Tomorrow (22 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union Political and Security Committee (EU PSC) will convene their 15^th joint annual consultative meeting in Addis Ababa.

The informal joint retreat the two organs customarily convene ahead of their joint annual consultative meeting with the aim of facilitating constructive dialogue through informal engagements, was held earlier this year in March 2024 at the request of the EU PSC. In the joint informal retreat, the AUPSC and the EUPSC exchanged views on conflict prevention, mediation and post-conflict strategies and financing of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The AUPSC and EU PSC also used the informal retreat to deliberate on their working methods.

Ahead of the consultative meeting, the representatives of the AU and the EU are set to hold a meeting at the level of directors on 21 November. On that same day, at the level of the PSC, the Committee of Experts of the PSC is scheduled to hold a final preparatory meeting.

It is envisaged that the meeting commences with welcoming remarks by the co-chairs, Jean Leon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November and Delphine Pronk, Permanent Chair of the EU Political and Security Committee.

Considering that this meeting comes at the heels of two consecutive joint annual consultative meetings without a jointly issued communiqué, as a result of divergence particularly as it related to disagreements concerning responses to the Russia – Ukraine war, it is expected that this meeting will focus on thematic and continental security related agenda items of common interest and pathways for enhanced cooperation.

Despite some divergences, the broader scope of the AU – EU relationship suggests a commitment to regional stability and security areas where both organs’ interests intersect. Shifting the conversation to mutual areas of interest could allow both sides to sidestep their differences while advancing shared peace and security priorities on files of common interest. The agenda items for this year’s meeting show that they will focus on regional and country-specific situations of concern for both organs. These are: the situations in Somalia and the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023), Sudan, Sahel and Lake Chad Basin and Great Lakes Region.

Somalia

As it has become a common practice of the PSC, it is anticipated that different PSC member states take the lead in making interventions on the different agenda items on behalf of the PSC. On Somalia, it is anticipated that Uganda along with Egypt will take lead in making the intervention from the side of the PSC. On the part of the EUPSC, France along with Italy is envisaged to take the lead.

With respect to Somalia, the issue that is expected to attract the most attention is the transition from the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This transition comes amidst rising piracy incidents along Somlaia’s coast, driven in part by shifting shipping routes due to Red Sea security concerns linked to the Middle East crisis.

There are two issues that are sure to dominate the meeting. The first relates to the lack of clarity and disagreement surrounding troop-contributing countries in the context of the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM. Following the between Ethiopia and Somalia that were sparked by the signing of a MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, Somalia responded by insisting that it opposes the participation of Ethiopia, which is a major troop contributor to ATMIS, in the AUSSOM unless Ethiopia retracts the MoU. The post-ATMIS process has turned into a major regional flashpoint following the express reference welcoming Egypt’s offer to contribute to AUSSOM in the communique of the 1225^th session of the PSC. This provoked an expression of alarm by Ethiopia about the risk of the situation endangering regional peace and security. There is a shared interest between the AU and the EU, given the considerable investment the EU put into supporting the AU mission in Somalia and its interest in preventing the unravelling of the situation in Somalia and the region, to urge that the countries refrain from taking measures or making pronouncements that escalate tension. They may also reiterate the AU PSC communique of its 1238 session that directed ‘the African Union Commission to undertake consultation with AU Member States that have expressed readiness to contribute troops to AUSSOM’ and requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission ‘to use all available preventive diplomacy tools to urgently find an amicable/peaceful solution to the differences between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia based on the respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’

The second issue concerns the financing of AUSSOM. On the part of the AU, the preferred source of funding is UNSC Resolution 2719 as stated in the various PSC communiqués.  The EU, which has been the major source of funding for AU mission in Somalia, also supports this position. It has indicated that it does not anticipate to contribute more than Euro 60 million. Yet, considering that there is no consensus in the UN Security Council on the use of Resolution 2719, one of the issues in tomorrow’s meeting is whether the EU would be amenable for considering to provide a substantial portion of the funding for AUSSOM as a measure for bridging between the time of the deployment of AUSSOM and the activation of Resolution 2719 as seems to be proposed by the US.

Sudan

Sudan is another critical agenda item expected in the consultative meeting. It is anticipated that Egypt along with Uganda and Morocco would take the lead in making interventions on the side of the PSC. From the side of the EUPSC, Ireland and Cyprus are expected to take the lead.

The hostilities between the SAF and RSF have escalated into a humanitarian emergency with widespread reports of indiscriminate attacks on civilians, SGBV and violations against children, famine, displacement and violations of international humanitarian law. The conflict has resulted in a large scale crisis in the region with recent reports indicating that nearly 25 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance and over 14 million people forcedly displaced internally and into neighbouring states. High Representative Josep Borrell recently described the situation as one that is ‘becoming desperate’.

The AUPSC and EUPSC are expected to express deep concerns over worsening conditions, condemning attacks on civilians, including recent mass killings and rapes in Sudan’s El-Jazirah state. The two bodies are likely to emphasise based on respective existing pronouncements the urgent need for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to halt the violence and ensure the protection of civilians while reiterating that a civilian-led government remains the only sustainable solution to the crisis. They are also expected to underline the importance of accountability for those responsible for atrocities. Additionally, the councils are anticipated to highlight the necessity of a coordinated international response to address the massive humanitarian needs. And stress the urgency of providing immediate humanitarian aid while supporting Sudan’s path toward long-term peace and stability.

Sahel and Lake Chad

Nigeria along with Morocco and Cameroon is expected to take the lead in making interventions on the side of the AU on the situation in the Sahel. It would be Hungary along with Luxembourg that would take the lead on the side of the EUPSC.

The Sahel’s complex security, governance and humanitarian crisis has long been a focal point for AU and EU security agendas. Since the last AUPSC – EUPSC session, the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) this setback in regional integration and security was further compounded by the dissolution of the G5 Sahel initiative and the withdrawal- upon the request of the host- of the UN’s 10-year mission in Mali, MINUSMA.

In light of these developments, it is expected that the two sides will express concern over the worrying security situation in the region and the attendant deteriorating humanitarian situation. They may echo existing pronouncements on the need for countries in political transition in the Sahel to adhere to the transitional timelines. They may also express the need for coordinating engagements in responding to the situation in the region and express support for the role of ECOWAS and the AU in advancing stability and the resolution of the constitutional crisis in the three Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The need for maintaining lines of communication and engaging the authorities in these countries may also underscored. Emphasis is also expected to be made on the need for enhancing support for people affected by the humanitarian situation in the region.

On Lake Chad, Cameroon along with Nigeria is expected to take the lead in making intervention on the side of the PSC. In Lake Chad, despite gains by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the splinter groups Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) factions, the security and humanitarian situations remain critical, with millions of civilians in urgent need of assistance. The AU PSC and EU PSC are expected to recognise the importance of a cohesive multidimensional regional approach to address the security and humanitarian crisis in the region. Cognizant of the threats the region faces from terrorism and violent extremism, coups and unconstitutional changes of government, it is also expected that the two organs will emphasise the need for enhancing security, civilian protection and humanitarian relief.

Great Lakes Region

On Great Lakes, Angola is expected to take the lead in making interventions on the side of the AUPSC while Belgium along with Romania will take lead on the side of the EUPSC. The discussion on the Great Lakes Region is expected to focus on the situation in Eastern DRC. The two organs will likely focus on terrorism, proliferation of armed groups, illegal exploitation of natural resources and the progress with the Luanda process. The EU’s renewed strategy for the GLR may also feature.

Since the last consultations between the two organs, the Luanda process has revived with the 30 July 2024 signing of a ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda. However, the security situation in eastern DRC has remained volatile with armed groups continuing to perpetrate atrocities. It is thus expected that the AUPSC and EU PSC may express deep concern over the insecurity prevailing in Eastern DRC and the deteriorating humanitarian situation. They may condemn the various armed groups engaged in acts of violence in the region and the support that is extended to these armed groups wreaking havoc in the region. They may also commend the Luanda process and the progress achieved thus far in the talks under the auspicious of the Luanda process. In this respect, they may welcome the ceasefire agreement negotiated between DRC and Rwanda on 30 July 2024 within the framework of the Luanda process. They may also urge both DRC and Rwanda to maintain their commitment to and engage constructively in the Luanda process for achieving a conclusive peace agreement.

The agenda also allocates a slot for AOB. Beyond the foregoing issues that are on the agenda of the PSC, it is anticipated that representatives of the EUPSC would raise from the floor the war in Ukraine. This is a pressing issue of existential proportion particularly for members of the EUPSC from Eastern Europe. In their intervention, it is expected that EU representatives may underscore their expectation that the annual consultative meeting should not be focusing on African peace and security issues only and need to reflect on peace and security issues of concern in Europe as well with a focus in particular on Ukraine. They may emphasise that the blatant breach of the fundamental UN Charter and international law principles of state sovereignty and inviolability of the territorial integrity of states are matters of concern for all members of the international community and should be condemned.

Yet, while members of the PSC may empathise with the concerns of the EUPSC, there has been no change in their position from the last two years. Most notably, While AU member states may share the view that the invasion of one country by another and the breach of the sovereignty of one country by another is contrary to the UN Charter and international law and don’t support the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, they lack a common AU position to enable the PSC on adopting any measure against this particular breach of international law. In view of this, if EU member states insist on the inclusion of reference as a condition for the adoption of a joint communique, it is possible that the two sides may end up repeating the last two consultative meetings, thereby ending their meetings without adopting a joint communiqué.

However, aside from the issue of Ukraine, the two Councils share common interests and perspectives on most of the issues relating to the various agenda items of the consultative meeting. This may therefore be the moment for the two sides to decide on whether they should continue to be stuck on an issue in respect of which they face incompatibility arising from mandate gaps affecting the AU PSC and held themselves back from pronouncing themselves on all the issues on the agenda of the consultative meeting on which they do not have differences.

In the light of the dilemmas this poses and the strongly held policy position, the two sides are left with four options and scenarios. The first option is the repeat of the last two consecutive consultative meetings. This is the scenario of each clinging to its position and agree to disagree. This is in a way a well-known experience. The second option is they agree to adopt a joint communique with the EUPSC having the possibility of attaching as annexe their views on Ukraine. This is the scenario of tampered compromise which in some ways allows both sides to uphold their policy position with some adjustment. The third option is to adopt a joint communiqué in which there would be no reference to Ukraine and focusing exclusively on the agenda of the consultative meeting. The other and fourth scenario is the AU PSC relents on its existing position and agrees to a reference to Ukraine in the joint communiqué.