Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council
Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council
Date | 15 May 2025
Tomorrow (16 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council (MSC), at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Following opening remarks by Harold Bundu Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May, the Chair of ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council is expected to make a statement. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, may also address the session.
The PSC held its inaugural meeting with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) policy organs on the promotion of peace and security, focusing on harmonisation and coordination of decision-making processes and division of labour in May 2019. The joint communiqué of that meeting agreed to hold ‘annual joint consultative meetings, between the PSC and the RECs/RMs policy organs on peace and security issues, alternately in Addis Ababa and in the headquarters of the RECs/RMs, in rotation’ and to be ‘convened ahead of the mid-year coordination summit between the AU and RECs/RMs’. It took some years before the PSC acted on the convening of a consultative meeting with individual REC/RM policy-making organs similar to the consultative meeting it holds annually with the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the European Union (EU) Peace and Security Committee. The first such consultative meeting was held with the ECOWAS MSC on 24 April 202, when, as part of its April 2024 Programme of Work, the PSC undertook a field mission to Abuja, Nigeria, for the High-level African Counter Terrorism Meeting.
The Inaugural Joint Consultative Meeting with ECOWAS MSC zeroed in on the dire situation in West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, where terrorist activities have wreaked havoc on communities and derailed development. The Joint Communiqué voiced deep alarm over the surging insecurity fueled by terrorism and extremism. The two Councils called for robust counter-terrorism strategies, backed by substantial funding and resource mobilisation to bolster regional and continental peace operations. They emphasised the need for revitalisation of existing security frameworks, such as the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes, the ECOWAS Plans of Action Against Terrorism, the Accra Initiative, and the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin. Beyond military measures, the meeting highlighted the necessity of tackling the root causes of terrorism – poverty, unemployment, political instability and social inequality.
Since then, a meeting of the Nouakchott process was held in November 2024 in Dakar, Senegal. Convened with the support of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the Government of the Republic of Senegal, the meeting sought to ‘enhance coordination, information and intelligence sharing, and joint operations in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel-Sahara region.’ The meeting (which saw the participation of ECOWAS, MNJTF, Executive Secretariat of the Accra Initiative and the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) of the Sahel countries) brought together the heads of intelligence services of the Sahel-Sahara countries, particularly member states of the Nouakchott Process and the Accra Initiative, namely Algeria, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. It is of interest to both the PSC and the ECOWAS MSC to receive an update on the outcome of this meeting and how to build on the outcome for developing and implementing concrete policy action to stem the tide of conflicts involving terrorist groups in the Sahel and West Africa.
The other issue that the inaugural meeting focused on was the instability military coups induce and the governance deficits fueling unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), which has affected most prominently the ECOWAS region. They welcomed the creation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions to oversee UCG-related decisions. Against the background of the growing pressure for speeding up the process towards lifting suspension of countries in transition including the recent return of Gabon to the AU fold in full, tomorrow’s consultative meeting is also expected to discuss how the AU and ECOWAS develop a joint strategy and engage more actively to negotiate and agree on the parameters of the process for the restoration of constitutional order in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger while having regard to the specificities of each situation.
While they stressed the importance of joint mediation without clarifying the modalities for translating that into action, this requires that they change their institutional culture and the conceptual parameters governing their role in peace and security. First, they need to recognise that many of the challenges facing the region cannot be addressed by any one institution and need the role of both the AU and ECOWAS, having regard to the terms of Article 16 of the PSC Protocol. Second, conceptually, instead of subsidiarity and the competition it induces, they should embrace complementarity. Instead of comparative advantage, they should work on the basis of cumulative advantage.
In terms of modalities, the meeting agreed on mechanisms to ensure coherence and complementarity, including annual joint consultative meetings, frequent interactions between chairpersons and swift communication of decisions. They also proposed joint field missions, retreats, staff exchanges and the establishment of focal point teams. There is no indication that they have started to operationalise these proposed areas of action for deepening their close working relationship.
Given that this second consultative meeting coincides with the 50th anniversary of ECOWAS, it is expected that the 50-year journey of ECOWAS, particularly in the realm of peace and security, democratic governance and constitutional rule, as well as regional integration and the challenges facing them, are expected to feature during the session. Of immediate concern will be the withdrawal of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) from ECOWAS. Indeed, during the inaugural session, a particularly pressing issue was the announcement of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger for withdrawal from ECOWAS. The two Councils urged continued engagement with these states to preserve regional stability, referencing the ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit communiqué of 24 February 2024, and Article 91 of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty, which outlines withdrawal procedures. On 29 January 2025, the withdrawal of these countries from ECOWAS took effect. This notwithstanding and in a commendable step, ECOWAS expressed commitment to preserving crucial privileges for citizens of these countries, including recognition of ECOWAS-branded documents, trade benefits under ETLS, visa-free movement rights, and support for ECOWAS officials from these nations.
Building on the maintenance of the relations, apart from commending ECOWAS on avoiding complete severance of the relationship, the consultative meeting may consider how best to support AES states in their quest for containing terrorism and restoring stability. Relatedly, of interest for both the AU and ECOWAS is also how to reverse the instrumentalisation of tensions and instability for settling geopolitical scores by external powers attempting to reduce the region into a theatre of geopolitical rivalry.
As with the first consultative meeting, the expected outcome is a Joint Communiqué. The meeting is expected to welcome the institutionalisation of the consultative meeting by implementing the joint communique of the inaugural meeting that decided the convening of the meeting on an annual basis. The PSC and the MSC are also expected to reiterate their commitment to deepen closer working relationship by implementing the conclusions of the inaugural consultative meeting. They may also welcome the steps taken in implementing the joint communique, particularly the convening of the Nouakchott process with the participation of ECOWAS and its member states. They may ask AU and ECOWAS Commissions to develop workstreams and focal points for operationalising the parts of the joint communique that are yet to be implemented. The PSC and the MSC may also underscore that most of the challenges in the region demand joint action and the collective weight of the AU and ECOWAS. The two sides may underscore the importance of ECOWAS as a key pillar of regional integration in the ECOWAS region and the need for revitalising ECOWAS and safeguarding the progress it registered during its 50-year journey. PSC and the MSC may also commend the measures ECOWAS adopted for keeping its door open for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, including by sustaining the benefits of ECOWAS membership to the citizens of the three countries.
Open Session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region
Open Session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region
Date | 13 May 2025
Tomorrow (14 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1279th session as an open session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Harold Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are also expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).
Despite the Council’s decision in 2019, during its 845th session, to institutionalise an annual session on Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) as a standing agenda item, the last time the Council convened a session dedicated to the theme was in May 2022 during its 1082nd session. However, the Council had consistently shown concern over the rise of transnational organised crime in Africa in several sessions on conflict-specific situations and on thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Council has also acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism. During its 1237th session, convened to consider the report of the AU Commission on combating terrorism in October 2024, the Council noted with deep concern the growing linkages between TOC and terrorism and called for the strengthening of international cooperation.
Tomorrow’s session is of particular importance given the accelerating pace at which organised criminal networks are expanding their operations across Africa and some countries and regions have become major sites of TOC. These include notably the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin. According to data from the Africa Organised Crime 2023 Index, countries in these regions exhibit some of the highest levels of organised criminality on the continent above the continental average of 5.25. Such is the case in Nigeria (7.28), Sudan (6.37), Cameroon (6.27), Mali (5.93), Burkina Faso (5.92), Niger (5.70) and Chad (5.50). Beyond trafficking in arms, TOC in these regions and beyond manifests in multiple forms: trafficking in narcotics, people, and fuel; cybercrime; and the illicit exploitation of natural resources, such as gold.
Another dimension of TOC is its deepening entanglements with terrorism, insurgency and broader instability. And the growing convergence between TOC and terrorism is increasingly evident in various parts of Africa, but more so in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, which are most affected by terrorism. While it does not account for it, TOC contributes to and is aggravated by the standing of the Sahel as the region that has become the epicentre of global terrorism. Illicit arms and weapons proliferation and trade is one example of TOC affecting the Sahel. In this context, the TOC and conflicts involving terrorist groups feed into each other, as criminal economies provide financial lifelines to extremist groups, while terrorist actors offer protection and enforcement mechanisms to illicit traders. These mutually reinforcing relationships allow both sets of actors to thrive in environments of weak state control, porous borders, and pervasive governance deficits.
The political economy of TOC goes beyond simply criminal economies in regions like the Sahel. It also creates an environment in which it is used as an informal survival strategy for marginalised communities, where state presence is weak and employment and livelihood opportunities are scarce. A 2024 UNODC report underscores this feature of TOC in the Sahel, both as intensifying violence and serving as a critical source of livelihood for economically marginalised communities. By distributing the benefits of illegal markets, non-state armed groups often gain accommodation from local communities, further entrenching their influence and ability to perpetuate the cycle of insecurity. Firearms trafficking, in particular, has played a catalytic role in triggering conflict across the Sahel. Additionally, the UNODC report notes that organised criminal networks provide financial and human resources to armed groups, thereby prolonging conflicts. Illicit economies are central to sustaining violence, as revenues are either directly or indirectly reinvested in weapons and logistical support, strengthening the operational and economic resilience of armed groups.
Given the role of unregulated borders in facilitating TOC, the other issue to be addressed in tomorrow’s session is the institutional weaknesses at the national level that create the vacuum for the emergence and expansion of TOC. This draws attention to some of the major underlying causes, including spaces with weak presence of state institutions and porous borders. Apart from addressing state fragility and expanding legitimate local structures of governance, this highlights the need for strengthening border control capacities through training, technology transfer, and joint operations.
In addition to receiving updates and reflecting on trends in TOC in the Sahel during the past few years and its intersection with insecurity and conflict, tomorrow’s session serves to follow up on PSC’s earlier engagements on the subject. In its communiqué from its 1082nd session, the PSC had requested AFRIPOL to work in collaboration with the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) to develop two databases; one on persons, groups and entities involved in Transnational Organised Crimes, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters; and another regional database for guiding member states and RECs/RMs on their policy interventions for Transnational Organised Crimes. The PSC also requested AFRIPOL and INTERPOL to produce in-depth research on ‘regional information papers in the fight against transnational organised crime’. Given the two-year lapse, tomorrow’s session will provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on these mandates and renew calls for institutional synergy. Also of importance is the need to bridge the gap, which is the disconnect between policy pronouncements and operational coherence. Coordination among the various AU bodies tasked with countering TOC continues to suffer from resource constraints and insufficient horizontal integration.
In terms of policy, some of the notable instruments include the November 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking on Human Beings, especially Women and Children, the 2014 Niamey Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation, the August 2019 AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2019-2023 and the December 2018 Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational Organised Crimes Project. Institutionally, AFRIPOL is one of the recent institutional structures instituted at the AU as the continent’s law enforcement coordination mechanism to, among others, deal with TOC. An example of the contribution of AFRIPOL in this respect is the launch of ‘Operation TAPI’ in Benin, the first cross-border initiative that targeted a range of illicit activities, including the trafficking of drugs, pharmaceuticals, arms, counterfeit or smuggled goods and environmental crimes. The operation will engage six AU member states: Benin, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria, Chad, and Togo. It is also worth giving due consideration to deepen the role of the Nouakchott Process and the Djibouti Process in contributing to addressing the scourge of TOC. However, the AU has as yet to find ways of bringing counter TOC to the centre of its conflict prevention, management and resolution processes in view of TOC’s deepening entanglement with conflict dynamics. For example, it is rare that reference is made to the policy instruments cited above in responding to and dealing with specific conflict situations.
Beyond the continental frameworks, there is also the issue of how to mainstream response to and address TOC in international conflict management. In Mali, despite a 2018 mandate to address TOC, the UN’s mission, MINUSMA, focused primarily on terrorist financing rather than tackling the broader political economy that sustains organised crime. A similar pattern was noted in the Central African Republic under MINUSCA. These examples reflect a systemic challenge to treat TOC as a central concern of conflict dynamics. They also illustrate the broader problem of siloed mandates and loosely integrated strategies, an area where there is an increasing need for adaptation by peacekeeping missions.
Against this backdrop, in tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC also faces the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of TOC and terrorism and emphasise the need for a multidimensional response that combines intelligence-sharing, targeted enforcement, and community resilience-building. The Council is likely to revisit the importance of early warning systems, localised peacebuilding efforts, institution-building, and socioeconomic development interventions as tools for preventing recruitment into criminal and terrorist networks. The 17th Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and the UNSC, convened on 6 October 2023, also underscored the necessity of a ‘multidimensional approach to tackle the structural root causes of insecurity’, while advocating for coordinated responses to the interlinked threats of terrorism and TOC in the Sahel. It also highlighted the importance of sustained international engagement. The need for stronger international partnerships is likely to be reiterated, as collaboration with global partners remains crucial for securing predictable and sustainable financing for regional initiatives. The PSC had emphasised the importance of cooperation with institutions such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), UNODC, and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) in previous sessions. The 17th Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC reinforced the value of aligning AU-led responses with global strategies like the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel while calling for increased, predictable funding for regional initiatives. Tomorrow’s session is expected to echo these calls, pushing for greater international support while ensuring that responses remain context-sensitive and locally owned.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the increasing threat of the scourge of transnational organised crime in Africa. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional and multipronged approach that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. In this regard, it may call for increased use of livelihood support interventions, the rolling out of legitimate local governance structures and other peacebuilding and development support activities as critical measures to address not just the symptoms but also the underlying factors that make TOC possible. Given the transnational nature of TOC, the PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention and the lessons from AFRIPOL’s Operation TAPI. It may also reiterate the importance of the Nouakchott and Djibouti processes while underscoring the need for ensuring that those processes expand their lens beyond the security and law enforcement domain to integrate peacebuilding with a focus on advancing economic development and building of legitimate local governance structures that facilitate the delivery of social services. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole of AU system approach, emphasising both the need for coordination between AU security institutions such as AFRIPOL and CISSA, and importantly, the role of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), African Development Bank, AUDA/NEPAD, African Governance Architecture. The PSC may emphasise the need to develop counter TOC as a key area of joint action with the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). It may task the AU Commission to develop and present a comprehensive report on both the trends in TOC in Africa and importantly on how the AU contributes to addressing the growing scourge of TOC leveraging on its broader governance, regional integration and peace and security norms and instruments while enhancing the role of AFRIPOL and CISSA in this area. The PSC may also task the AU, working closely with RECs/RMs, to develop guidance on giving growing attention to TOC in developing and implementing peace and security initiatives in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. It may also call for greater international support and cooperation in developing responses to the threat posed by TOC.
The Future of United Nations - African Union Peacekeeping Partnership: Practical Considerations for the Berlin Ministerial Conference
The Future of United Nations - African Union Peacekeeping Partnership: Practical Considerations for the Berlin Ministerial Conference
Date | 8 May 2025
INTRODUCTION
This report outlines what could constitute Africa’s key messages to the Berlin Ministerial Conference, informed by the continent’s extensive experience with peacekeeping operations and the imperative to harness the complementarity between UN and African Union (AU) efforts, while also situating the debate on the future of peacekeeping within the broader context of an evolving multilateral system. It then proceeds to highlight specific steps for enhancing the UN-AU partnership, drawing directly from the conclusions of the study on the future of peacekeeping. In its concluding section, the report underscores the relevance of peacekeeping to today’s peace and security challenges while continuing to adapt to remain fit for purpose, as well as its significance as an essential component of the very multilateral architecture that, in spite of its shortcomings, nonetheless offers Africa its most effective platform for advancing its agenda and interests on the global stage.
Africa and the African Union in Shaping the Future of Peacekeeping and the Berlin Ministerial
Africa and the African Union in Shaping the Future of Peacekeeping and the Berlin Ministerial
Date | 6 May 2025
INTRODUCTION
Peacekeeping faces unprecedented challenges, driven by rapidly evolving security threats, complex global geopolitics, and shifting priorities among Member States. While talk of the ‘end of peacekeeping’ may be overstated, the foundational consensus that has long supported peacekeeping missions has faded, if not collapsed. In response, the international community—including policymakers, scholars, and peacekeeping practitioners—is engaged in a deep reassessment of peacekeeping’s role, relevance, and the strategies required to adapt and make it fit for these changes and challenges.
This policy brief presents an analysis of the major themes and insights that emerged from a day-long conference that Amani Africa convened on 19 March 2025 based on the UN Commissioned Independent Study on the Future of Peacekeeping.
Briefing on AU Support to Member States on Security Sector Reform
Briefing on AU Support to Member States on Security Sector Reform
Date | 6 May 2025
Tomorrow (07 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1278th session to receive a briefing on the theme ‘AU Support to Member States (The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan) on Security Sector Reform (SSR): Lessons Learned and Perspectives on the Way Forward’.
The session will commence with opening statements by Harold Bundu Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are expected from the representatives of The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, and South Sudan. Mali, currently suspended from AU activities, will not participate in the session. In addition, statements may be delivered by the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), will also address the session. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) may brief the PSC on the study reviewing the SSR processes in the five countries, conducted in partnership with the AU Commission.
This is not the first time the PSC is addressing the issue of Security Sector Reform. The last dedicated discussion on the theme took place at the 874th session in September 2019, held in the context of the commemoration of Africa Amnesty Month. In that session, the PSC underscored that good governance of the security sector is a sine qua non for sustainable economic and political development and recognised SSR as a ‘delicate, sensitive, and politically complex process’ requiring careful handling. SSR is also featured regularly in PSC discussions on country-specific situations. For instance, at its 844th session in April 2019, the PSC considered a progress report on SSR in The Gambia. During its 1219th session in June 2024, while reviewing the report of its field mission to South Sudan, the PSC called on the Chairperson of the Commission to provide technical support to South Sudan on SSR, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and the collection of weapons currently in illegal possession.
Beyond the PSC, the AU Commission undertook several activities in 2023 to mark the 10th anniversary of the AU SSR Policy Framework, adopted by the AU Assembly at its 20th Ordinary Session. In November 2023, it convened a major conference under the theme ‘The African Union Security Sector Reform Policy Framework: A Decade of Implementation’. This served as a platform for reflecting on achievements, challenges, and lessons from a decade of AU support to Member States, while setting a course for the next phase. Also in November, the AU Commission convened the 5th meeting of the AU/Regional Economic Communities (RECs) SSR Steering Committee—established in 2019—which reviewed the implementation of the AU SSR Policy Framework and discussed follow-up on the Addis Ababa conference, agreeing to submit recommendations to the PSC for strategic guidance.
The AU Commission, in partnership with the ISS, has also conducted a study documenting lessons from AU engagement on SSR in The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan. Tomorrow’s session is expected to build on this study, offering a reflection on AU’s engagement over the past decade, identifying gaps, and informing recalibrated approaches to better support Member States.
Over the years, the engagement of the AU in SSR is anchored on various normative and institutional frameworks elaborated as part of its peace and security mandate. The 2013 AU SSR Policy Framework remains central, offering guidance to the AU, RECs, Member States, and partners on implementing SSR programmes. SSR is also a pillar of the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy—revised in 2024—which outlines key objectives for conflict-affected states. Complementing this framework, the AU Commission has developed several Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) on aspects of SSR including training, needs assessments, legislative harmonisation, codes of conduct, good practices, monitoring and evaluation, and gender integration. In October 2024, the Commission also finalised draft OGNs on ‘Oversight and Accountability in SSR’ and ‘SSR and Mediation’, which were validated through a workshop.
At the institutional level, the AU’s DDR/SSR Division, under the Governance and Conflict Prevention Directorate, oversees SSR-related activities. The Commission also established mechanisms for regular dialogue and coordination, including the triannual SSR Africa Forum and the annual SSR Steering Committee, which bring together the AU, RECs, the UN, and other partners to coordinate support and share best practices.
The AU’s SSR work is integral to its broader peace and security agenda, including Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063 and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ flagship initiative, which should be applied not only in post-conflict settings but also as a conflict prevention strategy. Its efforts focus on three core areas: providing direct technical support to Member States, generating knowledge tools and building capacity, and promoting coordination among actors. Support to Member States is provided upon request and typically covers design, implementation, and coordination of nationally led SSR processes.
Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to highlight country-specific engagements by the AU Commission in the five focus countries.
In The Gambia, AU support has demonstrated how modest interventions can yield significant results. Between 2018 and 2020, the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG)—a small group of SSR and rule of law experts—was embedded in national institutions. The team assisted in developing the National Security Policy, structuring the Office of the National Security Adviser, reorganising the Ministry of Defence and the Gambia Armed Forces, and enhancing civil-military cooperation. Though the AUTSTG’s mandate ended in 2020, AU support has continued. In November 2024, the Commission supported the review of the national SSR strategy and helped develop an M&E framework in line with the AU Operational Guidance Note.
In Mali, the AU provided support through its Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), deploying a DDR/SSR expert in 2018 to assist in implementing accelerated DDR and restructuring defence and security forces. In 2024, the AU supported efforts to enhance national capacity for SSR M&E, aligned with Mali’s National SSR Strategy (2020–2024).
AU support to Madagascar began in 2014 after a constitutional crisis. The AU led a joint SSR assessment with partners, identifying key priorities. Subsequently, the Commission deployed SSR experts to the AU Liaison Office in Madagascar to advise on the formulation, design and implementation of a nationally led SSR initiative. This engagement contributed to the adoption of a national SSR Policy in 2016. The Commission also supported the country’s SSR revitalisation processes in the re-establishment of a national SSR coordination mechanism.
In Lesotho, the AU worked in close collaboration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2016, the AU and SADC supported a national technical workshop on SSR that helped forge consensus on the importance of implementing SSR and establishing the necessary legal, institutional, and financial frameworks. The AU further deployed a consultant to support the reform process.
In South Sudan, following a request from the government and a PSC decision, the AU deployed a DDR/SSR consultant between November 2023 and February 2024 to support the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) in developing SSR guidelines, which were validated in July 2024. Ongoing technical needs, the Commission also deployed a senior DDR/SSR consultant with arms management expertise in November 2024.
In addition to highlighting technical support, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to reflect on key challenges and lessons. One of the major challenges in this regard is securing political will. SSR is not merely a technical exercise but is fundamentally political as it involves control over the state’s coercive instruments. As such, governments may be reluctant to embrace SSR, particularly when it challenges entrenched power structures. Even when SSR is launched—sometimes to meet donor expectations—it often lacks genuine political backing or adequate resources. South Sudan provides a case in point: despite AU support, the SSR process has stalled amid delays in force unification and deployment. Tensions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, exacerbated by the 4 March 2025 incident, underline the risks of half-hearted commitment.
These experiences demonstrate the importance of advocacy and awareness-raising to encourage Member States to view SSR as essential to peace and democratisation. Trust is also vital. Without confidence in the support provided—both in terms of the AU’s impartiality and the expertise of its consultants—Member States may resist or delay cooperation. Ensuring national ownership and deploying highly qualified technical experts are critical for success.
Moreover, while SSR is a necessary condition for sustainable peace, it is not sufficient on its own. To achieve lasting outcomes, it must be embedded within broader processes of political reform and democratisation. In this context, it is particularly important to integrate and ensure the coordinated implementation of interrelated programmes such as DDR and transitional justice as part of a comprehensive political settlement.
The complex socio-political and security dynamics in political transitions and stabilisation processes present another challenge, often slowing SSR implementation. The lack of inclusive processes and the failure to design gender-sensitive SSR programmes are also critical gaps that need to be addressed
Another challenge is funding. AU support to the five countries has often involved short-term consultancy deployments due to budget constraints, even though long-term engagement is necessary. Increasing the allocation of resources from the AU Peace Fund could help address this gap. The recent operationalisation of the Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), in line with the Assembly’s February 2023 decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.2(XXXVI)], is a promising development. It is to be recalled that the AU disbursed USD 1 million in late 2023 to support DDR efforts in Ethiopia. Given the involvement of multiple stakeholders in SSR, enhanced coordination also remains imperative to prevent duplication and ensure efficient use of limited resources.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the decades of support provided by the AU Commission to Member States in implementing SSR programmes. It may encourage Member States to fully utilise the technical support offered by the Commission, including the AU SSR Policy Framework and Operational Guidance Notes. At the same time, the communiqué may underscore the need to address key challenges impeding effective SSR implementation, particularly the lack of political commitment and funding gaps. In this context, the PSC may highlight the importance of sustained advocacy and awareness-raising to promote SSR as a cornerstone of lasting peace. The PSC may call for embedding SSR in robust security sector governance reform and political settlement. It may also emphasise the need for adequate and predictable funding to strengthen the Commission’s support. To this end, and alongside efforts to mobilise resources and coordinate with international partners, the PSC may explore the possibility of leveraging the AU Peace Fund to finance SSR support to Member States. It may further encourage Member States to integrate SSR-related expenditures into their national budgets. Finally, the PSC may stress the imperative of designing and implementing inclusive and gender-responsive SSR programmes in Member States.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2025
Date | March 2025
In March, under the chairship of Morocco, as the stand-in chair on behalf of The Gambia, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of six sessions, covering seven agenda items, an informal session and induction of members of the PSC.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2025
Date | May 2025
In May, the Republic of Sierra Leone will take the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Program of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages five substantive sessions, all scheduled at the ambassadorial level and a field mission to the Republic of Guinea. Among the five sessions, only one is country-specific session on the political situation in Gabon.
On 7 May, the PSC will hold its first session of the month to receive a briefing on the AU’s support to Member States—specifically The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan—in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR), focusing on lessons learned and the way forward. Notably, since its 844th session, which focused on SSR efforts in The Gambia, the PSC has not held a dedicated session to review and assess SSR support of the AU. In the case of The Gambia, following a request in 2017, the PSC mandated a needs assessment that led to key recommendations on state-building priorities, including SSR, the rule of law, transitional justice, and human rights. The PSC endorsed the assessment during its 694th session, resulting in the deployment of a ten-member AU Technical Support Team from 2018 to 2020 to assist national security institutions. Recognising ongoing challenges in coordinating SSR efforts, the AU Commission later deployed an SSR Consultant from October to December 2021 to provide targeted technical support. Building on these efforts, in November 2024, the AU further supported in enhancing The Gambia’s national SSR strategy, aligning it with the AU’s Operational Guidance Note on Monitoring and Evaluation. In Lesotho, the AU Commission provided similar support, focusing on capacity building through training and research to enhance strategic SSR competencies. These efforts also emphasised national ownership, self-assessment, and the development of reform action plans to guide prioritisation and resource mobilisation. In Mali, on 31 July 2024, through its mission MISAHEL, the AUC delivered technical and institutional support, particularly in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), helping to build national expertise aligned with the 2022–2024 National SSR Strategy. Complementary efforts in The Gambia also involved reviewing the national SSR process and establishing an M&E Framework to assess alignment with national security priorities and democratic principles. In South Sudan, following a request from the government and a PSC decision, the AU Commission deployed a DDR/SSR consultant from November 2023 to February 2024 to support the development of SSR guidelines under the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) and the guidelines were validated in July 2024. Due to continued technical needs, particularly on SSR documentation, and in response to PSC calls for inclusive strategies to address intercommunal violence and arms management, the AU also deployed a senior DDR/SSR consultant with arms management expertise in November 2024. The session is also expected to feature briefings on best practices that can be applied in contexts where states face a high risk of relapse into conflict.
The next session, set for 12 May, will focus on addressing food insecurity and conflict in Africa. Although PSC has addressed food insecurity in the context of its annual sessions on humanitarian action in Africa, it was not until its 1083rd session, held on 9 May 2022, that the Council dedicated a meeting specifically to the link between food security and conflict. Later that year, the PSC also explored the issue in relation to climate change. In the Communiqué adopted by the 1083rd session, the impact of conflicts on food production and the role they play in the disruption of agricultural yields and value chains was emphasised. Of particular significance was the PSC’s condemnation of ‘any kind of conditionality for food access and the use of starvation as instruments of war and/or access to humanitarian assistance.’ Currently, this is particularly important in the war in Sudan, where access to food is used as an instrument of war and the fighting involves targeting of agricultural production. Building on its previous session, the PSC is expected to review how food insecurity and conflict intersect and the ways in which the intersection between the two manifests itself in current conflicts. In terms of countries affected by conflict, the World Bank’s March 2025 Food Security Update further highlights that nearly 25 million people in Sudan, 6.3 million in South Sudan, and 3.4 million in Somalia are facing acute food insecurity. Additionally, the session also presents the opportunity for the PSC to follow up on its previous decisions, including conducting a study with recommendations to improve food production, strengthening coordination across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts, and receiving regular briefings from regional centres on climate change, agriculture, and food security.
The third session planned for the month is an open session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region planned for 14 May. During its 845th session held on 25 April 2019, the PSC had decided to hold an annual session on the theme of transnational organised crime and peace and security in Africa. The session comes against the backdrop of deepening security challenges in the region marked by the expanding nexus between transnational organised crime and terrorism. While the three Sahelian states: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso had pledged to jointly address terrorism through a new regional force under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) following their withdrawal from ECOWAS, there is concern that the disrupted flow of information, intelligence sharing and cross border cooperation could worsen the region’s response to security threats and cross-border organised crime. This lack of coordinated regional response, compounded also by the dissolution of the G5 Sahel, has increased the risk of further terrorist expansion in the central Sahel region, making the region the epicentre of global terrorism. A recent UNODC report on the impact of transnational organised crime on stability and development in the Sahel, highlights the dual role of organised crime in the Sahel noting that while it fuels violence by financing armed groups and exacerbating competition over illicit markets, it also serves as a critical livelihood source in areas with few economic alternatives, something the PSC would need to grapple with to develop effective responses. Stabilisation efforts in the Sahel have predominantly focused on terrorism and have largely underestimated the role transnational organised crime plays in driving the current situation in the Sahel. As such, the session will provide the PSC an opportunity to shape coherent continental responses that match the scale and complexity of the threat. The session would also serve the PSC to recalibrate its approach to the Sahel by coupling security cooperation with sustained diplomatic and political engagement. While strengthening coordination among AU member states’ police forces and enhancing collaboration with international partners remain essential, the AU must also ensure that suspension from its activities does not hinder its responsibility toward affected countries. The last time the PSC considered this theme was during its 1082nd session. The session would also present an opportunity for the PSC to follow up on its decisions from that session, including its request for AFRIPOL to work in close collaboration with CISSA and INTERPOL to urgently develop a comprehensive database of persons, groups and entities involved in Transnational Organised Crimes, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters, as well as regional databases on Transnational Organised Crimes in order to guide Member States and RECs/RMs in the formulation of necessary policy interventions.
On 16 May, the PSC is scheduled to convene its second annual joint consultative meeting with the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The consultative meeting is in alignment with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, which emphasises the importance of close collaboration and policy coordination with RECs/RMs. The meeting will be an opportunity to assess progress since the inaugural session held in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2024 and reinforce collaborative efforts against West Africa’s pressing security challenges. The inaugural consultative meeting between the Councils had urged for the immediate operationalisation and revitalisation of regional security frameworks such as the Nouakchott and Djibouti Process and synergised international and regional efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism.
On the same day, the PSC will commemorate the International Day of Living Together in Peace.
The final session of the month, scheduled for 19 May, will be dedicated to the political situation in Gabon. This will mark the PSC’s second engagement on Gabon since its 1241st session held in October 2024, which followed the Council’s field mission to Libreville, Gabon in September 2024. Following the presidential elections held in Gabon on 12 April and the emergence of the coup leader, General Brice Oligui Nguema, as the winner of the election, the PSC convened a session on 30 April 2025 to determine whether the conclusion of the elections would mark the restoration of constitutional order in Gabon, which would warrant the lifting of the suspension placed by the AU.
Aside from these substantive sessions, the last activity of the PSC for May 2025 is expected to be a field visit to the Republic of Guinea that will take place 30-31 May 2025. In the footnote, the program of work also envisages a possible engagement of the Council with the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The last time the PSC held an interaction with the AU Commission Chairperson was in September 2019.
Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic
Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic
Date | 29 April 2025
Tomorrow (30 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene for its 1277th meeting to review the Political transition program of the Gabonese Republic.
The meeting will begin with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to be present at the meeting to make a presentation, followed by remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives from ECCAS and the Gabonese Republic are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s meeting is being convened as an additional agenda item to the programme, as the session was not on the initial programme of work for April, having been proposed for May. This session also comes exactly two weeks after Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president, won the presidential election, by about 90 per cent of the vote. Following the 2023 coup, the country progressed with a transition roadmap, in which Gabon’s Council of Ministers, following the adoption by Gabon’s parliament of a new electoral code, set out the rules and conditions for organising elections in the country, which declared the presidential elections to take place on 12 April 2025. In addition, the Gabonese voters approved a new constitution in November 2024. The proposed new constitution introduced changes, including the establishment of presidential term limits and the elimination of the prime minister’s position.
It is to be recalled that following the mission it undertook to Gabon on 12 to 14 September 2024, the PSC held a session for considering the Report of the mission, which sought to legitimise the coup stating that ‘[t]he [Gabonese] interlocutors mentioned that the coup d’état of 30 August 2024, which they described as a ‘Liberation Coup’, was a peaceful coup with no bloodshed.’ The PSC failed to communicate the AU rule on non-eligibility of those who participated in the military seizure of power under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Instead, the communique of its 1241st session that considered the report of the field mission requested ‘the AU Commission to engage the Transition Authority of Gabon to identify areas of support and provide the needed technical and financial support to Gabon…’ In addition to this, the Council also requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to use his good office to engage with the leader of the Transition Authority to mediate the differences with the former President to ensure a smooth and peaceful transition in the country.’
As a follow-up to the foregoing, the AU deployed an election observation mission to Gabon. Following the election, it also welcomed the outcome of the election and expressed a congratulatory message. Tomorrow’s session comes as the presidential victory of Nguema would mark the end of the political transition in the country. The purpose of the meeting is accordingly to determine that the conclusion of the election marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of the suspension of Gabon.
The fact that Gabon’s military-led transitional government agreed to a transitional timeline and respected the timeline is notable. This together with the conclusion of the election on and of itself does not indicate that Gabon is witnessing a new dawn of democracy. Even then, the fact remains that the PSC determined that a coup happened in Gabon and suspended Gabon from participation in the activities of the AU. The nature of the process followed for restoring constitutional order does not vitiate or render inapplicable Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Even if the PSC proceeds with deciding to lift the suspension of Gabon, as it seems to be prepared to do, in the light of the outcome of its field mission, it needs to address the question of the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This is critical not just from the perspective of PSC’s credibility in the face of its policy position of zero tolerance to unconstitutional changes of government, particularly coups. It is imperative for at least two strategic considerations. The first of this is the precedent that the election of someone who led a military seizure of power sets for those involved in military usurpation of power in the other five countries with respect to the applicability of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The second strategic consideration is the message that such leniency in the enforcement of Article 25(4) sends to all militaries on the continent. If those who seize power through military coup can be legitimised through election that the AU endorses, why should not militaries across the continent feel that the benefits of engaging in a coup outweighs its risks and costs?
It emerges from the foregoing that the question before the PSC during tomorrow’s session is not a simple question of whether the ‘successful’ conclusion of the elections in Gabon marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of Gabon’s suspension. The PSC also has to address the question of the implications of the election of Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president in the face of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. As outlined in a recent analysis, this necessitates that the PSC engages in thoughtful reflection by putting the case of Gabon in the broader context of all the countries under suspension and the applicable AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government.
The process followed thus far by the PSC and the AU in relation to the transitional process in Gabon suggests that the PSC is unlikely to consider as an option non-recognition of the outcomes of the elections that marked the end of the transitional period as representing restoration of constitutional order in Gabon. If the PSC consequently lifts the suspension of Gabon, what can and should the PSC do about the implications of this with respect to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance? First, it should be recognised that there is a breach of Article 25(4). Second, the PSC needs to state clearly that it does not condone the breach. Third and relatedly, it needs to affirm the validity of the AU rule under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Fourth, the PSC also requires to state that the breach of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in some cases does not mean to set a precedent that overturns the application of the rule under Article 25(4) in other cases. Fifth and finally, the PSC needs to express its commitment to this provision and its application in future cases.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will lift the suspension of Gabon from participating in AU activities. It remains unclear if the PSC would take account of and pronounce itself on the lack of compliance in the Gabon election process with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. At the very least, it can indicate that it stands by Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and it does not consider any deviation from this article as negating the applicability of this provision, hence the prohibition of coups and the exclusion of coup makers from benefiting from their engagement in prohibited acts. It is worth noting that there will be a press conference by the PSC Chairperson, the AU Commission Chairperson, Gabon and the Commissioner for PAPS. It is expected that they will commend Gabon for concluding the transitional process within the agreed timeline and call on others to follow the example of Gabon in having a time-bound transitional process for restoring constitutional order.
