9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC

9^th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC

Date | 4 November 2026

Tomorrow (5 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 9^th informal joint retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ahead of their 17^th annual joint consultative meeting on 6 November.

Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to co-chair the informal seminar. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and a representative from the EU are also expected to address the retreat.

The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat/seminar and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting.

Since 2015, the PSC and EUPSC have institutionalised informal retreats ahead of their annual consultations to address thematic peace and security issues. This year’s retreat will cover four items: maritime security; AU/EU efforts on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; AI governance, peace and security; and Women, Peace and Security.

Maritime Security

The agenda envisages that Spain, Greece and Romania will take the lead in delivering intervention on the side of the EU. It is to be recalled that this agenda featured in last year’s informal retreat. It is worth recalling that this item also featured in the AU-EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025, whereby the ministers in their Joint Communiqué ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’

As in the earlier retreat, the two sides are expected to review developments across Africa’s maritime domain, assess existing cooperation and identify priorities for strengthening joint responses. There are dynamic developments in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans that affect the maritime interests of African states and the maritime and trade route interests of European states. As choke point geopolitics intensifies and the maritime domain acquires increasing economic significance, there is a rising need in Africa to secure and invest in Africa’s maritime zones and in both Africa and Europe to enhance the security of global trade routes. In terms of recent developments, it is expected that the impact of agreements on ports and maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea may attract attention. The decline in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, supported by the Yaoundé Architecture and coordinated regional and international efforts, constitutes a major progress. Yet maritime insecurity has become increasingly complex, with persistent threats from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, trafficking, oil theft and transnational organised crime. In the Red Sea, some of the notable developments involve conflicts and geopolitical tensions, including the impact of the war between the US and Israel against Iran and the emergence of Houthi threats on the Red Sea, endangering major maritime corridors, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, forcing shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope and contributing to the resurgence of piracy activities off the Somali coast. The expansion of terrorist activities towards West Africa’s coastal states also raises concerns over maritime routes being exploited for arms trafficking, illicit financing and movement of fighters.

The PSC side may highlight continental and regional frameworks, notably the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, the Yaoundé Architecture and the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Particular attention may be given to progress towards operationalising the Combined Maritime Task Force in the Gulf of Guinea, which the PSC considers an important step towards an African-led, ready-to-deploy maritime security capability. For its part, the EUPSC is expected to highlight its maritime engagements, including Operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, both mandated until February 2027; the Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative in the Gulf of Guinea; and the various maritime capacity-building programmes across the continent. Another recent development that may feature under this agenda item is the July 2026 EU–Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement for ASPIDES.

Against this background, a key issue for the retreat is how to leverage and boost existing African-led maritime governance frameworks and security arrangements at continental, regional and national levels for enhancing the safety of maritime trade routes, coordination between existing AU and EU maritime initiatives, particularly through intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, joint operational planning and capacity-building.

AU/EU Efforts on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

It is expected that Ethiopia, Cameroon, Somalia and Togo will take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Austria, Hungary and Slovakia from the EU side. Terrorism remains one of Africa’s most pressing security threats. Despite a global decline in terrorism-related fatalities, Africa has become the main epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for around 70–75 per cent of global fatalities, according to a report presented at the PSC’s 1354^th session in July 2026.

The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters, as well as the operationalisation of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter Terrorism. However, mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorist threats. These challenges informed the PSC’s ministerial meeting on ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa,’ held on the margins of the 81^st UN General Assembly in September. At its 1354^th session, the PSC also expressed its grave concern about the ‘downturn in international cooperation, including the withdrawal of technical and financial support to peace support operations in Africa, attributed to the shift in national policies and escalating geopolitical fragmentation,’ a concern that the PSC is likely to raise during tomorrow’s engagement.

For its part, the EUPSC may highlight its extensive counterterrorism engagement in Africa, combining operational assistance with support for criminal justice institutions and prevention of violent extremism. According to EU figures, Africa receives 72 per cent of its €659 million counterterrorism and prevention programming. Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has supported AU missions in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the SADC mission in Mozambique, alongside bilateral military assistance. Its support also extends to counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, border security, countering terrorist financing and community-based prevention programmes, particularly in the Sahel, West African coastal states and East Africa. Recent initiatives include the €45 million SecFin Africa programme (2024–2028) targeting illicit financial flows and terrorist financing, and the €30 million Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme (2024–2028), supporting security and criminal justice capacities in West Africa.

In this context, the retreat offers an opportunity to address gaps in coordination and the sustainability of counterterrorism efforts, particularly amid declining international financing for African-led peace operations, including the AU mission in Somalia. Beyond sustaining operational support and coordination, as well as the role that natural resources exploitation is playing in fueling war economies in affected regions, there are also major issues, including how to address the trust deficit that affects policy coherence both on the continent and between the AU and EU and the need for a shift from security-heavy instruments to investment in long-term interventions that address underlying conditions of fragility.

AI Governance, Peace and Security

In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that Poland and Latvia will speak for the EU and Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC are expected to lead in making interventions on the side of the AU. Artificial intelligence (AI) has gained increasing prominence on the agenda of the PSC. During tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC may highlight its efforts to establish a continental AI governance framework and the progress made so far. Its engagement on AI governance, peace and security began at its 1214^th session in June 2024, which recognised AI’s potential for conflict prevention, early warning and peacebuilding, while raising concerns over the risks associated with its rapid development in the absence of adequate regulation. At that session, the Council requested a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, and the establishment of a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and governance to propose continental governance options, including for military applications. The advisory group was established in March 2025.

At its 1267^th session, held at the ministerial level in March 2025, the PSC called for mainstreaming AI in peace support operations, early warning and preventive diplomacy, alongside the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. At another ministerial-level meeting, its 1339^th session in April 2026, the Council emphasised the need for Africa to shape, develop and control its own AI technologies to safeguard its sovereignty across the AI ecosystem. It also underscored the importance of digital and data sovereignty and requested the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of an African Fund for AI. Given Africa’s limited influence over the development of AI systems, the Council further stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in international norm-setting through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement in multilateral forums.

The retreat provides an opportunity for both sides to exchange experiences and explore practical areas of cooperation in AI governance, peace and security. Particular attention could be given to translating the AU’s growing policy commitments into institutional capabilities, including through capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and cooperation on the responsible use of AI in conflict prevention, particularly by exploring the integration of AI-enabled tools into the Continental Early Warning System. The discussions could also explore ways to strengthen coordination on emerging international AI norms, ensuring that African perspectives and priorities are adequately reflected in global AI norms and governance.

Women, Peace and Security

It is expected that South Africa and Uganda will lead the AU’s intervention on this agenda, and Ireland, Malta and Italy will take the lead on the side of the EU. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been a standing agenda item of the PSC since March 2010. Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Council held 28 dedicated sessions, progressively expanding its engagement from the protection of women in conflict to their meaningful participation in conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Key institutional developments include the Office of the AU Special Envoy on WPS, FemWise-Africa, the Continental Results Framework (CRF) for monitoring implementation, and the Swakopmund Process, a biennial, rotational platform for PSC engagement with WPS actors that has contributed to advancing gender parity policy for all AU-led and co-led mediation processes.

This is an area on which there has been growing collaboration between the AU and the EU. The EU and individual EU member states have provided and remain major sources of support to AU’s work on the WPS agenda, including the work of the AU Special Envoy on WPS. In the context of the emergence of some powerful currents against gender equality and the WPS agenda, tomorrow’s retreat is likely to highlight the impact these developments are having and the responses to the threat these developments pose. In the context of these developments, discussions may focus on deepening the convergence between the AU and the EU for safeguarding the gains registered over the years and supporting initiatives to this end, building on existing collaboration between the AU and the EU. In view of the growing focus on bridging the gap between normative commitments and implementation, the discussion on this agenda is also expected to focus on ways of enhancing steps to translate normative and institutional investment into operational reality, not least of all in enhanced women’s participation in peace processes. As Amani Africa’s fifteen-year review of the WPS agenda of the PSC underscores, the priority is to move beyond regular deliberations towards systematic implementation.

by Amani Africa

Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security

Date | 2 November 2026

Tomorrow (3 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1377^th meeting, an open session on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver a statement. A representative of Burundi, the AU Champion for Youth, Peace and Security, will also deliver a statement. Vanessa Nakate, the newly appointed AU Youth Envoy, is also expected to make her inaugural statement. The AU Youth Ambassadors for Peace from the five regions are also envisaged to update the PSC on their activities.

The PSC institutionalised its annual YPS open session at its 807^th meeting in November 2018. Its most recent dedicated engagement, the 1310^th meeting of 11 November 2025, addressed migration, youth, peace and security. Council requested draft guidelines for developing and implementing National Action Plans (NAPs) on YPS and a comprehensive study on migration, youth, peace and security. The upcoming session follows the commemoration of the Africa Youth Day marked annually on 1 November. This session also comes in the context of the 20^th anniversary of the African Youth Charter, which is set to be observed in the context of the 6^th Pan-African Youth Forum, scheduled for 16–20 November 2026 in Addis Ababa under the theme ‘Reflecting, Reimagining, and Repositioning the African Youth Charter’. Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) in December 2025. It also precedes. The Forum, themed, commemorates the Charter’s 20^th anniversary. These milestones invite assessment of outstanding PSC decisions and mechanisms, including the African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAP), WiseYouth Network and Youth for Peace Africa programme.

In terms of follow-up on the previous session, a notable development was the designation on 10 August 2026 of Commissioner Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah as Special Envoy on the Situation of Stranded Migrants and Refugees, focusing on efforts to revitalise the AU–EU–UN Tripartite Task Force.

It is also a welcome development that, after remaining vacant since the end of 2024, the AU Commission Chairperson reinstated the position of the AU Youth Envoy with the announcement of the appointment of Vanessa Nakate, a prominent youth climate advocate from Uganda.

The fifth AU Continental Dialogue on YPS and Women, Peace and Security (WPS) was held from 10 to 12 August 2026 in Bujumbura, Burundi, under the theme ‘Water, Peace and Inclusive Leadership in Africa’. Convened in the context of the AU’s 2026 Theme of the Year, the Dialogue brought attention to the role of youth and women in resource governance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly where water insecurity, climate shocks and resource-related disputes compound insecurity.

An outcome of the Bujumbura Dialogue was the Bujumbura Declaration, adopted on 11 August 2026 by the Youth Creative Consortium (YCC) during a side event. Apart from recognising the contribution that youth are already making as ‘strategic partners, decision-makers and agents of change ‘, the Declaration calls for linking ‘community-based early warning initiatives’ with national, regional and continental early-warning systems, alongside structured engagement between AU institutions and credible youth-led organisations.’

It is clear that notable progress has been registered in terms of putting in place institutional arrangements dedicated to youth. In this regard, tomorrow’s session is expected to also review the activities of existing continental mechanisms, including AYAP, the WiseYouth Network and the Youth for Peace Africa programme, alongside broader institutional arrangements for youth engagement, including the AUC Chairperson’s Special Envoy for Youth and the AGA–APSA Platform. The critical issue is whether these mechanisms, within their respective mandates, provide meaningful opportunities for youth engagement in preventive diplomacy, political dialogue, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction. The fifth APRM Youth Symposium Outcome Report, published in August 2026, similarly identifies a gap between participation and influence, calling for efforts to ‘mainstream youth input to mandates, budgets, decisions and monitoring systems’. Council may therefore seek an account of the practical contributions of the plethora of mechanisms put in place to peace processes, including the extent to which youth participation influences decisions and outcomes.

A key issue for the YPS agenda that is of interest for PSC’s session is the norm-to-implementation gap, not least of all in advancing one of the pillars of the AU’s YPS continental framework, participation. The PSC, in various instances, including at its 1183rd session, emphasised the need ‘for the AU Commission to institutionalise the inclusion of the youth, particularly the AYAPs and WiseYouth Network, in preventive diplomacy missions and AU Election Observer Missions.’ Despite the inclusion of AYAPs in election observations during the past two years, the level of participation of youth in peace processes did not go beyond what some call tokenism. This gap between institutional and policy commitment and the reality was echoed during the August 2026 Dialogue in Bujumbura, where Bakary Sonko, AYAP for West Africa, underscored the distinction between policy adoption and implementation, as reflected in the account of his intervention that ‘adoption is not implementation’.

In terms of advancing policy action at the national level, at the UNGA high-level side event, ‘Advancing the Bujumbura Outcomes: Youth, Peace and Security in Africa’, held on 21 September 2026, it was reported that eight African countries had adopted YPS NAPs, over 15 were drafting them, and at least ten others had formally committed to the process. The reported progress may be assessed against the AU’s continental targets for 25% of Member States to develop youth-led and youth-centred NAPs by 2024 and 50% by 2029. This data illustrates that the pace of domestication of the YPS agenda through NAPs is off AU’s target.

Another issue worth following up during tomorrow’s session with respect to advancing domestication of the YPS agenda at national level is the state of execution of the PSC’s request, in various sessions since its 933^rd session and reiterated at its 1183^rd session, for the AU Commission ‘to develop a Guideline that would assist Member States to accelerate their efforts to develop the National Action Plans (NAPS).’ The drafting and technical validation of the guidelines have been finalised during 2024 and 2025. The AU Youth for Peace Programme reportedly indicated during a meeting held in Gaborone, Botswana, on 28-29 July that the NAP Development and Implementation Guidelines are awaiting adoption by the PSC.

The proliferation of platforms on youth also deserves attention in reviewing state of the YPS agenda. In addition to the YPS framework and the mechanisms noted above, there is the AGA–APSA Youth Engagement Strategy. At the Platform’s February 2026 political meeting, Commissioner Bankole Adeoye acknowledged the implementation challenge, observing that ‘We do have the strategy already, the AGA-APSA Youth Engagement Strategy; we just need to action it’. Beyond the question of implementation, there is also the issue of coherence and coordination across various YPS arrangements within the AU. While these initiatives provide institutional and capacity-building frameworks, their contribution to YPS will ultimately depend on whether they translate into opportunities for young people to influence governance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding decisions.

Financing remains a major challenge for implementing the YPS agenda, particularly for local youth-led peacebuilding organisations. The UN Peacebuilding Fund’s 2025 YPS thematic review identifies persistent administrative and eligibility barriers limiting direct access to financing for youth-led organisations, underscoring the need for more accessible and flexible funding arrangements. An African example is the Fund-supported initiative in the Burkina Faso–Mali–Niger border region, which provided microgrants to local organisations, prioritising youth-led initiatives for community improvements and sustainable livelihoods. More recently, at their 27–28 October 2026 consultation in Accra, ECOWAS ministers resolved to establish a regional YPS Basket Fund to mobilise ‘predictable and sustainable financing’ from Member States, development partners, financial institutions and the private sector, alongside developing a costed and measurable Regional Action Plan on YPS. Council may therefore underline the need for accessible and sustained financing, with youth participation in setting funding priorities, allocating resources and assessing outcomes, so that investments translate into lasting institutional capacity and tangible peacebuilding impact.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome the outcomes of the fifth Continental Dialogue on YPS and WPS, including proposals for strengthening youth participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Council may call on the AU Commission to expedite the submission of the guidelines for developing and implementing NAPs on YPS and provide updates on their adoption and implementation. It may also underscore the need to strengthen coordination among AYAP, the WiseYouth Network, Youth for Peace Africa programme, AGA–APSA Platform and RECs/RMs to ensure meaningful youth engagement in mediation, early warning and peacebuilding processes. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of mainstreaming youth perspectives in country-specific deliberations. Council may call for predictable and accessible financing for youth-led peacebuilding initiatives and concrete measures to translate existing commitments into meaningful youth influence on peace and security decisions.

by Amani Africa

Open Session on the Review of Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa

Date | 1 November 2026

Tomorrow (2 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1376^thsession on the ‘Review of Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa.’ The meeting will be held as an open session.

Following opening remarks from Anthonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November 2026, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make introductory remarks. A representative of Egypt, as AU Champion on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), is also expected to make a statement. Further statements are expected from PSC Members, AU Member States, Representatives of RECs/RMs and partners.

The last time the PSC convened on PCRD was at its 1312^th session held on 17 November 2025. The PSC requested the AU Commission to ‘extend the period for the commemoration of the PCRD Awareness Raising from one week to one month, effective from 2026.’ This 6^th edition of the AU PCRD commemoration marks the first transition from PCRD Awareness Week to a month-long observance, from 1 to 30 November 2026. This year’s commemoration also marks the 20^th anniversary since the adoption of the AU PCRD Policy in Banjul in 2006. Marked under the theme ‘Twenty Years of Building and Sustaining Peace: From Policy to Action,’ this PCRD Month will provide an opportunity to take stock of the 20-year journey, reflect on lessons learned and identify priorities for implementation of the revised AU PCRD Policy for the next decade, having regard to the profound changes both on the continent and globally. Tomorrow’s session is the first of the month-long engagement on AU PCRD and is the most authoritative platform for taking stock of and outlining the strategic direction in AU’s pursuit of its PCRD policy.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to reflect on, among other things, progress made towards the operationalisation of the policy framework over the last 20 years. In this respect, a major development since the 2006 adoption of the PCRD policy was the revision of the Policy following the AU Assembly decision at its 35^th Ordinary Session of February 2022, calling for the urgent review of the 2006 PCRD Policy with a view to realigning and adapting to the evolving continental security dynamics. It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 1047^th session in November 2021, emphasised the imperative of broadening the scope of AU PCRD activities, which includes incorporating a peacebuilding dimension, thus covering the entire conflict cycle phase — pre-conflict, during conflict and post-conflict. Following the review process, in January 2024 the PSC, at its 1198^th meeting, adopted the revised AU PCRD Policy, which now comprises of nine pillars, including Political Governance and Transition, Security Governance, Humanitarian Assistance, Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development, Women, Peace, and Security, Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation, Youth Inclusion, Child Protection, and Environmental Sustainability. It was subsequently endorsed by the AU Assembly during the 37^th Ordinary Session held in February 2024.

In terms of the institutional architecture of the PCRD, a major development was the official launch of the PCRD Centre in December 2021. The Centre became fully operational with the appointment of its head in 2023 and the designation of a dedicated office infrastructure. Subsequently, in August 2025, the PSC convened its 1297^th session, in which it adopted the Terms of Reference for this Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee, established under Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, is sought to serve as a mechanism to receive assignments and mandates on specific post-conflict situations from the PSC (see our insight here for a comprehensive overview and analysis of the PSC Sub-Committee on PCRD and its ToR).

Against this background, several developments have happened since then. The sub-committee on PCRD had its inaugural meeting in February 2026, chaired by Haidy Ahmed Abdelghani of Egypt, as Chair of the subsidiary body for that month. The meeting featured Libakiso Matiho, Executive Secretary of the AU-PCRD Centre, who briefed the Sub-Committee on the Centre’s priorities and key focus areas. The meeting further deliberated on ways to support the Centre in achieving full operational capacity, while recommending that it avoids duplication of efforts and strengthen coordination with relevant AU entities to ensure complementarity.

In terms of the translation of the ambition of the policy into operational reality shaping the transitional trajectory of countries coming out of conflict, there remains a huge gap between ambition and reality. Some implementation efforts, including the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in Somalia; the development of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin and the Stabilisation Strategy for the Sahel; and the AU’s support in the areas of reconciliation and healing (e.g. South Sudan), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR), as in the case of Central African Republic (CAR), can be cited as some of the best practices in terms of AU’s PCRD interventions. The most notable PCRD policy implementation in a specific transitional setting was the PSC’s deployment of a PCRD mission to The Gambia, the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG). Unfortunately, this mission ended owing to a lack of funding before the conclusion of its objectives.

It is to be recalled that the PSC in its 1157^th session and most particularly its 1221 session of 11 July 2024 tasked the AU Commission, through its PCRD Centre, to urgently conduct needs assessment in CAR to identify priority areas for peacebuilding. In May 2026, the PCRD Centre, through AU PAPS, conducted a 2-day mission to Bangui, CAR, to assess priority needs and identify Quick Impact Projects to support implementation of the revised AU PCRD Policy. The mission engaged government institutions, health sector stakeholders, youth associations and local partners to strengthen access to quality healthcare, youth inclusion, peacebuilding and sustainable development in the country.

On 9 June 2026, the AUC-PCRD, in collaboration with the Africa Business Council (AfBC) and the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA), convened a High-Level Dialogue themed ‘Towards a Roadmap for AUC-PCRD and Private Sector Partnership: Unlocking African Private Sector Engagement and Business Opportunities,’ in Cairo, Egypt. The forum aimed to explore innovative approaches to strengthen private sector engagement, mobilise African solidarity and advance the implementation of PCRD activities. This was followed by a Consultative Meeting on the Review of the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) under the theme, ‘Towards an African Mutual Support Strategy for Peacebuilding,’ on 10 and 11 June 2026, still in Cairo. This meeting aimed to discuss how to transform continental solidarity into tangible action through technical cooperation, in-kind support and mutual assistance that respond directly to nationally identified priorities. It is worth recalling that the African Solidarity Initiative was launched at the 19^th Ordinary Session of the policy organs of the Union that was held in Addis Ababa, in July 2012, as an AU-led process for mobilising support from within the continent for countries emerging from conflict, in line with the AU PCRD framework adopted in 2006. The ASI, however, has largely failed at its core goal of raising resources. Previously, its two pledging conferences (2014 and 2017) raised only about US$25,000 in traceable donations. The initiative has not been formally abandoned; however, it was cited in AU communiqués as needing revitalisation.

Furthermore, on 16 and 17 September 2026, the PCRD Centre convened a two-day Validation Workshop in Cairo, Egypt, to review, discuss and validate the 2026 – 2028 Strategic Framework. The Strategic Framework is aimed at guiding the Centre’s strategic direction and priorities for the coming years. Tomorrow’s session serves as a useful occasion for the presentation of the strategic framework to the PSC.

Various challenges remain in terms of the implementation of the PCRD policy. The first of these is funding. Some of the options proposed include the establishment of an African PCRD Fund (this was considered by the Council during its 528^th meeting) and dedicating a percentage of the AU Peace Fund to PCRD activities as suggested by the Council at its 593^rd and 958^th sessions. Another challenge relates to the planning of PCRD as part of AU’s peace processes. In a Press Release of 31 October 2026, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, commemorating the 20^th anniversary of the AU PCRD Policy, pointed out that sustaining peace requires recovery to be planned from the earliest stages of peace efforts and supported beyond immediate crisis responses. He also calls for more predictable and sustained financing for recovery, with transparent management, effective oversight and clear accountability for results.

Tomorrow’s session therefore provides an opportunity to assess not only the strides made since the last PSC session, but also in the context of the commemoration of the 20^th anniversary of the AU PCRD policy. It will be important for the discussions to rethink and approach differently several interlinked challenges, especially that the PSC may wish to consider in reviewing of PCRD in Africa. The most pressing is the persistent resource gap: the stalling of ASI and pledges made at the 2014 conference remain unhonored, while declining official development assistance deepens dependence on unpredictable external donors. The Peace Fund’s PCRD contribution is still modest. Institutional follow-through is, on the other hand, also a concern, while at the same time the Cairo-based PCRD Centre requires adequate resources. The policy-to-practice disconnect is evident in fragile transitions such as South Sudan, CAR and Libya and finally, the PSC may wish to note the weak African ownership of PCRD knowledge production and the limited local capacity for emerging technologies such as AI-based early warning.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Among others, the Council may commend the progress made in the operationalisation of the PCRD Policy during the past twenty years, including the establishment of the PCRD Centre and the operationalisation of the PSC sub-committee. The PSC may underscore the need to sustain the emerging practice to mainstream PCRD programmes in all relevant country and thematic agendas of the PSC. The PSC is also likely to encourage the AU Commission, through the AU PCRD Centre, to always pursue the implementation of the PCRD Policy through and with AU peace support operations (PSOs), and AU Liaison Offices (AULOS), which remain platforms for AU’s national-level engagements. The PSC may also echo the Chairperson’s statement that PCRD needs to be planned from the earliest stages of peace efforts and, as such, should be reflected when initiating peacemaking or mediation processes. The PSC may also affirm the importance of the strategic leadership of the PSC in the implementation and deployment of PCRD interventions. It may also reaffirm the importance of securing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding for AU’s PCRD and peacebuilding initiatives to fully realise the objectives outlined in the revised Policy.

by Amani Africa

Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for November 2026

Date | November 2026

In November, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The month’s Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) includes eight substantive sessions. There is one session that will focus on a country-specific situation in addition to the session on the AU mission in Somalia. All the remaining sessions will address thematic issues. The PPoW also includes the annual PSC Retreat on the Review of its Working Methods. All sessions are expected to take place at the ambassadorial level. It is also worth noting that two sessions will be held in an open format. The PPoW also envisages that the Committee of Experts (CoE), the PSC subsidiary body, is also expected to hold three meetings during the month.

The PSC will begin the month with a CoE meeting on 2 November to prepare for the 17^th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and the EUPSC. It is expected that the preparatory meeting will focus on shaping the interventions that the PSC members will deliver on the draft agenda items for the joint retreat and the consultative meeting.

On the same day in the afternoon, the PSC will convene its first substantial session of the month, which will be an open session on the ‘Review of Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa.’ This is an annual statutory session that is held in November, and this year’s session coincides with the 20th anniversary of the AU PCRD Policy. The last session on this was at the 1312^th session held on 17 November 2025. It is worth noting that during the session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to ‘extend the period for the commemoration of the PCRD Awareness Raising from one week to one month, effective from 2026.’ This year will be the first transition from PCRD Awareness Week to a month-long engagement involving various PCRD-related activities. This will be the 6^th edition of the AU PCRD commemoration. Held under the theme ‘Twenty Years of Building and Sustaining Peace: From Policy to Action,’ the 2026 PCRD Month will provide an opportunity to take stock of the 20-year journey, reflect on lessons learned and identify priorities for implementation of the revised AU PCRD Policy for the next decade, having regard to the profound changes both on the continent and globally.

Following this, the next day, 3 November, the CoE will meet again in the morning to continue preparing for the AUPSC – EUPSC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting. Their second agenda item will be to prepare for the PSC Retreat, which will be held later in the month on 16 and 17 November.

On the afternoon of the same day, 3 November, the PSC will convene its second substantive session of the month focusing on ‘Youth, Peace and Security.’ The session, which will be convened in an open format, will be held following the Council’s 807^th meeting of November 2018 decision to ‘institutionalise and regularise an annual open session dedicated to the theme of ‘Youth, Peace and Security in Africa.’ This session will also build on its last dedicated session on the theme, the 1310^th session, held on 11 November 2025. The session will also take place a day after the commemoration of African Youth Day, which is celebrated annually on 1 November. This year will mark the 20^th anniversary of the African Youth Charter (AYC), which will be commemorated under the ‘AYC@20’ campaign. Adopted by the AU Assembly on 2 July 2006 in Banjul, The Gambia, the AYC is the continent’s foremost legally binding instrument dedicated to promoting, protecting and advancing the rights, responsibilities and development of young people aged 15 to 35. The Charter provides Member States with a comprehensive framework to strengthen youth participation, expand access to education, employment, health, peace and security and ensure that young people are empowered to contribute meaningfully to national and continental development. The official AYC@20 commemoration will take place during the 6^th Pan-African Youth Forum to be held from 16 to 20 November at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

On 5 November, the AU PSC and the EU PSC will convene for their 9^th Annual Informal Joint Retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Since 2015, the AUPSC and the EUPSC have made it a standing practice to hold an informal joint retreat ahead of their annual consultative meeting. These retreats usually centre on current thematic issues. Past retreats have covered subjects such as cooperation between Africa-led missions and EU CSDP missions and maritime security, and this upcoming engagement may also touch on predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations including implementation of UNSC Resolution 2719, youth, peace and security, WPS and children affected by armed conflicts among others.

On 6 November, the AUPSC and the EUPSC will meet for their 17^th Annual Joint Consultative meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This will build on its previous 16^th annual joint meeting, in which (as analysed in Amani Africa’s October 2025 Monthly Digest) a notable breakthrough from the meeting was the adoption of a Joint Communiqué after three consecutive years of being unable to do so owing to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. As in previous years, the 17^th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting is expected to feature a combination of regional and thematic agenda items. The consultative meeting is likely to address regional and country-specific conflict situations, with continuity on issues that have featured in recent meetings, including particularly Somalia/AUSSOM, Sudan and South Sudan, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin and the Great Lakes Region with a focus on Eastern DRC. It is also expected to involve AoB as in earlier consultative meetings such as in 2024.

On 10 November, the PSC will receive a briefing on the activities of AUSSOM. In July 2026, there was an Informal Consultation held on ‘Funding Support for Somalia/AUSSOM Logistics Package.’ At the meeting, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, among other things, urged the accelerated operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, implementation of the 0.2% levy, and increased Member State contributions. Prior to this, the PSC convened its 1342^nd meeting on 28 April 2026 to consider the ‘Report on Joint AU-FGS–UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Mission Configuration Plan.’ At the session, the Council reiterated its call for the Commission to convene the AUSSOM troop- and police-contributing countries at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces. Developments in the following months were shaped largely by the mission’s financing crisis. The EU announced a €75 million funding package for AUSSOM’s military component in April 2026, and political tensions in Somalia deepened, including suspended cooperation between the federal government and the federal member states of Jubaland and Puntland and armed clashes in Mogadishu in June. With the AU failing to act on the PSC decision on the convening of AUSSOM troop- and police-contributing countries at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, on 1 July, the US Mission to the AU wrote that the US would not support the renewal of AUSSOM’s mandate in December if it includes UNSOS or any UN logistical or operational support. The letter prompted a TCC/PCC experts’ meeting on 24 July and the troop-contributors’ summit in Kampala on 29-31 July. The summit mandated the TCCs’ foreign ministers to form a Joint Task Force for diplomatic outreach on predictable and sustainable financing, though the convening did produce no collective plan for the post-December scenario. The AU Commission is meanwhile consulting stakeholders and contributing countries to give the PSC options on AUSSOM’s fate after 2026. With no resolution of the financing crisis, it is reported that during this past week Uganda initiated the process of withdrawing its troops. It is striking that this will be the first time that the PSC is convening a session on AUSSOM since the US letter triggered unprecedented uncertainty about the immediate future of the mission since early July.

On 11 November, the PSC will convene a session on ‘Climate, Peace and Security in Africa: Emerging Challenges, Institutional Responses and Future Priorities.’ It was in September 2026 that the PSC had scheduled an ‘Open Session on the Nexus Between Climate Change, Peace and Security in Africa’ on its September 2026 Programme of Work, but the session was eventually postponed. The Climate, Peace and Security theme has featured regularly on the PSC’s agenda since its 585^th session in March 2016, where the Council committed to holding annual deliberations on the link between climate change and security. The upcoming session will be the second session this year focusing on climate, after the 1344^th meeting in May 2026, which discussed the ‘Impact of climate change on crises in the Sahel and Lake Chad.’ From that session, the AUC Chairperson was tasked with undertaking a comprehensive mapping of the impact of climate change in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel region. This upcoming meeting will also give an opportunity to get an update on the implementation of some of the decisions from the 1331^st meeting held in February 2026. These included tasking the AU Commission to ‘expedite the operationalisation of the African Humanitarian Agency and the Continental Civil Capacity Mechanism for preparations towards and response to disasters, in particular climate disasters.’ In addition, the PSC called for the finalisation of the study on the assessment of climate-related security risks and the implementation of the PSC Matrix of threats to peace and security on the continent, adopted in August 2025. This session may also give an update on the process of the development of the common position on climate, peace and security.

18^th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods will be convened on 16 and 17 November in Arusha, Tanzania. Traditionally, the PSC retreats are held as part of the ongoing efforts to continue to further strengthen the PSC working methods in order to enable it to more effectively and more efficiently deliver on its mandate of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It will build on the 17^th Annual PSC Retreat held in November 2025 in Abuja, Nigeria, where several decisions requiring follow-up were put across. These included tasking the PSC Sanctions Sub-Committee to undertake a review exercise of the AU Sanctions Regime to ascertain when and how sanctions should be imposed and to ensure that they are effective in contributing towards the achievement of the desired results with minimum collateral impact on the population. The PSC secretariat was also tasked, among other things, to develop an ethic charter on confidentiality of documents and deliberations of the PSC, and a ‘Guide’/Orientation Manual on the work to be availed to new Members joining the PSC.

On 20 November, the PSC will convene for a ‘Discussion on Migration, Youth, Peace and Security.’ Given the Council’s growing focus on migration and youth, it has previously examined how persistent development and governance challenges drive rising youth migration and how migration has become intertwined with threats to peace and security, such as transnational organised crime, including human smuggling and terrorism. The upcoming session will build on its 1310^th meeting held in November 2025, in which it reiterated its previous call for the appointment of an AU Special Envoy on Migration and tasked the AU Commission to urgently submit the Draft Guidelines for the development and implementation of national action plans on Youth, Peace and Security. Other decisions that would require follow-up include the decision to reactivate the AU-UN-EU Tripartite Task Force on Migration in Libya, as directed at the Summit level, and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to commission a comprehensive study on migration, youth, peace and security in Africa.

On 24 November, the CoE will convene a virtual session on ‘Information on the Preparation for the 13^th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa (Assisting the incoming A3) – Oran Process.’ This year’s seminar will be held on 1 and 2 December in Algiers, Algeria.

The last substantive session of the Council will be held on 26 November, focusing on the Situation in South Sudan. The session will come exactly three months since Council considered the latest developments in the country. This was on 26 August 2026, at its 1364^th session. With less than a month remaining to the 22 December 2026 date set for the general elections, the PSC decided, at its 1364^th session, to ‘hold a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October 2026,’ and further requested the AU Commission ‘to submit a detailed fact sheet on election readiness ahead of this meeting, based on the findings of the missions of the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, C5, as well as the AU Assessment Mission to South Sudan.’ Although no substantive session dedicated to the situation in South Sudan was featured in the October 2026 Programme of Work, this upcoming session will be where the proposed PSC engagement will be undertaken. Since the last PSC session, the National Elections Commission has announced that voter registration will begin in early November, and its chair, who replaced the one that was removed without due process, briefed AU Commission’s Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security officials in Addis Ababa on the state of preparedness. One of the major developments on the diplomatic front was the convening of the summit of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) on 29 September virtually. Apart from recalling its earlier summit declaration of 15 February 2026, the summit expressed concern over renewed hostilities and reported ceasefire violations while affirming that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable and paramount framework for the country’s political transition. The summit also appealed to South Sudan’s Government to ‘publish a feasible, consensual and time-bound electoral roadmap that clearly sets out the legal basis, scope and sequencing of elections.’ This PSC session will be a major test in terms of the PSC ensuring that conditions necessary for credible elections are put in place and that the R-ARCSS is adhered to as a critical measure to prevent poorly organised elections from relapsing South Sudan into full-scale civil war.

by Amani Africa

Between War and El Niño: The Horn of Africa’s Gathering Perfect Storm

Date | 30 October 2026

Abdul Mohammed

For families in parts of the Horn of Africa, the season has brought too little rain, failing crops and shrinking pasture. In some areas, October rainfall has been absent or very low. In others, the rains have arrived unevenly, after households have already lost livestock, depleted their savings or been driven from their homes by conflict. The result is a daily struggle to find food, water and safety.

Now the climate outlook points to a new danger, rising loss and damage to parts of the world that contributed very little to the major cause of climate change, greenhouse gases emission. Described by the African Union (AU) as the strongest since 1950, historic ‘super’ El Niño, this season’s El Niño is already very strong and is expected to persist into early 2027. For the Horn of Africa, as the chiefs of UNOCHA and WMO put it, it is going to be season of extreme weather ‘that threatens to inflict severe humanitarian and economic pressure on conflict-affected nations across (the region).’

For much of the equatorial and southern Greater Horn, the current forecast is for wetter-than-normal October–December rains, with heightened risks of flooding. That forecast means that people weakened by one shock may soon face another: destructive floods, damaged crops, lost livestock, cut-off roads and fresh displacement.

This is the human face of the climate induced super El Niño of 2026-2027 in the Horn: not a simple choice between drought and flood, but exposure to both, in a region where affected people have little left with which to withstand either.

The crisis is unfolding amid devastating wars in affected countries, with no clear end in sight for many of them. Sudan’s war has uprooted millions and helped drive one of the world’s gravest hunger emergencies. Fighting has also returned to northern Ethiopia, raising fears that a new conflict could spread beyond the country. In Somalia, insecurity continues to disrupt livelihoods, markets and aid delivery. As rivalry in the Red Sea intensifies, conflict and geopolitical confrontation are increasingly entangled with the region’s security and economic life. These are not separate theatres for the people caught between them. War destroys homes and farms, blocks roads, empties markets and makes it dangerous for humanitarian workers to reach those in need.

People are being trapped between war and environmental shock. A family fleeing violence may arrive in a drought-affected area with no land to cultivate and no livestock to sell. A pastoralist who has lost animals may have to travel farther for water, crossing into areas where insecurity or competition over scarce resources puts the family at risk. A farmer who has planted after a poor season may see a flood wash away the crop. Displacement then increases pressure on host communities already struggling to meet their own needs.

The numbers point to the scale of this exposure, but they cannot capture its daily cost. In Sudan, 19.5 million people face acute hunger, while funding shortfalls are forcing the World Food Programme to reduce assistance to 800,000 people through the end of 2026. In Somalia, 5.4 million people are projected to face crisis levels of hunger or worse between October and December. The United Nations and Somali authorities warn that El Niño-related floods could destroy crops, cut communities off from markets and trigger further displacement.

The scarcity is not only a scarcity of food. Humanitarian resources are shrinking just as needs are rising. In Somalia, funding shortages have already contributed to the closure or scaling back of health services, while many children and mothers are no longer receiving nutrition support. Across the region, insecure roads, restricted access and underfunded operations make it harder to deliver assistance even when it exists. When aid is cut, the consequences are immediate: a meal missed, treatment delayed, a child’s condition worsening, a family left without shelter or clean water.

Beyond humanitarian aid, the enormous human and socio-economic costs that societies that contributed little to climate change but bear the heavy brunt of this season’s El Niño highlights the urgency and imperative of responsible countries delivering on their commitments for adaptation and loss and damage. It is reported that the African Development Bank (AfDB) warned that the anticipated ‘super’ El Niño could inflict a combined 10 to 20 billion U.S. dollars economic hit on African countries, with adaptation finance requiring nearly 100 billion U.S. dollars.

The phrase ‘perfect storm’ is often used too easily. Here, it describes a real convergence of dangers: war, displacement, food insecurity, disrupted trade and rising costs, fragile health systems, climate extremes and a humanitarian response with diminishing capacity. Each pressure makes the others more dangerous. Conflict prevents people from adapting to climate shocks. Climate shocks deepen hunger and displacement. Displacement stretches already scarce services. Funding cuts leave families with fewer options to survive.

This convergence also connects with events beyond the region’s borders. In Sudan, the World Food Programme has warned that disruptions to maritime supply routes in the Red Sea are increasing fuel and fertilizer costs, while food prices remain high. For farmers, higher input costs can mean less fertilizer and lower production. For traders and aid agencies, fuel and transport costs determine how much food can reach a market or an isolated community. A conflict at sea can therefore compound hunger in a village far inland.

The challenge is to prepare for both sides of the forecast while protecting people now. This entails coming to the rescue of communities facing the immediate effects of poor rains, and those at risk from flooding in the weeks ahead.

To that end national and local authorities and non-state actors along with humanitarian responders and those who bear the most responsibility for climate change need to invest in protecting humanitarian access, restoring and sustaining food and nutrition assistance, preparing flood-prone areas, supporting local health services, and helping farmers and pastoralists preserve the means to recover. It also means confronting the political reality at the heart of the crisis: while wars continue, every drought, flood and price shock becomes more deadly.

As stressed by the chiefs of UNOCHA and WMO in a joint press briefing in Geneva, the people of the Horn are not facing the shock from the super El Niño in isolation. They are living through it amid war, displacement and the erosion of the support systems on which survival depends. They are caught between a season that has failed them and rains that may come too heavily, between conflict that drives them from home and aid that cannot reliably reach them. Their lives should not be reduced to a forecast or a statistic. They are a call for urgent action to end the wars, protect livelihoods and ensure that early warnings are matched by help before the next shock arrives. And importantly for countries that bear the most responsibility for climate change to make good on their commitments relating to financing of adaptation and loss and damage and for the upcoming COP31 as the ‘super’ El Niño COP to be where existing climate finance commitments will be delivered, as underscored in the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the AU held under the theme Strengthening Africa’s Preparedness, Resilience and Climate Action: Responding to the Anticipated 2026 El Niño while Advancing Africa’s Priorities Towards COP31 and COP32.

by Amani Africa

Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - September 2026

Date | September 2026

In September, under the chairship of the Republic of Benin, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisted of five substantive sessions, alongside the 2nd Ministerial High-Level Seminar on Women, Peace and Security, and the 2026 Commemoration of Africa Amnesty Month. Following the revision of the PPoW, four substantive sessions were held. Of the four, only one focused on a country-specific issue, while the rest addressed thematic issues. Except for one session, ‘Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa,’ which was held at the ministerial level, all the others were held at the level of permanent representatives.

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by Amani Africa

Briefing by the INTERPOL

Date | 29 October 2026

Tomorrow (30 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive a briefing from the Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver an introductory statement. The Secretary-General of INTERPOL, Valdecy Urquiza, is expected to brief the PSC.

This will not be INTERPOL’s first briefing to the PSC, although its previous briefings have generally taken place in the context of the Council’s sessions on transnational organised crime, which has been one of its standing thematic agenda items since 2019. INTERPOL last briefed the Council at its 1345^th session, held on 6 May 2026, under the theme ‘African strategies for combating transnational organised crime in Africa.’ It was the organisation’s Special Representative to the AU who delivered a statement. Representatives of INTERPOL also addressed the Council during its previous sessions on transnational organised crime in Africa, including the 845^th (2019), 1082^nd (2022) and 1279^th (2025) sessions.

At its 1345^th session, the PSC directed the AU Commission, working in close collaboration with African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to establish a structured and integrated continental mechanism inspired by INTERPOL’s system of notices, coupled with an African ‘continental warrant’ framework. During its 1082^nd session, the PSC also requested AFRIPOL, in collaboration with INTERPOL, to develop in-depth, research-based regional information papers on combating transnational organised crime. At its 1279^th session, the PSC requested the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other relevant stakeholders in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including through joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.

At tomorrow’s session, the Secretary-General of INTERPOL is expected to brief the PSC on the activities of the organisation across the continent to combat transnational crime and terrorism, its support to Member States’ law enforcement agencies, and ways of strengthening its partnership with the AU, particularly its relevant institutions, such as AFRIPOL and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA).

Against this background, the Secretary-General is likely to highlight the longstanding cooperation between INTERPOL and the AU on matters such as the sharing of resources and expertise and the development of joint responses to Africa’s policing needs. This cooperation was formalised through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and INTERPOL in 2011, followed by a further cooperation agreement in 2019 aimed at ensuring complementarity between INTERPOL and AFRIPOL, avoiding duplication of efforts among common member countries and promoting synergies.

In May 2016, INTERPOL also established the Office of the Special Representative to the AU to serve as a liaison and strengthen cooperation between the two organisations. The INTERPOL Support Programme for the AU in relation to AFRIPOL (ISPA) was launched in 2020 for an initial three-year period (Phase 1) to assist AFRIPOL in developing its functions across the continent. The programme was subsequently extended until December 2026 under its second phase. With the second phase set to conclude in two months, tomorrow’s session may also provide an opportunity to review the progress registered and discuss the future of the programme.

The ISPA Programme supports AFRIPOL in five key areas: strengthening its governance and legal framework; enhancing its capacity to combat terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime and financial crime; establishing secure information-sharing and communication systems through INTERPOL’s I-24/7 network; strengthening criminal intelligence analysis through equipment, training and mentoring; and building the capacities of AFRIPOL and INTERPOL’s common member countries through needs assessments and targeted workshops. Under the ISPA Programme, various forms of technical assistance have been provided to AFRIPOL and Member States’ law enforcement agencies to strengthen their capacity to combat transnational crime across the continent. These include the provision of advanced cybercrime investigation equipment and comprehensive training to AFRIPOL and at least 36 African member countries, covering cybercrime investigation tools, blockchain analysis software and digital forensic capabilities.

In addition, the Secretary-General is likely to highlight other achievements of the programme, notably the series of joint AFRIPOL–INTERPOL operations that demonstrate growing cooperation in combating transnational organised crime, terrorism, cybercrime, human trafficking and illicit trade across Africa. Beginning with Operation Flash-IPPA (2021), the first jointly coordinated pan-African police operation targeting pharmaceutical crime, cooperation expanded through operations such as WEKA II and Flash-WEKA (2022–2023), which collectively resulted in over 1,300 arrests and the rescue of more than 1,500 trafficking victims. (For more details on the programme and its achievements, see here)

Cybercrime operations, notably Africa Cyber Surge (2022–2023) and Serengeti (2024), disrupted thousands of criminal networks, with Serengeti alone resulting in 1,006 arrests across 19 countries. Counterterrorism operations, including Flash-ARISE (2024) and Catalyst (2025), strengthened cross-border intelligence sharing and led to 120 arrests. Other significant initiatives, including First Light (2024), Djembe (2025) and the Nigerian inter-agency operation (2024), further demonstrated the value of coordinated law enforcement, intelligence sharing and cooperation among national agencies.

The Secretary-General is particularly expected to highlight the latest operation, Operation Serengeti III (2026), coordinated by INTERPOL between 29 June and 31 August 2026, which brought together law enforcement agencies from 21 countries to combat cyber-enabled fraud, ransomware, business email compromise, online scams and digital extortion. The operation resulted in 1,462 arrests, the disruption of 10,909 malicious networks and the recovery of over USD 105 million in illicit funds. It also identified 65,929 victims and criminal activities linked to financial losses exceeding USD 385 million. Major achievements included the dismantling of transnational investment and pension fraud networks in Uganda, illegal cryptocurrency mining operations in Angola, and phishing, investment fraud and money-laundering schemes in Nigeria, alongside cybercrime investigations in Tanzania, Gabon and the Republic of Congo. Supported by intelligence sharing, technical expertise and private-sector partnerships, the operation demonstrated the importance of coordinated international law enforcement efforts in addressing increasingly sophisticated and borderless cybercrime threats across Africa.

The briefing may also provide an opportunity to explore ways of building on these achievements and further strengthening cooperation between INTERPOL and the AU, particularly AFRIPOL. It may also address operational challenges affecting their cooperation and identify areas requiring additional technical and institutional support.

Yet, it is of interest for the PSC that tomorrow’s session is not confined to the work of INTERPOL on the continent in relation to fighting transnational crime in general. It is of particular significance that it addresses the intersection of organised crime and conflicts in Africa. As such, from the perspective of the mandate of the PSC, tomorrow’s session is important for PSC members to discuss how the expertise from and the collaboration with INTERPOL can best be leveraged in integrating analysis of the impact of transnational crime on specific conflict situations and the tools that need to be used to address such impact as part of peace processes for such conflict situations.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm the importance of the cooperation between INTERPOL and the AU, particularly AFRIPOL, as demonstrated by the various capacity-building initiatives and joint operations involving Member States’ law enforcement agencies, including the latest Operation Serengeti III. The Council may also follow up on its previous decisions, particularly those concerning the establishment of a structured and integrated continental mechanism, the development of in-depth, research-based regional information papers on combating transnational organised crime, and the establishment of tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of criminal corridors, including through joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities. In this regard, the PSC may encourage INTERPOL to provide the necessary technical and operational support to the AU Commission and AFRIPOL to facilitate the implementation of these decisions. The Council may encourage INTERPOL’s regular briefings during its annual thematic sessions on transnational organised crime in Africa. Given the increasing intersection between organised crime and conflicts, the Council may request that the AU Commission, working in coordination with AFRIPOL and INTERPOL, present a report on how transnational organised crime shapes current conflicts and affects the stability of states on the continent, with recommendations on how to address the impact of organised crime on peace and security, including the tools to be deployed as part of peace processes.

by Amani Africa

Restoring African Union Leadership in Peace and Security through Prioritising Peace Diplomacy: Insights from Expert Panel on AU and the APSA

Date | 28 October 2026

INTRODUCTION

The African Union (AU) and its peace and security order, known in conventional discourse as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), are at a cross roads. Internally, in addition to the expansion of the number and geographic spread of conflicts, the continent suffers from major deficit of collective leadership both on the part of states and at the level of pan-African multilateral bodies. Africa also faces a crisis of political and strategic cohesion owing, among others, to the erosion of commitment to and pursuit of the collective vision of Pan-Africanism. At the global level, the international system is in a state of deep crises.

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by Amani Africa

Briefing on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Date | 26 October 2026

On 27 October, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) will receive a briefing from the AU Facilitators on the situation in eastern DRC.

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make an introductory statement. The session is also expected to feature a briefing by the Panel of Facilitators.

Following the joint extraordinary summit of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on the situation in eastern DRC in March 2025, the two regional organisations appointed five former African heads of state from Botswana, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria as co-facilitators of the peace process. In April 2025, the Bureau of the AU Assembly appointed Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé as the AU mediator. The mediator and the five co-facilitators constitute a panel leading the African-led mediation efforts to address the situation in eastern DRC. At its 1323rd ministerial meeting in December 2025, the AUPSC endorsed the consolidated African-led mediation architecture.

Tomorrow’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of a significant deterioration in the security situation in eastern DRC. It will provide an opportunity for AUPSC members to take stock of developments since their last meeting on the issue in December 2025. Despite agreements signed by the parties under the Washington and Doha processes last year, fighting continues unabated in eastern DRC, fuelling tensions across the wider region. The growing use of drones in the conflict has also become a major concern, significantly increasing the risks to civilians.

In light of these developments, AUPSC members may welcome the renewed momentum behind the African-led mediation efforts. Since the beginning of this year, the Panel has been active in raising its profile and strengthening coordination with international partners. On the sidelines of the AU Summit in February, Panel members held consultations with the AU Commission, during which the Commission’s role in anchoring the Independent Joint Secretariat supporting the African-led mediation architecture was reaffirmed.

On 7 and 8 June, the Panel held a high-level meeting in Lomé, Togo, with the participation of other partners, as part of its semi-annual review of progress in the African-led mediation efforts. The communiqué adopted at the conclusion of the meeting reaffirmed the centrality of the AU’s role in the ongoing mediation, while underscoring the need to strengthen synergies and complementarity with other processes aimed at resolving the crisis in eastern DRC. This was followed by a high-level harmonisation meeting of the AU Panel of Facilitators and the Independent Joint Secretariat, held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 24 to 26 July. A key outcome was the development of a six-month strategic roadmap and action plan outlining the Panel’s core objectives and priorities in support of a negotiated solution to the crisis in eastern DRC.

In this regard, the Panel’s strategic objective appears to be to ‘consolidate coherent African political leadership of the eastern DRC peace process and deliver measurable de-escalation by promoting alignment and complementarity among the AU-led architecture, the Washington process and the Doha process; advancing the broader regional, national and community-level dimensions of the conflict; and supporting coordinated implementation consistent with Congolese ownership, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and relevant AU decisions’.

In line with this strategic objective, the panel intends to focus on five key priority areas:

supporting coherence and implementation in relation to the Washington and Doha tracks under the auspices of the US and Qatar, respectively;
advancing community-level reconciliation and structured engagement with prioritised armed-group interlocutors;
supporting a broader regional political and security dialogue extending beyond the bilateral DRC-Rwanda dimension;
advocating for strengthened humanitarian action and the meaningful participation of women and youth; and
promoting cooperative and transparent governance of natural resources to reduce conflict incentives, address illicit mineral flows, disrupt armed-group financing and support sustainable regional development.

It appears that the panel has organised itself along five workstreams to implement these priorities.

The Military and Security workstream, which supports ceasefire implementation, verification and compliance monitoring;
Engagement with armed groups and community reconciliation, which connects national and regional political processes with locally identified grievances, security concerns and entry points for social cohesion;
The Humanitarian workstream, which prioritises humanitarian access, civilian protection and durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons;
The Regional Economic Cooperation workstream, which advances regional cooperation and responsible natural resource governance, including through the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) agreed within the framework of the Washington Accords signed between DRC and Rwanda in December 2025; and
The meaningful participation of women, youth, faith-based organisations and community leaders, which is a cross-cutting requirement across all workstreams.

Panel members have already undertaken various initiatives over the past several months to advance the African-led mediation efforts. According to the Secretary-General’s latest report on the Great Lakes, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has been working to build consensus around convening a high-level summit aimed at restoring confidence among the parties. Former Botswana President Mokgweetsi Masisi convened a meeting on economic integration and natural resources in April to promote private-sector engagement. In June, former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde engaged the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes to mobilise support for the AU-led mediation efforts. Meanwhile, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta developed options for engaging armed groups not yet covered by the ongoing peace processes.

The Panel members also undertook a regional tour that had been delayed due to the Ebola outbreak. On 5 October, they visited Goma, the capital of North Kivu, where, according to a 9 October AU press statement, they held a series of meetings with representatives of the M23; the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), which is based in the city; and UN and other international partners operating on the ground. The EJVM was established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in 2012, while the EJVM+ is being operationalised as a key component of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM), agreed upon by the Congolese government and the M23 under the Doha process.

The Panel members subsequently visited Kigali on 7 October, where they met with Rwandan officials, including President Paul Kagame. On 10 October, they travelled to Kinshasa, where they met with Congolese officials, including President Félix Tshisekedi, as well as civil society representatives. At tomorrow’s meeting, the Panel members are expected to brief AUPSC members on these engagements and seek their continued support for the African-led mediation efforts. AUPSC members discussed the situation in eastern DRC with their Security Council counterparts during their annual consultations, held on 23 October in New York. There appears to be broad support for the ongoing mediation efforts across multiple tracks. The key challenge, however, remains translating commitments made by the parties through these processes into concrete action to silence the guns in eastern DRC.

The expected outcome of the session is the adoption of a communiqué. The PSC is expected to strongly condemn the escalation of violence and the growing use of drones in the conflict. The PSC may call on all parties to the conflict to respect their commitments under the existing agreements and translate them into concrete actions towards the cessation of hostilities and de-escalation. It may further emphasise the imperative of ensuring the effective implementation of the agreed ceasefire arrangements, including through verification and compliance monitoring mechanisms. With respect to the African-led mediation, the PSC may welcome the renewed momentum behind the work of the AU Mediator and the Panel of Facilitators, including their recent engagements in Goma, Kigali and Kinshasa, and reaffirm the centrality of AU leadership in advancing a coherent and coordinated peace process. In this context, it may call on the AU Commission to continue anchoring the Independent Joint Secretariat and encourage closer coordination between the AU-led mediation architecture and the Washington and Doha processes, with a view to ensuring complementarity and supporting the implementation of commitments made under the respective tracks. The PSC may also express support for the implementation of the Panel’s six-month strategic roadmap and action plan, particularly in advancing community-level reconciliation, engaging armed groups not adequately covered by existing processes, and promoting broader regional political and security dialogue beyond the bilateral DRC–Rwanda dimension. Furthermore, the PSC may emphasise the importance of strengthening humanitarian access and civilian protection, promoting the meaningful participation of women and youth, and addressing the conflict-related drivers associated with illicit mineral flows and the financing of armed groups through responsible natural resource governance and regional economic cooperation. It may also encourage sustained engagement with regional actors, international partners and local communities to consolidate confidence among the parties and reinforce Congolese ownership of the peace process.

by Amani Africa

The 20th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNSC

The 20^th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNSC

Date | 22 October 2026

Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 20^th annual joint consultative meeting in New York, covering four agenda items: identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, and the situations in Sudan, South Sudan and eastern DRC.

The Consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, and Aghi Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN and UNSC President for October. Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, are expected to deliver remarks during the meeting.

On the situation in Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia will co-lead the PSC, while Liberia, Russia, Panama and Pakistan will lead from the UNSC side.

Discussions are expected to build on recent engagements, including the UNSC’s open briefing and closed consultations on 16 October and the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum. The PSC may share its observations on the widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis, while discussions are likely to focus on diplomatic initiatives and coordination among mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.

The Councils may also welcome the first joint high-level meeting of the Quad and Quintet on 23 September. A follow-up meeting scheduled for 20–21 October in Switzerland aims to coordinate ceasefire efforts and preparations for political transition. The consultative meeting therefore offers an opportunity to assess progress towards a ceasefire and an inclusive political process leading to civilian rule.

On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, the Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and criticised the statement of the AU Commission, warning that a political process under military control without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division.

External involvement in the conflict may also feature prominently. The September 2026 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. At its 1218^th session in June 2024, the PSC also tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions with identifying external actors supporting the warring parties and proposing measures to contain their involvement. The Councils may therefore explore closer coordination between the PSC’s Sub-Committee and the UNSC Sudan Sanctions Committee to address external support networks undermining peace efforts.

On identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, Uganda and Nigeria will represent the PSC, while Somalia and the United Kingdom will co-lead from the UNSC.

The discussions come ahead of the UNSC’s consideration of the mission’s mandate renewal in December, which provides the two Councils to exchange views on the future of the mission. Since commencing operations in January 2025, AUSSOM has faced severe financial constraints, having deployed without predictable and sustainable funding. The AU has consistently advocated applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM as its first test case, considering it the most viable framework for securing adequate, predictable and sustainable financing. However, the United States has strongly opposed this approach. It is to be recalled that the application of Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM was one of the most contentious issues at last year’s consultative meeting.

The financial crisis has been compounded by the US announcement in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires on 31 December 2026. UNSOS provides essential logistical support, including fuel, rations, medical and casualty evacuation, aviation, communications and reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment. (For further analysis of the financial and logistical challenges facing AUSSOM and their implications for the future of the mission, see here and here.)

Against this backdrop, the second Extraordinary Summit of AUSSOM Troop-Contributing Countries and Somalia, held in Kampala on 31 July, called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UNSC to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. This would facilitate agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated foreign ministers of troop-contributing countries, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.

Given the financial and logistical challenges, sustaining AUSSOM until its envisaged exit in 2029 appears increasingly difficult. Yet an abrupt withdrawal risks reversing security gains, underscoring the need for a realistic, well-supported transition. With little prospect of reversing US opposition to applying Resolution 2719, discussions may shift toward interim support arrangements and an orderly, coordinated and phased drawdown.

On the situation in eastern DRC, Gabon, Cameroon and Sierra Leone will represent the PSC, while DRC, France and China will co-lead from the UNSC.

The Councils are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across mediation tracks. The UNSC received briefings on DRC and MONUSCO on 29 September and the Great Lakes region on 13 October, while the PSC is scheduled to hear from AU facilitators on 27 October. Attention may focus on the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ October shuttle diplomacy, involving meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October to advance existing peace commitments.

Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including establishing its secretariat and conducting reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. A trilateral planning conference involving DRC, Rwanda and the US was envisaged for October.

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire. During his October UNSC briefing, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes highlighted persistent hostilities, increasing use of armed drones and civilian suffering. He also warned about the spread of Ebola and continued regional distrust, reflected in tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa and between Kinshasa and Burundi. Another significant development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition under former President Joseph Kabila, potentially further complicating the situation.

The main question for the Councils will be whether diplomatic progress is translating into reduced hostilities and tangible improvements on the ground. Discussions may therefore emphasise coordination among the AU-led, Doha and Washington processes, effective implementation and verification of commitments, and avoiding fragmented mediation efforts that could undermine a durable political settlement.

On the situation in South Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda and DRC will co-lead from the PSC, while the United States, Denmark, Latvia, Bahrain and Colombia will represent the UNSC.

Discussions are expected to focus on the elections scheduled for 22 December 2026 and the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The UNSC will consider South Sudan in November, while the PSC last addressed the situation at its 1364^th session on 26 August. Despite serious political, security, operational and financial obstacles to credible elections, the PSC reiterated that the transitional mandate ‘must conclusively end in February 2027 without further extension’. Although it decided to hold a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October, it does not appear in its October Programme of Work, missing an opportunity to receive the latest updates on electoral preparations and consider appropriate preventive measures.

The AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) has recently intensified its engagement, including the July visit to Juba and virtual C5 Plus summits in February and on 29 September. The Councils may therefore draw on the PSC’s 1364^th session, the AU Pre-Election Assessment Mission held in August and the latest C5 Plus Declaration.

One of the main questions facing the consultative meeting will be whether prevailing conditions allow credible elections without further exacerbating political tensions and insecurity. The government appears determined to proceed with polls in December. In July, President Salva Kiir signed constitutional amendments delinking permanent constitution-making and the national census from elections. In September, he unilaterally dissolved the transitional unity government, including the national legislature and state governments, removed five Vice-Presidents and appointed a caretaker administration accountable only to him and operating outside the R-ARCSS.

Against this backdrop, the 29 September C5 Plus Declaration acknowledged electoral preparations but stressed outstanding political, technical, operational, financial, legal and security requirements for peaceful, credible, inclusive and transparent elections. It also called for urgent confidence-building measures, including considering the release of political detainees, particularly Dr Riek Machar, to promote national cohesion and reconciliation.

Importantly, the Declaration requested the AU Commission, in consultation with IGAD and the UN, to establish a joint AU–IGAD–UN task force under C5 auspices. Working closely with the AU High Representative, the task force would support preventive diplomacy, strengthen coordination, monitor implementation of agreed measures, and provide political oversight and strategic guidance to support South Sudanese ownership of the peace process and the electoral transition. Given the heightened risk of violence, the two Councils may reiterate and follow up on the operationalisation of this mechanism as a practical avenue for coordinated preventive diplomacy for facilitating inclusive agreement on the convening of the elections, including on the timing and conditions of the elections.

It remains uncertain whether the two Councils will adopt a joint communiqué, having failed to do so last year due to disagreements over several contentious issues (for details, see Amani Africa’s Monthly Digest on the AUPSC for October 2025). Instead, the meeting concluded with a joint press statement. For this year’s meeting, the UNSC, as host, has initiated a relatively shorter draft joint communiqué. The PSC travelled from Addis Ababa to New York on 17 October, with negotiations on the draft scheduled for 19–20 October. If the Councils fail to agree even on the shorter draft, they may once again settle for a joint press statement.

by Amani Africa