16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC
Date | 8 October 2025
Tomorrow (09 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 16th annual joint consultative meeting. This follows the 8th annual joint retreat taking place today in Brussels, Belgium, where the consultative meeting is also being held.
Opening remarks at the 16th consultative meeting are expected from Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Delphine Pronk.
This year’s consultative meeting comes against the background of three consecutive years of the AUPSC and the EUPSC being unable to adopt a joint communique due to disagreement over the language to be included with specific reference to the war in Ukraine. It is anticipated that this trend will finally come to an end during this year’s consultative meeting.
The members of the PSC reviewed and provided inputs on the draft joint communiqué only yesterday 6 October after the draft was sent by the EU side to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October. The agenda for this year’s consultative meeting reflects continuity with past discussions, focusing on developments in the Horn of Africa—particularly Somalia/AUSSOM and Sudan—, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes Region. In addition, the two sides are expected to address broader global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’. Additionally, the final agenda included ‘Working lunch on Women, Peace and Security’ during which the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security is scheduled to make a presentation.
Horn of Africa
Under the Horn of Africa agenda item, two situations are envisaged to receive particular attention: the situation in Somalia, including the deployment of AUSSOM, and the ongoing crisis in Sudan.
With Ethiopia and Eswatini leading the intervention of the PSC on Somalia and AUSSOM, the dominant concern remains the mission’s funding. AUSSOM is faced with an existential crisis, arising from mounting debts and the lack of a predictable and sustainable financing arrangement to sustain operations until its planned exit at the end of 2029.
The AU had pinned its hope on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations as a viable framework for predictable financing. However, efforts to operationalise the resolution stalled in May after the UN Security Council failed to reach an agreement, primarily due to U.S. opposition to applying the resolution as a test case for AUSSOM.
The AU has long explored alternative mechanisms, particularly the convening of a pledging conference. Following repeated delays—including earlier plans for Doha to host—progress was made on 25 September 2025 when the AU, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the UN, and the United Kingdom co-convened a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The AU has already committed an unprecedented amount of USD 20 million from its Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility for the mission’s 2025 operations, in addition to the provision of personnel and logistical enablers to strengthen operational effectiveness. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each appeared to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, contributions are also anticipated from Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Given the nearly $200 million annual budget of AUSSOM, the pledges—though symbolically important—remain insufficient to bridge the gap. The co-chairs’ summary of the New York event underscored that ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial’. Yet, in the immediate term, there may be a possibility for significantly reducing the financing gap if the EU comes to the rescue of the mission through additional renewed support, considering the EU investment into this mission as the single largest contributor to AU missions in Somalia, providing close to €2.7 billion since 2007.
While the EU has not yet announced a specific funding package for AUSSOM, following the signal from the EU during the pledging conference in New York, expectations remain high that the EU may make an announcement in the near future. Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to provide more clarity on the EU’s thinking in this respect.
Meanwhile, Somalia’s political landscape remains tense, with disagreements sparked by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s introduction of a ‘one person, one vote’ electoral model for the 2026 elections, replacing the long-standing clan-based indirect system. The move has generated friction with opposition figures and some of the federal member states, notably Jubaland and Puntland. These tensions risk diverting focus from the fight against al-Shabaab and, if left unresolved, could potentially escalate into violence.
It is also expected that, despite the fact that the attempt to apply Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM did not succeed, reference will be made in the outcome document to the continued relevance of Resolution 2719 and the imperative for its implementation.
With Tanzania and Algeria leading PSC’s intervention on Sudan, discussions are expected to focus on the security, political, humanitarian situations and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Fierce fighting has continued around El-Fasher and the Kordofan region between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
On the political front, a particular point of concern for both counterparts will be the establishment of parallel governing structures and their implications for Sudan’s territorial integrity. In May 2025, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister and announced a technocratic government based in Port Sudan. In response, the RSF-led Tasis coalition declared its own parallel government in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in July 2025, naming Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as Prime Minister, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo as head of a Presidential Council, and SPLM-N leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu as his deputy.
The PSC, during its 1264th, 1292nd, and 1293rd sessions, firmly rejected the RSF’s creation of a parallel government and urged AU member states and the wider international community not to recognise it. Similarly, the 24 September 2025 Co-Chairs’ statement issued by the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK following a ministerial meeting on Sudan ‘strongly’ rejected the establishment of parallel governing structures. In tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC and the EU PSC may reiterate the more neutral language of the co-chairs’ statement, rejecting the establishment of parallel governments in Sudan, while emphasising the need for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned transition process.
Signs of a more concerted diplomatic process gained momentum in September, though it remains fragile and without any breakthrough. On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (the Quad) issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, followed by the launch and conclusion of an inclusive and transparent transition process within nine months. The conflict parties did not heed the call.
On 24 September, the Quad’s foreign ministers met again on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. That same day, the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with relevant actors to discuss Sudan and coordinate efforts toward de-escalation and civilian protection. The Co-Chairs’ statement, while welcoming Quad’s joint statement, expressed support for the AU and IGAD’s efforts to coordinate international and bilateral initiatives to pressure all Sudanese parties towards a ceasefire, humanitarian action and political dialogue. While these peace initiatives are encouraging, the lack of coordination among various initiatives remains a major challenge to launching a credible single peace process for Sudan—a challenge that tomorrow’s meeting is likely to reflect upon further.
The two counterparts are also expected to discuss ways of increasing pressure on the warring parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access, urge foreign actors to refrain from fueling the conflict, and step up humanitarian assistance in response to what has become the world’s most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis—with over two-thirds of the population (30 million people) in need of assistance and more than 24 million facing acute food insecurity.
Great Lakes Region
With The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea leading PSC’s intervention, on the Great Lakes Region, as before, the focus remains on the situation in eastern DRC and the renewed diplomatic efforts to address it—particularly the involvement of the US and Qatar alongside the AU and relevant regional blocs (SADC and EAC). Diplomatic activity has intensified since M23’s significant territorial advances in eastern DRC beginning in January, including control of mineral-rich Goma in North Kivu Province.
A major breakthrough was the US-brokered peace agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened three meetings so far, the latest held earlier this month. In parallel, Qatar has been facilitating direct peace talks between the DRC and M23 since late March. This separate but coordinated track with the US produced a preliminary peace agreement in July, but missed the mid-August deadline for a final deal. Talks are expected to resume during the week of 6 October.
Meanwhile, in March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process.
Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s meeting will grapple with at least three issues. First, despite progress in implementing the US-brokered peace agreement, hostilities and hostile rhetoric persist, with the parties trading blame for obstructing peace efforts. Second, accountability in the region is critical in light of continued allegations of human rights violations against civilians, as evidenced in the 5 September report of the Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu. Third, there is also the issue of how the three peace initiatives could be consolidated into one credible process.
Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
On the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria will lead the intervention of the PSC during tomorrow’s meeting. The security and political situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate since the last consultative meetings of the two organs in November 2024. JNIM and ISGS have intensified their attacks in the Central Sahel and expanded their operations into coastal West Africa. This worsening insecurity is compounded by protracted political transitions, with the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger consolidating power and extending military rule until 2030.
The approach of the AU and the regional body ECOWAS was primarily focused on the unconstitutional change of government, with no due regard to the priority issue of saving the countries from the existential threat facing them due to terrorism. In a departure from this flawed policy approach, at their second annual joint consultative meeting, they held in May, the PSC and ECOWAS agreed to develop a security cooperation framework with the three countries to more effectively respond to the crisis.
Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to discuss recent AU efforts, including the AU Commission Chairperson’s meeting with representatives of the three countries in May, the visit of Angola’s Foreign Minister as special envoy on behalf of AU Chairperson João Lourenço, and the July appointments of President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel and former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of MISAHEL. The meeting is further expected to deliberate on ways to step up engagement with the three countries to address the security crisis as a critical avenue for facilitating a return to constitutional order.
On Lake Chad Basin, tomorrow’s discussion is expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the status of implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR). The EU has pledged €30 million over 18 months from January 2025 to strengthen MNJTF operations, while the AU Commission has also been providing support through the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund and equipment from the Continental Logistics Base. A key regional development of interest to the consultative meeting is Niger’s March announcement of its withdrawal from the MNJTF, raising fears that this could weaken the Force and create a security vacuum that can be exploited by terrorist groups active in the region.
This year, beyond African peace and security issues, the agenda also reserves space for Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments. As an agenda proposed by the EU side, it remains unclear what the focus of the discussion on this agenda would be. However, there is increasing recognition that the major global geopolitical changes, characterised by, among others, the emergence of a multipolar world, are not without serious implications for both the AU and the EU and for their relationship. In this context, the flagrant breaches of international law norms, including international humanitarian law and related challenges to multilateralism and global governance reform, may also feature in the discussions.
As noted earlier, for the past three years, the PSC and the EU PSC have been unable to adopt a joint communiqué, primarily due to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. As highlighted in our earlier insights on the PSC, the recent AU–EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025 and the ongoing negotiations toward the outcome document of the forthcoming AU–EU Summit, expected in November 2025, have created optimism that both sides may reach common ground to adopt a joint communiqué this time. Indications are that the draft communiqué of the consultative meeting reproduced the formulation used in the joint ministerial communiqué which expressed support for ‘a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel and in other major wars and conflicts around the globe, including Syria.’ With this, the two sides are expected to adopt a joint communiqué, ending the past three years of deadlock in adopting such a communiqué.