Amani Africa

Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan

Amani Africa — Tue, 25 Aug 2026 07:37:05 +0000

Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan

Date | 25 August 2026

Tomorrow (26 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1364^th session to receive briefings from the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) and the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea on the situation in South Sudan.

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Representative of South Africa as the chair of C5 and the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, Jakaya Kikwete, are expected to brief the Council.

The meeting comes less than four months before the country’s first general elections, scheduled for 22 December 2026, and at a moment when political mistrust, armed confrontation and humanitarian distress are placing the transition under enormous strain. The PSC last considered South Sudan on 30 April, at its 1343^rd session, when it adopted the report of its 23–25 April field mission. During that session, the PSC urged the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) to ensure that any amendment to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) follows the due process stipulated in the Agreement. It also called for sustained engagement to secure the release of First Vice-President Riek Machar and other political detainees and enable meaningful dialogue. On the elections, it reiterated the call for ensuring all necessary preparations and establishment of conducive conditions for the organisation of the elections. In this context, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to expedite the deployment of a multidimensional technical needs-assessment team.

At tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to hear from the C5 and the High Representative on their respective diplomatic engagements since the Council’s April session. Their briefings are expected to highlight progress and challenges in implementing the R-ARCSS, as well as developments on the ground, including the political, security and humanitarian conditions and their implications for the December elections. The briefers are also expected to assess South Sudan’s level of electoral preparedness.

In terms of diplomatic engagement, the C5 is likely to brief about its 6-7 July visit to Juba to consult stakeholders on the R-ARCSS and electoral preparedness. South Africa, which chairs the C5, expressed optimism about an inclusive national dialogue while emphasising the need to improve security. The High Representative, Jakaya Kikwete, is expected to report on his 21 May engagement in Dar es Salaam with the SPLM/A-IO and several opposition and holdout groups. During his second visit to Juba, from 17 to 23 June, he met President Salva Kiir, other South Sudanese stakeholders, regional ambassadors and international partners involved in the peace process.

These diplomatic engagements have taken place against a deteriorating political, security and humanitarian backdrop. The latest report of the UN Secretary-General describes an increasingly volatile situation marked by armed clashes, a contested ceasefire, worsening humanitarian conditions and shrinking civic space. At the UN Security Council briefing of 6 August, the Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) similarly warned that the diminishing inclusivity of the RTGoNU, repeated violations of the Permanent Ceasefire and disruption of the activities of the Agreement implementation institutions and mechanisms have eroded trust among the parties and impeded implementation, particularly of the governance and security provisions.

Unilateral measures have further eroded trust. On 1 July, parliament ratified amendments to Articles 1.2.5 and 1.2.14 of the R-ARCSS, delinking the permanent constitution-making and national census processes from the December elections. The process drew criticism for failing to follow the procedure prescribed by the Agreement. The SPLM/A-IO, for instance, strongly objected that the amendments had been introduced unilaterally and undermined the power-sharing arrangements established under the Agreement. A proposed amendment to Article 8.3 that would have removed the supremacy of the R-ARCSS was, however, dropped following sustained international advocacy. Unilateral removals by President Salva Kiir have also continued, contrary to the spirit of the Revitalised Agreement. Government reshuffles in late April and June affected senior portfolios. In May, President Kiir removed 57 SPLM/A-IO legislators before parliament considered the amendments; on 3 July, he replaced two National Elections Commission (NEC) members nominated by Machar. Meanwhile, Machar, who has been detained since March 2025, remains on trial despite repeated calls for his release and that of other political detainees. In addition, AU and other regional diplomatic envoys have not been granted access to Machar.

On the security front, clashes have continued between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the SPLM/A-IO and its allies, as well as with some holdout groups. Violence involving intercommunal actors has also persisted. The Greater Upper Nile region, particularly Jonglei State, remains the major flashpoint for fighting between the SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO. Meanwhile, intercommunal violence, cattle-related attacks and conflict involving pastoralist communities have affected parts of Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal, resulting in significant civilian casualties and displacement.

The humanitarian situation also remains bleak. An estimated 7.8 million people—56 per cent of the population—were projected to face crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity between April and July, with conflict-affected counties such as Nasir, Ulang, Nyirol and Akobo at risk of famine. Multiple public health emergencies, including the ongoing Cholera outbreak, persist, while conflict, attacks against aid workers and administrative impediments restrict relief operations. Thirty-six humanitarian workers have reportedly been killed this year alone. Yet only 35 per cent of the USD 1.46 billion required under the 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan has been secured.

It is in this context that the NEC announced elections for 22 December across all ten states and three administrative areas. Some preparations are under way: the Political Parties Council announced the registration of 39 parties, while the SPLM launched an inter-party dialogue and nominated President Kiir as its sole presidential candidate. The government considers the remaining difficulties ‘manageable’ and appears determined to proceed, with voter registration expected to begin soon. Some domestic actors also oppose another postponement, while the February 2026 C5 Plus Summit emphasised that there should be no further extension of the transition. The rejection of an open-ended transition is understandable. It does not, however, settle whether credible and peaceful elections can be held in December. RJMEC has stated that critical prerequisites for the conduct of credible, peaceful and inclusive elections remain uncertain. Similarly, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS has identified unresolved concerns over political trust, civic and political space, security arrangements, financing, constituency boundaries and institutional preparedness. During the PSC field mission in April, the Troika, European Union, IGAD Partners Forum, civil society, faith-based organisations and research institutions also warned that a unilateral electoral process could return the country to full-scale war. The choice is therefore not simply between elections and another extension. The main test is not whether an election takes place on 22 December, but whether the process provides a credible path out of transition without becoming the route back to war.

Coming at a critical juncture for South Sudan, tomorrow’s briefing offers the PSC an important opportunity to take concrete measures to prevent the country from descending into full-scale civil war. In this regard, the PSC may consider the following measures.

First, the PSC should objectively assess South Sudan’s level of electoral preparedness, determine whether conditions conducive to credible elections exist, and pronounce itself on the basis of that assessment. This assessment can build on the findings of the AU Pre-Election and Needs Assessment Mission to South Sudan, led by former Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Onyeama. The mission arrived in Juba yesterday to engage stakeholders on preparations for, and challenges facing, the forthcoming elections. Its deployment follows the decision of the PSC’s 1219^th session, which requested the AU Commission to deploy election observers four months before the elections and to brief the PSC both before and after the mission’s deployment.

Second, while the appointment of High Representative Kikwete is a positive step, it will not yield the expected results without strong political backing, sustained follow-up and adequate technical support. His engagement should also be coordinated with the C5, IGAD, RJMEC, UNMISS and neighbouring states through a unified diplomatic framework with agreed priorities and a clear division of labour. Strengthening the AU Mission in South Sudan and drawing systematically on the field presence of UNMISS would improve AU’s access to timely political, security and electoral information. The PSC should also lend political support to the continuation of the mandate of UNMISS during this sensitive period.

Third, the PSC should maintain close and regular oversight by convening at least once every two months until the risks associated with the electoral process have been sufficiently mitigated. These sessions should be informed by comprehensive reports from the Chairperson of the AU Commission to facilitate substantive consideration of the situation. South Sudan remains one of the situations in which the PSC could exercise meaningful diplomatic leverage. Using it now, before the situation spirals out of control, would be far less costly than responding after violence has escalated.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable framework for achieving sustainable peace, stability, unity and democratisation in South Sudan. In this regard, it may urge the parties to uphold the integrity of the Agreement and work towards a peaceful and democratic conclusion of the transitional period. While taking note of the preparations underway for the December elections, the PSC may emphasise the importance of ensuring that the elections are conducted in an orderly, peaceful, inclusive and credible manner and do not become a trigger for renewed violence. In this context, it may reiterate the need for inclusive political dialogue among South Sudanese stakeholders. The PSC may welcome the deployment of the AU Pre-Election and Needs Assessment Mission to South Sudan, led by former Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Onyeama. In line with the decision of its 1219^th session, it may request the AU Commission to brief the Council on the mission’s findings regarding the state of electoral preparedness. Furthermore, the PSC may decide to convene at least once every two months until the risks of renewed violence associated with the electoral process have been adequately addressed. It may request the Chairperson of the AU Commission to submit, ahead of these sessions, detailed reports on developments in South Sudan, the AU’s diplomatic activities and recommendations for further action. The Council may further request the AU Commission to provide the High Representative with the technical, financial and institutional support necessary for the effective discharge of his mandate.

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Africa’s stake in the future of the UN

Amani Africa — Mon, 24 Aug 2026 06:46:25 +0000

Africa’s stake in the future of the UN *

Date | 24 August 2026

Abdul Mohamed, a former UN senior political advisor and head of the Sudan mediation office, is a senior fellow at Amani Africa

The selection of the next Secretary-General of the United Nations comes at a moment when the institution he or she will lead is confronting perhaps the gravest crisis of relevance, authority and confidence since its establishment over eighty years ago. This is not simply another leadership transition within an international organisation. The international order is not merely changing, but the multilateral foundations on which it once rested are being progressively weakened, through geopolitical rivalry, selective adherence to international law, declining political investment and, increasingly, preferences for unilateral and transactional arrangements. The UN finds itself having simultaneously to defend its own relevance, protect the principles of its Charter, and respond to global crises whose scale makes international cooperation more necessary than ever.

For Africa, this is not an ordinary institutional crisis. The weakening – let alone the possible demise – of effective multilateralism constitutes an existential strategic threat to the continent. Africa consequently has reason to be more invested, more vocal and more politically engaged in defending and renewing multilateralism than any other region. Yet that urgency is not sufficiently visible in African diplomacy or in the debate surrounding the selection of the next Secretary-General. This contradiction should concern us.

The retreat for multilateralism should alarm Africa

Major powers can navigate, and some may even believe they can prosper in a weakened multilateral order. They possess military power, economic leverage, technological capacity, privileged positions in global finance, and bilateral networks through which they can pursue their interests. They can use multilateral institutions when convenient and bypass them when they are not.

Africa does not enjoy the same luxury. For Africa, multilateralism is not an á la carte proposition. Our stake in it is comprehensive. Peace and security, development, climate action, international finance, humanitarian protection, public health, migration, trade, technology governance and the protection of sovereignty all depend, in varying degrees, upon functioning international institutions, agreed rules and collective action. International law matters most to those who cannot rely upon power alone.

This is why the current retreat from multilateralism should alarm Africa.

The crisis did not begin yesterday. For more than a decade, geopolitical rivalry, paralysis in the Security Council, weakening respect for international law, unequal globalisation and growing distrust of international institutions have accumulated. The wars of recent years, including Gaza, have further exposed the selectivity with which international norms are sometimes applied and have damaged confidence in the universality of the system. More recently, policies pursued by the current United States administration have accelerated the retreat from multilateral approaches, reducing support for international institutions and privileging bilateral bargains, narrower coalitions and national power. Whatever the stated rationale, the practical effect is to weaken institutions, make collective rules more negotiable and increase the premium on power.

Consequences for Africa’s multilateral institutions

Apart from removing the international arrangements that support pan-African multilateral cooperation, the global retreat from multilateralism does not stop at Africa’s shores. Its continental manifestation may be equally consequential. A world increasingly organised through bilateral transactions between unequal states can weaken the African Union (AU) and the regional economic communities, circumvent common African positions, and reward fragmented national bargains over continental approaches. It can encourage external powers to deal selectively with individual states and transform Africa once again into an arena in which others compete, rather than a political space in which Africans collectively exercise agency. In its most dangerous form, this tendency threatens a new balkanization of Africa – not necessarily through the redrawing of borders, but through the fragmentation of African political purpose.

The defence of global multilateralism and the defence of African multilateralism are therefore inseparable. Defending and pushing for a just global multilateralism is in the interest of Africa’s multilateral institutions. For Africa, this retreat of the post-World War II global order requires it not only to take active interest in and extend heightened support for the UN and the forging of a more inclusive and just multilateral cooperation but also to double down on its integration push and the deepening of continental multilateral cooperation.

Africa should be concerned about the selection of the next Secretary-General

This is also why Africa’s present disposition toward the selection of the next Secretary-General is inadequate at the moment. The selection process is already in full swing. Candidates have presented their visions in public interactive dialogues and a General Assembly town hall. The Security Council has cast two straw polls in July and August indicating the views of members of the Council about each candidate at the particular point at which the polls were cast. Yet Africa has not generated the continental debate that the stakes of the selection of the next UN Secretary-General at this point in time require.

The continent should by now be asking, collectively and publicly: what kind of United Nations does Africa require in the coming decade? What must be preserved, what must be reformed, and what must be reinvented? What qualities should the next Secretary-General possess to navigate a period in which the institution may have to fight for both its relevance and its political space? And what commitments should Africa expect from candidates on peace and security, development, international financial reform, climate justice, Security Council reform and partnership with African institutions?

These are not questions to be left to New York diplomacy alone. They concern Africa’s strategic future. While the Security Council holds the key for the selection of the next Secretary-General, Africa exercises influence and responsibility by establishing the political and leadership test against which any candidate should be assessed. The question is not simply who can administer the United Nations. It is who can help navigate the organisation through this turbulent transition while contributing to the reinvention of multilateralism for a world that still desperately needs it.

The next Secretary-General must be a competent and independent leader

The next Secretary-General cannot be merely a custodian of institutional survival. He or she must be a political leader of unusual competence, independence and judgment: firmly anchored in the Charter; capable of engaging and earning the support of the great powers without becoming captive to them; credible to the Global South; attentive to smaller states; and sufficiently imaginative to understand that defending multilateralism does not mean defending every feature of the status quo. The existing order requires reform precisely because its inequities and failures have contributed to its loss of legitimacy.

Africa cannot be asked to defend indefinitely an international system that marginalises Africa. Renewing multilateralism must therefore include democratising it. Multilateralism will survive only if states and citizens can see its value, not least of all in the core purpose of the UN. That means restoring prevention, mediation and political settlement to the centre of international peace and security; defending international law consistently rather than selectively; and advancing meaningful Security Council reform. For today’s world, this additionally means supporting reform of the international financial architecture; mobilising collective action on climate change; and developing workable regimes for global public goods, including public health, food security, digital governance, artificial intelligence and the global commons.

The UN must pursue equal partnerships with African institutions

For Africa, one additional priority is indispensable: a qualitatively stronger relationship between the UN, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. The future of multilateralism will not be constructed solely in New York. It will increasingly depend upon legitimate and capable regional institutions with political knowledge, proximity and operational capacity. In networked multilateralism, the UN should not treat African institutions merely as implementing partners after decisions have been made elsewhere but at the very least as co-creators. Partnership must increasingly mean shared political analysis, early consultation, complementarity, predictable support and respect for African agency and cooperative decision-making. Strengthening African multilateralism is part of strengthening global multilateralism.

Africa must, however, also look inward. We cannot demand multilateralism internationally while weakening it continentally. The AU requires deeper political investment, predictable financing and a willingness by Member States to treat collective positions as strategic assets rather than optional declarations. The credibility of Africa’s defence of the United Nations begins with our willingness to defend and strengthen our own multilateral institutions.

Africa must decide its vision of the future of the UN and the next Secretary-General

The selection of the next Secretary-General should therefore serve as a wake-up call. Africa needs a common strategic conversation and, where possible, a common position – not necessarily about a particular individual, but about the mandate history is imposing upon whoever assumes the office. The AU should help convene and give political expression to that conversation. African governments and diplomatic missions should engage candidates systematically against an agreed set of priorities. African intellectuals, policy institutions and civil society should debate the future of multilateralism as an African strategic question rather than as a distant institutional concern. Silence is itself a position, and at this historical moment it is the wrong one, more so for Africa.

For a continent whose quest for sovereignty, development, integration and international agency has been inseparable from collective institutions, the survival and renewal of multilateralism is not somebody else’s agenda. It is an African strategic interest of the first order. Africa should therefore speak earlier, louder and more coherently than it presently does – not because the United Nations as it exists is adequate, but because a world without effective multilateral institutions would be considerably more unequal, more transactional and more dangerous for those without great-power capabilities.

The selection of the next Secretary-General gives Africa an opportunity. Africa should seize this moment – not merely to help select the next Secretary-General of the UN, but to insist upon its place as a co-author of whatever multilateral order comes next.

* An earlier version of this article was published by the International Centre for Dialogue Initiatives and can be read here https://dialogueinitiatives.org/africas-stake-in-the-future-of-the-un/

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Africa’s stake in the future of the UN

Amani Africa — Mon, 24 Aug 2026 06:10:59 +0000

Africa’s stake in the future of the UN *

Date | 24 August 2026

Abdul Mohamed, a former UN senior political advisor and head of the Sudan mediation office, is a senior fellow at Amani Africa

The retreat for multilateralism should alarm Africa

This is why the current retreat from multilateralism should alarm Africa.

Consequences for Africa’s multilateral institutions

Africa should be concerned about the selection of the next Secretary-General

The next Secretary-General must be a competent and independent leader

The UN must pursue equal partnerships with African institutions

Africa must decide its vision of the future of the UN and the next Secretary-General

* An earlier version of this article was published by the International Centre for Dialogue Initiatives and can be read here https://dialogueinitiatives.org/africas-stake-in-the-future-of-the-un/

The post Africa’s stake in the future of the UN appeared first on Amani Africa.

Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems

Amani Africa — Sun, 23 Aug 2026 15:02:44 +0000

Coordination between AUCTC-APRM-CISSA-AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems: Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning Systems

Date | 23 August 2026

Tomorrow (24 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1364^th meeting to discuss the theme ‘Coordination between the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) – the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning System (EWS).’

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will make a statement. The representatives of AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL are then expected to deliver briefings.

The last time the PSC met on the theme of Early Warning was in December 2025 at its 1320^th meeting. From the communiqué, the PSC, among other things, underlined the need to strengthen the analytical convergence between AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL and the RECs/RMs. The same meeting further saw the PSC reiterating its request to the AU Commission ‘to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa, as adopted by the PSC through its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1298 (2025) of 27 August 2025, in order to enable Council to enhance its conflict prevention efforts.’ It is expected that this will be central to the discussions therein. Noteworthy also, the session comes just slightly over a month following PSC Committee of Experts level consultations on the ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action,’ held in July 2026. The proposed model ‘seeks to strengthen timely and proportionate AU responses by establishing clear triggers, thresholds and response options to address emerging risks before they escalate into violent conflict.’ It is expected to serve as a decision-support tool for the PSC, connecting early warning analysis with preventive action through existing AU governance and peace and security mechanisms.

The session comes amidst continuing security crises and an ever-evolving security landscape whose scale, complexity and changing character increasingly outpace the capacity of existing early-warning architecture. The Global Terrorism Index 2026 report recorded 5,582 terrorism deaths across 2,944 incidents in 2025, a 28 per cent fall from the previous year, with the impact of terrorism falling in 81 countries, the highest number of annual improvements since 2021 Sub-Saharan Africa remains the global epicenter, accounting for over half of all terrorism fatalities, with six of the ten most-impacted countries located on the continent: Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and the DRC. Fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa surpassed 20,000 for the fourth consecutive year, spread across the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, and Mozambique. In the Sahel specifically, JNIM (al-Qaeda-linked) and ISWAP/ISSP (Islamic State-linked) now collectively control more territory than at any point since the 2012 Mali crisis, with JNIM combining guerrilla attacks with governance strategies, providing basic services and arbitration in areas under its control.

With the evolving security landscape, there have also been significant operational shifts. Drone warfare has become a genuine insurgent capability. In Nigeria’s northeast, ISWAP is deploying combat drones in the Lake Chad basin at operational scale for the first time. Amani Africa’s Special Research Report, ‘Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council’ highlighted that one of the new security threats in Africa arises from the expansion of the use of emerging technologies. In addition, jihadist groups are no longer content with launching attacks; rather, they now administer territories and control trade routes, with their influence gradually pushing all the way to the Gulf of Guinea. JNIM’s strategy against Mali in 2026 illustrates a shift toward strangulation rather than storming capitals: JNIM formally declared an economic blockade of Bamako in April 2026, exploiting the fact that Mali imports about 95% of its fuel by road, with convoy attacks causing rationing, fuel queues and power shortages. Previously, the AU Commission, CISSA, AFRIPOL and AUCTC, were tasked to ‘thoroughly investigate the scourge of illicit financial flows, highlighting the networks and to report to PSC as soon as possible’ and called for ‘the establishment of a continental working group on illicit financing, which will inter alia, ensure the mapping of hawala/mobile money networks used by extremist terrorist groups and networks and the launch of a cross-border early warning protocol for suspicious transfers linked to convergence zones.’

Institutionally, the AU’s February 2026 Assembly decision called for the full operationalisation of the Continental Security Cartography and directed the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish a dynamic and continuously updated risk-mapping tool capable of providing the PSC with ‘a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential triggers’. It also called for fast-tracking the CEWS–AUCTC Joint Analytical Cell, closer harmonisation of RECs/RMs early-warning tools with CEWS, and development of a draft AU Early Action Guideline that ‘defines triggers, thresholds, and institutionalises response with timelines’ for consideration by the PSC. Taken together, these measures situate the forthcoming validation within a broader effort to move from parallel institutional reporting towards a more integrated continental risk picture and to strengthen the link between early warning and early action. The validation exercise therefore provides an opportunity to assess whether the emerging risk-mapping architecture is being designed as a decision-support mechanism capable of prompting timely preventive action, rather than as another analytical product whose warnings are not systematically translated into response.

The process acquired further operational content at the 1345^th PSC meeting on ‘Transnational Organised Crimes’ held in May 2026. The session saw the AU Commission, AFRIPOL, AUCTC, CISSA and APRM being tasked to ‘finalise by the end of 2026 a matrix of risks and threats to peace and security in Africa as a tool of the Continental Early Warning System.’ It also tasked AFRIPOL, in coordination with the Commission and RECs/RMs, to establish a continental criminal-intelligence mechanism for the ‘continuous mapping, analysis and dissemination of criminal flows, corridors and networks’ and to produce an annual consolidated continental threat assessment. This broadens the scope of continental early warning beyond conventional conflict indicators to include the evolving nexus among terrorism, organised crime, illicit economies and cross-border security threats.

The governance dimension has advanced in parallel. At its 1349^th meeting, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of ‘an early warning system dedicated to governance within the APRM’ and its inclusion in the matrix of risks and threats being finalised by relevant AU structures, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS. The Joint Burayu Declaration similarly called for institutionalised data- and information-sharing so that APRM country findings ‘feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning,’ within the wider coordination involving AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA. This direction was reinforced by the 35^th APRM Forum in February 2026, which called for efforts to ‘position the APRM as an effective early-warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent,’ and by the March engagement between the AUC Deputy Chairperson and APRM leadership, where discussions focused particularly on ‘governance monitoring, early warning and conflict prevention.’ The key question is therefore whether governance indicators will be integrated into a common analytical picture rather than treated as a parallel stream of information.

The most recent 1354^th ministerial session on counter-terrorism held in July 2026 added another specialised layer. Alongside adopting the African Union Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026 -2030), the Council called for ‘specific indicators on radicalisation and violent extremism’ to be integrated into CEWS ‘to enable early detection and timely intervention.’ This places terrorism-specific early warning within the implementation of a broader continental counter-terrorism framework. Taken together with parallel efforts on criminal intelligence and governance-related risks, these decisions point to an increasingly ambitious system in which terrorism analysis, criminal intelligence, governance vulnerabilities and broader conflict indicators are expected to inform one continental warning architecture. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to take note of the briefings by AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL and may welcome progress towards validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and the APRM Early Warning System. Council may underscore that the validation should support the institutionalisation of a dynamic and continuously updated continental risk-mapping mechanism capable of providing an integrated picture of emerging threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers. It may further emphasise the need for the validated tools to strengthen analytical convergence among AUCTC, APRM, CISSA, AFRIPOL and CEWS, including through common analytical standards, greater methodological alignment and secure information-sharing arrangements. Building on earlier decisions, the PSC may emphasise the imperative of regular consolidated horizon-scanning briefings covering emerging and escalating risks, indicators requiring preventive action, cross-border contagion dynamics and scenario options requiring Council guidance, while also encouraging systematic circulation of early-warning products to Member States to inform timely responses. It may also call for adequate technical, human and financial resources for the operationalisation, regular updating and sustained use of the tools, and for governance-related risks identified through the APRM EWS, alongside specialised terrorism and organised-crime indicators, to be systematically incorporated into the broader CEWS architecture.

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PSC – ACHPR Consultation

Amani Africa — Thu, 20 Aug 2026 08:10:07 +0000

PSC – ACHPR Consultation

Date | 20 August 2026

Tomorrow (21 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1363^rd session for a consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the ACHPR is also expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC on the ACHPR’s work as it relates to peace and security.

The consultative meeting is being convened pursuant to Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in advancing peace, security, and stability across the continent. Building on this provision, the PSC, at its 866^th Session in August 2019, resolved to institutionalise the engagement through annual joint consultative sessions with the ACHPR. This commitment rests on a shared legal and normative foundation: Article 3(f) of the PSC Protocol identifies the promotion of human rights as integral to conflict prevention, Article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights mandates the ACHPR to promote and protect the rights of individuals and communities, and Article 23 of the African Charter affirms the right of all peoples to live in peace and security. Taken together, these provisions position the PSC-ACHPR consultation as the institutional space through which the AU’s peace and security architecture and its human rights architecture are meant to speak to one another.

Tomorrow’s meeting follows the 1284^th session held on 19 June 2025, which marked the resumption of joint consultations after a three-year interruption. While the session reaffirmed its commitment to deepening collaboration with the ACHPR, notably through consistent information exchange and by institutionalising and regularising the consultation as an annual fixture, the session outcome document was largely couched in general terms and missed critical opportunities to operationalise concrete cooperation. Specifically, the session failed to build upon practical modalities established during the 866^th session.

The overarching question for the consultation is how the PSC and ACHPR can pool their respective mandates, tools and networks to translate human rights protection into a more effective conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This matters because human rights violations are not only consequences of armed conflict but can themselves function as early-warning indicators and drivers of conflict. The ACHPR’s own report on addressing Human Rights issues in conflict situations has identified monitoring and response, prevention, the mainstreaming of human rights across the conflict cycle, remedial action and institutional coordination as the areas requiring the greatest attention. Its Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups, and fact-finding and promotional missions generate a significant body of information and expertise that could strengthen the PSC’s preventive and protective action, provided that information is translated into timely political engagement rather than remaining confined within the human rights system.

The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, also depends on their ability to draw on information and perspectives from actors closest to the situations they monitor. This places civil society organisations at an important intersection between human rights monitoring and the AU’s peace and security efforts. CSOs can channel information from communities that might not otherwise reach AU institutions, contribute to early warning, document violations, support victims and survivors, facilitate dialogue, and contribute to accountability and reconciliation. The ACHPR’s Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan illustrates this value directly: its evidentiary record has drawn substantially on testimony from victims, witnesses and other stakeholders, including through direct engagement with Sudanese refugees in Chad, and its mandate, extended in May 2026, emphasised the need for independent monitoring, preservation of evidence, a victim-centred approach, accountability and civilian protection. The relevance of this channel is sharpened by deteriorating civic space in several conflict and crisis settings, which the ACHPR addressed directly in its June 2026 Resolution ACHPR/Res.663 (LXXXVII) on the Situation of Human and Peoples’ Rights Defenders in Africa, expressing concern over the criminalisation of legitimate civil society activity and calling on States to protect freedoms of association and peaceful assembly. The consultation could therefore explore how the ACHPR’s extensive networks of NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and special mechanisms might be connected more systematically to the PSC’s early-warning and conflict-prevention architecture, while ensuring that civil society actors engaged in this work are themselves protected, an approach that could strengthen the quality and timeliness of information available to the Council, particularly where official reporting is limited, contested or delayed.

The Sudan experience illustrates the potential of such cooperation in practice. The ACHPR’s Joint Fact-Finding Mission, established in 2024 and extended for a further year in May 2026, has documented serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and its May 2026 Banjul Joint Declaration with the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission stressed that a sustainable future for Sudan requires an inclusive, civilian-led political process with the meaningful participation of women, youth, civil society and communities from all regions, treating human rights findings, political process and peacebuilding as connected rather than separate tracks. A similar logic runs through the Commission’s other conflict-related work: its recent promotional mission to the DRC highlighted the continuing human rights and humanitarian consequences of conflict there, while its earlier engagement on South Sudan linked escalating violence to stalled implementation of the peace agreement. Both cases underline the value of ensuring the ACHPR’s country-level findings reach the PSC while situations remain under active consideration, rather than only after the fact, and both point toward the accountability question that the 953^rd and 1019^th sessions had already begun to address. At those sessions, the Council acknowledged the ACHPR’s contribution to transitional justice and called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, mediation and consensual transitional justice mechanisms, alongside investigation of violations and accountability for perpetrators. Tomorrow’s consultation offers an occasion to examine how that expertise can complement the PSC’s political and mediation efforts more directly, including on reparations, reconciliation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

Tomorrow’s session is also expected to centre on the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and their contribution to peace and security. The election of a new Bureau in October 2025, the adoption of the Commission’s Strategic Plan 2026 – 2028, and the subsequent adoption of the implementation, planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks by the 87th Ordinary Session, provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage early with the Bureau’s priorities and identify areas of mutual reinforcement, particularly given the breadth of the Commission’s current conflict-related work. Beyond the Sudan Fact-Finding Mission, the ACHPR has undertaken a promotional mission to the DRC, strengthened engagement with international human rights mechanisms, and, at its 87^th Ordinary Session, adopted further resolutions with direct implications for conflict prevention and civic space. As such, the presentation offers an opportunity to identify where joint planning, information sharing, and the complementary use of institutional tools could generate greater preventive impact.

The Session is also expected to follow up on previous decisions and assess how to move from six years of accumulated commitments to measurable action. Given the strength of the practical modalities agreed at the 866^th session, particular attention is likely to be given to their implementation, including undertaking joint field visits to conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, communicating PSC decisions with human rights implications to the ACHPR, and facilitating regular ACHPR briefings on the human rights dimensions of situations on the PSC agenda. This suggests that the key challenge is one of implementation rather than a lack of substantive agreement, making a review of the implementation matrix an opportunity to identify which commitments have been fulfilled, which remain outstanding, the constraints affecting implementation, and the responsibilities and timelines required to address these gaps. This is particularly important for early warning: the 866^th session requested that ‘the AU Commission and the ACHPR Secretariat propose a modality for the establishment of a coordinated early warning mechanism on human rights-related issues on the Continent between the two Organs’. The consultation could thus provide an opportunity to revisit these commitments and consider practical modalities for systematically feeding ACHPR-generated information into CEWS assessments, allowing human rights-related warning signals to inform preventive action before violations escalate.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC and ACHPR may renew their commitment to strengthened cooperation and joint action. The communiqué may identify specific roles for NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions and other civil society actors in early warning, monitoring, mediation, protection, accountability and reconciliation, while encouraging the ACHPR to draw more systematically on its civil society networks and special mechanisms, with due attention to their own protection. The Council may welcome the strategic priorities of the ACHPR’s new Bureau and encourage closer alignment between the Strategic Plan 2026-2028 and AU peace and security priorities through coordinated work planning and information-sharing. It may further underscore the importance of mainstreaming human rights standards throughout conflict prevention, management, stabilisation, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, including through the integration of ACHPR analysis into the CEWS. On implementation, the communiqué may call for an updated joint implementation matrix with clearly identified responsibilities, timelines and follow-up mechanisms covering outstanding commitments, regular information-sharing, ACHPR participation in relevant PSC sessions, joint field or assessment missions and early-warning cooperation. It may also encourage continued ACHPR advisory support on transitional justice and accountability, and underscore the importance of integrating women’s meaningful participation and prevention of conflict-related sexual violence into AU peace and security efforts, so that the consultation moves beyond reaffirming complementarity towards a partnership in which human rights information and tools are put to active use in early warning, prevention, protection and sustaining peace.

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Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)

Amani Africa — Tue, 18 Aug 2026 16:05:39 +0000

Consultative Meeting Between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)

Date | 18 August 2026

Tomorrow (19 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1362^nd Session dedicated to a Consultation between the PSC and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).

The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU, Mohamed Khaled, will deliver the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. The President of PAP, Fateh Boutbig of Algeria, is also expected to deliver a statement. This will be his first time briefing the PSC following his election to serve as president of the institution in April 2026, during the Extraordinary Session of the Seventh Legislature held at the PAP headquarters in Midrand, South Africa. He will serve for a three-year term, to 2029.

It is worth recalling that the annual engagement emanates from the decision of the 1160^th Meeting held in June 2023, which was dedicated to the annual consultative meeting between the two bodies. From the meeting, the two bodies decided to institutionalise and regularise their annual joint meeting on peace and security in Africa, to be hosted alternately between Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Midrand, South Africa. The annual consultation is grounded in two complementary legal foundations. First, the mandates of the PAP and the PSC are closely linked. According to the 2001 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, one of the PAP’s central objectives is to promote peace, security and stability. As a result, the PAP’s mandate has a component that overlaps with that of the PSC, even though the PSC retains primary responsibility for peace and security matters. Second, and more importantly, the session will also be held pursuant to Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. This provision calls for a close working relationship between the PSC and the PAP, in recognition of the complementary nature of the roles each body plays in advancing peace, security and stability across the continent.

This year’s meeting will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, building on the 1290^th meeting held in July 2025, in which it adopted the Conclusions of their Inaugural Joint Consultative meeting held on 17 and 18 July 2025 in Midrand, South Africa. In an effort to give greater structure and substance to their cooperation, the two bodies agreed on several concrete steps to strengthen their collaboration. These commitments are expected to be central to this year’s discussions, alongside an update on activities conducted since the past interaction vis-à-vis issues related to advancing peace, security and stability in Africa.

Firstly, the session comes just days after PAP’s First Ordinary Session of the Seventh Legislature and the launch of its three new Model Laws, namely: i) Model Law on Gender Equality and Equity ii) Model Law on Labour Migration and iii) Model Law on Sustainable Soil Management, established to provide voluntary legislative frameworks to guide AU Member States in developing and strengthening national laws in line with Agenda 2063. This follows a call made from the Inaugural session between PSC and PAP on the need to adopt a model law on AU Agenda 2063. In this context, Member States were ‘encouraged to adopt and integrate the agenda into their national policy frameworks and programs, including aligning national development plans with the continental framework and ensuring that the agenda’s goals and priorities are reflected in national policies and legislation.’

Secondly, the PAP and PSC Secretariats were tasked to jointly develop a draft roadmap on structured collaboration between the two organs, identifying concrete areas of cooperation and mechanisms for monitoring progress. This also included the need for experience sharing and lessons learned between the two organs on issues related to peace and security and governance, as well as capacity building in areas such as mediation and preventive diplomacy. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will give an opportunity to get an update on this particular decision, given that the draft roadmap was ‘to be presented at the next Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and PAP.’ It will provide an opportunity for the two bodies to assess the evolution of their engagement and how they can translate their complementary mandates into more regular and coordinated action. The two bodies previously called for structured and regularised engagement between them, including through the establishment of clear thematic areas of focus and fostering communication and collaboration through various mechanisms.

Relatedly, and in furtherance of a call made from the conclusions of the Inaugural meeting on ‘the need for regular engagement between the PSC and PAP though, among others, PSC Chairperson participating in PAP Sessions, the PSC Troika/PAP bureau engagement,’ the PSC Chair for July 2026, Rebecca Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, participated in a joint capacity-building training by the PAP Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance facilitated by the secretariat of the AGA-APSA Platform, to advance democratic governance in Africa.

The PSC’s relevance, in this context, extended beyond Ambassador Otengo’s participation in the capacity-building training. The Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution (CCIRCR), one of the ten Permanent Committees of PAP, during the Permanent Committee sittings held from 21-25 July 2026 in Midrand, South Africa, convened a joint sitting alongside the Permanent Committee on Justice and Human Rights. It is worth noting that pursuant to Rule 26(d) of the PAP Rules of Procedure, the CCIRCR has specific responsibility for introducing issues of peace and security in Africa for consideration of the Chamber. This July joint session focused on addressing the security crisis in Sudan, its humanitarian impact and developing recommendations for African-led intervention and civilian protection, calling for the Pan-African Parliament to consider convening a dedicated parliamentary session on Sudan to help the Parliament monitor the implementation of decisions of the AU PSC and the recommendations of the African Commission’s Fact-Finding Mission.

In its consultative/advisory role, PAP has since its earlier years sent various fact-finding missions to different conflict areas across the continent, including Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur/Sudan, Libya, Rwanda, Mauritania and Chad. These missions have produced reports used to inform recommendations, and PAP has also adopted resolutions addressing specific conflicts. Despite PAP’s mandate to forward these recommendations to relevant bodies, including the PSC, no standing mechanism exists for systematically transmitting them. For much of PAP’s history, this gap was compounded by the near-total absence of direct engagement between the two organs, particularly between 2008 and 2023. Only two interactive sessions took place under Article 18 of the PSC Protocol, in 2008 and 2012. That pattern has, however, begun to shift when the two bodies held a Joint Consultative Meeting in July 2025, and tomorrow’s session is expected to be a follow-up session to discuss a roadmap for structured collaboration. Even so, this emerging engagement has centred on institutional relations rather than on a dedicated channel for PAP’s fact-finding recommendations specifically, so it remains difficult to assert that the Parliament’s recommendations have been directly reflected in PSC decisions.

Beyond this, there are also institutional challenges that affect the effective operationalisation of the relationship. One such challenge relates to the continued non-ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to PAP (the 2014 PAP Protocol), which seeks to provide the PAP with an enhanced legislative mandate within the AU institutional framework. In its February 2026 decision, the AU Assembly requested ‘the Bureau of PAP and all PAP Members of Parliament with the support of the AUC to intensify sensitisation and outreach to Member States on the ratification of the Malabo Protocol.’ Today, around 23 Member States have signed and 15 have deposited the instrument of ratification for the 2014 PAP Protocol. It is worth noting that progress remains slow, with the Protocol still well short of the majority of 28 AU Member States required for entry into force. Drawing on PSC’s experience with other AU bodies, notably the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, it would be most effective for the proposal on operationalising Article 18 to come from PAP itself, having regard to its mandate and how that mandate can best be leveraged in implementing the objectives of the PSC Protocol.

Financing issues may also feature during the discussions. The two bodies previously called for ‘advocacy for increased AU Member State voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund, to advance African ownership and self-reliance in peace and security financing.’ In this regard, and in addition to the call for the development of a plan of action to identify concrete areas of collaboration and monitor progress, they also agreed to establish a corresponding financing plan, to support peace and security activities involving both organs.

The youth dimension, on the other hand, is also likely to be discussed. The Conclusions of the Inaugural consultations highlighted ‘the growing disillusionment among Africa’s youth, marked by unemployment, social exclusion, and political apathy [and] underlined the need for more inclusion of youth, and women in all efforts aimed at addressing the conflicts on the continent and in Africa’s development agenda.’ The previous meeting highlighted the need for ‘the PAP to champion the establishment of socio-economic programs aimed at economically empowering people, especially women, youth, children and special interest groups on the continent, including post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes.’

The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the new leadership of PAP and commend the body for its contribution to the promotion of peace, security, stability and for representing the African people in the development and integration of the Continent. The PSC is also expected to welcome updates from the PAP on the activities undertaken in relation to peace and security and to continue cooperation through the annual consultative meeting within the framework of Article 18. The session is also likely to encourage those Member States who have not yet done so to consider signing and ratifying the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU relating to the PAP. The meeting may also stress the importance of regular engagement and coordination of the two bodies’ efforts in complementing each other in addressing governance, peace and security challenges. The meeting may underline the imperative for the two organs to actively advocate for the reform of global institutions to better represent African interests and ensure more equitable global governance. Finally, the PSC may also stress the imperative of establishing a mechanism for the communication of decisions and recommendations of PAP on peace and security in order to ensure coherence and complementarity in decision-making processes.

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Libya’s latest turmoil has the hallmarks of the African Union Peace and Security Council’s diagnosis of why its transition remains stalled

Amani Africa — Fri, 14 Aug 2026 16:53:05 +0000

Libya’s latest turmoil has the hallmarks of the African Union Peace and Security Council’s diagnosis of why its transition remains stalled

Date | 14 August 2026

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Previne Habu, Researcher, Amani Africa

The news coming out of Libya during the 8-12 August 2026 highlights a peace process and a transition caught up in a vicious cycle of violence and institutional instability. There were three major incidents that together carry significant ramifications for both the country’s economic and political stability.

In eastern Libya, the explosion of a car bomb led to the assassination of Khalifa Haftar-led Libya National Army’s intelligence chief, Major General Fawzi Al-Mansouri. The death of Al-Mansouri is indicative of the fragility of the security situation in eastern Libya, where Haftar’s LNA is dominant.

This assassination took place while in western Libya the oil refinery in Zawiya was on fire. Drone attacks on a major oil refinery and power station have triggered massive fires, prompting Libya’s National Oil Corporation to declare a ‘maximum state of emergency.’ Blackouts have triggered protests in Tripoli, Zawiya, Misrata and other cities.

Firefighters battle a blaze at the Zawiya refinery in western Libya after a drone attack

Another major incident highlighting the institutional instability involved the announcement in Tripoli by Naji Issa, the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, of his resignation.

Taken together, these incidents indicate persisting strains in the peace process and transition of the country, owing to their interrelated factors aptly identified in the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council’s most recent meeting on Libya. According to the PSC’s 1351^st meeting held on 9 June 2026, one of the three major factors for the stalled peace process and transition in Libya was the institutional and political fragmentation.

Libya continues to operate on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the lead entity in the Libyan peace process and transition, has been exerting diplomatic efforts and has proposed a political roadmap aimed at helping Libyan stakeholders overcome their differences. The UN roadmap aims to facilitate the adoption of a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unify institutions under a new government; and pave the way for the holding of elections. To this end, the mission launched a structured dialogue among Libyan stakeholders in December 2025 to advance implementation of the roadmap.

But there has been little progress toward meeting the major milestones set out in the roadmap to pave the way for the unification of institutions and the holding of elections. The stalled progress for implementing the roadmap is in no small measure due to the entrenched institutional bifurcation of two rival governments.

It was in view of these that the PSC emphasised the need for ‘national cohesion’, ‘the reunification of the Libyan defence and security institutions under legitimate civilian authority’ and ‘unification of all state institutions.’ It further called on ‘all Libyan stakeholders to jettison their personal ambitions, refrain from actions and statements that could escalate tension.’

The resignation of Issa, who is seen as a referee in the dispute over oil revenues, is not only a product of this institutional and political rivalry but also may come as a setback to recent efforts to unify the national budget. For the first time in a decade, US Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, purportedly facilitated an agreement on Libya’s first unified budget, which was signed on 11 April. This was hailed as a major success in bridging differences between the Libyan political rivals. The PSC also welcomed ‘the signature, on 11 April 2026, of the agreement on a unified budget by representatives of the High Council of State (HCS) and the House of Representatives (HoR) under the auspices of the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL).’ The resignation of Issa, for reasons that he said are too sensitive to disclose, seems to suggest that the celebration of the purported unified budget came too early.

While no one claimed responsibility for it, the drone attacks that precipitated the declaration of emergency in Zawiya appear to be part of a power play. The 120,000-barrel-per-day facility has repeatedly been caught in fighting between rival armed factions. This incident also relates to the second factor that accounts for the stalling of the peace process and the transition in Libya identified by the PSC, namely what could be identified as a shadow or war economy. While it encompasses trafficking of weapons and human smuggling, central to this war economy is also the illicit oil exports.

This shadow economy continues to entrench both internal and external rivalries while deepening the country’s economic decline. The PSC’s 1351^st meeting communique pointed to this, albeit indirectly, expressing concern over the economic challenges facing Libya stemming from institutional crises and instability and calling for the establishment of ‘an accountable and transparent mechanism to manage the country’s economy.’

The third major factor identified in the PSC session was external interference and uncoordinated engagement with Libyan actors. One manifestation of potentially uncoordinated engagement reflects recent US initiatives in Libya. Although Boulos reiterated US support for UNSMIL’s ongoing efforts to advance the UN political roadmap, facilitate national elections, and promote Libyan unity, his parallel engagement with Libya’s rival political leaders generated mixed reactions. Concerns have been raised, including by some major actors, that the initiatives risk undermining the framework established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (the Skhirat Agreement), which remains the cornerstone of international efforts to support a unified and inclusive political transition in Libya.

Critics argued that any political arrangement negotiated outside established UN mechanisms could weaken the legitimacy of the UN-led process and reinforce elite-driven bargaining at the expense of broader national consensus. In meetings held in January and May 2026 of the tripartite framework of neighbouring countries of Libya involving Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, the foreign ministers of these countries emphasised their support for developing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations and rejecting all forms of foreign interference.

While the competing engagements highlight persisting challenges in coordinating interested global and regional actors, the most nefarious aspect of external involvement is the backing that different regional and external powers extend to rival political and armed entities in Libya. The PSC accordingly expressed its ‘strong rejection’ of ‘any form of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Libya’ and urged ‘all external parties to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Libya.’

Nearly thirty sessions after first taking up the Libya file in February 2011, the AU, like the UN, is still grappling with a country whose political and economic future hangs in the balance. While PSC’s 1351^st session shows that PSC’s diagnosis of the factors stalling the peace process and the transition in Libya is on mark, its prescriptions leave much to be desired. Indeed, despite the marginal progress around the signing of the AU-sponsored reconciliation charter, AU’s engagements, including PSC’s decisions, carry no significant measure that could address any of the factors entrenching and perpetuating Libya’s vicious cycle of instability.

The three incidents that took place in quick succession signify the stronghold that institutional fragmentation, the shadow economy and external interference have on the country. Libya is nowhere near the end of its stalled peace process and transition.

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Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance

Amani Africa — Thu, 13 Aug 2026 06:13:04 +0000

Consultation between the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance

Date | 13 August 2026

Tomorrow (14 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1361^st meeting, an annual consultation with the African Governance Architecture–African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA–APSA) Platform and the Permanent Representatives Committee Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).

Following the opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and PSC Chairperson for August 2026, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver introductory remarks. Presentations are also expected from Jevin Pillay Ponisamy of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Office to the AU, in his capacity as Vice Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform, on behalf of Khaled Mohamed, Chairperson of the AGA-APSA Platform, as well as from Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU and Vice Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG.

The PSC last held this joint consultation at its 1295^th meeting on 8 August 2025. It requested a comprehensive matrix of AU legal frameworks on governance, human rights, peace and security, assessing whether they remain ‘fit for purpose’, together with an action plan for their review. It also reiterated the need to operationalise the African Governance Facility and integrate governance and human-rights indicators into the PSC’s early-warning systems. This consultation seeks to strengthen synergies between the AU’s governance and human-rights mechanisms and the PSC’s early-warning and preventive responsibilities.

This year’s consultation coincides with a notable institutional shift. For 2026–2028, the PSC chairs the AGA–APSA Platform at both levels: the PSC Chairperson for the month at the political level and the Head of the PSC Secretariat at the technical level. This gives the Council a more direct opportunity to steer cooperation across governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security, and to advance an ‘AU delivery as one’ approach through aligned priorities, coordinated action and stronger follow-up. The tripartite engagement also reflects the mutually reinforcing nature of these agendas and provides a practical forum for reducing institutional silos and drawing on the comparative strengths of the participating bodies.

The consultation is expected to revolve around four closely connected areas: strengthening sustained institutional cooperation among the PSC, the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG and the AGA–APSA Platform; improving the exchange and joint analysis of information on governance, democracy, human rights, peace and security trends; identifying priorities for coordinated responses to governance-related risks; and examining governance deficits and institutional weaknesses, including gaps in accountability, inclusion, transparency and institutional effectiveness, that can contribute to conflict and instability.

In terms of institutional synergy, coordination and sustained engagement, the consultation provides an opportunity to assess how the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG can translate their complementary mandates into more regular and coordinated action. The September 2025 review of the High-Level Panel of Eminent African Experts on the Review of AU Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks found the AU’s governance, peace and security frameworks largely relevant, but constrained by limited political will, weak prioritisation, resource constraints and changing geopolitical dynamics, and called in particular for stronger AGA–APSA synergies, institutional coherence and implementation. Although the review focused primarily on AGA and APSA, its findings are relevant to the tripartite consultation because they underline the wider need for stronger coordination and follow-through across governance, human-rights and peace and security mechanisms. The consultation can therefore consider whether existing arrangements among the three bodies are sufficient to sustain cooperation and implementation beyond the annual engagement. An Amani Africa policy brief provides a complementary APSA-focused perspective, highlighting implementation deficits, institutional follow-through and the early warning–early action gap.

A related outstanding issue concerns cooperation measures requested in earlier PSC decisions and carried forward in 2025. These include joint promotional activities supporting ratification and domestication of AU shared-values instruments and closer PSC participation in AGA–APSA flagship initiatives. Subsequent engagement indicates progress, but does not establish whether the joint visits occurred or specific PSC responsibilities were assigned for flagship implementation and monitoring. The consultation may therefore seek reporting and a regular mechanism for sustaining PSC involvement.

A notable development was the AGA–APSA Platform’s first statutory technical meeting of 2026, convened from 9-10 February, which reviewed the Secretariat’s activities and work plan, the proposed flagship initiative, the Governance, Peace and Security Programme and revised Rules of Procedure. At the political meeting on 10 February, which included PSC and PRC Sub-Committee participation, Bankole Adeoye urged the Platform to accelerate implementation of its decisions and communiqués. He identified youth empowerment as the proposed flagship, called for implementation of the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy and, stressing the need to move from policy to action, stated: ‘We do have the strategy already, the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy; we just need to action it.’ While this indicates some follow-up, the PSC’s precise role in planning, implementation and monitoring remains unclear. The consultation may therefore seek clarity on political endorsement of the revised Rules of Procedure, allocation of responsibilities and the status of the Joint Roadmap, framework matrix, African Governance Facility and decision-tracking mechanism. Without consolidated reporting and clear follow-up, annual consultations risk repeating commitments while leaving previous assignments unresolved.

The consultation may focus on how the PSC, the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG can make more systematic use of governance, human-rights and electoral information for early warning and preventive action. The February 2026 Assembly decision called for stronger CEWS monitoring of electoral processes and a human-rights-based approach to early warning through Preventive Action Cells, standardised indicators and support to National Human Rights Institutions and national early-warning mechanisms. This provides an important basis for establishing clearer arrangements through which information generated across the AU governance and human rights mechanisms can inform joint analysis and timely political engagement. Amani Africa’s Special Research Reports (here and here) similarly underlined the need to strengthen prevention and place greater reliance on political and diplomatic tools. The consultation could therefore consider practical arrangements for pooling analysis across the three bodies and translating it into coordinated preventive engagement in countries facing elevated governance and conflict risks.

The AU generates substantial governance and human-rights information. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) activity report illustrates the human-rights information already available within the AU and records the Commission’s June 2025 consultation with the PSC on strengthening institutional synergies, regular information exchange and a rights-based approach across the conflict cycle. The challenge is therefore less the absence of information than ensuring that relevant information reaches preventive structures early, in an accessible and actionable form, and is linked to political follow-up. Election-related risks provide an entry point. The February 2026 Assembly Decision encouraged early deployment of technical teams and Heads of Mission during the pre-election phase and stronger CEWS monitoring of electoral processes, while the ACHPR’s 2026 resolution on elections calls for adherence to relevant human-rights obligations ‘before, during and after the electoral process,’ including protections relating to political participation, freedom of expression and assembly, electoral-body independence and election-related violations. Joint pre-election risk assessments could therefore link electoral expertise with human-rights monitoring, governance analysis and preventive diplomacy, shifting attention beyond election-day observation to restrictions on political competition, institutional distrust, inflammatory mobilisation, contested constitutional changes and unimplemented recommendations.

The fifth joint PSC–APRM retreat, held in Burayu on 29 and 30 April 2026, offers a practical model. Its Joint Declaration called for regular interaction among the PSC, the African Peer Review (APR) Panel of Eminent Persons, Panel of the Wise, WiseYouth, FemWise and AGA–APSA Platform, and for ‘institutionalising data and information sharing’ so that APRM country findings feed systematically into APSA early warning and mediation planning. At its 1349^th meeting on 21 May, the PSC welcomed the APRM’s development of an early-warning system dedicated to governance and ongoing work to include it in the continental risk-and-threat matrix, while urging Member States to integrate APRM assessments into CEWS and establish national structures able to ‘translate early warnings into immediate preventive actions.’ Building on these developments, the consultation could identify practical arrangements for pooling information, conducting joint assessments and establishing clear pathways for political follow-up. The consultation could also consider how the findings and recommendations of the Africa Governance Report can secure political uptake and follow-up by Member States, particularly where governance assessments identify vulnerabilities with implications for peace and security.

Such arrangements could also strengthen coordinated responses to governance-related risks beyond elections. Joint assessment could extend to countries facing elevated risks from political transitions, constitutional disputes, emerging transnational and geopolitical risks, including external interference, institutional breakdown or severe deterioration in civic space. Bringing the PSC’s political authority, the AGA-APSA Platform’s coordination role and the Sub-Committee’s Member State engagement to enable earlier and more coherent preventive diplomacy. A similarly integrated approach could inform post-conflict reconstruction, consistent with the revised AU PCRD Policy, by linking governance, human-rights, institutional-reform and rule-of-law priorities to efforts to prevent relapse into conflict.

The youth dimension should likewise be connected more directly to governance and prevention. The AGA-APSA statutory meetings have identified youth empowerment as a flagship priority, while preparations for the Africa Governance Report 2027, under the theme ‘Youth in Governance: From Promise to Prosperity,’ provide a further opportunity to link youth participation to governance and preventive processes. The Citizens’ Engagement Strategy 2025–2030 provides a complementary framework for broadening citizen participation in AU processes. The consultation could therefore encourage country-level, time-bound implementation of the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy and stronger involvement of women, youth, civil society and marginalised communities in governance assessments and preventive initiatives.

Finally, the consultation may consider how existing AU norms and mechanisms can be used more consistently to address governance deficits and structural drivers of instability. The February 2026 Assembly decision recognised ‘governance deficits, human rights violations’ among the structural drivers of unconstitutional changes of government. The comprehensive matrix requested in 2025 could help identify outstanding ratifications, domestication and reporting gaps, overlapping mandates, implementation deficits and areas requiring normative review. The decision also placed the proposed 2028 AU Theme of the Year on human rights, democracy and governance within this broader agenda. The joint consultation can therefore provide the opportunity not only to improve information exchange, but to connect information to joint analysis, early political engagement and sustained follow-up on governance and human rights commitments.

The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC may reaffirm the importance of strengthening the linkages between governance, human rights, democracy, peace and security, while supporting the continued institutionalisation and strengthening of its annual engagement with the AGA–APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG. It may call for deeper collaboration beyond the annual consultation through concrete joint actions that strengthen conflict prevention, democratic governance and sustainable peace, consistent with a stronger ‘One AU Approach’. The Council may also encourage more systematic information-sharing and joint analysis of governance, democracy, human rights, peace and security trends, and agree on priority recommendations and coordinated responses to emerging governance challenges and risks. The PSC may reiterate the call on Member States that have not yet done so to ratify the ACDEG and other AU Shared Values instruments, while urging States Parties to strengthen implementation and meet applicable reporting obligations. It may also encourage mobilisation of political, institutional, technical and financial support for preparations related to the proposed 2028 AU Theme of the Year and associated flagship initiatives, including support from AU organs and institutions, Member States, RECs/RMs and partners, as well as measures to strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of the AGA–APSA Secretariat.

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Revitalising African Union’s role in Peace and Security in Africa: Insights and Lessons from AU’s Ad Hoc Mechanisms for Peace

Amani Africa — Wed, 12 Aug 2026 09:42:04 +0000

Revitalising African Union’s role in Peace and Security in Africa: Insights and Lessons from AU’s Ad Hoc Mechanisms for Peace

Date | 12 August 2026

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, the African continent has witnessed a rise in both the number and geographic spread of conflicts. Alarmingly, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—established under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to provide the African Union (AU) with normative instruments and institutional mechanisms for promoting and maintaining peace, security, and stability—has increasingly struggled to respond effectively to the continent’s growing security challenges. Recent conflicts in Libya, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo–Rwanda, and tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia underscore the AU’s waning agency in addressing these crises, with external actors often stepping in. The erosion of multilateralism, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, and increasing foreign involvement in African peace and security affairs demand that the AU urgently recalibrate and strengthen its peace and security framework.

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Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation

Sisay Shifferaw — Tue, 11 Aug 2026 08:38:10 +0000

Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalisation

Date | 11 August 2026

Tomorrow (12 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene to deliberate on the theme ‘Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap: Revitalization’.

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for August. Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, is expected to deliver a briefing on the agenda item.

It is to be recalled that to translate the vision into practical steps, the Peace and Security Council developed the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, which was adopted by the 29^th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2017. The Lusaka Master Roadmap (2016) provided a framework for addressing the root causes of conflict, focusing on five interlinked areas: political governance, economic development, societal cohesion, environmental sustainability and peace and security. The roadmap emphasises strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, advancing post-conflict reconstruction, addressing governance and economic drivers of conflict, fostering democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the proliferation of illicit arms.

The lack of adequate progress to achieve the 2020 timeline led the AU Assembly, at its 14th Extraordinary Session in December 2020, to extend the implementation timeline to 2030 and to review the initiative’s implementation every two years. Subsequently, a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism to strengthen implementation and accountability was developed in 2021. It is expected that tomorrow’s deliberation may also include how to approach the 2030 deadline in view of the persistent challenges to peace and security.

The last time the PSC held a session on STGs was at its 1252^nd meeting of 18 December 2024. Recognising the need for an assessment of the state of implementation of the STGs as the 2030 deadline fast approaches and in view of the worsening state of peace and security on the continent, the key aspect of the outcome of the session was the call on the AU Commission to convene a high-level reflection or strategic review of the STGs. Subsequently, the AU Commission convened in June 2025 a Mid-Term Strategic Evaluation of the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns by the Year 2030.

Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to follow up on the previous session of the PSC, including on its request for regular briefing from the AU High Representative at least every two years, and take stock of where the implementation of the Silencing the Guns (STG) initiative stands.

As the continent passed the midpoint of the extended 2030 timeline, the question before the PSC is therefore no longer simply whether progress has been made, but why the trajectory of Africa’s peace and security landscape remains so starkly at odds with the 2030 ambition, where implementation is falling short, and what needs to change to reverse that trajectory.

This question is particularly consequential for the ongoing review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), since the experience of STG provides a practical test of APSA’s capacity to translate its norms, institutions and tools into effective conflict prevention, timely response, sustained peace processes and peace consolidation. With the Extraordinary AU Summit on strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms scheduled to convene in Luanda later this month, the session also offers a timely opportunity to connect the STG assessment to the broader APSA review and to shape the Summit’s deliberations around concrete, measurable and time-bound measures to address the implementation gaps. In this sense, the session is expected to seek not another declaratory recommitment to the STG roadmap, but a clearer determination of what must change in the approach and posture of the continent’s peace and security architecture towards the peace and security situation on the continent and how those changes can be translated into delivery during the remaining period to 2030.

Amani Africa’s assessment of the first decade of STG (2013 – 2023) established that the gap between the initiative’s ambition and the realities on the ground had widened considerably. The number of conflict situations on the PSC agenda increased nearly threefold between 2013 and 2023, while the number of internally displaced persons and refugees tripled. The updated data suggests that this deterioration remains largely unchanged.

Figure 1: No. of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC (Source: own data collected from PSC activities)

This increase in the number and geographic spread of conflicts is also notable in the increase in the number of situations on the agenda of the PSC, whose proliferation is in part attributable to the unprecedented surge in military coups.

According to the data from different conflict data sets, the most notable trend is the sharp increase in recorded conflict events, rising from 1,671 in 2013 to 6,124 in 2025. Although annual variations exist, the overall trajectory has been consistently upward, particularly after 2019. The nature of conflict has also evolved from concentrated hotspots to a more dispersed continental security challenge. While traditional conflict theatres such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic remain major centres of violence, new areas of instability have emerged. The Sahel represents the clearest example, with Burkina Faso experiencing a dramatic escalation from 2 (two) recorded conflict events in 2016 to 657 in 2025. The spread of insecurity into coastal West Africa, including Benin, as well as emerging concerns in countries such as Togo and Tanzania, demonstrates the expanding geographic reach of armed groups and regional insecurity.

Figure 2: Number of conflict events in Africa (2013 -2025) (Source: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organised violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046)

When disaggregating the data by conflict type, the surge is concentrated in just two categories rather than evenly spread. State‑based conflict nearly quadrupled between 2013 and 2025 (906 to 3,573, now 58% of all events), and one‑sided violence against civilians more than tripled (536 to 1,840). By contrast, non‑state conflict (588 to 733) and internationalised conflict rose only modestly. Sudan’s civil war, which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, exemplifies both drivers and accounts for much of the sharp 2023–2025 escalation. The RSF’s 2024–2025 siege and October 2025 capture of El Fasher, where UN investigators documented mass executions, sexual violence, and thousands of civilian deaths, provides a direct real‑world instance of the one-sided violence spike. The Sahel reflects a similar dual dynamic: JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province simultaneously battle state militaries (state‑based) and massacre civilians in contested villages (one‑sided violence). Additional weight comes from the M23 resurgence in the DRC since 2022 and Ethiopia’s 2020–2022 Tigray war, both adding to the state‑based conflict totals in this period.

Figure 3: Number of conflict events by conflict types (2013 – 2015), (Source: Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg, Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests, Journal of Peace Research, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopres/xjag046)

The humanitarian impact, captured in the graph below, is the direct result of the substantial increase in the incidence, intensity and geographic spread of armed violence, while also particularly affected by the dynamics of specific conflicts.

Figure 4: Number of Refugees and IDPs in Africa Between 2010 – 2025 (Source: UNHCR Global Trends; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

Measured against the pillars of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, the data reveals a widening gap between the ambition of the STGs agenda and the conditions required for its realisation. By AU’s own admission, some of the limited progress achieved is a far cry from the lofty goals and objectives set out in the AU Master Roadmap and the scale of peace and security challenges. Parts of the continent remain mired in conflict, and new challenges to peace and security have proliferated.

The growing number and geographic spread of conflicts are linked to the increased involvement of terrorist and violent extremist groups, deteriorating political governance, the persistence and expansion of armed conflicts, the fragility of peace agreements, and the continued proliferation of arms. These trends show that the challenge extends beyond the failure to end individual conflicts.

Closing this structural gap requires not only addressing the root causes of conflict but also ensuring that early‑warning systems are translated into timely political action. Early warning remains vital, but the persistent gap between warning and political action points to the need to operationalise the Roadmap by making early-warning outputs more systematically actionable. In this regard, the PSC has in its recent sessions emphasised the centrality of early responses to early warning in enhancing its conflict prevention mandate. It is therefore expected that the PSC, building on its 1247^th, 1298^th session, and 1320^th session, will follow up on progress in the operationalisation of its decisions, particularly the dynamic risk-mapping tool and regular horizon-scanning briefings by AUCTC, CISSA and AFRIPOL.

Furthermore, the PSC may also use the opportunity to examine how to ensure that CEWS analysis products directly inform its agenda-setting and decisions, including through regular confidential briefings, periodic horizon-scanning sessions, and by improving AU–REC/RMs information-sharing, while giving greater attention to emerging threats such as digital radicalisation and illicit financial flows that increasingly underpin the evolution and cross-border expansion of conflicts. The central issue for follow-up is therefore how to ensure that early-warning information consistently triggers timely political decisions and preventive action, rather than being repeatedly generated without corresponding response.

These experiences suggest that the challenge for the AU is not simply to expand mediation efforts, but to develop conflict-specific strategies that combine sustained political engagement with security, humanitarian, development and peacebuilding instruments. They also reinforce the importance of African agency and institutional coherence, while external engagement can provide important diplomatic leverage and resources; fragmented mediation can dilute African ownership and create parallel processes. Strengthening AU–RECs/RMs coordination, clarifying the respective roles of regional and continental actors, and ensuring that external engagement complements rather than substitutes African-led processes will therefore be essential to making mediation and preventive diplomacy more effective in the changing conflict landscape.

The experience of the past thirteen years also demonstrates that ending active hostilities does not necessarily amount to silencing the guns. The lesson is that peace agreements should not be treated as the endpoint of conflict resolution. They are the beginning of a longer process of transforming the political, security and socioeconomic conditions that produced conflict in the first place.

This also points to a weakness in the way success in peace processes is often measured. A more meaningful measure of progress would examine whether peace agreements are being implemented, whether political institutions are becoming more inclusive, whether displaced populations can return safely, whether former combatants are effectively reintegrated, whether communities experience improved security and whether institutions are capable of resolving grievances without violence. Amani Africa’s earlier work on PCRD has highlighted the importance of linking security, political governance, humanitarian assistance, socioeconomic reconstruction, justice and reconciliation, and women and youth in sustaining peace. The challenge for the PSC is therefore to strengthen the connection between mediation and post-conflict support, ensuring that the political attention and resources mobilised to secure peace agreements are sustained during implementation.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC will underscore the need for a revitalised and more effective implementation of the Silencing the Guns Master Roadmap, taking into account the prevailing peace and security situation on the continent. The PSC may emphasise the importance of identifying and addressing the political, institutional and operational gaps that have impeded the implementation of the Roadmap, including the persistent gap between early warning and early action. It may call for strengthening the AU’s preventive diplomacy and mediation capacities and adapting approaches to conflict prevention and resolution to the evolving nature of armed conflicts, while enhancing coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs and reinforcing African ownership of peace processes. In view of the widening gap between the STG ambition and developments on the ground, the PSC may call for concrete, measurable and time-bound measures to accelerate implementation during the remaining period to 2030, including more systematic follow-up and accountability for the implementation of STG commitments. The PSC may also decide that a quarterly ministerial-level meeting dedicated to the adoption of measures specific to various conflict situations and constant review and, as necessary, updating of implementation of such measures in order to push significant progress by 2030. The PSC may also consider more concrete and measurable targets to register tangible progress by 2030 and request a report for making a determination on how to adapt and continue the agenda beyond 2030.

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