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	<title>Thematic Insights Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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		<title>Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-onthe-10-year-country-structural-vulnerability-and-resilience-assessment-csvra-review/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:22:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>24 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-onthe-10-year-country-structural-vulnerability-and-resilience-assessment-csvra-review/">Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 24 June 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-june-2026/">June 2026 Programme of Work</a> had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/360.prev_.dipl_.22.03.pdf">360<sup>th</sup> </a>session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/463-com-states-fragile-situations-27-10-2014andconceptnote.pdf">463<sup>rd</sup></a> session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/502.com_.cews_.29.4.2015.pdf">502<sup>nd</sup> </a>session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/901.comm_en.pdf">901<sup>st</sup></a> meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1251.comm_en.pdf">1251<sup>st</sup></a> session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251<sup>st</sup> session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report <a href="https://x.com/auc_paps/status/1990376729945546834?s=46">validation meeting</a> was held in November 2025, and the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/strategic-review-meeting-of-the-continental-early-warning-system-concludes">Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology</a> was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35<sup>th</sup> AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35<sup>th</sup> session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.</p>
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		<title>Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-thecompliance-and-accountability-framework/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:18:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23752</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>24 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-thecompliance-and-accountability-framework/">Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-1"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 24 June 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the AU’s Compliance and Accountability Framework.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for June, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session takes place as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is set to review the implementation of Resolution <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4031070?ln=en&amp;v=pdf">2719</a> (2023) later this year, three years after its adoption, as required under the resolution. The Resolution stresses the operational necessity for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions to be planned and conducted in compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and aligns with relevant UN frameworks and policies. Although Resolution 2719 has yet to be applied, the AU and the UN have, over the past two and a half years, undertaken a range of preparatory efforts to facilitate its implementation. These efforts have included a series of meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, culminating in the development of a joint roadmap for the implementation of Resolution 2719, which is structured around four workstreams, one of which focuses on compliance and the protection of civilians.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In tomorrow’s session, the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC on where the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) currently stands, progress made in strengthening and operationalising the Framework, the state of AU–UN coordination and institutional readiness for the implementation of Resolution 2719 in the context of compliance requirements, challenges encountered so far, and the way forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The issue of compliance began to feature prominently within the AU in the context of institutional reform efforts and the revitalisation of the Peace Fund from 2016 onwards. The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-on-predictable-and-sustainable-financing-for-peace-in-africa">Report</a> on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, prepared by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and endorsed by the AU Assembly at its 27<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session in July 2016, recommended the development of an AU Compliance Framework outlining applicable international legal obligations and due diligence requirements. The recommendation reflected the AU’s growing role in the deployment of PSOs across the continent and the legal and moral imperative for such operations to adhere to obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Strengthening compliance was seen not only as essential to enhancing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and credibility of AU peace operations, fostering trust among local populations, and contributing to sustainable peace and stability, but also as one of the conditions for AU-led PSOs to access UN-assessed contributions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC subsequently reinforced this agenda at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/689.comm-Peace-Fund-30-05-2017.pdf">689<sup>th</sup></a> session, held on 30 May 2017, where it underscored the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law, human rights standards, and conduct and discipline requirements in the conduct of PSOs. The Council further agreed that the operationalisation of financing arrangements for AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC should be predicated, inter alia, upon strengthening the AU’s human rights due diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Efforts to strengthen the AU’s compliance framework gained further momentum during negotiations on a UNSC resolution on the financing of AU-led PSOs, which intensified between 2018 and 2023 and culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023. Throughout these negotiations, several UNSC members repeatedly emphasised the need for the AU to establish a robust compliance framework capable of meeting UN standards on human rights due diligence, conduct and discipline, and accountability. In response, the AU progressively consolidated its compliance architecture.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Notable milestones included the adoption by the PSC, at its <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-813th-meeting-of-the-aupsc-considered-and-adopted-the-african-union-policy-on-conduct-and-discipline-for-peace-support-operations-aupsos-and-the-african-union-policy-on-the-prevention-and-response-to-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-for-psos">813<sup>th</sup></a> session in November 2018, of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs, both of which were subsequently endorsed by the 32<sup>nd</sup> AU Assembly in February 2019. Compliance and accountability principles were further mainstreamed into the 2021 AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations. Additional progress was made through the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) during its 14<sup>th</sup> ordinary session. The framework received a further boost in January 2023 when the 15<sup>th</sup> STCDSS <a href="https://apstaafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Report-of-the-15th-STCDSS.pdf">adopted</a> three key instruments: the AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, and the AU Policy on Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To further institutionalise the compliance and accountability framework and strengthen implementation efforts, the AU <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/media-advisory-launch-of-african-union-compliance-and-accountability-framework-aucf-project">entered</a> into a Tripartite Project with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations in February 2022 on AUCF for PSOs. The project aims to ensure that AU-led PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this initiative, the AU has benefited from additional staffing, technical expertise and dedicated programmatic resources to support the implementation of the framework. Currently, there is a dedicated AUCF Project Focal Point within the Peace Support Operations Division of the Conflict Management Directorate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Recent developments indicate continued progress in strengthening the framework. In May 2026, the AU–EU–UN Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) of the AUCF <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/2053027410463830097">launched</a> the next phase of the project covering the period 2026–2030. AU also officially <a href="https://aupaps.org/uploads/media-advisory-30-june-2025.pdf">launched</a> the Case Management System (CMS) for PSOs under the AUCF. The CMS serves as a critical mechanism for the prevention, reporting, investigation, tracking and management of allegations relating to violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as other forms of misconduct. It is also intended to facilitate corrective action, accountability processes and redress for affected individuals. In addition, a Third-Party Compensation Policy has been <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pr-psod-4-nov-25.pdf">developed</a>, while the AU’s compliance training curriculum—originally developed in 2018—has undergone a comprehensive review to ensure its continued relevance and responsiveness to the evolving operational requirements of AU-mandated and authorised PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Encouraging steps have also been taken to integrate the AU’s compliance architecture into ongoing peace operations. The March 2026 report on joint AU–Federal Government of Somalia–UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan highlighted several advances, including the role of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The mechanism enables the mission to identify, assess and analyse incidents involving civilian harm and supports the implementation of mitigation measures, operational adjustments and accountability actions where necessary. To strengthen accountability and transparency, AUSSOM has also established Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) at both contingent and Mission Headquarters levels. These bodies serve as formal investigative mechanisms responsible for examining incidents involving potential violations, operational failures, and breaches of conduct and discipline.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite these progresses, challenges remain in the implementation of the compliance and accountability framework. AU PSOs are often deployed in highly volatile and complex conflict environments characterised by asymmetric warfare involving terrorist and other non-state armed groups, which complicates compliance efforts. Mission management dynamics can also pose challenges. In some instances, troop-contributing countries retain varying degrees of operational control over their contingents, which may constrain the AU’s authority over mission personnel and impede the consistent application of compliance and accountability measures. Most of all, at the continental level, the growing emergence of ad hoc security arrangements and regionally led deployments operating outside established continental frameworks highlights major challenges in the effective implementation of the AUCF. Sustained support is required not only to uphold compliance standards but also to facilitate investigations, disciplinary processes, remedial measures, and cooperation with oversight mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Institutionally, the project-based nature of elements of the framework raises questions regarding sustainability and continuity. While external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the framework, long-term institutionalisation will require predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity. Adequate resources are particularly important to support continuous training, monitoring and evaluation, investigations, victim assistance, and compensation mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Challenges also persist in AU–UN coordination, particularly in the context of operationalising Resolution 2719. While the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have maintained regular engagement on the technical and operational requirements for the application of the resolution through the various workstream configurations, progress in unpacking and operationalising compliance-related requirements appears to have been relatively limited. While major progress has been registered on all workstreams, including compliance, compared to other workstreams—most notably joint planning, decision-making and reporting, and mission support— there are areas in which the Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians workstream lags behind, such as the existence of a full staff complement dedicated to this at strategic headquarters towards full operational readiness.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is not yet clear whether tomorrow’s session will adopt an outcome document in the form of a communiqué or press statement. However, the PSC may welcome the achievements of the first phase of the AU–EU–UN tripartite project on the AUCF, as well as the launch of its second phase covering the period 2026–2030. The Council may also take note of the progress made over the years in strengthening the AU’s compliance architecture and its institutionalisation and operationalisation, including the adoption of key policy instruments, the recent launch of the AUCF Case Management System, the development of a Third-Party Compensation Policy, and the revision of the compliance training curriculum. While acknowledging progress made in unpacking and operationalising Resolution 2719 through the four workstreams, the PSC may request the AU Commission to intensify engagements with the UN Secretariat in order to develop a common understanding of the compliance requirements under the Resolution and the steps necessary to meet them, as the UN Security Council prepares to review its implementation later this year.</p>
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		<title>Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-compliance-and-accountability-framework/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 11:04:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>24 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-compliance-and-accountability-framework/">Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-2"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 24 June 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the AU’s Compliance and Accountability Framework.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for June, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session takes place as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is set to review the implementation of Resolution <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4031070?ln=en&amp;v=pdf">2719</a> (2023) later this year, three years after its adoption, as required under the resolution. The Resolution stresses the operational necessity for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions to be planned and conducted in compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and aligns with relevant UN frameworks and policies. Although Resolution 2719 has yet to be applied, the AU and the UN have, over the past two and a half years, undertaken a range of preparatory efforts to facilitate its implementation. These efforts have included a series of meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, culminating in the development of a joint roadmap for the implementation of Resolution 2719, which is structured around four workstreams, one of which focuses on compliance and the protection of civilians.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In tomorrow’s session, the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC on where the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) currently stands, progress made in strengthening and operationalising the Framework, the state of AU–UN coordination and institutional readiness for the implementation of Resolution 2719 in the context of compliance requirements, challenges encountered so far, and the way forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The issue of compliance began to feature prominently within the AU in the context of institutional reform efforts and the revitalisation of the Peace Fund from 2016 onwards. The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-on-predictable-and-sustainable-financing-for-peace-in-africa">Report</a> on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, prepared by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and endorsed by the AU Assembly at its 27<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session in July 2016, recommended the development of an AU Compliance Framework outlining applicable international legal obligations and due diligence requirements. The recommendation reflected the AU’s growing role in the deployment of PSOs across the continent and the legal and moral imperative for such operations to adhere to obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Strengthening compliance was seen not only as essential to enhancing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and credibility of AU peace operations, fostering trust among local populations, and contributing to sustainable peace and stability, but also as one of the conditions for AU-led PSOs to access UN-assessed contributions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC subsequently reinforced this agenda at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/689.comm-Peace-Fund-30-05-2017.pdf">689<sup>th</sup></a> session, held on 30 May 2017, where it underscored the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law, human rights standards, and conduct and discipline requirements in the conduct of PSOs. The Council further agreed that the operationalisation of financing arrangements for AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC should be predicated, inter alia, upon strengthening the AU’s human rights due diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Efforts to strengthen the AU’s compliance framework gained further momentum during negotiations on a UNSC resolution on the financing of AU-led PSOs, which intensified between 2018 and 2023 and culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023. Throughout these negotiations, several UNSC members repeatedly emphasised the need for the AU to establish a robust compliance framework capable of meeting UN standards on human rights due diligence, conduct and discipline, and accountability. In response, the AU progressively consolidated its compliance architecture.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Notable milestones included the adoption by the PSC, at its <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-813th-meeting-of-the-aupsc-considered-and-adopted-the-african-union-policy-on-conduct-and-discipline-for-peace-support-operations-aupsos-and-the-african-union-policy-on-the-prevention-and-response-to-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-for-psos">813<sup>th</sup></a> session in November 2018, of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs, both of which were subsequently endorsed by the 32<sup>nd</sup> AU Assembly in February 2019. Compliance and accountability principles were further mainstreamed into the 2021 AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations. Additional progress was made through the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) during its 14<sup>th</sup> ordinary session. The framework received a further boost in January 2023 when the 15<sup>th</sup> STCDSS <a href="https://apstaafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Report-of-the-15th-STCDSS.pdf">adopted</a> three key instruments: the AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, and the AU Policy on Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To further institutionalise the compliance and accountability framework and strengthen implementation efforts, the AU <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/media-advisory-launch-of-african-union-compliance-and-accountability-framework-aucf-project">entered</a> into a Tripartite Project with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations in February 2022 on AUCF for PSOs. The project aims to ensure that AU-led PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this initiative, the AU has benefited from additional staffing, technical expertise and dedicated programmatic resources to support the implementation of the framework. Currently, there is a dedicated AUCF Project Focal Point within the Peace Support Operations Division of the Conflict Management Directorate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Recent developments indicate continued progress in strengthening the framework. In May 2026, the AU–EU–UN Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) of the AUCF <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/2053027410463830097">launched</a> the next phase of the project covering the period 2026–2030. AU also officially <a href="https://aupaps.org/uploads/media-advisory-30-june-2025.pdf">launched</a> the Case Management System (CMS) for PSOs under the AUCF. The CMS serves as a critical mechanism for the prevention, reporting, investigation, tracking and management of allegations relating to violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as other forms of misconduct. It is also intended to facilitate corrective action, accountability processes and redress for affected individuals. In addition, a Third-Party Compensation Policy has been <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pr-psod-4-nov-25.pdf">developed</a>, while the AU’s compliance training curriculum—originally developed in 2018—has undergone a comprehensive review to ensure its continued relevance and responsiveness to the evolving operational requirements of AU-mandated and authorised PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Encouraging steps have also been taken to integrate the AU’s compliance architecture into ongoing peace operations. The March 2026 report on joint AU–Federal Government of Somalia–UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan highlighted several advances, including the role of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The mechanism enables the mission to identify, assess and analyse incidents involving civilian harm and supports the implementation of mitigation measures, operational adjustments and accountability actions where necessary. To strengthen accountability and transparency, AUSSOM has also established Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) at both contingent and Mission Headquarters levels. These bodies serve as formal investigative mechanisms responsible for examining incidents involving potential violations, operational failures, and breaches of conduct and discipline.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite these progresses, challenges remain in the implementation of the compliance and accountability framework. AU PSOs are often deployed in highly volatile and complex conflict environments characterised by asymmetric warfare involving terrorist and other non-state armed groups, which complicates compliance efforts. Mission management dynamics can also pose challenges. In some instances, troop-contributing countries retain varying degrees of operational control over their contingents, which may constrain the AU’s authority over mission personnel and impede the consistent application of compliance and accountability measures. Most of all, at the continental level, the growing emergence of ad hoc security arrangements and regionally led deployments operating outside established continental frameworks highlights major challenges in the effective implementation of the AUCF. Sustained support is required not only to uphold compliance standards but also to facilitate investigations, disciplinary processes, remedial measures, and cooperation with oversight mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Institutionally, the project-based nature of elements of the framework raises questions regarding sustainability and continuity. While external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the framework, long-term institutionalisation will require predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity. Adequate resources are particularly important to support continuous training, monitoring and evaluation, investigations, victim assistance, and compensation mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Challenges also persist in AU–UN coordination, particularly in the context of operationalising Resolution 2719. While the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have maintained regular engagement on the technical and operational requirements for the application of the resolution through the various workstream configurations, progress in unpacking and operationalising compliance-related requirements appears to have been relatively limited. While major progress has been registered on all workstreams, including compliance, compared to other workstreams—most notably joint planning, decision-making and reporting, and mission support— there are areas in which the Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians workstream lags behind, such as the existence of a full staff complement dedicated to this at strategic headquarters towards full operational readiness.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is not yet clear whether tomorrow’s session will adopt an outcome document in the form of a communiqué or press statement. However, the PSC may welcome the achievements of the first phase of the AU–EU–UN tripartite project on the AUCF, as well as the launch of its second phase covering the period 2026–2030. The Council may also take note of the progress made over the years in strengthening the AU’s compliance architecture and its institutionalisation and operationalisation, including the adoption of key policy instruments, the recent launch of the AUCF Case Management System, the development of a Third-Party Compensation Policy, and the revision of the compliance training curriculum. While acknowledging progress made in unpacking and operationalising Resolution 2719 through the four workstreams, the PSC may request the AU Commission to intensify engagements with the UN Secretariat in order to develop a common understanding of the compliance requirements under the Resolution and the steps necessary to meet them, as the UN Security Council prepares to review its implementation later this year.</p>
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		<title>Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-10-year-country-structural-vulnerability-and-resilience-assessment-csvra-review/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 10:23:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>24 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-on-the-10-year-country-structural-vulnerability-and-resilience-assessment-csvra-review/">Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 24 June 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-june-2026/">June 2026 Programme of Work</a> had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/360.prev_.dipl_.22.03.pdf">360<sup>th</sup> </a>session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/463-com-states-fragile-situations-27-10-2014andconceptnote.pdf">463<sup>rd</sup></a> session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/502.com_.cews_.29.4.2015.pdf">502<sup>nd</sup> </a>session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/901.comm_en.pdf">901<sup>st</sup></a> meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1251.comm_en.pdf">1251<sup>st</sup></a> session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251<sup>st</sup> session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report <a href="https://x.com/auc_paps/status/1990376729945546834?s=46">validation meeting</a> was held in November 2025, and the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/strategic-review-meeting-of-the-continental-early-warning-system-concludes">Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology</a> was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35<sup>th</sup> AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35<sup>th</sup> session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.</p>
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		<title>Open Session on Refugees, IDPs and Humanitarian Assistance in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/opensession-on-refugees-idps-and-humanitarian-assistance-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:31:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Humanitarian Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>1 June 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/opensession-on-refugees-idps-and-humanitarian-assistance-in-africa/">Open Session on Refugees, IDPs and Humanitarian Assistance in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<h1><strong>Open Session on Refugees, IDPs and Humanitarian Assistance in Africa</strong></h1>
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<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Tomorrow (2 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene an open session on refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and humanitarian assistance in Africa.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the African Union (AU) and stand-in Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for June 2026. This will be followed by an introductory statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. The Council will then receive presentations from Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS), and Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Migration. The session will also feature briefings from representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP), who are expected to provide updates on the humanitarian situation across the continent and ongoing response efforts.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The session is being convened within the framework of the PSC’s annual indicative program of work. It is often scheduled to coincide with <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/refugee-day">World Refugee Day</a>, which is marked on 20 June, in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution <a href="https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n00/563/95/pdf/n0056395.pdf?token=PfpM3afTrA1frpm6gf&amp;fe=true">55/76/2001</a>. The last time the PSC convened a session to examine the humanitarian situation in Africa was during its 1307<sup>th</sup> session on 23 October 2025, when it received a briefing from the ICRC on its activities across the continent. The session takes place at a time when the continent is confronting the combined effects of armed conflict, forced displacement, food insecurity, public health emergencies, and shrinking humanitarian financing. More than 160 million people across Africa <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260526/africa-unveils-landmark-humanitarian-coordination-platform-strengthen-aligned">require</a> humanitarian assistance, while approximately 45 million people have been forcibly displaced. Despite these growing needs, only about 26.7 per cent of the required humanitarian funding has been mobilised. The session is therefore expected to address both immediate humanitarian challenges and the longer-term question of how Africa can develop more sustainable and self-reliant response mechanisms.</span></p>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 1: Countries with the Highest Number of Refugees and IDPs by the End of 2025 (Source: UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2025)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A major issue likely to feature during the session is the continued escalation of forced displacement across Africa. Displacement figures for 2025 reveal both the scale and complexity of the challenge. Internal displacement remains the dominant form of forced displacement, with Sudan hosting more than 9 million IDPs, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Burkina Faso. Refugee flows similarly reflect the regionalisation of conflicts, with Sudan generating more than 2 million refugees and South Sudan accounting for approximately 2.3 million refugees despite having fewer than one million IDPs. The DRC and Somalia also continue to generate large refugee populations, highlighting the persistence of protracted crises compounded by climate change that extend beyond national borders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Longer-term trends demonstrate that displacement in Africa is becoming increasingly entrenched. Between 2010 and 2025, the number of refugees on the continent increased from 2.9 million to 10.6 million, while the number of IDPs rose from 9.8 million to more than 29 million. Although IDP numbers declined slightly between 2024 and 2025, the overall trajectory points to a continent experiencing unprecedented levels of forced displacement. These trends suggest that displacement is increasingly becoming a long-term challenge requiring solutions that extend beyond emergency humanitarian assistance.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-23570" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-27.jpg" width="970" height="491" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-27.jpg 970w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-27-300x152.jpg 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-27-768x389.jpg 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2-27-350x177.jpg 350w" sizes="(max-width: 970px) 100vw, 970px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Figure 2: Number of Refugees and IDPs in Africa Between 2010 – 2025 (UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear from the trends these figures represent that Africa needs to adopt both <strong>mitigation measures</strong> geared towards addressing the immediate needs and risks associated with displacement and <strong>resolution measures </strong>seeking to address the conditions that induce and sustain displacement. Considering that conflicts and political and security crises account for much of the displacement on the continent, it is of paramount significance in this respect that the AU and its member states restore their grip on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent as a critical measure for reversing the current worrying trend of year-on-year increase in displacement on the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Within the framework of the foregoing, it is necessary that policy measures are tailored to the specific dynamics of each conflict situation. In this respect, Sudan may need to receive particular attention in the Council’s discussions. As the conflict enters its fourth year, Sudan has become the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis. More than <a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis">33 million</a> people require humanitarian assistance, while nearly 12 million people have been displaced internally and across borders. The crisis has also generated severe food insecurity, with more than 19 million people facing acute hunger and famine conditions already confirmed in some areas. The collapse of health services in conflict-affected regions has further contributed to outbreaks of cholera, malaria, dengue fever, and other diseases.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Alongside and central to addressing conflicts as sources of displacement, the session may also engage with the increasingly developmental nature of displacement. Refugees and IDPs often remain displaced for years, which in itself affects development trends both in origin and host countries. Countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Chad continue to shoulder significant responsibilities despite limited resources. This reality has strengthened calls for implementing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and moving beyond approaches that focus exclusively on short-term humanitarian relief. In this regard, tomorrow’s session provides the opportunity to explore measures to reduce aid dependency and address the structural drivers of displacement, including conflict, governance challenges, and climate-related vulnerabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In view of recent developments, the session may also examine the growing intersection between public health emergencies, conflict, and displacement. Recent outbreaks, including Ebola affecting parts of the DRC, have <a href="https://countercurrents.org/2026/05/ebola-outbreak-deepens-africas-humanitarian-crisis-amid-expanding-conflicts/">highlighted</a> the challenges of responding to health emergencies in environments characterised by insecurity, displacement, and weak health systems. Ongoing violence in affected areas has disrupted healthcare delivery, restricted humanitarian access, and undermined response efforts. Such situations illustrate how humanitarian crises increasingly overlap and reinforce one another, creating complex emergencies that are more difficult and costly to address.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another major issue expected to feature prominently is the deepening humanitarian financing crisis. Humanitarian organisations increasingly warn that funding shortfalls are no longer simply operational constraints but are becoming drivers of instability in their own right. Reduced funding is affecting food assistance, shelter, protection services, and support for host communities. UNHCR has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-funding-crunch-increases-risks-violence-danger-and-death-refugees">cautioned</a> that funding reductions threaten essential services for vulnerable groups, including refugee women and girls, while also undermining prospects for durable solutions and voluntary returns. Humanitarian support often functions as a stabilising factor in fragile contexts, and reductions in aid can exacerbate grievances and desperation among affected populations. The broader financing landscape remains equally concerning.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These developments may strengthen calls within the PSC for accelerating the development of African-owned financing mechanisms. The session may provide an opportunity for the Council to revisit discussions on innovative financing, greater domestic resource mobilisation, and reducing dependence on increasingly uncertain external funding sources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With regards to new developments, the <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260526/africa-unveils-landmark-humanitarian-coordination-platform-strengthen-aligned">launch</a> of the African Humanitarian Coordination Platform in May 2026, following a continental engagement in Seychelles, is expected to feature during the session. The platform adopted a 2026–2027 Joint Implementation Plan focused on humanitarian diplomacy, localisation, financing, accountability, and resource mobilisation. Its establishment aims to address longstanding coordination gaps within Africa’s humanitarian architecture and translate previous AU humanitarian commitments into more operational mechanisms. The PSC may therefore use tomorrow’s session to reinforce political backing for the platform and encourage regular reporting on implementation progress.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to revisit several decisions from previous sessions. Among the most significant is the operationalisation of the African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), which is expected to become operational in 2026 and be headquartered in Uganda. While the establishment of AfHA represents a major institutional step in strengthening Africa’s humanitarian architecture, important questions remain regarding timelines, benchmarks, and sustainable financing arrangements. Another significant previous decision that requires the attention of the Council is its request to the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying the financial shortfalls and making concrete and practicable proposals on how to address the financial challenges for meeting Africa’s humanitarian needs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express deep concern over the worsening humanitarian situation across the continent, characterised by increasing forced displacement, food insecurity, public health emergencies, and shrinking humanitarian financing. The Council is also expected to make a call on Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), international partners, and humanitarian actors to strengthen coordinated responses to humanitarian emergencies across the continent. The PSC may further express serious concern over the deepening humanitarian financing shortfall and its direct implications for the delivery of life-saving assistance, including food security, health services, and protection programs, and may request the AU Commission to expedite the previously mandated study on humanitarian financing and present concrete proposals for sustainable and predictable funding mechanisms. In this regard, the Council may call for increased contributions to existing African instruments such as the Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF) and the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC), while also urging the development of innovative and African-owned financing solutions, including stronger engagement with domestic resource mobilisation and non-traditional sources, including through establishing a <strong>strategy for private sector partnership</strong>. The Council may further emphasise the importance of strengthening Africa’s institutional humanitarian architecture, including by calling for the fast-tracked operationalisation and sustainable financing of the African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), and by expressing support for the African Humanitarian Coordination Platform and its 2026–2027 Joint Implementation Plan. Lastly, the PSC may reiterate the need to embed the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in all responses to protracted displacement and recurrent crises and stress the need to address the root causes of displacement, particularly conflict and political instability, while strengthening African-led mechanisms capable of responding to increasingly interconnected crises.</p>
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		<title>Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/operationalisation-of-the-combined-maritime-task-force-cmtf-in-addressing-piracy-and-other-maritime-crimes-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-gog/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 09:34:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Maritime Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23489</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>14 May 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/operationalisation-of-the-combined-maritime-task-force-cmtf-in-addressing-piracy-and-other-maritime-crimes-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-gog/">Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-5"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 14 May 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to discuss the Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Following opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), representative of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF), and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The Gulf of Guinea remains one of Africa’s most strategically significant maritime spaces due to its role in international trade, energy exports, and access to strategic natural resources. Stretching approximately 6,000 kilometres from Senegal to Angola and encompassing 19 coastal states, the region facilitates nearly 90% of the international trade of West and Central African coastal countries. The Gulf also contains substantial oil, gas, and mineral reserves, including cobalt, manganese, bauxite, uranium, tin, and diamonds, which continue to reinforce its economic and geopolitical importance. The increasing strategic value of the region has also intensified both regional and international interest in securing maritime routes and protecting offshore infrastructure.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The PSC’s discussion is expected to take place against the backdrop of important progress in reducing piracy. Since the peak of piracy incidents in the 2010s, the region has recorded a significant decline in attacks. Reported incidents declined from 115 in 2020 to 22 in 2023, 18 in 2024, and 21 in 2025. According to the ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, only one reported theft-at-sea incident was recorded in the first quarter of 2026. This decline reflects the cumulative impact of improved regional coordination, increased naval patrols, international maritime cooperation, and strengthened maritime surveillance mechanisms. Regional frameworks such as the Yaoundé Architecture, combined with national initiatives including Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project, have contributed significantly to enhancing maritime domain awareness and response capabilities.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">However, despite these improvements, the PSC is expected to note that the reduction in piracy has not necessarily translated into a fully secure maritime environment. Rather, maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea have evolved and diversified. Criminal actors are increasingly shifting toward less visible but more sophisticated forms of maritime criminality, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of narcotics and arms, fuel smuggling, oil theft, and maritime-linked organised crime networks.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Among these threats, IUU fishing has emerged as one of the most serious and persistent challenges confronting the region. Estimates indicate that between 40% and 65% of fish catches in parts of the Gulf of Guinea may result from illegal fishing activities, with annual regional losses estimated at approximately $2.3 billion. Beyond economic losses, IUU fishing has become an important security concern due to its impact on food security, livelihoods, and social stability within coastal communities. The depletion of fish stocks and declining livelihoods for artisanal fishers contribute to economic desperation and increase vulnerability to criminal recruitment and participation in illicit maritime economies.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The PSC is also likely to consider the growing interconnection between maritime insecurity and wider regional instability. Maritime trafficking routes are increasingly linked to inland conflict economies and armed groups operating across the Sahel. The Gulf of Guinea has become an important corridor for the movement of narcotics, arms, fuel, and other illicit goods connecting Latin America, West Africa, Europe, and the Sahel. In 2022 alone, authorities reportedly seized more than 16,000 kilograms of cocaine in West Africa. The increasing use of ‘dark vessels’ that disable tracking systems further illustrates the growing sophistication of criminal networks operating in the region.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">At the same time, the southward spread of violent extremism from the Sahel into northern areas of coastal states such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire is increasingly blurring the distinction between inland and maritime security threats. This evolving security environment has contributed to a growing recognition that maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea must be addressed through integrated approaches that combine maritime operations with governance reform, development interventions, and regional security cooperation.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">It is within this context that the PSC is considering the implementation of the CMTF in tackling maritime insecurity in the region. The PSC first introduced the need for a maritime task force during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/1012.comm_.-state-of-maritime-security-in-africa.23.07.2021.pdf">1012<sup>th</sup></a> session held on 23 July 2021, where it called for enhanced cooperation among African littoral states through the establishment of a Maritime Task Force. This political commitment gradually evolved into concrete operational planning through subsequent PSC sessions. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">In this regard, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1275.comm_en.pdf">1275th</a> session held on 23 April 2025, the PSC formally endorsed the CMTF as a standing and ready-to-deploy maritime force for the Gulf of Guinea, reaffirming its vision of promoting a secure and resilient maritime environment free from transnational organised crime and maritime insecurity. This endorsement marked an important step in transitioning the CMTF from a conceptual initiative into an institutionalised regional maritime security mechanism within the AU peace and security architecture. To this end, the CONOPS explicitly requires formal PSC authorisation to secure broader political, technical, and financial support from the AU, the United Nations, and international partners. Such authorisation is critical not only for providing continental political legitimacy to the Task Force, but also for anchoring it within broader continental frameworks, including the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), the Lomé Charter, and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ initiative.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Beyond the Gulf of Guinea, the operationalisation of the CMTF is also likely to contribute to broader continental maritime security efforts, particularly the implementation of the Regional Maritime Command Post Exercise within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF), proposed by the PSC during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/1128.comm_en.pdf">1128<sup>th</sup></a> session in December 2022. In this respect, the PSC is expected to follow up on progress toward strengthening the maritime dimension of the ASF through enhanced interoperability, joint operational planning, and coordinated maritime responses. The CMTF could therefore serve not only as a regional security mechanism for the Gulf of Guinea, but also as a pilot framework for strengthening the ASF’s maritime component and advancing AU-led maritime operational readiness more broadly.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">While the CMTF is designed as an operational maritime security mechanism, the CONOPS makes clear that its effectiveness will depend fundamentally on sustained political, institutional, and strategic support from the PSC. In this regard, the PSC’s role extends beyond political endorsement to encompass strategic legitimacy, coordination, oversight, and resource mobilisation. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s role in mobilising political will among Member States will be discussed during tomorrow’s session. The CONOPS identifies weak political commitment and inadequate resources as some of the principal limitations undermining the effectiveness of the Yaoundé Architecture. Given the sensitivities surrounding sovereignty and cross-border maritime operations, the PSC remains uniquely positioned to foster trust, sustain collective ownership, and encourage Member States to fulfil operational commitments and force pledges. The Council’s engagement is also expected to be essential in strengthening coordination between the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, CRESMAO, and national maritime structures to reduce institutional fragmentation and improve interoperability and information-sharing across the region. Regarding this, the PSC may also follow up on its previous decision for the establishment of a Maritime Security Coordination Unit within the AU Commission. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Beyond political coordination, the PSC is also expected to play a decisive role in addressing the structural and operational constraints affecting the implementation of the CMTF. One of the most significant challenges identified in the CONOPS relates to sustainable financing and operational readiness. The successful deployment of the Task Force requires substantial maritime assets, surveillance systems, trained personnel, and logistical infrastructure, all of which necessitate predictable and long-term financing arrangements. In this respect, the PSC’s engagement will be critical in mobilising AU support, encouraging burden-sharing among Member States, and facilitating strategic partnerships with international actors and maritime industry stakeholders. The implementation of the CMTF currently relies heavily on Nigeria’s leadership and logistical support. While this demonstrates important regional leadership, excessive dependence on one state may create sustainability and ownership challenges over the longer term, particularly for smaller coastal states with limited naval and financial capacities.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The Council is also expected to deliberate on creating mechanisms to exercise oversight over legal and normative harmonisation efforts, particularly regarding the implementation of international maritime law, the criminalisation of piracy, judicial cooperation, extradition arrangements, and adherence to human rights standards during operations. This role is particularly important given the persistent legal inconsistencies and weak prosecution mechanisms that continue to undermine maritime security responses in the region. Different states continue to prioritise maritime threats differently depending on their economic interests and national vulnerabilities. While oil theft and attacks on offshore infrastructure remain major concerns for some countries, smaller coastal states may prioritise IUU fishing and coastal criminality. Additionally, the PSC is likely to discuss how it can play a broader strategic oversight role through regular monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the CMTF’s implementation progress and operational effectiveness. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Another important element in the CONOPS that is expected to be featured in the discussions is the importance of integrating maritime security into continental peace and security priorities by addressing longstanding ‘sea blindness’ within African security frameworks. In this regard, the PSC’s engagement will be important in elevating maritime security within the AU agenda and linking it to broader continental priorities such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Africa’s blue economy strategy.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Tomorrow’s session is also expected to assess recent developments toward operationalising the CMTF. During the 6<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the ECOWAS Sub-Committee of Chiefs of Naval Staff held in February 2026, Nigeria announced practical measures to support the launch of the Task Force, including the provision of three ships, one helicopter, eight vehicles, and temporary office facilities for the headquarters in Lagos. Earlier, during its 67<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in June 2025, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government formally endorsed Nigeria’s offer to host the headquarters of the CMTF. Additionally, six countries, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, confirmed readiness to participate in the ceremonial flag-off of the CMTF scheduled for 31 May to 1 June 2026 in Lagos. The PSC is likely to consider these developments as important steps toward transitioning the CMTF from a conceptual framework into an operational regional maritime security mechanism. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">Beyond the discussion on the CMTF, the PSC may also emphasise in its discussion that sustainable maritime security cannot rely exclusively on military deterrence and naval deployments. Maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea remains deeply linked to broader socio-economic and governance conditions, including poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, weak institutions, and limited economic opportunities within coastal communities. Consequently, long-term maritime stability will require integrated approaches that combine security operations with governance reform, economic development, institutional strengthening, and community resilience initiatives.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span lang="EN-US">The outcome of the session is expected to be a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate the need to strengthen coordination between the CMTF and existing regional maritime mechanisms, particularly the Yaoundé Architecture and maritime coordination centres, to improve intelligence-sharing and operational responsiveness. The Council may also encourage continued political and financial support from the Gulf of Guinea states for the operationalisation of the Task Force and request the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of the Maritime Security Coordination Unit. Additionally, the PSC may call for the development of sustainable financing arrangements, harmonised legal frameworks, and enhanced burden-sharing mechanisms to ensure the long-term effectiveness and collective ownership of the CMTF. Finally, the Council may emphasise that durable maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea requires balancing operational responses with investments in governance, development, environmental sustainability, and coastal community resilience.</span></p>
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		<title>Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-operationalisation-of-the-african-standby-force-asf-may-15-2026/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 07:08:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23477</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>14 May 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-operationalisation-of-the-african-standby-force-asf-may-15-2026/">Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF)</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 14 May 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1346<sup>th</sup> meeting to receive an ‘Update on the Status of the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following the opening remarks from Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the progress made in the operationalisation of the Force.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the PSC discussed this theme was during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/update-on-the-operationalisation-of-the-african-standby-force-asf/">1257<sup>th</sup></a> session held on 30 January 2025, in which, it <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/January-Monthly-Digest-2025.pdf">provided</a> an opportunity for the PSC to assess the status of ASF’s readiness, key challenges to ASF’s operationalisation, and the ongoing strategic review process aimed at enhancing its effectiveness as Africa’s primary mechanism for peace support operations (PSOs), and the integration of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL and IHRL) into the ASF doctrine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In tomorrow’s session, two recent developments are expected to feature. The first is the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) on the Use of the ASF, during the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/46188-Assembly_Decisions_31_March_E.pdf">39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union,</a> held in February 2026. The Assembly directed the AU Commission to expedite its signing and its operationalisation, which is scheduled to take place in June 2026 on the margins of the AU Mid-Year Coordination meeting to be held in Egypt. The second development is the endorsement of completion of the ASF Strategic Review by the same Assembly session, which further tasked the AU Commission to ‘expedite the implementation of its recommendations, with emphasis on readiness, interoperability, and sustainable financing mechanisms.’ It is to be recalled that during Council’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/1159.comm_en.pdf">1159<sup>th</sup> </a>meeting held at the ministerial level on 22 June 2023, it requested the AU Commission, among other things, to expedite ‘the strategic review of the ASF in order to align it with contemporary security challenges facing the continent’ drawing on <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/conclusions-of-the-inaugural-lessons-learned-forum-on-au-peace-support-operations-and-the-african-standby-force">Conclusions of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations and the ASF</a> that was held in November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria. Despite the Assembly decision indicating the completion of the review, the outcomes of the process were expected to be tabled before the PSC and the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) in early 2026, as agreed during the second Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and the ASF held in November 2025, unless the review process was concluded without prior presentation to the PSC and the STCDSS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, a recent PSC meeting, <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1341.comm_en.pdf">1341<sup>st</sup></a> meeting, held on 27 April 2026 on ‘Peace Support Operations in Africa,’ saw the Council, among other things, calling for the need for ‘regular strategic reviews of AU PSOs, drawing on lessons learned to inform necessary adjustments to the PSO framework, in line with the outcomes of the Abuja Lessons Learned Forum on PSOs and the ASF,’ and called for systematic follow-up and integration of the outcomes of the Abuja Forum into ongoing AGA-APSA and PSO reform processes. The same meeting also saw the PSC calling for the need to ‘improve rapid deployment capacity, force readiness (training and equipment for ASF battalions), and key enablers (aviation, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – ISR, engineering, medical, and mobility).’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is also anticipated that, during tomorrow’s session, the Commission will provide updates on its consultations with key stakeholders as part of the ASF strategic review process, amid its full operationalisation. A major impediment to the operationalisation of the Force has been the lack of political consensus and institutional alignment between the AU and RECs/RMs. The adoption of the MoU during the <a href="https://apstaafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Report-of-the-15th-STCDSS.pdf">15<sup>th</sup> STCDSS</a> in May 2023 clarified roles and responsibilities in planning, deployment, and post-deployment stages, as well as political sensitivities. However, competing regional interests continue to hinder coordination. Differences over authority, particularly between the AU and RECs, have complicated decision-making and affected the ASF’s readiness across regions. While ECOWAS, SADC and EASF have made notable progress, other regions continue to face challenges related to resources, coordination, and harmonisation. The PSC during its 1341<sup>st</sup> session called for the need to ensure ‘multidimensional strategic management at the AU and within the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs.’ This arises from previous consultations between the AU Commission and the five ASF PLANELMs, including the first phase, held from 2 to 4 December 2024 in Algiers, Algeria, involving a Technical Consultative Meeting and dedicated consultations between the ASF RECs/RMs PLANELMs and TCEs/Tis, to strengthen coordination and harmonise decision-making in line with the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Logistical and operational readiness also remain significant obstacles to the ASF’s effectiveness. Although the establishment of the Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, in 2018 marked important progress, the incomplete development of Regional Logistics Depots and inadequate strategic airlift capabilities continue to constrain rapid deployment. The PSC’s 1159<sup>th</sup> session, therefore, called on the AU Commission to expedite assessments and agreements related to pledged strategic lift assets to support troop deployment, reinforcement, casualty evacuation, and logistics supply. Maritime readiness also requires further investment despite ongoing preparations for the ASF’s first maritime exercise. Tomorrow’s sessions will also provide the opportunity to advance discussions on the council’s previous decision at its 1159<sup>th</sup> meeting on the ‘need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.’ At the same time, the ASF’s potential role in counter-terrorism has gained strategic importance amid growing insecurity in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and other regions. The proposed establishment of a counter-terrorism unit within the ASF, first endorsed during the PSC’s 960<sup>th</sup> session in October 2020, remains a key priority for enhancing the ASF’s response to asymmetric threats.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite these challenges, the ASF framework continues to offer significant opportunities for strengthening Africa’s peace and security architecture through standardised training, improved interoperability, and enhanced institutional resilience. ASF-led training programmes have contributed to a shared understanding of operational procedures, while integrating regional and ad hoc peace support initiatives into the ASF framework could optimise collective security efforts. In this vein, from 1 to 5 December 2025, the <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/1997919193627324739?s=20">17<sup>th</sup> African Standby Force Training Implementation Workshop</a> (TIW) took place in Harare, Zimbabwe, under the theme, ‘Enhancing Efficiency in Mandate Implementation: Reassessing Capacity Needs Assessments.’ The workshop brought together stakeholders to review progress and challenges in implementing the ASF Training Directives (2024–2026) and the recommendations from the 16<sup>th</sup> TIW, while emphasising the importance of Training Needs Assessment (TNA) as a key instrument for aligning training with PSOs&#8217; mandate requirements and strengthening operational effectiveness. Among others, the discussions also focused on enhancing strategic analysis, promoting collaboration, and harmonising training efforts among the AU, RECs/RMs, PSOs, training centres, and partners through the exchange of best practices and lessons learned.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Conversely, the ASF strategic review process has been slowed by funding gaps, with recent consultations focusing on legal and policy frameworks, operational challenges, financing, and capacity enhancement. Finally, the ASF’s effectiveness in addressing terrorism, violent extremism, and other complex threats depends on sustained political commitment, strategic investment, and the resolution of institutional ambiguities between the AU and RECs. The PSC’s directive to integrate ASF principles into all AU PSOs and align the ASF concept with the AU doctrine on PSOs represents an important step toward institutionalising the framework and ensuring that the ASF remains a practical mechanism for advancing African-led peace and security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session could be a communique or a summary record. Council may call for enhanced collaboration and coordination between the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs and the Continental PLANEL, to facilitate harmonisation of decision-making on the deployment of the ASF based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages. Council may further underscore the need for a maritime component within the ASF, among others, to facilitate maritime trade and ultimately the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Regarding funding, Council may highlight the importance of intensifying efforts to address the perennial challenge of unpredictable, inadequate and unsustainable funding for AU peace and security efforts, including the commitment by Member States to make contributions to the AU Peace Fund according to the approved scales of assessment.</p>
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		<title>Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-african-strategies-for-combating-transnational-organised-crime-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 05:52:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Terrorism and Organised Crime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23413</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>5 May 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/discussion-on-african-strategies-for-combating-transnational-organised-crime-in-africa/">Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-7"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 5 May 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (6 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1345<sup>th</sup> session on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Ambassador Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In 2019, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/845.com_.trans_.organised.crime_.ps_.africa.25.4.2019-1.pdf">845<sup>th</sup></a> session, the Council decided to institutionalise an annual session on TOC as a standing agenda item. Beyond dedicated sessions, the Council has repeatedly expressed concern over TOC in conflict-specific and thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and small arms proliferation, and has acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The last time the Council convened on this issue was at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1279.comm_en.pdf">1279<sup>th</sup></a> meeting, held on 14 May 2025, under the theme ‘Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.’ Unlike that meeting, tomorrow’s session is not region-specific, offering an opportunity to consider the trends and developments at a continental level and to follow up on key outcomes of the 1279<sup>th</sup> session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://ocindex.net/assets/downloads/2025/english/global-ocindex-report.pdf">Global Organised Crime Index 2025</a> provides an important evidence base on recent developments and trends relating to TOC. Its Africa-specific findings show steady growth in criminal markets and actors since 2019, with financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, counterfeit goods and arms trafficking among the most pervasive TOC markets on the continent. It also highlights <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-Index-Africa-PR.pdf">regional diversity</a>: human trafficking, arms trafficking and human smuggling in East Africa; financial crimes and cannabis trade, along with human trafficking in North Africa; non-renewable resource crimes in Central Africa; cocaine trafficking in West Africa; and wildlife crime in Southern Africa. This calls for tailored and regionally grounded responses.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A central issue for the PSC is that TOC is no longer merely a law-enforcement concern, but a structural peace and security threat that erodes sovereignty, weakens institutions, fuels corruption, sustains conflict economies and creates structures that undermine legitimate sources of authority. In various conflict settings from the Sahel, Sudan, Somalia and Great Lakes, terrorist armed groups, insurgents, and militias increasingly intersect with and draw on TOC networks and markets. In the Sahel, terrorist groups and criminal groups draw revenue from illegal gold mining, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping, fuel smuggling and drug trafficking, while exploiting livelihood vulnerabilities in a region where informal work and artisanal mining sustain millions. Similar dynamics affect the Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, Libya, Somalia, North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The PSC may therefore stress a multidimensional response to TOC that goes beyond criminal justice, combining borderland development, legitimate governance, service delivery, law enforcement and community resilience, including livelihood support.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The link between TOC and illicit arms flows is another major concern. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, described small arms proliferation as ‘a cancer’ driving instability across the continent, from the Sahel to the Great Lakes. In West Africa alone, around <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/illicit-activities-fuel-extremism-in-the-sahel-s-conflict-zones">12 million illicit arms</a> are circulating, used by terrorist groups, vigilantes, self-defence groups, bandits and civilians who feel abandoned by the state. Their proliferation transforms local disputes into deadly conflict. Counter-TOC relating to illicit arms flows should therefore be linked to efforts at curbing SLW stockpile management, arms tracing, diversion control, and disarmament initiatives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These include the call for an AFRIPOL-anchored continental criminal intelligence mechanism, criminal corridor mapping and tailored responses to criminal flows. It further requested the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on TOC, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations, and to present the study to the PSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is of interest to the PSC that the networks and corridors of TOC are mapped to inform targeted response. In this respect, several criminal corridors have been <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1279-Concept-Note-EN.pdf">identified</a>. These include: the Lagos–Kano–Agadez–Tripoli route for migrant smuggling and Tramadol trafficking; the Bamako–Gao–Tamanrasset route for arms and fuel trafficking; the Dakar–Ziguinchor–Bissau route for cocaine from Latin America, the Diffa–Lake Chad–Maiduguri route linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) logistics, and the Port Sudan–Khartoum–Bangui corridor for arms trafficking. The Global Initiative-TOC Risk Bulletin on arms trafficking routes in Mali <a href="https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/wea-obs-013/01-arms-trafficking-routes-in-mali-disrupted.html">shows</a> that disrupted routes pushed traffickers and armed groups to seek alternative routes and weapons sources. The <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/illicit-hub-mapping-in-west-africa-2025/">Illicit Hub Mapping</a> in West Africa 2025 report maps 350 illicit hubs across 18 countries and identifies five accelerant markets: kidnapping, cattle rustling, illicit arms, illicit gold and extortion/protection racketeering. The tracing and operation of these various routes highlights the importance of following up on one of the outcomes of the last PSC session on TOC. It is to be recalled that the PSC tasked the AU Commission to coordinate AFRIPOL and others in ‘developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Corruption and state-embedded criminality are also central to the discussion. TOC often thrives where institutions are weak, compromised or penetrated by criminal interests, enabling illicit networks to evade accountability, influence decision-making and undermine the rule of law. As Global Initiative-TOC’s analysis of the role of state actors and armed groups in the conflict in Eastern DRC <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/rwanda-drc-peace-deal-m23-organized-crime-geocriminality/">shows</a>, conflicts can become structurally criminalised where armed actors and state-linked networks benefit from illicit resource extraction. African strategies should therefore treat anti-corruption, institutional resilience, financial investigation, asset recovery, judicial cooperation and public integrity as core peace and security tools, integrating them into conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding, stabilisation, security sector reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Given the transnational character of TOC, border governance remains a major issue. Borderlands are often areas of weak state presence, but also livelihood spaces where communities depend on cross-border trade, pastoral mobility, family networks and informal markets. Criminal networks exploit these same routes. The Niamey Convention remains relevant not only for border security but also for local development, cross-border governance and conflict prevention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session may also benefit from considering emerging and non-traditional forms of TOC, which are increasingly shaped by new technology and artificial intelligence (AI). African strategies should therefore address conventional trafficking alongside cybercrime, AI-enabled fraud, online exploitation, digital finance, crypto-enabled laundering and the criminal use of logistics and technology platforms, consistent with the 1279<sup>th</sup> session’s concern over the co-option of new technologies by criminal actors.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Institutionally, addressing the transnational dimension of organised crime requires leveraging the role of AFRIPOL, CISSA and AUCTC. The <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1320.comm_en.pdf">1320<sup>th</sup> </a>meeting on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Security Outlook adds an operational layer by calling for AUCTC–CISSA–AFRIPOL horizon-scanning briefings, a dynamic risk-mapping tool, stronger cyber and digital-threat monitoring, and a continental working group on illicit financing, including hawala/mobile-money networks used by extremist groups.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another policy area concerns peace operations. Recent work on <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/transnational-organized-crime-and-peacekeeping-joint-input-paper-global-alliance-peace-operations">TOC and peacekeeping</a> and <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/looking-into-the-future-transnational-organized-crime-and-un-peace-operations/">TOC and UN peace operations</a> underlines that organised crime can undermine peace operations by financing armed groups, distorting local economies and weakening political settlements. AU-led and AU-authorised missions, therefore, need a stronger analytical capacity to understand criminal economies without being transformed into anti-crime agencies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the growing threat of TOC in Africa and its linkages with terrorism, illicit arms flows, corruption, illicit financial flows, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, illegal mining, cybercrime and environmental crime. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional African strategy that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. It may call for targeted enforcement, financial investigations, criminal justice cooperation, border governance, anti-corruption measures, livelihood alternatives, legitimate local governance, service delivery and community resilience as critical measures to address the underlying factors that make TOC possible. The PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention, improved weapons management, joint border management and strengthened coordination of police, intelligence, customs, border-control, financial intelligence and judicial institutions. It may further urge Member States to domesticate and implement relevant continental and international instruments, combat money laundering and illicit financial flows. The Council may also call for the AU Commission to present a comprehensive report on trends in TOC in Africa, including criminal corridors, sources of financing, links with armed actors and impacts on local populations. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole-of-AU system approach, emphasising coordination among AFRIPOL, CISSA, AUCTC, the AU Border Programme, the African Governance Architecture, the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), the PCRD Centre, the African Development Bank and RECs/RMs.</p>
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		<title>The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-impact-of-climate-change-on-the-crisis-situation-in-the-lake-chad-basin-and-sahel-regions/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 07:47:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Climate Change and Natural Disaster]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mali and Sahel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lake Chad Basin]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23403</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>3 May 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-impact-of-climate-change-on-the-crisis-situation-in-the-lake-chad-basin-and-sahel-regions/">The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-8"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="h2" ><span></p></span><span><h1 style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span lang="EN-US">The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions</span></strong></h1></span><span><p></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>3 May 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (04 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1344<sup>th</sup> session to consider the impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session will open with remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are also expected from Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE); Mamadou Tangara, High Representative and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Mali/Sahel; and Marie Jose Samba Ovono Obono, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Chad. Representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are also expected to deliver statements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The climate, peace and security agenda has been a standing item on the PSC’s programme since its 585<sup>th</sup> session in March 2016, when the Council committed to annual deliberations on the nexus between climate change and security. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding two sessions annually on the theme—amounting to over 18 sessions to date—reflecting the growing prominence of the issue. While previous deliberations have referenced the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel within broader discussions, the upcoming session appears to be the first dedicated engagement focused specifically on these regions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel unfolds within a complex socio-ecological system in which environmental stress, livelihoods, demographic pressures, governance deficits, and insecurity interact in mutually reinforcing ways. In line with the PSC’s consistent framing, climate change operates as a ‘threat multiplier,’ exacerbating existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as a direct cause of conflict. As underscored in its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1301.comm_en.pdf">1301<sup>st</sup></a> session in September 2025, climate change is a ‘risk multiplier’ that aggravates vulnerabilities, heightens insecurity, and undermines livelihoods, thereby exacerbating existing conflicts and creating new security challenges or social, economic, and environmental factors that can lead to food insecurity, forced migration, conflict and economic disruption through extreme weather events like droughts and floods.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the context of the Lake Chad Basin, as highlighted in the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for Boko Haram-affected areas, the shrinkage of Lake Chad is often attributed to climate change and desertification, with associated livelihood losses sometimes linked to increased vulnerability to violent extremism. The lake’s surface area declined dramatically from 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to about 1,300 km² in the 1980s—a reduction of nearly 90 per cent. Today, it fluctuates between 8,000 and 14,000 km² depending on rainfall patterns. However, the environmental reality is more complex. Communities around the lake have historically adapted to cyclical flooding and fluctuating water levels, developing resilient livelihood strategies over generations. In recent years, however, more frequent and intense flooding, combined with long-term environmental changes, has placed a growing strain on these adaptive capacities. This pressure is compounded by rapid population growth, which has significantly increased competition over limited and variable natural resources. At the same time, ongoing conflict has further degraded environmental conditions by disrupting agricultural systems, destroying infrastructure, and eroding local knowledge. These intersecting pressures—climate variability, demographic change, and insecurity—have reinforced longstanding marginalisation and underdevelopment, creating conditions in which radical narratives and armed groups persist.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Sahel is among the regions most vulnerable to climate change globally. Temperatures are <a href="https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/news/sahel-climate-change-challenges/">rising</a> about 1.5 times faster than the global average, with projections indicating an increase of at least 2°C by 2040. This has profound implications for populations whose livelihoods depend heavily on climate-sensitive sectors, with 60 to 80 percent engaged in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing. According to the African Climate Risk Assessment, climate-related security risks in the Sahel stem from the interaction of environmental stress and structural fragility. Livelihood insecurity is central, as dependence on climate-sensitive sectors like farming and pastoralism makes land and water disputes a flashpoint for conflict. Armed groups exploit weakened state presence and economic hardship to recruit, while coping strategies such as charcoal production and artisanal mining worsen deforestation and finance insurgency. Migration, once an adaptation tool, now often fuels displacement, resource competition, and trafficking. Notably, in the Lake Chad Basin, instability is driven less by absolute resource decline than by environmental variability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Governance and institutional capacity remain central to the climate–security nexus. The PSC has consistently underscored that climate stress translates into insecurity primarily in contexts where state institutions are weak, absent, or unable to manage competing demands over scarce resources. In such settings, limited capacity to regulate resource use, mediate disputes, and deliver basic services allows localised tensions to escalate into broader violence. Armed groups have proven adept at exploiting these conditions. Across both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, extremist organisations have embedded themselves within local socio-economic systems, leveraging grievances linked to marginalisation, livelihood loss, and state neglect. Climate-induced economic hardship expands the pool of individuals vulnerable to recruitment, while weak governance enables these groups to operate with relative freedom and, in some cases, to position themselves as alternative providers of order and livelihoods. As noted during the PSC’s 1301st session, inadequate adaptation systems can transform climate shocks into insecurity, whereas effective governance can channel similar pressures into cooperation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This governance challenge is compounded by limitations in existing early warning systems, which remain largely reactive and insufficiently equipped to integrate climate indicators such as rainfall variability, drought cycles, and water stress. The PSC’s 1114<sup>th</sup> session of 18 October 2022 emphasised the need to incorporate such indicators into early warning frameworks, thereby linking environmental stress more directly to peace and security responses. At the same time, structural constraints—including limited access to climate finance, technological gaps, and broader global inequalities—continue to restrict the capacity of countries in these regions to respond effectively to climate-related risks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Mobility adds further complexity to this landscape. Movement in search of water, pasture, and economic opportunity has long been a defining feature of communities in the regions and a key adaptation mechanism to environmental variability. However, the scale and patterns of mobility have shifted in recent years. Poorly regulated cross-border movements have contributed to localised clashes between farmers and herders, particularly in resource-scarce areas, illustrating how climate-induced mobility, absent cooperative governance, can undermine stability. Large-scale displacement driven by both conflict and climate shocks has also placed considerable pressure on host communities, especially in urban and peri-urban areas with limited infrastructure and services. At the same time, restrictions on movement, whether due to insecurity or policy measures, can undermine traditional coping strategies and exacerbate vulnerability. Mobility thus presents a paradox: it remains essential for resilience, yet, when poorly managed, can become a source of tension.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These dynamics are further reinforced by feedback loops between climate stress and conflict. Insecurity disrupts agricultural production, limits access to land, and damages critical infrastructure, thereby weakening the capacity of communities to cope with environmental shocks. In turn, climate stress deepens poverty, displacement, and governance fragility—conditions that sustain and intensify conflict. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle in which environmental degradation and insecurity mutually exacerbate one another, making stabilisation through conventional security responses alone increasingly difficult.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU has established important normative frameworks to address this nexus, including the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032), the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, and the draft Common African Position on climate, peace and security. At the regional level, the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for the Lake Chad Basin provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the multidimensional nature of the crisis. For the Sahel, the Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance and Development, led by former Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou and jointly launched by the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel in September 2022, provided a strategic assessment of the region’s underlying challenges, including climate change. The report was discussed during the 8th AU–UN annual conference in October 2024, but its uptake within AU processes and practical relevance as a policy framework remains unclear.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, particularly in Mali, and may highlight the role of climate change in amplifying existing vulnerabilities. It may also underscore the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) as a robust framework for addressing the multidimensional challenges facing the Lake Chad Basin, and stress the need to mobilise adequate support for its effective implementation. The PSC may further reiterate the importance of integrating climate indicators into early warning systems to strengthen risk analysis and enable timely preventive action. Echoing the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, it may emphasise the need for greater horizontal integration between climate and weather-related early warning systems and conflict early warning mechanisms, as well as stronger vertical coordination across continental, regional, national, and local levels. Recognising the transboundary nature of climate-induced mobility and resource competition, the PSC may call for enhanced collaboration among Member States, regional mechanisms, and relevant climate institutions, including the Sahel Climate Commission. In addition, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening governance and state presence, including improving service delivery and rebuilding trust between states and communities, as essential conditions for preventing climate pressures from translating into conflict. Finally, the PSC may underline the importance of adequate and equitable access to climate finance, which requires increased international support and strengthened African-led financing mechanisms, including the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Climate Change, as decided at its 984th session.</p>
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		<title>Peace Support Operations in Africa</title>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 08:12:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[APSA Tools and Pillars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>26 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-support-operations-africa/">Peace Support Operations in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Peace Support Operations in Africa</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 26 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (27 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an open session on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with an opening statement by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements will also be delivered by El-Ghassim Wane, former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali, Head of MINUSMA, and UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, as well as former AU Director for Peace and Security; Dagmawit Moges, Director of the AU Peace Fund; and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session is one of the signature events of Ethiopia’s chairship, given its history and contributions to peacekeeping. It comes against the background of major challenges afflicting AU-led PSOs from the breakdown of the political consensus on which they are predicated to the resultant weakening of diplomatic, financial and logistical support and political coherence necessary for deployment and successful conduct of PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since its operationalisation in 2004, the PSC has remained consistently engaged on PSOs, which continue to constitute a critical tool in the AU’s peace and security architecture. The first PSO to be deployed under the mandating authority of the PSC was the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. Since then, PSOs in Africa have featured on the agenda of the PSC both through mission-specific sessions and thematic sessions dedicated to peacekeeping in Africa. Over time, its thematic focus has focused on key strategic issues, including the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) (with over 15 dedicated sessions since 2007), financing of AU PSOs, and broader systemic challenges affecting peace operations on the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Two recent sessions are particularly noteworthy. At its 851st session (May 2019), the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted a <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/fd734fdc-9cbc-400b-a14c-f8a764e69dc6/content">report</a> assessing the evolving context of AU PSOs, identifying key operational and strategic challenges, drawing lessons from past and ongoing missions, and proposing measures to enhance effectiveness. More recently, the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/986.comm_.18.03.2021_en.pdf">986th</a> session, held at ministerial level on 18 March 2021 under Kenya’s chairship, reaffirmed these concerns under the theme ‘Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: Emerging Challenges and Critical Lessons for Sustainable Peacekeeping Operations.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Africa remains the main theatre for peacekeeping operations, hosting a wide range of deployments, including those of the UN, AU, RECs/RMs, as well as bilateral arrangements. Over the past two decades, the AU has also authorised, mandated, or endorsed around two dozen peace support operations, according to <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/AU-PSC-Handbook-2024.pdf">Amani Africa data</a> (see map below). In addition, regional mechanisms and <em>ad hoc</em> coalitions have in recent years come to step in to fill the gap that emerged in situations where neither the AU nor the UN were able to deploy in a timely manner, particularly in response to insurgencies with regional implications. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, deployed missions in Mozambique and eastern DRC, while ECOWAS has undertaken interventions in contexts such as the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Alongside these, ad hoc coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force have been deployed. These arrangements have often emerged as gap-filling responses by affected states, reflecting both the evolving nature of security threats and the limited capacity of continental and regional mechanisms to act promptly and adapt rapidly. In parallel, bilateral deployments have also increased, including Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique and the Central African Republic and various bilateral deployments in Somalia alongside the AU mission.</p>
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</div><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-23342" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/20260426_150106.png" width="768" height="544" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/20260426_150106.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/20260426_150106-300x213.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/20260426_150106-350x248.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 768px) 100vw, 768px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>AU mandated, authorised, and endorsed PSOs (2003-2023) (Source: Amani Amani 2024 Handbook on the African Union Peace and Security Council: Guide on the Council’s Procedure, Practice and Traditions)</figcaption></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The various deployments have contributed meaningfully to stabilising conflict-affected contexts. However, recently, there has been a trend of steady decline in the deployment of PSOs in Africa, not only in the context of the AU but also the UN. The UN has not deployed a new mission on the continent since 2015, while the AU has not initiated any major PSO deployment under its command since its missions to Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. This is not due to a lack of situations requiring PSOs, but rather reflects the fact that the AU has become significantly <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-african-union-peace-and-security-council-at-20-from-a-promising-past-and-a-challenged-present-to-a-less-certain-future/">behind the curve</a> in mobilising timely engagement in situations directly implicating its peace and security mandate and the timely consensus and support required for deploying under its command, as well as in adapting to the evolving security threats on the continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this context, several emerging trends and challenges over the past decade are shaping the effectiveness of PSOs in Africa, and are expected to feature in tomorrow’s deliberation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the key issues likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s deliberation is the changing peace and security landscape, which calls for some adaptation of PSOs. Since around the mid of 2010s, Africa’s security environment has shifted significantly, with contemporary threats increasingly driven by fragmented non-state actors and asymmetric warfare by terrorist groups, rather than conventional civil wars. While the emergence of ad hoc deployments to fill in the ensuing gap contributes to managing the urgent security needs, they tend to be security-heavy, bereft of the tools necessary for addressing the underlying governance and socio-economic challenges. Often, they also operate outside the multilateral normative framework, with limited institutional anchoring within the AU framework.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite efforts to explore how to adapt the ASF, engagement on AU PSOs remains largely episodic, with limited efforts to develop new operational models aligned to current security dynamics and institutional and financial constraints. Systemic lessons and insights are not consistently carried forward to inform the AU’s approach to current and future PSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Conflicts on the continent have become increasingly complex, often rooted in political contestation, governance crises, and deep-seated socio-economic challenges that do not lend themselves to purely military solutions. There is therefore a need to reconsider the growing <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-africa-a-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response/">tendency</a> among policymakers to frame responses to Africa’s peace and security challenges—particularly those involving terrorism and insurgency—primarily in military terms. While military operations may be necessary in some contexts, they cannot substitute for a coherent political strategy. In this regard, the 2025 Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and the ASF reaffirmed that military action must be directly aligned with, and supportive of, clearly defined political end states. In the absence of such a strategy, PSOs risk becoming protracted and ineffective, as illustrated by the ongoing challenges facing the AU deployment in Somalia. <strong>The principle of the ‘primacy of politics’ should therefore remain central in all conflict resolution efforts, with political processes at the forefront of design, implementation, and exit strategies for PSOs.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Financing remains a major challenge, particularly for large, multidimensional missions. This is most evident in the current AUSSOM deployment, which has been operating under significant financial strain, with mounting debt and without predictable, adequate, and sustainable funding—conditions that have directly affected its effectiveness. The issue of financing the AU, including its PSOs, has gained increasing political attention, including at the most recent AU Summit held in February, where the Assembly, in light of these challenges, <a href="https://au.int/en/decisions/decisions-declarations-and-resolution-thirty-ninth-ordinary-session-assembly-union">decided</a> to convene an extraordinary session of the Executive Council dedicated to financing no later than November 2026.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the AU, there is growing interest in expanding the use of the Peace Fund. But given the limited scope of the Fund’s endowment, only smaller and limited-scope PSOs may be financed through AU resources, including the Peace Fund. Large and resource-intensive multidimensional missions authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter require the shouldering of the financial burden by the UN and other international partners, given that the maintenance of international peace and security remains a primary responsibility of the UN Security Council. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 in December 2023 was premised on this consideration and marked an important milestone in AU–UN cooperation on peacekeeping. Yet, its implementation has been affected by shifting geopolitical dynamics. Changing policy towards PKOs and security priorities among partners, notably the US and EU, as well as the UN’s liquidity crisis affecting peacekeeping operations, has stifled implementation of resolution 2719 and further intensified financial pressures on AUSSOM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Beyond financing, effective PSOs require adequate logistics, intelligence, and equipment, particularly in asymmetric environments where capabilities such as counter-IED measures are essential.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Coordination challenges also persist among the AU, RECs/RMs, the UN, and host states. The growing number of regional and ad hoc deployments risks fragmenting APSA. While AU–UN complementarity remains essential, both institutions retain distinct comparative advantages and should operate in a coordinated rather than substitutive manner. As <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-future-of-united-nations-african-union-peacekeeping-partnership-practical-considerations-for-the-berlin-ministerial-conference/">noted</a> by El-Ghassim Wane, the UN remains indispensable for multidimensional peacekeeping and supporting transitions to sustainable peace, while the AU is often better positioned to undertake early engagement using robust peace enforcement and counter-terrorism operations, with UN support, as well as smaller-scale stabilisation missions. Some of the models identified in the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/study-on-future-of-peacekeeping-new-models-and-related-capabilities">study</a> on the future of peacekeeping that Wane led create opportunities for the AU in this respect.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s deliberation is expected to explore concrete pathways for addressing them, building on some of the existing efforts, such as the lessons learned forum. This requires adopting a more systematic and sustained engagement by the PSC rather than an episodic one. Consideration may also be given to a comprehensive review of AU PSOs and the ASF framework—without reopening foundational instruments such as the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol—to ensure they remain responsive to evolving realities. Such a review should focus on developing adaptable PSO models aligned with current security and financial constraints, institute processes for systematically integrating lessons learned into policy, planning and practice, strengthening coordination with RECs/RMs, the UN, and international partners, and, while firmly anchoring operations in coherent political strategies. Given the need for strategic and high-level political support for PSOs, consideration may also be given to designating a dedicated AU-led PSOs Champion to sustain high-level attention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reaffirm the indispensable role that PSOs play in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. It may further express concern over the multifaceted challenges facing PSOs in Africa, including political, operational, and financial constraints, and may consider the above measures, as well as modalities for follow-up, as part of efforts to address these challenges and enhance the effectiveness of PSOs on the continent. It may commission an independent, time-bound study on the future of PSOs in Africa, drawing inspiration from the recent UN initiative. It may also underscore the need for PSOs to be designed and implemented as part of a broader, integrated approach encompassing diplomacy, mediation, peace-making, and peacebuilding. The PSC may also consider developing an annual ministerial forum on AU PSOs, similar to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Ministerial, as a strategic platform for mobilising strategic, financial, logistical, and technical support for AU-led PSOs.</p>
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