Can a unified leadership of the A3+ help in navigating the geopolitical gridlock in the UN Security Council in relation to African files?
Date | 28 November 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Kaleab Tadesse Sigatu
Associate Researcher, Amani Africa
The 18 November 2024 Russian veto against the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution on Sudan triggered understandable consternation. This development raises a major policy issue for the African Union (AU) and the three African members of the UNSC plus (A3 plus – currently made up of Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone plus Guyana). This issue principally concerns how the A3 plus can facilitate consensus in the UNSC on African files and thereby help overcome the impact of the hardening rift in the Permanent five members of the UNSC (P5) and the rising resort to the use of veto even in relation to African files as highlighted by the recent voting in the UNSC on a resolution on Sudan.
In recent years, the space for effective collective action in the UNSC has enormously dwindled. This in the main is owing to the rising geopolitical contestation on the part of the P5. One of the indices of this is the increasing use of the veto by the permanent five members of the UNSC. In 2024, a total of 7 vetoes were cast, making it the highest number of vetoes in a single calendar year since 1989.
While the deadlock in the P5 has until recently had limited impact on African files, this is no longer the case. As a result, the deepening geopolitical division in the P5 is also affecting African files on which the P5 have generally managed to achieve consensus in previous years. Such is particularly the case in instances in which the A3 are unable to take a unified position and robust African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) backing is lacking.
On 18 November 2024, the UNSC failed, on account of a veto by Russia, to adopt a Resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan, as the war grinds on, killing tens of thousands of Sudanese and causing the largest displacement crisis in the world, with over 13 million people displaced. The draft resolution demanded the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the ‘Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan’, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023.
The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone. The UK apparently invited the A3 plus members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the A3 plus members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this as a group. This led to Sierra Leone serving as the only co-penholder of the resolution. Sudan’s representative was invited to participate in the meeting.
Russia’s veto has the appearance of being a result of its increasing shift towards the Transitional Sovereign Council and the exchanges during the voting also suggest it is also a manifestation of the divide in the P5 reflecting the tension between Russia and the UK, which is the pen holder on Sudan. Yet, the fact that the A3 plus, despite voting in favour of the resolution on 18 November, were neither fully united nor took the lead on the file might have also played a role. Apart from the inability of the A3 plus to join in co-pen holding for drafting the particular resolution, the A3 plus did not take the same position on various aspects of the resolution during negotiation on the draft, as documented in SCR analysis.
As shown in the table below, there have at least been seven instances in which the UNSC considered products on the situation in Sudan since the outbreak of the current war in April 2023. While Russia abstained from many of them, the UNSC managed to adopt all of them until the latest resolution was vetoed by Russia.
UN Security Council Resolutions on Sudan
Source: Compilation by author based on materials from the Security Council Report
The latest voting on Sudan is clearly a warning sign, if not a turning point, that UNSC products on African files are no longer immune from being vetoed. This is particularly true in cases where the A3 plus are not fully united and not on the lead on a file. The upshot of this is that there is room for the A3 plus and the AU, particularly through the PSC, to help shield African files from the most severe manifestation of the tension in the P5. For this, all that is needed is to build on and expand the existing working arrangement that facilitates A3 plus collective stand.
It is worth noting that in order to mitigate the fact that Africa has no permanent representation in the UNSC with full prerogatives accorded to the P5, a major avenue the AU instituted the constitution of the A3 into a unified block. This has increasingly enabled the A3 plus and the AU to exercise rising influence in the UNSC as documented here and here, despite the fact that it may at times have the effect of limiting the UNSC’s engagement. It is anticipated that the influence of the A3 plus will further increase in the context of the deepening rift in the P5.
In view of the latest failure of the UNSC to adopt the resolution on Sudan, one potential area for such growth in the influence of the A3 plus is how the A3 plus both achieve unity and takes lead in drafting of UNSC products on African files. If such a way of organising is used for enhancing effective engagement of the UNSC rather than preventing its role, it has the potential for facilitating consensus and overcoming the gridlock in the P5 and avoiding veto.
This however requires addressing at least two challenges in how the role of the A3 is organised. The first of these, which is advanced by the AU policy organs and the A3 themselves, is the assumption of the role of pen-holding by the A3 plus particularly on African files. While there has been progress in this respect in recent years, the A3 plus have as yet to effectively assume this critical, if challenging, role. The second area is the crafting of unified position by the A3plus to speak with one voice and negotiate as a block, something on which the A3 plus has achieved substantial progress.
Furthermore, if the AU PSC institutes a practice of providing clear guidance on African files under consideration in the UNSC, thereby throwing its full weight behind the lead of the A3, it could enhance the legitimacy and support for A3 plus initiated resolution. Such strong engagement and backing of the PSC facilitates the conditions for achieving consensus in the UNSC and making vetoing, very difficult, although not necessarily impossible.
As the PSC convenes the 11 annual high-level seminar of Oran on peace and security focusing on the role of the A3 plus on 1-2 December 2024 in Oran, Algeria, one of the issues worth reflecting on is how to advance effective international action by the UNSC by limiting the deleterious impacts of the deepening contestation in the P5 on African files. As discussed above, the case of the vetoed UNSC resolution on Sudan offers a useful basis for informing the elaboration of such policy approach.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’