Tefesehet Hailu, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

On 1 June 2026, leaders and naval representatives from six Gulf of Guinea states gathered in Lagos, Nigeria, for the ceremonial flag-off of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF), marking a historic milestone in Africa’s efforts to develop a standing, ready-to-deploy maritime security capability. The six Gulf of Guinea countries that pioneered the task force are Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

Coming only weeks after the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) considered the operationalisation of the CMTF at its 1346^th session on 15 May 2026, the ceremony represented the most tangible manifestation yet of a process that began with the PSC’s call for a maritime task force in 2021. The flag-off not only signalled the transition of the CMTF from a conceptual framework into an operational mechanism, but also reflected growing continental recognition that maritime security has become an indispensable pillar of Africa’s peace, security, trade, and development agenda. The ceremony further underscored Nigeria’s leadership role in advancing regional maritime security and aligned with broader efforts under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s Renewed Hope Agenda to strengthen maritime governance and security cooperation across the Gulf of Guinea.

A central focus of the PSC’s deliberations was the assessment of progress toward operationalising the CMTF as Africa’s first standing and ready-to-deploy maritime force. The Council welcomed a series of developments that have steadily transformed the initiative from a political aspiration into an emerging operational reality. These included the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by ten Gulf of Guinea countries, the endorsement by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government of Nigeria’s offer to host the headquarters, and Nigeria’s commitment to provide key operational assets, including three ships, one helicopter, eight vehicles, and temporary headquarters facilities in Lagos.

The subsequent flag-off ceremony on 1 June provided visible evidence that the CMTF has entered a new phase of development. While largely symbolic, the ceremony demonstrated that participating states are increasingly prepared to move beyond declarations of intent toward practical implementation. Viewed within the broader trajectory of PSC engagement on maritime security, the ceremony represents the culmination of a gradual institutional evolution: from the Council’s initial call for a Maritime Task Force during its 1012^th session in 2021, through the formal endorsement of the CMTF in 2025, to the operational readiness milestones recorded in 2026. The challenge now will be ensuring that the momentum generated by the flag-off translates into sustained operational capability, regular deployments, and measurable improvements in maritime security outcomes.

Although piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea have declined significantly in recent years, the PSC correctly recognised that the region’s maritime security challenges have become increasingly diverse and complex. The reduction in piracy should not obscure the persistence of other forms of maritime criminality that continue to undermine regional stability and economic development. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, oil theft, trafficking in narcotics and arms, maritime-linked organised crime, and environmental crimes have emerged as some of the most significant threats confronting the region.

Particularly noteworthy is the growing recognition of the linkages between maritime insecurity and broader regional instability. Criminal networks increasingly operate across maritime and terrestrial domains, connecting illicit economies in the Gulf of Guinea with conflict dynamics in the Sahel. The southward expansion of violent extremist groups into northern areas of coastal states such as Benin, Togo, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire has further blurred traditional distinctions between maritime and inland security threats. This evolving threat landscape reinforces the rationale for the CMTF not merely as a counter-piracy mechanism, but as a broader instrument to address transnational maritime threats that increasingly intersect with regional peace and security challenges.

The PSC’s discussions also reflected a growing appreciation that maritime security is not solely a security concern but a strategic development imperative. The Gulf of Guinea remains one of Africa’s most important maritime regions, facilitating the overwhelming majority of international trade for West and Central African coastal states while serving as a critical source of energy exports and marine resources. The Council’s emphasis on the relationship between maritime security, the Blue Economy, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), and the Lomé Charter illustrates a more integrated understanding of maritime governance within continental development priorities.

Beyond its regional significance, the CMTF may also represent an important test case for strengthening the maritime dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF). As the AU continues to seek practical mechanisms for enhancing operational readiness, interoperability, and rapid deployment capabilities, the CMTF could provide valuable lessons for future maritime operations under the African Peace and Security Architecture. In this regard, the initiative’s success or failure will have implications that extend far beyond the Gulf of Guinea.

Despite the positive developments celebrated during the Lagos flag-off ceremony, questions surrounding sustainability remain largely unresolved. The communiqué reiterated the need for predictable financing, equitable burden-sharing, and collective ownership, yet stopped short of identifying concrete funding arrangements or operational cost-sharing mechanisms. This omission is particularly significant given that inadequate resources and inconsistent political commitment were identified within the CMTF’s own CONOPS as key factors limiting the effectiveness of existing maritime security arrangements under the Yaoundé Architecture.

The heavy reliance on Nigeria’s political leadership, naval assets, and logistical support demonstrates commendable regional leadership while also highlighting a structural vulnerability. Unless broader contributions are secured from participating states, there is a risk that the CMTF could become overly dependent on a single state’s capabilities. The true measure of success following the flag-off ceremony will therefore not be the symbolism of the launch itself, but rather whether participating states translate their political commitments into sustainable financial contributions, force-generation commitments, and operational participation. Without such collective ownership, the CMTF risks replicating many of the same institutional and resource constraints that have historically limited regional maritime security initiatives.

In a nutshell, the flag-off of the CMTF in Lagos on 1 June 2026 represents a landmark achievement for African-led maritime security cooperation. It also demonstrates the growing political commitment among Gulf of Guinea states to address maritime insecurity collectively. Yet the ceremony should be viewed as the beginning rather than the culmination of the process. The ultimate test of the CMTF will lie not in its establishment but in its sustainability, operational effectiveness, and ability to generate measurable security outcomes. Success will require predictable financing, equitable burden-sharing, robust coordination with the Yaoundé Architecture, harmonised legal frameworks, and continued political support from AU member states. If these challenges are addressed, the CMTF has the potential not only to strengthen security in the Gulf of Guinea but also to serve as a model for future AU-led maritime operational mechanisms and contribute to the development of the maritime dimension of the African Standby Force. If not, the Task Force risks becoming another ambitious institutional initiative that struggles to move beyond symbolic significance.

Abdul Mohammed

Africa and the African Union (AU) have rich mediation experiences from the post-election crisis in Kenya (2007/2008) to the civil war in Darfur, Sudan to draw from for restoring the peacemaking and mediation leadership that the AU lost. The release of the book titled The Sudans by Alex de Waal and Willow Berridge providing the most comprehensive and detailed data and analysis on one of AU’s most sustained and impactful mediation process.

There are moments in history when institutions are not merely bureaucratic creations but expressions of political conviction. The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) was born in such a moment.

To understand the significance of the AUHIP experience—and why its lessons matter urgently today—it is necessary to recall the Africa that gave rise to it.

The AUHIP emerged at the zenith of a remarkable era in which the continent’s organizations were invigorated: the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, the emergence of New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the construction of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Across Africa, leaders, intellectuals, diplomats, liberation veterans, civic formations, and policy thinkers were engaged in profound reflection on Pan-Africanism and African agency in a changing world.

This was not merely institutional reform. It was an attempt to redefine Africa’s political Destiny and agency.

New norms and principles were adopted. The Peace and Security Council was established. Mediation became a strategic political instrument rather than an ad hoc diplomatic exercise. The ‘primacy of politics’ was embraced as a guiding doctrine for conflict prevention and resolution. Africa committed itself, at least normatively, to leave no conflict unattended.

The phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’ was widely invoked during this period. Unfortunately, it is often misunderstood today. It never meant excluding international actors or retreating into continental isolation. Rather, it meant that Africans themselves had to assume responsibility for defining the political nature of their crises and shaping the frameworks for their resolution. International partnership remained essential, but African political ownership had to provide the strategic direction.

Sudan became one of the first and most consequential tests of this new African doctrine.

The Darfur conflict erupted in 2003 just as the APSA was taking shape. Indeed, Darfur was among the earliest agenda items confronted by the newly established PSC of the AU, leading to the adoption of several far-reaching decisions, including the deployment of a mission to protect civilians and oversee the ceasefire reached among the belligerents, as well as the launching of a political process to achieve a lasting settlement (see here).

At that moment, the crisis was being actively defined externally—by international advocacy groups, humanitarian campaigns, major powers, and competing geopolitical narratives. The dominant global framing of Darfur as genocide shaped international diplomacy, which resulted in the referral of the Sudan situation to the International Criminal Court and the indictment, years later, of President Omar al-Bashir But the AU recognized something important: unless Africa itself defined the political character of the crisis, it would never be able to contribute meaningfully to its resolution.

That was the significance of the July 2008 PSC decision to establish the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD). Chaired by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and composed of former President Abdulsalami Abubakar of Nigeria and former President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, the Panel later evolved into the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).

The Panel’s first and most important decision was deceptively simple: it resolved to define the problem.

I remember vividly how seriously this was taken. Defining the problem was not treated as a rhetorical exercise. It was understood as the very foundation of mediation itself. A wrongly defined conflict inevitably produces a wrongly designed peace process.

The Panel therefore embarked upon one of the most extensive consultative exercises ever undertaken in African mediation. For more than forty days, it travelled throughout Darfur, speaking with people from all walks of life: armed movements, displaced communities, tribal leaders, women’s groups, civil society organizations, intellectuals, native administrations, youth groups, religious leaders, and ordinary citizens.

This was not diplomacy confined to hotels and conference halls. It was political listening as method.

The consultations were enabled by the joint AU–United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, particularly through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation mechanism. At the time, I was serving within the political structures supporting these processes and was directly involved in coordinating aspects of this engagement before later being seconded fully to the Panel itself, where I eventually served as Chief of Staff.

What struck me most was the seriousness with which mediation was approached—not as technical facilitation, but as political responsibility. The Panel assembled exceptionally competent African and international experts who worked collectively to support a political process rooted in African norms, principles, and institutional legitimacy. There was a belief that mediation required intellectual depth, historical understanding, political sensitivity, and strategic patience.

And above all, there was humility before the complexity of Sudan itself.

The consultations ultimately produced a definition of the Darfur crisis that differed significantly from prevailing international narratives. The Panel concluded that Darfur was not an isolated problem detached from Sudan’s wider political history. It was ‘the Sudanese crisis in Darfur.’ In other words, Darfur reflected deeper structural failures of governance, marginalization, exclusion, unequal development, and the unresolved management of diversity within the Sudanese state.

This distinction mattered enormously because it changed the logic of conflict resolution itself.

If Darfur was fundamentally a Sudanese political crisis, then the solution could not be reduced merely to humanitarian management, military containment, or negotiations among armed actors. There could be no stand-alone solution for Darfur. It required a broader political transformation of Sudan.

The Panel also proposed one of the most innovative recommendations in African mediation at the time: the establishment of a hybrid court to address questions of justice and accountability. But the Sudanese government hesitated to embrace this aspect of the recommendations. This reluctance proved consequential.

When the report was presented to a special summit of the PSC in Abuja in October 2009, the discussions among African heads of state were remarkable. Several leaders argued that for the first time, Africa had produced its own coherent political definition of a major continental conflict and that the methodology itself (extensive consultation with affected people and the various conflict actors) should guide future African conflict resolution efforts.

The AUHIP pivoted from the Darfur file toward another historic responsibility: accompanying the implementation of the outstanding matters of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and helping manage the approaching referendum on self-determination for the people of southern Sudan.

The Panel had defined the Darfur issue through consultation with the people of Darfur. This was different: the Panel was mandated to facilitate the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in completing an agenda that had already been agreed. But the next stage demanded forward thinking, and the Panel defined the purpose of the post-referendum North-South negotiations around a central concept: the creation of’“two viable states.’ As extensively documented in the Two Sudans, this became the organizing political framework of the mediation.

The Panel understood clearly that if the referendum resulted in separation—as increasingly appeared inevitable—the task of mediation was not merely to manage partition administratively, but to ensure that both Sudan and South Sudan emerged as viable states capable of coexistence and future cooperation.

Every issue—citizenship, borders, oil, the disputed territory of Abyei, security arrangements, economic cooperation—was approached through the lens of whether it would contribute to stability, viability, and long-term coexistence between the two states.

The Panel constantly challenged the parties to think politically. The mediation sought not merely to broker deals, but to legitimize political thinking itself as a tool of statecraft and as a method of mediation.

On the eve of the referendum, as documented in details in the Two Sudans, President Thabo Mbeki delivered two seminal lectures—one at the University of Khartoum and another at the University of Juba. In both, he reminded leaders and citizens alike that if the people of South Sudan voted for independence, this would not produce one Arab country and one African country. Rather, it would produce two African countries, both carrying responsibilities toward Pan-African cooperation, coexistence, and integration.

Another important lesson from the AUHIP experience was the disciplined integration of international actors into the mediation process under African political leadership.

The United Nations, IGAD, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway—the Troika—were all closely integrated into the mediation framework. They contributed expertise, political leverage, technical support, and diplomatic backing. But critically, this occurred within a coherent political architecture led by the Panel.

This avoided the parallel mediation tracks and fragmentation that plague many contemporary peace processes today.

The Panel also took seriously its responsibility to regularly brief the AU PSC in detail. These substantive engagements enabled the Council to understand the complexity of the issues and adopted informed communiqués and decisions that strengthened the mediation process.

As a result, the PSC and the UN Security Council frequently operated in close coordination, issuing complementary statements and resolutions in support of the mediation effort.

As Chief of Staff of the AUHIP, I witnessed firsthand the remarkable commitment of the African and international experts who supported the process. They worked tirelessly, often under enormous pressure, and brought out the best in one another through collective purpose and discipline.

The resulting agreements were extraordinarily detailed and comprehensive—arguably among the most sophisticated political agreements ever produced in mediation history on the continent.

One aspect of the Panel’s work that remains especially vivid in my memory was President Mbeki’s practice during moments of crisis in the negotiations.

Whenever the process reached difficult impasses, President Mbeki would write lengthy and deeply thoughtful letters to President Omar al-Bashir, President Salva Kiir, and the two parties’ respective chief negotiators. These letters reminded the leaders of their historic responsibilities, outlined the difficulties confronting the mediation, proposed pathways forward, and insisted upon a central principle: that responsibility for peace ultimately belonged to the Sudanese parties themselves, not to the mediators.

I often reflect on those letters today. They represented mediation not simply as facilitation, but as sustained political engagement and ethical persuasion.

Among those who played an indispensable role in supporting the work of both the AUPD and the AUHIP was the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. As Chair of IGAD and as a sitting African head of government deeply invested in peace and stability in the region, Prime Minister Meles provided exceptional political support to the mediation effort. During moments of serious stalemate and tension, his interventions were often decisive. He engaged directly with the leadership of both Sudan and South Sudan and with the chief negotiators, offering ideas and political pathways that helped unlock difficult impasses. His support for the Panel was exemplary and reflected a profound understanding of mediation as strategic African statecraft.

Tragically, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi passed away before the completion of the negotiations. In recognition of his immense contribution, the two parties and the chief mediators agreed to dedicate the agreement signed between Sudan and South Sudan in his honor. It was a deeply emotional and symbolic moment that reflected the respect he had earned across the process. The resultant full confidence of the two countries in Ethiopia led to the unprecedented and historic development in which Ethiopia was invited to serve as the only troop contributing country for the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

Looking back today, I increasingly believe the AUHIP represented the high-water mark of an era when Africa attempted to practice mediation as serious political statecraft. What made this mediation practice standout was how it built and nurtured collective strategic leadership through leveraging AU’s normative and policy instruments, constantly galvanized the consensus and support of member states and successfully sustaining international alignment. It was also exemplary in being anchored on a political strategy pursued through the policy leadership of the PSC and the political and technical stewardship of the AUHIP.

Unfortunately, many of the lessons from that period were not sustained. Over time, fragmentation returned.  Collective strategic leadership faded. Competing mediation initiatives proliferated. Geopolitical competition intensified. The coherence that once existed between African institutions and international actors gradually weakened. Respect for shared norms diminished and multilateral frameworks disregarded. This is the context in which contemporary mediation is taking place.

The central lesson of the AUHIP experience remains profoundly relevant: sustainable peace cannot emerge unless mediators possess the political courage and intellectual discipline to define conflicts honestly, engage societies broadly, and insist upon political solutions rooted in legitimacy and ownership.

Ownership means that the parties themselves take the credit and win the plaudits, not the mediator. That is one reason why it has taken more than a decade for this book to be published—none of those involved wanted to rush to claim the limelight.

Dag Hammarskjöld once observed that multilateral institutions were not created to take humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell. The AUHIP exemplifies the seriousness with which African institutions carried such responsibilities at that time.

The Panel also benefited enormously from the exemplary support and facilitation of the African Union Commission itself. Under the leadership of Chairperson Jean Ping and subsequently Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, along with Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit and his successor Ramtane Lamamra, El-Ghassim Wane, then Director of the Peace and Security Department, and senior staff, such as Dawit Toga played crucial roles.

All in all, the AU mobilized its political, diplomatic, and technical capacities in support of the Panel’s work, without fretting about control or taking credit. The commitment of various AU actors reflected a period when the AU approached mediation not as peripheral diplomacy, but as a central strategic responsibility. This responsibility was not seen as a matter of personal choice or discretion of particular leaders of the AU Commission but is discharged as mandatory pan-African public role and by actively seeking and harnessing the contribution of all those whose role advances the cause of peace.

The Panel also received dedicated and indispensable support from key international and regional partners, highlighting the collective nature of the exercise. Haile Menkerios and the late Nicholas Haysom, both serving as representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General, provided critical political and diplomatic backing throughout the process. Key UN staff included Vladimir Zhagora and Muin Shreim. Ambassador Lissane Yohannes, representing IGAD, the late Ambassador Princeton Lyman, the Special Envoy of the United States, and Mohamed Yonis, Head of Administration of UNAMID, all played vital roles in sustaining and supporting the mediation effort at crucial moments.

The Panel’s support team was the nerve centre of the work of the Panel. As Chief of Staff of the AUHIP, I attest with deep appreciation the extraordinary dedication and professionalism of the colleagues who formed part of the Panel’s support team. Among them were Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Barney Afako, Alex de Waal, Allan Pillay, Sani Atsu, Neha Erasmus, Pauline Odera, Laura James, Sarah Nouwen, Chris Luckham, Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, Ambassador Mahmoud Kane, Ali Hassan, Fiona Lortan, Mukoni Ratshitanga, Mashood Issaka, Eric Abibo N’gandu, Sergine Gakwaya, Meron Genene and many others whose tireless efforts, intellectual rigor, and collective sense of purpose were indispensable to the success of the Panel.

The Sudans by Alex de Waal and Willow Berridge captures and documents this African mediation journey with exceptional richness and depth. The book is fundamentally about the work of the Panel itself and the broader political and mediation experience surrounding Sudan and South Sudan as well as the lessons from that experience.

The book documents the mediation experience, the negotiations, and the broader African political journey surrounding Sudan and South Sudan with sophistication and humanity. It is not merely a dry institutional account or technical documentation of negotiations. It captures the human drama, the tensions, the personalities, the political dilemmas, and the immense complexity of mediation itself. Much of what I have reflected upon in this essay is captured in the book in extraordinary detail and richness.

Alex de Waal himself was deeply involved in the work of the Panel and contributed immensely across multiple dimensions of the mediation process. No one could have documented this experience with the same depth of understanding.

As Chief of Staff of the AUHIP, I bear witness to the seriousness, commitment, and integrity with which this work was undertaken. For that reason, I believe The Sudans will stand as one of the most important contributions to the literature of mediation and African political history for many years to come, not least of all by availing authoritative source of reference on the exemplary contribution of the Panel to translating AU norms and processes into mediation practice.

Abdul Mohammed

Africa and the African Union (AU) have rich mediation experiences from the post-election crisis in Kenya (2007/2008) to the civil war in Darfur, Sudan to draw from for restoring the peacemaking and mediation leadership that the AU lost. The release of the book titled The Sudans by Alex de Waal and Willow Berridge providing the most comprehensive and detailed data and analysis on one of AU’s most sustained and impactful mediation process.

There are moments in history when institutions are not merely bureaucratic creations but expressions of political conviction. The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) was born in such a moment.

To understand the significance of the AUHIP experience—and why its lessons matter urgently today—it is necessary to recall the Africa that gave rise to it.

The AUHIP emerged at the zenith of a remarkable era in which the continent’s organizations were invigorated: the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, the emergence of New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the construction of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Across Africa, leaders, intellectuals, diplomats, liberation veterans, civic formations, and policy thinkers were engaged in profound reflection on Pan-Africanism and African agency in a changing world.

This was not merely institutional reform. It was an attempt to redefine Africa’s political Destiny and agency.

New norms and principles were adopted. The Peace and Security Council was established. Mediation became a strategic political instrument rather than an ad hoc diplomatic exercise. The ‘primacy of politics’ was embraced as a guiding doctrine for conflict prevention and resolution. Africa committed itself, at least normatively, to leave no conflict unattended.

The phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’ was widely invoked during this period. Unfortunately, it is often misunderstood today. It never meant excluding international actors or retreating into continental isolation. Rather, it meant that Africans themselves had to assume responsibility for defining the political nature of their crises and shaping the frameworks for their resolution. International partnership remained essential, but African political ownership had to provide the strategic direction.

Sudan became one of the first and most consequential tests of this new African doctrine.

The Darfur conflict erupted in 2003 just as the APSA was taking shape. Indeed, Darfur was among the earliest agenda items confronted by the newly established PSC of the AU, leading to the adoption of several far-reaching decisions, including the deployment of a mission to protect civilians and oversee the ceasefire reached among the belligerents, as well as the launching of a political process to achieve a lasting settlement (see here).

At that moment, the crisis was being actively defined externally—by international advocacy groups, humanitarian campaigns, major powers, and competing geopolitical narratives. The dominant global framing of Darfur as genocide shaped international diplomacy, which resulted in the referral of the Sudan situation to the International Criminal Court and the indictment, years later, of President Omar al-Bashir But the AU recognized something important: unless Africa itself defined the political character of the crisis, it would never be able to contribute meaningfully to its resolution.

That was the significance of the July 2008 PSC decision to establish the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD). Chaired by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and composed of former President Abdulsalami Abubakar of Nigeria and former President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, the Panel later evolved into the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).

The Panel’s first and most important decision was deceptively simple: it resolved to define the problem.

I remember vividly how seriously this was taken. Defining the problem was not treated as a rhetorical exercise. It was understood as the very foundation of mediation itself. A wrongly defined conflict inevitably produces a wrongly designed peace process.

The Panel therefore embarked upon one of the most extensive consultative exercises ever undertaken in African mediation. For more than forty days, it travelled throughout Darfur, speaking with people from all walks of life: armed movements, displaced communities, tribal leaders, women’s groups, civil society organizations, intellectuals, native administrations, youth groups, religious leaders, and ordinary citizens.

This was not diplomacy confined to hotels and conference halls. It was political listening as method.

The consultations were enabled by the joint AU–United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, particularly through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation mechanism. At the time, I was serving within the political structures supporting these processes and was directly involved in coordinating aspects of this engagement before later being seconded fully to the Panel itself, where I eventually served as Chief of Staff.

What struck me most was the seriousness with which mediation was approached—not as technical facilitation, but as political responsibility. The Panel assembled exceptionally competent African and international experts who worked collectively to support a political process rooted in African norms, principles, and institutional legitimacy. There was a belief that mediation required intellectual depth, historical understanding, political sensitivity, and strategic patience.

And above all, there was humility before the complexity of Sudan itself.

The consultations ultimately produced a definition of the Darfur crisis that differed significantly from prevailing international narratives. The Panel concluded that Darfur was not an isolated problem detached from Sudan’s wider political history. It was ‘the Sudanese crisis in Darfur.’ In other words, Darfur reflected deeper structural failures of governance, marginalization, exclusion, unequal development, and the unresolved management of diversity within the Sudanese state.

This distinction mattered enormously because it changed the logic of conflict resolution itself.

If Darfur was fundamentally a Sudanese political crisis, then the solution could not be reduced merely to humanitarian management, military containment, or negotiations among armed actors. There could be no stand-alone solution for Darfur. It required a broader political transformation of Sudan.

The Panel also proposed one of the most innovative recommendations in African mediation at the time: the establishment of a hybrid court to address questions of justice and accountability. But the Sudanese government hesitated to embrace this aspect of the recommendations. This reluctance proved consequential.

When the report was presented to a special summit of the PSC in Abuja in October 2009, the discussions among African heads of state were remarkable. Several leaders argued that for the first time, Africa had produced its own coherent political definition of a major continental conflict and that the methodology itself (extensive consultation with affected people and the various conflict actors) should guide future African conflict resolution efforts.

The AUHIP pivoted from the Darfur file toward another historic responsibility: accompanying the implementation of the outstanding matters of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and helping manage the approaching referendum on self-determination for the people of southern Sudan.

The Panel had defined the Darfur issue through consultation with the people of Darfur. This was different: the Panel was mandated to facilitate the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in completing an agenda that had already been agreed. But the next stage demanded forward thinking, and the Panel defined the purpose of the post-referendum North-South negotiations around a central concept: the creation of’“two viable states.’ As extensively documented in the Two Sudans, this became the organizing political framework of the mediation.

The Panel understood clearly that if the referendum resulted in separation—as increasingly appeared inevitable—the task of mediation was not merely to manage partition administratively, but to ensure that both Sudan and South Sudan emerged as viable states capable of coexistence and future cooperation.

Every issue—citizenship, borders, oil, the disputed territory of Abyei, security arrangements, economic cooperation—was approached through the lens of whether it would contribute to stability, viability, and long-term coexistence between the two states.

The Panel constantly challenged the parties to think politically. The mediation sought not merely to broker deals, but to legitimize political thinking itself as a tool of statecraft and as a method of mediation.

On the eve of the referendum, as documented in details in the Two Sudans, President Thabo Mbeki delivered two seminal lectures—one at the University of Khartoum and another at the University of Juba. In both, he reminded leaders and citizens alike that if the people of South Sudan voted for independence, this would not produce one Arab country and one African country. Rather, it would produce two African countries, both carrying responsibilities toward Pan-African cooperation, coexistence, and integration.

Another important lesson from the AUHIP experience was the disciplined integration of international actors into the mediation process under African political leadership.

The United Nations, IGAD, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway—the Troika—were all closely integrated into the mediation framework. They contributed expertise, political leverage, technical support, and diplomatic backing. But critically, this occurred within a coherent political architecture led by the Panel.

This avoided the parallel mediation tracks and fragmentation that plague many contemporary peace processes today.

The Panel also took seriously its responsibility to regularly brief the AU PSC in detail. These substantive engagements enabled the Council to understand the complexity of the issues and adopted informed communiqués and decisions that strengthened the mediation process.

As a result, the PSC and the UN Security Council frequently operated in close coordination, issuing complementary statements and resolutions in support of the mediation effort.

As Chief of Staff of the AUHIP, I witnessed firsthand the remarkable commitment of the African and international experts who supported the process. They worked tirelessly, often under enormous pressure, and brought out the best in one another through collective purpose and discipline.

The resulting agreements were extraordinarily detailed and comprehensive—arguably among the most sophisticated political agreements ever produced in mediation history on the continent.

One aspect of the Panel’s work that remains especially vivid in my memory was President Mbeki’s practice during moments of crisis in the negotiations.

Whenever the process reached difficult impasses, President Mbeki would write lengthy and deeply thoughtful letters to President Omar al-Bashir, President Salva Kiir, and the two parties’ respective chief negotiators. These letters reminded the leaders of their historic responsibilities, outlined the difficulties confronting the mediation, proposed pathways forward, and insisted upon a central principle: that responsibility for peace ultimately belonged to the Sudanese parties themselves, not to the mediators.

I often reflect on those letters today. They represented mediation not simply as facilitation, but as sustained political engagement and ethical persuasion.

Among those who played an indispensable role in supporting the work of both the AUPD and the AUHIP was the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. As Chair of IGAD and as a sitting African head of government deeply invested in peace and stability in the region, Prime Minister Meles provided exceptional political support to the mediation effort. During moments of serious stalemate and tension, his interventions were often decisive. He engaged directly with the leadership of both Sudan and South Sudan and with the chief negotiators, offering ideas and political pathways that helped unlock difficult impasses. His support for the Panel was exemplary and reflected a profound understanding of mediation as strategic African statecraft.

Tragically, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi passed away before the completion of the negotiations. In recognition of his immense contribution, the two parties and the chief mediators agreed to dedicate the agreement signed between Sudan and South Sudan in his honor. It was a deeply emotional and symbolic moment that reflected the respect he had earned across the process. The resultant full confidence of the two countries in Ethiopia led to the unprecedented and historic development in which Ethiopia was invited to serve as the only troop contributing country for the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).

Looking back today, I increasingly believe the AUHIP represented the high-water mark of an era when Africa attempted to practice mediation as serious political statecraft. What made this mediation practice standout was how it built and nurtured collective strategic leadership through leveraging AU’s normative and policy instruments, constantly galvanized the consensus and support of member states and successfully sustaining international alignment. It was also exemplary in being anchored on a political strategy pursued through the policy leadership of the PSC and the political and technical stewardship of the AUHIP.

Unfortunately, many of the lessons from that period were not sustained. Over time, fragmentation returned.  Collective strategic leadership faded. Competing mediation initiatives proliferated. Geopolitical competition intensified. The coherence that once existed between African institutions and international actors gradually weakened. Respect for shared norms diminished and multilateral frameworks disregarded. This is the context in which contemporary mediation is taking place.

The central lesson of the AUHIP experience remains profoundly relevant: sustainable peace cannot emerge unless mediators possess the political courage and intellectual discipline to define conflicts honestly, engage societies broadly, and insist upon political solutions rooted in legitimacy and ownership.

Ownership means that the parties themselves take the credit and win the plaudits, not the mediator. That is one reason why it has taken more than a decade for this book to be published—none of those involved wanted to rush to claim the limelight.

Dag Hammarskjöld once observed that multilateral institutions were not created to take humanity to heaven, but to save it from hell. The AUHIP exemplifies the seriousness with which African institutions carried such responsibilities at that time.

The Panel also benefited enormously from the exemplary support and facilitation of the African Union Commission itself. Under the leadership of Chairperson Jean Ping and subsequently Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, along with Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit and his successor Ramtane Lamamra, El-Ghassim Wane, then Director of the Peace and Security Department, and senior staff, such as Dawit Toga played crucial roles.

All in all, the AU mobilized its political, diplomatic, and technical capacities in support of the Panel’s work, without fretting about control or taking credit. The commitment of various AU actors reflected a period when the AU approached mediation not as peripheral diplomacy, but as a central strategic responsibility. This responsibility was not seen as a matter of personal choice or discretion of particular leaders of the AU Commission but is discharged as mandatory pan-African public role and by actively seeking and harnessing the contribution of all those whose role advances the cause of peace.

The Panel also received dedicated and indispensable support from key international and regional partners, highlighting the collective nature of the exercise. Haile Menkerios and the late Nicholas Haysom, both serving as representatives of the United Nations Secretary-General, provided critical political and diplomatic backing throughout the process. Key UN staff included Vladimir Zhagora and Muin Shreim. Ambassador Lissane Yohannes, representing IGAD, the late Ambassador Princeton Lyman, the Special Envoy of the United States, and Mohamed Yonis, Head of Administration of UNAMID, all played vital roles in sustaining and supporting the mediation effort at crucial moments.

The Panel’s support team was the nerve centre of the work of the Panel. As Chief of Staff of the AUHIP, I attest with deep appreciation the extraordinary dedication and professionalism of the colleagues who formed part of the Panel’s support team. Among them were Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Barney Afako, Alex de Waal, Allan Pillay, Sani Atsu, Neha Erasmus, Pauline Odera, Laura James, Sarah Nouwen, Chris Luckham, Boitshoko Mokgatlhe, Ambassador Mahmoud Kane, Ali Hassan, Fiona Lortan, Mukoni Ratshitanga, Mashood Issaka, Eric Abibo N’gandu, Sergine Gakwaya, Meron Genene and many others whose tireless efforts, intellectual rigor, and collective sense of purpose were indispensable to the success of the Panel.

The Sudans by Alex de Waal and Willow Berridge captures and documents this African mediation journey with exceptional richness and depth. The book is fundamentally about the work of the Panel itself and the broader political and mediation experience surrounding Sudan and South Sudan as well as the lessons from that experience.

The book documents the mediation experience, the negotiations, and the broader African political journey surrounding Sudan and South Sudan with sophistication and humanity. It is not merely a dry institutional account or technical documentation of negotiations. It captures the human drama, the tensions, the personalities, the political dilemmas, and the immense complexity of mediation itself. Much of what I have reflected upon in this essay is captured in the book in extraordinary detail and richness.

Alex de Waal himself was deeply involved in the work of the Panel and contributed immensely across multiple dimensions of the mediation process. No one could have documented this experience with the same depth of understanding.

As Chief of Staff of the AUHIP, I bear witness to the seriousness, commitment, and integrity with which this work was undertaken. For that reason, I believe The Sudans will stand as one of the most important contributions to the literature of mediation and African political history for many years to come, not least of all by availing authoritative source of reference on the exemplary contribution of the Panel to translating AU norms and processes into mediation practice.