Briefing on the situation in South Sudan

Briefing on the situation in South Sudan

Date | 30 November 2022

Tomorrow (30 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1123rd session to receive updates on the situation in South Sudan.

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office in Juba, Joram Mukama Biswaro is also expected to brief the PSC. Representative of South Sudan, as the concerned country will also be making a statement. Ismail Wais, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for South Sudan; Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), Major General (Rtd) Charles Gituai; and Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) are also expected deliver statements.

The last time the PSC met to discuss the situation in South Sudan was at its 1092nd session held on 11 July 2022. In its communique adopted following the meeting, the PSC encouraged the South Sudanese parties to urgently complete all outstanding transitional tasks, including the graduation and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), the ratification of the Permanent Constitution-Making Bill and electoral laws, the reconstitution of the National Constitutional Review Commission and the National Elections Commission. In this regard, the PSC encouraged the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) to expedite the development of the long-awaited roadmap, which was expected to outline the outstanding transitional tasks in the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and chart out the way forward.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to focus on developments since the last session including the finalization of the roadmap, the implementation of outstanding transitional tasks and the state of preparations and commitment for the implementation of the roadmap. September 12 marked four years since the signing of the R-ARCSS. Although some progress has been made in the implementation of the agreement, much more remains to be done in implementing the agreement in full, including the outstanding transitional tasks mentioned in the communiqué of the PSC.

Considering that major transitional tasks remain outstanding and will not be completed before the end of the current transition in February 2023, there was a need for achieving political consensus on how to ensure implementation of these outstanding tasks and what happens at the end of the current transitional period. This is what the roadmap, whose finalization the PSC called for, is expected to deliver. On 4 August 2022, all signatories to the R-ARCSS agreed on and adopted ‘Agreement on the Roadmap to a Peaceful and Democratic end to the Transitional Period of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.’ The roadmap extended the transitional period by 24 months up until 22 February 2025.

In a statement issued on 9 August, the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat took note of the decision to extend the current transitional period. Underscoring that ‘the people of South Sudan have endured enough conflict and deserve a safe, secure and peaceful country’, he reiterated ‘his call for the urgent need for the leaders of the Transitional Government to fulfil their pledge to fully implement the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in order to deliver on the legitimate expectations of its citizens for peace and stability’.

On 1 September 2022, RJMEC voted on the roadmap that the RTGoNU presented during the extraordinary meeting of the RJMEC. RJMEC adopted the roadmap and the extension of the transition period with 37 of the 43 members of the RJMEC voting in favour of the adoption of the roadmap. However, the Troika (Norway, UK, and US) did not support the extension of the transition period expressing dissatisfaction that the South Sudanese leaders extended their time in power without delivering on their commitment to the agreement. They also expressed regret that the consultation on the roadmap did not involve civil society and other relevant stakeholders. But they supported the roadmap calling on South Sudanese leaders to dedicate the necessary resources for its implementation and deliver their commitments within the set timeframe.

The unification of forces remains the most critical task, according to RJMEC, to address inter-communal violence and lay the foundation for lasting peace. In an important milestone towards achieving this objective, the first batch of the NUF, more than 21 thousand officers who received training in the Equatoria region, were graduated on 30 August 2022. RJMEC welcomed the first phase graduation of the NUF and called for the graduation and deployment of all the forces as quickly as possible. Another 7500 officers were also graduated on 22 November 2022 in Malakal, Upper Nile State, as part of the NUF. It is reported that as of the middle of this month, around 80% of phase 1 of the NUF have graduated.

While welcoming the above progress, RJMEC and the UNMISS highlighted the need for finalizing and implementing deployment plans and for ‘phase two’ of the graduation to be provided with adequate logistical and political support. The other issue critical to reduction of subnational conflicts that have become dominant and stabilization of South Sudan is the implementation of the call on the government to start the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program. During the ceremony of the graduation of forces in Malakal, RJMEC Chairperson, Charles Tai Gituai, while expressing the expectation of RJMEC to see the roadmap fully followed to the letter and spirit, stated his wish ‘to see a program of DDR be taken seriously so those not able to be eligible to join the forces are able to leave the military in a manner that is respectable’.

RJMEC underscored the need for the revitalized transitional government to avoid lagging behind in terms of the implementation of other outstanding tasks outlined in the roadmap. In this regard, it emphasized the urgency of expediting the passage of the relevant bills particularly the Permanent Constitution-Making Process Bill, which is considered critical not only for constitution-making but also paving the way for the holding of elections at the end of the transition period. Recently, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) reportedly passed important bills, including the Constitution-Making Process Bill, ‘the Roadmap Bill’, National Police Bill and National Wild Services Act.  The adoption of the National Elections Act necessary for the reconstitution of the National Elections Commission is still pending. It is also important to point out that the full implementation of the transitional justice chapter of the R-ARCSS is still pending.

Additionally, underscoring the need for vigilance in ensuring compliance with the benchmarks and timelines of the roadmap, various stakeholders are pointing out the slippage of early timelines specified in the roadmap. In this respect, the areas that require urgent attention for timely efforts include the reconstitution of the Political Parties Council, the National Constitutional Review Commission, the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the National Elections Commission. During the 24th plenary meeting of RJMEC, its Chairperson called for action on prioritizing the implementation of the roadmap tasks within timeline, provision of funds for all roadmap tasks, funding and implementation of the program of DDR and fast tracking the establishment of the Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH).

Tomorrow’s session will also consider the security situation in South Sudan, where intercommunal violence continues to ravage parts of South Sudan. This month, fighting between Shiluk armed youth and Nuer elements resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, according to UNMISS. There have also been deadly clashes in Upper Nile, Greater Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal regions which exasperated the dire humanitarian situation in the country. The country is suffering from the impact of climate change and flooding which has affected many South Sudanese living along rivers banks and marshlands. The continued intercommunal violence and the challenges posed by the massive flooding has made it very difficult for humanitarian workers to reach out to those in need. According to OCHA, close to 10 million South Sudanese will require urgent humanitarian assistance in 2023.

On the mediation front, it is to be recalled that the PSC in its earlier sessions commended the efforts that have been exerted by Sant’Egidio, the Rome based Catholic association with links to the Vatican, to mediate between the government and non-signatory parties since 2019. Although two factions of the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) had taken part in an induction workshop in June within the framework of the Sant’Egidio process to be integrated into the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) structure, they apparently failed to meet the deadline of 15 August 2022 to join the Mechanism, according to the latest report of the UN Secretary-General released on 13 September 2022. The non-signatory opposition groups also rejected the extension of the transitional period. In November, South Sudanese presidential Affairs Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin reportedly informed Sant’Egidio of the government’s decision to suspend its participation in the mediation process accusing the South Sudanese opposition groups of preparing for war.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may take note of the adoption of the roadmap outlining the outstanding transitional tasks and extending the transitional period and call on the RTGoNU to ensure the full implementation of the roadmap as necessary step for peaceful conclusion of the transitional period with a convening of national elections. The may also welcomed the graduation of the first batch of the NUF and call for the graduation and deployment of all forces as expeditiously as possible and implement phase 2 of the process. PSC may also call on the RTGoNU to proceed expeditiously with the DDR program and provide the required funding for its implementation. The PSC may also echo the call of RJMEC and UNMISS for the RTGoNU to take steps towards the reconstitution of the Political Parties Council, the National Constitutional Review Commission, the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the National Elections Commission and fast track the establishment of the CTRH. On intercommunal violence affecting various parts of the country and forcing civilians into displacement, the PSC may express its concern about the impact of these conflicts. It may welcome the activation of the investigation committees charged with investigating inter-communal conflicts by RTGoNU and urge the committees to conclude their investigations and submit their reports to facilitate measures for enhancing intercommunal harmony. The PSC may express concern over the dire humanitarian situation and appeal for enhanced support from the international community. On mediation efforts to bring non-signatory groups into the R-ARCSS, the PSC may express its concern over the failure of the groups to integrate into CTSAMVM and the declaration by the government of its withdrawal from the process and may express its support to the Sant’Egidio process and urge the parties to cooperate with and implement agreements reached under the process.


MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022

Date | November 2022

Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).

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Briefing on the situation in Abyei

Briefing on the situation in Abyei

Date | 29 September 2022

Tomorrow (29 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a briefing session on the situation in Abyei.

Following the opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Banole Adeoye or his representative will deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), former South African President Thabo Mbeki is expected to provide update briefing to the PSC. The representative of South Sudan, as a country concerned, is also expected to make a statement. It remains unclear if Sudan would be allowed to deliver a statement considering that it is suspended from participation in AU activities. This is important more so because Sudan is also Chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and delivered a statement during the last PSC session on Abyei in this capacity. Others expected to address the PSC include the UN Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Hannah Teteh and the new United Nations (UN) Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) Force Commander, Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr.

The last time the PSC considered this issue was at its 966th session in November 2020. The communique adopted following this meeting expressed concern over the lack of progress in the discussion on the final status of Abyei. AUPSC appealed to the Governments of the South Sudan and Sudan to agree on the arrangements that can expedite the resolution of this longstanding issue. It also appealed to the two countries to accelerate the implementation of their Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for the Abyei Area, signed on 20 June 2011, particularly the finalization of the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Area Council, and the Abyei Police Service, in order to facilitate the provision of essential services to the Abyei population.

Since then, there has not been any movement on all these issues as both Sudan and South Sudan have been preoccupied by their own internal challenges. The lack of progress seems to have increased frustration among the residents of the area who recently staged a public demonstration to demand autonomy. This is said to be a proposal supported by Francis Deng, a prominent South Sudanese politician and diplomat from Abyei who served as his country’s first Ambassador to the UN after its independence in 2011. However, the Chief Administrator of Abyei and some others apparently oppose the proposal which they said entertains the idea of a joint interim arrangement.

Following this development, news about the resumption of talks between Sudan and South Sudan on the final status of Abyei have emerged. Sudan Tribune quoted South Sudan’s presidential adviser on security affairs as having said that President Salva Kiir and the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan started talks on the status of Abyei. But the details about these talks remain sketchy at this stage. Over the past decade and more, the AUHIP under the chairmanship of former South African President Thabo Mbeki has been engaged in trying to assist Sudan and South Sudan to find a lasting solution to the issue of Abyei. It is to be recalled that President Mbeki briefed the PSC during its last session at the 966th meeting and remains to be the main AU mechanism dedicated to, among others, the situation in Abyei.

On the security front, reports indicate that this year saw a rise in intercommunal violence in Abyei. This led to the loss of lives and displacement of thousands of people. Of particular concern has been the outbreak of violence between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities in the Agok area in February and March, and its spillover towards Abyei town. The situation is said to have been relatively calm in recent months following a traditional leaders peace conference facilitated by UNISFA. The conference took place in Entebbe, Uganda, in May 2022 and it concluded with the Dinka and Misseriya traditional leaders signing a peace accord in support of efforts to find lasting peace for the Abyei area.

Apart from UNISFA, the other mechanisms that play important role for stability in Abyei include the Political and Security Mechanism and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). However, there is not much change in respect to the engagement of these mechanisms.

There have also been major changes with respect to UNISFA since the last PSC meeting. The border tension between Sudan and Ethiopia affected UNISFA when Khartoum openly called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian peacekeepers. Ethiopia was the sole troop contributing country to UNISFA which has been deployed in the area since 2011. The Ethiopian peacekeepers have now left the mission and they have since been replaced by other peacekeepers from Ghana, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh.  On 15 March 2022, Major General Benjamin Olufemi Sawyerr of Nigeria took over from Ethiopia’s Major General Kefyalew Amde Tessema, as the new Force Commander and acting head of UNISFA, to lead the recently reconfigured multinational peacekeeping mission.

UNISFA’s mandate is set to expire on 15 November 2022 and the Security Council is expected to renew it possibly for another six months. Ahead of the mandate renewal negotiation, the Security Council will meet on 28 October 2022 to discuss the situation in Abyei based on the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNISFA which is due by 15 October 2022. Tomorrow’s PSC meeting would be very timely and relevant in light of the upcoming meeting and negotiation in New York. Its outcome will likely feed into the discussion at the Security Council and help guide the African members in their participation on the mandate renewal negotiation. The UN mission proves to be critical for promoting stability and law and order as well as supporting efforts for reconciliation and determination of the final status of the area. Yet, its role is impacted by the level of cooperation of Sudan and South Sudan and the scope and nature of its mandate. Apart from the issues of concern from the communique of the 996th session that remain unresolved, the PSC may also address itself to these relevant issues relating to the mandate and functioning of UNISFA.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may express concern over and condemn incidents of intercommunal conflicts including killings, shootings, cattle-rustling, violence against women, including rape and migration-related violence witnessed in Abyei since its last session while calling for enhancement of efforts for maintaining peace among various communities. The PSC may also call for the enhancement by the AU through the AUHIP, of the mediation efforts including through possible support to the parties in resuming the meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. The PSC may also welcome the reconfiguration of UNISFA and commend the support that the stakeholders and the two countries concerned along with troop contributing countries gave in this respect and urge them to continue their support for finalizing this process. The PSC may reiterate its earlier call for implementation of the outstanding determination of the status of Abyei which is the underlying cause for the various insecurities, including by appealing to the Governments of the South Sudan and Sudan to agree on the arrangements that can expedite resolving the status of Abyei and request the Chairperson of the Commission, working with the AUHIP, to engage the two Heads of State to resolve the status of Abyei on the basis of the AUHIP proposal of 21 September 2012. It may also reiterate the need for implementation of demarcation of the Safe demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) to allow the JBVMM to effectively discharge its mandate.


MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 2022

Date | September 2022

In September, Ghana was the monthly Chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). From the items making up the agenda of the Provisional Program of Work at the beginning of the month, the PSC did not consider one agenda item and another item that did not initially feature in the program of work was added during the month. In total, the PSC convened six sessions. Four of these sessions were committed to thematic agenda, while two addressed country/region specific issues.

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Briefing on the situation in South Sudan

Briefing on the Situation in South Sudan

Date | 11 July 2022

Tomorrow (11 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1092nd session to consider the situation in South Sudan, with a focus on the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized – Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

The session will commence with the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson for July, Djibouti’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Abdi Mahamoud Eybe. This would be followed by remarks of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The PSC is expected to receive the main briefing from Joram Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS). The PSC will also receive statements from the representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Ismail Wais and the Head of the United Nations (UN) Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Nicholas Haysom. As a country of concern, it is also anticipated that there will be the statement by the Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the AU.

The last time the PSC met to discuss South Sudan was at its 1060th session convened on 25 January 2022. At the time, it decided to undertake a solidarity visit to South Sudan on the second anniversary of the formation of the Transitional Government on 22 February 2022, considering that the end of the three-year transition period was approaching fast.

Members of the PSC undertook their sixth field visit to South Sudan from 22 to 25 February 2022. The visit allowed them to assess the overall situation on the ground, particularly the status of progress in the implementation of the R-ARCSS. During the visit, PSC members met with President Salva Kirr Mayardit and encouraged progress on the full implementation of the peace agreement, particularly its Chapter II on security arrangements. They also met with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), members of the Troika (US, UK and Norway) and other international partners in Juba. Furthermore, they discussed with civil society representatives on the need to engage women and the youth in the implementation of the peace agreement. Subsequent to the visit, the PSC was supposed to discuss its field report and adopt a Communique in March although this did not happen as planned.

Given the present challenges in South Sudan, the co-guarantors of the peace agreement namely Sudan and Uganda have been expected to renew their engagement in support of reinvigorating the implementation of the peace agreement. Sudan is preoccupied with its own internal challenges. Even though it is currently chairing IGAD, it has been a while since the organization met and discussed any of the peace and security challenges in the region, including South Sudan. The IGAD Executive Secretary visited Khartoum recently to secure the participation of the leadership as Chairperson in the IGAD Summit that took place in Nairobi on 5 July.

On his part, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni had invited South Sudan President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar to Kampala to facilitate talks on the implementation of the peace agreement, including on the issue of security arrangements. The PSC welcomed his initiative to help the parties resolve some of the outstanding issues. However, the meeting which was planned to be convened from 3-4 March 2022, did not take place.

The PSC also recognized the need to reactivate the AU Ad-Hoc High-Level Committee’s engagements on the South Sudan peace process. Following its meeting and decision to undertake a visit to South Sudan, the Committee traveled to South Sudan in early June and engaged various stakeholders. Among others, it received a briefing from the Revitalized Joint monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JEMC) on the status of implementation of the peace agreement.

One of the issues that tomorrow’s session will thus address itself to is the follow-up on the PSC field mission, including the report on the mission and this recent mission undertaken by the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan.

South Sudanese government has been partly attributing the delay in the implementation of the peace agreement, particularly as it relates to the security arrangements, to the arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC). At its 1060th session, the PSC had called on ‘the international community to lift the arms embargo and other sanctions imposed on South Sudan to enable the country to build the required capacity of the unified armed forces and for them to more effectively discharge their constitutional mandate of defending the territorial integrity of their country’. However, several UNSC members were of the view that South Sudan did not make adequate progress on the benchmarks set out by the UNSC for the easing or lifting of the sanctions. On 26 May 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution 2633 (2022) renewing the South Sudan sanctions regime until 1 July 2023. Ten Council members including Ghana voted in favor of the resolution, while five abstained including the two African members Gabon and Kenya as well as China, India and Russia.

The implementation of the peace agreement was further complicated by the split within SPLM-IO and the emergence of factions which led to deadly clashes.  This eroded trust in the peace process resulting in SPLM/A-IO to suspend its participation in the monitoring mechanisms of the agreements – RJMEC and CTSAMVM. On 30 and 31 March 2022, UN, AU, IGAD and RJMEC representatives met with the South Sudanese leadership – President Salva Kiir Mayardit, and First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny, as well as Vice Presidents Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior, Dr. Wani Igga, and Gen. Taban Deng Gai – and urged them to de-escalate the political tensions. They also encouraged them to resort to dialogue to resolve their differences and called on the leaders to return to the full implementation of the Agreement underscoring the need to make progress based on a clear roadmap to address outstanding issues such as the unification of forces, the constitution-making process and preparations for elections. The representatives of the three institutions also appealed to SPLM/A-IO to resume its participation in RJMEC and CTSAMVM. The RJMEC and CTSAMVM face further strain due to withdrawal of financial support by the US, which contributes up to 40 percent of their funds. The efforts of the representatives of the four entities culminated in a rapprochement between President Kiir and the first vice President Machar, although SPLM-IO suspended its participation in Parliament over the passage of the Political Parties Amendment Act 2022 without consensus.

With less than eight months left for the end of the transition period, there is increasing concern within the country about what will happen in February 2023 as not much has been done to prepare for elections. There is also growing fear that if South Sudan slides back into yet another cycle of conflict and violence, it will further aggravate the complex situation in the horn of Africa region which is already facing enormous peace, security and humanitarian challenges. At the R-JMEC monthly meeting on 2 June 2022, the Interim Chair Charles Tai Gituai noted the ‘growing public anxiety, frustration and despair on what happens when the Transitional Period lapses in February 2023 without the completion of all tasks of the Agreement’.

The UN Special Representative Nicolas Haysom also underscored the sense of urgency with the impending deadline for the end of the transition fast approaching. In his engagement with the media on 30 June 2022, SRSG Haysom called on ‘all parties to demonstrate collective common purpose—unity of purpose—by working together towards the full implementation of the agreement. I encourage the leaders to take the necessary steps for the country to exit its transitional period, through the conduct of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections.’

Perhaps, the most pressing issue, which is also of concern for South Sudanese, is the question of whether and how elections could be held at the end of the traditional period. There is no consensus among South Sudanese political forces on whether to proceed with the elections as scheduled for early 2023. While some advocate for holding of elections as scheduled, others point out that the elections should be postponed given the lack of progress in implementing key aspects of the peace agreement including unification of forces, preparation of the final constitution, and establishment of the necessary legal and institutional frameworks.

As this delay may become a site for political contestation and lead to instability, PSC members may seek clarification on contingency plans on how to deal with the uncertainty and disagreement that may result from this situation. It is worth recalling that during its visit last month, the delegation of the AU Ad Hoc Committee received assurance from officials it engaged that it will receive a proposed roadmap on how to manage the uncertainty resulting from the failure to complete the basic transitional arrangements for holding the elections as scheduled in February 2023. The proposed roadmap, which among others is expected to indicate the duration of the possible extension of the transitional period and the plan for completing remaining transitional tasks for holding of elections, has not as yet been received.

The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the security situation. As noted above, growing disagreement among the parties to the peace agreement brought the country to the brink of the collapse of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and the return to fighting. As parts of the country are experiencing insecurity often on account of local political, socio-economic and security dynamics, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to consider how the lack of progress in implementation of the peace agreement exacerbates these existing conflict dynamics. These include cattle-raiding in the tristate corridor between Warrap, Lakes, and Unity States, child abduction among communities in the GPAA and Jonglei, the impact of cattle migrations from Jonglei and Lakes States into the Equatorias, or contestation over state administrations among ethnolinguistic communities in Wau and Malakal. These highlight the need for peacebuilding initiatives to focus also on measures for mitigating such local conflict dynamics while working on modalities for speeding up implementation of the peace agreement and securing consensus among South Sudanese actors on how to manage transitional tasks not finalized at the end of the traditional period.

The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. The PSC may welcome the efforts of AU, IGAD, RJMEC and the UN to accompany the parties to the R-ARCSS through among others mediating their disputes. While welcoming the rapprochement between President Kiir and First Vice President Machar and the progress made in implementing the peace agreement including the launching of consultations for the establishment of the Truth, Healing and Reconciliation Commission, it may also express concern about the lack of progress in the implementation of key transitional activities necessary for successful end of the transition and the convening of elections on time including making of final constitution, adoption of laws for convening of elections, the reform of the elections commission and the graduation and redeployment of the unified forces. The PSC may urge the parties to exert their utmost efforts and commitment for speeding up implementation of the key transitional activities. It may also call on the authorities to present the roadmap outlining the plan on the implementation of the remaining transitional tasks. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to work with IGAD and the UN to undertake joint assessment of the areas of the transitional process in South Sudan that require urgent engagement and support from the region, the AU and the international community. It may welcome the field visit by the AU Ad Hoc Committee of five member states to South Sudan in June and encourage them to have a follow up visit to review developments since last visit and assess implementation of commitments made during the last field mission. The PSC could also call on the AU and the international community to mobilize peacebuilding and humanitarian support for South Sudan to address the pressing peacebuilding and humanitarian issues including a high-level of food insecurity facing many parts of the country.


MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JULY 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JULY 2022

Date | July 2022

In July, Djibouti chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). During the month, the PSC convened three sessions. All the sessions were dedicated to country/ region specific issues. Two sessions were held at ambassadorial level. There was one session at ministerial level. The outcome for all the three sessions were adopted as Communiqué. On average, it took about one week for the outcome documents of the sessions to be published.

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THE MAJOR PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA IN THE YEAR THE AU MARKS ITS 20 YEARS

South Sudan

March 2022

2022 marks the 20th anniversary of the inauguration of the African Union (AU). In reviewing the record of the AU in its two decades of existence, the aspect of AU’s role that is sure to attract the most scrutiny relates to the area of peace and security. While this special research report is not meant to provide such a comprehensive review, it seeks to provide an analysis of the major peace and security issues in Africa in 2022 as a useful lens for understanding where the AU’s peace and security order stands 20 years after AU’s launch. In presenting the analysis on the various major peace and security issues afflicting the continent, this report attests to both the importance of AU’s role and how its role has become more, not less, important today than at the time of its establishment, notwithstanding recent regressions in its performance.

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Briefing on the situation in South Sudan

South Sudan

Date | 25 January, 2022

Tomorrow (25 January,) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold a briefing session on the situation in South Sudan.

Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, is expected to make opening remarks. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, may brief the Council. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan, Joram Biswaro, may also brief the Council. As per usual practice, the PSC may also receive the statements of the representative of South Sudan and the representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The Special Representative of the Secretary General Hanna Tetteh may also make a statement.

The last time the Council met to discuss South Sudan was in April 2021 following its field mission to the country in March 2021. The PSC adopted a communique welcoming the steady progress in the implementation of the R-ARCSS and urging R-TGoNU, among other things, to take all possible steps to mobilize the necessary resources for the implementation of the R-ARCSS, especially Chapter II relating to transitional security arrangements.

Since then, there has been limited progress across the different pillars of the peace agreement but also challenges that continue to persist. The permanent ceasefire continues to hold in spite of continued intercommunal violence. Important tasks related to the appointment of state assemblies have made progress after significant delays. Disagreements over how to divide parliamentary seats have also been resolved. The constitution-making process bill has been reviewed and adopted by the council of ministers. A roadmap has been developed and adopted to facilitate the implementation of tasks related to transitional justice and a technical Committee has been established to undertake national consultations on the establishment of the Commission for Truth, Healing and Reconciliation. Furthermore, President Salva Kiir decided to resume talks with the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SSOMA) in Rome under the auspices of the Community of Sant’Egido.

However, more than three years after the signing of the revitalized peace agreement, no tangible progress has been made in establishing the necessary unified forces, which is a key aspect of the peace agreement. According to the UN, the government attributes the delay to the arms embargo imposed against South Sudan and disagreements among signatory parties over the command-and-control structure and share ratio of the necessary unified forces. However, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC) underscores the need for the government to approve critical bills and avail the necessary resources to complete the transitional security arrangements.

What complicated the situation further is the split within SPLM-IO and the emergence of the Kitwang faction which has eroded trust and confidence in the peace process. The split within SPLA-IO led to deadly clashes between forces loyal to Vice President Riek Machar and those loyal to Kitwang faction led by General Simon Gatwech Dual and his deputy Johnson Olony. President Kiir designated his Presidential Advisor for National Security, Tut Gatluak, to negotiate with the Kitwang faction in Khartoum but SPLM-IO complained that this violates the peace agreement which prohibits the shifting of allegiance. Nevertheless, the Khartoum meeting between SPLM and the Kitwang faction led to the signing of two separate agreements which, according to media reports, deal with integration of forces loyal to the Kitwang faction into the South Sudanese army with a general amnesty and the settlement of local land disputes.

South Sudan is expected to hold elections in 2023 marking the end of its fragile political transition. The reconstituted transitional national assembly (TNLA) has been slow to operationalize and this has impacted the adoption of critical bills related to constitution-making process, election, public financial reform and others. The constitutional bill, which has already been approved by the Council of Ministers, is yet to be endorsed by the TNLA. This is considered to be a very critical task which paves the way for the country to hold elections in 2023. Delays in the establishment of the TNLA standing committees, which are supposed to consider these bills, was said to be the main obstacle. On January 3rd, the Speaker of TNLA announced the appointment of chairpersons and deputies of the various committees, which hopefully contributes to expediting the legislative process. The coming one year is going to be decisive in making concrete progress in implementing the peace agreement and set the stage for the elections.

The government has already called for international support to hold elections. However, due to other crisis situation in the neighborhood including in Ethiopia and Sudan, South Sudan is not getting the necessary international attention at the moment. Sudan is the current chair of IGAD and one of the guarantors of the revitalized peace agreement but it is undergoing a difficult transition which is facing a serious setback following the October 25 coup. Ethiopia, as previous chair of IGAD played an important role in facilitating the South Sudanese peace process however it is now embroiled in its own crisis. The regional dynamics has weakened IGAD and the leadership position of its key mechanisms tasked with overseeing the implementation of the South Sudanese peace agreement – RJMEC and CTSAMVM – remain vacant for quite some time. The AU Ad Hoc Committee, established to support IGAD, has not also been very active and there is a need to reactivate the committee to support of the South Sudanese peace process. Uganda, the other guarantor, is planning to host a South Sudan leader retreat in February and the expectation is that this will give renewed impetus to the implementation of the peace agreement.

The expected outcome is a communique. While recognizing some of the progress that has been made the PSC may express concern over the slow implementation of the peace agreement. It may urge the R-TGoNU to mobilize adequate the financial resources, for the implementation of the R-ARCSS, especially Chapter II relating to transitional security arrangements. The PSC may also call for the rapid and full operationalization of the TNLA. It may further underline the importance of expediting the legislative process to lay the foundation for the planned election in 2023. The PSC may reiterate it previous decision on the need to hold a transparent, democratic and credible election at the end of the transition period. It may also call on the international community to provide support for the implementation of R-ARCSS.


Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - January 2022

South Sudan

Date | January 2022

In January, Ghana, under the leadership of Ambassador Amma A. Twum-Amoah, was the Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Council’s initial programme of work for the month envisaged four sessions.

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Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - April 2021

South Sudan

Date | April 2021

During April, the PSC was chaired by Djibouti. In total, five substantive sessions were convened during the month. Out of these, only one was thematic while the rest were country specific sessions dedicated to situations in the central Africa and east and horn of Africa regions. All sessions convened during the month took place at ambassadorial level.

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