At the Summit, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, as he did in 2025, strongly and repeatedly objected to the inclusion of political matters in the communiqué, maintaining that Somali political questions are a sovereign matter that should be handled by Somalis themselves and that the Summit should remain focused on security and AUSSOM. The relevant provision was subsequently removed. As in 2025, the opportunity for mutual accountability and for a shared commitment was lost.

The problem with this is that it would be difficult for TCCs and the AU to convince the US or other partners to continue to enable the funding of AUSSOM. The removal of that clause from the Kampala summit outcome robbed the TCCs of a much-needed bargaining tool in their outreach for mobilising logistics support for AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

Under these circumstances, there is a possibility that even the shorter transition period suggested above may not be attained. As argued in an earlier article, a plan for the worst-case scenario of withdrawal of AUSSOM by December 2026 should be considered. However, the AU and the Kampala summit did not produce a collective plan for such a scenario. Under the circumstances, TCCs have no option but to put in place their own respective individual contingency plan.

Seife Ayalew Asfaw, PhD.
Affiliate Faculty, Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution
African Peacebuilding Project
George Mason University

One of the key questions in a recent policy dialogue that Amani Africa hosted on The Horn of Africa in an age of Regional Fragmentation and Global Disorder was the nature of the changing relationship between ports, maritime infrastructure, logistics and transport corridors on the one hand and peace and security, and regional order in the Horn of Africa on the other. In my presentation, my central argument was that ports and corridors are no longer simply matters of transport infrastructure or commercial access. In a contested global order, their role as strategic institutions in which sovereignty, economic integration, security, political authority and geopolitical alignment are increasingly negotiated has become most prominent.

This transformation reflects one of the defining features of today’s global disorder: the changing political meaning of infrastructure. For much of the post-World War II order, and under the dominant development paradigm, ports, maritime infrastructure and transport corridors were understood primarily as engines of development and globalisation. They were expected to facilitate trade, deepen economic interdependence, connect markets, attract investment and sustain international cooperation.

Those assumptions are now being challenged as the unipolar moment of the post-Cold War era gives way to a more fragmented, fluid, multipolar and increasingly unpredictable geopolitical landscape. In this context, ports and corridors function not only as gateways for trade and investment, but also as instruments of economic statecraft, strategic competition and regional influence. If ports and corridors have become strategic instruments rather than simply commercial assets, the central question is no longer only how to expand regional connectivity, but how to govern the political, economic and security relationships that connectivity creates.

Connectivity and Regional Integration

A central implication of this transformation is that connectivity should not automatically be equated with regional integration. A region may become more physically connected while becoming more politically fragmented. A new port, railway, transport corridor or logistics arrangement can reduce transport costs, diversify access to international markets and expand economic opportunities. At the same time, it can redistribute political influence, intensify bilateral competition, bypass neighbouring countries, strengthen contested political authorities and embed the region more deeply in competing external networks.

Infrastructure is never politically neutral. Every corridor prioritises particular routes, ports and territories, redistributes opportunities, reshapes strategic geography and creates both winners and losers. When these choices are made principally through bilateral arrangements without broader regional consultation, infrastructure can deepen the very fragmentation it is expected to overcome.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether infrastructure connects places, but what kinds of political, economic and security relationships that connectivity produces. Does it create reciprocal interdependence or new forms of asymmetric dependence? Does it broaden regional cooperation or reinforce bilateral competition? Does it strengthen collective regional agency or deepen reliance on external actors? These questions suggest that physical connectivity alone says little about the quality of the regional order it produces.

Accordingly, the governance of infrastructure becomes as important as the infrastructure itself. These are fundamentally questions of regional governance rather than engineering, logistics or investment. The central challenge with the proliferation of port and transport corridor development is therefore not whether the Horn becomes more connected, but whether that connectivity is governed in ways that deepen regional integration rather than regional fragmentation.

Strategic Infrastructure, Peace and Regional Order

The significance of this distinction becomes clearer when viewed through current developments across the Horn of Africa. Infrastructure is no longer simply an economic issue. It has become an integral part of peace, security and regional order. Somaliland illustrates this particularly well. Its strategic significance is shaped not only by questions of political status, but also by Berbera’s maritime position, Ethiopia’s search for diversified access to the sea and the growing strategic importance of the Red Sea. Recent developments surrounding Berbera, including diplomatic initiatives, major infrastructure investments and growing strategic interest from regional and extra-regional actors, further illustrate how commercial infrastructure has become increasingly entangled with questions of recognition, security and geopolitical competition.

At the same time, these issues should not be collapsed into one another. Commercial cooperation around ports does not necessarily have to await the resolution of every sovereignty dispute, nor should cooperation over transit and logistics automatically be interpreted as political recognition. Developing practical arrangements that distinguish commercial cooperation from questions of sovereignty may therefore help reduce tensions while preserving opportunities for mutually beneficial connectivity.

The evolving politics of the Red Sea provides another illustration of the same broader transformation. Littoral states understandably have primary responsibilities because their sovereignty and security are directly affected. However, the consequences of disruptions in the Red Sea extend far beyond the coastline. Trade continuity, corridor security and supply chain resilience also affect the wider hinterland. The impact can have serious security, economic and political ramifications for affected countries. Recent debates over exclusive versus more inclusive approaches to Red Sea security governance, including Ethiopia’s calls for greater participation in regional maritime affairs, illustrate how questions of infrastructure, access and security have become increasingly intertwined. They also reflect competing visions of regional order. One emphasises sovereignty-focused arrangements centred primarily on littoral states, while another advocates a broader regional framework that recognises the legitimate interests of interconnected hinterland states. In an era of regional fragmentation and global disorder, these competing governance models risk reinforcing political polarisation, weakening the legitimacy and accountability of regional governance, and creating greater opportunities for external powers and competing geopolitical agendas to shape the region’s security architecture. An inclusive regional approach should therefore recognise both the sovereignty-based legitimate interests of coastal states and the wider regional consequences of maritime governance and security.

These developments also illuminate a broader challenge concerning regional agency. The countries of the Horn possess agency. They negotiate investments, develop infrastructure and choose their international partners. Yet this agency is often exercised separately through bilateral arrangements rather than through shared regional frameworks. The result is not an absence of agency, but its fragmentation. The issue, therefore, is not whether the region possesses agency, but whether it can exercise that agency collectively in ways that strengthen collective regional governance rather than deepen strategic competition.

Imagining a new regional order

The real challenge facing the Horn is not connectivity itself, but how the region chooses to govern it. Rebuilding regional order is therefore not simply about developing more infrastructure or expanding access to ports. It is about strengthening the regional governance needed to manage the growing political, economic and security interdependence that infrastructure creates. This, in turn, requires restoring collective regional agency, not by withdrawing from external partnerships, but by developing the capacity to shape them through shared regional priorities and institutions.

From that perspective, peace and security can no longer be understood only through conflict management or military balances. They also depend on how the region governs its ports, corridors, maritime space and economic connectivity. Infrastructure has become part of the region’s security architecture, and its governance must increasingly become part of the region’s peace architecture. This also requires reimagining ports, corridors and the connectivity they create not simply as objects of geopolitical competition or national advantage, but increasingly as shared regional public goods for whose provision, sustenance and long-term value all affected countries should bear responsibility and jointly shoulder the responsibility towards cooperation, collective stewardship and mutual benefit.

The broader lesson is that the Horn has long been socially, culturally and historically interconnected, but it is becoming materially more interconnected through infrastructure, trade and transport networks while politically more fragmented. Connectivity, by itself, does not necessarily produce regional integration. Without common rules and institutions, it can instead deepen rivalry and fragmentation and in a context of political fragmentation, fuels tension and proxy conflicts.

This, in turn, raises a broader question for the region. The question is no longer simply who controls the next port or finances the next corridor. Rather, it is whether the countries of the Horn can transform increasingly securitised and zero-sum competition over ports, corridors and infrastructure into complementary, cooperative and mutually beneficial regional connectivity.

If so, what forms of regional governance, political trust and prudent regional risk management are needed to make that transformation possible by strengthening and politically empowering existing regional and sub-regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms, so that the region’s geography, infrastructure and connectivity contribute to peace, security and a more resilient regional order rather than becoming another source of fragmentation?

On 29-30 July, once again Kampala plays host to the technical, ministerial and summit-level meetings of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Troop Contributing and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) plus Somalia. The meeting kicked off yesterday with a session of the Chiefs of Defence Forces of TCCs/PCCs of AUSSOM.

Initially, this meeting was requested by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU in view of the existential financial crisis facing AUSSOM. It was the 1317th session of 15 December 2025 of the PSC that tasked ‘the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit a detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ This request was further reiterated by the PSC during its 1342nd session of April 2026.

It was the letter that the United States (US) Mission to the AU (USAU) sent to the African Union on 1 July 2026 that led to the speedy convening of this meeting. In the letter, the US informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of AUSSOM comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal ‘if it includes UNSOS or any UN logistical or operational support.’

While the decision was not completely surprising given that it came in a context in which the US has been reconsidering its funding of UN missions and an earlier decision cutting 25% of UNSOS budget, it came before the AU and Somalia acted timely on PSC’s request and put in place a plan on the immediate future of AU’s long-running and largest peace operation to date.

As pointed out in an earlier Amani Africa article, the end of UNSOS and the critical logistics support on which AUSSOM depends for all its operations would practically make the continuation of the AU mission, which suffers from major funding shortfalls, untenable. The unplagging of UNSOS from AUSSOM is like pulling the life support from a patient whose life depends on it. While AUSSOM has sustained and can continue its operation while facing a major shortfall of funds, it cannot continue with its operations without UNSOS logistics support or without finding, within the short time left, an alternative logistics support arrangement fully replacing UNSOS.

The Kampala meeting comes following a series of meetings in response to the US letter, including ‘an information briefing’ of 3 July for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM, an informal consultation of the PSC of 8 July, and a meeting of experts of TCCs & PCCs of AUSSOM plus Somalia of 24 July. The key meeting of 24 July deliberated on the three options on the future of AUSSOM referenced in the 1317th session of the PSC of 15 December 2025.

The three options PSC proposed for further interrogation, were initially outlined in the AU Commission Chairperson’s report to the 1317th session of the PSC. The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions. The second option involved transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.

It emerged from the meeting of 24 July that the options further updated without UNSOS were not deemed feasible due to the significant risks they posed to operational continuity, force sustainment and the potential for security gaps. The meeting proposed the presentation of the three options to the Chiefs of Defence Forces of AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs along with this conclusion on the options and a proposal for engaging the US ‘to negotiate for the continuation of’ the 2024-2029 transition supported by UNSOS. The three options as updated and the report of the 24 July meeting were presented to the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Forces held yesterday in Kampala, Uganda.

The proposal for preserving UNSOS for the duration of the transition is understandable from the point of view of avoiding a security gap, getting Somali forces to a level where they are able to preserve the security gains made and ensuring a planned withdrawal. However, its feasibility is contingent on having the US reverse its decision. Addressing the Chiefs gathered in Kampala, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces called for ‘African-led alternative arrangements that would sustain the mission beyond 2026,’ noting the indications that the US would not support the current UN support framework. As a recent policy brief cogently argued, another option that the Kampala summit may consider envisages minimal logistic support through a hybrid mechanism from funds other than UN assessed contributions, including AU, anchored on a negotiated transition compact.

These are best-case scenario options but with significant variation. They assume either reversal of the US decision on unplugging UNSOS or the possibility of the establishment of a viable alternative option within the very short time available to ensure the sustenance of AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

In addition to a plan for exploring these options, the Kampala summit needs to consider and adopt a contingency plan for the worst-case scenario too. This is a scenario where reversal of the US decision on supporting UNSOS mandate beyond December 2026 could not be secured, or an alternative to it or any middle ground could not be arranged to sustain AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

Given the risks identified during the 24 July meeting of experts and the dangers that AUSSOM’s withdrawal by December 2026 poses, planning for this worst-case scenario should accordingly involve ways of managing such risks. This necessitates the designing and implementation of measures that mitigate the risks to the minimum possible and ensure as orderly a withdrawal as possible while simultaneously facilitating alternative security support to Somalia that may involve a combination of bilateral support along with a regional joint force modelled on the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin adapted to the Somalia context.

The worst-case scenario is not necessarily inevitable. Nor is it one to be embraced. However, the AU, TCCs/PCCS of AUSSOM and Somalia could not afford not to plan for it.

Abdul Mohammed

I have sat across from men who command armies, knowing that some of them were responsible for the very violence we were trying to stop.

There is a particular silence that fills such rooms. It is not the silence of diplomacy. It is the silence of moral tension — the unspoken awareness that peace, if it is to be achieved, may require engaging those whose actions have made peace necessary in the first place.

This is the uncomfortable truth at the heart of modern conflict mediation. It is what Pierre Hazan described as ‘negotiating with the devil.’ In many places such as the Horn of Africa today, it is not a metaphor. It is a daily reality.

Yet the challenge confronting mediators today extends beyond the moral dilemma of negotiating with armed actors. What we are witnessing in various conflict settings in the continent and beyond including across Sudan and the wider Horn is something more profound and more consequential: a growing structural mismatch between mediation as it is currently practiced and the realities it is meant to address.

Mediation in a fragmented geopolitical landscape

The world in which modern mediation evolved has fundamentally changed.

The assumptions that once underpinned international peacemaking — shared norms, coherent multilateral leadership, and a broadly agreed international order — are steadily eroding. In their place is a far more fragmented and competitive geopolitical landscape, one in which conflicts have become increasingly regionalized, internationalized, and economically embedded.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Horn of Africa.

The region is no longer experiencing isolated national crises. It is increasingly evolving into an interconnected regional system of conflict shaped by cross-border armed networks, external intervention, fragmented sovereignties, war economies, ideological polarization, and intensifying geopolitical competition along the Red Sea corridor.

Sudan illustrates this reality in its starkest form.

Sudan is no longer simply a country at war. It is a state and society being hollowed out. Its institutions are collapsing, its cities are being destroyed, and millions have been displaced by a conflict whose consequences increasingly transcend Sudan itself. The war has become deeply entangled with broader regional rivalries and international strategic interests.

And yet, for all the urgency surrounding Sudan, the path to peace partially runs through the very actors who are sustaining the war.

Mediation in a changing conflict landscape

The new era of conflicts and insecurity characterized by shifts in the nature and drivers of conflicts presents further challenge to the current model of mediation. Contemporary conflicts are no longer primarily about seizing state power or achieving decisive military victory.

They increasingly resemble wars of permanence—open-ended struggles sustained by political fragmentation, economic incentives, and geopolitical rivalry. As the conflicts in the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel show, some of today’s conflicts tend to be transnational, entangled with regional and international criminal and economic networks.

Today’s wars have also become more intractable and easier to wage due to the profound changes in the means of warfare. In many conflict settings from Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel to DRC and Sudan, drones have become the weapon of choice, signaling further rapid evolution with the emergence of AI-enabled warfare technologies in a normative context designed for earlier technologies.

Digital technologies have become the dominant information platform that shape not only the conflict environment but also the mediation landscape.

Mediation in the current and emerging context thus needs to adapt to these new and changing conflict dynamics.

The uncomfortable moral realities of ending conflicts

This remains the central dilemma of mediation. The men who can stop the war are often the same men fighting it.

It is tempting to believe that peace can be built by excluding such actors — that legitimacy alone can substitute for power. But experience suggests otherwise. Wars do not end because we morally isolate those who wage them. They end when those actors are brought, however reluctantly and imperfectly, into a political process capable of reshaping their incentives and constraining their violence.

This is not a comfortable proposition. Nor should it be.

Every mediation effort forces a version of the same question: Is it better to engage and risk legitimizing violent actors, or to refuse engagement and risk prolonging the war?

There are no clean answers. Only consequences.

In much of the Horn of Africa, power is not exercised primarily through formal institutions. It is embedded in networks of patronage, coercion, economic extraction, and armed mobilization. Alex de Waal has described this as a ‘political marketplace,’ where loyalties are transactional, alliances are fluid, and violence itself becomes a tool of political bargaining.

Peace processes that fail to engage these underlying realities often collapse under the weight of their own assumptions. Agreements may appear coherent on paper while remaining disconnected from the actual structures that sustain conflict.

This is one of the defining weaknesses of much contemporary mediation.

Too often, mediation has shifted from shaping political outcomes to managing diplomatic processes. Meetings proliferate. Statements multiply. Tracks expand. Yet leverage weakens and coherence declines.

The result is the paradox increasingly visible across many conflicts today: more mediation, but less peace.

The Horn of Africa vividly illustrates this crisis.

Different actors pursue different initiatives through overlapping and sometimes competing tracks. Regional organizations, international institutions, bilateral powers, and external geopolitical actors often engage simultaneously without strategic alignment.

The multiplication of forums has not necessarily produced greater effectiveness. In some cases, it has deepened fragmentation.

This is not merely an operational problem. It reflects a deeper transformation in the international system itself.

Mediators must negotiate a fiercely contested diplomatic environment

The era in which mediation could rely on relatively coherent multilateral consensus is fading. What is emerging instead is a far more contested diplomatic environment shaped by geopolitical rivalry, transactional partnerships, declining trust in institutions, and the growing influence of middle and regional powers.

For mediators, this creates a new level of complexity. It is no longer enough to navigate the conflict itself. One must also navigate the competing interests of those seeking to shape the conflict’s outcome.

This emerging reality is most evident in the Red Sea corridor. Gulf powers, global powers, regional actors, and non-state networks increasingly intersect across the Horn in ways that blur the line between domestic conflict and wider geopolitical competition. Proximity to the Middle East has transformed the Horn into part of a wider and deeply interconnected security arena.

Mediation frameworks, however, have often failed to evolve accordingly.

Many still operate according to assumptions rooted in an earlier era — one in which conflicts were more localized, mediation tracks more centralized, and multilateral authority more coherent. But today’s wars, economically embedded and digitally amplified, do not lend themselves to this conventional approach.

This demands a fundamental rethinking of mediation itself.

The challenge is not simply to improve mediation processes. It is to redefine mediation politically, strategically, and institutionally for an entirely different era of conflict.

Three deficits increasingly define contemporary mediation efforts.

Key challenges facing modern mediation

First, there is a deficit of political strategy.

Mediation has too often become procedural rather than transformational. Process has become a substitute for strategy. Yet mediation that is disconnected from a clear political understanding of power, incentives, and end states risks becoming performative rather than consequential.

Second, there is a deficit of coherence.

Multiple actors engage without alignment, weakening leverage and creating opportunities for conflict actors to exploit divisions among mediators themselves. Fragmented diplomacy frequently mirrors the fragmentation of the conflicts it seeks to resolve.

Third, there is a deficit of legitimacy.

Formal peace processes often remain disconnected from societal realities and civilian constituencies most affected by war. Inclusion is frequently symbolic rather than meaningful, while local actors capable of sustaining peace remain marginalized.

These deficits are particularly dangerous in contexts such as Sudan, where the collapse of state structures risks generating prolonged fragmentation with regional consequences extending far beyond national borders.

The ongoing tensions between peace and justice

At the same time, mediation confronts another enduring tension: the relationship between peace and justice.

Victims of conflict do not speak in abstractions about stabilization. They speak about accountability, dignity, recognition, and historical grievance. They demand not only the cessation of violence but also justice for the violence already committed.

Yet here too mediation encounters difficult realities.

Actors who fear immediate accountability are often unwilling to negotiate. Insisting on maximalist justice demands at the outset may, in some circumstances, foreclose opportunities to stop the violence itself.

This does not mean justice should be abandoned. It means justice must be sequenced carefully within broader political transitions.

Mahmood Mamdani has long argued that violence in Africa is often rooted not merely in individual criminality but in deeper political structures and historical systems of exclusion. Sustainable peace therefore requires more than prosecutions alone. It requires transforming the conditions that continuously reproduce violent conflict.

In practical terms, this means prioritizing the cessation of violence while preserving pathways toward accountability, institutional reform, reconciliation, and political transformation.

It is not a perfect approach. But in the midst of war, perfection is rarely available.

And this is precisely where African agency becomes indispensable.

It is such normative and socio-political imperatives that informed and animate the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. It is premised on both the necessity of justice and accountability and the recognition that wars are extraordinary events that are not amenable to the application of systems of justice that are designed for normal and peace times.

On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342^nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342^nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342^nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342^nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.

By Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi

Convener and Chairperson, Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement

Africa is in danger of becoming accustomed to war.

What would have shocked the conscience of the continent a generation ago is increasingly being treated as routine. Daily reports of bombed villages, displaced populations, massacred civilians, sexual violence, starvation, collapsing states, and endless humanitarian crises no longer generate the urgency they deserve.

The tragedy is not only that war is spreading, and Africa is in a new era of conflict and insecurity. The greater tragedy is that war is becoming normalized.

From Sudan to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, from the Sahel to parts of the Horn of Africa, violence is increasingly becoming a defining feature of political life itself. Armed conflict is no longer appearing as an exception to politics; in too many places it is becoming a substitute for politics.

Africa today confronts a profound and dangerous reality: war is increasingly becoming systemic, self-sustaining, and in some places permanent.

Many of the continent’s contemporary conflicts are also increasingly shaped by external interference and geopolitical competition. Local conflicts are becoming entangled with regional and international rivalries, giving rise to proxy wars that often outlive their original causes. External sponsorship, competition for strategic influence, and access to resources can prolong violence, complicate peace efforts, and transform local conflicts into seemingly endless wars. In too many places, Africa is paying the human cost of struggles that extend far beyond its borders.

The return of war is not simply a security challenge. It is an existential challenge to Africa’s future. It threatens every major aspiration Africans have articulated for themselves—from Agenda 2063 and regional integration to democratic governance, economic transformation, poverty reduction, social justice, and women’s empowerment.

Across the continent, conflicts are becoming more fragmented, more regionalized, and more resistant to traditional approaches to peacemaking.

In too many places, war has become an economic system, a method of governance, a pathway to political power, and a means of negotiating access to state resources. For some actors, peace has become a threat while war has become an opportunity.

Even more troubling is the changing status of civilians. In many contemporary conflicts, civilians are no longer unfortunate victims caught between warring parties. They are increasingly becoming deliberate targets (see here).

No group bears the burden of Africa’s wars more heavily than women and children.

Women carry responsibilities that extend far beyond their own survival. They become caregivers, providers, protectors, and custodians of communities under conditions of extraordinary hardship. They face displacement, loss of livelihoods, hunger, sexual violence, forced migration, and the collapse of essential social services. Yet, they remain significantly underrepresented in the political decisions that determine war and peace.

Children are perhaps the greatest victims of all. Millions are growing up amid violence, displacement, interrupted education, hunger, and profound psychological trauma. Many have never known a society at peace.

The destruction of civilian life is no longer merely collateral damage. It is increasingly part of the logic of war itself.

Entire societies are being traumatized. Communities that have lived together for generations are being torn apart. Reconciliation becomes more difficult. State-building becomes more fragile. Democratic transitions become more elusive. Development becomes impossible.

Africa’s peace institutions are under immense strain. Existing approaches are not matching the scale of the challenge. Conflict prevention remains weak, mediation efforts are fragmented, and civilian protection remains inadequate.

Most importantly, leadership for peace is becoming increasingly scarce, while leadership for war often appears more visible.

It is against this backdrop that the Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement is advancing the Women for Peace in Africa Initiative.

Peace is too precious to be left to governments and formal institutions alone. Sustainable peace requires the active participation of citizens, women’s organizations, youth movements, faith communities, intellectuals, traditional leaders, humanitarian actors, and civil society. The defense of peace must become a shared societal responsibility.

The initiative recognizes that sustainable peace requires organized civic leadership capable of defending civilians, promoting accountability, supporting mediation efforts, strengthening social cohesion, and generating public pressure for political solutions.

Africa has reached a moment when silence is no longer an option. The scale of suffering demands action. The erosion of peace demands leadership. The future of the continent demands a broad-based civic movement committed to ensuring that war does not become a permanent feature of African political life.

The defense of peace must once again become a continental cause.

Africa must rise against the normalization of war.