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		<title>AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/aupsc-summit-on-the-situation-in-libya/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2025 06:02:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2025]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>23 July 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/aupsc-summit-on-the-situation-in-libya/">AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 23 July 2025</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (24 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1291 session on the situation in Libya, at the level of Heads of State and Government.<sup>1</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s summit-level session marks the first time since the PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/294-psceng.pdf">294<sup>th</sup> session</a> in September 2011 that Libya will be discussed at the level of Heads of State and Government. It will be the 27<sup>th</sup> session of the PSC since the PSC was seized of the situation in Libya in February 2011.</p>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Previous sessions of the PSC on Libya, Amani Africa database</figcaption></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-1" data-row="script-row-unique-1" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-1"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-2"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter single-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July 2025. It is also expected that Mahamoudi Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, will make an introductory statement setting the context for the session. As a country concerned, the representative of Libya is expected to make a statement. As per the usual practice of the PSC, Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary-general of the UN for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is expected to deliver a statement. A representative of Congo may also make a statement as Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Coming only in two months from the last session, tomorrow’s session follows the 23 May PSC <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1280.comm_en.pdf">convening</a> that was prompted by clashes between rival militias in Tripoli on 12 May. Apart from calling for unconditional ceasefire, the PSC underscored ‘the imperative of maintaining order and demilitarising the non-state forces in the capital and efforts to restore civilian order.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a follow-up to this immediate past session, the PSC is expected to hear during tomorrow’s session the fragile truce of 14 May that calmed down the situation in Tripoli, about the mechanisms established to monitor its implementation, and broader security and military arrangements aimed at easing tensions among rival factions in Tripoli.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is of interest for members of the PSC to take stock of the persistence of insecurity and political instability in Libya. It is to be recalled that after Libya’s descent into civil war and anarchy following the 2011 military campaign that toppled the government of Muammar Gaddafi, the civil war came to an end with the signing of the ceasefire agreement of October 2020 and the establishment of the Libyan Dialogue Forum in November 2020. Despite the fact that this was supposed to lead to a transitional process set to culminate in the convening of elections at the end of 2021, the persistence of political and security divisions impeded agreement on the process and modalities for the holding of elections, leading to indefinite postponement of the elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Beyond the indefinite postponement of the elections that left Libya in a transitional limbo, the 2020 peace process that ended the civil war has not been able to overcome the political and security fragmentation that has become the characteristic feature of the political and institutional landscape of Libya. At the level of government entities, Libya operates on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers. This has direct bearing on the economy reflected, among others, in the significant deterioration of the purchasing power of the Libyan dinar and the lack of agreement on a unified budget.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other factor that carries particular significance for security and stability is the absence of a unified and professional security sector and the prevalence of various armed groups with various levels of links with the rival governments. These armed groups that emerged and proliferated following the descent of Libya into civil war in 2011 exercise control over various territories and have ties with various parts of Libya.</p>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Territorial influence of various armed groups in Libya, by ACLED</figcaption></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-3" data-row="script-row-unique-3" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-3"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-4"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter single-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tensions between these armed groups over territorial control and competition of political actors for influence over state institutions and access to state resources have on various occasions led to the eruption of violence between these armed groups. One of the major conflict databases, <a href="https://acleddata.com/2025/07/10/political-competition-and-infighting-among-tripolis-armed-groups-reach-beyond-libyas-capital/">ACLED</a>, reported that it recorded ‘64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.’ The most recent of these violent episodes that shook Tripoli took place in May 2025. While the leaders of GNU described the violent clashes as law enforcement operations against criminals, aimed at enforcing judicial orders issued by the Libyan Attorney General with the goal of upholding the rule of law, it is viewed as a manifestation of patterns of inter-elite competition.  Thus, in her briefing to the UN Security Council on 24 June, Tetteh observed that ‘narratives have emerged, that risks pitting cities and neighbourhoods within western Libya against one another, threatening social cohesion and potentially fomenting further escalation.’ She further warned that the ‘continued inflow of weapons into Tripoli has led to the proliferation of heavy arms and weapons depots in densely populated civilian areas, posing serious risks to civilian lives. There is also growing concern that further instability will draw in eastern security actors and undermine the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further compounding the political and institutional division and the fragmentation of the security landscape with the persistence of rival armed groups exerting influence on and loosely affiliated to government institutions are competing external interests. External actors have further destabilised the situation by supporting opposing sides, effectively turning Libya into a proxy battleground and complicating international mediation efforts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Considering the fact that the rivalry between armed groups feeds into and reinforces the political and institutional division in Libya and that stability in Tripoli is held by transactional arrangements and financial cooption by the GNU rather than formal arrangements and institutional reform, it will be of interest for the PSC to interrogate whether and how a political roadmap that will lead to elections can be agreed to by the major actors under the prevailing conditions and without pursuing effective security sector reform.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other issue that is of interest to PSC members is the state of the peace process and recent developments concerning the peace process and reconciliation in Libya. The UN remains the main actor in the Libyan peace process. Its recent efforts, under the leadership of Tetteh, focused on achieving consensus on the process and modalities for holding the long-delayed elections in Libya by promoting dialogue between the country’s rival factions. Following Tetteh’s appointment, in February, UNSMIL established an Advisory Committee to propose technically sound and politically viable solutions, building on frameworks like the Libyan Political Agreement, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap and the 6+6 Committee’s electoral laws. By 20 May 2025, after more than 20 meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, the committee delivered a comprehensive report to UNSMIL, outlining four <a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-shares-advisory-committee-recommendations-prepares-public-consultation">options</a> to address critical disputes, including the linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, candidate eligibility criteria, voting rights and the electoral appeals mechanism. These options were: (1) holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; (2) conducting parliamentary elections first, followed by the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution; (3) adopting a permanent constitution prior to holding elections; and (4) establishing a political dialogue committee—based on the Libyan Political Agreement—to finalise electoral laws, determine the structure of the executive authority, and adopt a permanent constitution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the submission of the committee’s report, UNSMIL has been conducting a series of nationwide consultations aimed at facilitating an inclusive dialogue among Libyans on the committee’s proposed options and on how best to overcome the country’s prolonged political gridlock. These consultations have revealed widespread frustration among Libyans over the current security, political, and economic conditions. Many have reportedly lost trust in existing institutions and expressed a strong desire to see the transitional period come to an end. UNSMIL intends to use the views and perspectives gathered from a broad cross-section of Libyan society to develop a consensus-based roadmap toward national elections and the reunification of state institutions. At Thursday’s meeting, the PSC may receive updates on these developments and express support to the UN’s efforts in this regard.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another notable recent development that is of interest to PSC members was the meeting of the Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL), held on 20 June for the first time in four years. The IFCL was established to coordinate international efforts in support of the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led political process. The June meeting brought together representatives from 19 countries and three regional organisations, including the African Union. According to the meeting’s summary, participants reviewed the work of the advisory committee, wherein countries such as Türkiye requested the dropping of one of the four options proposed by the committee, highlighting an instance of external actors determining the scope of choices for Libyans. Indicating renewed effort for coordinated action, participants agreed to hold regular meetings to strengthen coordination in support of the UN-led process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the UN continues to lead mediation efforts in Libya, the AU has also played a supportive role in advancing the United Nations-led political process. The AU is a member of the Libya Quartet—alongside the United Nations, the European Union, and the League of Arab States—which was established to ensure a coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis. Notably, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya, chaired by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, led on the national reconciliation efforts. In February, the Committee facilitated the signing of a Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation by Libyan stakeholders in Addis Ababa. However, some Libyan political actors voiced reservations about the Charter, and several prominent leaders were notably absent from the signing ceremony. Despite the fact that the head of the Presidential Council was in Addis Ababa, he did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation accord.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and the compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country. It may also express support to the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya and reiterate its call on those Libyan actors who did not sign the Charter signed on the sidelines of the AU summit to sign and join the Charter. The PSC may also welcome the truce that was agreed in Tripoli and reiterate its call for unconditional ceasefire. The PSC may call for renewed effort for the adoption of a roadmap on implementation of security sector reform, focusing on the integration of the various security groups into a unified and professional national security institution and the disarmament and reintegration into society of others. With respect to the political process, it may express its support to the latest initiative of the UN for achieving a consensus among the various Libyan political and security actors on a roadmap for unification of national institutions and conducting the long-delayed elections. The PSC may call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and cease their support of rivalry among contending Libyan actors. It may also reiterate its plan for undertaking a field mission to Libya and the decision for moving the AU office to Tripoli.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode_text_column text-small" ><p><sup>1</sup> This is the third year in a raw that Uganda convenes a session on specific conflict situation at the level of Heads of State and Government during its chair-ship of the PSC, signifying the interest on the work of the PSC at the highest levels in Uganda.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/aupsc-summit-on-the-situation-in-libya/">AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Consideration of the Emergency Situation in Libya</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 09:50:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>22 May 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/consideration-of-the-emergency-situation-in-libya/">Consideration of the Emergency Situation in Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Consideration of the Emergency Situation in Libya</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 22 May 2025</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (23 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1280<sup>th</sup> session on the situation in Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Ambassador Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Libya, Ambassador Wahida Ayari, is also likely to make a statement. If previous practice is guidance, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Head of the UN Mission in Libya, Hannah Tetteh, may also address the PSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC considered this agenda item was in November 2024, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1244.comm_en.pdf">1244<sup>th</sup></a> meeting.  The PSC reiterated ‘AU’s full support for the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement of 23 October 2020’ and reaffirmed ‘the resolute commitment and readiness of the AU to continue to support Libya in addressing its crisis, in line with AU’s principles and instruments.’ Other than this session, the only engagement of the AU involved a high-level visit in October 2024 by a delegation comprising Mauritanian President and AU Chairperson for 2024, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the then AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and Congo’s Foreign Minister Jean-Claude Gakosso. The visit aimed to revive efforts to convene Libya’s long-delayed national reconciliation conference, which was initially scheduled for April 2024 but did not take place. Beyond the occasional effort focusing on the convening of national reconciliation, the attention given to the situation in Libya has been waning, with the PSC convening only one session. The field mission to Libya, envisaged in the PSC’s annual indicative programme, did not take place in 2024, just as it did not in 2023.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s meeting comes following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/12/un-urges-calm-as-heavy-fire-clashes-erupt-in-libyas-tripoli">assassination</a> of a key militia leader, which has reignited violence in Tripoli, threatening the fragile 2020 ceasefire. The assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli (aka ‘Gheniwa’) on 12 May 2025, a prominent militia leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), sparked intense clashes in Tripoli. The fighting involved rival militias, including the 444<sup>th</sup> Combat Brigade, with gunfire, drones and anti-aircraft weapons reported. The Interior Ministry declared a state of emergency, urging residents to stay indoors.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Such violent eruptions are not inseparable from the state of political and security division afflicting Libya. The country remains fractured by a relentless political division, its people caught in the crossfire of two rival administrations vying for power. In Libya’s capital, Tripoli, the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, holds sway, striving to assert its legitimacy on the global stage. Meanwhile, in eastern Libya in Benghazi, the Government of National Stability (GNS) commands influence, bolstered by the House of Representatives (HoR) and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). This division, rooted in years of conflict following the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, has left Libya in a state of recurrent political instability, institutional fragmentation and recurrent violence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With both sides locked in a bitter struggle for dominance, the rivalry between the two sides and rival armed supporters has stifled the transitional process. Previous efforts to overcome this division have rather been unsuccessful. National elections, initially slated to bring reconciliation and a unified government, have been indefinitely postponed since 2021, mired in disputes over electoral laws and eligibility criteria. As oil fields &#8211; Libya’s economic lifeline &#8211; become ‘bargaining chips’ in the power struggle, foreign powers quietly back their preferred faction. The persistence of these conditions has deepened the nation’s woes, with ordinary Libyans bearing the brunt of economic instability, periodic violence and a fragmented state.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Eastern Libya-based parliament was reported to have adopted a national reconciliation and transitional justice law in January 2025. In parallel, in February 2025, a Charter for Peace and Reconciliation was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the sidelines of the 38<sup>th</sup> AU Summit. The Libyan parties that signed the charter included representatives from the Parliament, the High State Council, and representatives of presidential candidate Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, along with other Libyan dignitaries. Reflecting the persisting division in Libya, it was the head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed al-Menfi, who was present in Addis Ababa for the AU Summit, but did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation accord.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The UN remains the main actor in the Libyan peace process. Cognisant of this and following the departure of Abdoulaye Bathily from UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the PSC, in the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1244.comm_en.pdf">communiqué</a> of its 1244<sup>th</sup> Session, underscored ‘the urgent need for the United Nations Secretary-General to appoint his Special Representative for Libya.’ On 24 January 2025, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2025-01-24/ms-hanna-serwaa-tetteh-of-ghana-special-representative-for-libya-and-head-of-the-united-nations-support-mission-libya">appointment</a> of Hanna Serwaa Tetteh of Ghana as his Special Representative for Libya and Head of the UNSMIL, succeeding Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal, who served as Special Envoy and Head of UNSMIL until May 2024. Since her appointment, UNSMIL established a 20-member Libyan Advisory Committee, a diverse group of experts tasked with untangling the contentious issues blocking the path to elections. Comprising respected Libyan figures with expertise in legal, constitutional and electoral matters, the committee was designed to propose technically sound and politically viable solutions, building on frameworks like the Libyan Political Agreement, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap and the 6+6 Committee’s electoral laws. By 20 May 2025, after more than 20 meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, the committee delivered a comprehensive report to UNSMIL, outlining four <a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-shares-advisory-committee-recommendations-prepares-public-consultation">options</a> to address critical disputes, including the linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, candidate eligibility criteria, voting rights and the electoral appeals mechanism. This report, described by UNSMIL as a ‘launching point for a country-wide conversation,’ aimed to guide the next phase of a Libyan-led political process, with public consultations planned to foster inclusivity and national consensus. However, consensus remains elusive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 17 May, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, issued <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250517/statement-chairperson-auc-situation-libya">a statement</a> expressing deep concern over the armed clashes that broke out in Tripoli. While welcoming ‘the ceasefire and the return of cautious calm’, he emphasised the need for ‘demilitarising’ Tripoli. Calling for ‘national responsibility and engagement in a comprehensive political process to end Libya’s prolonged transition’, he urged all stakeholders to commit to ‘the National Reconciliation Charter signed in Addis Ababa.’ On the same day, the UNSC issued a <a href="https://unsmil.unmissions.org/security-council-press-statement-libya-17-may-2025">Press Statement</a> on the situation in Libya, expressing ‘deep concern at the escalation of violence in Tripoli in recent days, with reports of civilian casualties.’ The Security Council further ‘welcomed reports of agreed truces and called for these to be unconditionally respected and for a permanent ceasefire to be agreed.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the return of calm, on the political front, actions taken by the rival factions continue to escalate tension. The latest such development involved the announcement by the Head of the Presidential Council (PC) of several legislations that he said were adopted by the PC. While these legislations were rejected by some Libyan institutions, including some members of the PC and the speaker of the HoR, the Prime Minister of the GNU, Abdulhamid Debaiba, transmitted the legislations to the HoR and the High Council of State. Amid these developments, UNMSIL issued a warning against the risk of escalatory unilateral actions by political and security actors and urged them to refrain from taking steps that undermine the fragile situation in Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As with previous sessions, tomorrow’s session is expected to discuss the recent armed clashes in Libya and the continuing political and institutional division impeding progress in the transitional process in the country. It is also expected that the PSC will get an update on developments around the reconciliation process and the status of and the follow-up to the Peace and Reconciliation Charter signed under the auspices of the AU. Also of interest for the PSC is receiving an update on the progress made in relocating the AU Liaison Office from Tunis to Tripoli, as directed by the AU Assembly at its 35th Ordinary Session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and the compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country, which is undermining development and security. Council is also likely to reiterate that the Skhirat Agreement signed on 17 December 2015 remains one of the credible bases and frameworks for a lasting political solution for the Libyan crisis. Council may welcome the Libyan Reconciliation charter signed in Addis-Ababa on 14 February 2025. The PSC may request the AU to take steps to ensure that the Charter receives the support of all Libyan stakeholders and is adequately aligned with other initiatives in Libya for reconciliation and transitional justice. The PSC may call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and support the rivalry among contending Libyan actors. The PSC may also emphasise the importance of improved coordination, harmonisation and complementarity among the UN, the AU, the League of Arab States and the EU to prevent overlapping efforts and competing initiatives in support of Libyan peace.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on the situation in Libya</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situation-in-libya-nov-12-2024/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2024 08:14:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=19638</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>11 November 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situation-in-libya-nov-12-2024/">Briefing on the situation in Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-6"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on the situation in Libya</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 11 November 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (12 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene for its 1244<sup>th</sup> session to discuss the situation in Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks from Jean Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department, is expected to make a statement. It is also expected that Wahida Ayari Yari, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson to Libya briefs the PSC, and a representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) makes a statement. The representative of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya and a representative of Libya, as the country concerned, are also expected to make statements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is the first since the last substantive PSC session. That last session in April 2023 was the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/1150.comm_en.pdf">1150<sup>th</sup> session titled, ‘Towards National Reconciliation in Libya’</a>. In its communiqué from that meeting, the AUPSC commended ongoing efforts to convene a national reconciliation conference as a step toward restoring stability in Libya. The council also reiterated its decision to conduct a field mission to Libya to demonstrate the AU’s solidarity with the Libyan people and to gather direct insights into the situation, aiming to support more informed decisions on the way forward.  This session also comes against the background of the recent visit by the AU under the leadership of the Mauritanian President, the AU Chairperson for 2024, along with the AU Commission Chairperson and the Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Ad Hoc Committee on Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session can therefore serve two objectives. The first of these objectives is to take stock of developments in Libya since the last PSC session. The second objective is to receive an update from the AU on the role of the continental body, on why the convening of the reconciliation conference scheduled to take place in April 2024 could not be held, and on the nature and outcome of the recent mission of the AU to Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Libya’s political deadlock persists, with rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk unable to make any progress toward resolving their differences. At the heart of the crisis is the delayed organisation of national elections, initially scheduled for 2021 but now indefinitely postponed. The UN has taken the lead in facilitating talks to help Libyan political stakeholders agree on a roadmap for elections. However, continued intransigence among these stakeholders has hampered the UN’s efforts. Former UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, who was leading these talks, left his position in April, deeply frustrated by what he described as the stakeholders’ ‘stubborn resistance, unreasonable expectations, and indifference to the interests of the Libyan people.’ Complicating the situation further is the rivalry among external actors seeking influence in Libya, which, according to Bathily, has made finding a resolution ‘ever elusive.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Six months after Bathily’s resignation, the UN has yet to appoint a successor. Currently, Stephanie Koury of the United States serves as the Acting Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. Koury has expressed her intention to revive talks between Libyan stakeholders, though the prospects for substantial progress in overcoming the political deadlock remain bleak.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tensions escalated in Libya in August when the Tripoli-based government dismissed the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, one of the few institutions serving both rival governments. The Governor&#8217;s relationship with Tripoli had recently deteriorated, leading to his removal—a decision contested by authorities in eastern Libya. This sparked a major crisis, resulting in the closure of key oil fields and terminals and a sharp decline in oil exports, the cornerstone of Libya’s economy. In response, the UN facilitated multiple rounds of negotiations with Libyan political stakeholders, eventually achieving a compromise on appointing new Central Bank leadership.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session is the role of the AU. The AU has not taken a lead role in resolving the Libyan political crisis but remains a member of the Quartet, which includes the UN, the AU, the League of Arab States, and the EU. The AUPSC has repeatedly emphasised the importance of improved coordination, harmonisation, and complementarity among these partners to prevent overlapping efforts and competing initiatives in support of Libyan peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU High-Level Committee on Libya, chaired by the Republic of Congo’s President, Denis Sassou Nguesso, is responsible for the AU’s role in the Libyan issue. This committee contributes to the UN-led process by prioritising peace and reconciliation efforts, which are seen as crucial steps toward organising national elections and concluding Libya’s prolonged transitional period. On 5 February, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya held a high-level meeting in Brazzaville to prepare for the national reconciliation conference. The meeting urged the swift advancement of peace and reconciliation efforts in Libya and encouraged all Libyan parties to engage inclusively and constructively. Emphasising transitional justice, the committee highlighted the importance of traditional conflict resolution practices to foster national unity, healing, consensus, and social cohesion. The meeting requested the AU Commission to continue supporting Libyans to ensure the successful conduct of this process in a timely and effective manner. Furthermore, it underscored the need to expedite the relocation of the AU Liaison Office for Libya from Tunis to Tripoli, as directed by the AU Assembly at its 35th Ordinary Session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Libyan political stakeholders had initially agreed to hold the national reconciliation conference on 28 April in Sirte, Libya. However, persistent divisions among them led to its indefinite postponement. Last month, the current AU Chair, Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ghazouani of Mauritania, accompanied by AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Congo, representing the AU High-Level Committee on Libya, visited Tripoli to revive discussions around convening the conference. The AU delegation indicated plans to visit eastern Libya in the coming weeks for further talks, though no specific date was provided.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the lack of progress in the effort to achieve consensus on the issues dividing Libyan political and social forces including notably the electoral process and the establishment of a unified interim government. It may express concern that the prevailing status quo in Libya is unsustainable and keeps the country in political limbo and uncertainty, which perpetuates the division, instability and sporadic incidents of violence and conflicts. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country, which is undermining development and security in the country. It may welcome the agreement reached between the rival administrations in Libya to resolve the disagreement over the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya and call on the rival parties to show the same level of commitment and compromise in resolving their disagreement over the formation of a unified interim administration, the electoral process and the finalisation of the making of the final constitution. The PSC may emphasise the need for finalising the preparatory work for the convening of the national reconciliation conference. It may also reiterate the outcome of the summit of the AU High-level Committee on Libya encouraging the Presidential Council to establish as soon as possible the National Commission for Reconciliation to carry out its mandate. The PSC may also echo the emphasis that the High-Level Committee put on ‘the essential aspect of transitional justice, including the use of traditional approaches to conflict resolution to promote national consensus, healing, unity and social cohesion.’ The PSC may also reiterate its earlier calls for the urgent need for the convergence and complementarity of the actions of the AU, the UN, the League of Arab States, the EU, and the international community to avoid duplication of efforts for Libya.</p>
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		<title>PSC ministerial meeting on Libya</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/psc-ministerial-meeting-on-libya/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2023 09:51:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=13915</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>18 April 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/psc-ministerial-meeting-on-libya/">PSC ministerial meeting on Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-7"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>PSC ministerial meeting on Libya</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 18 April 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (18 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1149<sup>th</sup> meeting to assess the situation in Libya, with a particular focus on promoting national reconciliation. This session is expected to take place at a ministerial level.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is set to commence with the statement of the Chairperson of the PSC, Nabil Ammar, Foreign Minister of Tunisia followed by statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The PSC is expected to receive statements from Jean-Claude Gakosso, Chair of the AU High-Level Committee for Libya and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) and Head of UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSML), Abdoulaye Bathily. As the concerned country, the representative of the State of Libya is also expected to make a statement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is to be recalled that on 08 January 2023, a preparatory meeting for a Libyan national reconciliation conference took place in Tripoli, with the support of the AU, particularly the High-Level Committee on Libya chaired by the Republic of Congo.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The 36<sup>th</sup> AU Summit that took place on 18-19 February 2023 in Addis Ababa also recognised the significance of the National reconciliation process in the run up to the national elections and welcomed the convening of the preparatory meeting in January with the support of the AU High-Level Committee. It also encouraged continued efforts by the Libyan authorities and the AU High-Level Committee towards the organisation of the national reconciliation conference in an inclusive manner. At its previous session dedicated to the situation in Libya – the 1136<sup>th</sup> meeting – the PSC commended efforts geared towards the convening of the national reconciliation conference and underscored the critical need for continued AU role in promoting national reconciliation and stabilisation in Libya. Tomorrow’s session provides the opportunity for the PSC to follow up on efforts being made to organise the national reconciliation conference which is expected to take place over the coming months. The AU Commission and the Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee are expected to provide details on progress made with respect to finalizing the plan for the convening of the reconciliation conference. In this respect, it would be of interest to members of the PSC to get information on details of the precautions including modalities of determining participation to ensure inclusivity, state of agreement with key stakeholders on the agenda of the reconciliation conference, follow up on outcomes including coordination with other processes such as the effort to achieve agreement on the constitutional framework and the timelines for convening elections, with a view to finding a lasting and comprehensive solution to the country’s protracted political crisis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In its 1136<sup>th</sup> meeting, the PSC also decided to undertake a field mission to the country to demonstrate solidarity with the Libyan people and engage with all key stakeholders ahead of the national reconciliation conference. At tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC may also follow up on this decision and preparations of the plans for this field mission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year marks the 12<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Libyan revolution but ‘Libya’s political class is going through a major legitimacy crisis’, as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Abdoulaye Bathily, informed the Security Council in his 27 February 2023 briefing. Since the postponement of elections that were supposed to be held in December 2021, the political impasse between the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, Abdulhamid Al Dabiba, and Fathi Bashagha, the Prime Minister-designate nominated by the House of Representatives (HoR), remains unresolved. The Libyan people appear to be extremely frustrated by the status quo which has become untenable. A major focus of regional and international efforts has, therefore, been to resolve this political crisis in order to pave the way for the completion of the Libyan transition through the holding of presidential and legislative elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since his appointment in September 2022, Bathily has been undertaking extensive consultations with the Libyan stakeholders as well as other regional and international partners in an effort to break the political impasse. The Special Representative has already informed the Security Council of his decision to establish a High-Level Panel for Elections (HLPE) which will be comprised of all relevant Libyan stakeholders, including representatives of political institutions, major political figures, tribal leaders, civil society organizations, security actors, women, and youth representatives. Its main responsibility, according to Bathily, will be to facilitate the adoption of the legal framework and roadmap for the holding of elections in 2023 and provide a platform for building consensus on matters such as election security and the adoption of a Code of Conduct for all candidates. Yet, the success of this formation depends on the buy-in from the rival political and security forces, the composition of the Panel and the modalities it uses for resolving disputes. Equally important is how this Panel can function effectively in the context of the continuing division involving two rival executive bodies of government. As critical is the follow up to the announcement made in Egypt by Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the HoR and Khaled Al-Mishri, Chairman of the High State Council (HSC) that they agreed to draw up a roadmap for completion of all measures necessary for the conduct of elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In February 2023, the Libyan HoR adopted an amendment to the 2011 Constitutional Declaration which set up a committee of 12 members, comprising six members from the HoR (the Libyan legislative body based in Tobruk) and six from the HSC (an advisory body established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement), to prepare for elections. In his briefing to the Security Council on 27 February 2023, however, Bathily said that the amendment does not address issues such as the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates which has been contentious. It does not also provide a clear road map and timelines for the holding of elections, Bathily noted, expressing his fear that further controversy may arise because of issues such as the regional representation in the Senate. The HoR disapproved this assertion and characterized it as inaccurate in a statement issued on 28 February 2023.  Nevertheless, in his briefing to the press on 11 March 2023, Bathily expressed hope that the 6+6 committee will address some of those issues and come up with a reasonable timeframe for the holding of elections. He also expressed the UN’s readiness to support the committee in discharging its responsibilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Security Council members issued a presidential statement on 16 March 2023, welcoming the progress in terms of the constitutional framework for the elections and encouraged the HoR and the HSC to continue building momentum towards the holding of elections in the country. They also expressed strong support for the efforts being exerted by Bathily and were encouraged by his initiative to set up the high-level panel, thus urging all stakeholders to cooperate and constructively engage with him. But the difference between 6+6 committee and the High-Level Panel does not seem to be very clear and is something that needs to be clarified.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While ensuring the conduct of elections remains critical to achieve full stability in Libya, success of the election depends on overcoming the institutional divisions reflected in the existence of rival executive arms of government and the lack or legitimacy afflicting much of the current Libyan institutions in the eyes of the Libyan public. The national reconciliation conference can accordingly be organized to mobilize and provide platform for the engagement of the wider society and to further buttress ongoing efforts to achieve consensus on modalities for convening of national elections including through the establishment of the High-Level Panel that Bathily proposed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the security front, with continued sporadic clashes between different armed groups and criminal gangs, the overall security in the country remains tense.  The situation has been further exasperated by external interference, including the activities of foreign fighters and mercenaries deployed in the country and the continued violation of the arms embargo imposed on Libya under Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) [<a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement">S/RES/1970 (2011)</a>]. The AU has been calling for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries and this was the subject of discussion at a meeting held by the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission (JMC) and liaison committees from Libya, Sudan and Niger in Cairo on 8 February 2023, which agreed on an integrated mechanism to facilitate this objective. The JMC also held its meeting in Benghazi on 7 April 2023 to enhance confidence among the Libyan military and security institutions in support of the political process and create a conducive environment for holding free and fair elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its full support and encourage efforts for the convening of the Libyan national reconciliation conference and urge all Libyan parties to participate in good faith in this process. It may further call on Libyan parties to work towards reaching consensus on finalising the necessary constitutional and electoral frameworks for the conduct of national elections. The PSC may welcome the ongoing effort for the convening of the national reconciliation conference under the auspices of the AU. It may urge all Libyan actors to collaborate with the AU to ensure the convening of an all-inclusive national reconciliation conference. It may also condemn and totally reject any external interference in the internal affairs of Libya and urge Libyan actors to prioritise unification and refrain from taking actions that will put at risk the country’s fragile stability. The PSC may express its concern over the continuing humanitarian and human rights crises affecting in particular migrants and refugees, and call on the relevant Libyan authorities as well as international actors to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and protection of populations in need. It may also reiterate the call made at its previous sessions, regarding the ‘urgent need for the AU Commission to ensure that the AU Mission in Libya is relocated to Tripoli and is sufficiently capacitated, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate and adequately support the AU’s efforts on Libya, in line with the Decision [<a href="https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1569/Assembly%20AU%20DEC%20813%20-%20838%20%28XXXV%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=5&amp;isAllowed=y">Assembly/AU/Dec.819(XXXV)</a>] adopted by the 35<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly’.</p>
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		<title>The Situation in Libya</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-situation-in-libya/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2023 06:54:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=11907</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>01 February 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-situation-in-libya/">The Situation in Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-8"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>The Situation in Libya</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 01 February 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (01 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), is scheduled to convene the very first meeting of the month at its 1136<sup>th</sup> session to receive updates on the situation in Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Edward Xolisa Makaya, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of February, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to deliver a statement. Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson in Libya is expected to provide update on the situation in Libya. Republic of the Congo, as Chairperson of the High-Level Committee for Libya is also expected to make a presentation. The representative of the State of Libya, as the country concerned will also deliver statement. Representatives of the Libya Contact Group and Libya’s immediate neighbouring countries, as well as representatives from Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), North African Regional Capability (NARC), and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), as relevant Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to make statements. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) will also deliver a statement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Libya was at its 1091<sup>st</sup> session which took place on 29 June of the previous year. The challenges that continue hindering the conduct of general elections in Libya formed one of the main issues the PSC addressed at that session. In this regard, it is to be recalled that the PSC, while acknowledging and expressing full support to on-going political processes in Libya aimed at resolving issues impeding the conduct of elections, it urged Libyan stakeholders to reach consensus on the necessary constitutional framework and electoral laws and enable registered 2.8 million voters elect their leaders. In addition to providing general overview on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Libya, tomorrow’s session is expected to provide latest updates related to on-going efforts for the conduct of the much-delayed general elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One key new development with respect to processes aimed at resolving the political crisis in Libya has been the appointment of Senegalese Abdoulaye Bathily, as the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL. Since the former SRSG for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, Jan Kubis stepped down in late November 2021, the post has remained vacant while the UN chief appointed US diplomat Stephanie Williams as his Special Advisor considering her previous engagement as a UN deputy Special Representative in Libya. Since resignation of Williams in the end of July 2022, the mission has been functioning without the required leadership. Tomorrow’s session therefore presents the opportunity to welcome the appointment of Bathily to lead UNSMIL, and commend the Secretary-General and the UN Security Council (UNSC) for responding to PSC’s call for appointment of an African candidate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since the PSC’s last deliberation on the situation, the political impasse between the Tripoli based Government of National Unity (GNU) headed by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh on the one hand, and Fathi Bashagha, the Prime Minister-designate nominated by the east based House of Representatives (HoR) on the other hand, persisted with little to no progress. Although talks resumed between the speakers of the HoR and the High State Council (HSC) which functions as Libya’s Senate, agreement is yet to be reached between the two institutions on the necessary frameworks for the conduct of elections. On the economic track as well, Libya’s financial institutions continue to be divided despite on-going efforts to implement reform and reunification measures for the Central Bank.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While international efforts have predominantly been focused on the holding the general elections, the current reality on the ground seems to be revealing the need for strengthening parallel approaches that aim to resolve the political impasse and dispute over executive power. Without the necessary concerted international effort to overcome the fragmentation of government institutions and achieve integration, progress in the effort for reaching agreement on the necessary legal frameworks for the conduct of the national elections is likely to remain elusive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The launch of Libya’s reconciliation process has been a welcome development on the other hand. Preparatory meeting for the Libyan national reconciliation conference was initiated on 08 January, in Tripoli, under the auspices of the AU. From the AU’s side, in attendance were President Macky Sall of Senegal in his capacity as the AU Chair; Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat and Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Claude Gakosso, on behalf of the Chairperson of the High-Level Committee for Libya, Denis Sassou Nguesso. From the side of Libya, key actors including Head of the Libyan Presidential Council, Mohammed Menfi as well as members of the HSC and HoR tool part in the meeting. If implemented in an inclusive manner that ensures the participation and involvement of all the pertinent institutions and sectors of society including civil society actors, the national reconciliation process can potentially serve to create the conducive political and social environment that would lend societal support to the effort to bring Libyan parties a step closer towards forging unity and reaching agreement on the modalities for conducting elections and forming a legitimate government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The security situation in Libya remains worrying. Although sporadic, incidents of clashes between supporters of the two rival governments as well as attacks against civilians have characterised the security landscape over the past year. In late August 2022, the worst fighting the country has experienced in couple years broke out in Tripoli between armed fighters backing the GNU and Bashagha’s loyalists, reportedly claiming the lives of over 30 people and injuring hundreds more. The incident occurred as supports of Fathi Bashagha attempted for a second time to gain territory within Tripoli, the first attempt already staged earlier in the year, in mid-May. Further to constituting a clear violation of the October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement, these incidents complicate and impose considerable challenge to efforts aimed at the unification of Libya’s armed forces. Added to this is the continued presence of foreign forces in parts of Libya which compounds the security challenges that confront the country.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A critical aspect that warrants a close follow-up is also the nature of geo-politics in the wider eastern Mediterranean region and the consequent impact it entails to Libya’s internal affairs. With Turkey’s demonstrated political and military backing to the GNU and the signing of an agreement between the two in early October 2022 that allows the former to explore energy resources in disputed areas of the eastern Mediterranean Sea, tensions are likely to increase between Turkey and other countries in the region that are opposed to its military and economic reach in Libya. Left unchecked and with continued lack of unity among Libyan actors, such developments have the potential to revive divided foreign support either through open or tacit backing of the two governments in Libya, threatening to plunge the country back to a full-blown conflict.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Due to the protracted political crisis and the years-long armed conflict that only came to an end very recently, public services in Libya have been weakened considerably and struggle to properly address the humanitarian needs of affected populations. The UN estimates that nearly 526,000 people (including nearly 200,000 children) will require humanitarian assistance in 2023. Migrants and refugees hosted in both state operated and non-state operated centres continue to experience serious humanitarian and protection challenges and endure grave human rights violations. According to the UN Secretary General’s report of 09 December 2022, there are 4,001 migrants as of November 2022, being held in government operated detention centres.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session also serves as an opportunity for reviewing the state of implementation of various AU and PSC decisions regarding enhancing AU’s role in the Libya peace process and with respect to addressing the plight of African refugees and migrants.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily as the SRSG for Libya and Head of UNSMIL and commend the Secretary-General, African three members of the UN Security Council (A3) and the wider UNSC for supporting the appointment of Bathily, in line with previous Communiqués of the PSC. The PSC may also welcome the initiation of the Libyan national reconciliation conference and urge all Libyan parties to participate in good faith in this process. It may further call on Libyan parties to work towards reaching consensus on finalising the necessary constitutional and electoral frameworks for the conduct of national elections and urge international and regional stakeholders to fortify efforts aimed at finding diplomatic settlement for the dispute over executive power in Libya. It may urge all Libyan actors to exercise utmost restraint to avoid incidents similar to the August 2022 armed clash and to refrain from further breach of the 23 October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement in order to preserve the relative peace and security achieved since its signing. The PSC may reiterate its call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya in line with the 23 October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement. It may also condemn and totally reject any external interference in the internal affairs of Libya and urge Libyan actors to prioritise unification and refrain from taking actions that will put at risk the country’s fragile stability. The PSC may take note of the continuing humanitarian and human rights crises affecting in particular migrants and refugees, and call on the relevant Libyan authorities as well as international humanitarian actors to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and protection of populations in need. It may also reiterate the call made at its previous session, regarding the ‘urgent need for the AU Commission to ensure that the AU Mission in Libya is relocated to Tripoli and is sufficiently capacitated, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate and adequately support the AU’s efforts on Libya, in line with the Decision [<a href="https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1569/Assembly%20AU%20DEC%20813%20-%20838%20%28XXXV%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=5&amp;isAllowed=y">Assembly/AU/Dec.819(XXXV)</a>] adopted by the 35<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly’.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on the situation in Libya</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situation-in-libya-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jun 2022 15:49:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2022]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=10975</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>29 June 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-situation-in-libya-2/">Briefing on the situation in Libya</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-9"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Briefing on the situation in Libya</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 29 June 2022</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (29 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1091<sup>st</sup> session to receive a briefing on the situation in Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Libya; the representative of the State of Libya as the country concerned and representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) are also expected to deliver statements. Other invited guests expected to participate at the session include representatives of the immediate neighboring countries of Libya &#8211; Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Tunisia and representatives of the relevant regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) &#8211; Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU position on Libya is encapsulated in the relevant AU Assembly and PSC decisions. The 997<sup>th</sup> PSC Communique which was adopted on 18 May 2021 following the holding of a Ministerial level meeting on the situation in Libya stressed the importance of an inclusive, comprehensive national reconciliation process, as well as the need to implement confidence-building measures such as a framework to put to an end to divisions and to restore social cohesion among Libyans. Tomorrow’s meeting will afford an opportunity for PSC members to take stock of the developments in Libya since their last meeting and pronounce themselves on the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, the political consultation process in Cairo and the holding of elections to conclude the prolonged transition period which is deemed critical to respond to the needs and aspiration of the Libyan people.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">After more than a decade since the Libyan revolution, the country remains mired in a protracted political crisis. There was hope that the organization of inclusive, free, fair and credible elections would have helped in ending the long transition period. Although 2.8 million people were registered to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections which were scheduled to be held on 24 December 2021 based on the roadmap agreed within the framework of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), the elections were postponed and the Libyan political stakeholders have yet to agree on a new timeline. The mandate of the Libyan Government of National Unity within the framework of the LPDF is set to expire by the end of this month.  The transitional phase was due to expire on 22 June, according to the LPDF roadmap, had the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on 24 December 2021, which did not happen.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the postponement of the elections, the Tobruk based House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha, a former minister of interior and one of the presidential candidates, as the new prime minister for the remaining transition period arguing that the incumbent prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh failed to organize elections. However, Debeibeh insisted that he will only handover power following the holding of elections. The political rivalry between the Dbeibeh and Bashagha has escalated tensions in Libya leading to clashes in Tripoli in May when Bashagha tried to take over the government but was met with resistance from Dbeibeh’s forces. Another round of fighting took place on 10 June between rival forces supporting Dbeibeh and Bashagha. This latest crisis is threatening to divide the country and plunge it into yet another cycle of conflict and violence. It also led to the partial blockade of Libya’s oil facilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">UN Special Advisor Stephanie Williams has been trying to resolve the political impasse and engaged with both Dbeibeh and Bashagha to encourage them to resolve their disputes through dialogue. She is also facilitating a discussion on the constitutional basis for the holding of elections through the establishment of a Joint Committee comprising of representatives from the High State Council and the House of Representative. The Joint Committee has met three times and the latest meeting taking place in Cairo. During the two previous sessions held in April and May, the Joint Committee reached agreement on 137 of 197 articles on the form and nature of the state; basic rights and freedoms, including women rights; the structure and powers of a bicameral Parliament; and some of the prerogatives of the President and Prime Minister, including on the prerogative of president and Prime Minister”, according to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosmary Dicarlo who briefed the Security Council on the matter on 26 May 2021.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are, however, outstanding issues that need to be addressed and the hope was that during the third and final round the joint committee will finalize the constitutional arrangements for the holding of national elections. Stephanie Williams underscored the need to continue working towards building the necessary consensus on the constitutional framework to pave the way for the holding of elections. As the final round came to a close on 20 June, Stephanie Williams released a press statement stating that ‘the Joint Committee achieved a great deal of consensus on the contentious articles in the Libyan Draft Constitution’ also highlighting differences on the ‘measures governing the transitional period leading to elections’. The Special Advisor urged the Presidencies of the two Chambers ‘to meet within ten days at an agreed upon location to bridge outstanding issues’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some observers have been expressing concerns about the ongoing consultation process including the lack of openness to involve the wider Libyan populace. The other complication is the involvement of regional and international actors in the situation in Libya through their backing of different parties. In the meantime, Stephanie Williams is expected to leave her position as Special Advisor by the end of June. Consultations are underway to appoint a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The AU has been insisting that this post should be filled by an African and the African members have been advancing this same position in the Security Council.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU is part of the Libya Quartet which involves the UN, the EU and League of Arab States. The UN has been in the lead in terms of facilitating the Libyan political dialogue but it is not clear how much the AU has been involved and/or consulted within the framework of the latest UN led talks in Cairo.  The AU has a Liaison Office which was based in Tunis. The 35<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to relocate the office to Tripoli.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its concern over the recent flare up of tension between armed groups in support of the two rival governments. Council may further urge the rival groups to avoid any violence and resort to dialogue to reach at a consensus on a unified Libyan government that would steer the country towards the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. It may also urge all international actors to refrain from taking any actions that may re-ignite divided foreign support and engage instead in a more constructive role that will contribute to ensuring peaceful resolution of the current impasse. It may further call on the AU High-Level Committee on Libya chaired by H.E. President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, to convene a consultative meeting on the current infighting between rival parties. While noting the consultations made by the Joint Committee of the House of Representatives and High Council of State on the constitutional basis for the holding of the elections and progresses made in this regard, Council is also expected to call upon them to reach agreement over the remaining outstanding issues.</p>
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		<title>MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL &#8211; JUNE 2022</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/monthly-digest-on-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-june-2022-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2022 16:24:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Monthly Digest on the AUPSC]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=12777</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>June 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/monthly-digest-on-the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-june-2022-2/">MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL &#8211; JUNE 2022</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-10"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL &#8211; JUNE 2022</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | June 2022</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During June, the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), under the chairship of the Republic of Congo, convened five sessions. Three of these were committed to thematic issues while the other two addressed a country/region specific issue. All sessions convened during the month took place at Ambassadorial level. The outcomes for the four sessions were adopted as Communiqués while no outcome document was released for one session. On average, it took about two weeks for the release of outcome documents.</p>
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		<title>The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response?</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-africa-a-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response-5/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 May 2022 16:26:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special Report]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=12781</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>May 25, 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-africa-a-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response-5/">The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-11"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Libya</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>May 25, 2022</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 28 May 2022, the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the supreme decision-making organ of the AU, will hold its 16<sup>th</sup> extraordinary session. The thematic focus of the extraordinary summit is on terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government. The summit is convened based on the AU Assembly February 2022 decision on the proposal of the Republic of Angola for the convening of ‘Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa’.</p>
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</div><span class="btn-container animate_when_almost_visible alpha-anim" data-delay="200"><a role="button"  href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-Africa-A-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response.pdf" class="custom-link btn border-width-0 btn-color-165108 btn-square btn-outline btn-icon-left" target="_blank">Read Full Document</a></span><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><div class="h3 youtube-video fluid-object" style="padding-top: 56.31%"><iframe title="AU Summit to focus on rescuing Africa from wars as it remains besmirched by perennial conflicts" width="840" height="473" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/tLxhKtvewuk?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div></div>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-africa-a-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response-5/">The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>THE MAJOR PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA IN THE YEAR THE AU MARKS ITS 20 YEARS</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-major-peace-and-security-issues-in-africa-in-the-year-the-au-marks-its-20-years-8/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Mar 2022 16:25:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special Report]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=12779</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>March 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-major-peace-and-security-issues-in-africa-in-the-year-the-au-marks-its-20-years-8/">THE MAJOR PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA IN THE YEAR THE AU MARKS ITS 20 YEARS</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-12"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Libya</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>March 2022</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">2022 marks the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the inauguration of the African Union (AU). In reviewing the record of the AU in its two decades of existence, the aspect of AU’s role that is sure to attract the most scrutiny relates to the area of peace and security. While this special research report is not meant to provide such a comprehensive review, it seeks to provide an analysis of the major peace and security issues in Africa in 2022 as a useful lens for understanding where the AU’s peace and security order stands 20 years after AU’s launch. In presenting the analysis on the various major peace and security issues afflicting the continent, this report attests to both the importance of AU’s role and how its role has become more, not less, important today than at the time of its establishment, notwithstanding recent regressions in its performance.</p>
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</div><span class="btn-container animate_when_almost_visible alpha-anim" data-delay="200"><a role="button"  href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-major-peace-and-security-issues-in-Africa-in-the-year-the-AU-marks-its-20-years.pdf" class="custom-link btn border-width-0 btn-color-165108 btn-square btn-outline btn-icon-left" target="_blank">Read Full Document</a></span></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-12" data-row="script-row-unique-12" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-12"));</script></div></div></div>
</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-major-peace-and-security-issues-in-africa-in-the-year-the-au-marks-its-20-years-8/">THE MAJOR PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA IN THE YEAR THE AU MARKS ITS 20 YEARS</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Monthly Digest on the AUPSC &#8211; September 2021</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/monthly-digest-on-the-aupsc-september-2021-2/</link>
					<comments>https://amaniafrica-et.org/monthly-digest-on-the-aupsc-september-2021-2/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 16:22:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Monthly Digest on the AUPSC]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=12773</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>September 2021</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/monthly-digest-on-the-aupsc-september-2021-2/">Monthly Digest on the AUPSC &#8211; September 2021</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-13"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Libya</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | September 2021</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Chad assumed chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in September. In total, eight sessions were convened throughout the month. Although Council planned to convene a session to consider strategic priorities for the utilization of the AU Peace Fund and the zero draft African consensus paper on financing AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) through UN assessed contributions, that session was postponed to October. On the other hand, two of Council’s sessions took place outside of the programme of work to address the emergency situation in Guinea, following the coup of 5 September 2021.</p>
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</div><span class="btn-container animate_when_almost_visible alpha-anim" data-delay="200"><a role="button"  href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/September_monthly-Digest_2021_Final.pdf" class="custom-link btn border-width-0 btn-color-165108 btn-square btn-outline btn-icon-left" target="_blank">Read Full Document</a></span></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-13" data-row="script-row-unique-13" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-13"));</script></div></div></div>
</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/monthly-digest-on-the-aupsc-september-2021-2/">Monthly Digest on the AUPSC &#8211; September 2021</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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