra-African trade remains embarrassingly low as a share of our total trade. We cannot demand to be treated as a bloc if we do not act as one.

Our institutional capacity for strategic economic negotiation is inadequate. The European Union arrives at trade talks with battalions of economists, lawyers, and technical experts. Many African delegations are outgunned before negotiations begin. Building that institutional depth — the analytical capacity, the negotiating expertise, the legal architecture — is not optional. It is the precondition for sovereign agency.

And we must address governance. Weak rule of law, and institutional fragility are not just moral failings — they are economic costs that our people bear and that undermine our credibility at the negotiating table. The new bargain with the West is inseparable from the new bargain we must strike with our own citizens.

The Architecture of a New Bargain

What would a genuinely new bargain look like in practice?

On trade, it means a fundamental renegotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements — moving from market access frameworks that entrench Africa’s commodity dependence to industrial partnership agreements that incentivise manufacturing, value addition, and skills transfer. Europe should welcome African processed goods, not just raw materials. Europe should reform lopsided partnership agreements such as the ones signed by many coastal states that deplete our oceans, marine life, and community livelihoods, compounding the migration crisis. Europe should accept reforms to global tax rules. That is the test of genuine partnership.

On finance, it means a reformed development finance architecture in which African-led institutions like the African Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank have greater capitalisation and mandate, in which sovereign debt carries risk-adjusted pricing that reflects reality rather than perception, and in which climate finance arrives as grants and concessional lending — not additional debt for countries that contributed least to the problem.

On security, it means an end to arrangements in which African countries pay for security cooperation with political compliance. Security partnerships must be transparent, mutually accountable, and consistent with African sovereignty and the decisions of the African Union.

On governance of the global commons — AI, digital infrastructure, climate rules, pandemic response — it means Africa having a genuine seat at the design table, not just the implementation table. The G20, the IMF, the WTO: all of these must be reformed to reflect the actual weight of the Global South in the 21st century world and Europe must support reforms to the UN Security Council to ensure greater African representation. Our European friends must also eschew the notion that only European values are central to defining new partnerships. We must also acknowledge that Europe has interests, and it’s important to understand and engage these.

And on restoration of dignity, Europe must acknowledge historical atrocities against the African continent and agree on reparations – including the return of looted African assets and artifacts and genuine rebates on African diaspora remittances.

From Dialogue to Compact

Mama Graca, we joyfully celebrated your 80^th birthday last night. In your lifetime, you have seen Africa at its most oppressed and at its most liberated. You have seen what is possible when Africans refuse to accept the terms handed to them and insist on writing their own. That spirit — the spirit of agency over victimhood, of bargaining from strength rather than dependency — is what this moment demands.

Let me close with this: the turning point we face is not a gift from the changing global order. Turning points only become transformations when they are seized. They need not just the right analysis but the right institutions, the right leadership, and the right collective will.

Africa has the resources. Africa has the population. Africa has — at long last — the geopolitical leverage and the critical mineral advantage. What we need now is the strategic coherence to convert that leverage into a new bargain: one in which partnership replaces patronage, co-creation replaces conditionality, and African agency is not a talking point but a lived reality.

The generation watching us right now — the 400 million young Africans who will enter the labour market in the next decade — cannot afford for us to produce another beautiful document that changes nothing. They are watching. Let us make this turning point count.

 

* Address delivered during the high-level dialogue of African leaders organised by ACCORD and hosted by Graça Machel, Chairperson of the Board of ACCORD held on 13-14 March at Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The news of Former Senegalese President, Macky Sall’s nomination as a candidate for the position of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General came as a surprise for many. One of the notable aspects of the nomination relates to the confusion on whether Sall received the support of the continental body, the African Union (AU). On 4 March 2026, one media report stated ‘[N]ow the official candidate of the African Union in a race to succeed António Guterres as UN Secretary-General, Macky Sall is currently in Paris, where he is expected to meet with the French president.’

Rather than the merit of Sall’s candidature (which is worthy of interrogation as a matter of public interest), the issue that this media report raises is the factual question of whether Sall’s candidacy was processed through the AU’s established mechanism regarding the nomination of nationals of African states as candidates for positions on international bodies. It is thus necessary to address two questions: How is Sall nominated? What are the established processes for AU endorsement of such a nomination?

It was through a letter of the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the UN in New York, dated 2 March 2026, addressed to the Presidents of the UN General Assembly and the March 2026 President of the UN Security Council, that Sall was nominated as a candidate for the UN’s top job. In the most relevant part, the letter states, ‘…my government, current Chair of the African Union, nominates His Excellency Macky Sall, former President of the Republic of Senegal, for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations.’ What this makes clear is that Sall, who is a Senegalese, is a nominee of the Government of Burundi, which happened to be the Chairperson of the AU Assembly for 2026.

It is clear from the letter that the Government of Burundi did not submit Sall’s nomination in its capacity as Chairperson of the AU. It is, however, clear that Sall made a ‘smart’ move in approaching Burundi, rather than any other country, including his own Senegal. What is significant about Burundi as the country nominating him is its current role at the AU, which undoubtedly Sall sought to leverage.

Considering the strategic importance of candidatures for positions in international organisations, both for member states and in advancing Africa’s agency, the AU has established a process and mechanism for nomination for such positions. The process ordinarily entails the submission of the nomination by the nominating member states of the AU through a Note Verbale addressed to the AU Commission. After review of the submissions within the regional groups, usually through the Permanent Representatives Committee, to avoid fragmentation through competitive bidding from several candidates from the continent, the list is submitted for further consideration to the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System, a standing subsidiary body of the Executive Council of the AU. Then, the list is presented by the Committee to the Executive Council for endorsement or for noting, as the case may be.

This is the Committee that processed the endorsement of many of the African nationals leading various international bodies, such as the WTO and the WHO. The most recent of such nominations that the Committee endorsed, which led to a successful election for the position of Director-General of UNESCO, was the candidacy of Dr Khaled El-Enany, a known Egyptologist and former Minister of Antiquities of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This Ministerial Committee presented its report during the 39^th AU Assembly, when Burundi assumed the role of chairing the AU, to the 48^th ordinary session of the Executive Council. The report contains a list of candidatures of individuals submitted by governments for endorsement, including, for example, for the post of Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for the period of 2027-2032 or for noting which is the case, for example, for the post of Director General of FAO. Conspicuously absent from the Ministerial Committee’s report list is the name of Macky Sall for the most important of post in the international system.

Not only is his name absent from the report of the Ministerial Committee, but Sall also made no attempt to have his name considered during the AU Assembly, which took place only two weeks before the submission of his name as a candidate to the UN. He was even spotted during the summit. The proximity of the time between the 39^th ordinary session of the AU Assembly and his nomination as a candidate (two weeks) raises important questions of both process and transparency around his candidacy.

Does not the approach he took undermine AU’s established process? Doesn’t it show contempt for following a process? Is such contempt also reflective of a trend on the part of Sall, who plunged Senegal into a constitutional crisis in attempting to circumvent the constitutional process ahead of Senegal’s last election? Or why seek nomination by a government, which happened to be the Chair of the AU, if not interested in following the AU process, unless the intention is to leverage the status of AU Chairperson for his candidacy?

There are reasons why processes exist and why AU’s process on candidatures for positions in international bodies matter. First, it is to provide equal opportunity for all who may seek leadership positions in international bodies. Second, such a process also provides member states of the AU the opportunity to exercise their sovereign prerogative and satisfy themselves that the best candidate receives the endorsement of the wider membership. Third, it also ensures transparency. Sall’s approach to his candidacy flies in the face of all of these important public policy reasons for the process. It unnecessarily risks creating confusion and, as a news report noted, division in the AU.

This process should apply to everyone. It applied to many statespersons previously. Sall cannot and should not be the exception, irrespective of his view of himself or the support he may have from his friends or states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, such as France, as a news report indicated.

Contrary to what Sall would like many to believe and the news report referenced above, there is no basis, even from the letter nominating him, that suggests that Sall is an official candidate of the AU. After reporting that Sall’s candidacy sparks division in the AU, the same news entity qualified him as an official candidate of the AU, while there is no official AU endorsement of Sall’s candidacy. It should be stated plainly and clearly that such a categorical report represents misinformation. The hard truth is that Macky Sall is not an official candidate of the AU!

In terms of timing, today’s discussions are both propitious and challenging! We have a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that must save itself from paralysis in the face of complex conflicts. Hence, the compelling need to expedite action in ongoing negotiations to reform it.

In this, the role of ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, that is Non-State Actors and citizens of the world, would be crucial. I would therefore like to commend Amani Africa for creating this platform which enables us to cross-fertilize ideas as practitioners in government and non-governmental spaces.

As the UN Secretary-General has repeatedly warned, including during the 80^th Session of the General Assembly, the reform of the Security Council is no longer optional; it is urgent. The global order is changing faster than our institutions are adapting. Africa has been at the forefront of this reform movement.

Africa remains the only region that has articulated a unified institutional framework for the Security Council reform. For decades, our continent has insisted on a more representative Council, as articulated in the African Common Position, The Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration which unveiled Africa’s demand for fair representation which is at least two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for African States in a reformed Security Council. Africa’s position has not changed. This is not a mere aspiration but a prescription for justice.

On the Continent our ongoing focus is driven by the following approaches:

1. Right to development;
2. Building of strong and capable States;
3. Peace and reconciliation as basis for viable African society;
4. Primacy of politics, including a greater role for Women and Youth in governance;
5. Peace enforcement not mere peacekeeping; and
6. SMART partnerships (Inclusive of African Regional Actors).

Against this background, we seek in our common African position to be a strong united, resilient and influential global player and partner. On the global scene we hope to work with partners to:

1. Promote global identity and representation in rich diversity;
2. Global shared values;
3. Global platforms for experience and good practice sharing; and
4. Global peace and development as shared public goods.

It is important to recall that at the UN Summit of the Future, African leaders campaigned successfully to include Africa’s issues as a top priority (See here). The resulting Pact explicitly frames reforming the Council as a task of justice.

This support must translate into text-based negotiations. Text must translate into amendment, and amendment must translate into ratification. The intergovernmental negotiations process cannot remain an annual ritual of repetition.

These are not yet breakthroughs but they are not stagnation either. The momentum must be seized and turned into progress.

How do we sustain the momentum when global politics are so polarized?

We must be honest about the nature of this process. The Security Council Reform is not stalled because the arguments are weak. It is stalled because power is entrenched. The Charter amendment requires ratification by the Permanent Members, giving each of them decisive influence over the outcome. Support for the reform would seem to exist in principle while remaining limited in practice. Intermediate proposals that exclude veto equality or permanent status, continue to circulate in diplomatic discussions. Such proposals risk institutionalizing a hierarchy in which Africa is permanently represented but never equal. This is incompatible with the Common African Position.

Critical Questions we must answer:

• Is the current and apparent consensus that reforms are necessary real?
• Are reforms a matter of justice/global peace enhancement or mere procedure in a political chess game.
• Are the reforms a matter of when, how and to what effect, or a ritual of inconsequential efforts.
• Are we moving on the track of negotiated reform in the context of sober peace time or drifting towards reform on the back of devastating war like happened after WW2?
• Are We the People’s taken along, differently from 1945?

Recommendations:

To keep the Security Council Reform at the top of the global agenda, we must pursue at least four lines of efforts:

• Reinvigorate the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) process with the AU Model:

The IGN process has produced areas of convergence that can serve as a foundation for text-based negotiations. The African Model on the UNSC Reform, our unified proposal of 2 permanent (with equal rights) and 5 non-permanent seats for Africa, has been endorsed by all 55 AU Member States. It was formally tabled in the UNGA’s negotiations. The Pact itself calls for such a consolidated model to guide talks. As negotiations continue, let us reiterate the moral logic that without Africa’s inclusion, there can be no truly legitimate Council. Africa’s unity under C10 negotiating leadership, remains key in maintaining coherence, and this leadership must continue. Our think tanks and other non-state actors would need to align and support.

• Expand the coalition of support:

Africa cannot do this alone. We must sustain outreach to key partners and regional groups. Africa’s position is one among several competing reform frameworks including the G4 proposal, the Uniting for Consensus model, incremental expansion models, and intermediate membership proposals. These competing visions divide support among UN Member States and slow convergence. Africa must therefore focus not only on defending principles but on building a winning coalition. This should include intra and intercontinental platforms for advocacy and sharing ideas like the one AMANI provides.

Leadership of the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government in negotiations must be supported based on the African common position which necessarily includes no discussion at this time of who the two Members would be. We will cross the bridge when we get there.

• Leverage UN informal mechanisms.

While negotiations continue, we need to also keep an eye on low hanging fruits especially addressing Security Council Working Methods through membership of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group of Friends. This should contribute to the nature and quality of anticipated and substantive reform.

• Emphasize urgency and fairness.

In all our messages, we must highlight that reform is not a luxury but a necessity. We will remind colleagues that peace operations now often rely on African troops and that sustainable security solutions increasingly come from African initiatives. If the Council fails to evolve, it risks losing credibility in Africa and beyond. As the UN’s High-Level Advisory Panel warned, without meaningful reform, the Security Council risks irrelevance. Consequentially, the very survival of multilateralism and global peace would be unpredictably and dangerously compromised.

Geopolitical volatility makes reform harder, but also more compelling. If the multilateral system does not evolve, fragmentation will be deepened. Parallel coalitions and alternative governance structures will proliferate. Reform, therefore, is not only about justice for Africa. It is about preserving the relevance of the United Nations itself and global peace.  Inclusive and constructive dialogue with a sense of urgency, is the way to go.