INTRODUCTION

Against the background of the persistence and escalation of threats to physical & social security of women and girls amid escalating and persisting conflicts, shrinking civic space, and the marginalisation of women from peace processes in various settings on the continent, this special research report examines the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) fifteen-year engagement with the WPS agenda, assessing both progress achieved and enduring gaps. It situates PSC deliberations within Africa’s evolving conflict dynamics and evaluates the extent to which normative advances have translated into operational impact across conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations, and accountability mechanisms. The report argues that renewed political will, institutional coherence, and sustained resourcing are essential to ensure that the WPS agenda functions not only as a set of principles, but as a strategic tool for addressing Africa’s contemporary peace and security challenges.

Tomorrow (6 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1345^th session on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).

In 2019, during its 845^th session, the Council decided to institutionalise an annual session on TOC as a standing agenda item. Beyond dedicated sessions, the Council has repeatedly expressed concern over TOC in conflict-specific and thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and small arms proliferation, and has acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism.

The last time the Council convened on this issue was at its 1279^th meeting, held on 14 May 2025, under the theme ‘Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.’ Unlike that meeting, tomorrow’s session is not region-specific, offering an opportunity to consider the trends and developments at a continental level and to follow up on key outcomes of the 1279^th session.

The Global Organised Crime Index 2025 provides an important evidence base on recent developments and trends relating to TOC. Its Africa-specific findings show steady growth in criminal markets and actors since 2019, with financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, counterfeit goods and arms trafficking among the most pervasive TOC markets on the continent. It also highlights regional diversity: human trafficking, arms trafficking and human smuggling in East Africa; financial crimes and cannabis trade, along with human trafficking in North Africa; non-renewable resource crimes in Central Africa; cocaine trafficking in West Africa; and wildlife crime in Southern Africa. This calls for tailored and regionally grounded responses.

A central issue for the PSC is that TOC is no longer merely a law-enforcement concern, but a structural peace and security threat that erodes sovereignty, weakens institutions, fuels corruption, sustains conflict economies and creates structures that undermine legitimate sources of authority. In various conflict settings from the Sahel, Sudan, Somalia and Great Lakes, terrorist armed groups, insurgents, and militias increasingly intersect with and draw on TOC networks and markets. In the Sahel, terrorist groups and criminal groups draw revenue from illegal gold mining, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping, fuel smuggling and drug trafficking, while exploiting livelihood vulnerabilities in a region where informal work and artisanal mining sustain millions. Similar dynamics affect the Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, Libya, Somalia, North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The PSC may therefore stress a multidimensional response to TOC that goes beyond criminal justice, combining borderland development, legitimate governance, service delivery, law enforcement and community resilience, including livelihood support.

The link between TOC and illicit arms flows is another major concern. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, described small arms proliferation as ‘a cancer’ driving instability across the continent, from the Sahel to the Great Lakes. In West Africa alone, around 12 million illicit arms are circulating, used by terrorist groups, vigilantes, self-defence groups, bandits and civilians who feel abandoned by the state. Their proliferation transforms local disputes into deadly conflict. Counter-TOC relating to illicit arms flows should therefore be linked to efforts at curbing SLW stockpile management, arms tracing, diversion control, and disarmament initiatives.

These include the call for an AFRIPOL-anchored continental criminal intelligence mechanism, criminal corridor mapping and tailored responses to criminal flows. It further requested the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on TOC, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations, and to present the study to the PSC.

It is of interest to the PSC that the networks and corridors of TOC are mapped to inform targeted response. In this respect, several criminal corridors have been identified. These include: the Lagos–Kano–Agadez–Tripoli route for migrant smuggling and Tramadol trafficking; the Bamako–Gao–Tamanrasset route for arms and fuel trafficking; the Dakar–Ziguinchor–Bissau route for cocaine from Latin America, the Diffa–Lake Chad–Maiduguri route linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) logistics, and the Port Sudan–Khartoum–Bangui corridor for arms trafficking. The Global Initiative-TOC Risk Bulletin on arms trafficking routes in Mali shows that disrupted routes pushed traffickers and armed groups to seek alternative routes and weapons sources. The Illicit Hub Mapping in West Africa 2025 report maps 350 illicit hubs across 18 countries and identifies five accelerant markets: kidnapping, cattle rustling, illicit arms, illicit gold and extortion/protection racketeering. The tracing and operation of these various routes highlights the importance of following up on one of the outcomes of the last PSC session on TOC. It is to be recalled that the PSC tasked the AU Commission to coordinate AFRIPOL and others in ‘developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’

Corruption and state-embedded criminality are also central to the discussion. TOC often thrives where institutions are weak, compromised or penetrated by criminal interests, enabling illicit networks to evade accountability, influence decision-making and undermine the rule of law. As Global Initiative-TOC’s analysis of the role of state actors and armed groups in the conflict in Eastern DRC shows, conflicts can become structurally criminalised where armed actors and state-linked networks benefit from illicit resource extraction. African strategies should therefore treat anti-corruption, institutional resilience, financial investigation, asset recovery, judicial cooperation and public integrity as core peace and security tools, integrating them into conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding, stabilisation, security sector reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

Given the transnational character of TOC, border governance remains a major issue. Borderlands are often areas of weak state presence, but also livelihood spaces where communities depend on cross-border trade, pastoral mobility, family networks and informal markets. Criminal networks exploit these same routes. The Niamey Convention remains relevant not only for border security but also for local development, cross-border governance and conflict prevention.

The session may also benefit from considering emerging and non-traditional forms of TOC, which are increasingly shaped by new technology and artificial intelligence (AI). African strategies should therefore address conventional trafficking alongside cybercrime, AI-enabled fraud, online exploitation, digital finance, crypto-enabled laundering and the criminal use of logistics and technology platforms, consistent with the 1279^th session’s concern over the co-option of new technologies by criminal actors.

Institutionally, addressing the transnational dimension of organised crime requires leveraging the role of AFRIPOL, CISSA and AUCTC. The 1320^th meeting on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Security Outlook adds an operational layer by calling for AUCTC–CISSA–AFRIPOL horizon-scanning briefings, a dynamic risk-mapping tool, stronger cyber and digital-threat monitoring, and a continental working group on illicit financing, including hawala/mobile-money networks used by extremist groups.

Another policy area concerns peace operations. Recent work on TOC and peacekeeping and TOC and UN peace operations underlines that organised crime can undermine peace operations by financing armed groups, distorting local economies and weakening political settlements. AU-led and AU-authorised missions, therefore, need a stronger analytical capacity to understand criminal economies without being transformed into anti-crime agencies.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the growing threat of TOC in Africa and its linkages with terrorism, illicit arms flows, corruption, illicit financial flows, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, illegal mining, cybercrime and environmental crime. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional African strategy that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. It may call for targeted enforcement, financial investigations, criminal justice cooperation, border governance, anti-corruption measures, livelihood alternatives, legitimate local governance, service delivery and community resilience as critical measures to address the underlying factors that make TOC possible. The PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention, improved weapons management, joint border management and strengthened coordination of police, intelligence, customs, border-control, financial intelligence and judicial institutions. It may further urge Member States to domesticate and implement relevant continental and international instruments, combat money laundering and illicit financial flows. The Council may also call for the AU Commission to present a comprehensive report on trends in TOC in Africa, including criminal corridors, sources of financing, links with armed actors and impacts on local populations. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole-of-AU system approach, emphasising coordination among AFRIPOL, CISSA, AUCTC, the AU Border Programme, the African Governance Architecture, the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), the PCRD Centre, the African Development Bank and RECs/RMs.

Tomorrow (04 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1344^th session to consider the impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions.

The session will open with remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are also expected from Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE); Mamadou Tangara, High Representative and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Mali/Sahel; and Marie Jose Samba Ovono Obono, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Chad. Representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are also expected to deliver statements.

The climate, peace and security agenda has been a standing item on the PSC’s programme since its 585^th session in March 2016, when the Council committed to annual deliberations on the nexus between climate change and security. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding two sessions annually on the theme—amounting to over 18 sessions to date—reflecting the growing prominence of the issue. While previous deliberations have referenced the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel within broader discussions, the upcoming session appears to be the first dedicated engagement focused specifically on these regions.

The crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel unfolds within a complex socio-ecological system in which environmental stress, livelihoods, demographic pressures, governance deficits, and insecurity interact in mutually reinforcing ways. In line with the PSC’s consistent framing, climate change operates as a ‘threat multiplier,’ exacerbating existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as a direct cause of conflict. As underscored in its 1301^st session in September 2025, climate change is a ‘risk multiplier’ that aggravates vulnerabilities, heightens insecurity, and undermines livelihoods, thereby exacerbating existing conflicts and creating new security challenges or social, economic, and environmental factors that can lead to food insecurity, forced migration, conflict and economic disruption through extreme weather events like droughts and floods.

In the context of the Lake Chad Basin, as highlighted in the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for Boko Haram-affected areas, the shrinkage of Lake Chad is often attributed to climate change and desertification, with associated livelihood losses sometimes linked to increased vulnerability to violent extremism. The lake’s surface area declined dramatically from 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to about 1,300 km² in the 1980s—a reduction of nearly 90 per cent. Today, it fluctuates between 8,000 and 14,000 km² depending on rainfall patterns. However, the environmental reality is more complex. Communities around the lake have historically adapted to cyclical flooding and fluctuating water levels, developing resilient livelihood strategies over generations. In recent years, however, more frequent and intense flooding, combined with long-term environmental changes, has placed a growing strain on these adaptive capacities. This pressure is compounded by rapid population growth, which has significantly increased competition over limited and variable natural resources. At the same time, ongoing conflict has further degraded environmental conditions by disrupting agricultural systems, destroying infrastructure, and eroding local knowledge. These intersecting pressures—climate variability, demographic change, and insecurity—have reinforced longstanding marginalisation and underdevelopment, creating conditions in which radical narratives and armed groups persist.

The Sahel is among the regions most vulnerable to climate change globally. Temperatures are rising about 1.5 times faster than the global average, with projections indicating an increase of at least 2°C by 2040. This has profound implications for populations whose livelihoods depend heavily on climate-sensitive sectors, with 60 to 80 percent engaged in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing. According to the African Climate Risk Assessment, climate-related security risks in the Sahel stem from the interaction of environmental stress and structural fragility. Livelihood insecurity is central, as dependence on climate-sensitive sectors like farming and pastoralism makes land and water disputes a flashpoint for conflict. Armed groups exploit weakened state presence and economic hardship to recruit, while coping strategies such as charcoal production and artisanal mining worsen deforestation and finance insurgency. Migration, once an adaptation tool, now often fuels displacement, resource competition, and trafficking. Notably, in the Lake Chad Basin, instability is driven less by absolute resource decline than by environmental variability.

Governance and institutional capacity remain central to the climate–security nexus. The PSC has consistently underscored that climate stress translates into insecurity primarily in contexts where state institutions are weak, absent, or unable to manage competing demands over scarce resources. In such settings, limited capacity to regulate resource use, mediate disputes, and deliver basic services allows localised tensions to escalate into broader violence. Armed groups have proven adept at exploiting these conditions. Across both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, extremist organisations have embedded themselves within local socio-economic systems, leveraging grievances linked to marginalisation, livelihood loss, and state neglect. Climate-induced economic hardship expands the pool of individuals vulnerable to recruitment, while weak governance enables these groups to operate with relative freedom and, in some cases, to position themselves as alternative providers of order and livelihoods. As noted during the PSC’s 1301st session, inadequate adaptation systems can transform climate shocks into insecurity, whereas effective governance can channel similar pressures into cooperation.

This governance challenge is compounded by limitations in existing early warning systems, which remain largely reactive and insufficiently equipped to integrate climate indicators such as rainfall variability, drought cycles, and water stress. The PSC’s 1114^th session of 18 October 2022 emphasised the need to incorporate such indicators into early warning frameworks, thereby linking environmental stress more directly to peace and security responses. At the same time, structural constraints—including limited access to climate finance, technological gaps, and broader global inequalities—continue to restrict the capacity of countries in these regions to respond effectively to climate-related risks.

Mobility adds further complexity to this landscape. Movement in search of water, pasture, and economic opportunity has long been a defining feature of communities in the regions and a key adaptation mechanism to environmental variability. However, the scale and patterns of mobility have shifted in recent years. Poorly regulated cross-border movements have contributed to localised clashes between farmers and herders, particularly in resource-scarce areas, illustrating how climate-induced mobility, absent cooperative governance, can undermine stability. Large-scale displacement driven by both conflict and climate shocks has also placed considerable pressure on host communities, especially in urban and peri-urban areas with limited infrastructure and services. At the same time, restrictions on movement, whether due to insecurity or policy measures, can undermine traditional coping strategies and exacerbate vulnerability. Mobility thus presents a paradox: it remains essential for resilience, yet, when poorly managed, can become a source of tension.

These dynamics are further reinforced by feedback loops between climate stress and conflict. Insecurity disrupts agricultural production, limits access to land, and damages critical infrastructure, thereby weakening the capacity of communities to cope with environmental shocks. In turn, climate stress deepens poverty, displacement, and governance fragility—conditions that sustain and intensify conflict. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle in which environmental degradation and insecurity mutually exacerbate one another, making stabilisation through conventional security responses alone increasingly difficult.

The AU has established important normative frameworks to address this nexus, including the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032), the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, and the draft Common African Position on climate, peace and security. At the regional level, the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for the Lake Chad Basin provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the multidimensional nature of the crisis. For the Sahel, the Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance and Development, led by former Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou and jointly launched by the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel in September 2022, provided a strategic assessment of the region’s underlying challenges, including climate change. The report was discussed during the 8th AU–UN annual conference in October 2024, but its uptake within AU processes and practical relevance as a policy framework remains unclear.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, particularly in Mali, and may highlight the role of climate change in amplifying existing vulnerabilities. It may also underscore the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) as a robust framework for addressing the multidimensional challenges facing the Lake Chad Basin, and stress the need to mobilise adequate support for its effective implementation. The PSC may further reiterate the importance of integrating climate indicators into early warning systems to strengthen risk analysis and enable timely preventive action. Echoing the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, it may emphasise the need for greater horizontal integration between climate and weather-related early warning systems and conflict early warning mechanisms, as well as stronger vertical coordination across continental, regional, national, and local levels. Recognising the transboundary nature of climate-induced mobility and resource competition, the PSC may call for enhanced collaboration among Member States, regional mechanisms, and relevant climate institutions, including the Sahel Climate Commission. In addition, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening governance and state presence, including improving service delivery and rebuilding trust between states and communities, as essential conditions for preventing climate pressures from translating into conflict. Finally, the PSC may underline the importance of adequate and equitable access to climate finance, which requires increased international support and strengthened African-led financing mechanisms, including the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Climate Change, as decided at its 984th session.