PSC to undertake a field mission to South Sudan as it warns of ‘the potential of a full-scale war’
Date | 8 August 2025
From 10 to 12 August 2025, the premier standing decision-making body of the African Union (AU), the Peace and Security Council, is scheduled to undertake a preventive field mission to South Sudan. This field visit comes against the background of various and high-level engagements by the AU, including through the PSC, as part of the effort to contain the situation in South Sudan and sustain the transitional process.
Following the eruption of fighting in March this year and the ensuing political and constitutional crisis in South Sudan, concerns have been rising about the risk of the situation unravelling the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and precipitating the relapse of South Sudan back to conflict. Since then, the PSC has had three engagements on the situation in Sudan, two of them in the course of March 2025, indicating heightened attention and effort to stabilise the situation and avoid further deterioration.
The most recent engagement of the PSC was when it convened its 1283rd session to receive an updated briefing on the situation in South Sudan on 12 June.
The PSC went further from its earlier pronouncements on the situation in South Sudan in its assessment of the gravity of the situation in the country. Expressing ‘deep concern’ over the deteriorating political and security situation, in the communiqué it adopted, the Council warned about ‘the potential of a full-scale war, in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement, thus reversing all the gains registered thus far… in the implementation of the R-ARCSS.’ The PSC called for an ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ between the South Sudan Peoples’ Defence Forces (SSPDF), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the White Army, and all other affiliated groups.’ It reiterated that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan. As it calls on the parties to ‘agree to mediation and pursue genuine dialogue’, the PSC expressed ‘deep concern over the continued detention of Riek Machar Teny, First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan’ and ‘the dismissal and detention of SPLM-IO officials from the Revitalised National Government of Unity (R-TGoNU), in blatant violation of the R-ARCSS.’ It thus reiterated its call ‘for their immediate and unconditional release and reinstatement.’ The PSC considered these measures to be necessary not only ‘to de-escalate the ongoing political tension’ but also ‘to prevent the total collapse of the R-ARCSS.’
Cognisant of how the erosion of trust and the ensuing breakdown of relations between the leaders of the signatories of the R-ARCSS, the Council urged ‘the pursuit of dialogue aimed at restoring mutual trust and confidence.’ Reaffirming the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for lasting peace in South Sudan and calling for the signatory parties to use peaceful and legal means to resolve their differences and refrain from undermining the agreement and the coalition under RTGoNU, PSC urged them to respect the provisions of the R-ARCSS and desist from undermining peace.
While the PSC was right in calling for an investigation of all violations of the R-ARCSS and warning that peace spoilers will be held accountable, it did not outline the modalities of how these steps need to be followed up. However, in terms of further steps for addressing the deteriorating situation, the PSC envisaged the deployment of sustained diplomatic efforts. First, it encouraged ‘the Panel of the Wise to continue its engagement and mediation efforts with all actors, and the parties to the R-ARCSS.’ Second, it also encouraged the AU Commission Chairperson ‘to sustain engagements with President Salva Kiir and regional leaders to foster inclusive dialogue, facilitate the release of political detainees and support the full implementation of’ R-ARCSS.’
The PSC’s call on the AU Commission Chairperson to sustain engagement with ‘regional leaders’ is particularly notable considering the influence that Uganda, in particular, has in South Sudan, including as a major guarantor of the R-ARCSS. Indeed, it would be difficult for any mediation effort for de-escalating tension and restoring full commitment of the parties to the R-ARCSS to be effective without harnessing and relying on Kampala’s support and leverage.
The threat that the recent fighting and continuing risk of violence pose to the protection of civilians also received the attention of the PSC. Condemning ‘violence against civilians, particularly women and children,’ which, in its view, constitutes violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, the PSC called for ‘an immediate end to indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.’ It also urged South Sudanese authorities to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable ‘while taking immediate action to ensure protection of civilians.’
The other issue that was the centre of discussion during the session, as it had been in recent years, was the implementation of the R-ARCSS. In this respect, apart from encouraging the parties to the Tumaini Initiative and those yet to join ‘to reach a timely consensus for an inclusive peace process,’ the PSC first called on ‘the RTGoNU to expediate the deployment of the Necessary United Forces…facilitate the civic and political space for inclusive engagement.’ Second, it encouraged ‘the South Sudanese parties to commit to implementing all outstanding transitional tasks, such as security sector reform, including undertaking the second phase of the unification of forces, and the harmonisation of the command structure with a national character under one commander in chief.’ This is profoundly critical as success in reform of the security sector and its governance is central to ensuring the fragmentation of the security landscape in South Sudan. Third, it urged the RTGoNU to mobilise resources for the three institutions critical to the implementation of transitional tasks, critical to the holding of elections: the National Elections Commission (NEC), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC).
In terms of advancing mediation efforts, the PSC also encouraged the Trilateral Mechanism to work with the RTGoNU ‘to reactivate the Government-Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) and facilitate the implementation of pending R-ARCSS provisions, including constitution making and electoral processes.’
The PSC field mission session came following high-level visits to South Sudan, a) by the Panel of the Wise, which the PSC had called for during its 1265th and 1270th sessions, and b) by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It is expected that the PSC visit will build on these previous engagements of the relevant AU structures, including at the highest levels by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The visit also affords the PSC an opportunity to follow up on its various previous decisions, as highlighted above from its 1283rd session. Whether the mission succeeds in securing critical concessions and gets the parties back on track for implementing the transitional process will be a major test of whether South Sudan can conclude the transitional process for holding national elections in 2026 and avoid relapse.
This article builds on an analysis of the June 2025 PSC session on South Sudan that first appeared on The Monthly Digest on the PSC for June 2025.
