Tensions between these armed groups over territorial control and competition of political actors for influence over state institutions and access to state resources have on various occasions led to the eruption of violence between these armed groups. One of the major conflict databases, ACLED, reported that it recorded ‘64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.’ The most recent of these violent episodes that shook Tripoli took place in May 2025. While the leaders of GNU described the violent clashes as law enforcement operations against criminals, aimed at enforcing judicial orders issued by the Libyan Attorney General with the goal of upholding the rule of law, it is viewed as a manifestation of patterns of inter-elite competition.  Thus, in her briefing to the UN Security Council on 24 June, Tetteh observed that ‘narratives have emerged, that risks pitting cities and neighbourhoods within western Libya against one another, threatening social cohesion and potentially fomenting further escalation.’ She further warned that the ‘continued inflow of weapons into Tripoli has led to the proliferation of heavy arms and weapons depots in densely populated civilian areas, posing serious risks to civilian lives. There is also growing concern that further instability will draw in eastern security actors and undermine the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement.’

Further compounding the political and institutional division and the fragmentation of the security landscape with the persistence of rival armed groups exerting influence on and loosely affiliated to government institutions are competing external interests. External actors have further destabilised the situation by supporting opposing sides, effectively turning Libya into a proxy battleground and complicating international mediation efforts.

Considering the fact that the rivalry between armed groups feeds into and reinforces the political and institutional division in Libya and that stability in Tripoli is held by transactional arrangements and financial cooption by the GNU rather than formal arrangements and institutional reform, it will be of interest for the PSC to interrogate whether and how a political roadmap that will lead to elections can be agreed to by the major actors under the prevailing conditions and without pursuing effective security sector reform.

The other issue that is of interest to PSC members is the state of the peace process and recent developments concerning the peace process and reconciliation in Libya. The UN remains the main actor in the Libyan peace process. Its recent efforts, under the leadership of Tetteh, focused on achieving consensus on the process and modalities for holding the long-delayed elections in Libya by promoting dialogue between the country’s rival factions. Following Tetteh’s appointment, in February, UNSMIL established an Advisory Committee to propose technically sound and politically viable solutions, building on frameworks like the Libyan Political Agreement, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap and the 6+6 Committee’s electoral laws. By 20 May 2025, after more than 20 meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, the committee delivered a comprehensive report to UNSMIL, outlining four options to address critical disputes, including the linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, candidate eligibility criteria, voting rights and the electoral appeals mechanism. These options were: (1) holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; (2) conducting parliamentary elections first, followed by the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution; (3) adopting a permanent constitution prior to holding elections; and (4) establishing a political dialogue committee—based on the Libyan Political Agreement—to finalise electoral laws, determine the structure of the executive authority, and adopt a permanent constitution.

Following the submission of the committee’s report, UNSMIL has been conducting a series of nationwide consultations aimed at facilitating an inclusive dialogue among Libyans on the committee’s proposed options and on how best to overcome the country’s prolonged political gridlock. These consultations have revealed widespread frustration among Libyans over the current security, political, and economic conditions. Many have reportedly lost trust in existing institutions and expressed a strong desire to see the transitional period come to an end. UNSMIL intends to use the views and perspectives gathered from a broad cross-section of Libyan society to develop a consensus-based roadmap toward national elections and the reunification of state institutions. At Thursday’s meeting, the PSC may receive updates on these developments and express support to the UN’s efforts in this regard.

Another notable recent development that is of interest to PSC members was the meeting of the Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL), held on 20 June for the first time in four years. The IFCL was established to coordinate international efforts in support of the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led political process. The June meeting brought together representatives from 19 countries and three regional organisations, including the African Union. According to the meeting’s summary, participants reviewed the work of the advisory committee, wherein countries such as Türkiye requested the dropping of one of the four options proposed by the committee, highlighting an instance of external actors determining the scope of choices for Libyans. Indicating renewed effort for coordinated action, participants agreed to hold regular meetings to strengthen coordination in support of the UN-led process.

While the UN continues to lead mediation efforts in Libya, the AU has also played a supportive role in advancing the United Nations-led political process. The AU is a member of the Libya Quartet—alongside the United Nations, the European Union, and the League of Arab States—which was established to ensure a coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis. Notably, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya, chaired by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, led on the national reconciliation efforts. In February, the Committee facilitated the signing of a Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation by Libyan stakeholders in Addis Ababa. However, some Libyan political actors voiced reservations about the Charter, and several prominent leaders were notably absent from the signing ceremony. Despite the fact that the head of the Presidential Council was in Addis Ababa, he did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation accord.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and the compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country. It may also express support to the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya and reiterate its call on those Libyan actors who did not sign the Charter signed on the sidelines of the AU summit to sign and join the Charter. The PSC may also welcome the truce that was agreed in Tripoli and reiterate its call for unconditional ceasefire. The PSC may call for renewed effort for the adoption of a roadmap on implementation of security sector reform, focusing on the integration of the various security groups into a unified and professional national security institution and the disarmament and reintegration into society of others. With respect to the political process, it may express its support to the latest initiative of the UN for achieving a consensus among the various Libyan political and security actors on a roadmap for unification of national institutions and conducting the long-delayed elections. The PSC may call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and cease their support of rivalry among contending Libyan actors. It may also reiterate its plan for undertaking a field mission to Libya and the decision for moving the AU office to Tripoli.