Consideration of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the AU-Led Mission in Somalia Post-ATMIS
Consideration of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the AU-Led Mission in Somalia Post-ATMIS
Date | 24 July 2024
Tomorrow (25 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1223rd session to consider the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the AU-Led Mission in Somalia post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). It is envisaged that ATMIS will be replaced by the AU Stabilisation and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
Following an opening remark by Miguel César Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. The PSC may also receive briefings from the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, Mohamed El-Amine Souef, potentially with a focus on the state ATMIS and its drawdown, and PAPS Conflict Management Directorate who worked on the development of the CONOPs.
The last time the PSC held a meeting on post-ATMIS AU support for Somalia at its 1217th session, it chose, among the options presented by the AU assessment report, the option of deploying an AU-led mission. As a follow-up to that decision, the PSC requested the AU Commission, in consultation with ATMIS, the FGS, and all relevant stakeholders, to submit a Concept of Operations (CONOPs). The CONOPs intends to outline the new post-ATMIS security arrangements, including its mandate, configuration, benchmarks, duration, and transition timelines from the existing mission to the new one. The PSC’s request was also acknowledged by UNSC Resolution 2741, which in addition to the request from the PSC, called for clear milestones and progress indicators, as well as a comprehensive exit strategy for the new mission.
In light of these requests, the session tomorrow is expected to provide the Council with an update on its previous request. It is to be noted that the session will be proceeded by an informal session on the CONOPs a day before this session. As such the focus of tomorrow’s session will be based on the informal session and thus predominantly focus on the progress made by the AU Commission in producing CONOPs with the intended request emanating both from the PSC and UNSC. To develop the new CONOPS, it is reported that nine members from the AU Commission held a four-day consultation with the Federal Government of Somali (FGS) and key partners between 14-17 July. The consultations included discussion among the senior leadership team of ATMIS officials, the Federal Government of Somalia, representatives of ATMIS Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) and international partners who consist of members from the Core Security Partner Groups (CSPG). Based on the press release of the consultations, the consultations covered key elements of the CONOPs and were used for informing the development of the CONOPs.
The draft CONOPs has some 17 major parts: principles; assessment of the situation in Somalia; key assumptions; mandate; political directive; strategic end state; operational end state; exit strategy; major risks; component-specific tasks; mission composition and structure; mission phases; command, control and coordination mechanism; strategic management and control; operational and administrative processes; key performance benchmarks; and Mission support. Among the principles is AU leadership and the central role AU will play in the strategic management and oversight of the new mission. Under this, the draft CONOPs envisages a comprehensive approach to PSOs focusing on the provision of support to security, stabilisation and state-building processes through a multidimensional AU PSO deployment with civilian, police and military components. Indeed, reducing the mission’s role to only fighting and a military component leads to fragmentation and disconnect between military and other stabilisation and political processes key to the success of the mission. Indications are that FGS seems to be insisting to assume greater control over the operation of the mission and to use the mission more like forces contracted by the Government. PSC’s reflections on resistance to the multidimensionality of the mission and the scope of mandate as well as AU’s leadership role thus require careful consideration.
Not surprisingly as a mission that builds on ATMIS, much of the components of the draft CONOPs for the new mission reflect continuity. As with ATMIS, the exit strategy for the post-ATMIS mission is premised on the effective implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan (SSDP). More specifically, the draft CONOPs for the new mission is predicated on the achievement by Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability for assuming security responsibility from the AU mission, the erosion of Al Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats and most notably the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services. All of these depend on the capacity of the FGS (and the wider Somalia political and social forces) to shoulder effectively their part of the responsibility much better than they have done over the years.
In terms of composition, the initial draft CONOPs envisaged that the post-ATMIS mission will be made up of 11,911 personnel, comprising 85 civilians, 11,146 military and 680 police personnel, deployed in 4 Sectors. The implementation of the mission envisages three phases and pre and post-mission phases. The pre-mission phase is the transitional phase involving the completion of ATMIS phases and the parallel preparation of the reorganisation of the areas of operations and troop deployments. As such it runs for the duration of the last two phases of ATMIS, namely Phase III and Phase IV which is envisaged to conclude on 31 December 2024. In this context, the PSC may benefit from a discussion of the current progress of the ATMIS drawdown as it will influence the final composition of a new post-ATMIS Arrangement. With regards to the amalgamation of the four phases of ATMIS drawdown and the formation of new missions, the PSC’s outcome document highlighted the need for careful coordination between the exit of ATMIS and the follow-on mission that will replace it.
The other three phases are envisaged to be implemented from 01 January 2025 to 31 December 2026, 01 January 2027 to 31 December 2028 and 01 January 2029 to 31 December 2029. Accordingly, the post-ATMIS mission is expected to run for a period of four years. Then, there is a post-mission phase involving the liquidation of the mission.
Of particular strategic significance for tomorrow’s session, in addition to the details of the CONOPS, is the financing of the post-ATMIS mission. Considering the financing shortfalls that frustrated the effective functioning of ATMIS, the importance of finding predictable and sustainable funding for the mission cannot be overemphasised. It is to be recalled that in the communique of its 1217th session, the PSC requested ‘that a dedicated funding mechanism, through UN assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) …be established to guarantee the financial stability of the mission.’ The adoption of a CONOPs that has the support of all stakeholders, including the host country and members of the UNSC, will be crucial, if not a sufficient condition, for AUSSOM to be a test case for the application of 2719. In this regard, the earlier the preparatory processes are thoroughly carried out, the higher the chances for facilitating the processes for the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution authorising UN-assessed contributions for the mission within the framework of Resolution 2719. Considering that this process may not be completed by 1 January 2025 and that the funding from UN assessed contribution may not exceed 75%, it would be of interest for PSC members to reflect on the mobilisation of funds both for the period until the finalisation of the adoption of UNSC resolution authorising UN assessed contributions (provided that no major UNSC member opposes it) and for meeting the balance beyond the 75 per cent.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Unless the FGS push for the draft CONOPs to be reflective virtually of its views carries the day, the PSC is expected to welcome the preparation and presentation of the CONOPs as per the Council’s request. The PSC may endorse the CONOPs subject to amendments and request the submission of the CONOPs to the UNSC ahead of 2 August 2024. It may press on the FGS the need for it to shoulder its part of the responsibility by ensuring the generation of forces with adequate capacities, at the requisite number and within agreed timelines for the success of the Mission in supporting SSF and in SSF ultimately taking over full security responsibilities. Regarding sustainable funding for the post-ATMIS mission, the PSC may reiterate its previous request for the AU Commission and UN Secretariat to develop options for funding for the new mission within the framework of UN Res 2719. The PSC may condemn the recent attacks in the Lower Shabelle region as well as the attacks on ATMIS and Somali Security Forces over the past month. On the phased drawdown of ATMIS, the PSC may also welcome the efforts by ATMIS and FGS in handing over crucial forward operating bases (FOBS) to the Somali Security Forces. However, the PSC may reiterate the need for ATMIS and the FGS to follow the revised timeline set for the third phase drawdown.
Consideration of Mid-year report of the Chairperson of the Commission on elections in Africa: January to June 2024
Consideration of Mid-year report of the Chairperson of the Commission on elections in Africa: January to June 2024
Date | 24 July 2024
Tomorrow (25 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1224th session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between January and June 2024.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period and from the representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) that observed the elections. Despite not deploying election observation to Chad due to violation of relevant PSC decisions and AU norms on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in elections, it appears that Chad is invited, along with Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, South Africa, Togo and The Union of Comoros, to make a statement on the presidential election held on 6 May 2024.
The Chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa is in line with the PSC’s decision at its 424th session of March 2014 to receive regular briefings on national elections in Africa. The last time the Chairperson presented the half-year report was during PSC’s 1194th session held on 24 January 2024, covering elections held between July and December 2023. As with the previous report, tomorrow’s briefing on the Chairperson’s report will provide an update on the electoral process and the conduct of the elections held during the reporting period, while also providing a snapshot of elections planned for the second half of 2024. The report is also expected to highlight emerging governance trends during the period under review, as well as positive practices and areas of concern.
During the first half of 2024, seven Member States organised presidential and parliamentary elections, namely The Union of Comoros, Senegal, Togo, Chad, South Africa (where the AU Commission also deployed a pre-election assessment mission in April), Madagascar, and Mauritania. The AU Commission deployed Election Observation Missions (EOMs) in the elections in all these countries, except the Presidential elections in Chad.
The Presidential and gubernatorial elections of the Union of the Comoros held on 14 January, in which the incumbent was declared to have won the presidential election by 57.2 per cent, saw varying levels of turnout for the two elections held on the same day. The elections were marred by political tension and protests over allegations of irregularities.
On 24 March, Senegal held presidential elections following a turbulent electoral season. Deadly protests erupted following Macky Sall’s decision to postpone the originally scheduled 25 February 2024 election. The Constitutional Council rejected both the law passed by parliament delaying the election until December and the 2 June proposed election date by the National Dialogue Commission. Consequently, Sall’s government was compelled to set a new election date before his term expired on 2 April. The vigilance of the Senegalese youth-led mass movement gave the Constitutional Council the conducive context for it to play its critical role in safeguarding Senegal’s democratic process. Bassirou Diomay Faye from the opposition PASTEF party emerged victorious with 54 per cent of the vote.
On 29 April, Togo convened legislative elections alongside its inaugural regional elections, with a voter turnout of 61.76 per cent, following the adoption of a controversial constitutional amendment that changed the country’s system of government from presidential to a parliamentary system. The ruling party amassed 108 out of the 113 contested seats. The opposition criticised the constitutional reform as an ‘institutional coup’, claiming that this would pave the way for the incumbent President Faure Gnassingbé’s prolonged rule if his party maintained an assembly majority, effectively circumventing previous term limits.
The other election held during the period under review is the presidential election in Chad held on 6 May. The Constitutional Council declared Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, who led the TMC that unconstitutionally seized power following the death of his father Idriss Déby Itno, the winner with 61 percent of the votes.
Déby’s candidacy and eventual victory in the election clearly disregarded the AU’s anti-coup norms and the decision of the PSC on 14 May 2021, which expressly demanded that the chairman and members of the TMC do not take part in the election at the end of the transition. Amani Africa’s ‘Ideas Indaba’ published on 9 April warned that ‘If the PSC is unable to enforce the rule on non-eligibility concerning Chad, it would be the end of any future application of this rule as well. And most immediately, this would also mean that the AU would have no standing to apply this rule for stopping any of the military leaders in the six other countries (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan) from becoming candidates for elections.’ The invitation of Chad to make a statement during this session without the PSC reaffirming its decision on non-eligibility for election may constitute another instance of the PSC enabling disregard of its own decisions and the applicable AU norms it is meant to safeguard.
On 29 May, South Africa held general elections to elect Members of the National Assembly and Provincial legislators. The election was notably competitive, with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) receiving only 40.18 per cent of the votes, losing its parliamentary majority for the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994. This unprecedented outcome forced the ANC to strike a deal with the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), which came in second with 22 per cent, and other parties to form a ‘national unity’ government.
Madagascar also convened legislative elections on 29 May. Contrary to last year’s presidential election, which was marred by low voter turnout and boycotts, political actors showed interest in the legislative elections, fielding 473 candidates for the 163 parliamentary seats. The ruling party secured 51.53 per cent of the vote. Mauritania also held its presidential election on 29 June, in which the incumbent President, Mohamed Cheikh El Ghazouani, who is also the current chairperson of the AU, was re-elected with 56 per cent of the vote.
The report is expected to preview ten elections scheduled to take place between July and December 2024: Rwanda, Algeria, Tunisia, Mozambique, Botswana, Guinea Bissau, Namibia, Ghana, South Sudan, and Mauritius. On 15 July, Rwandans elected their President, with President Paul Kagame re-elected to a fourth term in office in a landslide victory, securing a provisional result of 99 per cent of the vote.
In Algeria, President Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE will be seeking a second term in the upcoming election slated for 7 September. Tunisia will hold its presidential election on 6 October, while in Mozambique, general elections are slated for 9 October, with the ruling party FRELIMO represented by regional governor Daniel Chapo, succeeding President Filipe Nyusi. Botswana’s general election is also set to take place no later than 29 October. The legislative elections in Guinea-Bissau are scheduled for 24 November, a year after President Umaro Sissoco Embaló dissolved the opposition-dominated parliament in December 2023. On 27 November, Namibia will hold presidential and legislative elections, while Ghanaians will elect their new president on 7 December, with President Nana Akufo-Addo stepping down as he completes his second term. Mauritian legislative elections are also expected to take place before the end of this year.
South Sudan’s general elections—scheduled for 22 December, which will be the first since its independence in 2011—are perhaps the most consequential, warranting closer attention from the PSC. Considering the high stakes of these elections to the peace and stability of South Sudan as well as the wider region, the PSC may explore different preventive measures to ensure that the elections do not re-ignite armed confrontations between different factions. It is worth recalling that during its 1219th session, the PSC made important decisions in relation to accompanying South Sudan throughout the electoral season.
The other aspect of the report is expected to provide an overview of the governance trends. On a positive note, the report is likely to highlight that the majority of the elections during the period under review were conducted relatively calmly. Notably, some of the Member States, such as Senegal and South Africa, were able to consolidate the conduct of free and fair elections, with Senegal avoiding the threat of democratic backsliding.
On the other hand, the report is likely to point out the prolonged political transitions in Member States that experienced unconstitutional changes of government as a major issue of concern for the continent’s governance landscape covering not only countries affected by coups but also others such as South Sudan and Libya.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may commend Member States for holding their periodic elections in a relatively calm environment and for the consolidation of democracy in some of the countries. The PSC may also take the opportunity to express its dissatisfaction with the participation of the leader of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) of Chad in the 6 May Presidential election in defiance of the PSC’s decision on the non-eligibility of members of the TMC and the AU norm as enshrined in the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. It may also call on AU member states to expand the civic and political space both to address voter apathy, particularly on the part of young people of voting age and the growing disenchantment with elections on the continent. In relation to countries under political transition, given the complexity of the issue, the PSC may go beyond reiterating the need to strictly adhere to their respective transition agreed timelines, and task the Commission to undertake a comprehensive study with practical strategies on how to expedite the return of constitutional order in these countries in line with relevant AU norms. On upcoming elections, while urging the Commission to continue its support to Member States to hold credible elections, it may particularly emphasise the need to deploy effective mechanisms in relation to the elections in South Sudan, in line with the decisions made at its 1219th session.
Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)
Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)
Date | 23 July 2024
Tomorrow (24 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a retreat to discuss the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
Following an opening remark by Miguel César Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a presentation based on a report prepared by the AU Commission.
The PSC last considered the UNSC Resolution 2719 on 14 June 2024, during its 1215th session. This session addressed challenges that may hinder the effective implementation of the resolution and highlighted ambiguities within it. Although the meeting concluded without adopting any outcome document, it was decided that the PSC convenes a retreat on the subject at the end of July 2024. This retreat is being convened against this backdrop.
Besides planning for a retreat, at the 1215th session, the PSC also requested the AU Commission to prepare a document that includes the matrix for Resolution 2719, which outlines the sharing of responsibilities, a position paper on its implementation, guidelines for its operationalisation and recommendations. Therefore, tomorrow’s retreat is anticipated to be grounded on the document that will be presented by the AU Commission.
Using the document as a basis the discussions of the retreat are expected to explore and propose recommendations on the ambiguous areas of the resolution concerning the decision-making process, the notion of ‘case-by-case,’ ‘AU-led and under direct and effective AU command and control,’ the ‘75:25’ formula, and the extent of application of the UN Financial Rules and Regulations to AU PSOs as well as mission support.
Additionally, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2719 stipulates that AU-led PSOs, granted access to UN-assessed contributions by the UNSC, will remain under ‘the direct and effective command and control of the AU’. Considering the fragmentation in the use of deployment of ‘peace operations’ on the continent taking the form of regional operations, ad hoc operations, a coalition of the willing and bilateral deployments, this formulation aims at bringing deployment under the umbrella of AU’s multilateral and established normative frameworks that ensure coherence and compliance. The implication of the requirement of ‘direct and effective command and control’ requires more than a deployment on the basis of consultation with the PSC and under the AU peace operations policy frameworks. The implication of this is that such operations by arrangements other than the AU including peace support operations by Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) will not have direct access to UN-assessed contributions within the framework of 2719.
This however does not necessarily imply there cannot be a situation in which operations initiated by RECs/RMs will not at all fall under Resolution 2719. In terms of precedent, there is no single case of a regional operation or ad hoc operation in which the AU exercised ‘direct command and control.’ The only example that can provide instructive lessons on this question of direct command and control is the hybrid UN and AU experience of mission in Sudan – the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). While UNAMID was a joint mission of the UN and the AU, the UN exercised direct command and control in coordination with the AU. UNAMID could be the model that can help develop an arrangement between the AU and RECs/RMs for meeting the requirements of operational paragraph 2 of Resolution 2719 that the AU-led peace support operation that can benefit from this resolution needs to be under ‘the direct and effective command and control of the AU.’
Concurrently, Paragraph 2 requires that the use of assessed contributions has to be ‘consistent with Article 17 of the Charter as well as the financial regulations and rules of the United Nations.’ Similarly, Paragraph 4 of the resolution mandates that these AU-led PSOs must adhere to the UN Financial Regulations and Rules. The UN Financial Regulations and Rules grant the UN Secretary-General authority over peacekeeping budgets, including setting objectives, outputs, activities, and resource allocations for budgets submitted to the General Assembly. This framework raises issues for AU PSO budgets in that it may necessitate adjustments in both budget preparations and reporting on the use of appropriated budget in order to ensure alignment between the demands of ensuring supplies that meet the tempo of AU-led PSOs on the one hand and the UN financial regulations and the decision-making processes of the 5th Committee of the UN General Assembly on the other hand. The UN Secretary-General also holds the authority to commit funds and make payments based on General Assembly appropriations, delegating this authority to mission heads in UN operations. However, this delegation system cannot extend the administration of UN Financial Regulations and Rules outside the UN.
There are however experiences to draw from. As pointed out in Amani Africa’s special research report on the financing of AU PSOs through UN-assessed contributions, the UN, under Resolutions 1863 (2009) and 2010 (2011), established a support package for supporting the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) using UN assessed contributions. This is also one of the two models (the other being the hybrid model of UNAMID) for channelling the funds that were proposed in the UN Secretary-General’s May 2023 report to the UNSC. As observed in our Special Research Report, ‘[e]xplaining the reason for the choice of the two models, the Secretary-General’s report states that ‘both approaches would facilitate the application of United Nations Rules and Regulations, standards for financial oversight, accountability mechanisms and requirements for human rights due diligence and can be implemented under existing policies and procedures.’ It is worth noting that the AU Consensus Paper on Financing of AU PSOs adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2023 also provides the support package model as ‘the best starting points for discussing financing options.’
With regards to the financial burden-sharing aspect of the resolution, which directs for the use of up to 75% of UN-assessed contributions for eligible AU-led Peace Support Operations, two issues may arise. Various AU member states made it clear that the AU is not in a position to contribute the 25%. In keeping with not leaving the AU with the full burden of contributing the balance of the budget not covered by UN Assessed contributions, one is the aspect of the resolution, which states that the remaining 25% is expected to be jointly mobilised from the international community as extra-budgetary resources. The UNSC with its resolution commits to exploring ‘all viable options’ in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilisation. This commitment raises the question of whether ‘all viable options’ might include the use of assessed contributions beyond the 75% cap. Another matter that seeks clarity in this regard is what accounts as a ‘contribution’ according to what is stated under paragraph 9 of the resolution.
The other aspect of Resolution 2719 that is expected to receive attention is the decision-making process in the authorisation of AU-led PSOs that falls under Resolution 2719 envisaged in operational paragraph 3. This envisages a process that requires a workflow that covers a series of sequential activities: a) consultation by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN for the conduct of a strategic assessment (of emerging and ongoing conflict situations) with a range of options for response, b) a joint strategic assessment guided, among others, by ‘regular joint review and reporting processes to ensure oversight by the Security Council of all authorised operations that access United Nations assessed contributions’, c) preparation of the report of the strategic assessment and the draft concept of operations (CONOPs), d) decision by the PSC on the report and the draft CONOPs, d) transmission of the PSC decision to the UNSC, and e) a consideration and decision by the UNSC. The key issues that the decision-making process envisaged under operational paragraph 3 include the kind of working arrangement that needs to be established between the AU and the UN and whether or not there is a need for engagement with and greenlight from the UNSC in starting the initial process of consultation between the AU Commission Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General as well as the mechanism for triggering the process.
Furthermore, the AUC report and briefing are expected to explore the conception of a ‘case-by-case’, as it can have different outcomes as to the response to the request of UN-assessed contributions by the AU. Some member states of the PSC are of the view that the fact that the assessed contribution is grunted on a case-by-case basis does not secure adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs. This is because one of the outcomes for a case-by-case consideration of AU-led PSOs could be the rejection of the request by the UNSC. In these cases, the PSC will be required to answer questions like, what will be the contingency plan in scenarios where UN-assessed contributions fall short. It is therefore expected that the PSC will develop a position on the issue as to what should be adopted in examining different conflict cases.
As a follow-up to previous discussions, the PSC is also expected to continue deliberations on the identification of the test case for implementation of Resolution 2719. It is worth recalling in this respect that the 1217th session of the PSC that decided on the deployment of a post-ATMIS mission to Somalia in paragraph 17 stipulated the PSC’s request ‘that a dedicated funding mechanism, through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)…be established to guarantee the financial stability of the mission.’ Part of the issue in this context is how this decision of the PSC can be pursued in the implementation of the various aspects for authorisation for access to UN-assessed contributions under Resolution 2719.
With respect to mission support, Resolution 2719 provides that ‘the Security Council will decide on the most appropriate mission model, prioritising the establishment of a United Nations Support Office, which enables the use of the fiduciary processes and reporting of the United Nations system or as may be necessary through any other mission model.’ The experience from AMISOM/ATMIS shows that there is a need for aligning the strategic logistic frameworks of the AU and the UN. Particularly where AU-led operations require enforcement action, there is not only a robust logistical support framework that meets the demands of such kinetic operations and the tempo of such operations which may necessitate decentralisation and prepositioning of supplies. Part of the consideration in tomorrow’s PSC retreat is how to ensure the development of such a strategic logistics support framework and the kind of steps required to avoid some of the shortfalls that undermined the effectiveness of AMISOM including airlift capacity and availability of force enablers.
The expected outcome is a conclusions document of the retreat that will later be submitted to future PSC sessions on the matter. The PSC is expected to commend the AU Commission for developing the matrix of the UNSC Resolution 2719, the position paper and further. The PSC may also state that it looks forward to the conclusion of the development of the position paper. The Council may further call on member states and the AU Commission to utilise the upcoming 18th PSC-UNSC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in October, to engage with stakeholders, including the A3, to forge a common understanding of the resolution.
Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)
Discussion on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)
Date | 23 July 2024
Tomorrow (24 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a retreat to discuss the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
Following an opening remark by Miguel César Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a presentation based on a report prepared by the AU Commission.
The PSC last considered the UNSC Resolution 2719 on 14 June 2024, during its 1215th session. This session addressed challenges that may hinder the effective implementation of the resolution and highlighted ambiguities within it. Although the meeting concluded without adopting any outcome document, it was decided that the PSC convenes a retreat on the subject at the end of July 2024. This retreat is being convened against this backdrop.
Besides planning for a retreat, at the 1215th session, the PSC also requested the AU Commission to prepare a document that includes the matrix for Resolution 2719, which outlines the sharing of responsibilities, a position paper on its implementation, guidelines for its operationalisation and recommendations. Therefore, tomorrow’s retreat is anticipated to be grounded on the document that will be presented by the AU Commission.
Using the document as a basis the discussions of the retreat are expected to explore and propose recommendations on the ambiguous areas of the resolution concerning the decision-making process, the notion of ‘case-by-case,’ ‘AU-led and under direct and effective AU command and control,’ the ‘75:25’ formula, and the extent of application of the UN Financial Rules and Regulations to AU PSOs as well as mission support.
Additionally, paragraph 2 of Resolution 2719 stipulates that AU-led PSOs, granted access to UN-assessed contributions by the UNSC, will remain under ‘the direct and effective command and control of the AU’. Considering the fragmentation in the use of deployment of ‘peace operations’ on the continent taking the form of regional operations, ad hoc operations, a coalition of the willing and bilateral deployments, this formulation aims at bringing deployment under the umbrella of AU’s multilateral and established normative frameworks that ensure coherence and compliance. The implication of the requirement of ‘direct and effective command and control’ requires more than a deployment on the basis of consultation with the PSC and under the AU peace operations policy frameworks. The implication of this is that such operations by arrangements other than the AU including peace support operations by Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) will not have direct access to UN-assessed contributions within the framework of 2719.
This however does not necessarily imply there cannot be a situation in which operations initiated by RECs/RMs will not at all fall under Resolution 2719. In terms of precedent, there is no single case of a regional operation or ad hoc operation in which the AU exercised ‘direct command and control.’ The only example that can provide instructive lessons on this question of direct command and control is the hybrid UN and AU experience of mission in Sudan – the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). While UNAMID was a joint mission of the UN and the AU, the UN exercised direct command and control in coordination with the AU. UNAMID could be the model that can help develop an arrangement between the AU and RECs/RMs for meeting the requirements of operational paragraph 2 of Resolution 2719 that the AU-led peace support operation that can benefit from this resolution needs to be under ‘the direct and effective command and control of the AU.’
Concurrently, Paragraph 2 requires that the use of assessed contributions has to be ‘consistent with Article 17 of the Charter as well as the financial regulations and rules of the United Nations.’ Similarly, Paragraph 4 of the resolution mandates that these AU-led PSOs must adhere to the UN Financial Regulations and Rules. The UN Financial Regulations and Rules grant the UN Secretary-General authority over peacekeeping budgets, including setting objectives, outputs, activities, and resource allocations for budgets submitted to the General Assembly. This framework raises issues for AU PSO budgets in that it may necessitate adjustments in both budget preparations and reporting on the use of appropriated budget in order to ensure alignment between the demands of ensuring supplies that meet the tempo of AU-led PSOs on the one hand and the UN financial regulations and the decision-making processes of the 5th Committee of the UN General Assembly on the other hand. The UN Secretary-General also holds the authority to commit funds and make payments based on General Assembly appropriations, delegating this authority to mission heads in UN operations. However, this delegation system cannot extend the administration of UN Financial Regulations and Rules outside the UN.
There are however experiences to draw from. As pointed out in Amani Africa’s special research report on the financing of AU PSOs through UN-assessed contributions, the UN, under Resolutions 1863 (2009) and 2010 (2011), established a support package for supporting the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) using UN assessed contributions. This is also one of the two models (the other being the hybrid model of UNAMID) for channelling the funds that were proposed in the UN Secretary-General’s May 2023 report to the UNSC. As observed in our Special Research Report, ‘[e]xplaining the reason for the choice of the two models, the Secretary-General’s report states that ‘both approaches would facilitate the application of United Nations Rules and Regulations, standards for financial oversight, accountability mechanisms and requirements for human rights due diligence and can be implemented under existing policies and procedures.’ It is worth noting that the AU Consensus Paper on Financing of AU PSOs adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2023 also provides the support package model as ‘the best starting points for discussing financing options.’
With regards to the financial burden-sharing aspect of the resolution, which directs for the use of up to 75% of UN-assessed contributions for eligible AU-led Peace Support Operations, two issues may arise. Various AU member states made it clear that the AU is not in a position to contribute the 25%. In keeping with not leaving the AU with the full burden of contributing the balance of the budget not covered by UN Assessed contributions, one is the aspect of the resolution, which states that the remaining 25% is expected to be jointly mobilised from the international community as extra-budgetary resources. The UNSC with its resolution commits to exploring ‘all viable options’ in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilisation. This commitment raises the question of whether ‘all viable options’ might include the use of assessed contributions beyond the 75% cap. Another matter that seeks clarity in this regard is what accounts as a ‘contribution’ according to what is stated under paragraph 9 of the resolution.
The other aspect of Resolution 2719 that is expected to receive attention is the decision-making process in the authorisation of AU-led PSOs that falls under Resolution 2719 envisaged in operational paragraph 3. This envisages a process that requires a workflow that covers a series of sequential activities: a) consultation by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the UN for the conduct of a strategic assessment (of emerging and ongoing conflict situations) with a range of options for response, b) a joint strategic assessment guided, among others, by ‘regular joint review and reporting processes to ensure oversight by the Security Council of all authorised operations that access United Nations assessed contributions’, c) preparation of the report of the strategic assessment and the draft concept of operations (CONOPs), d) decision by the PSC on the report and the draft CONOPs, d) transmission of the PSC decision to the UNSC, and e) a consideration and decision by the UNSC. The key issues that the decision-making process envisaged under operational paragraph 3 include the kind of working arrangement that needs to be established between the AU and the UN and whether or not there is a need for engagement with and greenlight from the UNSC in starting the initial process of consultation between the AU Commission Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General as well as the mechanism for triggering the process.
Furthermore, the AUC report and briefing are expected to explore the conception of a ‘case-by-case’, as it can have different outcomes as to the response to the request of UN-assessed contributions by the AU. Some member states of the PSC are of the view that the fact that the assessed contribution is grunted on a case-by-case basis does not secure adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs. This is because one of the outcomes for a case-by-case consideration of AU-led PSOs could be the rejection of the request by the UNSC. In these cases, the PSC will be required to answer questions like, what will be the contingency plan in scenarios where UN-assessed contributions fall short. It is therefore expected that the PSC will develop a position on the issue as to what should be adopted in examining different conflict cases.
As a follow-up to previous discussions, the PSC is also expected to continue deliberations on the identification of the test case for implementation of Resolution 2719. It is worth recalling in this respect that the 1217th session of the PSC that decided on the deployment of a post-ATMIS mission to Somalia in paragraph 17 stipulated the PSC’s request ‘that a dedicated funding mechanism, through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)…be established to guarantee the financial stability of the mission.’ Part of the issue in this context is how this decision of the PSC can be pursued in the implementation of the various aspects for authorisation for access to UN-assessed contributions under Resolution 2719.
With respect to mission support, Resolution 2719 provides that ‘the Security Council will decide on the most appropriate mission model, prioritising the establishment of a United Nations Support Office, which enables the use of the fiduciary processes and reporting of the United Nations system or as may be necessary through any other mission model.’ The experience from AMISOM/ATMIS shows that there is a need for aligning the strategic logistic frameworks of the AU and the UN. Particularly where AU-led operations require enforcement action, there is not only a robust logistical support framework that meets the demands of such kinetic operations and the tempo of such operations which may necessitate decentralisation and prepositioning of supplies. Part of the consideration in tomorrow’s PSC retreat is how to ensure the development of such a strategic logistics support framework and the kind of steps required to avoid some of the shortfalls that undermined the effectiveness of AMISOM including airlift capacity and availability of force enablers.
The expected outcome is a conclusions document of the retreat that will later be submitted to future PSC sessions on the matter. The PSC is expected to commend the AU Commission for developing the matrix of the UNSC Resolution 2719, the position paper and further. The PSC may also state that it looks forward to the conclusion of the development of the position paper. The Council may further call on member states and the AU Commission to utilise the upcoming 18th PSC-UNSC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in October, to engage with stakeholders, including the A3, to forge a common understanding of the resolution.
How does the withdrawal of SAMIM affect AU’s engagement in the Conflict in Northern Mozambique?
How does the withdrawal of SAMIM affect AU’s engagement in the Conflict in Northern Mozambique?
Date | 15 July 2024
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
Today 15 July marks the date for the official completion of the exit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). It is to be recalled that the 43rd Ordinary Summit of SADC held on 17 August 2023 decided to withdraw the SAMIM starting from 15 December 2023, although the mission’s withdrawal officially started on 5 April 2024.
SAMIM’s deployment came after the extraordinary SADC session held on 23 June 2021, which recognised the need for regional intervention in response to the escalating insurgency by the Islamic State of Mozambique (ISM) in the country’s Cabo Delgado region. In addition to the multinational SADC deployment, Mozambique also entered into a bilateral arrangement with Rwanda leading to the deployment of 1000 Rwandan forces in July 2021. While the insurgence became overt since 2017, what prompted the deployment of external forces was its expansion including the attack on the port city of Palma in early 2021 leading to the suspension of the significant liquefied natural gas projects involving Total Energies, EXXON and ENI.
While the African Union (AU) noted the threat posed by the situation as reflected in the report of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to the AU Assembly in 2020, the situation in northern Mozambique was put on the monthly agenda of the PSC for May 2021. However, it was later removed from the agenda following an objection from Mozambique. It was the deployment of SAMIM, to which Mozambique acquiesced reluctantly, that brought the matter back to the PSC. Even then, it emerged on the agenda of the PSC six months after the decision for SAMIM’s deployment and principally for purposes of endorsing SAMIM’s deployment and the Rwandan troops during its 1062nd session. The post-facto referral of SAMIM’s deployment to the PSC highlighted the lack of involvement of the AU in the decision-making for the deployment of SAMIM troops. This is despite what is provided under Article 13 (6) and (7) of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, which envisages the ASF to be deployed in pursuit of a decision of the PSC and puts the Chairperson of the AU Commission at the top of the chain of command of the ASF.
Even though there was a lack of coordination between the AU and SADC and the bypassing of the AU’s role, the AU endorsed the mission within the ASF framework. These initial steps have shaped the AU’s involvement throughout SAMIM’s deployment. The AU provided logistical support by shipping equipment from the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) to Mozambique in 2022 and 2023. It also facilitated the provision of financial support to SAMIM through AU’s EU-funded Early Response Mechanism (ERM) and the EU’s European Peace Facility (EPF).
Although the PSC requested regular updates during its 1062nd session in January 2022, it only met once that year and did not meet in 2023. Unsurprisingly, SADC made the decision for the withdrawal of the SAMIM in the same unilateral manner it had deployed the mission with no engagement from the AU.
SADC’s decision for a phased drawdown starting from 15 December 2023, with the complete withdrawal to be finalised by 15 July 2024 is premised on the SADC’s position that it cannot run two missions simultaneously. Following the decision for the withdrawal of SAMIM, the Foreign Minister of Mozambique Veronica Macamo stated that given its budgetary limitations, SADC had opted to prioritise its mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) above SAMIM. She further noted that ‘… and SADC thought that, for Mozambique, if other countries continue to support us with material, including lethal material, we can effectively overcome terrorism’. The decision to withdraw SAMIM thus stemmed from financial limitations and the logistical difficulties of sustaining two missions simultaneously. It is worth recalling that prior to the decision on the withdrawal of SAMIM, SADC adopted the Framework for Support to the Government of Mozambique and a Peacebuilding Support Programme to supplement Mozambique’s Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado (PRCD). This was after the 42nd SADC summit held on 17 August 2022 which decided to ‘de-escalate the intervention from scenario 6 to scenario 5 and subsequently to scenario 4.’
While it has not fully achieved its objectives, the mission, along with the Rwandan troops, has contributed significantly for stabilising the region through neutralising terrorists, recapturing villages, dislodging terrorists from their bases, and seizing weapons and equipment. These efforts have facilitated the creation of conditions for the return of internally displaced persons to their homes and the safer passage of humanitarian aid. Reported deaths also decreased from 1,100 in 2021 to 644 in October 2022. Furthermore, ISM participated in 11 political violence incidents per month during the first eight months of 2023, a significant decrease from the 36 incidents per month seen in 2022. By August 2023, over 570,000 internally displaced persons had successfully returned to their homes.
Despite these successes, the situation remained precarious. As we pointed out in the 3 March 2024 edition of Insights on the PSC, not long after the adoption of the decision on SAMIM’s withdrawal the insurgent group increased attacks since September 2023. Since January 2024, the ISM expanded its renewed campaign under the ‘kill them where you find them’ mantra, resulting in an increase in terrorist activities and internal displacement. These attacks have spread to the Mocímboa da Praia district and neighbouring districts of Palma and Muidumbe, extending to the Mocomia coast and Mecufi. Compared to the 51 attacks claimed by ISM in 2023, the group has already claimed 57 attacks within the first few months of this year. Additionally, a recent report by ACLED indicates the reestablishment of insurgents on the mainland of Palma district, where the international liquefied natural gas projects are based, for the first time since February 2023. Consequently, as of 15 March, since December 2023 more than 110,000 people have been internally displaced.
Given the resurgence of terrorist attacks, South Africa and Rwanda have reconsidered their deployment strategies. On Rwanda’s side, there was no intention of departure but it was recently announced that Rwanda will deploy another 2500 troops in addition to the 1000 troops that were deployed in 2021. South Africa, a country that was a major troop contributor with almost two-thirds of SAMIM’s troops, on the other hand, has announced that few of its troops will remain in Mozambique and 200 will stay up until March 2025. On July 1, the President of Tanzania, Filipe Nyusi, confirmed that Tanzania will maintain its 300-strong force in the northern district of Nangade even after SAMIM’s departure.
In view of these developments, the PSC during its March 2024 meeting on the situation, instead of endorsing SADC’s decision on the withdrawal of its mission, opted for simply noting the decision. It also requested the sharing of experiences and lessons learned, a comprehensive study and needs assessment, and regular reports and updated briefings from the SADC. The PSC’s requests reflect a cautious approach to the situation in northern Mozambique, emphasising the need to prevent the emergence of a security vacuum after SAMIM’s departure. By focusing on reviewing the Mozambican government’s progress in preparing to fill the void, the Council underscores the importance of assessing the country’s readiness to stabilise itself. This was also indicative that PSC’s engagement in any peace and security situation should not depend on and be mediated through regional mechanisms.
Thus, despite the fact that the PSC’s engagement in the crisis in Cabo Delgado was mediated through SAMIM, the departure of the SADC mission should not mark the end of the PSC being seized with the situation in Cabo Delgado. Developments in the past months warrant such continuous engagement of the PSC without this being mediated. The upcoming field mission of the PSC to Mozambique scheduled for 29 – 31 July 2024 serves not only as an opportunity for PSC’s continuous engagement but also for identifying the ways in which the AU can play a role in the effort for stabilising the Cabo Delgado region, beyond supporting efforts for filling in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of SAMIM. Most notably, during the field mission the PSC can engage national authorities and other local stakeholders in the ways in which the AU can contribute to peacebuilding and reconstruction including through an AU post-conflict reconstruction and development mission.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing on mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Briefing on mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Date | 14 July 2024
Tomorrow (15 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will discuss the role of mediation and reconciliation in resolving the conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), focusing on the Nairobi and Luanda Processes—regional peace initiatives under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), respectively.
The session commences with an opening remark from Tete Antonio, Minster of External Relations of the Republic of Angola and Chairperson of the PSC at the Ministerial Level. This is followed by a statement by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). DRC, as the concerned country, may also make an intervention. The representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ICGLR, EAC and the United Nations (UN) may also deliver statements.
The last time the PSC met on the situation in Eastern DRC at its 1203rd session, it PSC highlighted the importance of the diplomatic efforts embodied in the Nairobi and Luanda processes. These processes are ongoing regional initiatives under the auspices of the EAC and the ICGLR. The Nairobi Process aims to mediate a resolution between the Government of the DRC and various armed groups active in the eastern regions of the country. Concurrently, the Luanda Process seeks to address the inter-state dimension of the crises in the Eastern DRC through dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda. Considering the persistence of the fighting involving the M23 and the fact that both the Nairobi and Luanda processes are stalled, the PSC, apart from receiving updates on the state of the conflict and the peace efforts, faces the challenge of how to overcome the impediments to the two peace processes.
On the security front, the conflict involving the M23 continues to rage on and expand. The M23 is not only deepening its territorial control in North Kivu but also moving towards South Kivu province. Since the last PSC session in March, the M23 came closer to the town of Seke some 27 kilometres from the strategic and regional capital, Goma before abandoning the area. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Bintou Keita told the UN Security Council (UNSC) in a briefing on 8 July that ‘the M23 captured several strategic locations in North Kivu, burning several FARDC bases and triggering additional population displacements.’ On 29 June it captured Kanyabayonga, a strategic town that connects major commercial centres in North Kivu. In the context of the escalating fighting, it was reported that two South African soldiers died and 20 were injured when the M23 attacked the town of Seke at the end of last month. Beyond the fighting between FARDC and the M23, other domestic and foreign armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Red Tabara, and Mai-Mai also continue to wreak havoc in the region, significantly impacting the civilian population.
Apart from expressing concern about the territorial expansion of the M23 in North Kivu and its spillover into South Kivu, the head of MONUSCO warned in the 8 July briefing to the UNSC that ‘the rapidly escalating M23 crisis carries the very real risk of provoking a wider regional conflict.’ Instead of the gaps between DRC and Rwanda narrowing down, the tension between the two countries is deepening with escalatory rhetoric and trading of accusations. During the 8 July UNSC briefing the representative of the DRC held that ‘the deployment of Rwandan soldiers on the territory of the DRC, as well as Rwanda’s alliance with the M23 terrorist group to destabilise the country, constitute severe violations of the Charter of the United Nations.’ With a hint of unfulfilled expectations from the international community, the DRC representative noted that ‘[i]t appears that Rwanda has been guaranteed impunity and enjoys a blank cheque’ and called for a change of course by urging action against Rwanda. For the Rwanda representative, the ‘security and governance failures of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he said, have led to the mushrooming of more than 250 illegal armed groups, chief among them the FDLR.’ The Rwandan representative asserted that Congolese Tutsi populations are being ethnically cleansed by armed groups, hinting it as a source of the fighting (involving M23). The DRC representative asserted that ‘any discussion will be difficult’ as long as Rwanda forces remain in Congolese territory.
In terms of the humanitarian consequences of the conflicts, the UN reports that about 7 million are displaced in eastern DRC. MONUSCO’s chief described the situation as ‘one of the most severe, complex and neglected humanitarian crises of our times.’ Expressing their alarm about the deteriorating security situation in the Kivus and Itury and its humanitarian implications, in a joint statement to the 8 July UNSC briefing, the African 3 plus members of the UNSC (A3+) stated that they are ‘especially concerned about the protection of civilians risks posed by this problem.’
While no major breakthrough has been achieved with respect to the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes, the US working in concert with Angola brokered a two-week humanitarian truce that commenced on 5 July 2023. According to a statement by the US, the ‘truce commits the parties to the conflict to silence their weapons, allow for the voluntary return of displaced people, and provide humanitarian personnel unfettered access to vulnerable populations. The truce covers areas of hostilities most affecting civilian populations.’ It further stated that the DRC and Rwanda governments have expressed support for the truce despite putting conditions for a broader de-escalation. Following their retreat in Zanzibar on 6-8 July, the Foreign Ministers of the EAC called for the indefinite extension of the truce.
Apart from the unwillingness of the DRC government to talk to the M23, the Nairobi process was further complicated by tensions between the DRC and Kenya following a press conference in Nairobi in December 2023, where a new Congolese political coalition known as the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), reportedly including several armed groups such as the M23, was announced. With the formation of the new AFC coalition, the M23 also expressed unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the Congolese government. On 7 June, the EAC held an extraordinary virtual summit to discuss, among other things, the strained relations between some of its member states. During the meeting, Rwandan President Paul Kagame requested an in-person EAC summit as soon as possible. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi did not attend the EAC virtual summit, signalling his dissatisfaction with comments made by Kenyan President William Ruto in a 22 May interview with Jeune Afrique, where Ruto stated that the M23 is a Congolese issue, not a Rwandan one. Nevertheless, following the decisions of the 7 June extraordinary virtual summit, EAC ministers held a retreat in Zanzibar on 8 July to discuss inter-state relations within the EAC and their adverse effects on the regional integration agenda. At this meeting, the Congolese and Rwandan ministers agreed to meet soon within the framework of the Luanda process. Underscoring a political process as the viable path to sustainable peace and security in eastern DRC, the EAC ministers in their communiqué recommended ‘the convening of a summit of the EAC to revitalise the political track of the EAC led Nairobi process in reciprocal coordination with the Luanda process.’
Under the Luanda process, apart from the role that Angola played towards the humanitarian truce that the US brokered between the warring parties in Eastern DRC and following the mini-summit that Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço convened on the sidelines of the AU summit that ended without success after bitter exchanges, Lourenço held bilateral meetings with Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame on 17 February 2024. He continued his diplomatic engagement in Luanda, meeting with the two leaders on 27 February and 11 March 2024, during which they reportedly agreed, in principle, to meet for direct talks. However, this meeting has yet to take place.
On the military track, following the replacement of the EAC forces by SADC Mission to DRC (SAMIDRC), it is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 4 March 2024 session, endorsed the deployment of SAMIDRC and requested the UNSC to support SAMIDRC, despite opposition from Rwanda which considers SAMIDRC as a force taking side with FARDC. The Security Council is expected to discuss possible support for SAMIDRC based on the Secretary-General’s letter submitted on 28 June 2024, which outlines options for the Council’s consideration. These options include information sharing and technical assistance to enhance coordination and deconfliction; limited use of the UN’s logistical assets and capabilities; and comprehensive UN support. During the Security Council’s 8 July 2024 meeting on the situation in DRC, some members ruled out the possibility of applying the third option and emphasised the need to find a political solution through the existing regional peace initiatives under the Nairobi and Luanda processes.
A related issue to note is the proliferation of regional initiatives, highlighting the need for enhanced coordination and harmonisation. To address this, the AU initiated the quadripartite process, involving the EAC, ECCAS, ICGLR, and SADC. The first quadripartite summit held on 27 June 2023, agreed on a joint framework to promote coherence among the initiatives of the four regional mechanisms, with a clear division of responsibilities and timelines. In its March communiqué, the PSC requested the AU Commission to convene a second quadripartite summit to follow up on the implementation of commitments made during the first summit. It is anticipated that the Commission will update the PSC on preparations for this upcoming summit.
Additionally, there is an ongoing discussion on the revitalisation of the 2013 Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSC-F), ten years after its signing in Addis Ababa, in light of the escalating security situation in eastern DRC and its implications for the peace and stability of the Great Lakes region. This discussion is taking place in line with the decision of the 11th Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM)—the body overseeing the implementation of the PSC-F—held in Burundi in May 2023. The next ROM meeting, to be hosted by Uganda this year, is expected to consider the recommendations of an independent assessment report on the revitalisation of the PSC-F.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express concern over the escalating insecurity in the eastern DRC. It may condemn the violence targeting civilians, MONUSCO and that which led to the death of SMIDRC soldiers from South Africa. It may reiterate its earlier assertion that there is no military solution to the conflict and welcome the decision of the EAC ministers for the revitalisation of the political process. Commending Angola’s role under the Luanda process, the PSC may also seize the opportunity to welcome the humanitarian truce that the conflict parties agreed to early this month and endorse the call of the EAC ministers for the indefinite extension of the humanitarian truce beyond the two-week period expected to expire on 19 July. In light of the growing danger of the situation spilling into a regional war, the PSC may call for an exercise of utmost restraint, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC and guarantee for the internal security of Rwanda. The PSC may encourage the EAC and the SADC to encourage Rwanda and DRC to build on their support for the humanitarian truce and engage in the Nairobi and Luanda processes with a higher sense of responsibility and commitment for achieving wider de-escalation. The PSC may also reiterate the importance of the revitalisation of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region including through the adoption of measures such as a continental peace operation that ensure confidence and trust through ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty of DRC and security of Rwanda on the basis of political agreement for the resolution of the fighting in the eastern DRC on the basis of the Nairobi and Luanda processes. To this end, the PSC may request the AU Commission in consultation with EAC, SADC and ICGLR to explore and present options for an AU-led continental monitoring and supporting mission.
Consideration of the situation in CAR
Consideration of the situation in CAR
Date | 10 July 2024
Tomorrow (11 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1221st session to discuss developments in the Central African Republic (CAR).
Following opening remarks by Miguel César Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. A representative of CAR, as the concerned country, and representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the United Nations (UN) may also deliver statements.
The last time the PSC considered the situation in CAR was on 13 June 2023, at its 1157th session. The session welcomed the declaration made by several armed groups that are signatories to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (PAPR) to disband their movements in line with Article 5(d) of the Agreement. It also urged other armed groups in CAR, including those that do not fall within the framework of the PAPR, to follow suit and participate in conflict resolution processes and in the implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes. The focus of tomorrow’s session is to review developments in CAR since the last session including in the implementation of the goals of the PAPR and the Luanda Roadmap.
There have been various engagements to take the peace process in the CAR forward. On 6 February, President Touadéra chaired a special session of the Executive Monitoring Committee of the PAPR during which all relevant stakeholders were urged to remain committed to efforts aimed at fostering the consolidation of peace, security and national unity in CAR. The start of the second phase of the government’s communication plan for the peace process took place on 12 March. Another notable development is the move towards decentralising the implementation of the peace process, including the identification of activities to be undertaken at the local level for the implementation of the PAPR and the Luanda Roadmap. A high-level national conference on peaceful and prosperous transhumance opened on 13 May. In addition to these, the government also continued the implementation of its DDR programme, targeting not only groups but also individuals within armed groups that showed readiness to join the programme.
Despite these encouraging steps, challenges persist in CAR’s peace process. One of the key factors hindering progress is the intransigence of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) to rejoin the peace and reconciliation process. The CPC not only continues carrying out attacks in various parts of the country, including a most recent attack in a mining town located a few miles from the capital city, but it also remains to be implicated in reports of human rights abuses and conflict-related sexual violence. Considering that the actions of CPC are causing havoc to the security of civilians and impeding progress in the peace process, a key issue warranting PSC’s reflection during tomorrow’s session is exploring ways of inducing members of the CPC into giving up the use of force and embrace the path of dialogue to resolve the conflict involving the group.
Although the overall security situation has significantly improved in most parts of CAR, some of its remote regions remain unstable. One of the sources of insecurity is the rebel attacks perpetrated mainly by the CPC. The other sources of violence in the CAR involve transhumance-related tensions and criminal activities, particularly the abduction of people for ransom and looting.
There are legislative and institutional efforts for enhancing law and order and the protection of civilians in the CAR. These include the adoption of a national human rights strategy, a sectoral policy on justice, and a national strategy to combat sexual and gender-based violence in the course of the past year. While these are important developments, their significance lies in the political commitment of the government and the mobilisation of wider societal support for their implementation.
Apart from developments in the peace process and the security situation in the CAR, another key issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s meeting is the preparations underway for conducting the long-awaited local elections which were postponed from July 2023. The local elections, if conducted according to plan, will be taking place in the country for the first time in over three decades. While this underscores the importance that these local elections have including in extending legitimate structures of governance at local levels, consensus on the holding of the elections is still lacking.
On the one hand, the government and CAR’s partners are forging forward with preparations to conduct the elections in October this year. On the other hand, members of civil society and opposition groups are expressing concerns and calling for further postponement until structural reforms are successfully carried out to pave the way for the formation of an independent elections management body. In addition to voicing concern over the continued fragility of the security situation in parts of the country which may disrupt the elections, opposition groups are also of the opinion that the 30 July 2023 constitutional referendum which led to the adoption of a new constitution scraping the two-term limit and extending presidential mandate from 5 to 7 years is indicative of President Touadéra’s intention to consolidate power and his readiness to rig the local elections in favour of his party. The government does not agree with the position of the opposition and civil society organisations. Apart from viewing the elections as key vehicle for restoring security by fostering local governance, it considers the call for postponement as a manifestation of a lack of the necessary support for the opposition to democratically win the local elections.
It is clear from the existing discourse that there is a lack of trust between the CAR government and opposition groups as well as stakeholders in the civil society space. Despite the importance of conducting the local elections for consolidating democratic dividends and for further institutionalising legitimate structures of governance at the local level, the value of the election in bringing about legitimate local structures depends on wider public trust and buy-in. It may thus be critical to ensure that all processes leading to the elections are inclusive and based on sufficient consultations between the government and all the relevant stakeholders. In this regard, it may also be of relevance to consider the role that can be played by the AU and the sub-regional actors, ECCAS and ICGLR, as well as Angola as the AU champion of peace and reconciliation, to facilitate dialogue among CAR’s stakeholders on measures to be adopted for enhancing confidence and optimal conditions for the holding of the elections as planned.
The humanitarian situation in CAR is another area of concern that deserves the attention of the PSC. According to OCHA’s latest report of 2 July 2024, CAR is currently host to 31,649 forcibly displaced people from Sudan, including 25,491 Sudanese refugees and 6,158 returnees originally from CAR. Furthermore, the food insecurity crisis in CAR remains a major concern, with 2.8 million people in the country, which constitutes 46% of the total population, regarded to be extremely vulnerable that humanitarian assistance alone is feared not to suffice for their well-being. In a global context characterised by dwindling humanitarian funding and given CAR’s years long humanitarian crisis now further compounded due to the ongoing war in Sudan, the humanitarian community in CAR is faced with considerable capacity challenges. On its part, the CAR government adopted a humanitarian response plan in January 2024 with the aim to address the concerns of refugees and IDPs. However, this plan also continues to face the challenge of low financial mobilisation.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the progress made in some areas in the implementation of the PAPR and the Luanda Roadmap and the support provided, including from Angola in this respect. The PSC may encourage the CAR stakeholders to sustain and elevate their efforts to implement the PAPR and the Luanda Roadmap to advance peace and reconciliation in the country. The PSC may condemn attacks perpetrated predominantly by the CPC. It may in this respect task the AU Commission working with ECCAS to develop and submit options for addressing the challenge that the intransigence of CPC poses to the peace process in CAR. It may also note and welcome the appointment of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to CAR, António Egídio de Sousa Santos, in line with PSC’s request at its 1157th meeting. Highlighting the important role to be played by the AU Mission in CAR (MISAC) in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the PAPR, the PSC may further emphasise the need for strengthened support for the mission. The PSC may also encourage all CAR stakeholders to engage in inclusive dialogue for enhancing further popular consensus and support, particularly regarding the conduct of the local elections. In this regard, the PSC may also request the AU together with ECCAS and Angola as AU champion of peace and reconciliation, to facilitate engagement with stakeholders having concerns about the preparation for elections for enhancing the conditions that create wider trust and support for the holding of the election. Taking into account the spike in the number of displaced populations hosted in CAR due to the war in Sudan, the PSC may request the AU Commission and AU member states working in concert with ECCAS to mobilise support for the humanitarian efforts of CAR state and non-state actors including through the relevant PRC sub-committee.