Consideration of the Half-Year Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Elections in Africa for the Period January–June 2026

Consideration of the Half-Year Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Elections in Africa for the Period January–June 2026

Date | 21 July 2026

Tomorrow (22 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1355th session to consider the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period from January to June 2026.

The session will commence with an opening remark by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present the half-year report. Statements are also expected from representatives of Member States that held elections during the reporting period.

The half-year report is presented pursuant to the PSC’s decision at its 424th session in March 2014 to receive regular updates on elections in Africa. The previous briefing took place at the PSC’s 1327th session on 26 January 2026 and covered elections held between July and December 2025. In addition to reviewing elections conducted during the first half of 2026, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to provide an overview of elections scheduled for the remainder of the year and highlight broader governance trends, including positive developments and emerging challenges.

Between January and June 2026, six AU Member States held presidential, legislative or general elections: Benin, Uganda, the Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Cabo Verde and Ethiopia. The AU deployed election observation missions to all six countries.

Map: African election calendar 2026

Benin held legislative and local elections on 11 January, followed by presidential elections on 12 April, against the backdrop of an attempted coup in December 2025. The parties aligned with President Patrice Talon secured all parliamentary seats after the principal opposition party, The Democrats, failed to meet the electoral threshold introduced under the new Electoral Code. The same party was subsequently unable to field a presidential candidate after failing to obtain the required parliamentary endorsements, allowing Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, Talon’s endorsed successor, to win decisively, securing 94 per cent of the vote. While the elections were conducted peacefully, opposition parties criticised the electoral framework as limiting political competition. Voter turnout stood at 36.7 per cent in the legislative elections and 58.75 per cent in the presidential poll.

Uganda held general elections on 15 January, with President Yoweri Museveni securing a seventh term in office with 71.65 per cent of the vote. While noting that the elections were conducted in a relatively calmer environment than the 2021 polls, the AU-COMESA-IGAD observation mission expressed concern over reports of ‘harassment, intimidation, and arrests of opposition leaders, candidates, supporters, media and civil society actors, as well as the suspension of NGOs and the internet shutdown.’ Voter turnout, at 52.5 per cent, was the lowest recorded in the country’s electoral history.

The Republic of the Congo held presidential elections on 15 March, with President Denis Sassou Nguesso re-elected to a fifth consecutive term after securing 94.9 per cent of the vote. While the AU observation mission assessed the elections positively, the process was criticised by opposition groups, two of which boycotted the polls, citing an uneven electoral environment. Election day also saw nationwide internet and telephone service disruptions.

Djibouti’s presidential election on 10 April likewise returned the incumbent, President Ismail Omar Guelleh, with 97.8 per cent of the vote. The election followed a constitutional amendment removing the upper age limit for presidential candidates, enabling Guelleh to seek another term. The AU observation mission concluded that the electoral process complied with national, regional and international standards.

Cabo Verde’s parliamentary elections on 17 May once again demonstrated the country’s stable democratic practice. The African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV) defeated the incumbent Movement for Democracy (MpD), leading to a peaceful transfer of executive authority after Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva conceded defeat. Presidential elections are scheduled for later this year, completing the country’s electoral cycle.

Ethiopia held its seventh general election on 1 June. According to the National Election Board of Ethiopia, the ruling Prosperity Party won around 90 per cent of parliamentary seats and more than 80 per cent of regional council seats, with reported voter turnout exceeding 96 per cent. Elections were not conducted in 46 constituencies—38 in Tigray and eight in Amhara— owing to security conditions. The AU observation mission noted that the elections took place amid persistent challenges in parts of the country, particularly in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, with stakeholders raising concerns over the impact of conflict on political participation, campaigning and voter access.

In addition to reviewing elections held during the first half of the year, the Chairperson’s report is expected to provide an overview of elections scheduled between July and December 2026. Algeria has already held legislative elections on 2 July, with the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) emerging as the largest party after winning 90 of the 407 parliamentary seats. The elections were marked by record-low voter turnout of 21 per cent and controversy surrounding the disqualification of a significant number of prospective candidates.

São Tomé and Príncipe also held its presidential election on 19 July, followed by parliamentary elections at the end of September. Cabo Verde will elect its President later in the year, while Zambia is scheduled to hold general elections on 13 August, with President Hakainde Hichilema seeking a second term. Morocco will elect a new House of Representatives on 23 September. The Gambia’s presidential election is scheduled for 5 December, with President Adama Barrow contesting for re-election. Cameroon is also expected to hold parliamentary and municipal elections later this year following repeated postponements, although an election date has yet to be announced.

Among the remaining electoral processes, South Sudan’s planned general elections, scheduled for 22 December and expected to be the country’s first since independence, are likely to require the closest attention. The elections are expected to take place amid heightened political and security tensions, including the continued detention and prosecution of senior officials of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), among them First Vice President Riek Machar. At its most recent meeting on South Sudan, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to expedite the deployment of a multidimensional technical needs assessment mission. Given the potential implications of the elections for South Sudan’s fragile peace process and regional stability, preventive diplomatic engagement will remain critical. Particular attention may also be required to electoral boundary disputes, including South Sudan’s designation of Abyei as one of its electoral constituencies, with possible implications for relations with Sudan.

Beyond the electoral calendar, the report is expected to identify broader governance trends. One issue that deserves particular attention, as highlighted in Amani Africa’s recent policy brief, is the gradual normalisation of a minimalist approach to electoral assessment. Increasingly, election observation appears to place greater emphasis on the peaceful conduct of polling than on the overall integrity and competitiveness of the electoral process. As a result, elections are frequently characterised as peaceful—and in some instances as free, fair and credible—even where domestic observer groups and opposition actors have documented significant shortcomings in the electoral process. If left unaddressed, this trend risks weakening the credibility of the AU’s electoral assessment framework and diminishing the value of election observation as a tool for promoting democratic governance and conflict prevention. For a more detailed analysis of this emerging trend in AU’s election observation practice, see Amani Africa’s recent policy brief.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may adopt the Half-Year Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa covering the period from January to June 2026 and the outlook for elections scheduled during the second half of the year. It may commend Member States that conducted elections during the reporting period and welcome the deployment of election observation missions to all six countries. The PSC may request the Commission to strengthen technical assistance to Member States, within available resources, to support more credible, inclusive and transparent electoral processes and to help ensure that elections are conducted in a conducive environment. It may also emphasise the need to improve the analytical quality of election observation reports and the Chairperson’s half-year report so that their conclusions reflect the realities of electoral processes rather than relying on standardised formulations. While expressing concern over declining voter turnout in some countries, the PSC may encourage Member States to address voter apathy by expanding civic and political space and strengthening civic and voter education. Regarding forthcoming elections, it may request the Commission to continue monitoring developments closely and, where necessary, deploy preventive diplomacy and other conflict prevention measures to help mitigate electoral tensions before, during and after polling.


Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Date | 20 July 2026

Tomorrow (21 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its virtual 1354th ministerial-level meeting on ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa’.

The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July, Haruna Kyeyune Kasolo, will deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, and a representative of the United Nations (UN) will also deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session will build on and follows the PSC’s 1266th meeting of March 2025 on ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa’ expressed grave concern over increased terrorist activity and the return or relocation of foreign terrorist fighters, highlighted structural drivers of radicalisation and called for counter-radicalisation measures to be incorporated into the AU action plan on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism. It also offers an opportunity to follow up on the PSC’s 1111th meeting of October 2022, which emphasised national reconciliation and social cohesion, including dialogue and negotiation to facilitate voluntary surrender and rehabilitation, and requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African best practices.

The session is expected to assess recent trends and whether and how to adapt the mobilisation of effective response to the threat that terrorism continues to pose in various parts of the continent.

The more consequential test is whether the Council identifies practical follow-up measures. The AU does not lack frameworks. Its architecture includes the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), its Protocol (2004), and the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2022). These are the Nouakchott Process, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL, CISSA and the Djibouti Process (2015). The gap lies in implementation, coordination, institutional follow-through, and the political and socio-economic governance deficit-based diagnosis for anchoring responses.

Related to implementation and in terms of response, two issues stand out for tomorrow’s PSC session. The first relates to the impact of major power geopolitical rivalry, such as the rivalry between Russia and France in the Sahel, on regional and continental strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The second concerns the state of political cohesion at the regional and continental levels for advancing an effective strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism.

As a 2022 special research report observed, policy has remained disproportionately security-centred despite the political, governance, socioeconomic and environmental dimensions of the threat, particularly in marginalised territories with weak state–society relations, deficient local governance and absence of service delivery. Tomorrow’s session may therefore steer the PSC towards an implementation-oriented roadmap that combines the provision of capable and legitimate security institutions along with the consolidation of legitimate local governance, the delivery of essential services, development, and community-centred prevention and stabilization measures. The 13th Africa Security Symposium, held in Accra from 7 to 9 July 2026, similarly underscored African-led solutions, inclusive partnerships, practical cross-border cooperation and translating diagnosis into action.

The first substantive issue for tomorrow’s session is the geography of terrorism in Africa. According to GTI 2026, despite a 28% global decline in terrorism deaths in 2025, Africa remained the principal geographic concentration of terrorism-related deaths and highly affected countries. Six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism worldwide were in the region. The Sahel alone accounted for more than half of global terrorism deaths, compared with less than 1% in 2007, while four African countries were among the five states that together accounted for 70% of global fatalities.

This persistence of the threat of terrorism nevertheless coexists with uneven and, in some respects, improving regional trends. Across much of Africa, terrorism deaths fell by 23.5% and incidents by nearly 28%. Eighteen countries improved their overall GTI scores, while only four deteriorated. These aggregate declines may, however, obscure the consolidation of territorial influence by some groups, such as through imposing economic blockades.

Thus, it is of particular significance for tomorrow’s session that account is given to recent developments illustrating terrorism’s regionalised and adaptive geography across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and Somalia. In Mali, coordinated attacks on 25 April struck Kati and several other locations, including Bamako, Gao, Kidal and Sévaré. The attacks also killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara when assailants targeted his residence in Kati. In Niger, the January IS-claimed attack on the airbase at Diori Hamani International Airport, the April spillover of fighting between JNIM and IS into Tillabéri, and the June attack on the airport and adjoining military airbase, which killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, demonstrated growing pressure on strategic infrastructure and centres of power. Chad’s Lake Chad region similarly illustrated Boko Haram’s continuing lethality. The May attack on the Barka Tolorom military base killed at least 23 soldiers and wounded 26, followed two days later by an ambush that killed two Chadian generals. Further analyses (here and here) point to the consolidation of jihadist activity across the Benin–Niger–Nigeria borderlands and the southward expansion of Sahel-based groups towards coastal West Africa.

In the Horn of Africa, the UN Panel identifies al-Shabaab as the most immediate threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the wider region, highlighted by its activities during 2025. Apart from the 18 March 2025 attempted assassination of the Somali President near the presidential palace, in the first quarter of 2025, the group’s monthly attacks increased by about 50% compared with 2024 in areas such as Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. It also averaged around six attacks per month in Kenya, while the estimated number of Ethiopian fighters within its ranks rose to approximately 600, highlighting the increasing regionalisation of the group’s reach.

The other issue that is also expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is how terrorist groups are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilise support, recruit, undertake reconnaissance operations and increasingly carry out attacks. Terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have leveraged the digital era by utilising a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organise their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example, as highlighted in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP, for instance, increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). In the Sahel too, drone use has increased in 2025. JNIM has conducted repeated drone-enabled attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo in 2025, often coordinating drone use with ground assaults. Attention should also be paid to the risk that such actors may employ cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks.

Another issue that tomorrow’s session is expected to address relates to the terrorism–transnational crime nexus. Terrorist groups sustain their operations through illicit taxation, smuggling, kidnapping, illegal mining, livestock theft, fuel trafficking and protection economies. It is worth recalling that the PSC’s 1345th meeting warned of an ‘integrated, hybrid and transnational criminal ecosystem’ in which terrorism, trafficking, environmental crime, cybercrime and financial crime share corridors, financing mechanisms and logistics.’ The 2026 UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) report frames the relationship as a continuum from transactional cooperation and coexistence to, more rarely, organisational convergence. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are known for taking advantage of transnational criminal networks, including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members.

Counter-terrorism cannot therefore be effective without addressing the economic factors that enable and sustain terrorist groups, including arms trafficking, illicit financial flows and illicit natural resource extraction. The analytical report accompanying the PSC’s 1320th meeting similarly presents terrorism and violent extremism as interconnected threats sustained by illicit economies, digital recruitment, cross-border financing and governance gaps. The resulting communiqué placed greater emphasis on institutional coordination, early warning and early action.

The prevention dimension should focus on conditions that enable recruitment rather than on treating radicalisation as predominantly ideological. UNDP’s ‘Journey to Extremism’ study shows that recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa is shaped by economic hardship, limited opportunities, fractured state–society relations and security-force abuses rather than religion alone. 17 % of voluntary recruits cited religious ideas as their primary motivation, while 25% identified employment opportunities. Among the 48% who experienced a specific tipping-point event, 71% cited government action, including the killing or arrest of family members or friends. These findings echo Amani Africa’s aforementioned assessment that terrorism has often been misdiagnosed primarily as a security threat, producing excessive reliance on militarised responses despite the political, governance and development conditions sustaining it. Strengthening state legitimacy, accountable governance, socioeconomic development and community resilience should therefore be treated as central components of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and the Horn of Africa. It may also express concern over their growing convergence with illicit economies, transnational organised crime, and the use of new technologies, including digital and drones. It may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counter-terrorism strategy that combines security measures undertaken by legitimate security institutions with prevention, deradicalisation, stabilisation, recovery, reconciliation, dialogue, service delivery, and the building of legitimate local governance infrastructure. The PSC may also emphasise the need for member states to put aside their difference when it comes to the mobilisation of collective action to address the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. In this respect, it may emphasise the need for AU, ECOWAS and UN to join ranks in support of the counter-terrorism efforts of the Sahel countries that are the major theatre of terrorist activities on the continent, with a growing threat of expansion into coastal West Africa. It may also call for strengthened coordination among the AU Commission, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, RECs/RMs and relevant regional mechanisms, particularly in advancing intelligence-sharing, border management, and investigations into terrorist financing. Furthermore, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to develop an implementation-oriented roadmap identifying priority borderlands, practical channels for operational cooperation, support for national and regional deradicalisation programmes, and stronger linkages between counter-terrorism operations, civilian protection, stabilisation and recovery.


Negotiating War and Rethinking Mediation in Africa in a New Era of Conflicts and Global Disorder

Negotiating War and Rethinking Mediation in Africa in a New Era of Conflicts and Global Disorder

Date | 8 July 2026

Abdul Mohammed

I have sat across from men who command armies, knowing that some of them were responsible for the very violence we were trying to stop.

There is a particular silence that fills such rooms. It is not the silence of diplomacy. It is the silence of moral tension — the unspoken awareness that peace, if it is to be achieved, may require engaging those whose actions have made peace necessary in the first place.

This is the uncomfortable truth at the heart of modern conflict mediation. It is what Pierre Hazan described as ‘negotiating with the devil.’ In many places such as the Horn of Africa today, it is not a metaphor. It is a daily reality.

Yet the challenge confronting mediators today extends beyond the moral dilemma of negotiating with armed actors. What we are witnessing in various conflict settings in the continent and beyond including across Sudan and the wider Horn is something more profound and more consequential: a growing structural mismatch between mediation as it is currently practiced and the realities it is meant to address.

Mediation in a fragmented geopolitical landscape

The world in which modern mediation evolved has fundamentally changed.

The assumptions that once underpinned international peacemaking — shared norms, coherent multilateral leadership, and a broadly agreed international order — are steadily eroding. In their place is a far more fragmented and competitive geopolitical landscape, one in which conflicts have become increasingly regionalized, internationalized, and economically embedded.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Horn of Africa.

The region is no longer experiencing isolated national crises. It is increasingly evolving into an interconnected regional system of conflict shaped by cross-border armed networks, external intervention, fragmented sovereignties, war economies, ideological polarization, and intensifying geopolitical competition along the Red Sea corridor.

Sudan illustrates this reality in its starkest form.

Sudan is no longer simply a country at war. It is a state and society being hollowed out. Its institutions are collapsing, its cities are being destroyed, and millions have been displaced by a conflict whose consequences increasingly transcend Sudan itself. The war has become deeply entangled with broader regional rivalries and international strategic interests.

And yet, for all the urgency surrounding Sudan, the path to peace partially runs through the very actors who are sustaining the war.

Mediation in a changing conflict landscape

The new era of conflicts and insecurity characterized by shifts in the nature and drivers of conflicts presents further challenge to the current model of mediation. Contemporary conflicts are no longer primarily about seizing state power or achieving decisive military victory.

They increasingly resemble wars of permanence—open-ended struggles sustained by political fragmentation, economic incentives, and geopolitical rivalry. As the conflicts in the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel show, some of today’s conflicts tend to be transnational, entangled with regional and international criminal and economic networks.

Today’s wars have also become more intractable and easier to wage due to the profound changes in the means of warfare. In many conflict settings from Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel to DRC and Sudan, drones have become the weapon of choice, signaling further rapid evolution with the emergence of AI-enabled warfare technologies in a normative context designed for earlier technologies.

Digital technologies have become the dominant information platform that shape not only the conflict environment but also the mediation landscape.

Mediation in the current and emerging context thus needs to adapt to these new and changing conflict dynamics.

The uncomfortable moral realities of ending conflicts

This remains the central dilemma of mediation. The men who can stop the war are often the same men fighting it.

It is tempting to believe that peace can be built by excluding such actors — that legitimacy alone can substitute for power. But experience suggests otherwise. Wars do not end because we morally isolate those who wage them. They end when those actors are brought, however reluctantly and imperfectly, into a political process capable of reshaping their incentives and constraining their violence.

This is not a comfortable proposition. Nor should it be.

Every mediation effort forces a version of the same question: Is it better to engage and risk legitimizing violent actors, or to refuse engagement and risk prolonging the war?

There are no clean answers. Only consequences.

In much of the Horn of Africa, power is not exercised primarily through formal institutions. It is embedded in networks of patronage, coercion, economic extraction, and armed mobilization. Alex de Waal has described this as a ‘political marketplace,’ where loyalties are transactional, alliances are fluid, and violence itself becomes a tool of political bargaining.

Peace processes that fail to engage these underlying realities often collapse under the weight of their own assumptions. Agreements may appear coherent on paper while remaining disconnected from the actual structures that sustain conflict.

This is one of the defining weaknesses of much contemporary mediation.

Too often, mediation has shifted from shaping political outcomes to managing diplomatic processes. Meetings proliferate. Statements multiply. Tracks expand. Yet leverage weakens and coherence declines.

The result is the paradox increasingly visible across many conflicts today: more mediation, but less peace.

The Horn of Africa vividly illustrates this crisis.

Different actors pursue different initiatives through overlapping and sometimes competing tracks. Regional organizations, international institutions, bilateral powers, and external geopolitical actors often engage simultaneously without strategic alignment.

The multiplication of forums has not necessarily produced greater effectiveness. In some cases, it has deepened fragmentation.

This is not merely an operational problem. It reflects a deeper transformation in the international system itself.

Mediators must negotiate a fiercely contested diplomatic environment

The era in which mediation could rely on relatively coherent multilateral consensus is fading. What is emerging instead is a far more contested diplomatic environment shaped by geopolitical rivalry, transactional partnerships, declining trust in institutions, and the growing influence of middle and regional powers.

For mediators, this creates a new level of complexity. It is no longer enough to navigate the conflict itself. One must also navigate the competing interests of those seeking to shape the conflict’s outcome.

This emerging reality is most evident in the Red Sea corridor. Gulf powers, global powers, regional actors, and non-state networks increasingly intersect across the Horn in ways that blur the line between domestic conflict and wider geopolitical competition. Proximity to the Middle East has transformed the Horn into part of a wider and deeply interconnected security arena.

Mediation frameworks, however, have often failed to evolve accordingly.

Many still operate according to assumptions rooted in an earlier era — one in which conflicts were more localized, mediation tracks more centralized, and multilateral authority more coherent. But today’s wars, economically embedded and digitally amplified, do not lend themselves to this conventional approach.

This demands a fundamental rethinking of mediation itself.

The challenge is not simply to improve mediation processes. It is to redefine mediation politically, strategically, and institutionally for an entirely different era of conflict.

Three deficits increasingly define contemporary mediation efforts.

Key challenges facing modern mediation

First, there is a deficit of political strategy.

Mediation has too often become procedural rather than transformational. Process has become a substitute for strategy. Yet mediation that is disconnected from a clear political understanding of power, incentives, and end states risks becoming performative rather than consequential.

Second, there is a deficit of coherence.

Multiple actors engage without alignment, weakening leverage and creating opportunities for conflict actors to exploit divisions among mediators themselves. Fragmented diplomacy frequently mirrors the fragmentation of the conflicts it seeks to resolve.

Third, there is a deficit of legitimacy.

Formal peace processes often remain disconnected from societal realities and civilian constituencies most affected by war. Inclusion is frequently symbolic rather than meaningful, while local actors capable of sustaining peace remain marginalized.

These deficits are particularly dangerous in contexts such as Sudan, where the collapse of state structures risks generating prolonged fragmentation with regional consequences extending far beyond national borders.

The ongoing tensions between peace and justice

At the same time, mediation confronts another enduring tension: the relationship between peace and justice.

Victims of conflict do not speak in abstractions about stabilization. They speak about accountability, dignity, recognition, and historical grievance. They demand not only the cessation of violence but also justice for the violence already committed.

Yet here too mediation encounters difficult realities.

Actors who fear immediate accountability are often unwilling to negotiate. Insisting on maximalist justice demands at the outset may, in some circumstances, foreclose opportunities to stop the violence itself.

This does not mean justice should be abandoned. It means justice must be sequenced carefully within broader political transitions.

Mahmood Mamdani has long argued that violence in Africa is often rooted not merely in individual criminality but in deeper political structures and historical systems of exclusion. Sustainable peace therefore requires more than prosecutions alone. It requires transforming the conditions that continuously reproduce violent conflict.

In practical terms, this means prioritizing the cessation of violence while preserving pathways toward accountability, institutional reform, reconciliation, and political transformation.

It is not a perfect approach. But in the midst of war, perfection is rarely available.

And this is precisely where African agency becomes indispensable.

It is such normative and socio-political imperatives that informed and animate the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. It is premised on both the necessity of justice and accountability and the recognition that wars are extraordinary events that are not amenable to the application of systems of justice that are designed for normal and peace times.

Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow of Amani Africa, is a former United Nations Senior Political Advisor and head of the Sudan Mediation office and a former senior official of the AU HIP and senior advisor to IGAD


Briefing on the situation in Abyei

Briefing on the situation in Abyei

Date | 6 July 2026

On 8 July, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) will receive an update on the Situation in Abyei.

The session will commence with an opening remark by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS). Representatives of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. As a concerned country, South Sudan will also make a statement through its representative. Considering that Sudan is suspended, it cannot participate in PSC meetings, but its views may be sought.

In March 2024, the PSC had scheduled an informal consultation and a briefing on the situation in Abyei on 12 March. This session, however, did not happen as planned. It later emerged that, in preparation for the session, the PSC sought to obtain Sudan’s views through an informal consultation, given that Sudan remains suspended from participating in AU activities. However, both the planned informal consultation and the scheduled PSC session were unable to proceed as intended due to Sudan’s refusal to engage. In response to the diplomatic note inviting its participation in the informal consultation, Sudan’s representative in Addis Ababa declined the invitation and submitted a letter requesting that the PSC refrain from proceeding with its planned engagement on Abyei. (See here) Sudan further called for the removal of the Abyei issue from the PSC meeting’s agenda, despite the fact that the PSC Protocol states under Article 8 that the inclusion of an agenda may not be opposed by a member state.

The ongoing war in Sudan and continued instability in South Sudan have significantly affected Abyei, contributing to the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the disputed region. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has reported a sharp increase in security incidents over the past six months. Despite Abyei’s demilitarised status, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and personnel from the South Sudan National Police Service continue to maintain a presence in the area, according to UNISFA. The mission has also reported that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the parties to the conflict in Sudan, continue to operate in northern Abyei, particularly in Goli, Diffra, and Gibdud.

The overall security situation in Abyei reportedly continues to be exacerbated by intercommunal violence, the proliferation of illicit weapons, criminal activity, and the presence and activities of the RSF. In the absence of formal law enforcement in Abyei, community protection committees continue to assume policing responsibilities with support from UNISFA. In early March, an attack by unidentified armed youth on the county headquarters in Abiemnhom County, South Sudan, approximately eight kilometres from Abyei, resulted in significant civilian casualties and large-scale displacement, including the movement of displaced persons into Abyei.

On 13 December 2025, a drone attack struck the UN logistics base in Kadugli, South Kordofan State, Sudan, killing six peacekeepers and injuring nine others. The attack forced UNISFA to relocate its personnel and subsequently close all team sites, suspending its physical presence in the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, the buffer zone agreed between Sudan and South Sudan to reduce cross-border tensions. In a 14 December 2025 press statement, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, strongly condemned the attack that killed six Bangladeshi peacekeepers.

The annual Ngok Dinka and Misseriya seasonal pre-migration conference took place from 20-23 November in Noong, Abyei. During the conference, participants signed an agreement renewing their commitment to prevent conflict, safeguard livelihoods, and ensure the protection of civilians along migration corridors, while also pledging to strengthen trust between herders and farming communities. The two communities have had long-standing disputes over land ownership, access to water, and grazing areas, which often intensify during seasonal migration.

Meanwhile, efforts to resolve the final status of Abyei remain stalled. Preoccupied with their respective internal challenges, Sudan and South Sudan have struggled to engage in meaningful dialogue. Despite their commitment to reactivate the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC)—mandated to facilitate discussions on security issues and provide political and administrative oversight of Abyei, respectively—neither mechanism has convened.

On 14 November 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2802, renewing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for an additional year. The resolution was adopted with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation). The resolution expressed the Council’s intention to base UNISFA’s future mandate renewal on demonstrable progress by Sudan and South Sudan against a set of benchmarks. These include the withdrawal of all unauthorised armed forces and armed elements from the Abyei Area and progress towards its full demilitarisation; the resumption and regular documentation of meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), the bilateral body responsible for addressing security issues of mutual concern; and the establishment of the Abyei Joint Security Police, including measurable progress in its recruitment, training, and deployment.

The United States, the penholder on the file, has adopted a more stringent approach to the mission, reflecting the broader policy of the current Trump administration to prioritise cost efficiency and effectiveness by assessing the performance of UN peace operations and determining their future, including through the use of benchmarks. At the Security Council meeting in May, the US representative stated, ‘We cannot want peace more than the parties themselves,’ while calling for the withdrawal of all unauthorised armed elements from Abyei and urging both Sudan and South Sudan to facilitate the deployment of UN Police and establish the Abyei Police Service.

However, the African members of the Security Council, as well as China and the Russian Federation, have opposed conditioning the renewal of UNISFA’s mandate on benchmarks. During the Council’s deliberations, they expressed concern that such an approach would tie the mission’s future to benchmarks largely beyond its control. They also stressed the importance of upholding the 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area.

Following the Security Council’s decision in November, South Sudan requested that the AU include the issue of Abyei on the agenda of its Summit held on 14–15 February. However, the Summit’s final decision did not address the issue. Pursuant to resolution 2802, the Secretary-General is expected to submit, by the end of August, a report on the progress made by Sudan and South Sudan towards meeting the benchmarks set out in the resolution. The report is also expected to provide a comprehensive assessment of the security implications of any potential drawdown of the mission. Therefore, tomorrow’s PSC meeting will provide an opportunity for the AU to articulate its position on Abyei for the first time since October 2022, and to outline the way forward ahead of the report’s submission and UNISFA’s upcoming mandate renewal in November.

In his briefing to the Security Council in May, the UN Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Guang Cong, stated that his office continues to engage with relevant stakeholders to support preparations for renewed bilateral dialogue on Abyei. He noted that these efforts focus on encouraging both Sudan and South Sudan to make progress towards the benchmarks linked to UNISFA’s mandate renewal, while addressing the prevailing security dynamics that risk impeding political progress.

For its part, Sudan reaffirmed its commitment to the 2011 Agreement and expressed its readiness to meet the benchmarks established by the Security Council. Sudan also notified its decision to approve the deployment of the authorised police units and stressed that a sustainable solution to the Abyei issue can only be achieved through genuine dialogue and cooperation between the two countries.

South Sudan has maintained that the SSPDF were deployed to Abyei following the serious intercommunal violence of October 2022 to stabilise the situation, prevent further unrest, and protect civilian lives. While reaffirming its sovereign rights and responsibilities, including with respect to administrative facilitation in Abyei, South Sudan also maintained that sustainable peace will ultimately depend on the commitment of the two countries to dialogue, stability and coexistence.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may condemn the drone attack on UNISFA peacekeepers that claimed the lives of six peacekeepers and the increase in the frequency and impact of intercommunal conflicts in the region. The PSC may call on the RSF to withdraw from Abyei and cease all its activities affecting the stability of Abyei. It may express full support for the 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area and urge the UNSC to extend all its support to prevent the changing security dynamics in the two countries not to derail the agreement. It may urge Sudan and South Sudan to reaffirm their commitment to the 2011 agreement and withdraw any of their forces from the demilitarised zone. The PSC may also call on the two states to extend full cooperation to UNISFA, including through facilitating the deployment of UN Police, and take concrete steps to establish the Abyei Police Service. The PSC may also underscore the need for the reactivation and convening of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC). To this end, it may call on the AU, working along with IGAD and the UN Envoy for the Horn of Africa, to facilitate support to the two countries to enable them to convene these key mechanisms. The PSC may reaffirm the growing importance of UNISFA’s role in view of the changing dynamics affecting Abyei and encourage the UN Security Council to extend UNISFA’s mandate and its support to the JBVMM. It may commend the efforts of UNISFA to protect those affected by recent conflicts, including through the provision of shelter to the displaced, and encourage the mission to expedite the humanitarian response and call for other humanitarian providers to scale up their contribution for humanitarian assistance to the region.


The US plan to unplug the UN Support Office in Somalia, the last straw that may break the African Union’s peace operation

The US plan to unplug the UN Support Office in Somalia, the last straw that may break the African Union’s peace operation

Date | 5 July 2026

On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

1342nd Meeting of the PSC on ‘The Report of the Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM’s Configuration Plan,’ 28 April 2026. (Source: X @AUC_ PAPS)

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.


The US plan to unplug the UN Support Office in Somalia, the last straw that may break the African Union’s peace operation

The US plan to unplug the UN Support Office in Somalia, the last straw that may break the African Union’s peace operation

Date | 5 July 2026

On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

1342nd Meeting of the PSC on ‘The Report of the Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM’s Configuration Plan,’ 28 April 2026. (Source: X @AUC_ PAPS)

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.


Africa Must Rise Against the Normalization of War

Africa Must Rise Against the Normalization of War

Date | 2 July 2026

By Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi

Convener and Chairperson, Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement

Africa is in danger of becoming accustomed to war.

What would have shocked the conscience of the continent a generation ago is increasingly being treated as routine. Daily reports of bombed villages, displaced populations, massacred civilians, sexual violence, starvation, collapsing states, and endless humanitarian crises no longer generate the urgency they deserve.

The tragedy is not only that war is spreading, and Africa is in a new era of conflict and insecurity. The greater tragedy is that war is becoming normalized.

From Sudan to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, from the Sahel to parts of the Horn of Africa, violence is increasingly becoming a defining feature of political life itself. Armed conflict is no longer appearing as an exception to politics; in too many places it is becoming a substitute for politics.

Africa today confronts a profound and dangerous reality: war is increasingly becoming systemic, self-sustaining, and in some places permanent.

Many of the continent’s contemporary conflicts are also increasingly shaped by external interference and geopolitical competition. Local conflicts are becoming entangled with regional and international rivalries, giving rise to proxy wars that often outlive their original causes. External sponsorship, competition for strategic influence, and access to resources can prolong violence, complicate peace efforts, and transform local conflicts into seemingly endless wars. In too many places, Africa is paying the human cost of struggles that extend far beyond its borders.

The return of war is not simply a security challenge. It is an existential challenge to Africa’s future. It threatens every major aspiration Africans have articulated for themselves—from Agenda 2063 and regional integration to democratic governance, economic transformation, poverty reduction, social justice, and women’s empowerment.

Across the continent, conflicts are becoming more fragmented, more regionalized, and more resistant to traditional approaches to peacemaking.

In too many places, war has become an economic system, a method of governance, a pathway to political power, and a means of negotiating access to state resources. For some actors, peace has become a threat while war has become an opportunity.

Even more troubling is the changing status of civilians. In many contemporary conflicts, civilians are no longer unfortunate victims caught between warring parties. They are increasingly becoming deliberate targets (see here).

No group bears the burden of Africa’s wars more heavily than women and children.

Women carry responsibilities that extend far beyond their own survival. They become caregivers, providers, protectors, and custodians of communities under conditions of extraordinary hardship. They face displacement, loss of livelihoods, hunger, sexual violence, forced migration, and the collapse of essential social services. Yet, they remain significantly underrepresented in the political decisions that determine war and peace.

Children are perhaps the greatest victims of all. Millions are growing up amid violence, displacement, interrupted education, hunger, and profound psychological trauma. Many have never known a society at peace.

The destruction of civilian life is no longer merely collateral damage. It is increasingly part of the logic of war itself.

Entire societies are being traumatized. Communities that have lived together for generations are being torn apart. Reconciliation becomes more difficult. State-building becomes more fragile. Democratic transitions become more elusive. Development becomes impossible.

Africa’s peace institutions are under immense strain. Existing approaches are not matching the scale of the challenge. Conflict prevention remains weak, mediation efforts are fragmented, and civilian protection remains inadequate.

Most importantly, leadership for peace is becoming increasingly scarce, while leadership for war often appears more visible.

It is against this backdrop that the Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement is advancing the Women for Peace in Africa Initiative.

Peace is too precious to be left to governments and formal institutions alone. Sustainable peace requires the active participation of citizens, women’s organizations, youth movements, faith communities, intellectuals, traditional leaders, humanitarian actors, and civil society. The defense of peace must become a shared societal responsibility.

The initiative recognizes that sustainable peace requires organized civic leadership capable of defending civilians, promoting accountability, supporting mediation efforts, strengthening social cohesion, and generating public pressure for political solutions.

Africa has reached a moment when silence is no longer an option. The scale of suffering demands action. The erosion of peace demands leadership. The future of the continent demands a broad-based civic movement committed to ensuring that war does not become a permanent feature of African political life.

The defense of peace must once again become a continental cause.

Africa must rise against the normalization of war.

This article previously featured in The Sunday Times. Geraldine Joslyn Fraser-Moleketi, the Convenor of the Beijing +30 Women’s Movement, is the Chairman of the Thabo Mbeki Board of Trustees.


Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for July 2026

Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for July 2026

Date | July 2026

In July 2026, the Republic of Uganda is set to chair the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Council’s Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions alongside an informal consultation on ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action’ and an engagement with the AU Commission Chairperson. Of the four substantive sessions, two will focus on country-specific issues while the rest will address thematic issues. Except for one session planned to be held at the ministerial level, the remaining sessions will be held at the ambassadorial level. In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC subsidiary bodies – the Committee of Experts (CoE), the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the Sub-Committee on Sanctions – are also expected to meet during the month.

The first activity of the month will be the Third Accra Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Accra III process on UCGs), which will be held on 3 and 4 July, in Accra, Ghana. This year’s theme will be held under the theme ‘Youth Inclusion for African Stability.’ Despite the conclusions of the inaugural convening held in March 2022 and the second forum held in March 2024, the policy approach and the trends did not show any improvement. For example, a key aspect of the AU norm proscribing coups, on non-eligibility of coup makers for elections contained in Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, has in practice been abandoned. In 2025, two coups and one attempted coup took place. It remains uncertain if and how the Accra III Forum will produce an outcome that will change the dynamics both in the policy approach to and the recent trends in unconstitutional changes of government on the continent.

The first substantive session of the month, scheduled for 8 July, will be an update on the Situation in Abyei. In March 2024, the PSC had scheduled an informal consultation and a briefing on the situation in Abyei on 12 March. This session, however, did not happen as planned. It later emerged that in preparation for the session, the PSC sought to obtain Sudan’s views through an informal consultation, given that Sudan remains suspended from participating in AU activities, but both the planned informal consultation and the scheduled PSC session were unable to proceed as intended due to Sudan’s refusal to engage. In response to the diplomatic note inviting its participation in the informal consultation, Sudan’s representative in Addis Ababa declined the invitation and submitted a letter requesting that the PSC refrain from proceeding with its planned engagement on Abyei. Sudan further called for the removal of the Abyei issue from the PSC meeting’s agenda. However, this request is contrary to the PSC Protocol, which clearly states that no country may oppose the inclusion of an agenda.

The ongoing war in Sudan, coupled with persistent instability in South Sudan, has continued to deepen insecurity in the disputed Abyei region while further delaying efforts to resolve its long-standing final political status. Over the past six months, the security situation has deteriorated significantly. During this period, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) recorded 196 security incidents and 58 fatalities—a sharp increase compared with the preceding six months. Reports also indicate that South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and police have maintained ‘unauthorised checkpoints’ and continued occupying civilian infrastructure in southern Abyei, while the presence of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces around Goli and Diffra in northern Abyei remains a major source of concern. The relations between Sudan and South Sudan continue to be shaped by the conflict that erupted in Sudan in 2023. The last time the PSC convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Abyei was in September 2022, at its 1108th session, before the outbreak of the war in Sudan. In addition to following up on the issues identified in the 1108th session, there are new dynamics that the 8 July session needs to address in view of the changing security situation in Sudan and its implications on the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan.

On the same day, there will be an informal consultation on the ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action.’ The proposed AU Model is a key institutional development designed to bridge the gap between receiving early warning about a conflict and timely executing preventive action. It is worth recalling that the call for the establishment of a ‘trigger mechanism and indicators’ was first made during the Cairo Retreat of the PSC held in October 2018, to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls for an early action by the Council. This was further reiterated in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. The development of the trigger is premised on the recognition that it is only when the risks of conflict have to meet a certain threshold, including an indication that national processes are unable or unwilling to address them, and thereby requiring the action of the AU.

On 21 July, Council will convene its only ministerial-level meeting on the theme ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa.’ The session will build on Council’s March 2025 1266th session on ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa.’ In the session, the Council, among other decisions, called for the need to incorporate the fight against radicalisation and extremist ideologies into the AU action plan on the prevention and fight against terrorism and violent extremism. It is worth recalling that PSC’s 1111th meeting held in October 2022 marked a notable shift in the approach, expanding the instruments in the toolbox of responses by emphasising the importance of dialogue and negotiation as means to encourage the voluntary surrender, disengagement and rehabilitation of members of terrorist groups. The session also adopted several significant decisions, including requesting the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African national reconciliation best practices. In addition to building and following up on the outcome of these earlier sessions, the ministerial session is expected to review recent developments and trends both in conflicts involving terrorist groups on the continent and the state of policy action and response to address these conflicts, having regard to the specificities of how the threat that terrorism and violent extremism manifests itself in various parts of the continent.

Following this, on 27 July, the PSC will get an ‘Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger.’ This will be the third time that the Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one substantive agenda item.

The last substantive session of the month will be held on 28 July to consider the bi-annual Report of the AU Commission on Elections in Africa covering the Period of January – June 2026. As per the PSC’s decision from its 424th session in March 2014, which mandates periodic updates on African electoral developments, the Chairperson presents a mid-year elections report. The previous update was delivered during the 1327th PSC session on 26 January 2026, and covered electoral activities from July to December 2025, and the Outlook for 2026. Tomorrow’s briefing will similarly provide accounts of elections conducted from January to June 2026 – covering elections held in Benin, Uganda, Congo, Djibouti, Cape Verde, Guinea and Ethiopia – while also outlining the electoral calendar for the second half of 2026.

The last activity of the PSC will be an ‘Engagement with the AU Commission Chairperson.’ It is to be recalled that in September 2019, the PSC held, for the first time, an interactive session with the then Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, on the working relationship between the PSC and the Commission in the context of Article 2 of the PSC Protocol within the spirit of enhancing coordination on peace and security efforts. During that meeting, there was a commitment for convening it periodically.

In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC subsidiary bodies will also meet during the month. On 14 July, the Committee of Experts (CoE) will meet to prepare for the PSC Ministerial Meeting on ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa.’ In addition, the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions will also meet on 15 July for an ‘Engagement on political and socio-economic developments on preventive measures against UCG.’ It is to be recalled that the inaugural session of the Committee was held on 12 June 2024.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC), on the other hand, will have their first engagement of the year on 24 July, on an ‘Update on the CLB operations.’

The footnote of the PPoW also provides for the PSC Chairperson’s participation in a Policy Conference on ‘Peace, Security and Development Nexus,’ to be held in Mombasa, Kenya, from 10 to 13 July. On 24 July, the PSC Chairperson will also have an engagement with the Pan-African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa. Lastly, it is expected that the Chairpersons of the PSC for the months of May and June 2026 will present communications on the activities undertaken by the Council during their respective terms as Chair of the PSC.


African Union's Role in Elections: Promoting Democracy or Whitewashing Illegitimacy?

African Union's Role in Elections: Promoting Democracy or Whitewashing Illegitimacy?

Date | 30 June 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The African Union (AU)’s role in elections in Africa is conducted through two interrelated processes. The first is AU’s election observation activities and the other is the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) agenda on elections in Africa. Between 2021 and 2025, the PSC progressively consolidated its focus on elections, moving beyond episodic observation toward sustained engagement that recognises elections as extended political processes with significant implications for political and institutional stability. This period registered some notable institutional gains, including improved professionalism of AU Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs), support for professionalization of election observation bodies, increased attention to inclusivity of women and youth, and the launch of knowledge-generation initiatives.

These advances (not central to the political factors that shape the conduct of elections), however, were offset by persistent weaknesses, notably the normalisation of minimalist electoral assessments that privilege calm over credibility, inconsistent enforcement of continental norms, most critically Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in post-coup contexts and weak follow-up on election observation recommendations and the lack of consistent use of preventive diplomacy. AU’s uneven handling of elections following a) unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), b) constitutional and electoral manipulation and c) cases where electoral and military illegality converged (in Gabon in 2024 and in Guinea Bissau in November 2025) have not only eroded the deterrent value of AU norms and strained the Council’s preventive credibility but also are exposing the AU to charges of being complicit in the increasing perversion of elections in Africa.

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