Tomorrow (07 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1278th session to receive a briefing on the theme ‘AU Support to Member States (The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan) on Security Sector Reform (SSR): Lessons Learned and Perspectives on the Way Forward’.

The session will commence with opening statements by Harold Bundu Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are expected from the representatives of The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, and South Sudan. Mali, currently suspended from AU activities, will not participate in the session. In addition, statements may be delivered by the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), will also address the session. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) may brief the PSC on the study reviewing the SSR processes in the five countries, conducted in partnership with the AU Commission.

This is not the first time the PSC is addressing the issue of Security Sector Reform. The last dedicated discussion on the theme took place at the 874th session in September 2019, held in the context of the commemoration of Africa Amnesty Month. In that session, the PSC underscored that good governance of the security sector is a sine qua non for sustainable economic and political development and recognised SSR as a ‘delicate, sensitive, and politically complex process’ requiring careful handling. SSR is also featured regularly in PSC discussions on country-specific situations. For instance, at its 844th session in April 2019, the PSC considered a progress report on SSR in The Gambia. During its 1219th session in June 2024, while reviewing the report of its field mission to South Sudan, the PSC called on the Chairperson of the Commission to provide technical support to South Sudan on SSR, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and the collection of weapons currently in illegal possession.

Beyond the PSC, the AU Commission undertook several activities in 2023 to mark the 10th anniversary of the AU SSR Policy Framework, adopted by the AU Assembly at its 20th Ordinary Session. In November 2023, it convened a major conference under the theme ‘The African Union Security Sector Reform Policy Framework: A Decade of Implementation’. This served as a platform for reflecting on achievements, challenges, and lessons from a decade of AU support to Member States, while setting a course for the next phase. Also in November, the AU Commission convened the 5th meeting of the AU/Regional Economic Communities (RECs) SSR Steering Committee—established in 2019—which reviewed the implementation of the AU SSR Policy Framework and discussed follow-up on the Addis Ababa conference, agreeing to submit recommendations to the PSC for strategic guidance.

The AU Commission, in partnership with the ISS, has also conducted a study documenting lessons from AU engagement on SSR in The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan. Tomorrow’s session is expected to build on this study, offering a reflection on AU’s engagement over the past decade, identifying gaps, and informing recalibrated approaches to better support Member States.

Over the years, the engagement of the AU in SSR is anchored on various normative and institutional frameworks elaborated as part of its peace and security mandate. The 2013 AU SSR Policy Framework remains central, offering guidance to the AU, RECs, Member States, and partners on implementing SSR programmes. SSR is also a pillar of the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy—revised in 2024—which outlines key objectives for conflict-affected states. Complementing this framework, the AU Commission has developed several Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) on aspects of SSR including training, needs assessments, legislative harmonisation, codes of conduct, good practices, monitoring and evaluation, and gender integration. In October 2024, the Commission also finalised draft OGNs on ‘Oversight and Accountability in SSR’ and ‘SSR and Mediation’, which were validated through a workshop.

At the institutional level, the AU’s DDR/SSR Division, under the Governance and Conflict Prevention Directorate, oversees SSR-related activities. The Commission also established mechanisms for regular dialogue and coordination, including the triannual SSR Africa Forum and the annual SSR Steering Committee, which bring together the AU, RECs, the UN, and other partners to coordinate support and share best practices.

The AU’s SSR work is integral to its broader peace and security agenda, including Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063 and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ flagship initiative, which should be applied not only in post-conflict settings but also as a conflict prevention strategy. Its efforts focus on three core areas: providing direct technical support to Member States, generating knowledge tools and building capacity, and promoting coordination among actors. Support to Member States is provided upon request and typically covers design, implementation, and coordination of nationally led SSR processes.

Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to highlight country-specific engagements by the AU Commission in the five focus countries.

In The Gambia, AU support has demonstrated how modest interventions can yield significant results. Between 2018 and 2020, the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG)—a small group of SSR and rule of law experts—was embedded in national institutions. The team assisted in developing the National Security Policy, structuring the Office of the National Security Adviser, reorganising the Ministry of Defence and the Gambia Armed Forces, and enhancing civil-military cooperation. Though the AUTSTG’s mandate ended in 2020, AU support has continued. In November 2024, the Commission supported the review of the national SSR strategy and helped develop an M&E framework in line with the AU Operational Guidance Note.

In Mali, the AU provided support through its Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), deploying a DDR/SSR expert in 2018 to assist in implementing accelerated DDR and restructuring defence and security forces. In 2024, the AU supported efforts to enhance national capacity for SSR M&E, aligned with Mali’s National SSR Strategy (2020–2024).

AU support to Madagascar began in 2014 after a constitutional crisis. The AU led a joint SSR assessment with partners, identifying key priorities. Subsequently, the Commission deployed SSR experts to the AU Liaison Office in Madagascar to advise on the formulation, design and implementation of a nationally led SSR initiative. This engagement contributed to the adoption of a national SSR Policy in 2016. The Commission also supported the country’s SSR revitalisation processes in the re-establishment of a national SSR coordination mechanism.

In Lesotho, the AU worked in close collaboration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2016, the AU and SADC supported a national technical workshop on SSR that helped forge consensus on the importance of implementing SSR and establishing the necessary legal, institutional, and financial frameworks. The AU further deployed a consultant to support the reform process.

In South Sudan, following a request from the government and a PSC decision, the AU deployed a DDR/SSR consultant between November 2023 and February 2024 to support the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) in developing SSR guidelines, which were validated in July 2024. Ongoing technical needs, the Commission also deployed a senior DDR/SSR consultant with arms management expertise in November 2024.

In addition to highlighting technical support, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to reflect on key challenges and lessons. One of the major challenges in this regard is securing political will. SSR is not merely a technical exercise but is fundamentally political as it involves control over the state’s coercive instruments. As such, governments may be reluctant to embrace SSR, particularly when it challenges entrenched power structures. Even when SSR is launched—sometimes to meet donor expectations—it often lacks genuine political backing or adequate resources. South Sudan provides a case in point: despite AU support, the SSR process has stalled amid delays in force unification and deployment. Tensions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, exacerbated by the 4 March 2025 incident, underline the risks of half-hearted commitment.

These experiences demonstrate the importance of advocacy and awareness-raising to encourage Member States to view SSR as essential to peace and democratisation. Trust is also vital. Without confidence in the support provided—both in terms of the AU’s impartiality and the expertise of its consultants—Member States may resist or delay cooperation. Ensuring national ownership and deploying highly qualified technical experts are critical for success.

Moreover, while SSR is a necessary condition for sustainable peace, it is not sufficient on its own. To achieve lasting outcomes, it must be embedded within broader processes of political reform and democratisation. In this context, it is particularly important to integrate and ensure the coordinated implementation of interrelated programmes such as DDR and transitional justice as part of a comprehensive political settlement.

The complex socio-political and security dynamics in political transitions and stabilisation processes present another challenge, often slowing SSR implementation. The lack of inclusive processes and the failure to design gender-sensitive SSR programmes are also critical gaps that need to be addressed

Another challenge is funding. AU support to the five countries has often involved short-term consultancy deployments due to budget constraints, even though long-term engagement is necessary. Increasing the allocation of resources from the AU Peace Fund could help address this gap. The recent operationalisation of the Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), in line with the Assembly’s February 2023 decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.2(XXXVI)], is a promising development. It is to be recalled that the AU disbursed USD 1 million in late 2023 to support DDR efforts in Ethiopia. Given the involvement of multiple stakeholders in SSR, enhanced coordination also remains imperative to prevent duplication and ensure efficient use of limited resources.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the decades of support provided by the AU Commission to Member States in implementing SSR programmes. It may encourage Member States to fully utilise the technical support offered by the Commission, including the AU SSR Policy Framework and Operational Guidance Notes. At the same time, the communiqué may underscore the need to address key challenges impeding effective SSR implementation, particularly the lack of political commitment and funding gaps. In this context, the PSC may highlight the importance of sustained advocacy and awareness-raising to promote SSR as a cornerstone of lasting peace. The PSC may call for embedding SSR in robust security sector governance reform and political settlement. It may also emphasise the need for adequate and predictable funding to strengthen the Commission’s support. To this end, and alongside efforts to mobilise resources and coordinate with international partners, the PSC may explore the possibility of leveraging the AU Peace Fund to finance SSR support to Member States. It may further encourage Member States to integrate SSR-related expenditures into their national budgets. Finally, the PSC may stress the imperative of designing and implementing inclusive and gender-responsive SSR programmes in Member States.