On Sudan, the main focus is likely to be on how the two Councils can effectively collaborate to facilitate political dialogue, secure a cessation of hostilities, enhance the delivery of humanitarian aid and protection of civilians, and ensure better coordination and complementarity among the various peace initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict. The recent spike in fighting including most notably the siege of El Fasher, which featured during the PSC Ministerial session last month, will receive particular attention. Apart from reiterating the call for the lifting of the siege on El Fasher, the two may call for respect for IHL and the provision of humanitarian access as well as implementation of the Jeddah Declaration of commitments for the protection of civilians.

Apart from reiterating their affirmation from last year’s joint communiqué that there is no military solution to the conflict in Sudan, the two sides may explore how AU’s role could be enhanced and they all rally around the roadmap for the resolution of the conflict. It is expected that the two Councils will reaffirm the importance of the AU roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan and may welcome the establishment of the PSC Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Sudan. In this context, members of the UNSC may be particularly interested in hearing from the PSC about its recent engagement with Lt. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, and other Sudanese stakeholders during its field mission to Port Sudan. While al Burhan’s direct urging of the PSC for lifting off Sudan’s suspension may not be responded to affirmatively before, at the very least, an all-inclusive transitional process and roadmap is agreed to by various Sudanese political and social forces, it is hoped that this visit and the recognition that it accorded to al-Burhan as the internationally recognised authority in Sudan may further enhance collaboration from SAF on AU’s mediation role. In this context, the AU is also expected to open its Sudan office in Port Sudan.

On Somalia and post-ATMIS security arrangements, the Councils are expected to discuss three critical issues. The first is the persistently precarious political and security situation of Somalia. Of particular concern is the fact that this situation has become further complicated by escalating tension between Ethiopia and Somalia over the January Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. Following the PSC’s decision to establish the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) during its 1225^th session on 1 August when Egypt’s proposal to be a troop-contributing country was welcomed in the PSC communiqué, Somalia’s intention to replace Ethiopian forces with Egyptian troops has made the post-ATMIS process a major regional flashpoint. In a statement issued on 28 August, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the transition from ATMIS to a new peace support mission is ‘fraught with dangers to the region’. It is very unlikely that there will be any direct reference to this dimension of the complications around the post-ATMIS plans in the joint communiqué the two Councils are expected to adopt. Yet, reference may be made to the agreed language of the commitment of the two Councils to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states.

The second issue is on the design of the post-ATMIS mission, endorsed by the PSC as the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) during its 1225^th session on 1 August 2024. AUSSOM is set to commence on 1 January 2025, immediately after ATMIS mandate ends on 31 December 2024. On 15 August, the UNSC also adopted Resolution 2748, which requested the UN Secretary-General, jointly with the Chairperson of the AU Commission and in consultation with Somalia and international stakeholders, to report on the overall mission design for the proposed successor mission and financing options by 15 November. In line with this, the joint AU-UN delegation conducted an eight-day visit to Mogadishu in early October to engage with the FGS, ATMIS, UN, troop-contributing countries (TCCs), and international partners on the transition strategies and financing models.

The third is the perennial issue of financing and whether AUSSOM should be a test case for the application of Resolution 2719. This is where a major policy divergence exists between the PSC and some permanent members of the UNSC, notably the US. The PSC appears to favour linking the financing of AUSSOM with Resolution 2719 as reflected in its communiqués, including the latest one adopted at PSC’s 1225^th session, which emphasised the need for a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with Resolution 2719. In contrast, the US has expressed clear reservations on the matter. During the 3 October UNSC briefing on Somalia, the US stated that ‘this is not the time or place to apply 2719’, while highlighting the importance of avoiding the ‘premature application of the framework’ not to undermine its credibility. On 11 October, Donald Kaberuka and Souef Mohamed El-Amine, the SRCC and Head of ATMIS gave an update to the UNSC on this question of mission design and predictable funding for AUSSOM. The consultative meeting could offer an opportunity to take the discussion further and build consensus ahead of the UNSC meeting in November.

On the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, the increasingly deteriorating security situation, the fallout between ECOWAS and the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and the prolonged political transitions in these countries are likely to dominate the discussion. The two Councils are likely to highlight the need for enhancing civilian protection and compliance with IHL and the adoption of a multidimensional approach to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. Although it may not be reflected in the joint communiqué, the weakening of the regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States may also feature during the interventions. In a recent interview with France 24, Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo described the announcement by the juntas of these three countries to withdraw from ECOWAS and form the Confederation of Sahel States (AES) in July as a ‘setback for regional security’.

The two Councils may be interested in the status of the long-overdue report by the high-level independent panel led by former Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou. Tasked by the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force in September 2022 to conduct a strategic assessment of the underlying challenges in the Sahel, this report will be critical in guiding a coordinated response from the regional and international mechanisms to address the complex political, security and development challenges in the region.

Regarding the Great Lakes region, the focus will be on the situations in eastern DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR). Concerning the eastern DRC crisis, attention will be given to the threat that the presence of various armed groups poses to civilians and peace and security in the region and how to ensure the success of the Angola-facilitated peace talks between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda peace process) as well as the situation of MONUSCO, UN’s mission in the DRC. It is expected that they will condemn the various armed groups and the insecurity and violence that they continue to perpetrate in Eastern DRC with dire consequences to the lives and well-being of civilians. DRC may seek specific reference to the end of external support for the M23 and respect for the territorial integrity of the country.

Regarding the peace process, in a recent briefing to the UNSC, Huang Xia, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, highlighted the positive impact of the 30 July ceasefire agreement signed between DRC and Rwanda under the Luanda Process, which has contributed to relative calm, albeit with occasional skirmishes. It is expected that the two Councils will welcome the ceasefire agreement and urge the two governments to uphold the agreement.

During the UNSC briefing on 8 October on the Great Lakes Region, DRC and Rwanda exchanged accusations over responsibility for the stalling of the Luanda Process. It is to be recalled that  the meeting of Rwandan and DRC experts held on 30 August 2024 in Rubavu, Rwanda under the Luanda Process, adopted a harmonised plan focusing on the neutralisation of the FDLR, an ethnic Hutu armed group whose members include those who participated in the 1994 genocide and operating in eastern DRC, and what is called ‘the lifting of Rwandan defence measures’. Despite a ministerial meeting convened on 14 September in Luanda, Angola, it was reported that the ministers were unable to adopt the plan developed by experts including military leaders.

In its statement to the UNSC, DRC outlined three points for why the Luanda Process stalled: Rwanda’s requirement to link its withdrawal from DRC to the neutralisation of the FDLR; its rejection of liability clauses in a potential peace agreement; and refusal to a regional justice mechanism. Kigali refuted these accusations, arguing that clauses on liability and a regional justice mechanism were not even part of the expert-level negotiations, further asserting the importance of neutralising and fully disengaging the FDLR from the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) as crucial to achieving a lasting solution to the conflict in eastern DRC.

These public disputations notwithstanding, the ministers of the two countries convened for the 5^th tripartite Ministerial Meeting on 12 October in Eastern DRC within the framework of the Luanda Process under Angola’s facilitation. While it remains unclear how far the ministerial meeting went in clarifying the areas of disagreement and adopting the 30 August expert meeting conclusions, it was reported that the ministerial meeting concluded with the signing of the minutes of the meeting, signalling that the Luanda Process remains on track. Against this context, the two Councils may express their full support for the Luanda Process and urge the two parties to continue the dialogue in good faith and with a determination to achieve a settlement.

With respect to MONUSCO, it is expected that the two Councils would condemn attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers and urge all actors to respect the non-inviolability of UN peacekeepers. The progress in the drawdown of MONUSCO and the need for ensuring a smooth transition in the context of the withdrawal of the mission would also be of interest to the two Councils. They may also welcome the UNSC authorisation of limited support for the SADC Mission to the DRC (SAMIDRC), although it is unlikely SAMIDRC would fill in the enormous footprint that MONUSCO would leave behind.

In the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), the postponement of local elections to April next year may draw attention. These elections, originally scheduled for July 2023 and then October 2024, would have been the first in over three decades. Other key issues likely to be discussed include the illegal exploitation of natural resources and its impact on the country’s peace and stability, the severe humanitarian crisis, the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) process of former combatants, the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (PAPR-CAR) and the importance of the work of the Special Criminal Court of the CAR in the fight against impunity.

It is expected that the two Councils will adopt a joint communiqué. In recent years, these joint communiqués have been adopted shortly, suggesting that negotiations on their contents have been less contentious compared to earlier years, including 2016 and 2017 when the adoption of joint communiqués was delayed, and in 2019, where no outcome document could be agreed upon.