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		<title>The third international Conference on Sudan opens a new opportunity for a civilian-centred peace process</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-third-international-conference-on-sudan-opens-a-new-opportunity-for-a-civilian-centred-peace-process/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 13:13:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Ideas Indaba]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>24 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-third-international-conference-on-sudan-opens-a-new-opportunity-for-a-civilian-centred-peace-process/">The third international Conference on Sudan opens a new opportunity for a civilian-centred peace process</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<h1>The third international Conference on Sudan opens a new opportunity for a civilian-centred peace process</h1>
<p>
</div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 24 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-0" data-row="script-row-unique-0" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-0"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-1"><div class="row one-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding limit-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell no-block-padding" ><div class="uncont" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: right;"><strong>Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The major breakthrough of the international conference on Sudan held in Berlin was the adoption of a joint declaration by the civilian forces convened during the conference. On 15 April, marking the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States convened the third international Sudan conference in Berlin.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This meeting, which brought together ministers and representatives from 55 countries, alongside donors, regional organisations, United Nations entities, and other partners, as well as 38 international and Sudanese NGOs, follows earlier conferences in Paris (2024) and London (2025).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As with its predecessors, the convening was not without controversy—particularly regarding participation and representation. The exclusion of the warring parties (the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)) drew criticism from both sides. Sudan’s foreign ministry <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-slams-germany-hosted-conference-as-colonial-tutelage-approach-/3906455">denounced</a> the conference for proceeding without consultation with Khartoum, characterising it as a ‘colonial tutelage approach.’ Meanwhile, the Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS), a coalition aligned with the RSF, <a href="https://thesudantimes.com/sudan/tasis-warns-against-islamist-linked-figures-at-berlin-sudan-conference/">raised</a> concerns over the perceived inclusion of actors linked to the SAF and the Islamic movement, warning that such participation could dilute the civilian voice and hinder peace efforts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Additionally, the countries that participated in the conference were unable to agree on a joint communique. Despite the <a href="https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/09/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan">joint statement</a> that the members of the Quad negotiated and adopted in September 2025, divisions that resurfaced during the technical negotiations, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/africa/sudan-egypt-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-united-states/latest-sudan-conference-shows-diplomacy-backsliding?utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=social">reportedly</a> over language relating to the preservation of ‘state institutions’, forced the convening to end without a joint communique of the participating states, as in London. Consequently, the conference closed with a co-hosts’ <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/international-sudan-conference-berlin-2766850">communiqué</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite these drawbacks, Berlin registered some positive outcomes for a situation that needs some flicker of progress. In this respect, the outcomes of the conference should be assessed against its stated objectives, rather than against expectations it was not designed to fulfil. Some <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/sudans-berlin-conference-much-pledged-little-changed">commentary</a> has downplayed the conference’s significance, criticising its format for failing to deliver a ceasefire or immediate relief for civilians. The conference instead focused on three core objectives: mobilising humanitarian support, elevating global attention to the Sudan crisis, and creating space for civilian and political dialogue. Its success should be evaluated accordingly.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A major outcome of Berlin was the creation, for the first time in three years, of a platform for Sudanese civilian and political actors to convene and agree on a joint statement calling for an end to the war. This process was facilitated by the Quintet. Building on consultations initiated in Addis Ababa and concluded in Berlin, some 46 representatives endorsed a <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/joint-call-to-end-the-war-and-advance-a-sudanese-owned-political-process">joint call</a> structured around seven key priorities: an immediate ceasefire; protection of civilians and infrastructure; humanitarian access; civilian democratic governance; a Sudanese-owned political process; international support; and justice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This development is particularly significant given the persistent fragmentation of civilian actors and the limitation, to date, to collectively influence the trajectory of the conflict. Previous efforts by the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, established in January 2024, facilitated preparatory consultations in July and August 2024 and February 2025 but did not achieve comparable convergence. In this context, the progress made under the Quintet framework in Berlin should be seen as a meaningful step toward a unified civilian platform and lays the groundwork for a Sudanese-led political dialogue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the humanitarian front, the Sudan conflict has generated the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/north-africa/the-worlds-largest-hunger-displacement-and-protection-crisis-5428126">world’s largest humanitarian crisis</a>. According to OCHA’s February <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026-april-2026">report</a>, an estimated 33.7 million people need assistance, with 28.9 million requiring food security and livelihood support in 2026. Famine conditions have been confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli, with similar patterns observed in Dilling. As the conflict persists, humanitarian needs continue to rise, yet responses have not kept pace. Instead, significant funding shortfalls have led to reductions in life-saving assistance. The 2026 humanitarian response plan stands at USD 2.6 billion—a decrease of nearly one-third from the previous year—reflecting a constrained funding environment. Only 35 per cent of the 2025 plan was funded, and in 2026, just 16 per cent of the required funding has been secured to date.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this backdrop, one of the conference’s tangible outcomes is the mobilisation of financial commitments. International donors pledged €1.5 billion, with more than half (€811 million) contributed by the European Union and its member states, reflecting a significant increase compared to the London conference, where pledges totalled around €950 million. While insufficient to meet overall needs, this represents a substantial and concrete contribution that should not be understated, despite the lack of clarity about how much of the pledged money is additional to the amount pledged during the humanitarian convening held in Washington, D.C.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third, the conference succeeded in bringing Sudan’s crisis to the forefront of international attention. Despite constituting the world’s most severe humanitarian emergency, Sudan has increasingly been overshadowed by other geopolitical crises, including those in Ukraine, Gaza, and, more recently, Iran. The Berlin conference, at least temporarily, served to re-centre global focus on Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Overall, the Berlin conference has helped generate momentum for Sudanese civilian and political actors to engage more cohesively and to shape the country’s transition toward civilian-led governance. This is a major development given the persisting deadlock in the SAF-RSF-focused processes. Sustaining this momentum now falls to the Quintet. A key next step will be to engage those actors not represented in Berlin and ensure broader inclusivity. Encouragingly, plans are <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/igad-envoy-to-sudan-quintet-to-convene-meeting-for-those-absent-from-berlin-conf">reportedly</a> underway to convene follow-up meetings in May to incorporate additional stakeholders. The success registered in Berlin with the adoption of a joint statement of civilians presents a unique opportunity to take forward the question of how to pursue proposals towards <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-3rd-international-conference-on-sudan-in-berlin-a-turning-point-for-the-establishment-of-a-civilian-transitional-authority/">the constitution of a civilian transitional authority</a>.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-third-international-conference-on-sudan-opens-a-new-opportunity-for-a-civilian-centred-peace-process/">The third international Conference on Sudan opens a new opportunity for a civilian-centred peace process</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Constructing a Networked Multilateralism between Addis Ababa and Geneva: Seizing Policy Opportunities</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/constructing-a-networked-multi-lateralism-between-addis-ababa-and-geneva-seizing-policy-opportunities/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 12:40:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Special Reports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23320</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>22 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/constructing-a-networked-multi-lateralism-between-addis-ababa-and-geneva-seizing-policy-opportunities/">Constructing a Networked Multilateralism between Addis Ababa and Geneva: Seizing Policy Opportunities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-2"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Constructing a Networked Multilateralism between Addis Ababa and Geneva: Seizing Policy Opportunities</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 22 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>SUMMARY</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This Special report explores the potential for networked multilateralism to facilitate a more inclusive system of global governance through building networked policy exchanges and policy making between Addis Ababa and Geneva, two major global policy hubs. In response to shifting global power dynamics and complex challenges, it argues for a more connected, flexible, and inclusive multilateral system that leverages and draws on the role of multilateral diplomatic hubs and centres of decision-making in different parts of the world. Addis Ababa, as Africa’s diplomatic capital, excels in diplomatic negotiation for consensus-building and advancing regional priorities and global solidarity for a fairer global system, while Geneva offers a dense ecosystem of international organizations and technical expertise. Closer collaboration between the two diplomatic hubs could enable both to leverage their strengths, thereby becoming the example in practicing and organising networked multilateralism. Addis Ababa could access Geneva’s science diplomacy, data governance, and urban planning expertise, while Geneva could benefit from Addis’s experience in political negotiation, youth and gender inclusion, and Africa’s role as a major centre where current policy issues around energy transition and critical minerals and understanding African interests. Structured exchanges, joint research, and dedicated liaison platforms are recommended to operationalize this partnership. By moving beyond fragmented interactions, a structured and dynamic Addis-Geneva nexus can enhance collective action, better reflect African priorities in global forums, and model innovative approaches to global governance challenges.</p>
<p>
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		<title>The EastAfrican: &#8220;The world’s largest hunger, displacement and protection crisis&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-eastafrican-the-worlds-largest-hunger-displacement-and-protection-crisis/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 11:46:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23306</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>19 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-eastafrican-the-worlds-largest-hunger-displacement-and-protection-crisis/">The EastAfrican: &#8220;The world’s largest hunger, displacement and protection crisis&#8221;</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<h1 class="article__title"><a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/north-africa/the-worlds-largest-hunger-displacement-and-protection-crisis-5428126">The EastAfrican: &#8220;The world’s largest hunger, displacement and protection crisis&#8221;</a></h1>
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		<title>Briefing by the A3 on its activities</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-a3-on-its-activities/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 10:15:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC Meetings on A3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>19 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/briefing-by-the-a3-on-its-activities/">Briefing by the A3 on its activities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Briefing by the A3 on its activities </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 19 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (20 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1340<sup>th</sup> session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members, Somalia as the coordinator of the group for the first quarter, are expected to brief the PSC on the activities of the A3.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since January 2026, the three elected African members (A3) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) comprise the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia for the 2026–2027 term. Somalia joined the Council in January 2025 after more than five decades, while 2026 marks the return of Liberia after a 65-year absence and the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A3_research_report_2025.pdf">return</a> of the DRC after 35 years. Notably, the DRC concurrently serves on the PSC, creating an opportunity to strengthen coordination and coherence between the two councils.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With Guyana concluding its term at the end of 2025, there is currently no Caribbean representation on the Council. Consequently, unlike during the 2020–2021 and 2024–2025 terms, there is no prospect of expanding the A3 into an ‘A3+1’ configuration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s briefing takes place within the framework of longstanding efforts to strengthen coordination between the AU and the UNSC. This engagement traces back to <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/c108cff1-d94b-44ae-b3eb-d94384f0a750/content">the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS)</a> on peace and security in Africa, held in Algiers in December 2013, which established the practice of the A3 providing quarterly briefings to the PSC on African issues on the UNSC agenda, although, in practice, these briefings have not been delivered consistently.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This commitment has since been consistently reinforced. It was <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1259-Conclusions-for-the-11th-Annual-HLS-on-Promotion-of-Peace-and-Security-on-Africa-EN.pdf">reaffirmed</a> during the 11<sup>th</sup> Oran Process in 2024 and further institutionalised through the adoption of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Manual-of-Engagement-on-Engagement-between-PSC-and-A3-HLS-EN.pdf"><em>Manual</em></a><em> on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3</em> at the PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1289.comm_en.pdf">1289<sup>th</sup> session</a> on 24 July 2025, formalising requirements for regular reporting and structured engagement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the most recent <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1299.comm_en.pdf">A3+ briefing</a> to the PSC in August 2025, the PSC not only decided to institutionalise consultative meetings between the PSC and the A3+ at ambassadorial level as a statutory activity within its annual indicative programme, but also reiterated its request for the A3+ to brief and consult the PSC on a quarterly basis and whenever necessary, on African issues under consideration by the UNSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this context, the A3 are expected to brief the PSC on their activities within the UNSC since the beginning of 2026, highlighting their continued efforts to advance coordinated African positions and to ensure that the continent’s perspectives are effectively reflected in Council deliberations and outcomes. In this regard, the A3 have sustained an active and consistent engagement across a wide range of agenda items through the delivery of joint statements, covering both African country-specific situations and broader thematic and global issues. On African files, the A3 are likely to highlight their sustained engagement on situations such as the Central African Republic, DRC, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan. Beyond African situations, the A3 have also demonstrated engagement on broader international peace and security issues, including developments in the Middle East. These interventions have generally underscored key principles, such as the primacy of political solutions, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of civilians, and adherence to international law, while also reaffirming the central role of the AU and regional mechanisms in addressing conflicts on the continent. These positions underscore the A3’s efforts to situate Africa as an active stakeholder in global peace and security discussions, beyond continent-specific concerns.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In addition to statements, the A3 are also expected to reflect on their growing role in influencing Security Council outcome documents through engagement in negotiations on draft resolutions and other Council outcome documents. Recent examples include their involvement in ongoing negotiations on the resolution of situations relating to <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/libya-vote-to-renew-sanctions-measures-3.php">Libya</a> and a resolution and a press statement on South Sudan. Another instance is A3’s initiative in shaping Council engagement on Sudan, by initiating, together with the United Kingdom as penholder, a Security Council meeting in March, following a strike on a hospital in East Darfur state. These efforts point to the increasing role of the A3 in engaging with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African perspectives are reflected in the formulation of Security Council decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The session is also expected to feature discussions as a follow-up to previous decisions of the PSC aimed at strengthening communication and coordination with the A3. In this regard, PSC members may draw on past precedents, such as, the communiqué adopted at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1221-PSC-Communique-Situation-in-the-CAR-EN.pdf">1221<sup>st</sup> Session</a> in July 2024 on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), which reiterated the call for the total lifting of the arms embargo on the CAR and encouraged the A3 to promote a unified position on this matter within the UN Security Council. Building on such precedents, the session may also reflect on recommendations emerging from the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Conclusions-for-the-11th-Annual-HLS-on-Promotion-of-Peace-and-Security-on-Africa-EN.pdf">11th</a> and <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Conclusions-for-the-12th-Annual-HLS-on-Promotion-of-Peace-and-Security-on-Africa-EN.pdf">12th High-Level Seminars</a> on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process), which underscored the need for more systematic information sharing and the synchronisation of meetings between the PSC and the UN Security Council on issues under their joint mandate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The meeting is also expected to provide an opportunity to reflect on the outcomes of the <a href="https://x.com/AfricanUnionUN/status/2018885106606248053">5<sup>th</sup> Annual A3 Retreat</a> held on 4 February, which brought together incoming, current, and former A3+ members for strategic reflection and planning. The Retreat underscored the importance of strengthening coordination, unity, and synergy with the PSC, while enhancing Africa’s strategic positioning within the Security Council. In this context, discussions may reflect on the need to address the continued challenges faced by the A3 in influencing Council outcomes, particularly their role in pen-holding and drafting processes while navigating through the current complex geopolitical competition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Building on these reflections, the PSC session may recall the discussion that took place during the <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/2022271696216965331">6<sup>th</sup> A3 High-Level Meeting</a> held on 13 February on the margins of the 39<sup>th</sup> AU Assembly, which focused on advancing African agency and leadership in peace and security within a changing global order. Discussions at that meeting emphasised the need to strengthen the A3 as a strategic mechanism guided by African priorities, enhance its proactive role within the Security Council, and advance predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations. In this regard, particular attention may be given to the importance of enhancing AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719. The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2719 in December 2023 stands as a notable illustration of what coordinated A3 engagement can achieve in advancing a common African position. As such, the effective implementation and operationalisation of this resolution will be critical for further strengthening the AU–UN strategic partnership and ensuring sustained support for AU-led peace operations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s briefing outcome is expected to be a communiqué, and in this regard, the PSC is expected to welcome the briefing by the A3 and express appreciation for their continued efforts to articulate and advance coordinated African positions within the UNSC, while also commending the sustained cohesion, coordination, and unity demonstrated by the A3 since the beginning of their 2026–2027 term. Building on this, the PSC may acknowledge the growing role of the A3 in influencing UNSC outcomes, as well as their interaction with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African priorities and perspectives are adequately reflected, and in doing so, the Council may underscore the importance of strengthening coordination and coherence between the PSC and the UNSC. In the same vein, the PSC may further reiterate the need for the A3 to uphold, promote, and defend the decisions and positions of the PSC in their engagement within the UNSC, in line with relevant AU Assembly decisions and the conclusions of the High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process). In this regard, the PSC may also emphasise the importance of the effective implementation of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, particularly with regard to ensuring regular reporting, structured engagement, and timely exchange of information between the two bodies. In this context, it may call for enhanced regularity and predictability in the provision of briefings by the A3, in line with the agreed quarterly framework, and encourage more systematic consultations to facilitate timely guidance from the PSC on African issues under consideration by the UNSC, while at the same time encouraging further strengthening of practical cooperation between the PSC and the A3, including through the synchronisation of their respective programmes of work, enhanced interaction between the experts of the PSC and the UNSC, and the establishment of effective information-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the PSC may highlight the importance of enhancing the role of the A3 in pen-holding and drafting processes within the UNSC, while encouraging continued efforts to navigate geopolitical dynamics and safeguard African priorities. Finally, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation and operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 as a key instrument for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing of AU-led peace support operations.</p>
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		<title>Ana: Three years of the most ignored war: &#8220;Atrocious crimes are being committed&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/ana-three-years-of-the-most-ignored-war-atrocious-crimes-are-being-committed/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 12:29:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23292</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/ana-three-years-of-the-most-ignored-war-atrocious-crimes-are-being-committed/">Ana: Three years of the most ignored war: &#8220;Atrocious crimes are being committed&#8221;</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<h1 class="article__title"><a href="https://en.ara.cat/international/three-years-of-the-most-ignored-war-atrocious-crimes-are-being-committed_1_5707784.html">Ana: Three years of the most ignored war: &#8220;Atrocious crimes are being committed&#8221;</a></h1>
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		<title>PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1339TH MEETING (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1339th-meeting-ministerial-level/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 06:41:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cyber security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23296</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>16 APRIL 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1339th-meeting-ministerial-level/">PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1339TH MEETING (MINISTERIAL LEVEL)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Sierra Leone&#8217;s 2024 &#8211; 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa&#8217;s Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/sierra-leones-2024-2025-un-security-council-tenure-and-africas-recalibration-in-a-retreating-international-law-based-order/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 05:59:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Policy Briefs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Policy Brief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23278</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>16 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/sierra-leones-2024-2025-un-security-council-tenure-and-africas-recalibration-in-a-retreating-international-law-based-order/">Sierra Leone&#8217;s 2024 &#8211; 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa&#8217;s Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-7"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>Sierra Leone&#8217;s 2024 &#8211; 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa&#8217;s Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 16 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 custom fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-jevc-color fontsize-120750-custom font-size-custom" ><span>SUMMARY</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sierra Leone’s 2024–2025 tenure on the United Nations Security Council unfolded during a period of visible retreat from an international law-based order, marked by rising unilateralism, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, selective application of norms, and growing strain on the UN Charter’s collective security scheme. Drawing on Sierra Leone’s Council experience and the framing of Amani Africa’s 2026 Pre-AU Summit High-level Dialogue on ‘Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, the breakdown of  global order, and the Future of Collective Security,’ this paper argues that the present moment, while destabilizing, also creates strategic space for African recalibration. Four interrelated pathways emerge: consolidation of African solidarity through the A3 and A3 Plus; principled African engagement on global crises beyond the continent; strategic navigation of multipolarity through coalition-building and stronger resource-governance safeguards; and a dual reform agenda centered on Security Council reform and operational subsidiarity under Chapter VIII. The paper concludes that Africa’s policy task is neither inward retreat nor rhetorical resistance, but the practical advancement of African agency: investing in African solutions while sustaining global relevance through principled, coalition-based diplomacy.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/sierra-leones-2024-2025-un-security-council-tenure-and-africas-recalibration-in-a-retreating-international-law-based-order/">Sierra Leone&#8217;s 2024 &#8211; 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa&#8217;s Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/artificial-intelligence-governance-peace-and-security-in-africa/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 08:24:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cyber Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=23272</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>15 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/artificial-intelligence-governance-peace-and-security-in-africa/">Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-8"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 15 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (16 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1339<sup>th</sup> session on ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa’. The session will be held at the Ministerial level.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following opening remarks by Gedion Timothewos Hessebon<strong>, </strong>Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the PSC for April 2026, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission will make the introductory statement. The meeting will then receive briefings from Worku Gachena Negera, Director General of Ethiopian Artificial Intelligence Institute, and Samson Itodo, Chairperson of the African Union Advisory Group on Artificial Intelligence. Bernardo Mariano Junior, Assistant Secretary-General, Chief Information Technology Officer, UN Office of Information and Communications Technology (UNOICT) will also make a statement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> The rapid development of AI and its accelerating deployment across the political, social, economic, cultural, and security fields is attracting growing policy attention. Not surprisingly, there has been a burgeoning engagement on this matter during the past few years on the part of the UN and AU peace and security and governance policy-making bodies. In view of various technical and regulatory gaps and inbuilt flaws associated with AI, the widespread optimism that characterises the adaptation and deployment of AI in Africa requires critical engagement on ways of harnessing its benefits and mitigating its risks, some of which are particular to Africa. It has been <a href="https://african.business/2026/03/long-reads/africa-stakes-its-claim-in-global-ai-governance">reported</a> that AI is projected to add between $ 2.9 trillion and $ 4.8 trillion to Africa’s economy by 2030, presenting an opportunity for the youth who constitute the majority of the African population.   Industries from agriculture and healthcare to education and finance are on the brink of major transformation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of the deployment of AI, the continent faces a ‘non-linear’ development path marked by significant regional disparities. While East and South Africa possess more mature ecosystems, <strong>Central Africa</strong> remains in a nascent stage due to infrastructure and digital literacy constraints. There are persisting challenges across the continent affecting the potential of AI, including unreliable electricity, fragmented data regulations, a lack of a policy framework and the erosion of local talent to global companies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Africa currently represents only about <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250517/africa-declares-ai-strategic-priority-investment-inclusion-and-innovation#:~:text=With%20the%20continent's%20AI%20compute,enable%20local%20AI%20model%20development.">1%</a> of the world’s AI computing capacity. Without intentional investment and strong governance, the continent risks remaining largely a consumer of technologies built elsewhere, systems designed for different environments and not always aligned with African needs and realities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As noted in the various engagements of the AU and the UN, there is recognition that AI is reshaping the global governance, development and security environment. At the level of the UN, engagement on the implications of AI is gaining momentum both in the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. Among others, the UNGA adopted Resolution 79/239 on Artificial Intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security. Along with the ongoing effort for developing a global governance framework, these developments and the need for addressing the specific needs and concerns of Africa in relation to AI necessitate that Africa and the AU engage actively, among others, on issues of data protection, addressing the digital divide, developing capabilities for adapting and developing AI for Africa, regulatory and technical gaps, protection of vulnerable groups and deployment of AI in the military domain.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is against this background that the PSC started convening sessions dedicated to the theme of AI and its governance and peace and security implications. On 13 June 2024 – as part of its 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary commemoration – the AUPSC held its first session dedicated to ‘AI and its impact on peace and security in Africa’. This  <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1214.comm_en.pdf">1214<sup>th</sup></a> session of the Council underscored AI’s transformative potential for peacebuilding, including its applications in early warning systems, conflict prevention, and post-conflict recovery. Most notably, however, it recognised the risks associated with its rapid development in a regulatory vacuum. The meeting tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa and submit the Report to the PSC as soon as possible.’ It also assigned the AU Commission, in particular the PAPS Department, in coordination with the Department of Infrastructure and Energy, to ‘establish a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and good governance in Africa; and to propose options for Continental Artificial Intelligence governance, including its military application and to report to Council every six months.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Subsequently, the PSC held the first ministerial-level meeting on 20 March 2025 as its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1267.comm_en.pdf">1267<sup>th</sup></a> session under the theme ‘AI and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa’. Building on its initial session (1214<sup>th</sup>), the 1267<sup>th</sup> session proposed the mainstreaming of AI in peace support operations, early warning systems, and preventive diplomacy, while also calling for the development of <strong>a Common African Position on AI</strong> and <strong>an African Charter on AI</strong> to guide its responsible use. Some progress has since been made in implementing these decisions, notably through the establishment of the <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f3c4e62d-018a-4c45-ac3b-3cea50a0d5bc/content">AU AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security</a> in March 2025. In December 2025, the Advisory Group <a href="https://x.com/AUC_PAPS/status/2000221873037058139">convened</a> in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss its future plans, including the development of a Common African Position on AI, and to deliberate on emerging AI trends, opportunities and risks in Africa, as well as their implications for governance, conflict prevention and stability. Additionally, a technical workshop on the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/strategic-review-meeting-of-the-continental-early-warning-system-concludes">Strategic Assessment and Review of the Continental Early Warning System</a> was held in November 2025 in Kigali, Rwanda, which resulted in the adoption of a joint AU–RECs/RMs Roadmap to integrate AI into early warning processes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2026, convened under the theme ‘Women, Peace and Security in Africa: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence,’ the PSC’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1334.comm_en.pdf">1334<sup>th</sup></a> meeting drew attention to the implications of AI on women, peace and security. It served as a useful occasion for highlighting the deleterious consequences of the adoption of new technology, including AI, particularly in accentuating existing patterns of discrimination and prejudice, including technology-facilitated gender-based violence, online harassment, misinformation and disinformation, which undermines women’s effective leadership, credibility, reputation, participation, safety and authority. In this regard, the Council, among other decisions, directed the AU Commission, in particular the AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security, to ensure the inclusion of issues relating to women in the development of the Common African Position on AI Governance, Peace and Security.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s meeting is being held just a day before the PSC undertakes a field visit to the Ethiopian AI Institute and the Science and Technology Museum, as part of its activities planned for <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-peace-and-security-council-for-april-2026/">April 2026</a>. It should be recalled that the 39<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in February 2026 endorsed Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, as the AU Champion for AI. Relatedly, one of the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/46188-Assembly_Decisions_31_March_E.pdf">Decisions</a> during the Summit – particularly under the briefing by Cyril Ramaphosa, president of South Africa, on the outcomes of the November 2025 G20 leaders’ summit, was ‘to establish an annual AI for Africa Conference,’ following the inaugural Conference convened in Cape Town in September 2025.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is expected that the upcoming session will build on and further expand the PSC’s consideration of AI and governance and peace and security in Africa. Of particular interest in this respect for tomorrow’s session is the role that Africa plays on the one hand in bolstering national and continental technical and regulatory infrastructure for harnessing the benefits and mitigating the risks of AI for governance, development, and peace and security in Africa and on the other hand in participating actively and contributing to shaping the development of global AI governance systems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s session will additionally be an opportunity to follow up on its previous decisions and chart a way forward, particularly during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1267.comm_en.pdf">1267<sup>th</sup></a> session in which it highlighted the importance of setting up a mechanism ‘to monitor and assess the impact of AI on peace and security, such as an AU Watch Center with a mandate to monitor AI developments worldwide and in Africa, and to regularly inform AU Member States, RECs/RMs and the AU on the state of AI, particularly its impact on governance, peace and security in Africa.’ It may also follow on the decision tasking the AU Commission ‘to organise an African forum bringing together relevant partners and stakeholders to discuss AI as a key tool suited to share best practices and strategies for peace, security and governance in Africa’ and ‘to develop training programmes on AI in support of AU Member States in investing in human capital by training and capturing African talents in the fields of AI.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the need for developing technical and regulatory infrastructure, both at the national and continental levels, to position the continent for both harnessing the benefits and containing the risks of the use of AI in Africa. The Council may also emphasise that AI and its use, including in the military domain, are subject to international law rules, including human rights and international humanitarian laws. It may urge Member States to adopt national legislation aligned with the continental strategy and framework to regulate the use of AI, particularly as it relates to governance, peace and security. The PSC may also encourage the Members of the AU Advisory Group on AI in Peace, Security and Governance Group to expedite the development of the Common African Position on AI and its impact on peace, security, democracy and development in Africa in consultation with all AU Member States. Council may also reiterate the importance of ensuring greater representation of Africa on global AI regulatory and governance bodies and mobilise efforts and complementarity among the various initiatives dealing with the issue of AI at the continental and international levels. The PSC may also encourage all Member States to create conducive conditions for more meaningful and effective engagement of women and youth in digital governance, AI policy, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and decision-making, ensuring equitable access to digital tools, literacy and platforms.</p>
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</div><p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/artificial-intelligence-governance-peace-and-security-in-africa/">Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>The 3rd international conference on Sudan in Berlin: A turning point for the establishment of a civilian transitional authority?</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-3rd-international-conference-on-sudan-in-berlin-a-turning-point-for-the-establishment-of-a-civilian-transitional-authority/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 08:21:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Ideas Indaba]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>14 April 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-3rd-international-conference-on-sudan-in-berlin-a-turning-point-for-the-establishment-of-a-civilian-transitional-authority/">The 3rd international conference on Sudan in Berlin: A turning point for the establishment of a civilian transitional authority?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<h1>The 3rd international conference on Sudan in Berlin: A turning point for the establishment of a civilian transitional authority?</h1>
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</div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 14 April 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-9" data-row="script-row-unique-9" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-9"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-10"><div class="row one-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding limit-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell no-block-padding" ><div class="uncont" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: right;"><strong>Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">15 April 2026 marks the 3<sup>rd</sup>-year anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war in Sudan, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On that same day, the international conference on Sudan will be held in <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/wadephul-german-embassy-addis-ababa-2752978">Berlin</a>, hosted by Germany together with the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), France, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With the US-Israel war on Iran dominating international attention, this conference brings a rare focus to the war in Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Breaking the Saf-RSF death and destruction trap </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The war grinds on unabated. There is little sign of its resolution on the horizon (see <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/sudan-egypt-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-united-states/b211-divided-sudan-elusive-peace">here</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There is no prospect of either of the warring parties securing total military victory. Neither a ceasefire freezing of the war (and hence the crystallisation of the partition of Sudan) nor a power-sharing arrangement between SAF-RSF guarantees sustainable peace.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The coalescing of peace efforts into two tracks (the truce/ceasefire track championed by the US-led Quad and the political dialogue track spearheaded by the African Union leaning multilateral organisations making up the Quintet) carries little prospect of changing either the battlefield or the mediation dynamics.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is long past time to abandon the SAF-RSF-centric template that guided international engagement for the past three years.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the last three years, the warring parties carried out hostilities with no regard to the rules of war. They both unleashed violence in an atmosphere of <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/prioritising-protection-of-civilians-in-peace-and-security-diplomacy-in-sudan-challenges-and-options/">near-total impunity</a>. The UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/sudan-evidence-el-fasher-reveals-genocidal-campaign-targeting-non-arab">concluded</a> that RSF’s violence in Darfur is of such a nature, ‘the hallmarks of which point to a genocide.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The war has claimed the lives of more than <a href="https://www.nrc.no/feature/2025/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-sudan-explained">150,000 people</a>. Living up to <a href="https://time.com/7017127/sudan-%20darfur-crisis/">Kholood Khair’s</a> apt observation that ‘Sudan’s catastrophe can now only be described in superlatives’, Sudan now bears the <a href="https://www.savethechildren.net/sudan/news/ipc-alert-22-ingos-raise-concerns-about-deepening-starvation-sudan">status of being</a> ‘the world’s largest hunger, protection and displacement crisis.’ It is now the <a href="https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/press-releases/sudan-becomes-the-worlds-hungriest-country-as-famine-spreads-to-two-new-areas-of-darfur/">world’s worst famine</a>, on top of being the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and largest child displacement crisis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Much of the peace processes in Sudan since the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir prised the role of the SAF and RSF. This approach has persisted since the outbreak of this war three years ago. It is seen as a pragmatic necessity. Yet, instead of facilitating peace, this SAF-RSF-centric approach (along with growing Sudanese polarisation and deepening external support for the warring parties) has only incentivised the warring parties to persist in the military showdown.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Making the 3<sup>rd</sup> international conference count </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Apart from the enormous human suffering and the destruction it precipitated, this war has now resulted in the de facto partition of Sudan into two between the SAF-controlled northern, eastern and parts of southern Sudan, and the RSF-dominated western and parts of southern Sudan. This has put the very survival of Sudan in grave peril.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/sudan-at-the-zero-point-why-seventy-years-of-independence-demand-new-political-thinking/">Abdul Mohammed</a> pointed out, ‘without new thinking, a ceasefire risks freezing disaster in place.’ As such, breaking the death and destruction trap that the fighting between SAF and RSF imposed on Sudan requires giving a chance to a new approach – a civilian transitional authority.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The international conference on Sudan in Berlin, marking the 3rd year of the outbreak of the war, can be the forum for setting in motion the process towards the establishment of a civilian transitional authority.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Ahead of this anniversary, Chatham House, the United Kingdom’s international relations think tank, bestowed on Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) the most befitting recognition with the institution’s <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/03/sudans-volunteer-led-aid-network-receives-2025-chatham-house-prize">2025 prize</a>. This is a reminder that after three years of war and with no end in sight, the Sudanese civilian realm is the only avenue not only for breaking the stalemate between the two warring factions but also for forcing them into changing their calculations.</p>
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</div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-10" data-row="script-row-unique-10" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-10"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-11"><div class="row single-top-padding single-bottom-padding one-h-padding limit-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell no-block-padding" ><div class="uncont" ><div class="uncode-single-media  text-left"><div class="single-wrapper" style="max-width: 100%;"><div class="tmb tmb-light  tmb-media-first tmb-media-last tmb-content-overlay tmb-no-bg"><div class="t-inside"><div class="t-entry-visual"><div class="t-entry-visual-tc"><div class="uncode-single-media-wrapper"><img decoding="async" class="wp-image-23257" src="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-of-de-facto-partition-of-Sudan_without-title.png" width="1280" height="1121" alt="" srcset="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-of-de-facto-partition-of-Sudan_without-title.png 1280w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-of-de-facto-partition-of-Sudan_without-title-300x263.png 300w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-of-de-facto-partition-of-Sudan_without-title-1024x897.png 1024w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-of-de-facto-partition-of-Sudan_without-title-768x673.png 768w, https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-of-de-facto-partition-of-Sudan_without-title-350x307.png 350w" sizes="(max-width: 1280px) 100vw, 1280px" /></div>
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				</div></div></div></div><figcaption>Map of the de facto SAF-RSF partition of Sudan</figcaption></div></div></div></div></div></div><script id="script-row-unique-11" data-row="script-row-unique-11" type="text/javascript" class="vc_controls">UNCODE.initRow(document.getElementById("row-unique-11"));</script></div></div></div><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-12"><div class="row one-top-padding one-bottom-padding one-h-padding limit-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell no-block-padding" ><div class="uncont" ><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Why a civilian-centric process is a strategic necessity </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The issue is no longer about including civilians. It is rather whether peace is possible without making them the centre of gravity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Anchoring the peace efforts on and prioritising the civilian realm constitutes a critical antidote to the accelerating disintegration of Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Reinforcing the role played by the ERRs in the provision of aid and basic services and helping in maintaining infrastructure, this approach operates as an autonomous state-preservation instrument around which all Sudanese can rally.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The establishment of such technocratic civilian administration by Sudanese social and civic actors and the diplomatic recognition of such government by the international community carry additional benefits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">First, by creating an entity as the main locus of diplomatic efforts and separate from either of the two fighting parties, it ends the glorification of the people with guns. The idea is not that this will dispense with the necessity of engaging the warring parties, but it disrupts the incentive structure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, it thus has the potential to break the logic of total victory and total defeat by which the action of the warring parties is currently dictated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Third, this would incentivise the warring parties to opt for committing to a ceasefire as a means of limiting their loss in any future dispensation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fourth, by the sheer fact of its presence, it is also possible that the warring parties would be put into a position of pursuing their interests by choosing to accept the role of such technocratic civilian administration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>A two-phase transitional framework </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As argued <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/why-the-idea-of-the-establishment-of-a-civilian-transitional-authority-in-sudan-should-be-taken-seriously-and-how-it-can-be-realized/">previously</a>, the central idea to secure a breakthrough in breaking the SAF-RSF grip on the fate of Sudan is the establishment of a two-phased transitional process. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Yet the fragmentation that the war unleashed is not insurmountable. The alternative is the perpetuation of the three years of disaster. Given the trajectory of the war, there is neither a cleaner nor an easier approach than this for arresting Sudan’s deepening downward spiral.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Taking further the arguments that analysts such as <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/06/06/without-bold-new-diplomatic-approaches-sudans-state-will-collapse/">Alex de Waal </a>made, this two-staged process to a civilian-centric transitional process injects a measure of pragmatism into the proposal of establishing a civilian administration as a way of breaking the SAF-RSF trap.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The first phase involves the establishment of a civilian technocratic transitional administration. This is a government whose only raison d’etre is the salvation of the Sudanese state by creating the space for a Sudanese-led peace process that brings to the centre of diplomatic efforts the agency of Sudanese civic actors. The mandate of this caretaker administration is envisaged to be further limited in three ways. First, it has a limited substantive mandate focusing on facilitating humanitarian support and creating the space for charting a process for an all-inclusive civilian transitional government. Second, its term of office will also be limited in time. Third, to break the transitional governance trap, no member of this technocratic administration will be eligible to participate in the composition of the civilian transitional government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a body with such limited emergency and technocratic power for saving the Sudanese state, there is a need for its urgent establishment, whose narrow focus can mitigate, if not dissolve, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/sudan-engage-civilians-now-not-later">fragmentation and contestation</a>, which have been used against effective engagement with Sudanese civic actors. The impact of polarisation can also be reduced by mobilising the engagement of Sudanese social and political forces around the definition of the criteria for determining who and what needs to be done during the tenure of the technocratic administration.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sudanese civilian forces working with the AU and others in the international community can take the lead in initiating the process for the constitution of such a technocratic civilian administration. It is necessary that the upcoming conference on Sudan in Berlin can be the platform for making a declaration of support for such a process, with Sudanese civilian leadership. Among others, the international community will play a critical role not only in extending diplomatic recognition but also, importantly, in providing substantial institutional support for it to restore the effective functioning of such state institutions as the bureaucracy and the Central Bank.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Apart from creating opportunities for silencing the guns, the technocratic civilian administration’s main role is the creation of the conditions for the holding of a national popular convention based on principles and formats to be agreed to by the Sudanese.  This is a convention that will bring together various political and social forces of Sudan for the elaboration of a transitional roadmap and the establishment of the transitional government for the implementation of the roadmap, involving various reforms that will culminate in the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of a constitutional government, inaugurating a new dispensation in Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not this could work and how it could be made to work depends first and foremost on the Sudanese civic actors and the creativity and willingness of those engaging in the search for peace in Sudan. Barlin could be where the journey towards working on making this civilian-centric approach work begins.</p>
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		<title>PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1338TH MEETING</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1338th-meeting/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 09:40:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[CAR]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>9 APRIL 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1338th-meeting/">PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1338TH MEETING</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1338.comm_en.pdf">https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1338.comm_en.pdf</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1338th-meeting/">PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1338TH MEETING</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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