Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1302^nd session to receive an update on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR).

Following opening remarks by Miguel Bembe, Angola’s Permanent Representative to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for September 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to brief the Council. Statements are also expected from a representative of CAR, as the country under consideration, as well as from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the United Nations (UN).

The PSC last deliberated on the situation in the CAR at its 1241^st session on 30 October 2024, following a field mission to Bangui. At that meeting, the Council welcomed UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2745 (2024), which lifted the arms embargo, urged enhanced resource mobilisation in support of the 2025 general elections, and called on the CAR government to pursue inclusive dialogue with political groups. Building on the resolution thereof, the UNSC recently adopted Resolution 2789 (2025) on 29 July 2025, extending for one year the sanctions regime targeting non-state armed groups and individuals. Tomorrow’s session is expected to review developments since PSC’s last meeting, including security dynamics, the electoral process and the humanitarian and human rights situation.

The security situation is expected to remain a central focus. Since 2021, government offensives supported by Russian Wagner and Rwandan forces have improved stability in major cities by weakening rebel groups, yet competition over resources continues to drive violence, leaving civilians exposed to killings, kidnappings, forced displacement and extortion. In the southeast, two waves of attacks were reported in October 2024 and January 2025 across Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures, which left at least 24 people dead, some by summary execution. Since early May 2025, violence has intensified in Haut-Mbomou, particularly around Zemio and Mboki, where the national army, supported by Wagner-linked paramilitaries, has clashed with the Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé militia. Triggered by arrests in the Azandé community and disputes over resource control, the violence displaced more than 10,000 people by 8 May, including 6,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and thousands who fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Reports from Mboki describe widespread looting and arson that forced residents into churches and makeshift shelters. In the northwest, the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) group has remained active. On 24 June 2025, clashes between rival 3R factions in Bozoum killed at least six civilians, displaced between 5,000 and 6,000 people and destroyed dozens of homes. Crisis group reported that opposition to disarmament has fueled further violence: on 13–14 August, 3R fighters attacked two local officials in Lim-Pendé; on 21 August, they injured at least three civilians in Ouham-Bac; and on 18 August, they accused Russian paramilitaries of violating agreements by striking 3R positions in Nana-Mambéré and Ouham-Pendé. Separately, on 3 August, government forces clashed with anti-Balaka militia in Aba-Gobani (Nana-Mambéré), leaving one soldier dead.

Peacekeepers face ongoing risks. On 20 June, unidentified armed elements attacked a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrol in Vakaga prefecture. The Mission, whose mandate was extended until 15 November 2025 through Resolution 2759 (2024), confirmed that two Zambian peacekeepers were wounded, one of whom succumbed to his injuries. This was the third deadly attack in 2025, following incidents in Haut-Mbomou on 14 June, where two Nepalese peacekeepers were injured, and in February, when a Tunisian peacekeeper was killed. These incidents underscore the persistent dangers MINUSCA confronts.

Spillover from Sudan has heightened insecurity, with CAR’s porous borders enabling arms trafficking and the movement of armed groups. In May 2025, President Touadéra reportedly dispatched a delegation led by the Director of the Central African Intelligence Services to Port Sudan to engage with the Sudanese Armed Forces, reflecting CAR’s concern over the destabilising effects of Sudan’s conflict.

Discussions are likely to centre on the July 2025 disarmament agreements signed between the government and major groups, the Union for Peace in the CAR (UPC) and 3R, mediated by Chad, through which the latter formally announced their dissolution. These agreements build on the N’Djamena Peace Accord of 19 April 2025, in which 3R and UPC leaders pledged to cease hostilities and reaffirm their commitment to the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR-RCA). Despite the withdrawal of some Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC)-affiliated factions in December 2020, the APPR-RCA remains the central framework for peace. Regional efforts have complemented the APPR-RCA, particularly through the Luanda Roadmap adopted by the ICGLR, which emphasises inclusive political dialogue, ceasefire monitoring and confidence-building. The July deal was welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson, who urged all remaining armed groups to disarm and engage in inclusive dialogue in the national interest. Following the government’s announcement that 375 rebels surrendered their weapons during the ceremony where UPC and 3R leaders formalised the April Peace Accord, thousands of fighters remain active nationwide. Although commitments to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) represent a significant step forward, implementation is hampered by verification challenges, resource constraints and the risk of splinter groups undermining progress. As a result, armed violence persists in several regions, underscoring the fragility of the peace process.

Of particular significance for the session will be CAR’s preparations for the 28 December 2025 tripartite elections: presidential, legislative and local. The local elections, to be held for the first time in more than three decades, are viewed as an important test of democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, the political environment remains tense. The 2023 constitutional referendum, which removed presidential term limits and allowed President Touadéra to seek a third mandate, has been widely criticised as democratic backsliding. This development has intensified divisions and fueled opposition boycotts. In early April, the Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC) organised a mass protest, demanded dialogue with the president, and requested African mediation, all of which were declined by the government.

Financial and institutional challenges continue to undermine electoral preparations. Reports highlighted persistent dysfunction, funding shortfalls and delays in completing the roll as major risks to legitimacy. In response, the UN has urged urgent reforms and sufficient financing to safeguard electoral integrity. The National Electoral Authority (NAE) recently revised the election budget from 19 million to 21.8 million US dollars, leaving a gap of 9 million. Of the available resources, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is managing 12.4 million, while the Authority administers 9.4 million. Voter registration was finalised across all prefectures by March 2025, with anomalies addressed in May, yet opposition parties and civil society groups remain sceptical of the process’s credibility.  Complementing these efforts, the AU deployed its pre- and needs-assessment mission (PAM/NAM) to Bangui from 7 to 13 September 2025 to evaluate readiness and determine technical support requirements ahead of the 28 December polls. Against this backdrop, the NAE has confirmed the final roll, registering nearly 2.4 million voters.

Apart from security dynamics and election deliberations, tomorrow’s meeting is expected to address the dire humanitarian and human rights situation, with civilians, particularly women and children, bearing the brunt of violence and displacement. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  (OCHA) 2025 report, 2.4 million people out of an estimated 6.4 million, representing 38 percent of the population, are considered extremely vulnerable, while one in five Central Africans is either internally displaced or living as a refugee abroad, largely due to conflict, violence, the collapse of essential services and increasingly extreme weather. Armed incursions from Sudan have caused casualties and mass displacement in regions such as Vakaga and Ouham-Fafa, localised flooding in Gbazara has worsened conditions for female-headed households, and the Sudan crisis has driven refugee influxes into northeastern CAR, in some places outnumbering host communities. Additional arrivals of Chadian refugees and CAR returnees in the northwest have intensified pressures, particularly as many areas are cut off during the June to December rainy season. The World Food Programme (WFP) projected that 2.2 million people, or 35 percent of the population, will face acute food insecurity during the 2025 lean season from June to August, while continued militia activity, intercommunal conflict and restricted humanitarian access exacerbate vulnerability, forcing displaced populations into negative coping strategies and exposing women and girls to heightened risks of gender-based violence, poor sanitation and lack of maternal care.

Human rights violations remain a major concern, with MINUSCA documenting 790 violations and abuses affecting 1,162 victims between April and June 2025. The UPC was identified as the primary perpetrator, accounting for 115 violations, while the national police were responsible for the highest number of victims (246).  Another pressing issue is the persistent use of child soldiers, with Amani Africa highlighting that the exploitation of children in armed conflicts remains alarmingly widespread across Africa, and the Central African Republic stands out as one of the epicentres of child recruitment.