Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Previne Habu, Researcher, Amani Africa

The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its application across various fields are unfolding at a speed that has outpaced the development of appropriate guardrails both at national and multilateral levels. In Africa, the emergence of AI was greeted with enthusiasm and its adoption is accelerating across Africa. Despite the transformative impact of AI on how societies function across various fields and its potential to help overcome some of the structural constraints for development, the experience with AI, including in parts of the world at the forefront of its development and adoption, has also revealed major downsides.

Both the pace of advancement of AI and the various risks and issues identified with its adoption in various areas of social, economic, security and governance fields have prompted policy debates, including in multilateral forums.  As a multilateral platform that is known for its norm entrepreneurship, the African Union (AU), particularly its Peace and Security Council (PSC), took an interest in AI, with the PSC focusing on its implications for governance and peace and security.

Initially, reflecting the prevailing early enthusiastic discourse on digital technology and AI, PSC’s take on the subject was characterised by what experts call techno-optimism. Thus, its first meeting on AI during the 1214^th session came across as an AI optimist. This was reflected in its enthusiastic expression of its expectation of the contribution of AI ‘towards the promotion of peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, as well as in accelerating global development and the achievement of the aspirations of AU Agenda 2063 and the UN Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals.’

Certainly, the potential of AI to make such a contribution is not totally misplaced. Reports show that AI is projected to contribute between $2.9 trillion and $4.8 trillion to Africa’s economy by 2030, creating substantial opportunities for the continent’s predominantly youthful population. From agriculture and healthcare to education and finance, key sectors are poised for profound transformation as AI-driven innovations reshape production, service delivery, and governance systems.

Yet, the reality is also that, as new technology that is disruptive and in the process of continuous refinement, not only is AI not free from risks, but also its impact on various areas of the lives of societies and individuals is not without downsides. The prevailing optimism surrounding its transformative potential, particularly in Africa, warrants careful scrutiny. This is particularly important given the lack of consideration of the realities of parts of the world, such as Africa, in the design and development of AI systems, the algorithmic bias associated with most AI systems, the regulatory gaps, and the safety and human rights compliance risks.

For Africa, there are other factors that complicate the adoption of AI, including regional disparities and structural constraints such as technical gaps, infrastructural limitations, including pressure on the use of electricity (on a continent with nearly half of its people without access to electricity and an uneven data governance regime. Relatedly, the policy engagement of the AU and its member states including through the PSC need to pay particular attention to key issues, including data protection, bridging the digital divide, strengthening capacities to adapt and develop AI solutions suited to African realities, closing regulatory and technical gaps, safeguarding vulnerable groups, and ensuring the responsible use and human control in the use of AI in the military domain. Also, of significance is ensuring coherence and preventing emerging risks of policy fragmentation across the AU system.

The latest ministerial session of the PSC, its 1339^th meeting, held on 16 April 2026, on the theme ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security,’ marked the start of the PSC’s shift from optimism to realism. While the session built on previous PSC’s engagement of the nexus between AI, governance, peace and security in Africa, particularly its 1214^th Meeting held on 13 June 2024 and its 1267^th meeting held on 20 March 2025, it approached the subject with a sense of realism while still cognisant of its enormous potential. Accordingly, the PSC emphasised the imperative for Africa to shape, develop, and control its own AI technologies in order to guarantee the continent’s sovereignty across the entire AI ecosystem. Recognising the strategic importance of digital independence, the PSC underscored the need to safeguard Africa’s digital and data sovereignty. It emphasised the importance of developing AI systems in African languages as a means of promoting inclusivity, preserving cultural heritage, and strengthening social cohesion.

In terms of governance of AI, the PSC emphasised that the development and deployment of AI technologies must be guided by the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusivity, ethical governance, benefit- sharing, social cohesion, and full respect for international law. It further advocated for the progressive development of context-specific and adaptable AI governance and regulatory frameworks or charters aligned with international humanitarian law and the principle of meaningful human control. Having regard to Africa’s place in the global AI systems, the Council stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in global norm-setting processes through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement within multilateral platforms.

The 1339^th session, per the communiqué, reflected a discussion that was strategically ambitious and geopolitically informed with regard to Africa’s stance in the evolving global AI landscape. This clearly sets a useful foundation for shaping a more productive engagement that enables the harnessing of the benefits of AI in advancing Africa’s priorities while also seeking to put in place arrangements for limiting, if not avoiding, the perils and downsides of this disruptive yet transformative technology.

As the PSC and the AU take the policy engagement forward, some of the developments that merit closer scrutiny include the rapid evolution of AI-enabled warfare capabilities and the emergence of drones as weapons of choice in several conflict settings across Africa. As such, first, greater consideration could be given to the risks associated with lethal autonomous weapons systems, AI-driven and autonomous drone warfare, and algorithmic targeting.

Second, it will be imperative for the AU and the PSC to examine the huge environmental implications of expanding AI infrastructure. The growing energy requirements of data centres and the increasing demand for water resources associated with AI development raise important sustainability concerns, particularly in a continent already facing significant climate vulnerabilities and energy deficits.

Third, the Council could consider the potential socio-economic consequences of AI-driven automation. Given Africa’s large youth population, persistent unemployment challenges, and fragile labour markets, the implications of automation for employment, livelihoods, and social stability deserve greater policy attention.

Finally, while the 1339^th meeting highlighted the importance of including women and youth in AI governance processes, the PSC may wish to strengthen its approach through a more comprehensive human rights framework. Such a framework, apart from ensuring integration of safeguards for protection of vulnerable groups and key sectors of society, could address emerging concerns related to biometric surveillance, the misuse of facial recognition technologies, data privacy, and the proliferation of digital authoritarian tools.

There is also a need to address the risk of policy fragmentation within the AU system in view of the multiple initiatives in various parts of the AU. This underscores the need to have an AU-wide AI governance framework that is coherent across AU institutions and firmly grounded in existing African normative and legal instruments, particularly human and peoples’ rights standards, as well as continental frameworks on data protection and cybersecurity. The PSC should explore how the commitments made by Member States through the ratification of the AU Malabo Convention can be leveraged to strengthen AI governance and promote the safe, responsible, and peace-advancing use of AI across Africa.

The turn to AI realism that the 1339^th session marked could signify a useful baseline framework that all AU bodies and member states at the national level could draw on for informing their policy approach relating to AI.

By: Dr. Francis Deng and Dr. Amir Idris

Dr. Francis Deng is Sudan’s former Ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the United States, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs, and South Sudan’s first Permanent Representative to the UN

Dr. Amir Idris is a professor of African history and politics in the Department of History at Fordham University, New York. His latest book is Race, Ethnicity, and Violence in South Sudan (2024)

South Sudan’s transition remains unfinished, not only because of weak institutions, repeated political crises, and a lack of political will, but also because the country has yet to agree on a shared common ground. At the heart of the problem is a deeper question: what kind of state, system of governance, and form of citizenship should define South Sudan?

It is more accurate to describe South Sudan not as a failed state, but as a country with an unfinished transition. The structures of a state are there. Government institutions exist, administrative systems function, and legal frameworks are in place. However, what is missing is a shared foundation that can make these structures work in a democratic, responsive, and legitimate way.

This is not just a theoretical argument. It is grounded in the country’s own experience, through the Revitalized Peace Agreement, the National Dialogue, and the constitution-making process. Across all these efforts, one pattern is clear: a persistent gap between formal agreements and real consensus, between international support and national ownership, and between elite decision-making and the expectations of ordinary citizens.

South Sudan has not collapsed as a state. What remains incomplete is the transition toward a fully functioning, accountable, and legitimate political system. The principles, institutional culture, and governance practices needed for democracy are still weak or missing. The state has a skeleton, but it lacks the strength to function effectively.

In this context, expectations of credible elections in December 2026 are difficult to sustain. Elections are not simply about procedures. They depend on trust, accountability, inclusion, and the rule of law, all of which remain fragile.

If South Sudan’s transition is unfinished, then the question is: what is holding it back?

One major obstacle is the absence of common ground. Over the years, national initiatives have often worked against each other instead of reinforcing one another. The peace process and the National Dialogue became competing projects rather than complementary ones. Each side questioned the legitimacy of the other. Some saw the peace process as foreign-driven and biased toward opposition groups, while others viewed the National Dialogue as a government-led effort to consolidate power. Attempts were made to bridge these divides. Some opposition groups joined, others withdrew. The result was not consensus, but continued fragmentation, evidence of how fragile trust remains and how deep political and ethnic divisions continue to shape the country.

More broadly, political leaders have engaged in parallel processes without building a shared national framework. These initiatives have too often become arenas of competition over power and resources, rather than genuine efforts to build unity and reconciliation.

The Revitalized Peace Agreement itself reflects this problem. While leaders projected unity at the signing, serious disagreements remained unresolved. Many sought to avoid appearing obstructive before international mediators while maintaining fundamentally different positions on key issues such as power-sharing and resource distribution. The result was an agreement that was formally accepted but lacked deep national commitment. The ongoing challenges in implementation, and the continued emergence of new initiatives, highlight the gap between what is agreed on paper and what happens in practice.

Equally troubling is the expectation that external actors should finance basic elements of peace implementation. Requests for food, uniforms, and equipment for cantonment sites point to a deeper issue: peacebuilding is often treated as an international responsibility rather than a national obligation. Without ownership, peace agreements risk becoming external projects rather than national commitments.

The same pattern appears in the constitution-making process. New bodies are formed, members are appointed, and workshops are held, often funded by external donors, but real progress remains slow. There is also heavy reliance on foreign experts applying general models that may not reflect South Sudan’s realities. But a constitution cannot be imported. It must reflect the values, history, and experiences of the people. It requires broad participation and must speak directly to the country’s challenges. It should express a collective national will, not simply meet technical standards. Despite international support for South Sudan’s independence, the country has yet to convene a truly sovereign national constitutional conference to define its shared future. Political and military elites have not delivered the transition to democracy.

Another major weakness lies in the exclusion of ordinary citizens. Peace and constitutional processes have focused overwhelmingly on political elites, on power-sharing, positions, and security arrangements, while the broader population remains on the margins. Yet many of the country’s conflicts are local: disputes over land, cattle, resources, and representation. These conflicts persist even when national agreements are signed. As a result, elite peace deals do not always translate into peace in people’s daily lives. A sustainable transition requires broader participation. Peace cannot come only from agreements among leaders; it must reflect the needs and concerns of communities across the country.

Transitional justice presents another unresolved challenge. South Sudan must balance accountability with reconciliation as it confronts its violent past and the painful memories it continues to carry. While international approaches often emphasize punishment, many African traditions focus on healing and restoring relationships. The country will need a system that brings these approaches together, one that delivers justice while also promoting national healing. The central lesson is clear: South Sudan’s unfinished transition is, at its core, a crisis of shared vision and national ownership.

Moving forward requires more than institutions and agreements. It requires a common understanding of the values that should guide the state. It requires leadership that prioritizes inclusion, equality, and human dignity. It requires using national resources, especially oil, to support development, particularly in agriculture. It requires decentralizing governance, so communities have a greater voice. And it requires investing in infrastructure, especially roads, to connect the country and strengthen national unity.

Above all, it requires shifting from externally driven processes and elite bargains to a truly national project shaped by the people of South Sudan. Until that happens, until leaders and citizens find common ground on governance, justice, inclusion, and development, the transition will remain unfinished. Only then can South Sudan turn its formal structures into a functioning democracy capable of delivering peace, dignity, and prosperity for all.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The weakest link in Somalia’s quest to end the protracted conflict is the fragmentation and infighting between the political elites of the country. The constitutional revision process and the conduct of elections have become major sites of power struggle and confrontation between rival political elites, although these are not the only sites of confrontation between these elites.

Five years ago, the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. In a development that mimicked the resultant violent confrontation of April 2021, Somalia’s weakest link struck again as political leaders failed to agree on a constitutional amendment and the modality for holding parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The clashes occurred ahead of a planned protest scheduled for 4 June against the one-year extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term, which opponents argue expired in mid-May. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The latest violence is the culmination of months of growing tensions between the FGS and opposition forces organised under the Somali Future Council—a coalition established in October 2025 by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, together with other opposition figures, to coordinate positions on major national issues, including constitutional amendment, notably those relating to electoral reform and the role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) vis-à-vis Federal Member States (FMS).

Five years ago, Somalia plunged into political and security turmoil after the lower house of Somalia’s parliament adopted a bill extending its own term of office and that of the President and President Farmajo’s assenting of the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model. The latest eruption of political showdown and armed confrontation in Mogadishu followed, as in April 2021, the adoption by Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament of amendments to the 2012 Provisional Constitution, among others, extending the terms of the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years and introducing a highly contested direct electoral system. Just like former President Farmajo, President Mohamud did exactly what he opposed five years ago and signed the constitutional amendments into law on 8 March. As in 2021 (which sought to extend elections by two years), the constitutional changes extended the incumbent president’s tenure by one year beyond its expiry on 15 May and postponed federal elections until 2027.

As in 2021, opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s mandate and maintain that his constitutional term ended in May.

The political impasse that these amendments and Mohamud’s continuation in power after the expiry of his term in May eventually escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was against this backdrop that the opposition sought to organise demonstrations in Mogadishu on 4 June, but the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President amid rising tension tipped the situation into armed confrontation.

The confrontation has alarmed both domestic and international actors because of the risk that the escalation could spiral into a broader and less controllable conflict. Such an outcome would have profound implications for Somalia’s fragile stability and could undermine years of hard-won security gains achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab. There are growing concerns that the militant group could exploit political divisions and security vacuums created by the crisis to expand its influence and operational reach.

International and regional actors responded swiftly to the violence. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on all parties to cease hostilities immediately, exercise maximum restraint, protect civilians, and avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. The Chairperson also urged Somali stakeholders to resolve their differences through dialogue and established constitutional mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for de-escalation to protect Somalia’s stability and future. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement, underscoring the urgent need for all stakeholders to resume dialogue and identify a way forward to preserve the progress Somalia has achieved over recent years.

Although the immediate violence appears to have subsided following intense mediation efforts by traditional leaders and international actors, the underlying political disagreements remain unresolved, leaving open the possibility of renewed escalation.

Beyond the immediate security implications, the crisis constitutes a major test of Somalia’s state-building project, the resilience of its institutions, and the maturity of political actors in managing disputes before they evolve into wider conflict. The developments also warrant close attention from international partners, particularly the AU, which has deployed peace support operations in Somalia since 2007 and secured substantial, albeit fragile, security gains through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of thousands.

The timing of the crisis is particularly concerning given the challenges facing the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is currently grappling with significant political, operational, and financial constraints as it seeks to preserve security gains and support the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

For years, Somali political actors have continued to defer the assumption of full responsibility, as they continue to outsource security responsibility with their heavy reliance on AU-led security support. Despite notable progress, Somalia, on account of the weakest link in the equation for its stability, has yet to develop the level of institutional and security capacities necessary to fully assume responsibility for its own security. The latest political confrontation, if not resolved promptly, undermines confidence about progress for achieving a level of organisation and capability of Somalia’s security institutions for them to assume full security responsibility.

The crisis also reinforces a broader lesson for the AU: security interventions alone cannot provide a sustainable solution to Somalia’s challenges. Without an accompanying political strategy capable of addressing the underlying causes of instability and fostering political consensus, even significant security achievements remain vulnerable to reversal. AU’s interest and role are not just that of any third party. It has a direct and major stake in what is unfolding in Somalia and as such cannot afford to simply limit its engagement for de-escalating the situation and securing agreement on the holding of elections at the level of issuing statements.

First, as it did during the April 2021 political crisis, the AU Peace and Security Council could convene an emergency session to provide strategic guidance and adopt firm and principled policy decisions for urgent consensus on the holding of elections. In 2021, the PSC condemned the extension of the mandate of the president and the parliament. Second, the Chairperson of the AU Commission could undertake a high-level diplomatic mission to Mogadishu to engage directly with key stakeholders and encourage a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Third, the AU could work with IGAD, the United Nations, and international partners with leverage on Somali political actors—including the United States and Türkiye—to establish a coordinated mediation framework aimed at establishing a consensual and mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, while creating conditions for a broader political settlement that permanently ends Somalia’s weakest link.

In the short term, one of the intriguing questions is whether the incumbent, President Mohamud, would succeed in what his predecessor, former President Farmajo, tried and failed five years ago. This will determine the trajectory of the political dimension of Somalia’s protracted conflict.