Amani Africa

The African Union, the United Nations and Peacekeeping in an Evolving International Environment

Amani Africa — Thu, 12 Nov 2026 06:58:08 +0000

The African Union, the United Nations and Peacekeeping in an Evolving International Environment

Date | 12 November 2026

INTRODUCTION

Africa’s relationship with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has come full circle—not because the continent has returned to where it started, but because, after several decades of developing its own peacekeeping ambitions and capabilities, it has once again had to reckon with the continuing centrality of the UN. This relationship went through various stages: an initial phase in which African states largely looked to the UN to assume the peacekeeping responsibility, reflecting its Charter-based mandate, operational capabilities and access to resources; a timid foray into the world of peacekeeping in the early 1990s, with the authorisation and deployment of operations of limited duration and scope; the fundamental changes that accompanied the advent of the African Union (AU) in July 2000 and the adoption of the Peace and Security Council Protocol two years later, with the full-fledged introduction of peace support operations (PSOs) into the AU toolbox; and, more recently, a sober recognition of the limits to the organization’s ambitions, linked notably to logistical and financial constraints, bringing it back, in some respects, to the caution that marked the earlier period and underscoring the continuing centrality of the UN.

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La confiance infrastructure de l’intégration et de la prospérité continentale

Amani Africa — Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:51:40 +0000

La confiance infrastructure de l’intégration et de la prospérité continentale

Ambassadrice Selma Malika Haddadi, vice-présidente de la Commission de l’UA

Date | 11 novembre 2026

L’une des responsabilités les plus exigeantes qui incombent à la Vice-Présidence de la Commission de l’Union africaine consiste à veiller à ce que les ambitions collectivement définies par nos États membres puissent disposer, dans la durée, des moyens nécessaires à leur mise en œuvre. Cette responsabilité est souvent perçue comme une question de budgets, de mobilisation de ressources ou d’équilibres financiers. Elle est naturellement tout cela. Pourtant, au fil du temps, j’en suis venue à penser qu’elle renvoie également à une interrogation plus profonde, qui dépasse les seuls mécanismes de financement et touche à la manière dont nous nous approprions et organisons notre capacité collective à agir au service de nos ambitions communes.

Les contributions des États membres demeurent, et demeureront, le socle politique, institutionnel et financier de notre Union. Elles traduisent bien davantage qu’un engagement comptable ; elles expriment la volonté souveraine des États africains de porter ensemble un projet continental qui les dépasse individuellement. Rien ne saurait s’y substituer. Mais cette évidence fondamentale ne nous dispense pas d’une autre réflexion. À mesure que la mise en œuvre de l’Agenda 2063 prend progressivement corps, que les attentes de nos citoyens grandissent et que les responsabilités confiées à notre organisation continentale, à nos Communautés économiques régionales et à nos gouvernements s’élargissent, une question devient inévitable : comment permettre à l’Union africaine d’accroître progressivement sa capacité d’action sans jamais remettre en cause le rôle central des États dont elle tire sa légitimité ?

Ma conviction est que cette réponse ne réside ni dans une dépendance accrue à l’égard des financements extérieurs, ni dans une quelconque substitution aux responsabilités des États membres. Elle suppose plutôt que nous apprenions à mieux mobiliser les ressources que l’Afrique a elle-même fait émerger : ses banques et ses institutions financières, ses investisseurs et ses entreprises, ses fondations, ses diasporas, ses universités et ses centres de recherche, ainsi que cette nouvelle génération d’entrepreneurs qui transforme déjà le visage économique du continent. Pourtant, lorsque j’évoque ces ressources, je ne pense pas d’abord au financement lui-même, mais aux relations qui rendent ce financement possible et l’investissement plus attractif.

L’Afrique ne manque pas de ressources. Elle dispose aujourd’hui d’entreprises capables d’investir à l’échelle du continent, d’institutions financières de plus en plus solides, d’investisseurs institutionnels, de fonds souverains, de fonds de pension, d’une philanthropie émergente et d’une diaspora dont les capacités financières, intellectuelles et entrepreneuriales n’ont probablement jamais été aussi importantes. Pris séparément, chacun de ces acteurs constitue une force considérable. Pourtant, leur potentiel collectif demeure bien supérieur à la somme de leurs capacités individuelles, parce qu’ils continuent trop souvent à évoluer dans des univers qui se croisent davantage qu’ils ne se rencontrent véritablement.

J’ai progressivement compris que la véritable question n’était donc plus seulement de savoir comment mobiliser davantage de ressources. Elle consistait à comprendre comment créer les conditions dans lesquelles ces ressources choisiraient naturellement de converger vers une ambition commune. Autrement dit, avant d’être un défi financier, le financement devient un défi de coopération et d’appropriation.

Et toute coopération durable finit toujours par poser la même question : celle de la confiance. Mais la confiance elle-même n’est pas une réalité unique.

Il existe d’abord la confiance que les investisseurs internationaux, les partenaires et les marchés accordent au continent. Elle influence notre attractivité, le coût du capital et la capacité de nos économies à attirer les investissements dont elles ont besoin. Cette confiance demeure essentielle et continuera de l’être. Mais elle dépend de nombreux facteurs qui dépassent largement les responsabilités d’une institution continentale.

Il existe ensuite une autre confiance, plus silencieuse, qui se construit entre les Africains eux-mêmes. Celle qui conduit une banque africaine à financer une entreprise située dans un autre pays du continent, un investisseur à croire dans un projet au-delà de ses frontières, une université à collaborer avec un laboratoire d’un pays voisin, ou des entrepreneurs à bâtir ensemble des chaînes de valeur régionales. Plus cette confiance progresse, plus l’intégration cesse d’être seulement une ambition politique pour devenir une réalité économique.

Pourtant, la réflexion qui m’a conduite à écrire ces lignes porte sur une troisième forme de confiance, plus discrète encore, mais peut-être la plus déterminante pour une organisation comme l’Union africaine.

Elle naît dans cet espace où les chefs d’État, les responsables publics, les institutions panafricaines et les forces économiques du continent peuvent apprendre progressivement à mieux se connaître, à mieux comprendre leurs contraintes respectives, à identifier les opportunités et à construire ensemble une vision commune de l’intérêt général, tout en développant une véritable appropriation de cette vision.

Un ministre et un dirigeant d’entreprise peuvent souhaiter exactement la même chose : davantage d’investissements, davantage d’emplois, une économie plus compétitive. Pourtant, le premier porte la responsabilité de l’intérêt général, des équilibres sociaux, de la souveraineté et du temps politique, tandis que le second vit avec le risque, la concurrence, le coût du capital et l’obligation de décider vite. Aucun n’a tort. Ils observent simplement la même réalité depuis deux ensembles de responsabilités différents. Or il arrive encore trop souvent que ces deux mondes ne se rencontrent qu’au moment où leurs contraintes respectives sont déjà devenues des sources de désaccord.

Une telle confiance ne peut être décrétée. Elle ne naît pas davantage d’une conférence annuelle ou d’une déclaration commune.

Elle se construit lentement, lorsque le dialogue devient une habitude, que chacun apprend à comprendre les contraintes de l’autre avant de défendre les siennes et que les relations survivent aux divergences parce qu’elles reposent sur une connaissance réciproque devenue suffisamment solide.

Je crois que c’est précisément sur ce terrain que l’Union africaine peut apporter l’une de ses contributions les plus utiles, en offrant un cadre institutionnel au sein duquel de telles relations peuvent prendre racine et se développer.

Toute organisation intergouvernementale vit de la confiance que lui accordent les États membres qui l’ont créée. C’est le fondement même de sa légitimité. Mais les grandes institutions du XXIᵉ siècle devront probablement apprendre aussi à construire la confiance des forces économiques qu’elles sauront rassembler autour d’un projet commun d’intégration et de prospérité partagée, une ambition déjà formulée il y a plus de soixante ans par nos pères fondateurs. Faisant partie de la mise en œuvre du mandat que les États membres lui ont confié, ce rôle de mobilisation de la confiance vise précisément à contribuer à faire naître une appropriation commune autour de l’objectif de donner aux ambitions collectivement définies une capacité d’action plus grande que la simple somme des efforts individuels.

Car si le véritable défi consiste désormais à mieux relier les forces dont l’Afrique dispose déjà et à concentrer leur force partagée vers la réalisation de nos objectifs collectifs, il devient impossible de réfléchir au financement sans réfléchir à la manière dont nos économies se sont historiquement organisées. Les ressources ne circulent jamais au hasard. Elles empruntent les chemins que les sociétés ont progressivement dessinés au fil du temps. Comprendre les défis d’aujourd’hui et de demain suppose donc parfois de revenir sur les itinéraires d’hier.

Pendant plusieurs siècles, l’Afrique n’a pas seulement vu ses ressources exploitées et confisquées ; son espace économique a également été organisé selon une logique qui n’était pas la sienne. Les routes commerciales, les ports, les voies ferrées, les infrastructures et parfois même les frontières économiques répondaient avant tout à un même impératif : relier les territoires africains aux grands centres industriels du reste du monde bien davantage qu’à leurs voisins immédiats. L’objectif n’était plus de faire circuler la richesse à l’intérieur du continent, comme le faisaient autrefois les grandes routes transsahariennes, sahéliennes ou swahilies qui avaient vu naître de puissants centres urbains africains. Il était de plus en plus d’en organiser l’extraction et l’acheminement vers l’extérieur.

L’héritage le plus profond de cette période n’est donc peut-être pas seulement matériel, il est aussi relationnel.

Une économie est aussi une géographie des relations. Elle révèle qui échange avec qui, qui finance qui, qui produit pour qui et, finalement, qui apprend à faire confiance à qui. Pendant longtemps, les économies africaines se sont davantage habituées à commercer avec le reste du monde qu’entre elles, à rechercher des partenaires extérieurs plutôt que continentaux, et à regarder vers les grands centres économiques internationaux avant de se découvrir pleinement les unes les autres. Les habitudes de coopération se sont construites ailleurs. Les habitudes de confiance aussi. Aucune de ces trajectoires, cependant, n’est irréversible.

Depuis les indépendances, plusieurs générations d’Africaines et d’Africains travaillent précisément à les redessiner. L’Organisation de l’unité africaine, puis l’Union africaine, les Communautés économiques régionales, les institutions financières africaines, l’Agenda 2063 et ses projets phares, dont la Zone de libre-échange continentale africaine, ainsi que l’émergence d’entreprises présentes dans plusieurs régions du continent, participent d’un même mouvement historique : reconnecter progressivement l’Afrique avec elle-même.

Au fond, les économies ne se développent pas uniquement parce qu’elles échangent davantage. Elles se développent parce qu’en échangeant davantage, elles apprennent progressivement à se connaître. Chaque investissement réussi facilite le suivant. Chaque partenariat durable réduit un peu l’incertitude. Chaque projet mené en commun crée des habitudes de coopération qui rendent les initiatives futures moins risquées et plus naturelles.

À force de se fréquenter, les sociétés ne construisent pas seulement des marchés. Elles créent une ressource invisible. Cette ressource porte un nom : la confiance.

Elle est peut-être l’infrastructure la plus discrète de toutes. Elle ne figure sur aucune carte, ne se mesure ni en kilomètres ni en mégawatts, et pourtant elle réduit les distances entre la décision et l’action, rapproche l’État de l’entreprise, la recherche de l’investissement, les institutions des innovateurs et les ambitions des moyens de les réaliser. Les économies qui savent organiser cette proximité disposent d’un avantage que les statistiques peinent encore à mesurer, mais que les investisseurs reconnaissent presque immédiatement.

Cette intuition rejoint les travaux d’Elinor Ostrom, lauréate du prix Nobel d’économie en 2009. En étudiant les conditions qui permettent à des communautés de gérer durablement des ressources communes, elle observait que lorsque des individus développent des normes communes et des pratiques de réciprocité, ils construisent un capital social à partir duquel peuvent se former des arrangements institutionnels durables. La confiance n’y apparaît plus comme une simple disposition morale. Elle devient un actif collectif, capable de produire des institutions plus solides et une coopération plus durable.

Cette réflexion ne se limite d’ailleurs pas au continent africain. À Nairobi, en octobre 2026, lors du Sommet sur la confiance, j’ai eu l’occasion de souligner combien notre capacité collective à agir dépend de la qualité des relations que nous construisons. Le thème de la 81ᵉ session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies donne aujourd’hui à cette réflexion une résonance mondiale, en plaçant la restauration de la confiance au cœur de la transformation du multilatéralisme.

C’est peut-être ici que commence la prochaine conversation économique africaine, et l’Union africaine est particulièrement bien placée pour offrir un espace institutionnel naturel au sein duquel cette conversation peut être initiée, entretenue et traduite en bénéfices partagés.

Pendant longtemps, nous avons pensé l’intégration africaine comme une accumulation progressive d’institutions, d’accords, d’infrastructures et de marchés. Cette œuvre était indispensable et demeure loin d’être achevée. Mais à mesure que ces fondations prennent forme, une autre exigence apparaît. L’intégration ne consiste plus seulement à rapprocher des économies ; elle suppose désormais de rapprocher durablement les femmes et les hommes qui auront la responsabilité de la faire vivre. La prochaine étape de notre intégration est peut-être moins institutionnelle que relationnelle.

C’est précisément dans cet espace que l’Union africaine peut exercer une responsabilité particulière. Sans se substituer aux États membres, au secteur privé ou aux marchés, elle possède une capacité singulière : celle de créer les conditions d’un dialogue durable entre des acteurs qui poursuivent souvent les mêmes ambitions sans toujours partager les mêmes contraintes ni les mêmes temporalités. En ce sens, son rôle dépasse la coordination des politiques ; elle peut également agir comme un catalyseur de confiance au service de l’intérêt général africain.

Les infrastructures relient des territoires. Les institutions organisent des responsabilités. La confiance relie les volontés et ancre l’appropriation. Et c’est souvent de la rencontre de ces forces que naissent les transformations qui traversent le temps et changent durablement le cours de l’histoire.

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Trust as the Infrastructure of Continental Integration and Prosperity

Amani Africa — Wed, 11 Nov 2026 09:50:15 +0000

Trust as the Infrastructure of Continental Integration and Prosperity

Ambassador Selma Malika Haddadi, AU Commission Deputy Chairperson

Date | 11 November 2026

One of the most demanding responsibilities entrusted to the Office of the Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission is to help ensure that the ambitions collectively defined by our Member States have, over time, the means required for their implementation. This responsibility is often understood as a matter of budgets, resource mobilisation or financial balance. It is, naturally, all of these things. Yet over time, I have come to believe that it also raises a deeper question, one that goes beyond financing mechanisms alone and touches upon the way in which we take ownership of, and organise, our collective capacity to act in pursuit of our shared ambitions.

The contributions of Member States remain, and will remain, the political, institutional and financial foundation of our Union. They represent far more than an accounting commitment; they express the sovereign will of African States to carry together a continental project that transcends each of them individually. Nothing can substitute for this. Yet that fundamental principle does not relieve us of another responsibility. As the implementation of Agenda 2063 progressively takes shape, as the expectations of our citizens grow, and as the responsibilities entrusted to our continental organisation, our Regional Economic Communities and our governments expand, an unavoidable question arises: how can the African Union progressively strengthen its capacity to act without ever calling into question the central role of the States from which it derives its legitimacy?

My conviction is that the answer lies neither in greater dependence on external financing nor in any substitution for the responsibilities of Member States. Rather, it requires us to learn how to mobilise more effectively the resources that Africa itself has brought forth: its banks and financial institutions, its investors and businesses, its foundations, its diasporas, its universities and research centres, and the new generation of entrepreneurs already transforming the economic face of the continent. Yet when I speak of these resources, I am not thinking first and foremost about financing itself, but about the relationships that make financing possible and investment more compelling.

Africa does not lack resources. It now has companies capable of investing across the continent, increasingly robust financial institutions, institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, an emerging philanthropic sector and a diaspora whose financial, intellectual and entrepreneurial capacities have probably never been greater. Taken individually, each of these actors represents a considerable force. Yet their collective potential remains far greater than the sum of their individual capacities, because they too often continue to operate in worlds that intersect more often than they truly meet.

I have gradually come to understand that the real question is therefore no longer simply how to mobilise more resources. It is how to create the conditions in which those resources would naturally choose to converge around a common ambition. In other words, before financing becomes a financial challenge, it becomes a challenge of cooperation and ownership.

‘…the real question is therefore no longer simply how to mobilise more resources. It is how to create the conditions in which those resources would naturally choose to converge around a common ambition. In other words, before financing becomes a financial challenge, it becomes a challenge of cooperation and ownership.’

And every form of lasting cooperation ultimately raises the same question: that of trust. Yet trust itself is not a single reality.

There is, first, the trust that international investors, partners and markets place in the continent. It influences Africa’s attractiveness, the cost of capital and the ability of our economies to attract the investment they need. This confidence remains essential, and it will continue to be so. But it depends on many factors that extend far beyond the responsibilities of any continental institution.

There is then another, quieter form of trust, one that is built among Africans themselves. It is the trust that leads an African bank to finance a company in another country on the continent, an investor to believe in a project beyond national borders, a university to collaborate with a laboratory in a neighbouring country, or entrepreneurs to build regional value chains together. The further this confidence develops, the more integration ceases to be merely a political ambition and becomes an economic reality.

Yet the reflection that led me to write these lines concerns a third form of trust, more discreet still, but perhaps the most consequential for an organisation such as the African Union.

It emerges in the space where Heads of State, public officials, pan-African institutions and the continent’s economic actors can gradually come to know one another better, understand each other’s constraints, identify opportunities and build together a shared understanding of the common good, while developing a genuine sense of ownership over it.

A minister and a business leader may want precisely the same things: greater investment, more jobs and a more competitive economy. Yet the former carries responsibility for the public interest, social balances, sovereignty and the rhythms of political life, while the latter must contend with risk, competition, the cost of capital and the need to make decisions quickly. Neither is wrong. They are simply looking at the same reality from two different sets of responsibilities. Too often, however, these two worlds meet only once their respective constraints have already become sources of disagreement.

Such trust cannot be decreed into existence. Nor does it emerge from an annual conference or a common declaration.

It is built gradually, when dialogue becomes a habit, when each side learns to understand the constraints of the other before defending its own, and when relationships are able to survive disagreement because they rest upon sufficiently strong mutual understanding.

I believe this is precisely where the African Union can make one of its most useful contributions, by providing an institutional setting in which such relationships can take root and develop.

Every inter-governmental organisation lives by the confidence placed in it by the Member States that created it. That is the very foundation of its legitimacy. But the great institutions of the twenty-first century will probably also need to learn how to build the confidence of the economic actors they are capable of bringing together around a shared project of integration and common prosperity, an ambition already articulated more than sixty years ago by our founding fathers. As part of its effort to deliver on the mandate Member States entrusted to it, this role of mobilizing confidence seeks to help create shared sense of ownership around the objective of giving collectively defined ambitions a capacity for action greater than the simple sum of individual efforts.

For if the real challenge is increasingly to connect more effectively the forces Africa already possesses and channel their shared power into delivering on our collective objective, it becomes impossible to think about financing without also considering the way in which our economies have historically been organised. Resources never circulate at random. They follow pathways that societies have progressively drawn over time. Understanding the challenges of today and tomorrow therefore sometimes requires us to revisit the routes of yesterday.

For several centuries, Africa did not merely see its resources exploited and appropriated; its economic space was also organised according to a logic that was not its own. Trade routes, ports, railways, infrastructure and, at times, even economic boundaries were shaped above all by the same imperative: to connect African territories to the major industrial centres of the wider world far more than to their immediate neighbours. The purpose was no longer to circulate wealth within the continent, as the great trans-Saharan, Sahelian and Swahili trading networks had once done, nurturing powerful African urban centres. It was increasingly to organise its extraction and movement outward.

The deepest legacy of that period may therefore be not only material, but relational.

An economy is also a geography of relationships. It reveals who trades with whom, who finances whom, who produces for whom and, ultimately, who learns to trust whom. For a long time, African economies became more accustomed to trading with the rest of the world than with one another, to seeking external rather than continental partners, and to looking towards major international economic centres before fully discovering each other. Habits of cooperation were built elsewhere. Habits of trust were, too. None of these trajectories, however, is irreversible.

‘ For a long time, African economies became more accustomed to trading with the rest of the world than with one another, to seeking external rather than continental partners, and to looking towards major international economic centres before fully discovering each other. Habits of cooperation were built elsewhere. Habits of trust were, too. None of these trajectories, however, is irreversible.’

Since independence, successive generations of African women and men have worked precisely to redraw them. The Organisation of African Unity and later the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, African financial institutions, Agenda 2063 and its flagship projects, including the African Continental Free Trade Area, as well as the emergence of companies operating across several regions of the continent, are all part of the same historical movement: progressively reconnecting Africa with itself.

Ultimately, economies do not develop merely because they trade more. They develop because, through greater exchange, they progressively come to know one another. Every successful investment makes the next one easier. Every lasting partnership reduces uncertainty a little further. Every project undertaken together creates habits of cooperation that make future initiatives less risky and more natural.

Through sustained interaction, societies build more than markets. They create an invisible resource. That resource has a name: trust.

It may be the most discreet infrastructure of all. It appears on no map and is measured neither in kilometres nor in megawatts, yet it shortens the distance between decision and action, brings the State closer to enterprise, research closer to investment, institutions closer to innovators, and ambitions closer to the means required to realise them. Economies capable of organising such proximity enjoy an advantage that statistics still struggle to capture, but that investors recognise almost immediately.

This intuition resonates with the work of Elinor Ostrom, recipient of the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. In examining the conditions that enable communities to manage common resources sustainably, she observed that when individuals develop shared norms and practices of reciprocity, they build social capital upon which durable institutional arrangements can be constructed. Trust, in this understanding, is no longer merely a moral disposition. It becomes a collective asset capable of producing stronger institutions and more durable cooperation.

This reflection is not confined to the African continent. In Nairobi, on October 2026, at the Trust Summit, I had the opportunity to emphasise how deeply our collective capacity to act depends on the quality of the relationships we build. The theme of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly gives that reflection a global resonance today, placing the restoration of trust at the heart of the transformation of multilateralism.

It may be here that Africa’s next economic conversation begins, and the African Union is particularly well placed to provide a natural institutional space in which that conversation can be initiated, sustained and translated into shared benefit.

For a long time, we have thought of African integration as the progressive accumulation of institutions, agreements, infrastructure and markets. That work was indispensable and remains far from complete. Yet as these foundations take shape, another imperative is emerging. Integration is no longer only about bringing economies closer together; it must also bring closer, in a lasting way, the women and men who will be responsible for making that integration live. The next stage of our integration may therefore be less institutional than relational.

‘ Integration is no longer only about bringing economies closer together; it must also bring closer, in a lasting way, the women and men who will be responsible for making that integration live. The next stage of our integration may therefore be less institutional than relational.’

It is precisely in this space that the African Union can exercise a particular responsibility. Without substituting itself for Member States, the private sector or markets, it possesses a distinctive capacity: to create the conditions for sustained dialogue among actors who often pursue the same ambitions without necessarily sharing the same constraints or time horizons. In this sense, its role extends beyond policy coordination; it can also act as a catalyst of trust in the service of Africa’s common interest.

Infrastructure connects territories. Institutions organise responsibilities. Trust connects wills and anchors ownership. And it is often from the meeting of these forces that transformations emerge which endure and change the course of history.

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Climate, Peace and Security in Africa: Emerging Challenges, Institutional Responses and Future Priorities

Amani Africa — Tue, 10 Nov 2026 12:27:15 +0000

Climate, Peace and Security in Africa: Emerging Challenges, Institutional Responses and Future Priorities

10 November 2026

Tomorrow (11 November), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) is expected to convene its 1378th meeting on Climate, Peace and Security in Africa: Emerging Challenges, Institutional Responses and Future Priorities. The session takes place as the 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) opens in Antalya, Türkiye, coinciding with the first day of the World Leaders’ Summit.

The session is expected to open with remarks by Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, followed by a statement by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). A statement by the Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE) is also expected to feature. In addition, statements are expected from AU Member States, representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), and a representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).

Tomorrow’s session will be the Council’s third dedicated thematic engagement on the issue this year, following its 1331^st open session held on 19 February on the nexus between climate, peace and security and its 1344^th session held on 4 May on the impact of climate change on the crisis situations in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin region. The Council’s engagement with the climate-security nexus is a standing thematic agenda of the PSC dating to its 585^th session in March 2016, when the PSC first decided to hold annual deliberations on climate change and its implications for peace and security on the continent.

Tomorrow’s session is envisaged to provide an opportunity for the PSC to consider the progress towards and the state of the development of the CAP-CPS and provide guidance on next steps.

The development of the CAP-CPS follows a series of AU and PSC decisions beginning with the PSC’s 774^th session in May 2018, which requested a study on the climate–peace and security nexus, and continuing through the PSC’s 1051^st session in November 2021 and the AU Assembly’s 35^th Ordinary Session in February 2022, both of which called for the finalisation of a climate-security risk assessment and the development of a common African position. In response, the AU Commission, in collaboration with Adelphi, conducted the Africa Continental Climate Security Risk Assessment (ACRA), which analysed key continental climate-security risks and emerging good practices. Its findings, together with the Chairperson’s report on the climate change, peace and security nexus, were considered by the PSC at its 1184^th session in November 2023, which requested their consolidation into a comprehensive document and reaffirmed the importance of advancing a CAP-CPS.

Building on these reports, the Commission prepared a draft CAP-CPS and organised a three-day consultation in Nairobi, Kenya, from 27 to 29 August 2024, to further develop the draft. Following the consultations, at its 1240^th session, held in October 2024, the PSC, while welcoming the consultations, underscored that the development of the CAP should be data-driven and informed by contributions of Member States and African institutions. Subsequently, in November 2025, an AU Member States validation workshop was convened in Nairobi. The workshop concluded without adopting the draft CAP-CPS, instead producing a five-step roadmap towards its finalisation. Following these developments, the Council, in its February 2026 communiqué, welcomed the progress made and called for validation by national experts from all Member States ahead of Council endorsement. However, rather than undertaking further consultations, the document was subsequently circulated to Member States through digital communication, with Member States invited to provide their inputs. This approach raises questions about the extent to which the consultative and nationally driven process envisaged by the Council or the five-step roadmap adopted during the November 2025 Member States validation workshop has been pursued in the finalisation process.

While considering the key elements of the draft CAP-CPS as updated, having regard to the comments received from Member States that will be presented in tomorrow’s session, some Council members may raise questions that go to its basic rationale, its treatment of sovereignty and ownership, and its institutional design. One of the questions relates to the objective of the CAP, noting that a common position should primarily identify shared political messages for collective voice. If the CAP’s focus were on the question of how AU peace and security policy frameworks and processes, as well as peace initiatives across the conflict policy continuum from prevention to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), take account of the impact of climate change, the draft CAP would have been organised to reflect that focus and would be considered as providing guidance on how such account would be given in AU’s engagement, including its coordination globally within the framework of Article 17 of the PSC Protocol. Instead, the draft CAP‑CPS combines diverse issues, including those concerning climate policy writ large as well as impacts of climate change broadly. This raises major policy issues of strategic significance, including risks of securitisation of climate action in Africa and of the blurring of responsibilities for climate, albeit not deliberately but owing to this conflation.

The practice of the development of a CAP within the AU framework is directed towards guiding collective engagement in global policy processes concerning the subject of the CAP. With respect to climate change, the AU already has a strategy and action plan. Unlike such CAPs, the draft, as it currently stands, does not distinguish a common position for international advocacy and policy action, useful for African demands on climate finance, technology transfer, loss and damage, equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, from a mechanism for coordination with respect to CPS at continental and national levels. Instead, it reads as an operational framework providing policy guidance on national action relating to the integration of the peace and security implications of climate change impacts into national security, land, migration and development policy.

The current draft does not establish a substantially new problem. Climate stress, weak institutions, livelihood insecurity, displacement and resource competition are already addressed, in principle, through National Adaptation Plans, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), disaster-risk-reduction strategies, agricultural and pastoral policies, migration frameworks, the AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy, Agenda 2063, the Great Green Wall Initiative, African Governance Architecture, African Peace and Security Architecture and the PCRD Policy. The draft promises complementarity with this policy and institutional frameworks landscape but does not show what a common position adds. Its core justification, that action needs more integrated coordination, treats coordination as an objective rather than a demonstrated gap that demonstrably affects the trajectory of engagement on the CPS agenda. It did so without clarifying whether the real constraint is implementation of existing commitments, financing, capacity, or political will, each requiring a different remedy.

Another point of scrutiny could be the draft’s proposal for an extensive new architecture, integrated early warning, joint risk assessments, continental monitoring, data-sharing platforms, an AU-led Climate Security and Diplomacy Training Academy and new financing instruments. It is not clear whether the AU’s existing Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning System (AMHEWAS) is the kind of integrated early warning, joint risk assessments, continental monitoring and data-sharing platform that the draft CAP proposed to establish as new. A further issue is how AU’s pursuit of engagement in CPS on the basis of the CAP ensures that it does not deviate from and builds on AU’s existing collective position espoused through the continental strategy and action plan. While it calls for ‘alignment with global frameworks’, it is not specific in affirming existing international legal commitments within the framework of UNFCCC on financing, adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage. Of significance is the affirmation of the draft CAP of the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, although this foundational framework is referenced in the document only in three instances. Another aspect of the draft that deserves attention is the implementation modality. In this respect, the draft leans heavily on partnerships with donors, International Financial Institutions, the UN and the private sector, potentially inviting questions on policy coherence, conditionalities, decisions on priorities and control of data, as well as implications of such arrangements for policy autonomy on agendas on migration, balancing Africa’s development imperative and climate action, border control or critical minerals.

Beyond the CAP-CPS, the session is expected to address both how effective implementation of existing commitments under the UNFCCC in climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage and technology transfer can help address the peace and security implications of the impact of climate change and the need for enhancing access to climate finance for fragile and conflict-affected countries, which currently enjoy the least access. At the continental and global levels, the session may further underscore that climate-peace and security considerations are dealt with as part, rather than outside, of Africa’s climate policy processes and international engagements, including through CAHOSCC, the G20 and COP31, to ensure that the measures required to address the impact of climate change, including loss and damage, take full account of the role of climate as a threat multiplier having a bearing on existing security and conflict dynamics.

The outcome of the session is expected to be a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm that climate change acts as a risk multiplier, intensifying existing political, socio-economic and governance vulnerabilities rather than serving as a cause of conflict. In this context, the Council is expected to welcome progress towards finalising the Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace and Security (CAP-CPS), while reiterating the importance of Member State ownership, inclusive national consultations, data-driven analysis and coherence with existing AU and regional frameworks. The PSC may also stress that the CAP-CPS is meant to focus on the question of how AU peace and security policy frameworks and processes, as well as peace initiatives across the conflict policy continuum from prevention to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), take account of and be informed by the impact of climate change to ensure that preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, mediation, peace support operations and PCRD engagements are fit for purpose. PSC may reiterate its call for practical measures to mainstream climate considerations into conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including the integration of climate-related conflict indicators into early warning and risk assessment systems, improved coordination between early warning, humanitarian and response mechanisms, and stronger collaboration among the AU, RECs/RMs, Member States and relevant regional actors. The PSC is also expected to express concern over the persistent gap between Africa’s climate-financing needs and available resources, and call for scaled-up, predictable, accessible and grant-based financing, with enhanced access to climate finance particularly for fragile and conflict-affected countries. Finally, the PSC may underscore that climate-peace and security considerations are dealt with as part, rather than outside, of Africa’s climate policy processes and international engagements, within the framework of CAHOSCC, the G20 and COP31 as critical considerations to reinforce Africa’s existing positions in global climate policy processes.

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Unconstitutional changes of government in Somalia and South Sudan?

Amani Africa — Mon, 09 Nov 2026 13:39:55 +0000

Unconstitutional changes of government in Somalia and South Sudan?

Date | 9 November 2026

There are no military coups in Somalia and South Sudan. Unconstitutional change of government is not, however, limited to instances of military seizure of power only. As established in the Lomé Declaration and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), there are four other instances in addition to a coup d’etat that constitute unconstitutional changes of government. Of relevance for the context of both Somalia and South Sudan is one of the two instances of unconstitutional retention of power by incumbents. This most particularly concerns Article 23(5) of ACDEG, which involves unconstitutional retention of power through the adoption of constitutional or legal changes that constitute ‘an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’.

Throughout 2026, there has been growing political contestation in Somalia involving constitutional disputes. This most recent round of political crisis resulted from the confrontation among the various political forces in Somalia over the contentious process of the revision of the 2012 Constitution and the model for the conduct of elections. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has pursued a transition from the longstanding indirect, clan-based electoral system to universal suffrage under a one-person, one-vote model. Despite fierce rejection of the process and outcome of the constitutional revision by the opposition, President Mohamud pushed through parliament the contested constitutional amendments in March 2025.

Opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s and parliament’s mandates and maintain that his continuation in power and that of the parliament are constitutionally illegitimate. The resultant political impasse subsequently escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President of Somalia ahead of the planned protest that precipitated the boiling over of the mounting tension into armed confrontation. On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The constitutional dispute has since taken a more consequential turn. Last month, Somalia’s opposition filed an application to the Supreme Court of Somalia to determine the constitutionality of the process of the revision of the constitution and extension of the term of office of the President and Parliament. On 5 November 2026, the Supreme Court handed down a judgment on this application after consideration of the submissions of the applicants and the respondent, declaring extension of term of office of federal institutions, including the President’s unconstitutional. The five Supreme Court Judges unanimously decided that the constitutional amendments adopted in 2026 did not extend the four-year mandates of the incumbent federal institutions, declaring that the mandates of the Parliament and the Federal Government expired on 14 April and 15 May 2026, respectively. The ruling also invalidated decisions taken by these institutions after those dates, and tasked the government to perform routine caretaker functions. The Supreme Court also directed political stakeholders to agree on a consensus electoral framework within 30 days and conduct elections within 90 days.

Supreme Court of Somalia

In response to the Supreme Court’s exercise of its mandate, President Mohamud rejected the ruling of the Court and announced the replacement of the President of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice warned of threats to his life and violent interference by the government following the seizure by armed forces of the premises of the Supreme Court. In response, Ben Saul, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, has publicly called on Somalia’s leadership to respect the independence of the Supreme Court, constitutional procedures and limits on presidential terms.

For the AU, this development presents the latest instance in which the question of the application of Article 23 (5) of the ACDEG arises. While the application of this provision to the case of Somalia was not clear-cut between the expiry of the term of office of federal institutions in April and May 2026 and the determination of constitutionality by the Supreme Court, the 5 November Supreme Court ruling leaves no doubt as to the applicability of this provision. The fact that the Court ruled unanimously makes the case more compelling. Under the circumstances, the refusal of the President to respect the decision of the Court represents a case of infringement of the principles of democratic change of government envisaged in Article 23(5) of ACDEG, warranting the invocation by the AU Peace and Security Council of its Article 7(1)(g) mandate.

The situation in South Sudan, while not the same as Somalia, invites similar questions about the conformity of measures that the Government of South Sudan took in recent months with Article 23(5) of ACDEG. The transitional system of governance of South Sudan is governed through the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The R-ARCSS, under Articles 8.2 and 8.3, makes the Agreement supreme over the Constitution and national law. The R-ARCSS, whose compliance during the transitional process is determined by the Revitalised-Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Commission (R-JEMC), requires under Article 1.9.4, consensus of the signatory parties to the Agreement, including the first vice president who signed the agreement as leader of the SPLM/A-IO, for any changes to the transitional system of governance and implementation of the Agreement.

Despite this and under the pretext of the convening of elections, President Salva Kiir, one of the signatories of the R-ARCSS, unilaterally not only secured the passage of Constitutional Amendment No. 13 and the Election Act Amendments in September but also dissolved, on 22 September, by Presidential Decree, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), the national and State legislatures and all State and Administrative Area governments, removed the First Vice President and four Vice Presidents, and appointed a caretaker administration answerable to him alone. The amendments and dissolution were adopted outside the procedures laid down in the R-ARCSS (Arts. 1.9.4 and 8.4), which the Transitional Constitution still declares supreme (Arts. 8.2, 8.3 and 1.18.2). These measures were also adopted by bypassing R-JEMC, the institution mandated to monitor compliance with R-ARCSS.

President Salva Kiir signing the decree dissolving RTGoNU on 22 September 2026

It was within this context that the UN Human Rights Commission on South Sudan warned of the steps taken by President Kiir’s government as amounting to a ‘constitutional coup’. The contention is that the amendments and the Presidential Decree were adopted without compliance with established constitutional governance processes of South Sudan and, as such, infringe the principles of democratic change of government, contrary to Article 23(5) of ACDEG.

As with the case of Somalia, the developments in South Sudan invite the consideration of the application of Article 23(5) of ACDEG and the exercise by the PSC of its Article 7(1)(g) responsibility. Additionally, South Sudan also raises a major question about the legality or legitimacy of the electoral processes to be undertaken under such circumstances.

These two cases in Somalia and South Sudan are not a typical manifestation of unconstitutional change of government that takes the form of military seizure of power. Yet, the constitutionality question that they both raise is no less serious as far as the AU norm on unconstitutional change of government is concerned. The trend so far shows that the AU does not respond as strongly and proactively to such cases as it does to coups. The two cases present the AU with the opportunity, at the very least, to make an assessment of their compliance with Article 23(5) of ACDEG and to demonstrate that it is serious about upholding its norm on unconstitutional changes of government beyond coups. Ignoring these cases would further accentuate the crisis of credibility facing AU’s enforcement of the norm on Unconstitutional Changes of Government.

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Briefing on the activities of AUSSOM

Amani Africa — Mon, 09 Nov 2026 05:10:23 +0000

Briefing on the activities of AUSSOM

Date | 9 November 2026

Tomorrow (10 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet to receive a briefing on the activities of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The meeting comes amid significant developments in Somalia’s political and security landscape, as well as mounting funding challenges that threaten the mission’s sustainability and future.

Following opening remarks by Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver a statement. The representatives of Somalia and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM, is expected to brief the Council.

It is expected that tomorrow’s session will focus on the immediate existential crisis facing the nearly two-decade-old AU mission in Somalia and take policy decisions on ensuring orderly drawdown and exit of AUSSOM on an accelerated timeline while minimising risk of major security vacuum. Tomorrow’s meeting also comes ahead of the Security Council’s private meeting on AUSSOM scheduled for 18 November in advance of the reauthorization of AUSSOM’s mandate in December.

While the financial crisis facing AUSSOM is not new, the mission’s existential crisis is associated with its imminent loss of the logistics and operational support it receives from the UN. In contrast to the financial crisis, which does not endanger the immediate end of the mission, the end of the UN’s logistics support will automatically cripple AUSSOM given the lack of any comparable arrangement to replace the UN’s support. Although there were warnings the AU mission should plan for its possible early exit, it took a US decision opposing the renewal of the mandate on UN support to AUSSOM to set clear timeline on end of UN logistics support, putting the continuity of the mission beyond end of its current mandate in to serious question. In a letter dated 1 July 2026, the United States (US) Mission to the AU (USAU) notified the AU of the US decision to discontinue its support for the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond the current AUSSOM authorisation period, which expires on 31 December. Given UNSOS’s mandate to provide logistical and operational support to AUSSOM, the end of UNSOS at the expiry of its current mandate would freeze AUSSOM’s operations. This triggered the convening of the AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs) extraordinary summit in Kampala, Uganda, from 29 to 31 July to discuss the situation. According to the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the summit, the TCCs, among other things, ‘stressed the need for an orderly, coordinated and phased exit of AUSSOM.’ The summit also underscored the need for sustained support to the mission for a period of 18 to 24 months ‘to enable the implementation of agreed milestones, strengthen the capacity of Somali security institutions and facilitate the orderly transfer of security responsibilities.’

The summit’s outcome was expected to be submitted to the AUPSC for endorsement and subsequent transmission to the Security Council. However, the AUPSC is only meeting tomorrow to discuss AUSSOM for the first time since the Kampala summit.

The US, in a letter dated 1 September 2026, did not agree to the AUSSOM TCCs’ request for sustained support over 18 to 24 months, indicating instead that it is only prepared to allow UNSOS sufficient time to liquidate its operations through a 12-month drawdown process until the end of 2027. According to the US, this would also give AUSSOM time to prepare for the withdrawal of UNSOS support.

Against this backdrop, the AUPSC’s deliberations tomorrow are likely to shape decisions on the mission’s future beyond December. The most likely option is a final one-year renewal of AUSSOM’s mandate, bringing forward its originally scheduled exit, which had been envisaged for the end of 2029. In this regard, the AUPSC faces the daunting challenge of ensuring the mission’s drawdown and eventual exit without undermining the political and security gains achieved over the past two decades at enormous human and material cost. The key objective over the coming year will be to facilitate an orderly transition and drawdown, ensuring the handover of security responsibilities to Somali security forces without creating a security vacuum.

During the annual consultations between members of the United Nations Security Council and the AUPSC, held in New York from 22 to 23 October, identifying and optimising resources and support for AUSSOM was among the issues discussed. AUPSC members once again proposed invoking the resolution 2719 framework to address the mission’s financial constraints. However, the joint communiqué adopted by the two Councils contained only a broad reference to the issue, underscoring the importance of identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, as well as the need for an orderly, coordinated and phased transition of the mission. It also reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Somali federal government for ensuring security in the country.

During their stay in New York, AUPSC members also met with Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support Atul Khare to discuss the logistical and operational support UNSOS provides to AUSSOM, particularly in light of the US decision to suspend its contribution to UNSOS at the end of this year.

Meanwhile, Uganda has begun withdrawing its forces from Somalia, starting with those deployed under bilateral arrangements. Ugandan forces serving under AUSSOM are reportedly also expected to withdraw in phases next year. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Kampala in an effort to persuade Uganda to maintain its military presence but appears to have been unsuccessful. Ugandan troops have been deployed in Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu, and their withdrawal could have significant implications for the federal government’s security efforts. Reuters reported that, in a 31 October letter to UNSOS, AUSSOM warned that ‘the withdrawal of Ugandan forces could leave parts of the Lower Shabelle region to Al-Shabaab attacks’. Recognising this impending risk, it seems that Somalia is engaging with its bilateral partners to fill the void.

On the political front, the constitutional and political crisis in Somalia has continued to deepen. Disagreements between the federal government and federal member states over the extension of presidential and parliamentary terms, as well as the modalities for holding national elections, have escalated into a major political crisis. Two days ago, Somalia’s Supreme Court invalidated the extensions of the presidential and parliamentary terms, which had been approved in March through a constitutional amendment adopted by the federal parliament. The extensions had been a major point of contention between the federal government and the opposition, which maintains that the mandates of parliament and the president expired on 14 April and 15 May, respectively. Following the court’s ruling, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reportedly dismissed Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf, further escalating political tensions. The Supreme Court rejected the move, arguing that the President’s move was intended to obstruct the implementation of its decision.

Meanwhile, the Somali electoral commission announced a new electoral calendar last month, scheduling parliamentary elections for 15 April and the presidential election for 15 May. However, the Somali Future Council, a major opposition alliance, rejected the proposed timetable, arguing that it had been established without inclusive consultations with Somalia’s key political stakeholders. On 26 October, President Mohamud called for a national dialogue with the opposition, scheduled to take place from 14 to 18 November. While the Supreme Court’s ruling called for negotiation, it specified that elections should be held in 90 days.

The political divide is further compounded by tensions between the federal government and two federal member states, Puntland and Jubaland, both of which suspended relations with Mogadishu in 2024. The federal government’s attempt to resolve its differences with Jubaland through military force in late 2024 appears to have backfired. Meanwhile, relations with Puntland remain strained, with the two sides locked in a significant political and military standoff. Clashes between the federal government and Puntland forces have been reported over the past months.

In Southwest State, the federal government removed the region’s president by force in March. He has since mobilised his forces, known as Darwish, and retook several towns in the region encircling Baidoa, the regional capital. Tension is also rising in Hirshabelle state, mainly driven by clan dynamics and disputes with the federal government over regional elections. The regional state was formed in 2016 by the merger of two regions, Hirraan and Middle Shabelle. Major clans in the Hirraan region feel it is their turn to assume the presidency of the Hirshabelle state. These clans are trying to emulate the Darwish forces in the neighbouring Southwest State to put up resistance against the federal government. Tensions are escalating rapidly, with the federal government deploying forces near the residence of traditional leader Ugaas Yusuf Ugaas Hassan Ugaas in Beledweyne, the capital of the Hiraan region.

Al-Shabaab has sought to exploit the political crisis to recapture lost territory and further undermine the federal government. AUSSOM continues to support the federal government’s offensive operations against Al-Shabaab in accordance with its mandate. However, with the mission left with only a maximum of one year after the end of its current mandate on 31 December 2026, there is a need to find a replacement for its role in backstopping efforts of Somali forces to fend off Al-Shabaab’s push to gain territories under government control and avoid the emergence of the Afghanistan scenario in Mogadishu.

These developments are unfolding against the backdrop of rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which have made Somalia a battlefield for geopolitical competition involving major powers, Arab and Gulf states, and regional actors. And yet, Somalia is not receiving the international attention it warrants, as competing and pressing crises elsewhere divert attention. However, any further deterioration in its political and security situation could have far-reaching implications for the wider region, which is already grappling with multiple crises.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the contributions of AUSSOM and TCCs for the stabilisation of Somalia under very difficult circumstances. It may reiterate its concerns about the financial crisis affecting the effective functioning of the mission and may urge the AU Commission to sustain efforts for mobilising additional funds to fill the huge funding shortfall facing AUSSOM. The PSC may also appeal to all partners, including those who played a leading role in funding AUSSOM, to provide further funding to the mission to enable it to execute its mandate effectively for the remainder of its mandate to be renewed in December in a way that ensures that no major security vacuum emerges and the Afghanistan scenario is prevented in the event of its accelerated withdrawal. Taking note of the letters from the US, the PSC may also commend UNSOS for the logistics support it provides to AUSSOM and may request, in this context, the UNSC to extend the support of UNSOS to AUSSOM for the duration of the mandate of UNSOS beyond December 2026. In view of the fundamental changes that the end of UNSOS at the end of December 2027 introduces on the timelines of AUSSOM’s continuity in Somalia, the PSC may request the AU Commission to prepare and present a transitional plan for the accelerated drawdown and exit of AUSSOM, along with a Concept of Operations on the operation of the mission for the duration of the process of drawdown and transition. It may also request that the transitional plan put forward proposals on ways of preventing the emergence of a security vacuum, including through facilitating the retention of some AUSSOM troops beyond the end of 2027 on a bilateral basis, with some support from the AU. The PSC may also express its grave concern over the deteriorating political and constitutional crisis that is accentuating the security crisis in Somalia. In this regard, it may urge Somali political forces to respect the decision of the Supreme Court of Somalia and use the decision as an opportunity to exit the deepening security and constitutional crisis and negotiate an agreement on the holding of elections within the framework of the guidelines set in the Court’s decision.

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SEVENTEENTH (17TH) ANNUAL JOINT CONSULTATIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

Amani Africa — Fri, 06 Nov 2026 17:55:44 +0000

https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Joint-Communique-17th-EU-AU-PSC-to-PSC-EN.pdf

The post SEVENTEENTH (17TH) ANNUAL JOINT CONSULTATIVE MEETING BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE appeared first on Amani Africa.

17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC

Amani Africa — Thu, 05 Nov 2026 06:15:21 +0000

17^th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC

Date | 5 November 2026

Tomorrow (6 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 17^th annual joint consultative meeting, following the 9^th informal joint retreat taking place today.

Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to deliver opening remarks.

The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting. During the negotiation on the agenda for the informal retreat and the consultative meeting, there were some items that were proposed by both sides that did not make it to the final agenda due to a lack of agreement. These include Peace Support Operations and UNSC Resolution 2719, the role of exploitation of natural resources in conflicts, Somalia, the situation in the Horn of Africa & Ukraine as a standalone agenda.

The agenda remains largely unchanged from last year, except that the item previously framed as Somalia and AUSSOM now focuses exclusively on AUSSOM. Other agenda items include the situations in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Notably, South Sudan remains absent from the agenda despite the significant deterioration in its political and security situation since March and the country’s planned first elections since independence in 2011, scheduled for 22 December 2026. As in last year’s meeting, the two sides are also expected to discuss global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’, at the initiative of the EUPSC.

On AUSSOM

Ethiopia, Uganda, and Côte d’Ivoire are expected to take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Finland, Cyprus, Slovakia and Denmark from the EU side. The engagement comes at a critical juncture for the AU mission in Somalia, as AUSSOM faces mounting financial, logistical, political and operational challenges that cast uncertainty over its immediate future.

On 2 November, Uganda’s acting military spokesperson announced the commencement of troop withdrawals from Somalia after two decades of deployment. According to the spokesperson, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) had begun withdrawing troops deployed under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government of Somalia, effective immediately. The withdrawal of around 2,000 troops under these arrangements is expected to be completed within days, while Ugandan troops serving under AUSSOM will be withdrawn gradually by the end of 2027.

This development adds to the uncertainty surrounding AUSSOM, which has faced severe funding shortfalls since its launch in January 2025. These challenges were further compounded by the announcement from the US in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires at the end of this year.

It was against this context that AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs) convened their second Extraordinary Summit in Kampala on 31 July. The Summit called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UN Security Council to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. Such an arrangement would facilitate the achievement of agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated the foreign ministers of TCCs, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.

While the US later on announced that it would allow a one-year period for the drawdown of UNSOS by the end of 2027 without a commitment to extend the logistical support by UNSOS to AUSSOM, there is so far no plan on how to fill in the end of the logistical support from UNSOS.

In tomorrow’s consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are therefore expected to exchange on options for managing the financial and logistical uncertainty facing AUSSOM at the end of its current mandate by the end of December 2026 and the associated security vacuum this may create. The application of Resolution 2719 is likely to remain a key issue, particularly as successive PSC–UN Security Council consultations have failed to reach agreement on its application to AUSSOM due to US opposition. It remains to be seen whether the PSC and EUPSC will reaffirm their common position on the framework as a viable financing mechanism, as they did last year. It is recalled that the joint communiqué adopted at their previous consultative meeting stressed the need to fully and effectively implement Resolution 2719 to ensure predictable, sustainable and adequate financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations, including AUSSOM, as the only viable way of securing the gains that have been made so far. Given that the EU has been the largest single financial contributor to the AU missions in Somalia, providing nearly €2.7 billion since 2007, the two sides may also call on other international partners to increase their support for AUSSOM.

Most significant for tomorrow’s consultation is the preparation and implementation of a realistic transition plan for the managed unwinding of AUSSOM, as well as mitigating security risks that may arise from an unplanned and rushed withdrawal of AUSSOM.

Sudan

In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that DRC, Ethiopia, Algeria and Somalia will make statements from the AUPSC side and Slovenia, Poland, the Netherlands, France and Germany will make lead remarks for the EUPSC side.

Discussions are expected to build on the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum, with some from the PSC likely to share observations on what they encountered and established during the field mission. There have been notable developments since then, both in the conflict dynamics and the regional and extra-regional entanglement in the conflict, which may also attract some engagement. The consultation is also expected to focus on ongoing diplomatic initiatives and peace efforts. In this regard, both sides may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.

Efforts to coordinate diplomatic initiatives would also receive attention. On 23 September, the Quintet and Quad held their first joint high-level meeting, bringing together the two coordination mechanisms. This was followed by the sixth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination of peace initiatives in Sudan, held in Geneva on 21 October. The meeting brought together countries sponsoring major peace initiatives, members of the Quad, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Quintet, and neighbouring and regional countries, with the aim of aligning diplomatic efforts around the urgent needs of the Sudanese people.

On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded from the process. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and criticised the position of the Commission, warning that a military-controlled political process without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division. Against this backdrop, the PSC and EUPSC are likely to reaffirm the need for a humanitarian truce and cessation of hostilities as steps towards a permanent ceasefire, followed by an inclusive national dialogue and civilian-led political transition.

External involvement in the conflict may also feature in tomorrow’s discussion. The September 2026 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. The two sides are therefore expected to condemn external interference and call on external actors to cease providing support to the belligerents.

Eastern DRC

The draft agenda envisages that France, Croatia, Belgium and Germany will take the lead in delivering intervention from the side of the EU, while South Africa and Gabon will take the lead on the side of the AU. The two sides are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across the various mediation tracks, particularly AU-led mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ shuttle diplomacy in October, which included meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October, aimed at advancing existing peace commitments.

Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including the establishment of its secretariat and reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. This was followed by a meeting of military officials from the DRC and Rwanda, alongside representatives of the AU, the US and Qatar, in Garmisch, Germany, on 20–22 October. However, tensions have persisted, with the US imposing financial and asset-blocking sanctions on Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and the Zagima Credit and Saving Society, a financial institution serving Rwanda’s security services, on 28 October, citing continued support for M23. On 2 November, the US also announced the termination of Rwanda’s eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire, with continued fighting in North and South Kivu, increasing use of armed drones and mounting civilian suffering. According to Africa CDC figures, the latest Ebola outbreak has surpassed 10,000 cases and 5,000 deaths. Another notable development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition comprising M23 and other groups under former President Joseph Kabila, further complicating the conflict dynamics. During a recent engagement with UN officials led by MONUSCO head James Swan, the coalition reportedly threatened to withdraw from the Doha Framework Agreement if the government proceeded with its proposed constitutional referendum.

As in previous consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are expected to condemn the destabilising activities of armed groups in eastern DRC, call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and demand the unconditional withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). They may also call for the dismantling of parallel administrative structures established by M23 in areas under its control and reiterate their condemnation of the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in eastern DRC.

Sahel and Lake Chad

The draft agenda envisages that Spain, Czechia, Malta and Denmark will take a lead in making an intervention from the side of the EU, while Morocco, DRC, Nigeria, Algeria and Cameroon will lead the intervention from the side of the PSC.

The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated further since the October 2025 PSC–EUPSC consultative meeting, marked by intensified terrorist attacks. On 25 April, JNIM and Tuareg separatist fighters launched coordinated attacks across Mali, targeting Bamako and military installations. In Niger, the January attack on Diori Hamani International Airport by Islamic State Sahel Province was followed by another attack by JNIM in June.

PSC may highlight the AU’s intensified diplomatic engagement with Sahelian states. AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf visited Mali in July and subsequently Burkina Faso, reaffirming the AU’s commitment to constructive engagement. At its 1356^th session, the PSC welcomed these efforts and called for continued high-level engagement, including with Niger, to support political transitions and confidence-building. The AU High Representative Mamadou Tangara also participated in the inaugural ECOWAS–AES ministerial dialogue in Dakar on 17 October, reaffirming the AU’s readiness to facilitate cooperation between the two blocs through MISAHEL.

On the EUPSC side, it may also highlight that the EU has recalibrated its engagement, including the appointment of Birgitte Nygaard Markussen as its new Special Representative for the Sahel in July to advance its renewed regional approach and strengthen political dialogue. The European Parliament also examined options for re-engaging with the Sahel in July.

The Dakar talks between ECOWAS and AES, which established joint working groups to develop a framework for future cooperation, offer an opportunity to rebuild regional security coordination despite the AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS. The PSC and EUPSC are likely to welcome this development during tomorrow’s consultations and may explore ways to better coordinate their approaches and support efforts to comprehensively address the multidimensional challenges of the region.

With respect to Lake Chad, as in previous years, tomorrow’s consultations are expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, progress in implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR), and the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The two sides are likely to express concern over the persistent threats posed by Boko Haram, ISWAP and other terrorist groups despite the MNJTF’s efforts to degrade their operational capabilities. Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 has further complicated regional security efforts. At its 1347^th session, the PSC expressed deep concern over the resulting security vulnerabilities and urged Niger to reconsider its decision and resume full participation in the MNJTF, a call the two sides may reiterate.

The MNJTF’s financial constraints and operational gaps are also expected to feature during the consultation. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its position from the 1318^th session and explore with its EU counterparts the possibility of applying UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to support the MNJTF. The two sides may also commend the EU’s sustained support for the MNJTF and broader peace, security, stabilisation, recovery and resilience efforts in the region.

AOB (for information only)

As in last year’s meeting, the agenda also includes an item under Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments, proposed by the EUPSC. While Cyprus, Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania are envisaged to lead the intervention on the side of the EU, no representation is envisaged from the side of the AU. As in past years, it is anticipated that the situation in Ukraine is expected to be the main focus of the intervention of the representatives of the four countries from the EU side.

The consultative meeting will conclude with closing remarks by the joint chairs of the consultative meeting, the EUPSC Permanent Chair and the AU PSC Chairperson.

Joint communiqué

As host of the consultation, the PSC initiated a draft joint communiqué, which it finalised and shared with the EUPSC on the afternoon of 3 November. It is recalled that the two sides failed to adopt a joint communiqué between 2022 and 2024 due to disagreements over the inclusion of language referencing the war in Ukraine. Last year, however, they broke this trend and succeeded in adopting a joint communiqué, raising expectations that they will do so again at this year’s consultative meeting. It is anticipated that, while there will be no standalone statement or paragraph dedicated to Ukraine, the formulation used during the last consultative meeting will cover Ukraine in a list of conflict situations about which the two sides are concerned.

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9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC

Amani Africa — Wed, 04 Nov 2026 05:40:33 +0000

9^th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC

Date | 4 November 2026

Tomorrow (5 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 9^th informal joint retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ahead of their 17^th annual joint consultative meeting on 6 November.

Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to co-chair the informal seminar. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and a representative from the EU are also expected to address the retreat.

Since 2015, the PSC and EUPSC have institutionalised informal retreats ahead of their annual consultations to address thematic peace and security issues. This year’s retreat will cover four items: maritime security; AU/EU efforts on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; AI governance, peace and security; and Women, Peace and Security.

Maritime Security

The agenda envisages that Spain, Greece and Romania will take the lead in delivering intervention on the side of the EU. It is to be recalled that this agenda featured in last year’s informal retreat. It is worth recalling that this item also featured in the AU-EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025, whereby the ministers in their Joint Communiqué ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’

As in the earlier retreat, the two sides are expected to review developments across Africa’s maritime domain, assess existing cooperation and identify priorities for strengthening joint responses. There are dynamic developments in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans that affect the maritime interests of African states and the maritime and trade route interests of European states. As choke point geopolitics intensifies and the maritime domain acquires increasing economic significance, there is a rising need in Africa to secure and invest in Africa’s maritime zones and in both Africa and Europe to enhance the security of global trade routes. In terms of recent developments, it is expected that the impact of agreements on ports and maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea may attract attention. The decline in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, supported by the Yaoundé Architecture and coordinated regional and international efforts, constitutes a major progress. Yet maritime insecurity has become increasingly complex, with persistent threats from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, trafficking, oil theft and transnational organised crime. In the Red Sea, some of the notable developments involve conflicts and geopolitical tensions, including the impact of the war between the US and Israel against Iran and the emergence of Houthi threats on the Red Sea, endangering major maritime corridors, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, forcing shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope and contributing to the resurgence of piracy activities off the Somali coast. The expansion of terrorist activities towards West Africa’s coastal states also raises concerns over maritime routes being exploited for arms trafficking, illicit financing and movement of fighters.

The PSC side may highlight continental and regional frameworks, notably the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, the Yaoundé Architecture and the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Particular attention may be given to progress towards operationalising the Combined Maritime Task Force in the Gulf of Guinea, which the PSC considers an important step towards an African-led, ready-to-deploy maritime security capability. For its part, the EUPSC is expected to highlight its maritime engagements, including Operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, both mandated until February 2027; the Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative in the Gulf of Guinea; and the various maritime capacity-building programmes across the continent. Another recent development that may feature under this agenda item is the July 2026 EU–Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement for ASPIDES.

Against this background, a key issue for the retreat is how to leverage and boost existing African-led maritime governance frameworks and security arrangements at continental, regional and national levels for enhancing the safety of maritime trade routes, coordination between existing AU and EU maritime initiatives, particularly through intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, joint operational planning and capacity-building.

AU/EU Efforts on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

It is expected that Ethiopia, Cameroon, Somalia and Togo will take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Austria, Hungary and Slovakia from the EU side. Terrorism remains one of Africa’s most pressing security threats. Despite a global decline in terrorism-related fatalities, Africa has become the main epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for around 70–75 per cent of global fatalities, according to a report presented at the PSC’s 1354^th session in July 2026.

The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters, as well as the operationalisation of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter Terrorism. However, mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorist threats. These challenges informed the PSC’s ministerial meeting on ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa,’ held on the margins of the 81^st UN General Assembly in September. At its 1354^th session, the PSC also expressed its grave concern about the ‘downturn in international cooperation, including the withdrawal of technical and financial support to peace support operations in Africa, attributed to the shift in national policies and escalating geopolitical fragmentation,’ a concern that the PSC is likely to raise during tomorrow’s engagement.

For its part, the EUPSC may highlight its extensive counterterrorism engagement in Africa, combining operational assistance with support for criminal justice institutions and prevention of violent extremism. According to EU figures, Africa receives 72 per cent of its €659 million counterterrorism and prevention programming. Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has supported AU missions in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the SADC mission in Mozambique, alongside bilateral military assistance. Its support also extends to counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, border security, countering terrorist financing and community-based prevention programmes, particularly in the Sahel, West African coastal states and East Africa. Recent initiatives include the €45 million SecFin Africa programme (2024–2028) targeting illicit financial flows and terrorist financing, and the €30 million Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme (2024–2028), supporting security and criminal justice capacities in West Africa.

In this context, the retreat offers an opportunity to address gaps in coordination and the sustainability of counterterrorism efforts, particularly amid declining international financing for African-led peace operations, including the AU mission in Somalia. Beyond sustaining operational support and coordination, as well as the role that natural resources exploitation is playing in fueling war economies in affected regions, there are also major issues, including how to address the trust deficit that affects policy coherence both on the continent and between the AU and EU and the need for a shift from security-heavy instruments to investment in long-term interventions that address underlying conditions of fragility.

AI Governance, Peace and Security

In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that Poland and Latvia will speak for the EU and Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC are expected to lead in making interventions on the side of the AU. Artificial intelligence (AI) has gained increasing prominence on the agenda of the PSC. During tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC may highlight its efforts to establish a continental AI governance framework and the progress made so far. Its engagement on AI governance, peace and security began at its 1214^th session in June 2024, which recognised AI’s potential for conflict prevention, early warning and peacebuilding, while raising concerns over the risks associated with its rapid development in the absence of adequate regulation. At that session, the Council requested a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, and the establishment of a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and governance to propose continental governance options, including for military applications. The advisory group was established in March 2025.

At its 1267^th session, held at the ministerial level in March 2025, the PSC called for mainstreaming AI in peace support operations, early warning and preventive diplomacy, alongside the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. At another ministerial-level meeting, its 1339^th session in April 2026, the Council emphasised the need for Africa to shape, develop and control its own AI technologies to safeguard its sovereignty across the AI ecosystem. It also underscored the importance of digital and data sovereignty and requested the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of an African Fund for AI. Given Africa’s limited influence over the development of AI systems, the Council further stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in international norm-setting through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement in multilateral forums.

The retreat provides an opportunity for both sides to exchange experiences and explore practical areas of cooperation in AI governance, peace and security. Particular attention could be given to translating the AU’s growing policy commitments into institutional capabilities, including through capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and cooperation on the responsible use of AI in conflict prevention, particularly by exploring the integration of AI-enabled tools into the Continental Early Warning System. The discussions could also explore ways to strengthen coordination on emerging international AI norms, ensuring that African perspectives and priorities are adequately reflected in global AI norms and governance.

Women, Peace and Security

It is expected that South Africa and Uganda will lead the AU’s intervention on this agenda, and Ireland, Malta and Italy will take the lead on the side of the EU. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been a standing agenda item of the PSC since March 2010. Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Council held 28 dedicated sessions, progressively expanding its engagement from the protection of women in conflict to their meaningful participation in conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Key institutional developments include the Office of the AU Special Envoy on WPS, FemWise-Africa, the Continental Results Framework (CRF) for monitoring implementation, and the Swakopmund Process, a biennial, rotational platform for PSC engagement with WPS actors that has contributed to advancing gender parity policy for all AU-led and co-led mediation processes.

This is an area on which there has been growing collaboration between the AU and the EU. The EU and individual EU member states have provided and remain major sources of support to AU’s work on the WPS agenda, including the work of the AU Special Envoy on WPS. In the context of the emergence of some powerful currents against gender equality and the WPS agenda, tomorrow’s retreat is likely to highlight the impact these developments are having and the responses to the threat these developments pose. In the context of these developments, discussions may focus on deepening the convergence between the AU and the EU for safeguarding the gains registered over the years and supporting initiatives to this end, building on existing collaboration between the AU and the EU. In view of the growing focus on bridging the gap between normative commitments and implementation, the discussion on this agenda is also expected to focus on ways of enhancing steps to translate normative and institutional investment into operational reality, not least of all in enhanced women’s participation in peace processes. As Amani Africa’s fifteen-year review of the WPS agenda of the PSC underscores, the priority is to move beyond regular deliberations towards systematic implementation.

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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1376TH MEETING

Amani Africa — Mon, 02 Nov 2026 10:29:18 +0000

COMMUNIQUÉ

ANNUAL REPORT

Implementation Matrix

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