Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 20^th annual joint consultative meeting in New York, covering four agenda items: identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, and the situations in Sudan, South Sudan and eastern DRC.

The Consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, and Aghi Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN and UNSC President for October. Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, are expected to deliver remarks during the meeting.

On the situation in Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia will co-lead the PSC, while Liberia, Russia, Panama and Pakistan will lead from the UNSC side.

Discussions are expected to build on recent engagements, including the UNSC’s open briefing and closed consultations on 16 October and the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum. The PSC may share its observations on the widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis, while discussions are likely to focus on diplomatic initiatives and coordination among mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.

The Councils may also welcome the first joint high-level meeting of the Quad and Quintet on 23 September. A follow-up meeting scheduled for 20–21 October in Switzerland aims to coordinate ceasefire efforts and preparations for political transition. The consultative meeting therefore offers an opportunity to assess progress towards a ceasefire and an inclusive political process leading to civilian rule.

On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, the Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and criticised the statement of the AU Commission, warning that a political process under military control without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division.

External involvement in the conflict may also feature prominently. The September 2026 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. At its 1218^th session in June 2024, the PSC also tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions with identifying external actors supporting the warring parties and proposing measures to contain their involvement. The Councils may therefore explore closer coordination between the PSC’s Sub-Committee and the UNSC Sudan Sanctions Committee to address external support networks undermining peace efforts.

On identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, Uganda and Nigeria will represent the PSC, while Somalia and the United Kingdom will co-lead from the UNSC.

The discussions come ahead of the UNSC’s consideration of the mission’s mandate renewal in December, which provides the two Councils to exchange views on the future of the mission. Since commencing operations in January 2025, AUSSOM has faced severe financial constraints, having deployed without predictable and sustainable funding. The AU has consistently advocated applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM as its first test case, considering it the most viable framework for securing adequate, predictable and sustainable financing. However, the United States has strongly opposed this approach. It is to be recalled that the application of Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM was one of the most contentious issues at last year’s consultative meeting.

The financial crisis has been compounded by the US announcement in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires on 31 December 2026. UNSOS provides essential logistical support, including fuel, rations, medical and casualty evacuation, aviation, communications and reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment. (For further analysis of the financial and logistical challenges facing AUSSOM and their implications for the future of the mission, see here and here.)

Against this backdrop, the second Extraordinary Summit of AUSSOM Troop-Contributing Countries and Somalia, held in Kampala on 31 July, called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UNSC to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. This would facilitate agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated foreign ministers of troop-contributing countries, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.

Given the financial and logistical challenges, sustaining AUSSOM until its envisaged exit in 2029 appears increasingly difficult. Yet an abrupt withdrawal risks reversing security gains, underscoring the need for a realistic, well-supported transition. With little prospect of reversing US opposition to applying Resolution 2719, discussions may shift toward interim support arrangements and an orderly, coordinated and phased drawdown.

On the situation in eastern DRC, Gabon, Cameroon and Sierra Leone will represent the PSC, while DRC, France and China will co-lead from the UNSC.

The Councils are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across mediation tracks. The UNSC received briefings on DRC and MONUSCO on 29 September and the Great Lakes region on 13 October, while the PSC is scheduled to hear from AU facilitators on 27 October. Attention may focus on the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ October shuttle diplomacy, involving meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October to advance existing peace commitments.

Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including establishing its secretariat and conducting reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. A trilateral planning conference involving DRC, Rwanda and the US was envisaged for October.

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire. During his October UNSC briefing, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes highlighted persistent hostilities, increasing use of armed drones and civilian suffering. He also warned about the spread of Ebola and continued regional distrust, reflected in tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa and between Kinshasa and Burundi. Another significant development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition under former President Joseph Kabila, potentially further complicating the situation.

The main question for the Councils will be whether diplomatic progress is translating into reduced hostilities and tangible improvements on the ground. Discussions may therefore emphasise coordination among the AU-led, Doha and Washington processes, effective implementation and verification of commitments, and avoiding fragmented mediation efforts that could undermine a durable political settlement.

On the situation in South Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda and DRC will co-lead from the PSC, while the United States, Denmark, Latvia, Bahrain and Colombia will represent the UNSC.

Discussions are expected to focus on the elections scheduled for 22 December 2026 and the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The UNSC will consider South Sudan in November, while the PSC last addressed the situation at its 1364^th session on 26 August. Despite serious political, security, operational and financial obstacles to credible elections, the PSC reiterated that the transitional mandate ‘must conclusively end in February 2027 without further extension’. Although it decided to hold a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October, it does not appear in its October Programme of Work, missing an opportunity to receive the latest updates on electoral preparations and consider appropriate preventive measures.

The AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) has recently intensified its engagement, including the July visit to Juba and virtual C5 Plus summits in February and on 29 September. The Councils may therefore draw on the PSC’s 1364^th session, the AU Pre-Election Assessment Mission held in August and the latest C5 Plus Declaration.

One of the main questions facing the consultative meeting will be whether prevailing conditions allow credible elections without further exacerbating political tensions and insecurity. The government appears determined to proceed with polls in December. In July, President Salva Kiir signed constitutional amendments delinking permanent constitution-making and the national census from elections. In September, he unilaterally dissolved the transitional unity government, including the national legislature and state governments, removed five Vice-Presidents and appointed a caretaker administration accountable only to him and operating outside the R-ARCSS.

Against this backdrop, the 29 September C5 Plus Declaration acknowledged electoral preparations but stressed outstanding political, technical, operational, financial, legal and security requirements for peaceful, credible, inclusive and transparent elections. It also called for urgent confidence-building measures, including considering the release of political detainees, particularly Dr Riek Machar, to promote national cohesion and reconciliation.

Importantly, the Declaration requested the AU Commission, in consultation with IGAD and the UN, to establish a joint AU–IGAD–UN task force under C5 auspices. Working closely with the AU High Representative, the task force would support preventive diplomacy, strengthen coordination, monitor implementation of agreed measures, and provide political oversight and strategic guidance to support South Sudanese ownership of the peace process and the electoral transition. Given the heightened risk of violence, the two Councils may reiterate and follow up on the operationalisation of this mechanism as a practical avenue for coordinated preventive diplomacy for facilitating inclusive agreement on the convening of the elections, including on the timing and conditions of the elections.

It remains uncertain whether the two Councils will adopt a joint communiqué, having failed to do so last year due to disagreements over several contentious issues (for details, see Amani Africa’s Monthly Digest on the AUPSC for October 2025). Instead, the meeting concluded with a joint press statement. For this year’s meeting, the UNSC, as host, has initiated a relatively shorter draft joint communiqué. The PSC travelled from Addis Ababa to New York on 17 October, with negotiations on the draft scheduled for 19–20 October. If the Councils fail to agree even on the shorter draft, they may once again settle for a joint press statement.

Tomorrow (22 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 11^th informal joint seminar, ahead of the 20^th annual joint consultative meeting on 23 October 2026.

The seminar will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, and Aghi Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN and UNSC President for October.

Ahead of the seminar, the PSC is scheduled to hold consultations with the African Group and the three elected African members of the UNSC (A3) on 21 October. The 9^th PSC–UN Peacebuilding Commission consultative meeting will also take place that day. A fireside consultation is envisaged at the Greentree Foundation in Manhasset, New York, to facilitate more interactive exchanges between the Councils.

The seminar will address five thematic issues: the review of AU Peace Support Operations and UN Peace Operations, including the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719; Youth, Peace and Security; AU–UN joint efforts to address and counter terrorism in Africa, including in the Sahel region; Children and Armed Conflict; and illegal exploitation of natural resources as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts in Africa.

Agreement on the agenda was largely uncontentious, except for the natural resources item. Initially proposed by the PSC as ‘Natural Resources Management as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts’, Russia suggested reframing it as ‘Root causes of conflict in Africa and the exploitation of natural resources’, reportedly opposed by European Council members of the UNSC. The Councils eventually agreed on ‘Illegal exploitation of natural resources as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts in Africa’.

On the review of Peace Support Operations and UN Peace Operations, including the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Uganda will serve as PSC co-lead speakers, while Pakistan, France and Somalia will lead from the UNSC side. Discussions will address the respective roles, complementarity and division of labour between AU PSOs and UN peace operations, and progress in operationalising Resolution 2719, adopted on 21 December 2023 to establish a framework for financing AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions.

The discussions come amid important developments concerning peace operations. On 20 August, the UN Secretary-General submitted a review of UN peace operations, calling for recalibration amid growing geopolitical divisions and emphasising peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, host-state partnerships, and focused mandates. The PSC is expected to draw on its 1341^st session of 27 April, the August Luanda Summit and the ongoing African Peace and Security Architecture Review. At its 1341^st session, the PSC reaffirmed the importance of PSOs while stressing prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, alongside ‘lean, targeted, and time-bound missions’ in light of mounting challenges sustaining large-scale operations.

The Councils may therefore emphasise clearer division of labour based on comparative advantages, the primacy of political solutions and viable exit strategies. Another priority will be assessing progress under Resolution 2719 ahead of its envisaged UNSC review in December 2026. The AU–UN Task Team met in New York from 13 to 16 October to assess implementation progress of Resolution 2719. Although the framework remains unoperationalised, progress under the October 2024 joint roadmap includes developing modalities for joint planning, decision-making, reporting and mission support.

Outstanding questions concern its practical application. Last year’s consultative meeting exposed disagreements over applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM, as well as language concerning sustainable, predictable and adequate financing for AU PSOs more broadly. It remains to be seen how this year’s consultative meeting will address the issue. Some PSC members may also raise the possible application of the framework to sub-regional PSOs and ad hoc security arrangements, particularly in light of PSC’s 1318^th session that requested the AU Commission to consider the application of the Resolution to the financing of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

On Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), Morocco, South Africa and DRC will co-lead for the PSC, while DRC, Panama and Colombia will represent the UNSC. YPS has been a standing PSC agenda item since November 2018, with annual open sessions. The AU has institutionalised the agenda through Special Envoys on Youth since 2018 and the Continental Framework on YPS, adopted at the PSC’s 933^rd session in June 2020 to promote meaningful youth participation in peace and security processes.

In 2024, African Youth Ambassadors for Peace held regional and continental consultations to advance YPS under the New Agenda for Peace and presented the outcomes to the PSC on the sidelines of the PSC–UNSC consultative meeting. Building on these initiatives, the Councils may emphasise accelerating implementation of the Continental Framework, supporting the Network of African Youth in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (WiseYouth Network), and strengthening meaningful youth participation and leadership in prevention, mediation and peacebuilding.

On AU–UN joint efforts to address and counter terrorism in Africa, including in the Sahel region, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia and Nigeria will co-lead from the PSC, while Liberia, Bahrain, Russia and Denmark will represent the UNSC.

The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), and initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters. However, growing mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorism. These concerns prompted the PSC’s ministerial session on ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa’ during the 81^st UN General Assembly in September. At its 1354^th session, the PSC also expressed concern over declining international cooperation and withdrawal of technical and financial support for African PSOs amid shifting priorities and geopolitical fragmentation.

Against this backdrop, discussions may explore stronger AU–UN counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the Sahel, where regional divisions and diminishing international support have complicated collective responses. The Councils may also consider the independent strategic review of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, led by former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde, which is expected to inform UNSC consideration of adapting UN engagement to the region’s evolving political and security landscape. The review offers an opportunity to strengthen coordination and promote coherent regional responses. Both Councils may further emphasise aligning counterterrorism measures with political strategies addressing underlying drivers of terrorism and violent extremism, including governance deficits and local grievances.

On Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Uganda, Morocco, Benin and Sierra Leone will co-lead for the PSC, while Greece, the United Kingdom and Latvia will represent the UNSC.

CAAC has been a standing PSC agenda item since 2014, with the AU appointing a Special Envoy in February 2026. The PSC now holds two sessions annually, most recently on 2 September, while the UNSC is expected to hold a briefing later this month. Despite being among the most developed thematic agendas, serious challenges persist. The UN Secretary-General’s June 2026 annual report verified 38,558 grave violations affecting 24,174 children, the highest number affected since the establishment of the children and armed conflict mandate by the General Assembly in 1996. For the first time in three decades of UN monitoring, state and government forces accounted for more violations than non-state armed groups. In Africa, the DRC (4,114), Nigeria (2,560) and Somalia (2,195) recorded the highest numbers, ranking among the five worst-affected situations globally.

Against this alarming backdrop, the Councils may underscore that the central challenge lies less in the absence of normative frameworks and mechanisms than in inadequate political will to implement them. Discussions may therefore emphasise stronger accountability and full compliance by all conflict parties with international humanitarian and human rights law.

On the illegal exploitation of natural resources as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts in Africa, Gabon and DRC will represent for the PSC, while the United States and China will co-lead for the UNSC.

Both Councils have long recognised the relationship between illicit resource exploitation and insecurity. The issue has acquired renewed importance amid intensifying global competition for critical minerals, driven by the energy transition, technological advances and strategic rivalry among major powers.

The DRC, where resource exploitation and insecurity remain closely intertwined, has prioritised the issue across both Councils. During its November 2024 PSC chairship, it convened a session on armed and terrorist groups’ growing involvement in illicit resource extraction and trade. During its July UNSC presidency, it organised an Arria-formula meeting on 13 July and a high-level debate on resource governance on 22 July. Other Council members have also brought attention to the issue. Sierra Leone convened an Arria-formula meeting on the global race for critical minerals and resource-driven insecurity in Africa, while the United States held a briefing on energy, critical minerals and security during its March UNSC presidency.

The DRC has particularly advocated shifting attention towards resource governance. At the July debate, Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner proposed a new international doctrine placing resource governance at the centre of peace and security. This reflects the understanding that resources are not inherently sources of conflict or prosperity; their impact depends on governance.

The Councils may consequently assess existing mechanisms addressing illicit exploitation and its links to conflict, including the Kimberley Process, international due diligence standards and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s Regional Certification Mechanism. Although these mechanisms have improved accountability and traceability, implementation gaps, uneven enforcement, weak cross-border coordination and sophisticated smuggling networks continue to undermine effectiveness. Discussions may therefore prioritise stronger implementation of existing frameworks and closer AU–UN cooperation on the conflict-related dimensions of natural resource governance.

Tomorrow (13 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1373^rd session to receive a briefing from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa, and a briefing by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2026, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, ICRC President, is expected to deliver a presentation. This is followed by a presentation by Kate Forbes, President of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to be the IFRC’s first briefing to the PSC. The IFRC supports Africa’s National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in responding to disasters, disease outbreaks, hunger and displacement, while strengthening local capacity and community resilience. In view of the growing gap between humanitarian needs and international support, there is a heightening demand for enhancing national humanitarian capacity. The role of IFRC in working with and supporting national societies is thus gaining significance.

Since becoming a statutory meeting in 2007, the session has been meant to provide updates on major humanitarian issues across Africa and developments in humanitarian aid. Tomorrow’s briefing, delivered by the President of the ICRC for the first time since assuming her role in October 2022, will build on the Council’s 1307th session, held on 24 October 2025. In the outcome of the 1307^th session, the PSC pressed for regular joint ICRC-IFRC briefings to the PSC, accompanied by more concrete assistance from the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, especially for the refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. Furthermore, it called for the ‘expedited development of the Common African Position on IHL and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare’ and the imperative for the ‘development of an AU Humanitarian Diplomacy Framework.’

The humanitarian situation in Africa in 2026 is severe, marked by the triple conditions of increasing need, constrained humanitarian space, and a significant funding shortfall. More than 160 million people across the continent are in need of humanitarian assistance. This condition has been significantly compounded by restrictive operating environments and the crisis in the Middle East, which has driven up fuel, transport and food costs; disrupted supply chains; and placed additional strain on already fragile economies and food systems.

Some of the conflict situations, notably Sudan, led to the emergence of the largest displacement crisis in the world. More than 45 million people are reported to be forcibly displaced on the continent, mostly owing to conflicts.

Eastern Africa remains one of the world’s most severe humanitarian hotspots, with 48.5 million people in need of assistance in 2026 driven by conflict, displacement, climate shocks, disease outbreaks and food insecurity. Food insecurity worsened in the second quarter, with 40.5 million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels, 1.6 million more than in the first quarter and the sharpest rises were reported, in the context of the super El Niño event, in South Sudan, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Ebola outbreak is deepening an already severe crisis, with more than 6.1 million people displaced and 26.6 million facing acute food insecurity, mostly in the conflict-affected east. Continued fighting is expected to drive further displacement, loss of livelihoods and serious violations against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence.

In West Africa, another humanitarian hotspot on the continent, OCHA estimates that 24.3 million people across the Sahel will need humanitarian assistance and protection in 2026, with deteriorating security as the main driver. In the Central Sahel, 2.8 million people are internally displaced and 401,000 children suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Seasonal flooding has added to the strain. As of the end of September 2026, seasonal rains had triggered widespread flooding throughout West and Central Africa, affecting 1.5 million people in 15 countries, with Nigeria, Ghana and DRC accounting for almost 90 per cent of those affected. The floods displaced some 595,000 people, damaged or destroyed 117,000 homes, claimed 533 lives and injured around 1,500, while also hitting 300 schools, 26 health facilities, cropland and livestock.

Despite these growing humanitarian needs, only about 26.7 per cent of the required humanitarian funding has been mobilised. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to shed light on both immediate humanitarian challenges and the longer-term question of how Africa can develop more sustainable solutions to the persistence of humanitarian crises on the continent. Africa needs to adopt both mitigation measures geared towards addressing the immediate needs and risks and resolution measures seeking to address the conditions that induce and sustain humanitarian crises, including displacement. Particular attention should be given to conflict prevention and resolution, considering that conflicts and political and security crises account for much of the humanitarian crises on the continent.

The humanitarian consequences of public health crises remain significant. In addition to the risks associated with the persistence of the Ebola outbreak in DRC, the session may also examine the growing intersection between public health emergencies, conflict, and displacement. The Ebola outbreak unfolding in DRC highlights the challenges of responding to health emergencies in environments characterised by insecurity, displacement, and weak health systems. Ongoing violence in affected areas has disrupted healthcare delivery, restricted humanitarian access, and undermined response efforts. Such situations illustrate how humanitarian crises increasingly overlap and reinforce one another, creating complex emergencies that are more difficult and costly to address.

Tomorrow’s session will also address the growing impact of climate change, with a focus on the projected 2026 super El Niño, which is expected to deepen humanitarian needs. The World Meteorological Organisation projects that Africa could face severe floods and drought between October 2026 and March 2027, as the strongest El Niño ever recorded is expected to disrupt weather patterns. This could bring heavy rainfall and severe floods to East Africa, and intense drought across Southern Africa and the Sahel. As a result, 12 countries are at the highest risk of experiencing a food crisis, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Given the early warnings, whether states and relevant continental and international entities are heeding the warning and putting in place preventive interventions and preparedness for effective response and management of the impact.

In the context of the AU’s 2026 theme, ‘Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems,’ presenters from ICRC and IFRC are expected to draw attention to the need for safeguarding water and sanitation systems, health facilities and energy infrastructure from attacks. Protecting these infrastructures is central to strengthening humanitarian resilience, reducing the economic and social costs of conflict, and advancing the protection of civilians. As the war in Sudan and its impact on infrastructure shows, the growing use of drones, AI and autonomous functions in weapon systems raises new questions about how hostilities are conducted. Conflicts have also shifted from open battlefields into densely populated cities, where harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure is far greater.

Tomorrow’s session is also expected to pay attention to the threats facing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in conflict situations, not just in Africa but globally. As pointed out in a publication supported by ICRC, ‘[w]hat makes the current moment particularly alarming is not just the widespread violations of IHL rules, but the fact that these violations are occurring without any fear of accountability, thus with impunity, and are often cloaked in attempts to justify or legitimise them.’ While not unique to it, a context that illustrates the widespread perpetration of violations of IHL with impunity is the war in Sudan, as extensively documented, including by AU and UN bodies.

Against this backdrop, the ICRC briefing is expected to call on the PSC and AU member states to reinforce political commitment to uphold IHL. In this context, it may urge AU member states to join the Global IHL Initiative, developed in response to the growing erosion in global compliance with IHL in the context of wars in various parts of the world. It is also expected to call on member states to attend the High-Level Conference scheduled to take place on 7 December 2026, in Jordan, which is the culmination of the Global IHL Initiative.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the escalating humanitarian crises across Africa, particularly the combined impact of armed conflicts, violent extremism, climate-driven extreme weather and health emergencies, as well as shrinking humanitarian financing. The Council is also expected to make a call on Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), international partners, and humanitarian actors to strengthen coordinated responses to humanitarian emergencies across the continent. On financing, the PSC may call for the development of innovative and African-owned financing solutions, including stronger engagement in domestic resource mobilisation and non-traditional sources, including through establishing a strategy for private sector partnership. In the context of the 2026 AU Theme of the Year, the PSC may urge the AU Commission and Member States to give due attention to the protection of civilian objects and essential services, including water and sanitation systems, health and education facilities, energy and communications infrastructure, whose disruption can have far-reaching humanitarian consequences for civilian populations. In the context of the intensifying Ebola outbreak, the PSC may call for the need to protect the humanitarian space and health care providers and the imperative to implement preventive measures and preparedness for response to the impacts of the super El Niño. The Council may also remind States Parties of their obligations under international law to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and put in place legal frameworks for investigation and prosecution of violations of IHL. It may welcome the Global IHL Initiative and invite AU member states to support the initiative. The PSC may reiterate the need to embed the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in all humanitarian responses and stress the need to address the root causes of humanitarian crises, notably conflicts.