Tomorrow (1 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene to receive an update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chair for October, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. AU Special Envoy Patrice Émery Trovoada and Ovídio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, Special Representative of the AUC Chairperson to Guinea-Bissau, are also expected to brief the Council, while ECOWAS is expected to make a statement.

The PSC last considered Guinea-Bissau at its 1347^th session on 18 May, expressing concern over the ‘continued fragile political situation’. It called for the immediate and unconditional release of Domingos Simões Pereira and other political detainees, restoration of political and civic space, stronger CNE and Supreme Court independence, military non-interference, due process and fundamental freedoms. It also requested accelerated security-sector reform (SSR), sustained AU engagement, an AU–ECOWAS joint assessment and a PSC fact-finding mission.

The session comes at a consequential stage of the transition established after the 26 November 2025 military seizure of power. Since May, the census has advanced, the constitutional referendum has been held, and elections remain scheduled for 6 December. The central test is whether these milestones are restoring constitutional order and constraining military influence. Article 23 of the Transitional Charter prohibits interim President Horta Inta-a and Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té from contesting. Although the 1333^rd and 1347^th communiqués reaffirmed the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), they did not expressly address Article 25(4), which bars perpetrators of unconstitutional changes from elections held to restore democratic order. Clarifying eligibility before nominations are finalised is therefore important. In February 2026, the military-led authorities also replaced the electoral commission leadership, created a new secretariat and revised legislation on political parties, the electoral code and the military legal framework. Taken in a restricted political environment, these measures intensify concern over the independence of electoral institutions and rules. The question is not simply whether elections are held, but whether the transition prevents authority acquired through the coup from being converted into electoral advantage and returns political competition to rule-bound civilian institutions.

A notable political development since the last session was the 30 August referendum. The framework drew critiques that it ‘aims to consolidate power within the office of the president’. PAIGC, historically the dominant political party in Guinea-Bissau, also called for a boycott over concerns about inclusiveness. Official sources nevertheless reported about 70 per cent support, with turnout reported to have exceeded 55 per cent. The Constitution expands presidential authority over appointment and dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet, reduces the National People’s Assembly from 102 to 65 seats and constituencies from 29 to 12, and introduces a five-year continuous-residency requirement for presidential candidates. In effect, it moves the system from semi-parliamentary toward a fully presidential model in which parliament’s role is significantly curtailed. PAIGC rejects the result, describing it as ‘fraudulent’ and ‘another coup d’état’.

Another politically significant development was the launch of a national census. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1347^th meeting took note of the census scheduled for June 2026. Cognizant of its significance, the PSC underscored that the census should be conducted in a ‘transparent, inclusive and credible manner.’ UNFPA reported that field enumeration for the fourth General Population and Housing Census began on 1 June 2026, the first since 2009.

Political and civic space remains another central test of the transition. At its 1347^th meeting, the PSC called for restoration of political and civic spaces and a ‘transparent, independent and credible investigation’ into the killing of activist Vigário Luís Balanta. Subsequent reporting indicated that Po’ di Terra, the opposition political movement founded by Balanta in 2023,  had gone underground amid security concerns. The post-coup period also involved bans on demonstrations and press conferences, intimidation of human-rights defenders, closure of party headquarters and suspension of radio stations. In September, the Military High Command ordered political parties to relocate, within seven working days, headquarters situated less than 500 metres from sovereign institutions, hospitals, diplomatic missions or military and paramilitary facilities. The authorities presented the measure as enforcement of the February 2026 Political Parties Framework Law and justified it as necessary to preserve the country’s ‘climate of peace and security’. The measure directly affected, among others, PAIGC and MADEM-G15, whose national headquarters are located close to the presidential complex. PAIGC rejected the directive as ‘absolutely illegal’, arguing that the Military High Command lacked the legitimacy and legal authority to order the relocation of party premises and that any eviction should be determined by judicial authorities. The PAI–Terra Ranka coalition similarly rejected the measure as unlawful and questioned the military authorities’ competence to regulate political-party operations. These restrictions bear directly on whether opposition parties and civil society can organise, campaign and participate on equal terms. Electoral preparedness is thus not merely technical: an enabling environment for political competition is itself a substantive condition for credible elections.

There has been partial movement on the situation of PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira. On 24 July, he was allowed to leave detention for medical treatment in Portugal, with his family describing the release as ‘conditional’. This did not resolve the underlying allegations, due-process concerns or broader restrictions on opposition participation. Read with continuing constraints on party activity and civic space, a substantial part of the conditions set by the PSC at its 1347^th meeting remains outstanding as the electoral deadline approaches.

Of particular significance is the extent to which earlier PSC decisions have been implemented. The 1333^rd meeting called for an ‘expeditious’ integrated SSR plan, stronger CNE capacity and Supreme Court independence, an AU–ECOWAS assessment and a PSC field mission; the 1347^th communiqué reiterated these priorities and linked SSR to ‘civilian oversight and constitutional governance’. The key questions are whether an integrated, sequenced and costed SSR framework exists and whether progress has been made on military neutrality, command accountability and civilian oversight.

Taken together, these outstanding issues mean that electoral credibility depends on considerably more than adherence to the 6 December calendar. The interrupted 2025 election showed that orderly polling is insufficient if institutions cannot complete tabulation, adjudication and transfer of power. In this context, readiness should be assessed across four linked dimensions: technical preparedness, including an updated voter register, logistics, financing and ballot preparations; institutional and legal readiness, particularly the independence and capacity of the CNE and Supreme Court; political readiness, including freedom to organise, campaign and challenge decisions; and security readiness, requiring military neutrality and protection for all contestants. Against these benchmarks, 2026 developments suggest deepening military influence and constrained political and civic space, raising the question of whether the minimum conditions for credible elections are in place before 6 December.

Continental and regional diplomacy has intensified. After Fernando Dias da Costa’s campaign denounced ECOWAS remarks on the referendum as ‘inadmissible interference’, ECOWAS clarified on 29 June that its mission had ‘neither announced nor validated any constitutional process’. The 69^th ECOWAS Summit entrusted Senegal with facilitation; on 6 August, Foreign Minister Cheikh Niang, accompanied by Armed Forces Minister Yancoba Diémé, discussed the mandate with transitional authorities and reaffirmed readiness to support ‘a swift return to constitutional order’.  Nigeria remains engaged through the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission and deployed a new contingent in August. It is to be recalled that Fernando Dias da Costa had also taken refuge at the Nigerian embassy following the 26 November 2025 military takeover, while a Senegalese mission sought arrangements for his safe passage. More broadly, the 69^th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority, in addition to entrusting Senegal with the facilitation role, urged an inclusive transition, human rights and judicial safeguards, release of detained political figures, technical support and security guarantees.

The AU has maintained a parallel channel through Special Envoy Patrice Émery Trovoada. The AUC Chairperson met Trovoada on 18 August, reiterating support for ‘peace, stability and an inclusive political process’. During a September visit, Trovoada stressed that elections should be ‘as transparent and inclusive as possible’. On 24 September, the AUC Chairperson met Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té in New York and reiterated support for restoration of constitutional order; Té later stated at the UN that elections would be inclusive, free, transparent and credible. The PSC’s concern is whether political and institutional conditions substantiate these commitments. AU and ECOWAS engagement would therefore benefit from common pre-election benchmarks and consolidated reporting on political inclusion, electoral institutions and military neutrality.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome progress on the census, referendum and transition calendar while stressing that credible, inclusive and peaceful elections on 6 December require the necessary political and institutional conditions. It may reiterate fundamental rights, due process and the rule of law; call for the restoration of political and civic space; renew its demand for a credible investigation into Vigário Luís Balanta’s killing; and seek clarification on political detainees, restrictions on opposition participation and candidate eligibility. The Council may request an AU–ECOWAS electoral assessment to determine whether the minimum political, institutional, technical and security conditions for credible elections are in place, identify support needs, seek an update on the outstanding joint assessment and set a timeline for the PSC fact-finding mission. It may expressly invoke Article 25(4) of ACDEG, reaffirming that perpetrators of an unconstitutional change of government cannot participate in elections held to restore democratic order, and recall the Transitional Charter’s exclusion of interim President Horta Inta-a and Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té. In this regard, it may seek a reaffirmation of the commitment by the coup-making authorities that they will not contest the elections. The Council may further call for the non-participation of former President Umaro Sissoco Embaló in light of reports by opposition figures and regional political figures that he was involved in orchestrating the 26 November takeover. It may call for the lifting of restrictions on political and civic freedoms and concrete measures to create an enabling environment in which all political parties and candidates can freely undertake political activities, including organising and campaigning, and in which media and civil-society actors can operate without intimidation or undue restriction. It may further welcome Senegal’s facilitation and encourage closer coordination among the AU Special Envoy, ECOWAS facilitator and other partners, while requesting the status of the integrated SSR plan and urging military neutrality throughout the electoral process.