Tomorrow (20 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313^th session to receive a briefing on the Situation in Madagascar.

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. The Special Envoy of the AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamed Idris Farah, and Dominitien Ndayizeye, former Burundian President and member of the Panel of the Wise, are expected to brief the Council. It is also expected that a representative of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) will make a statement.

The session comes as the Council seeks to assess follow-up on the implementation of its 15 October decision following the coup in Madagascar and the country’s suspension from AU activities. It is to be recalled that the PSC held two sessions just one day apart, before and after the coup (1305^th and 1306^th Sessions).

Following the seizure of power by the leader of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) and the dissolution of parts of the constitution and all institutions except the lower house of parliament, the PSC, at its 1306th session on 15 October, suspended Madagascar from Participation in AU activities. Declaring the military coup a clear violation of AU principles and governance frameworks, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the PSC demanded the restoration of constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government and the organization of elections as soon as possible, while urging all units of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and refrain from meddling in political affairs.

The political landscape in Madagascar has evolved since the PSC’s previous session. Colonel Michael Randrianirina was formally sworn in as President of the ‘Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar’ on 17 October and has since moved to consolidate his authority while projecting an image of reform-minded governance. In his public statements, Randrianirina has dismissed allegations that Rajoelina’s removal amounted to a coup, stressing that it occurred without violence, and rejected claims of judicial retaliation, asserting that ongoing investigations reflect justice rather than vengeance.

On 28 October, Randrianirina unveiled a new 29-member government featuring several prominent opponents of former President Rajoelina in key positions, including Christine Razanamahasoa as foreign minister, Fanirisoa Erinaivo as justice minister, and Hanitra Razafimanantsoa as state minister for ‘refoundation,’ alongside businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as Prime Minister. Randrianirina announced priorities of fighting impunity, enforcing budget austerity, and stabilising the business climate, warning ministers that failure to show results within two months could lead to their replacement.

The military authorities have articulated what they describe as a comprehensive reform agenda. Randrianirina outlined a six-step plan purporting to respond to the collective will to break with past crises and build a just, stable, sustainable, and fully legitimate country. The steps include restoring trust between the state and its citizens, strengthening governance and transparency, intensifying the fight against corruption, guaranteeing the republican nature of the responsibilities of the armed forces, drafting the fundamental texts that will govern the new Republic, and organising a constitutional referendum followed by free and fair elections recognised by all. The proposed roadmap envisages nationwide consultations led by the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) to establish a new governance system, followed by a referendum and presidential election within two years, alongside plans for a Youth Assembly and strengthened Malagasy language and history education.

The proposed two-year transitional timeline and the plan for a new constitution are further indicators of the unconstitutional seizure of power. It is worth recalling that the High Constitutional Court that ‘invited’ Randrianirina to seize power, thereby giving a semblance of legality to the military seizure of power, tasked him to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant. While he accepted the ‘invitation’ of this Court and defended the ‘constitutionality’ of his seizure of power on that basis, after seizing power, he ignored the court order on the timeline for holding elections. The decision for the two-year transition is not a result of a process of national consultation or dialogue.

The military’s self-determined two-year governance timeline directly contradicts the AU’s call for immediate handover to a civilian-led transitional authority. More significantly, the military’s appointments of key figures, including Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo without consultation, and its unilateral extension of the transition timeline have reportedly fostered growing disillusionment among the youth protesters whose demonstrations precipitated the political upheaval. What began as a convergence of interests between CAPSAT and the youth-led movement has given way to a troubling divergence between the protesters’ demands for genuine democratic renewal and the military’s consolidation of its own authority. This pattern is increasingly familiar in the many instances of such military seizure of power on the continent from Gabon to Guinea, where military forces initially embraced as allies by civilian protesters subsequently sideline protest movements after seizing power, failing to fulfil revolutionary aims and instead entrenching their control under the guise of stabilisation and reform.

Acting on the PSC’s decision of its 1305^th session, the AU Commission Chairperson announced on 3 November that he appointed Mohamed Idriss Farah as Special Envoy for Madagascar. The Special Envoy commenced his first visit on 6 November. Along with the Farah’s mission to Madagascar and as a follow-up of the decisions of the 1305^th and 1306^th sessions of the PSC, the AU Commission dispatched a High-Level Delegation to Madagascar from 7 to 11 November, led by Ndayizeye. These visits had the primary objective of engaging in constructive dialogue with Malagasy authorities and national stakeholders to address the current political crisis. The delegation was received by the leader of the transition, Randrianirina, Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo, and the Foreign Minister, Razanamahasoa, in meetings described as taking place in ‘an excellent atmosphere’ that allowed both parties to share views on the current situation.

According to official AU communications, particular emphasis was placed during these exchanges on the need to maintain frank and constructive dialogue between the AU and Malagasy authorities to support their efforts to overcome the political situation, facilitate national reconciliation, and respond to the legitimate political and socio-economic aspirations of the Malagasy people. The Head of the AU delegation welcomed the openness of the authorities to dialogue and their expressed commitment to the African Union and the values of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, while reiterating the continental organisation’s commitment to supporting and accompanying the Malagasy people and authorities in their quest for peace, stability and justice. These positive characterisations of the engagement suggest that diplomatic channels remain open and suspension does not preclude but rather necessitates AU’s robust engagement.

Yet the critical question confronting tomorrow’s session is whether this diplomatic reception translates into a genuine willingness to meet the AU’s core demands for civilian-led transition and constitutional restoration. The AU delegation’s positive assessment of the authorities’ openness must be carefully weighed against the fact that the military leadership arrogated to itself the role of deciding the transitional process without any national consultative process. There is a tangible risk that the military authorities may seek to leverage diplomatic engagement to gain time and legitimacy while pursuing their predetermined course, rather than genuinely engaging with AU requirements. The articulation of reform commitments and the appointment of opposition figures to ministerial positions without the participation of political and civilian forces of the country is a clear entrenchment of the military’s control of the transitional process. It is worth recalling that the PSC in its decision demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.’ Yet, the developments since mid-October, instead of representing meaningful steps toward the civilian-led transition it demanded, indicate a consolidation of military authority dressed in reform rhetoric.

It is expected that the SADC representative will update the PSC on SADC’s initiatives. It is to be recalled that SADC differed on the determination of whether what transpired in Madagascar was a military seizure of power, contrary to the constitutional processes established in Madagascar for seizure of power. The PSC in which five SADC member states including the Chairperson of the PSC for October were represented did not deem difference of determination necessary as there was no any uncertainty about the occurrence of a military seizure of power contrary to established constitutional processes In a communiqué issued after the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, held virtually on 16 October 2025, the Organ urged all political actors in Madagascar to engage in inclusive dialogue as the only path toward lasting peace and endorsed the deployment of a technical fact-finding mission to Madagascar by 22 October 2025. SADC sent a fact-finding mission led by the Panel of Elders, including former Malawian President Dr. Joyce Banda, ‘to engage all stakeholders, ease tensions, promote dialogue, and identify the root causes of the crisis.’ The extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 7 November resulted in acknowledgement of Madagascar’s relinquishment of its role as Chair of SADC due to its incapacity to discharge the responsibilities of the position following recent political developments, and South Africa became Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026. It did not, however, address the outcome of the visit of the SADC Panel of Elders. From the information available, there is no indication as yet that the report from the SADC visit has yet been received and validated by the SADC Organ Troika Summit.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may also recall its previous decisions of the 1306^th sessions, urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed-upon transitional civilian authority and reaffirm its stand in that respect. The PSC may commend the AU Chairperson and the AU Commission Chairperson for assigning a dedicated mechanism that follows on the decisions of the 1305^th and 1306^th sessions and may in this respect welcome the visit by the Special Envoy to Madagascar immediately after his appointment along with the deployment of the high-level delegation. The Council may acknowledge the military authorities’ articulation of a reform agenda and their reported openness to dialogue and call on them to continue collaboration with the AU and SADC mechanisms within the framework of the communiqués its 1305^th and 1306^th sessions, including on the need for civilian-led rather than military-directed. It may in this respect call for inclusive national dialogue that centres the voices of civil society, youth movements, and political stakeholders and the development of a transitional roadmap on the basis of such inclusive national dialogue with the support of SADC and the AU. The PSC may emphasise the need for close coordination between the AU and SADC in providing comprehensive accompaniment to the transitional process in Madagascar on the basis of joint responsibility. The Council may stress that the reform process for restoration of constitutional order must address not only the political crisis but also the underlying socio-economic challenges and poor governance that sparked the protests. The PSC may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decisions of the Council and the initiatives of the AU and SADC toward addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth, and supporting the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.