Amani Africa short briefing on the Summit of the Future
Amani Africa short briefing on the Summit of the Future
Amani Africa Exec Director, Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso briefed the diplomatic community on key highlights of the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel Report during a reception held in recognition of the Summit of the Future by H.E. Mr Parfait Onanga-Anyanga on 17 September 2024.
The Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa: Bridging Gaps Between Policy and Practice
The Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa: Bridging Gaps Between Policy and Practice
Date | 1 October 2024
Tomorrow (2 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1234th meeting to deliberate on the theme ‘Peace, Security and Development nexus in Africa: Bridging the gaps between policy and practice’.
There will be opening statements from Mohamed Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and PSC Chairperson October 2024, and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Ashraf Sweilam, Assistant Foreign Minister for African Multilateral Organisations is expected to make a remark. The session will also hear from Ahmed Abdel-Latif, Director General of the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding and Executive Director of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development; Nardos Bekele-Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, African Union Development Agency; Kanayo Awani, Executive Vice-President, Intra-African Trade Bank, African Import-Export Bank; and Libakiso Matlho, Executive Secretary, African Union Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction.
The various peace and security issues on the continent are linked to development issues in more ways than one. As enunciated in the Constitutive Act of the AU, on the one hand ‘the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent.’ On the other hand, promoting peace, security and stability is ‘a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.’ Buttressing this interlinkage between peace and security and development, the World Bank reported that a civil war costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crises can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty. It further estimates that by 2030, up to two-thirds of the world’s extremely poor may live in fragile and violent conflict settings.
This is one of the thematic issues that featured on the agenda of the PSC on several occasions. The first time the PSC had a session dedicated to this theme was at its 883rd meeting whereby the PSC, in the communiqué it adopted, underscored ‘the importance of giving due consideration to the interdependence between peace, security and development, in order to ensure the effectiveness of all efforts aimed at conflict prevention, peacekeeping and the consolidation of peace in Africa.’ It also requested the AU Commission Chairperson to submit an annual report on the measures taken towards enhancing collaboration and coordination between departments within the AU Commission and AU Specialised Agencies on account of its recognition of the interdependent nature of peace, security and development. This theme was also featured during the 975th meeting of the PSC.
Subsequently, the PSC held the Tangier Conference from 25 to 27 October 2022 in collaboration with four key partners in the development arena: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). It is to be recalled that, the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held on 18 and 19 February 2023, through Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.842(XXXVI) ‘Endorsed the Declaration of the First African Union Policy Conference on Promoting the Peace, Security and Development nexus in Africa – The Promise of Regional Integration adopted in Tangier, Kingdom of Morocco, in October 2022; and urged the AU Commission to implement its conclusions; in this regard, called on the partners of the Tangier process to scale up support for the implementation of the nexus projects.’
A major challenge for the peace, security and development nexus is the persistent divide between the peace and security and the development dimensions. As pointed out in the edition of Insights on the PSC on the Monthly Programme of Work for October, despite wide recognition at a normative level of the need for aligning peace and security policy action and development policy action as reflected in various meetings the PSC held on this theme, this is not translated into practice owing to various factors. These factors include, as outlined in our Special Research Report, ‘The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response?’ (EN and FR), the inertia of existing practice in peace and security policy-making with its focus on peace and security tools, gaps in expertise, divergent working methods and lack of interaction between peace and security policymakers and those engaged in development policy making.
These persisting challenges to the nexus question require changes both at policy and operational levels. In a presentation of Amani Africa during a joint African Union and Aswan Forum workshop on the operationalisation of the humanitarian, peace and development nexus held on 1 December 2023, the dimensions of change to which reference was made include: a) a multidimensional analytical approach that goes beyond the narrow focus on peace and security indices; b) joint strategy that integrates the peace and security and development dimensions for informing peace and security policy making and development policy making; c) intervention programming by either peace and security or development actors informed by joint analysis and strategy; d) a joint forum of peace and security and development policy makers for regular dialogue and exchange as vehicle for strategic coherence and operational coordination critical for leveraging the comparative advantage of both dimensions; and e) creating space for enlisting inputs and contribution from each other in each other’s decision-making process for advancing complementarity. Also, of significance is exploring avenues to build synergies between existing continental, regional and national frameworks for the operationalisation of the Peace, Security and Development Nexus.
At its 1055th session held at the ministerial level, the PSC specifically called for ‘collaboration between the AU Commission, AUDA-NEPAD, African Development Bank and the broader international community to overcome socio-economic challenges and address human security.’ A major development in this respect was the launch of the AUDA-NEPAD Programme on Socio-economic development in post-conflict states. Bekele-Thomas is expected to flag this in her intervention. The establishment of the Africa Facility for Supporting Inclusive Transition (AFSIT) in collaboration with the UNDP is another practical example of translating the issue of nexus from policy discussion to policy practice.
Tomorrow’s meeting provides the Council with an opportunity to discuss the progress AFSIT has made in advancing the nexus issue in practical terms and the support rendered within that context to targeted member states of the AU. Additionally, the PSC may also draw on the aspect of the Tangier’s conference declaration which, along with the AU Assembly Decision (Assembly/AU/Dec. 817(XXXV)), called for a financial instrument designed to mobilise scalable and flexible resources via a Security-Indexed Investment Bonds to address the root causes of insecurity, enhance the capacity of formal institutions, and rehabilitate communities and infrastructure adversely affected by insecurity. This initiative is expected to be carried out via the Africa Development Bank. A recent development worth addressing by the Council is the signing of an MoU between the African Development Bank and partners to scale up support for the Security-Indexed Investment Bonds and the implication it might have for mobilising resources for programmes related to peace, security and development.
The session is expected to also draw on insights from the 4th Aswan Forum conclusions. In this respect issues that may be highlighted, in the intervention of Abdel-Latif, include the connection highlighted in the conclusion between the reform of international financial institutions and peace and security, the emphasis it put on the need for focusing on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the work of the PSC including through leveraging the role of peacebuilding bodies, the adoption of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach and promotion of the role of trade and investment in unlocking Africa’s economic potential and in advancing sustainable peace and development.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate the importance of giving due consideration to the interdependence between peace, security and development, in order to ensure the effectiveness of all efforts aimed at conflict prevention, peacekeeping and the consolidation of peace in Africa. In terms of bridging the gap between policy and practice, the PSC may call for the establishment of a forum that brings together peace and security policy actors and development policymakers in Africa for mainstreaming the nexus lens in respective processes and policy action. The PSC may also call for the need for adopting a multidimensional analytical approach that leverages the peace and security-specific analysis and the development lens. It may also underscore the need for integrating the development in the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to silence the guns in Africa. It may also call for the activation of its call from the 883rd session on the AU Commission Chairperson to submit an annual report on the measures taken towards enhancing collaboration and coordination between departments within the AU Commission and AU Specialised Agencies on account of its recognition of the interdependent nature of peace, security and development. The PSC may also underscore the need for leveraging the PCRD policy as an instrument for mainstreaming nexus particularly in deploying peacebuilding and post-conflict development interventions.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for October 2024
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for October 2024
Date | October 2024
In October, the Arab Republic of Egypt will chair the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the Month, prepared under Egypt’s lead as incoming Chairperson, outlines nine substantive sessions, with all but one session focusing on thematic issues. Three of the sessions will be conducted virtually, while the remaining six will be held in person. In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC will undertake field missions to Cairo and Port Sudan. The PSC will also travel to New York for the rotating annual consultative meeting between itself and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The month will commence with a four-day visit to Cairo and Port Sudan. The visit involves a half-day joint consultation meeting between the League of Arab States and the PSC. The last such consultation between the two bodies was held in 2010. This planned meeting aims to reactivate the consultative meeting between the two sides and discuss and agree on the periodicity and method of work of the consultation between the two sides. Substantively, it is envisaged that the consultation between the two sides would focus on matters common to the agenda of both sides notably Libya, Somalia and Sudan.
On 2-3 October, the PSC will conduct two additional engagements in Cairo. The first is a meeting on the peace, security and development nexus. On 2 October, the PSC will convene a session on this theme that will be held in person in Cairo. Held in the context of the 20th anniversary of the PSC, this session presents an opportunity for high-level dialogue and deliberation among members of the PSC and other key stakeholders on how to overcome the gap between existing policy ambition and the actual realities of policy practice about the peace, security and development nexus. As gathered during a consultation with the Chairperson, the session will be anchored on the Aswan Forum outcome document from the recent Aswan Forum held in August 2024 in Cairo, Egypt in which representatives of PSC participated.
Despite wide recognition at a normative level of the need for aligning peace and security policy action and development policy action as reflected in various meetings the PSC held on this theme, this is not translated into practice owing to various factors including, as outlined in our Special Research Report (EN and FR), the inertia of existing practice in peace and security policy making with its focus on peace and security tools, divergent working methods and lack of interaction between peace and security policymakers and those engaged in development policy making.
The second engagement will mark the inauguration of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre. Following the revised PCRD policy that was endorsed at the 37th AU Summit in February 2024, this launch marks a further step in revamping AU’s PCRD policy and institutional infrastructure. It is worth noting in this regard that the PPoW of the PSC for October envisages that the PSC is expected to initiate the launch of its Sub-Committee on PCRD. Following the inauguration of the PCRD Centre, the PSC will visit the police training academy, which serves as one of the platforms for the training of police personnel for countries contributing police capabilities to peacekeeping operations.
On 3 October, the PSC will also undertake a daytime field visit to Port Sudan. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1209th PSC meeting in April of this year (and in other sessions on Sudan), expressed its desire to undertake a field mission to Port Sudan. However, this plan to visit Sudan is tied essentially to the country’s conflict situation following the outbreak of the civil war in April 2023. This visit also comes ahead of a possible visit by the UNSC to Port Sudan under the presidency of the UK in November and prior to the annual joint PSC-UNSC consultation where Sudan will feature as one of the agenda items of the consultation.
Even outside of the PSC’s decision for a field mission in relation to the war, the field mission to Port Sudan did not come as a surprise. It is a manifestation of a recent trend in the PSC for direct engagement with transitional authorities of countries suspended from the AU for unconstitutional change of government following military usurpation of power. A case in point is the PSC engagement with the leader of the military junta in Gabon as part of its field mission to Gabon during 12-14 September 2024. This approach marks a break from the established approach whereby the PSC informs its engagement on the transitional process in such countries through the AU Commission and the mechanisms put in place for such purposes by the Commission on the direction of the PSC, such as a special envoy. While this change from the established practice brings the PSC the benefit of gaging the political dynamics on the ground first-hand, it has the risk of affecting the PSC’s role in crafting its policy actions in relation to the situations it covers with a level of dispassion necessary for it to treat situations it deals with consistently and impartially. Considering the complaints from the Sovereign Council about Sudan’s suspension from the AU following the 25 October 2021 ouster from power of the civilian government by the military, the issue of the lifting of Sudan’s suspension is anticipated to feature during PSC’s engagement with the leadership of the Sovereign Council, which is the internationally recognised authority that conducts the international relations of Sudan. It is believed that this may entail a discussion on a roadmap towards the lifting of the suspension of Sudan from the AU.
On 8 October, the PSC is envisaged to initiate the launch of its Sub-Committee on PCRD. It is accordingly due to consider the adoption the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the Sub-Committee. The membership of the Sub-Committee is envisaged to be the same as that of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC.
The PSC will hold a virtual session on 9 October to consider of the AU Commission’s annual report on combating terrorism in Africa. At its 1182nd meeting in October 2022, the PSC in the communiqué it adopted following the consideration of the Chairperson’s report advocated for enhanced financial and military support for the Union’s counter-terrorism institutions. While there has not been any major initiative by the AU during the year, the escalation and expansion of the threat of terrorism on the continent is not showing any sign of abating. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2024 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the epicentre of global terrorism has shifted from the Middle East to Africa’s Central Sahel region. By the end of 2023, data from the Africa Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), now known as the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), revealed a 99% increase in terrorist attacks and a 53% rise in terrorism-related deaths compared to the previous year.
In preparation for the 9th informal seminar and the 18th joint annual consultative meeting, the CoE of the PSC will travel to New York on 13 October. They will have various engagements including with the UNSC Working Group, to work on the drafting of the joint communiqué. In the context of the PSC’s visit to New York and preparations for the annual joint consultative meeting, the PSC is expected to hold meetings with the African three members of the UNSC plus (A3 plus). It is also envisaged that the PSC will consult with the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This is expected to serve as an opportunity for projecting the voice of the PSC and the AU based on the newly revised PCRD policy ahead of the 2025 review of UN peacebuilding. The PSC will also participate in an outreach activity that involves a lecture to be delivered at Yale University.
Ahead of the joint consultative meeting, the 9th informal seminar will be held. As per the practice, the agenda of the informal seminar is limited to thematic issues. This year’s informal seminar is expected to feature the following themes: working methods (which may cover discussion on how to follow up on the joint communiqué in between the annual consultative meeting, the outstanding issue of joint field missions or coordination around joint field missions considering the risk of divergent messaging particularly when the PSC and the UNSC undertake field mission to the same place as happened in the context of their mission to DRC only less than two weeks apart), climate, peace and development, implementation of Resolution 2719, youth, peace and security, women, peace and security and Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (CAAC). As far as the working methods issue is concerned, the two sides may consider enhancing the reference value of the joint communiqué to start their annual consultative meeting by a systematic review of the last joint communiqué, thereby ensuring that their engagement builds on the previous consultation rather than starting from a clean slate every year.
The 18th annual joint consultative meeting follows the informal seminar. During the consultative meeting, the UNSC and the PSC are expected to focus on country/region-specific conflict situations and peace and security dynamics. This year, the agenda of the consultative meeting would accordingly cover Sudan, Somalia, West Africa/Sahel and countering terrorism and violent extremism.
On 22 October, the PSC is expected to have the first engagement with the Permanente Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Budget and General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM). This session will focus on the financing of AU peace and security work including funding of peace support operations and the activities of the PSC. The goal of these discussions is to create synergy between financial resources and the peace and security initiatives undertaken by the AU. As the Chairperson indicated, there are working methods and legal issues that need to be clarified in terms of the PSC as a policy organ engaging a PRC sub-committee. This is an important issue considering that at times the PSC engages with entities that are not in terms of legal standing at par with its policy-making status, as it does, for example, with the PRC Sub-Committee on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights.
The PSC will hold a session on 23 October for the consideration of the reports on its missions to Cairo and Port Sudan.
On 25 October, the Council will have a virtual session to receive an update on the situation in Somalia and post-ATMIS arrangements with a specific focus on the preservation of State Institutions. Key developments influencing this discussion include the UNSC meeting scheduled for 11 October, the Secretary-General’s engagement with the AU Commission chair on 21 October, as well as the SG’s report on ATMIS/Somalia, based on consultations with the AUC chair, which will be submitted to the UNSC on 15 November. The session is unlikely to cover the ATMIS drawdown, as consultations between the AUC and the FGS are still ongoing.
During the last week of the month, the Council will engage in three thematic sessions. On 29 October, the PSC will receive an ICRC briefing on the humanitarian situation in Africa. The following day, 30 October, the PSC will hold an open session on Women, Peace and Security in the context of the annual Resolution 1325 anniversary.
Lastly, on 31 October, the Council is scheduled to convene a session on Climate Change, Peace and Security where it will address the consultations undertaken by the AU Commission on the Common African Position which took place in August in Nairobi, Kenya. Over the three days, participants worked to improve the draft Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace, and Security (CAP-CCPS). They offered key recommendations for its enhancement and developed a revised draft intended for submission to the PSC for consideration and potential adoption.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2024
Date | August 2024
In August, the Republic of Botswana chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). During the month, the Council planned to conduct four substantive sessions. Of the four sessions, one was dedicated to addressing country-specific situations. The remaining three sessions, along with the informal consultation, focused on thematic matters. During the month, all the sessions were held at the ambassadorial level.
Towards a New Agenda for Peace and Security in Africa: New Security Threats and the Future of the Peace and Security Council
Amani Africa
25 September 2024
WHY THIS REPORT MATTERS?
This special research report seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of the PSC and AU’s peace and security instruments in the context of Africa’s evolving security landscape. It will highlight some of the key emerging security threats in Africa and their implications to the existing AU Peace and Security Architecture. The report will then propose adjustments in tools, approaches, and processes to ensure that the AU/PSC and its security architecture remain relevant and fit for purpose in the face of new and emerging security threat and changing geopolitical dynamics both continentally and globally.
New Security Threats in Africa and the Future of the PSC
New Security Threats in Africa and the Future of the PSC
Date | 24 September 2024
Tomorrow (25 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1233rd session in New York, on the margins of the 79th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This ministerial-level meeting will address the theme ‘New Security Threats in Africa and the Future of the PSC’, as one of two agenda items.
Lejeune Mbellla Mbella, Minister of External Relations of Cameroon and PSC Chairperson for September, will preside over the session. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission is scheduled to deliver opening remarks, with Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security expected to provide an overview on the theme of this particular agenda. It is also envisaged that a representative of the UN will make a statement.
As a theme crafted as part of the 20-year anniversary of the PSC, tomorrow’s session builds on the discussions from the high-level colloquium held on 25 May 2024 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to mark the 20th anniversary of the PSC. It is to be recalled that this event, chaired by Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan, culminated in the adoption of the Dar es Salaam Declaration, which outlined key peace and security challenges facing the continent and proposed actions to address them. According to the concept note, the objective of tomorrow’s session is to ‘exchange views on the future of the PSC,’ ‘to re-commit to bolstering intervention in all the countries in conflict and collectively explore policy approaches for proactively addressing emerging complex threats.’
Twenty years after its operationalisation, the PSC is facing a new wave of security threats, while older challenges such as inter-state tensions, military coups, and internal armed conflicts are resurfacing with renewed intensity. Africa, particularly the Sahel region, has become a global epicentre of terrorism, witnessing not only a surge in attacks and fatalities but also an alarming geographic expansion of extremist activities. Meanwhile, emerging security threats—from new technologies and pandemics to climate change and increased foreign interference in African conflicts—are reshaping the security landscape, posing serious challenges to a peace and security architecture originally designed to address issues like civil wars and inter-state conflicts.
The prominence of new security dynamics in Africa poses significant challenges to the PSC and its peace and security architecture. Africa’s security landscape has evolved dramatically since the establishment of the AU and the creation of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 20 years ago. Initially, inter-state conflicts and civil wars dominated, with little anticipation of asymmetric warfare involving terrorist groups becoming primary security concerns. Consequently, many AU tools, like those of the United Nations, such as mediation and peace support operations, were primarily tailored for addressing civil war scenarios. Notably, the current framework for the deployment of the African Standby Force (ASF), a key element of APSA designed for rapid crisis response across the continent, did not envisage non-conventional and asymmetric warfare involving terrorist groups as the main target of its development and preparations for deployment.
The rise of asymmetric warfare, coupled with the lack of preparedness of APSA structures for a speedy response to the emergence of such threats as the major conditions undermining peace and security in Africa and the resultant vacuum this produced, have led to the emergence of ‘improvised’ security responses, characterised by the proliferation of ad hoc security arrangements and regional deployments such as MNJTF, G5 Sahel Joint Force, SAMIM, and SAMIDRC. This growing reliance on ad hoc security arrangements has led to the increasing marginalisation of the AU and the PSC. Additionally, it also risks fragmenting the collective security system anchored on the APSA, as more peace operations are undertaken outside, and without the application, of the APSA norms and policies.
Other security threats such as emerging technologies, public health emergencies, and climate change, also present unchartered challenges that existing continental security frameworks or peace and security tools struggle to address. The current security architectures are ill-equipped to manage or keep pace with such complex, rapidly evolving threats.
Meanwhile, the rise of geopolitical rivalries on the international stage has intensified foreign involvement by both old and emerging powers in conflicts in Africa, further complicating their resolution. This growing interference by foreign powers is not only shaping conflict dynamics and political behaviour but also undermining the agency of regional and continental policymakers in addressing conflicts and political crises.
These changing dynamics demand that the AU’s peace and security architecture adapt to remain relevant and fit for purpose. While instruments like the PSC Protocol and the AU Constitutive Act may not be perfect, effective responses to these new security threats in Africa neither depends on nor requires perfecting them. As the experience of the UN with respect to the UN Charter illustrates, the focus should be on updating and adapting the existing peace and security tools, approaches and processes as well as harnessing the role of development, financial and technological instruments to make them fit for the continent’s emerging realities and challenges.
Tomorrow’s session presents the opportunity for PSC Members to deliberate on the necessary shifts in light of the changing security dynamics and their implications for the APSA.
One key area for reflection is the need to prioritise conflict prevention over conflict management and resolution. Despite the cost-effectiveness of prevention and the emphasis on its prevention mandate in the PSC Protocol, the PSC has often taken a reactive approach, engaging in crisis management only after situations have escalated into full-blown security crises. While the rhetoric and normative recognition of the importance of conflict prevention are well established, the PSC’s actions have not consistently reflected this commitment. Its track record in anticipating and preventing crises before they fully erupt leaves much to be desired. The continental early warning system should be strengthened by addressing the technical, operational and political limitations, including through the restoration of a dedicated division for conflict prevention and early warning and bridging the gap between early warning and early response.
In light of the deteriorating security situation in Africa, coupled with the rising global geopolitical tension and a weakened multilateral system, AU should also reinvigorate its robust diplomacy as the primary tool for maintaining the continent’s security challenges and navigating complex political transitions. Apart from its role in reducing polarisation and establishing common ground between rival powers as highlighted in UN Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace, in the African context, the effective functioning of the PSC and the APSA and for the mobilisation of collective action for peace and security depend on mobilisation of consensus and the political will of member states for supporting such collective action. Reinvigorating diplomacy is a strategic imperative for the AU to contain the tide of these new and increasingly serious threats to peace and security. This requires the reaffirmation of the commitment of member states to AU instruments and to work collectively and for the AU Commission to enhance close working relationship with and the trust of member states on the basis of the obligations that member states assumed under AU instruments.
While the primacy of politics and diplomacy in addressing conflicts on the continent is imperative, Peace Support Operations (PSOs) involving peace enforcement mandate also remain key component of the AU’s conflict management toolkit. However, even in this context, there is a need to shift from a security-heavy approach to a comprehensive strategy that underpins the primacy of politics, particularly in addressing the scourge of terrorism in the continent. Over the years, a noticeable trend in the PSC approach to the surge in conflicts has been an increased emphasis on hard security measures. While security measures are undoubtedly critical in addressing the immediate threat posed by terrorists and in creating an enabling environment for non-military measures, it has become evident, as established in the Amani Africa report (EN & FR), that no amount of force alone will fundamentally alter the terrorism landscape in Africa. What is required is a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that moves beyond a security-first approach, placing greater emphasis on a human security-centered political strategy. This approach should address the structural causes of terrorism, such as marginalisation, governance deficits, and socioeconomic grievances. Equally important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation to facilitate the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters, alongside efforts to achieve political settlements that tackle the underlying conflict dynamics enabling the rise of terrorist groups.
Indeed, the evolving nature of conflicts and shifting peace and security dynamics in Africa call for a ‘reconceptualisation’ of the AU’s approach to PSOs. A key element of this shift involves viewing military operations as one part of a broader, comprehensive strategy that goes beyond purely military solutions and encompasses non-military approaches that address the root causes of conflict and violence. Given the complexity and fluidity of conflict situations on the continent, PSOs should also incorporate a combination of peace enforcement, stabilisation, and peacebuilding capacities with a clear exit strategy. These need to be complemented with the introduction of PCRD instruments including the expansion of legitimate local governance structures that deliver services and the use of livelihood support and development tools.
Regarding emerging technologies and climate change, it is imperative to develop a system within the continental early warning system to track and report risks and threats to peace and security posed by these emerging security threats to facilitate timely response. Strengthening institutional capacities, legal and policy frameworks, and enhancing collaboration with relevant stakeholders including Member States, RECs/RMs and international partners also remain important to mitigate security risks of emerging technologies. The rise in the impact of these unconventional security threats necessitates the introduction of new tools and approaches that emphasise non-security instruments including livelihood-supporting interventions, socio-economic and development instruments, adaptation measures as well as the systems and infrastructure as well as the institutional guardrails for containing the threat posed by new technology including AI.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to highlight the various emerging security threats and how they are changing the security dynamics in the continent and impacting AU’s peace and security architecture. In taking the agenda forward, the PSC may consider tasking the AU Commission, in collaboration with key stakeholders, to articulate a ‘New Agenda for Peace in Africa, drawing inspiration from the UN’s ‘New Agenda for Peace’. This initiative would take a comprehensive look at the evolving nature of security threats and shifting dynamics, identifying the necessary adjustments to the peace and security architecture in response to these challenges. Such a move would mark a significant step in advancing the role of the PSC and the APSA in view of these new security threats and changing peace and security environment.
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 24 September 2024
Tomorrow (25 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1233rd session at the ministerial level. Apart from the initial agenda for the ministerial session, the situation in Sudan has been added to the session’s agenda.
The session commences with the opening statement of the Minister of External Relations of the Republic of Cameroon and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of September 2024, Lejeune Mbella Mbella. AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, is expected to deliver a briefing. During the deliberation and following intervention from member states, the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan and AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, is slated to respond.
The last time the PSC discussed the situation in Sudan was during its 1228th session on 19 August 2024. Earlier in May, the PSC specifically addressed the situation in Darfur following the escalation of armed conflict and the imminent threat of violent capture of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In that session, the PSC expressed grave concern over the situation unfolding around El Fasher and reiterated the call of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for the parties to ‘return to the local truce that spared El Fasher from the worst of the fighting for a year, and to lift the current siege on the city that led to more atrocities and difficulties for civilians as well as to return to an expanded negation platform in Jeddah without delay.’ In addition, the PSC requested for the AU High-Level Panel to directly engage with the Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide, Adam Dieng to develop proposals on how to address ongoing atrocities and to prevent further escalation in Darfur, as well as to develop a plan for the protection of civilians. It also tasked the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to urgently investigate the human rights situation in El Fasher and other areas in Darfur and to report back to the Council.
What prompted the introduction of the situation in Sudan as a new agenda item of the PSC under the 1233rd session was the grave situation in North Darfur, particularly El Fasher. Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023 which led to the capturing of Darfur by the RSF following the spread of the war to Darfur, North Darfur’s capital city, El Sasher, remained to be the only city in Darfur that remained outside of RSF control. One of the factors for keeping this city outside RSF control was the truce that had been brokered by local authorities leading to the freezing of the fighters of warring parties where they are, with local armed groups committing to remain neutral.
Since the launch of an offensive by the RSF for capturing the city on 10 May 2024, El Fasher has become a sight of major fighting, with the RSF imposing a siege on the city. After some slowing down of the intensity of the fighting following mounting pressure from various quarters, including the statement the PSC issued on 21 May 2024, reports have emerged that large-scale fighting escalated in El Fasher city on 12 September.
Indicating RSF’s push for forcibly capturing the city, it was reported that the city faced a major multidirectional RSF attack from the northern, eastern, and southern directions. Despite the resistance of SAF and allied forces and their proclaimed success in repelling some attacks, a report confirmed that RSF has succeeded in breaching ‘SAF’s first layer of defensive berms on 19 September 2024.’ If the fighting is not halted and the RSF violently captures the city, it is feared that El Fasher will face the same fate that befell El Genina but with a much larger scale toll on the civilian population in the city particularly on the non-Arab communities and a large number of IDPs housed in the city.
El Fasher is home to over 2 million residents and IDPs from various parts of Darfur states. These include hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people at risk of famine, including in the Zamzam camp where famine has been confirmed. The escalation of violence in El Fasher following the renewed offensive by RSF has involved indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas and the perpetration of various atrocities. These include the bombing of residential areas and hospitals, leading to the destruction of the city’s five main hospitals and its only dialysis centre. Attacks on IDP camps, including the shelling of Abu Shouk and Al Salaam, have been reported.
Apart from the grave atrocities that the escalation of violence, prompted by the RSF offensive, exposes civilians particularly the non-Arab communities including those in IDP camps, the fighting will further aggravate the catastrophic famine condition confirmed by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC). On 1 August, the FRC determined that famine conditions were present in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) located near El Fasher, capital of North Darfur state, which houses approximately 500,000 people, and are expected to persist through October. The report noted that similar conditions are likely to prevail in other IDP sites in the El Fasher locality, notably in the Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps.
The recent upsurge in fighting has led to the death of civilians and the displacement of thousands of others. The ‘unprecedented large-scale combat operations’ in El-Fasher were reported to involve both the army and the RSF. The army’s resort to the use of indiscriminate air attacks has also resulted in civilian violence. According to one report, current levels of fighting ‘are likely to effectively reduce what is left of El Fasher to rubble.’
The atrocities that the renewed fighting in El Fasher occasioned and the risk of further atrocities have prompted heightened levels of grave concern about the situation. The Secretary General of the UN issued a statement expressing grave alarm about reports of a full-scale assault on El Fasher by the RSF. Similarly, on 20 September, the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide expressed grave concern. The Special Advisor in particular observed ‘[t]he recent escalation of hostilities has unleashed a maelstrom of violence that threatens to consume everything in its path, leaving a trail of devastation and despair in its wake.’
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its grave concern about the fighting in El Fasher and the violations of IHL and human rights laws being perpetrated by the warring parties. The PSC may condemn indiscriminate shelling by the RSF and the bombings by the SAF that led to death and destruction in parts of the city. It may remind the parties that they bear responsibility for all acts of violence and will be held criminally accountable. It may underscore that civilian infrastructure including hospitals and IDP camps are protected by IHL and human rights law from being attacked and urge the parties to desist from the deplorable acts of targeting hospitals and IDP camps. The PSC may demand the RSF to immediately cease its attacks and the siege it laid on the city of El Fasher as a pre-requisite for enabling lifesaving humanitarian assistance for people facing famine in El Fasher and its environs and preventing the perpetration of further mass atrocities and the destruction of the city. The PSC may underscore the imperative for a return to the local truce that spared El Fasher from heavy fighting, thereby protecting the more than 2 million civilians including the hundreds of thousands of IDPs sheltered in the city. The PSC may reiterate the call from its 21 May 2024 statement for ‘the warring parties to ensure humanitarian access to the population in need, in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.’ It may also reiterate its call for investigations into the various acts of violence perpetrated in and around El Fasher. Considering the dire state of the situation and the urgency of protection of civilians, the PSC may call for the urgent establishment of a civilian protection mechanism taking the form of non-military monitors who promote measures for reinstating the local truce and facilitating, in coordination with local communities, activities that ameliorate the suffering of the civilian population and promote humanitarian access, pending the deployment of a civilian protection force as soon as conditions allow.
The Summit of the Future through the independent Africa high-level panel report
The Summit of the Future through the independent Africa high-level panel report
Date | 20 September 2024
The Summit of the Future will be held in a matter of two days on 22 and 23 September. Billed by the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres as a ‘once in a lifetime opportunity for reinvigorating multilateralism’, the Summit will bring together world leaders to the UN Headquarters in New York to deliberate and agree on measures for the reform of the multilateral system.
Diplomats of UN member states are busy with final negotiations, co-facilitated by Namibia and Germany, on the Pact of the Future that outlines the set of multilateral reform measures to be adopted by consensus by the 193 member states of the UN.
Despite the understandable question that the current state of diplomacy in the UN invites about whether this is a propitious moment for the summit, Guterres’s challenge to the international community and the negotiations over the Pact have prompted active policy discourse involving both state and non-state stakeholders. In Africa, the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel of Experts emerged as a unique platform for harnessing the expertise and knowledge of the diverse group of African experts for articulating a vision of reform of the multilateral system that Africa envisions and the world needs and deserves in the context of the Summit and beyond.
The report of the Panel largely shares the assessment of the Guterres about the state of the multilateral system. The analysis of the factors that make reform of multilateralism an existential imperative for people and planate affirm is detailed under a chapter titled ‘reform or rapture,’ echoing the stark statement of Guterres from September 2023 that ‘…global governance is stuck in time…it is reform or rapture.’
The report observed that the multilateral system is not only structurally flawed and operationally biased (as illustrated by the non-representation and/or under-representation of Africa in key multilateral decision-making structures) but it also has become outdated and unfit for dealing with the changes and emerging challenges facing the world. It thus underscores the need both for addressing the structural and operational flaws of the multilateral system and making it fit for the purpose of responding to the realities of the multipolar world. Deeming such reform to be a matter of existential imperative and strategic necessity, it outlines the proposed reform measures that also seek to ‘future-proof’ the multilateral system from the emerging large-scale and intersecting challenges.
One of the unique features of the Africa high-level Panel’s report is its insistence that the process of the reform of the multilateral system has to be anchored on what it calls ‘irreducible principles’. Underscoring the importance attached to these principles (drawn from the UN Charter and international law), the report dedicated a chapter in which the elements of these principles are clarified. One gap in the Summit that this highlights is the absence of an explicit statement of the principles guiding the elaboration of the Pact of the Future.
With respect to peace and security, the issues to which the Report addressed itself include a) the historic injustice of the non-representation of Africa in the permanent category and its underrepresentation in the elected category of the UNSC membership, b) the bias and double standards characterising the operation of the global collective security system and c) its colossal failure to respond meaningfully to some of the major conflicts in, most notably, Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine, among others. The Panel thus elaborated on ‘how the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN, particularly its Security Council, can be restored by addressing this historic injustice on the basis of the Ezulwini Consensus as part of the Pact of the Future by affirming the commitment to treating Africa’s quest for permanent membership as a special case.’
The Panel’s position for Africa’s representation in the UNSC is not confined to the argument of rectifying the historic injustice the continent suffered and the attendant crisis of legitimacy afflicting the global body. What is novel is the Panel’s argument is the additional value proposition of Africa’s membership for the effectiveness of the Council.
Beyond meeting the demands of the principle of legitimacy, enlargement of the size of the Council, through the allocation of permanent and non-permanent seats within the Ezulwini framework, has also the role of injecting into the Council members who have [greater] stake in the effective functioning of the Council and hence have the incentive to operate as a moderating force for breaking the gridlock that from time to time paralyses the Council owing to geopolitical contestations between rival major powers in the UNSC.
This is premised on the recognition that the dysfunction and failure of the UNSC, like other parts of the multilateral system, tends to be most acutely felt in Africa and other parts of the world similarly situated. African states, and those similarly positioned in a reformed UNSC, thus possess, on account of their position, inherent motivation to operate as purveyors of common ground in a polarised and multipolar global order.
It is a major win for Africa that the Pact, in its latest version (4), states, as the first element of the first action point in the part concerning UNSC reform, the commitment of UN member states to ‘redress the historic injustice against Africa as a priority.’ Yet, as the recent announcement by the Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, expressing US support for two permanent seats for Africa made it clear, this commitment in the Pact could not be considered as reflecting support for Africa’s demand for two permanent seats with all their benefits and privileges, including the veto, if the veto is to be maintained.
With respect to the global financial and economic architecture, two of the five key reform areas that the Panel’s report proposed stand out. The first of this concerns the governance and decision-making structures and processes of the financial and economic institutions, including through the reform of the quota system of the IMF for ensuring effective representation of Africa in the Fund’s decision-making architecture and changing the business model of the international financial institutions.’ As the Panel observed ‘[r]eforming the quota system (in favor of developing countries while avoiding diminishment of existing quota shares) is crucial not only for its impact on voting rights but also due to its influence in guiding access to finance.’
The other relates to addressing challenges relating to access to development finance and the debt distress facing countries. In this respect, the Panel envisioned actions involving ‘independent global sovereign debt authority, rechanneling of SDRs through regional banks, reducing the cost of (access to development) financing and debt servicing and reforming credit rating standards and institutions.’
This has proved to be the aspect of the summit in respect of which major powers particularly the ‘US and its allies’ are reportedly reluctant to make any significant concession, arguing that ‘the UN is not the right space to negotiate financial issues.’ Viewed through the report of the Panel, this may be one of the areas where the Summit is not expected to advance substantial reform measures commensurate with what is required to meet the development needs of countries in Africa and other parts of the developing world. Yet, even here the elements in the latest (fourth) version of the Pact affirm the need for reform of the international financial architecture with a commitment for ‘more urgent and ambitious action to ensure that the international financial architecture becomes…fit for the world of today and responsive to the challenges faced by developing countries… Also worthy of note is the recognition of ‘the importance of continuing to pursue governance reforms at the international financial institutions and multilateral developments banks…to enhance the representation and voice of developing countries in decision-making, norm-setting, and global economic governance at the international economic and financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.’
It is thus clear that viewed through the lens of the report of the independent Africa high-level panel, the Summit and its Pact are sure to fail if they were expected to be the platform where decisions on concretely reforming the governance institutions of the multilateral system will be made.
In the best-case scenario, it would be seen as a success if the Summit produces commitments identifying specific areas for and setting clear and concrete parameters for reform. Such commitments establish the basis for further negotiation covering not only the areas discussed above but also the reform areas identified in the Panel’s report relating to artificial intelligence, climate and future generations. This may not meet the kind of changes that the challenges facing the world and acutely felt in Africa require immediately. Yet as anticipated in the sub-heading of the Panel’s report ‘The Summit of the Future and Beyond’, the Summit will not be a failure if it commits member states to such clear and concrete parameters for negotiating the reforms concretely beyond the summit.