Abdul Mohammed

I have sat across from men who command armies, knowing that some of them were responsible for the very violence we were trying to stop.

There is a particular silence that fills such rooms. It is not the silence of diplomacy. It is the silence of moral tension — the unspoken awareness that peace, if it is to be achieved, may require engaging those whose actions have made peace necessary in the first place.

This is the uncomfortable truth at the heart of modern conflict mediation. It is what Pierre Hazan described as ‘negotiating with the devil.’ In many places such as the Horn of Africa today, it is not a metaphor. It is a daily reality.

Yet the challenge confronting mediators today extends beyond the moral dilemma of negotiating with armed actors. What we are witnessing in various conflict settings in the continent and beyond including across Sudan and the wider Horn is something more profound and more consequential: a growing structural mismatch between mediation as it is currently practiced and the realities it is meant to address.

Mediation in a fragmented geopolitical landscape

The world in which modern mediation evolved has fundamentally changed.

The assumptions that once underpinned international peacemaking — shared norms, coherent multilateral leadership, and a broadly agreed international order — are steadily eroding. In their place is a far more fragmented and competitive geopolitical landscape, one in which conflicts have become increasingly regionalized, internationalized, and economically embedded.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Horn of Africa.

The region is no longer experiencing isolated national crises. It is increasingly evolving into an interconnected regional system of conflict shaped by cross-border armed networks, external intervention, fragmented sovereignties, war economies, ideological polarization, and intensifying geopolitical competition along the Red Sea corridor.

Sudan illustrates this reality in its starkest form.

Sudan is no longer simply a country at war. It is a state and society being hollowed out. Its institutions are collapsing, its cities are being destroyed, and millions have been displaced by a conflict whose consequences increasingly transcend Sudan itself. The war has become deeply entangled with broader regional rivalries and international strategic interests.

And yet, for all the urgency surrounding Sudan, the path to peace partially runs through the very actors who are sustaining the war.

Mediation in a changing conflict landscape

The new era of conflicts and insecurity characterized by shifts in the nature and drivers of conflicts presents further challenge to the current model of mediation. Contemporary conflicts are no longer primarily about seizing state power or achieving decisive military victory.

They increasingly resemble wars of permanence—open-ended struggles sustained by political fragmentation, economic incentives, and geopolitical rivalry. As the conflicts in the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel show, some of today’s conflicts tend to be transnational, entangled with regional and international criminal and economic networks.

Today’s wars have also become more intractable and easier to wage due to the profound changes in the means of warfare. In many conflict settings from Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel to DRC and Sudan, drones have become the weapon of choice, signaling further rapid evolution with the emergence of AI-enabled warfare technologies in a normative context designed for earlier technologies.

Digital technologies have become the dominant information platform that shape not only the conflict environment but also the mediation landscape.

Mediation in the current and emerging context thus needs to adapt to these new and changing conflict dynamics.

The uncomfortable moral realities of ending conflicts

This remains the central dilemma of mediation. The men who can stop the war are often the same men fighting it.

It is tempting to believe that peace can be built by excluding such actors — that legitimacy alone can substitute for power. But experience suggests otherwise. Wars do not end because we morally isolate those who wage them. They end when those actors are brought, however reluctantly and imperfectly, into a political process capable of reshaping their incentives and constraining their violence.

This is not a comfortable proposition. Nor should it be.

Every mediation effort forces a version of the same question: Is it better to engage and risk legitimizing violent actors, or to refuse engagement and risk prolonging the war?

There are no clean answers. Only consequences.

In much of the Horn of Africa, power is not exercised primarily through formal institutions. It is embedded in networks of patronage, coercion, economic extraction, and armed mobilization. Alex de Waal has described this as a ‘political marketplace,’ where loyalties are transactional, alliances are fluid, and violence itself becomes a tool of political bargaining.

Peace processes that fail to engage these underlying realities often collapse under the weight of their own assumptions. Agreements may appear coherent on paper while remaining disconnected from the actual structures that sustain conflict.

This is one of the defining weaknesses of much contemporary mediation.

Too often, mediation has shifted from shaping political outcomes to managing diplomatic processes. Meetings proliferate. Statements multiply. Tracks expand. Yet leverage weakens and coherence declines.

The result is the paradox increasingly visible across many conflicts today: more mediation, but less peace.

The Horn of Africa vividly illustrates this crisis.

Different actors pursue different initiatives through overlapping and sometimes competing tracks. Regional organizations, international institutions, bilateral powers, and external geopolitical actors often engage simultaneously without strategic alignment.

The multiplication of forums has not necessarily produced greater effectiveness. In some cases, it has deepened fragmentation.

This is not merely an operational problem. It reflects a deeper transformation in the international system itself.

Mediators must negotiate a fiercely contested diplomatic environment

The era in which mediation could rely on relatively coherent multilateral consensus is fading. What is emerging instead is a far more contested diplomatic environment shaped by geopolitical rivalry, transactional partnerships, declining trust in institutions, and the growing influence of middle and regional powers.

For mediators, this creates a new level of complexity. It is no longer enough to navigate the conflict itself. One must also navigate the competing interests of those seeking to shape the conflict’s outcome.

This emerging reality is most evident in the Red Sea corridor. Gulf powers, global powers, regional actors, and non-state networks increasingly intersect across the Horn in ways that blur the line between domestic conflict and wider geopolitical competition. Proximity to the Middle East has transformed the Horn into part of a wider and deeply interconnected security arena.

Mediation frameworks, however, have often failed to evolve accordingly.

Many still operate according to assumptions rooted in an earlier era — one in which conflicts were more localized, mediation tracks more centralized, and multilateral authority more coherent. But today’s wars, economically embedded and digitally amplified, do not lend themselves to this conventional approach.

This demands a fundamental rethinking of mediation itself.

The challenge is not simply to improve mediation processes. It is to redefine mediation politically, strategically, and institutionally for an entirely different era of conflict.

Three deficits increasingly define contemporary mediation efforts.

Key challenges facing modern mediation

First, there is a deficit of political strategy.

Mediation has too often become procedural rather than transformational. Process has become a substitute for strategy. Yet mediation that is disconnected from a clear political understanding of power, incentives, and end states risks becoming performative rather than consequential.

Second, there is a deficit of coherence.

Multiple actors engage without alignment, weakening leverage and creating opportunities for conflict actors to exploit divisions among mediators themselves. Fragmented diplomacy frequently mirrors the fragmentation of the conflicts it seeks to resolve.

Third, there is a deficit of legitimacy.

Formal peace processes often remain disconnected from societal realities and civilian constituencies most affected by war. Inclusion is frequently symbolic rather than meaningful, while local actors capable of sustaining peace remain marginalized.

These deficits are particularly dangerous in contexts such as Sudan, where the collapse of state structures risks generating prolonged fragmentation with regional consequences extending far beyond national borders.

The ongoing tensions between peace and justice

At the same time, mediation confronts another enduring tension: the relationship between peace and justice.

Victims of conflict do not speak in abstractions about stabilization. They speak about accountability, dignity, recognition, and historical grievance. They demand not only the cessation of violence but also justice for the violence already committed.

Yet here too mediation encounters difficult realities.

Actors who fear immediate accountability are often unwilling to negotiate. Insisting on maximalist justice demands at the outset may, in some circumstances, foreclose opportunities to stop the violence itself.

This does not mean justice should be abandoned. It means justice must be sequenced carefully within broader political transitions.

Mahmood Mamdani has long argued that violence in Africa is often rooted not merely in individual criminality but in deeper political structures and historical systems of exclusion. Sustainable peace therefore requires more than prosecutions alone. It requires transforming the conditions that continuously reproduce violent conflict.

In practical terms, this means prioritizing the cessation of violence while preserving pathways toward accountability, institutional reform, reconciliation, and political transformation.

It is not a perfect approach. But in the midst of war, perfection is rarely available.

And this is precisely where African agency becomes indispensable.

It is such normative and socio-political imperatives that informed and animate the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. It is premised on both the necessity of justice and accountability and the recognition that wars are extraordinary events that are not amenable to the application of systems of justice that are designed for normal and peace times.

On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342^nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342^nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342^nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342^nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.

On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342^nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342^nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342^nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342^nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.

By Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi

Convener and Chairperson, Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement

Africa is in danger of becoming accustomed to war.

What would have shocked the conscience of the continent a generation ago is increasingly being treated as routine. Daily reports of bombed villages, displaced populations, massacred civilians, sexual violence, starvation, collapsing states, and endless humanitarian crises no longer generate the urgency they deserve.

The tragedy is not only that war is spreading, and Africa is in a new era of conflict and insecurity. The greater tragedy is that war is becoming normalized.

From Sudan to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, from the Sahel to parts of the Horn of Africa, violence is increasingly becoming a defining feature of political life itself. Armed conflict is no longer appearing as an exception to politics; in too many places it is becoming a substitute for politics.

Africa today confronts a profound and dangerous reality: war is increasingly becoming systemic, self-sustaining, and in some places permanent.

Many of the continent’s contemporary conflicts are also increasingly shaped by external interference and geopolitical competition. Local conflicts are becoming entangled with regional and international rivalries, giving rise to proxy wars that often outlive their original causes. External sponsorship, competition for strategic influence, and access to resources can prolong violence, complicate peace efforts, and transform local conflicts into seemingly endless wars. In too many places, Africa is paying the human cost of struggles that extend far beyond its borders.

The return of war is not simply a security challenge. It is an existential challenge to Africa’s future. It threatens every major aspiration Africans have articulated for themselves—from Agenda 2063 and regional integration to democratic governance, economic transformation, poverty reduction, social justice, and women’s empowerment.

Across the continent, conflicts are becoming more fragmented, more regionalized, and more resistant to traditional approaches to peacemaking.

In too many places, war has become an economic system, a method of governance, a pathway to political power, and a means of negotiating access to state resources. For some actors, peace has become a threat while war has become an opportunity.

Even more troubling is the changing status of civilians. In many contemporary conflicts, civilians are no longer unfortunate victims caught between warring parties. They are increasingly becoming deliberate targets (see here).

No group bears the burden of Africa’s wars more heavily than women and children.

Women carry responsibilities that extend far beyond their own survival. They become caregivers, providers, protectors, and custodians of communities under conditions of extraordinary hardship. They face displacement, loss of livelihoods, hunger, sexual violence, forced migration, and the collapse of essential social services. Yet, they remain significantly underrepresented in the political decisions that determine war and peace.

Children are perhaps the greatest victims of all. Millions are growing up amid violence, displacement, interrupted education, hunger, and profound psychological trauma. Many have never known a society at peace.

The destruction of civilian life is no longer merely collateral damage. It is increasingly part of the logic of war itself.

Entire societies are being traumatized. Communities that have lived together for generations are being torn apart. Reconciliation becomes more difficult. State-building becomes more fragile. Democratic transitions become more elusive. Development becomes impossible.

Africa’s peace institutions are under immense strain. Existing approaches are not matching the scale of the challenge. Conflict prevention remains weak, mediation efforts are fragmented, and civilian protection remains inadequate.

Most importantly, leadership for peace is becoming increasingly scarce, while leadership for war often appears more visible.

It is against this backdrop that the Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement is advancing the Women for Peace in Africa Initiative.

Peace is too precious to be left to governments and formal institutions alone. Sustainable peace requires the active participation of citizens, women’s organizations, youth movements, faith communities, intellectuals, traditional leaders, humanitarian actors, and civil society. The defense of peace must become a shared societal responsibility.

The initiative recognizes that sustainable peace requires organized civic leadership capable of defending civilians, promoting accountability, supporting mediation efforts, strengthening social cohesion, and generating public pressure for political solutions.

Africa has reached a moment when silence is no longer an option. The scale of suffering demands action. The erosion of peace demands leadership. The future of the continent demands a broad-based civic movement committed to ensuring that war does not become a permanent feature of African political life.

The defense of peace must once again become a continental cause.

Africa must rise against the normalization of war.