The severance of ties by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger— from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), marking a watershed moment in the deterioration of solidarity (as former AU Commission Chairperson aptly put it) and regional integration, was top on the agenda of the 16 May 2025 Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting convened between the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC)  and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS MSC).

The outcome of the consultation was adopted as a joint communiqué. It is of significance that the consultative meeting reaffirmed the principles of the PSC Protocol, including, most notably, the ‘primary responsibility of the AUPSC in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.’ The meeting also recalled Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, the 2008 MoU and the 2020 Revised Protocol on Relations between the AU and RECs.

It emerges from the outcome of the consultation that the deliberation, not surprisingly, touched on a wide range of issues. Of these, those that are of substantive significance and deserving of particular attention include the threat of terrorism and the democratic governance deficit afflicting the sub-region. In this respect, the two sides expressed deep concern over ‘the worsening insecurity resulting from the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa, particularly, in the Sahel region, with potential expansion to the littoral states’ and ‘the slow pace of transition in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger.’

While the two Councils were on target in addressing the democratic governance deficit and adherence to governance norms of the AU and ECOWAS, ‘especially in relation to the principle of zero-tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government,’ the lack of reference to some of the significant manifestations of the democratic governance deficit beyond coups makes the call hallow. Apart from coups the region has also experienced in the past years the abuse of electoral processes as experienced in Senegal (See concern expressed by AU Commission in this respect here) and Sierra Leone (here and here) leading to political instability in both countries (with AU, ECOWAS and Commonwealth launching mediation in Seirra Leone) and the disregard of constitutional rules of separation of powers and checks and balances as in Guinea Bissau and manipulation of nationality laws and term limits in Cote d’Ivoire. The lack of reference to these forms of the democratic governance deficit creates a credibility gap, as the AU and ECOWAS express zero tolerance for military coups while failing to clearly pronounce themselves on flawed or rigged elections and the extension of constitutional term limits.

Concerning the persisting threat of conflicts involving terrorist groups particularly in the Sahel, the PSC and the ECOWAS MSC agreed ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS for engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’ Given how conflicts involving terrorist groups have been ravaging these central Sahel countries for more than a decade, the fact that such a mechanism was instituted only in 2025 is reflective of the lack of proactiveness of the continental and sub-regional bodies. Even then, the test of this decision depends on the proverbial pudding of implementation. In this respect, one of the significant issues that the AU and ECOWAS need to address, apart from ensuring follow-through, is rebuilding trust with the three central Sahel states. Considering that the three Sahelian states are pursuing their regional integration processes and announced the building of the Alliance of Sahelian States’ (AES) 5,000-member joint force, the success of the planned engagement with these states (including the joint framework for addressing the threat of terrorism) depends also on building on and accommodation of these efforts.

Acknowledging the poor delivery of existing policy responses, the PSC and ECOWAS MSC also stressed ‘the need for reinvigorating the Nouakchott Process, the ECOWAS Plan of Action Against Terrorism, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and PSC comm.1275 on a combined maritime taskforce for addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’(emphasis added) They also highlighted the need for addressing exogenous factors that accentuate the threat, such as ‘the supply of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)’ and ‘small arms and light weapons’ as well as ‘the influx of mercenaries and foreign fighters.’ The next step is for the AU and ECOWAS to work on specific modalities of addressing these ‘exogenous factors’ or drivers of insecurity in the region, including by updating the 2014 AU Sahel Strategy.

As part of the effort to bolster joint action to address the terrorism menace in the sub-region, the two Councils called for the establishment of a ‘Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell as part of the proposed AU-ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform, with the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) designated as the continental coordination point.’ Additionally, the emphasis on the need to review and update the dated AU legal instruments (such as the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its 2004 Protocol) is timely, to ensure that these instruments address some of the new dimensions, including, most notably, technology and transnational networks.

Although the communiqué advances APSA and AGA objectives, particularly through Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and counterterrorism efforts, its effectiveness requires complementing these mechanisms with instruments such as the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and a revised and updated version of the 2014 AU Sahel Strategy. The AU and ECOWAS can use the revision and updating of this 2014 strategy, which has so far been dormant, as a platform for advancing policy coherence and joint action in their engagement with AES states.

The communiqué directly addressed the withdrawal of AES states from ECOWAS on 29 January 2025, expressing ‘deep concern’ and urging the three states to ‘reconsider’ their decision. Yet, considering the lack of follow-up on the previous call of the PSC, their reiteration of the need to ‘continue engaging’ with the AES countries does not inspire confidence that it will lead to any breakthrough. This is in part due to the lack of recognition of addressing the concerns of the AES states. Additionally, beyond the critical role of the leaders of Ghana, Senegal and Togo, the lack of implementation of previous PSC decisions casts serious doubt on the effectiveness of this call to ‘continue engaging.’ The fact that AU neither deployed effective mechanisms nor ensured the effective functioning of existing ones prompted the PSC during its 1212^th session to reiterate its request for the AU Commission ‘to appoint a High-Level Facilitator at the level of sitting or former Head of State to engage with the Transitional Authorities.’ Additionally, taking note of ‘the leadership vacuum within the African Union Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL),’ the PSC requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure the nomination of a High Representative, which remains a crucial interface in ensuring collective oversight between the Commission, Council, and the Countries in transition.’ The position has been vacant since the departure of Maman Sambo Sidikou in August 2023.

The call by the PSC and the ECOWAS MSC for a cooperation framework to engage AES states signals a change from a policy of passive estrangement to one of active engagement. The success of this policy shift, however, depends on another shift from policy statement to action through effective follow-through and a dedicated mechanism for sustained diplomacy.