Amani Africa Monthly Highlights: September 2026
AMANI AFRICA MONTHLY HIGHLIGHTS
September 2026
HIGHLIGHTS
Research
I. Insights on the PSC
Amani Africa’s flagship work, Insights on the PSC, provides current information and independent analysis ahead of PSC sessions to inform the preparation for and deliberation of Council members on the agenda of each session of the PSC. During September, the series covered child protection, women, peace and security, regional cooperation against terrorism, and Africa Amnesty Month.
- Protection of Child Soldiers in Africa (UNSCR 1612 (2005)) | 1 September 2026
In addition to highlighting the persistence of the challenge of child soldiers in Africa, including the nature and scale of the six grave violations against children in conflict situations, this edition of the Insight on the PSC pointed out the finding that state and government forces accounted for more violations than non-state armed groups. It highlighted how the PSC advances progress in relation to the agenda on children affected by armed conflicts through stronger implementation tracking of earlier PSC commitments and accountability.
- High-Level Ministerial Seminar on Women, Peace and Security | 8 September 2026
Ahead of the second Swakopmund Process ministerial seminar, the analysis examined the current state of the WPS agenda, including the policy-to-implementation gap across the prevention, participation and protection pillars of the WPS agenda. It focused on meaningful participation in formal peace processes, operationalising quota and parity commitments, predictable financing, stronger prevention and protection measures, and more systematic monitoring and accountability.
- Commemoration of the 2026 Africa Amnesty Month | 13 September 2026
This edition of Insights on the PSC provided background information and analysis on the state of circulation of SALW and the use of anti-personnel mines, as well as outcomes of previous sessions of the PSC on the Africa Amnesty Month. To register progress, it called for moving from general discussion to concrete action in relation to specific conflict situations. It pointed out that this can be achieved through an independent report identifying the sources and channels of supply of arms in conflict situations, such as that requested by the communiqué of the 1218th session of the PSC on Sudan. It thus emphasised that ‘[i]n the absence of effective follow-up on such decisions, the commemoration of the Amnesty Month will remain part of the declaratory engagements disconnected from and lacking tangible relevance in respect to any of the conflict settings on the continent.’
- Good Neighbourliness and Regional Responses to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa | 22 September 2026
The analysis considered how the thematic focus of this session shifts the discussion about terrorism from a focus on trends and technical responses to the political and strategic question of ‘how the state of relations among neighbouring countries affects their ability to respond collectively to terrorism and other security threats.’ Drawing on the 2004 Solemn Declaration on Common African Defence and Security Policy and the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, it highlighted how this question affects the effectiveness of regional and continental responses to conflicts and terrorism in Africa.
II. Monthly Digest
- August Monthly Digest | August 2026
The August Monthly Digest reviews the PSC’s key engagements during the month, including education in conflict, developments in the Sahel and South Sudan, the Sudan field mission, progress on Silencing the Guns, and consultations involving PAP, ACHPR and continental early warning mechanisms.
III. Ideas Indaba
Ideas Indaba is Amani Africa’s platform for workshopping opinion, commentary and policy debate on current developments that are of concern or interest for Africa and the AU.
- African Union’s 2011 peacemaking in Libya: Lessons for the Review of the African Peace and Security Architecture | 14 September 2026
The article revisits the AU’s 2011 Libya mediation to draw lessons for the APSA review. It highlights how weak AU–UN coordination, rejection of mediation by one conflict party, external military intervention and institutional capacity constraints undermined the AU’s effort. It underscores early coordination with the UN, securing buy-in from all conflict parties, stronger professional mediation support and greater coherence among African actors.
- The 18 September UNSC Straw Poll for the selection of Antonio Guterres’s successor opens the race wide as an African’s chance as a consensus candidate grows | 20 September 2026
This Ideas Indaba article analysed the 18 September UNSC straw poll for selecting the next UN Secretary-General. While noting the strong performance of the frontrunner and the temporarily improved standing of Olara Otunnu, it established that the poll left the race wide open, with the possibility of some candidates starting to exit the race as several of them lost significant ground.
- From State Making to State Unmaking: The Horn of Africa and the Rise of Permanent War in a Changing Regional Environment | 21 September 2026
The article argues that the Horn of Africa is increasingly part of a single Red Sea security theatre in which external alliances, ports, drones, proxy relationships and war economies can erode rather than consolidate state authority. Framing this as a reversal of the idea that war makes states, it calls for peacemaking to become an instrument of statecraft and for the AU and IGAD to develop a sustained Horn of Africa–Red Sea framework.
- Sudan Is Still Possible: A UN General Assembly Opportunity to Turn Mediation into Action | 23 September 2026
Against the backdrop of Sudan’s worsening war and humanitarian crisis, the article argues that existing mediation mechanisms have produced a foundation but not yet a common strategy. It calls for coordinated Quad–Quintet action around a shared political destination, humanitarian de-escalation, external restraint, a disciplined division of labour and a time-bound action plan, alongside a minimum national platform from Sudanese political and civic actors.
STRATEGIC CONVENING, OUTREACH & MEDIA ENGAGEMENT
I. Policy Dialogue forums
Amani Africa convened, with the participation of Amnesty International, a policy dialogue examining how the Luanda Summit outcome and the APSA review can translate into stronger AU action for civilian protection, particularly in Sudan, the DRC and the Sahel. The discussion focused on recentering the principle of non-indifference, strengthening accountability, ensuring more effective AU follow-up on protection commitments, and promoting the meaningful inclusion of affected communities and civil society in AU protection decisions.
- From the Luanda Summit to the Finalisation of APSA: Revitalising the AU’s Role in Conflict Prevention and Resolution | 30 September 2026
The policy dialogue examined how the outcomes of the Luanda Summit can inform the finalisation of the APSA review and strengthen the AU’s role in conflict prevention and resolution. It focused on practical ways to enhance the AU’s agency in major conflict situations, strengthen early warning and preventive diplomacy, and improve the effectiveness of AU peacemaking and mediation mechanisms.
II. Selected Strategic Engagements
- Working session with Cameroon’s Permanent Mission to the AU | 18 September 2026
Amani Africa hosted H.E. Ambassador Ewumbue Monono and Cameroon’s PSC team for a working session. During the session, the two sides held exchanges on the PSC’s October Provisional Programme of Work under Cameroon’s chairship. The engagement also identified areas for close collaboration during Cameroon’s chairship.
- Meeting with H.E. Ambassador Fiseha of Ethiopia’s Permanent Mission to the AU | 18 September 2026
Amani Africa held a meeting with H.E. Ambassador Lemlem Fiseha. The exchanges focused on current PSC matters. Significantly, it served to discuss modalities for follow-up on Amani Africa’s recent engagement with Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs on COP32 and our work on climate, peace and security.
- Presentation on advancing the Luanda Summit outcome on conflict prevention | 17 September 2026
Drawing on the body of work built over time and an upcoming policy brief, Amani Africa Director Dr Solomon A. Dersso outlined why the core gap in conflict prevention is political, what makes up this gap & its sources and what needs to be done & how, during a presentation at the AU PAPS Department expert meeting on how to take the outcome of the Luanda Summit forward on conflict prevention and the conditions needed for effective preventive diplomacy, including trust, sustained engagement, diplomatic persuasion, political buy-in and collective responsibility.
- Amani Africa welcomed H.E. Ambassador Berggrav of the Royal Norwegian Embassy | 24 September 2026
Amani Africa welcomed Ambassador-designate Yngvild Berggrav and Deputy Head of Mission Signe Guro Gilen to our office. On the occasion, we held exchanges on Amani Africa’s work, current regional and continental issues and opportunities to deepen our cooperation.
- Intervention on climate, peace and security at UNECA | 10 September 2026
Dr Solomon Dersso highlighted the need for precision on the climate–peace–security nexus as a necessary requirement for avoiding policy incoherence. It underscored that the resolution of the adverse impacts of climate change, including on peace and security, depends on the implementation of the climate change commitments of adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage, while the value of the climate, peace and security agenda lies in whether it advances such implementation and whether it facilitates greater access to climate funding for conflict-affected and fragile countries, which currently have the least access.
- Received H.E. Ambassador Annika Allman, Ambassador-Designate of Canada’s Observer Mission to the AU | 24 September 2026
Amani Africa had the pleasure of welcoming Ambassador-designate Annika Allman to our office. The occasion served to discuss Canada’s priorities as an AU observer, Amani Africa’s work and possible areas of collaboration.
- Engagement with the ICRC Delegation to the African Union | 21 September 2026
Amani Africa welcomed an ICRC delegation to our office. It formally received the new Head of Delegation, Ibrahima Tounkara, and held extensive exchanges on shared priorities and areas for joint collaboration, including with respect to the AU’s theme of the year for 2026.
- Received Pirjo-Liisa Heikkila, the Embassy of Finland | 29 September 2026
Amani Africa welcomed Pirjo-Liisa Heikkilä, Deputy Head of Mission of Finland and Deputy Permanent Representative to the AU. The occasion served to discuss Amani Africa’s work, the impact that Amani Africa’s work supported by Finland registered and ongoing areas of collaboration.
- Exchange with the Korea National Diplomatic Academy delegation | 18 September 2026
Amani Africa held discussions with a Korea National Diplomatic Academy delegation on how shifts in the global order are testing multilateral institutions, the implications for regional powers and the Global South, and prospects for cooperation and reform.
III. Media References
Amani Africa’s analysis continued to gain external visibility, with its work referenced by media and research platforms covering peace, security and regional developments in Africa.
- An article published in the Guardian, Nigeria, made favourable reference to Amani Africa’s special research report on the APSA review. It noted, among others, that the Addis Ababa-based think tank, Amani Africa, in August 2026 provided ‘a detailed response to the AU report.’
- Amani Africa’s analysis on good neighbourliness and regional responses to security and terrorism challenges was referenced by SPACE and Sin Cortes in their coverage of conflict, peace and regional developments.
Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities
Briefing of the ICRC and the IFRC on the humanitarian situation and their activities
Date | 12 October 2026
Tomorrow (13 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1373rd session to receive a briefing from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa, and a briefing by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2026, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, ICRC President, is expected to deliver a presentation. This is followed by a presentation by Kate Forbes, President of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to be the IFRC’s first briefing to the PSC. The IFRC supports Africa’s National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in responding to disasters, disease outbreaks, hunger and displacement, while strengthening local capacity and community resilience. In view of the growing gap between humanitarian needs and international support, there is a heightening demand for enhancing national humanitarian capacity. The role of IFRC in working with and supporting national societies is thus gaining significance.
Since becoming a statutory meeting in 2007, the session has been meant to provide updates on major humanitarian issues across Africa and developments in humanitarian aid. Tomorrow’s briefing, delivered by the President of the ICRC for the first time since assuming her role in October 2022, will build on the Council’s 1307th session, held on 24 October 2025. In the outcome of the 1307th session, the PSC pressed for regular joint ICRC-IFRC briefings to the PSC, accompanied by more concrete assistance from the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, especially for the refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. Furthermore, it called for the ‘expedited development of the Common African Position on IHL and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfare’ and the imperative for the ‘development of an AU Humanitarian Diplomacy Framework.’
The humanitarian situation in Africa in 2026 is severe, marked by the triple conditions of increasing need, constrained humanitarian space, and a significant funding shortfall. More than 160 million people across the continent are in need of humanitarian assistance. This condition has been significantly compounded by restrictive operating environments and the crisis in the Middle East, which has driven up fuel, transport and food costs; disrupted supply chains; and placed additional strain on already fragile economies and food systems.
Some of the conflict situations, notably Sudan, led to the emergence of the largest displacement crisis in the world. More than 45 million people are reported to be forcibly displaced on the continent, mostly owing to conflicts.
Eastern Africa remains one of the world’s most severe humanitarian hotspots, with 48.5 million people in need of assistance in 2026 driven by conflict, displacement, climate shocks, disease outbreaks and food insecurity. Food insecurity worsened in the second quarter, with 40.5 million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels, 1.6 million more than in the first quarter and the sharpest rises were reported, in the context of the super El Niño event, in South Sudan, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Ebola outbreak is deepening an already severe crisis, with more than 6.1 million people displaced and 26.6 million facing acute food insecurity, mostly in the conflict-affected east. Continued fighting is expected to drive further displacement, loss of livelihoods and serious violations against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence.
In West Africa, another humanitarian hotspot on the continent, OCHA estimates that 24.3 million people across the Sahel will need humanitarian assistance and protection in 2026, with deteriorating security as the main driver. In the Central Sahel, 2.8 million people are internally displaced and 401,000 children suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Seasonal flooding has added to the strain. As of the end of September 2026, seasonal rains had triggered widespread flooding throughout West and Central Africa, affecting 1.5 million people in 15 countries, with Nigeria, Ghana and DRC accounting for almost 90 per cent of those affected. The floods displaced some 595,000 people, damaged or destroyed 117,000 homes, claimed 533 lives and injured around 1,500, while also hitting 300 schools, 26 health facilities, cropland and livestock.
Despite these growing humanitarian needs, only about 26.7 per cent of the required humanitarian funding has been mobilised. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to shed light on both immediate humanitarian challenges and the longer-term question of how Africa can develop more sustainable solutions to the persistence of humanitarian crises on the continent. Africa needs to adopt both mitigation measures geared towards addressing the immediate needs and risks and resolution measures seeking to address the conditions that induce and sustain humanitarian crises, including displacement. Particular attention should be given to conflict prevention and resolution, considering that conflicts and political and security crises account for much of the humanitarian crises on the continent.
The humanitarian consequences of public health crises remain significant. In addition to the risks associated with the persistence of the Ebola outbreak in DRC, the session may also examine the growing intersection between public health emergencies, conflict, and displacement. The Ebola outbreak unfolding in DRC highlights the challenges of responding to health emergencies in environments characterised by insecurity, displacement, and weak health systems. Ongoing violence in affected areas has disrupted healthcare delivery, restricted humanitarian access, and undermined response efforts. Such situations illustrate how humanitarian crises increasingly overlap and reinforce one another, creating complex emergencies that are more difficult and costly to address.
Tomorrow’s session will also address the growing impact of climate change, with a focus on the projected 2026 super El Niño, which is expected to deepen humanitarian needs. The World Meteorological Organisation projects that Africa could face severe floods and drought between October 2026 and March 2027, as the strongest El Niño ever recorded is expected to disrupt weather patterns. This could bring heavy rainfall and severe floods to East Africa, and intense drought across Southern Africa and the Sahel. As a result, 12 countries are at the highest risk of experiencing a food crisis, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Given the early warnings, whether states and relevant continental and international entities are heeding the warning and putting in place preventive interventions and preparedness for effective response and management of the impact.
In the context of the AU’s 2026 theme, ‘Assuring Sustainable Water Availability and Safe Sanitation Systems,’ presenters from ICRC and IFRC are expected to draw attention to the need for safeguarding water and sanitation systems, health facilities and energy infrastructure from attacks. Protecting these infrastructures is central to strengthening humanitarian resilience, reducing the economic and social costs of conflict, and advancing the protection of civilians. As the war in Sudan and its impact on infrastructure shows, the growing use of drones, AI and autonomous functions in weapon systems raises new questions about how hostilities are conducted. Conflicts have also shifted from open battlefields into densely populated cities, where harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure is far greater.
Tomorrow’s session is also expected to pay attention to the threats facing International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in conflict situations, not just in Africa but globally. As pointed out in a publication supported by ICRC, ‘[w]hat makes the current moment particularly alarming is not just the widespread violations of IHL rules, but the fact that these violations are occurring without any fear of accountability, thus with impunity, and are often cloaked in attempts to justify or legitimise them.’ While not unique to it, a context that illustrates the widespread perpetration of violations of IHL with impunity is the war in Sudan, as extensively documented, including by AU and UN bodies.
Against this backdrop, the ICRC briefing is expected to call on the PSC and AU member states to reinforce political commitment to uphold IHL. In this context, it may urge AU member states to join the Global IHL Initiative, developed in response to the growing erosion in global compliance with IHL in the context of wars in various parts of the world. It is also expected to call on member states to attend the High-Level Conference scheduled to take place on 7 December 2026, in Jordan, which is the culmination of the Global IHL Initiative.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the escalating humanitarian crises across Africa, particularly the combined impact of armed conflicts, violent extremism, climate-driven extreme weather and health emergencies, as well as shrinking humanitarian financing. The Council is also expected to make a call on Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), international partners, and humanitarian actors to strengthen coordinated responses to humanitarian emergencies across the continent. On financing, the PSC may call for the development of innovative and African-owned financing solutions, including stronger engagement in domestic resource mobilisation and non-traditional sources, including through establishing a strategy for private sector partnership. In the context of the 2026 AU Theme of the Year, the PSC may urge the AU Commission and Member States to give due attention to the protection of civilian objects and essential services, including water and sanitation systems, health and education facilities, energy and communications infrastructure, whose disruption can have far-reaching humanitarian consequences for civilian populations. In the context of the intensifying Ebola outbreak, the PSC may call for the need to protect the humanitarian space and health care providers and the imperative to implement preventive measures and preparedness for response to the impacts of the super El Niño. The Council may also remind States Parties of their obligations under international law to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and put in place legal frameworks for investigation and prosecution of violations of IHL. It may welcome the Global IHL Initiative and invite AU member states to support the initiative. The PSC may reiterate the need to embed the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in all humanitarian responses and stress the need to address the root causes of humanitarian crises, notably conflicts.
Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC
Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC
Date | 9 October 2026
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Amani Africa Briefing to the 1372nd session of the Peace and Security Council on ‘Information Integrity and Peace and Security in Africa’
Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, Ambassador Churchill Ewumbe-Monono
Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council
A very good morning.
It is an honour for me to address you today, representing my organisation, Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an organisation that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security by contributing to the noble mandate of this august house, our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body, through policy research, technical support, policy dialogue and strategic communication.
I wish to commend the Chairperson and this Council for dedicating today’s session to a subject that carries enormous implications for peace and security, political stability, economic advancement and democratic governance on the continent. The United Nations Global Principles for Information Integrity warn that the erosion of the integrity of the information space hinders efforts to achieve peace, prosperity and a livable future on our planet. In what signifies this threat from disinformation, South Africa’s Human Rights Commission, a constitutionally established independent body, observed ‘a growing pattern in which information disorder contributes to rights violations, including violence, discrimination, public health harms, and the erosion of democratic participation.’
Poignantly, and as a result, the UN points out that the task of strengthening information integrity may present us with one of the most urgent challenges of our time. Experience on the continent suggest that disinformation and related forms of information disorder poses increasingly grave threat to institutional stability and peace and security.
Information integrity has always been critical to peace and security. In our digital and AI age, it has become the precondition for political stability, democratic governance and a functioning socio-economic order. There is almost no domain of public life or social or economic sector that does not get seriously endangered by the erosion of information integrity. This heightened importance of information integrity, in this digital and AI age, is particularly pronounced for peace and security.
As we have pointed out in the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to this session, ‘quality of information affects both the behaviour of conflict parties and the context in which conflicts unfold.’ This makes the absence of information integrity detrimental to peace and security. ‘Without information integrity, it becomes difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In the absence of truth, there can be no trust. In the absence of truth and trust, war and conflict, division and violence thrive. The pursuit of peace is hugely impaired.’
For purposes of the mandate of the PSC, it is worth noting that disinformation gains particular saliency and exacts enormous costs in specific contexts. The experience from the continent shows that there are at least four contexts where disinformation proliferates and gets pervasive, driving violence and instability.
Conflicts and war are the first and major context in which the integrity of information is endangered the most. There is indeed analysis that indicates that African countries experiencing conflict tend to experience the highest levels of disinformation and information disorder. This is not a surprise. As the saying, ‘in war, the first casualty is often the truth’, clearly attests, conflicts have always been accompanied by a fog of competing narratives and propagation of manipulated information. In today’s digital and AI era, this fog has become constitutive of the war itself.
Sudan’s is a live case that illustrates the pervasiveness and impact of the erosion of information integrity. According to a study on the war in Sudan, a disinformation campaign (involving the warring parties, their supporters and external actors) has become a dominant feature of the war in Sudan. This emerged following the huge shift of Sudanese, inside and outside the country, to digital platforms and social media channels for accessing and sharing news and information after the destruction of Sudan’s established information infrastructure during the early stages of the war in April 2023. ‘The result is,’ the study held, ‘an information environment characterised by alternative ‘facts’, misleading narratives and information, and hate speech.’ This has not only endangered the lives of civilians and the operation of humanitarian actors but also undermined peace efforts through sowing division and polarisation.
The second context in which African countries face intense levels of disinformation, including from cross-border operators, concerns elections. Apart from state-sponsored operators as reported in relation to the Sahel, it is reported that a ‘private Israeli group, dubbed ‘Team Jorg,’ has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt 20 African elections since 2015.’ This is indicative of the growing vulnerability of elections to interference by profit-making cross-border operators.
It is particularly when they are closely contested and take place in a context of trust deficit, weak independent media and polarisation along identity fault lines that elections attract the most disinformation. According to a study on Kenya’s 2022 elections, ‘Social media platforms, especially Facebook, Twitter, TikTok and Instagram, along with messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, became the dominant vectors through which election news and disinformation were transmitted during Kenya’s election.’ The study further noted that ‘there were many disinformation narratives that circulated during the election campaign season, some of which used deepfakes and cheapfakes or altered video.’ Lack of confidence in legacy media and polarisation along identity lines played a major role. The 2023 Nigerian elections also attracted intense levels of disinformation as well.
The third context in which African states experience intense levels of disinformation and other forms of information disorder concerns situations involving political and social unrest. An experience that illustrates such a case is South Africa. According to the South African Human Rights Commission, ‘South Africa’s experience shows that information disorder now affects public safety, health, equality, institutional trust and democratic participation.’ ‘The July 2021 unrest, public-health misinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic, racialised conspiracy narratives, gender-based disinformation and digitally mediated hostility toward vulnerable communities all show that disinformation can deepen social division, undermine public trust, distort participation in democratic processes and contribute to discrimination and violence.’ More specifically, in relation to the July 2021 unrest that affected two major provinces, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, in South Africa, the Commission noted that ‘more than 350 people died after incendiary WhatsApp voice notes and fabricated Facebook posts turned a political grievance into days of looting and violence.’ That unrest, induced and accelerated by disinformation, also exacted enormous financial and economic costs on South Africa, estimated at R50 billion.
Health emergencies are the other context in which disinformation and other forms of information disorder become pronounced, particularly in settings facing institutional fragility and weak public trust. This was prevalent on the continent during COVID-19. Today, it constitutes a major challenge in the context of the new Ebola outbreak in the DRC. BBC and other media platforms reported false claims circulating in affected areas include ‘allegations that Ebola doesn’t exist, that health workers are deliberately infecting people or harvesting their organs, and that the Ebola response is a money-making scheme.’ The result has been various cases of ‘attacks on treatment facilities, assaults on health workers, and repeated attempts to interfere with safe burial procedures for people who died from the disease.’
It becomes clear from all these four contexts on the continent in which information disorder becomes acute that traditional approaches to securing peace, safeguarding democratic elections and ensuring political and social stability will be utterly inadequate in this era when digital platforms and AI are reconstituting the information ecosystem.
Responses to today’s conflicts, election contestation and social and political tension need to develop and use instruments that tackle disinformation and other forms of digital and AI-based manipulations. This requires understanding the factors that drive the proliferation of disinformation and information disorder in Africa.
There are at least five major drivers for the proliferation of disinformation and the growing threat such information disorder poses in Africa. First and foremost is the impact of digital technology and AI on the information ecosystem. The scale, reach, speed and sophistication of digital technology mean that false, harmful, manipulated, misleading and synthetic information spreads and reaches a large number of people instantly. With generative artificial intelligence and synthetic media, the production of shallow or deep fakes has become easier and cheaper. Algorithmic systems used by digital platforms, which are wired to expand viewership and facilitate data-driven targeting, accelerate the dissemination of disinformation and enable cross-border influence operations (involving paid influencers, digital avatars and actors involved in geopolitical rivalry on Africa).
Second, more and more people are accessing, producing and exchanging information from and on these digital platforms. In Africa, where the demographic majority on the continent are the youth, they get their news predominantly from such platforms, in a context in which there is a lack of and/or slow pace of local language moderation and verification tools.
The third factor, which interfaces with the second, concerns the prevalence of weak media, digital and information literacy. According to UNICEF, Africa faces the most significant gap in integration of media, digital and information literacy into national curricula. The resultant weak media, digital and information literacy enables the reception of false, manipulated and synthetic information as reliable and its wide circulation.
The fourth driver for the proliferation of disinformation and the growth of the threat it poses is the suppression of credible information. Beyond algorithmic bias, in Africa, credible information gets suppressed through censorship, internet shutdowns, closure of digital platforms and attacks on journalists or media operators.
The final and fifth driver is the inadequacy or lack of laws and institutions that set and enforce standards against disinformation and other information disorder for safeguarding information integrity through advancing access to reliable and accurate information.
In view of the foregoing, here are some policy recommendations for consideration of the PSC.
First, addressing the erosion of information integrity should be integral to the work of all the APSA frameworks across the conflict spectrum. For the PSC, this necessitates its consideration of conflict situations and analysis of trends in the nature, manifestations and scale of disinformation relating to each conflict situation.
Second, there is a need to integrate digital monitoring, fact-checking and media analysis into the Continental Early Warning System and ensure information integrity indicators and analysis inform and form part of mediation support, peacemaking processes and peace support operations.
Third, there is a need for developing a continental framework on information integration and peace and security that set standards for advancing access to reliable information focusing on, among others, a) protection of freedom of opinion and access to information, b) promoting fact-checking and the functioning of free media and independent journalism, c) attributing legal obligation to social media and tech companies operating digital platforms on the continent, including for transparency and platform accountability, d) promoting the adoption of measures by states for advancing digital, media and information literacy, and e) ensuring that Member states establish laws that tackle information disorder and regulatory bodies empowered to enforce such laws.
Fourth, in the context of elections, in addition to integrating media and digital platform analysis in assessing the election environment, one best practice that the AU could build on is the recent initiative of the Electoral Commission of South Africa. Only last month, on 4 September 2026, the Commission promulgated the Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections. It is therefore proposed that the PSC calls on the AU Commission to use this best practice for promoting the adoption by electoral bodies of a code of conduct countering disinformation in countries heading to elections.
Fifth and finally, while it organises and amplifies conflicts and undermines peace efforts, information disorder carries grave consequences for the safety of civilians, humanitarian actors, reporters & human rights groups. Most notably, vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and minority groups, bear much of the brunt of the consequences of information disorder, as events in Sudan highlight. As such, advancing the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups and compliance with IHL rules should be central to the responses to disinformation and other forms of information disorder.
I thank you for your kind attention!
Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC
Information disorder seriously endangering stability, Amani Africa tells the PSC
Date | 9 October 2026
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Amani Africa Briefing to the 1372nd session of the Peace and Security Council on ‘Information Integrity and Peace and Security in Africa’
Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, Ambassador Churchill Ewumbe-Monono
Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council
A very good morning.
It is an honour for me to address you today, representing my organisation, Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an organisation that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security by contributing to the noble mandate of this august house, our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body, through policy research, technical support, policy dialogue and strategic communication.
I wish to commend the Chairperson and this Council for dedicating today’s session to a subject that carries enormous implications for peace and security, political stability, economic advancement and democratic governance on the continent. The United Nations Global Principles for Information Integrity warn that the erosion of the integrity of the information space hinders efforts to achieve peace, prosperity and a livable future on our planet. In what signifies this threat from disinformation, South Africa’s Human Rights Commission, a constitutionally established independent body, observed ‘a growing pattern in which information disorder contributes to rights violations, including violence, discrimination, public health harms, and the erosion of democratic participation.’
Poignantly, and as a result, the UN points out that the task of strengthening information integrity may present us with one of the most urgent challenges of our time. Experience on the continent suggest that disinformation and related forms of information disorder poses increasingly grave threat to institutional stability and peace and security.
Information integrity has always been critical to peace and security. In our digital and AI age, it has become the precondition for political stability, democratic governance and a functioning socio-economic order. There is almost no domain of public life or social or economic sector that does not get seriously endangered by the erosion of information integrity. This heightened importance of information integrity, in this digital and AI age, is particularly pronounced for peace and security.
As we have pointed out in the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to this session, ‘quality of information affects both the behaviour of conflict parties and the context in which conflicts unfold.’ This makes the absence of information integrity detrimental to peace and security. ‘Without information integrity, it becomes difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In the absence of truth, there can be no trust. In the absence of truth and trust, war and conflict, division and violence thrive. The pursuit of peace is hugely impaired.’
For purposes of the mandate of the PSC, it is worth noting that disinformation gains particular saliency and exacts enormous costs in specific contexts. The experience from the continent shows that there are at least four contexts where disinformation proliferates and gets pervasive, driving violence and instability.
Conflicts and war are the first and major context in which the integrity of information is endangered the most. There is indeed analysis that indicates that African countries experiencing conflict tend to experience the highest levels of disinformation and information disorder. This is not a surprise. As the saying, ‘in war, the first casualty is often the truth’, clearly attests, conflicts have always been accompanied by a fog of competing narratives and propagation of manipulated information. In today’s digital and AI era, this fog has become constitutive of the war itself.
Sudan’s is a live case that illustrates the pervasiveness and impact of the erosion of information integrity. According to a study on the war in Sudan, a disinformation campaign (involving the warring parties, their supporters and external actors) has become a dominant feature of the war in Sudan. This emerged following the huge shift of Sudanese, inside and outside the country, to digital platforms and social media channels for accessing and sharing news and information after the destruction of Sudan’s established information infrastructure during the early stages of the war in April 2023. ‘The result is,’ the study held, ‘an information environment characterised by alternative ‘facts’, misleading narratives and information, and hate speech.’ This has not only endangered the lives of civilians and the operation of humanitarian actors but also undermined peace efforts through sowing division and polarisation.
The second context in which African countries face intense levels of disinformation, including from cross-border operators, concerns elections. Apart from state-sponsored operators as reported in relation to the Sahel, it is reported that a ‘private Israeli group, dubbed ‘Team Jorg,’ has reportedly implemented disinformation campaigns to disrupt 20 African elections since 2015.’ This is indicative of the growing vulnerability of elections to interference by profit-making cross-border operators.
It is particularly when they are closely contested and take place in a context of trust deficit, weak independent media and polarisation along identity fault lines that elections attract the most disinformation. According to a study on Kenya’s 2022 elections, ‘Social media platforms, especially Facebook, Twitter, TikTok and Instagram, along with messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, became the dominant vectors through which election news and disinformation were transmitted during Kenya’s election.’ The study further noted that ‘there were many disinformation narratives that circulated during the election campaign season, some of which used deepfakes and cheapfakes or altered video.’ Lack of confidence in legacy media and polarisation along identity lines played a major role. The 2023 Nigerian elections also attracted intense levels of disinformation as well.
The third context in which African states experience intense levels of disinformation and other forms of information disorder concerns situations involving political and social unrest. An experience that illustrates such a case is South Africa. According to the South African Human Rights Commission, ‘South Africa’s experience shows that information disorder now affects public safety, health, equality, institutional trust and democratic participation.’ ‘The July 2021 unrest, public-health misinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic, racialised conspiracy narratives, gender-based disinformation and digitally mediated hostility toward vulnerable communities all show that disinformation can deepen social division, undermine public trust, distort participation in democratic processes and contribute to discrimination and violence.’ More specifically, in relation to the July 2021 unrest that affected two major provinces, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, in South Africa, the Commission noted that ‘more than 350 people died after incendiary WhatsApp voice notes and fabricated Facebook posts turned a political grievance into days of looting and violence.’ That unrest, induced and accelerated by disinformation, also exacted enormous financial and economic costs on South Africa, estimated at R50 billion.
Health emergencies are the other context in which disinformation and other forms of information disorder become pronounced, particularly in settings facing institutional fragility and weak public trust. This was prevalent on the continent during COVID-19. Today, it constitutes a major challenge in the context of the new Ebola outbreak in the DRC. BBC and other media platforms reported false claims circulating in affected areas include ‘allegations that Ebola doesn’t exist, that health workers are deliberately infecting people or harvesting their organs, and that the Ebola response is a money-making scheme.’ The result has been various cases of ‘attacks on treatment facilities, assaults on health workers, and repeated attempts to interfere with safe burial procedures for people who died from the disease.’
It becomes clear from all these four contexts on the continent in which information disorder becomes acute that traditional approaches to securing peace, safeguarding democratic elections and ensuring political and social stability will be utterly inadequate in this era when digital platforms and AI are reconstituting the information ecosystem.
Responses to today’s conflicts, election contestation and social and political tension need to develop and use instruments that tackle disinformation and other forms of digital and AI-based manipulations. This requires understanding the factors that drive the proliferation of disinformation and information disorder in Africa.
There are at least five major drivers for the proliferation of disinformation and the growing threat such information disorder poses in Africa. First and foremost is the impact of digital technology and AI on the information ecosystem. The scale, reach, speed and sophistication of digital technology mean that false, harmful, manipulated, misleading and synthetic information spreads and reaches a large number of people instantly. With generative artificial intelligence and synthetic media, the production of shallow or deep fakes has become easier and cheaper. Algorithmic systems used by digital platforms, which are wired to expand viewership and facilitate data-driven targeting, accelerate the dissemination of disinformation and enable cross-border influence operations (involving paid influencers, digital avatars and actors involved in geopolitical rivalry on Africa).
Second, more and more people are accessing, producing and exchanging information from and on these digital platforms. In Africa, where the demographic majority on the continent are the youth, they get their news predominantly from such platforms, in a context in which there is a lack of and/or slow pace of local language moderation and verification tools.
The third factor, which interfaces with the second, concerns the prevalence of weak media, digital and information literacy. According to UNICEF, Africa faces the most significant gap in integration of media, digital and information literacy into national curricula. The resultant weak media, digital and information literacy enables the reception of false, manipulated and synthetic information as reliable and its wide circulation.
The fourth driver for the proliferation of disinformation and the growth of the threat it poses is the suppression of credible information. Beyond algorithmic bias, in Africa, credible information gets suppressed through censorship, internet shutdowns, closure of digital platforms and attacks on journalists or media operators.
The final and fifth driver is the inadequacy or lack of laws and institutions that set and enforce standards against disinformation and other information disorder for safeguarding information integrity through advancing access to reliable and accurate information.
In view of the foregoing, here are some policy recommendations for consideration of the PSC.
First, addressing the erosion of information integrity should be integral to the work of all the APSA frameworks across the conflict spectrum. For the PSC, this necessitates its consideration of conflict situations and analysis of trends in the nature, manifestations and scale of disinformation relating to each conflict situation.
Second, there is a need to integrate digital monitoring, fact-checking and media analysis into the Continental Early Warning System and ensure information integrity indicators and analysis inform and form part of mediation support, peacemaking processes and peace support operations.
Third, there is a need for developing a continental framework on information integration and peace and security that set standards for advancing access to reliable information focusing on, among others, a) protection of freedom of opinion and access to information, b) promoting fact-checking and the functioning of free media and independent journalism, c) attributing legal obligation to social media and tech companies operating digital platforms on the continent, including for transparency and platform accountability, d) promoting the adoption of measures by states for advancing digital, media and information literacy, and e) ensuring that Member states establish laws that tackle information disorder and regulatory bodies empowered to enforce such laws.
Fourth, in the context of elections, in addition to integrating media and digital platform analysis in assessing the election environment, one best practice that the AU could build on is the recent initiative of the Electoral Commission of South Africa. Only last month, on 4 September 2026, the Commission promulgated the Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections. It is therefore proposed that the PSC calls on the AU Commission to use this best practice for promoting the adoption by electoral bodies of a code of conduct countering disinformation in countries heading to elections.
Fifth and finally, while it organises and amplifies conflicts and undermines peace efforts, information disorder carries grave consequences for the safety of civilians, humanitarian actors, reporters & human rights groups. Most notably, vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and minority groups, bear much of the brunt of the consequences of information disorder, as events in Sudan highlight. As such, advancing the protection of civilians and vulnerable groups and compliance with IHL rules should be central to the responses to disinformation and other forms of information disorder.
I thank you for your kind attention!
Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa
Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa
Date | 8 October 2026
Tomorrow (9 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1372nd Session under the theme ‘Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa.’
Following opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make an introductory statement. Ourveena Geeresha Topsy-Sonoo, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), will then make a statement, followed by Rita Bissoonauth, Director, UNESCO Liaison Office to the AU and UNECA. Further statements are expected from Charlotte Scaddan, Senior Adviser on Information Integrity, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Global Communications, United Nations, Ibrahima Tounkara, Head of the ICRC Delegation to the AU, Solomon A. Dersso, Executive Director of Amani Africa Media Research Services, and Omar Faruk Osman, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ). A representative of the EU Delegation to the AU will also make a statement.
Previously, the PSC has convened several sessions that have directly or indirectly focused on information integrity, peace and security. On 4 August 2022, the PSC convened its 1097th meeting on ‘Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa.’ Moreover, on 13 June 2024, the Council convened for its 1214th meeting, which focused on the theme, ‘Looking into the Future: AI and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa.’ The session tasked the AU Commission to ‘enhance efforts to combat misinformation and disinformation, as well as fake news, through AI-driven tools while also addressing the risks associated with AI-generated false information.’
Most significantly, on 2 September 2024, the PSC held its 1230th meeting on ‘Protection of Journalists and Access to Information in Situations of Armed Conflicts in Africa.’ The session, which also addressed the spread of misinformation and disinformation, particularly on digital platforms, saw the AU Commission being tasked to ‘facilitate the development of a strategy and policy framework that enables the use of information and the media for peace-building, mediation, reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and peace support operations.’
On 14 November 2025, the Council held its 1311th meeting focusing on ‘Media, Peace and Security.’ This was its most comprehensive engagement to date on the role of the media in Africa’s peace, security and governance landscape. Of importance, it called for the expedition of ‘the development of a Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa.’
Coming within the framework of the commemoration of the International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI), marked under the theme ‘Upholding Information Integrity in the Digital Age: The role of access to information in addressing information disorder,’ tomorrow’s session offers the PSC an opportunity to assess the threats information disorder poses to peace and security on the continent, review progress on its earlier decisions on media and digital governance, and chart practical steps toward a coherent continental approach to information integrity.
Information Integrity refers to an information ecosystem in which reliable and accurate information is available to all, enabling people to engage meaningfully in public life, make informed decisions and exercise their rights. In the digital age, information integrity is not just about safeguarding rights. It is central to political stability, democratic governance, social cohesion and economic advancement. No domain of public life or industry can function optimally without information integrity. This is particularly true for peace and security.
As the quality of information affects both the behaviour of conflict parties and the context, the absence of information integrity is detrimental to peace and security. Without information integrity, it becomes difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood. In the absence of truth, there can be no trust. In the absence of truth and trust, war and conflict, division and violence thrive. The pursuit of peace is hugely impaired.
Thus, disinformation and the viral spread of hate speech or manipulated content can incite communal and ethnic violence and mob attacks. They can undermine electoral credibility and trigger post-election unrest, delegitimise peace processes, mediation efforts and peace operations, endanger humanitarian workers and feed recruitment and propaganda by terrorist and armed groups. They can also complicate the work of early warning by flooding the information space with false and unverified information. As such, the impact on peace and security is not marginal. It is direct and substantial.
There are examples that illustrate these damaging consequences of disinformation. In Sudan, rival factions turned digital platforms into a battlefield that shapes both the conduct of hostilities and the public’s engagement, with major consequences for the safety of civilians and fueling polarisation that undermines efforts to contain the war. Generative AI has opened a new front across the continent, with fake audio, deepfake videos and false endorsements used to sway elections and provoke instability. Nigeria‘s 2023 presidential election is described as possibly the first large-scale use of AI-generated electoral content in Africa. Following Tanzania‘s October 2025 elections, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights denounced the internet shutdown during the election and the AU Election Observation Mission and SADC acknowledged that the blackout hampered monitoring. Somalia‘s Al-Shabaab maintains consistent narratives across Facebook, Telegram, X, YouTube and other outlets, adapting quickly to moderation by creating backup accounts and moving between platforms, and treating the online space as an integral front of its insurgency.
Challenges to information integrity arise from various sources. One source is the malicious use of, or susceptibility of, digital media and AI technologies by actors who weaponise information to orchestrate manipulation, exploitation, or harm. Related to this is the challenge of the lack of adequate safety measures in the design, development and deployment of digital platforms that have become main avenues for accessing and transmitting information. Additionally, access and distribution risks/challenges stem from the decline of independent journalism and press freedom, the prevalence of algorithmic systems that limit information availability, visibility and diversity, and persistent digital divides. There are also content-based risks/challenges such as the spread and amplification of disinformation campaigns, hate speech and harassment targeting individuals or vulnerable groups.
Information integrity is also affected by the transformation of the information ecosystem due to new technology. More and more people rely on digital platforms to access, produce, and share information. Rapid growth of generative artificial intelligence, synthetic media, algorithmic amplification and cross-border influence operations accelerate the speed and scale of the spread of disinformation. Yet, despite the growth in internet and social media use on the continent, particularly among a young population, and the pace and scale of dissemination, local-language content moderation, fact-checking capacity, digital literacy and regulatory frameworks have not kept pace.
Another element that the PSC is likely to consider is media capture and exclusionary representation – two dynamics that seriously hinder democratic governance and peacebuilding. The first is the concentration of media ownership in the hands of political elites or business interests, often through state-controlled or state-influenced outlets, which narrows the range of information available to citizens. It weakens independent journalism, skews public discourse and leaves audiences with fewer credible sources to trust, often pushing them to unverified sources of information from digital platforms.
It is worth noting for the PSC from the foregoing that disinformation and other forms of information disorder have direct bearing at societal, national, regional, continental and international levels. This necessitates policy response at all these levels. At the national level, this would entail laws that set standards for safeguarding information integrity through a) prohibition of disinformation, b) the obligation of digital platforms to ensure coverage of African languages, transparency and put in place systems for detecting and taking measures against disinformation through algorithmic systems and content moderation, including labelling, suppressing, taking down misleading, harmful and manipulated content and accounts breaching community standards, c) promoting and protecting fact-checking, the functioning of free media and independent journalism, digital, media and information literacy and d) establishing regulatory bodies empowered to enforcing standards. At the continental level, the required policy action includes supporting the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and follow up on PSC’s decision for the development of a continental framework on information integrity and peace and security. Within the African Peace and Security Architecture, it would entail the systematic integration of information integrity considerations including media analysis, digital monitoring and fact-checking into AU election monitoring and observation framework, Continental Early Warning System and in preventive diplomacy and peace processes for managing and resolving conflicts including mediation, peacemaking and peace support operations.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Council may underscore the imperative of information integrity to advance peace and security in Africa and express concern over the serious threat that information disorder, including disinformation, poses to both political stability and the promotion of peace and security. It may encourage Member States to adopt, domesticate and effectively implement access to information laws in line with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa, as well as promote proactive disclosure of public information as a means of countering disinformation and building public trust. Council may reiterate its call for the expedition of the Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa, with a clear timeline for the AU Commission, along with the speeding up of and full coherence with a continental framework on ‘Information Integrity, Digital, Media and Information Literacy (MIL)’. The PSC may also highlight the need to integrate media analysis, digital monitoring and fact-checking into the Continental Early Warning System and include information integrity indicators in election observation, mediation support and peace support operations. Council may further encourage the formal establishment of the AU Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists in Addis Ababa, the completion of the study on the legal, institutional and policy framework for the protection of journalists and access to information, and also encourage coordination among the PSC, the AU Commission, the RECs/RMs, the ACHPR, the UN and its agencies, and civil society.
Somalia at a Strategic Inflection Point in the New Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa: Political Settlement Before Total Geopolitical Capture
Somalia at a Strategic Inflection Point in the New Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa
Political Settlement Before Total Geopolitical Capture
Date | 5 October 2026
Abdul Mohammed and Samira Gaid
On 12 September, the Houthis arrived on Mayun, also known as Perim, the island which sits at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandab Strait, after sweeping southward along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Their strategic foothold menaces a chokepoint through which roughly 12 per cent of the world’s trade by volume transits. Riyadh has solicited U.S. assistance. Washington has pledged intelligence support but has not yet committed to any direct action.
With Bab el-Mandab suffering interruptions in tandem with the war in and around the Strait of Hormuz between the United States, Israel and Iran, the two straits are increasingly merging as the war in Iran widens. This development has substantially elevated the growing significance of the western shores of the Red Sea.
In the same week that Riyadh was pressing its case in Washington, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro was there too on a mission for closer relations and recognition. Somaliland is marketing itself as a safe trading partner and anchor for security in the Red Sea. But the case most likely to win over Washington – its location, Berbera’s facilities and what they might do against the Houthis – is also the one most likely to draw Somaliland into an external alliance system and militarise it from the start.
For Somalia, the war across the ocean is no longer a remote affair. It is starting to restructure Somali politics.
The Crisis Is Larger Than Domestic Divisions
Somalia is already afflicted by a major internal fracture. The constitutional amendments adopted in March are contested, and elections have been postponed without a consensus-based framework in place. Puntland and Jubaland are alienated from the Federal Government, and the opposition in South West has on several occasions resorted to violence. Recent clashes around Baidoa on 3 September led to civilian displacement and demonstrated how political disagreements can easily turn into armed confrontations.
Clan and sub-clan politics continue to matter for representation, security and access to resources. But decades of clan-centred analysis now obscure more than they explain. The decisive new force is external security entanglement and how this is becoming the major factor tipping the scale.
Somali actors increasingly seek protection, finance, weapons, training, diplomatic recognition and market access from outside powers. Those powers seek ports, airfields, intelligence access, commercial concessions and local partners in rivalries originating far beyond Somalia.
This transaction sustains itself. Domestic fragmentation invites external sponsorship; external sponsorship disincentivises compromise. Political leaders find external insurance against domestic competitors, while external actors find Somali proxies for broader rivalries. Though Somalia has been an arena for foreign patronage since Independence, what has now changed is the currency. Patrons no longer only provide reversible assets like money, weapons, and training. Today, the currency is recognition, basing agreements, and defence relationships. Ports, transport corridors and military facilities sit at the centre of the new geopolitical contest in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia.
The risk is that the next Somali political settlement, like any of the political settlements in the Horn of Africa, will be determined less by negotiation between Somalis than by the competing demands of Middle Eastern and international alliances.
Somalia remaking the state Through Political Settlement
Somalia’s state-building record, still largely a work in progress, should be judged more generously. Having lost a functioning state in 1991, Somalis have reconstructed their political life without a reliable blueprint. They have negotiated, improvised and adjusted. Crises were often managed rather than resolved. Yet this approach preserved a measure of continuity, enabled changes of national leadership and kept alive the possibility of a common political order.
That process was an ongoing political settlement. It was not a one-off conference, a final constitution, or an agreement among a small coterie of elites. It was the changing set of understandings about who could legitimately exercise authority, how the centre and regions would share power and resources, how security would be provided, and how conflicts would be defused and returned to negotiation before they became violent. Federalism provided a language for coexistence among actors who deeply distrusted each other, but who knew none could govern Somalia alone.
African soldiers fought and died to protect that settlement, and multilateral and bilateral partners provided security, finance and diplomacy. In spite of fragmentation, their contributions allowed Somalis to remain the main actors in the reassembly of the state.
This is now at risk, and the shift is already visible on the ground. As soon as leaders rely on patrons for security and survival, compromise is riskier, and room for maneuver narrows. Somali leaders may hold office but become junior partners in competing factions, unable to make deals for Somalia as a whole, beholden to foreign interests.
Federalism Is Becoming Foreign Policy
The warning was made explicit in January when the Federal Government of Somalia terminated a number of deals with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on defense, security, and the ports of Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo. Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland denounced Mogadishu’s move and stated that their ties with the UAE would not be affected. The UAE continues to have close commercial and security relationships with Somaliland and Puntland and a presence in Jubaland. A constitutional argument about federal powers had morphed into a power play over international orientation.
The Federal Government also has strategic partnerships, particularly with Turkey, and growing ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Turkey’s relationship with the Federal Government is the largest single external security relationship in the country, covering training, a permanent facility, maritime and naval agreements and now energy exploration. The United States will remain at the center of counterterrorism efforts. In December 2025, Israel also recognized Somaliland, bringing in a new security actor directly across the Bab el Mandeb from Yemen.
The relationships are not in themselves illegitimate, and they are not two permanent blocs. Somalia requires investment and security cooperation. The problem is that foreign relationships now flow through competing Somali centres of authority. Various forces are accountable to different systems of training and finance, while ports and airfields are attached to distinct networks. Federalism then ceases to be about shared government and starts to split the country into external spheres of influence.
Al-Shabaab, too, profits from the expanding battlefield. Its alleged arms and training ties to the Houthis link a Somali insurgency to a war on the other side of the Gulf of Aden. The resurgence of piracy, as a result of the diversion of naval forces to other tasks, drives home the message that the security apparatus on the two coasts can no longer be considered separately.
Somaliland Risks Recognition Without Sovereign Freedom
Somaliland’s case deserves respect. It is based on a unique colonial history, the violent history of the defunct Somali state and over three decades of de facto self-rule. Its institutions and democratic transfers of power count. Its claims for recognition can no longer be written off as an outside creation.
Yet, recognition, if granted on the basis of the logic of the current war, could hollow out independence of its content. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025 was a diplomatic breakthrough, but tied Somaliland’s status immediately to the fight against Iran and the Houthis. It also tied this status to Israel’s standing in the Muslim world and its conduct in Palestine—an association Hargeisa will have to navigate both at home and abroad. In July, Le Monde reported building work at Berbera Airport that would enable its future use by the UAE, Israel and the United States. Somaliland has denied that a formal Israeli base agreement exists. The dispute itself, however, alters the threat environment. The Houthis have warned that an Israeli presence would be considered a military target.
If recognition is won mainly through offering strategic access, as President Irro’s recent visit to Washington underscored, it will come with obligations that Somaliland cannot control. A newcomer to the international system may be given a place in an alliance before it has secured the freedom to make its own foreign policy.
Somaliland could therefore be militarised before its sovereignty is consolidated. Berbera could become valuable to foreign militaries and vulnerable to their enemies at the same time. A state should enter international society with freedom of choice, not with a pre-assigned role in somebody else’s war.
A Political Settlement Before External Capture
The multilateral response, not least of all on the African continent that currently remains way behind the curve, needs to adapt rapidly, cognizant of the deepening fusion of security and economic dynamics of the Gulf and the Horn of Africa.
In Somalia, this means that fighting Al-Shabaab and maintaining the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) are still important, but neither can replace a political settlement. The United States has informed the AU it will block the use of assessed contributions to finance AUSSOM after 31 December, the last straw that may break AUSSOM’s back. This exposes both a funding crisis and the eroding international consensus that underpinned Somalia’s recovery.
The African Union, IGAD, the United Nations and the European Union should make restoring Somali political agency their central objective, while contributing to shielding internal contestation from external competition. They should help the Federal Government, Federal Member States and major opposition forces to agree on a credible electoral and constitutional pathway, workable federal arrangements and rules for resolving disputes without force. This must build on Somalia’s tradition of incremental bargaining, not impose another external formula.
External relations must be regulated as well. Somalis need agreed procedures for access by foreign militaries, port concessions, provision of security assistance, and major resource contracts. Disclosure at the national level and prior review would make it more difficult for external powers to shop among rival authorities. Units trained by foreigners must serve accountable Somali institutions, not individual leaders or patrons.
Somaliland requires a genuine political track, with AU and IGAD patronage, which takes its history and aspirations seriously but does not prejudge the result. The short-term priority should be to ensure that its status question is not resolved by military bargains concocted by the Bab el-Mandab war.
External powers present on both shores have their own part to play and must accept minimal restraints: no support for armed contests between Somali authorities, no clandestine deals that shift the regional balance, no use of Somali territory in external wars without a transparent and legitimate Somali decision.
Time is running out. Somalia may reclaim its culture of political settlement while its leaders still have maneuvering space, or its factions can strike deals with states that want bases, ports and proxies. In the first path, strategic location becomes national patrimony. In the second, Somalis rule in parts while outsiders own the whole.
Sudan and Libya show where the second road leads. It is the immediate duty of Somalia’s rulers and their allies, as well as the multilateral bodies, to prevent that road from becoming Somalia’s destiny. Somalis must resolve the power equation amongst themselves before other countries’ alliances determine it for them.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of October 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of October 2026
Date | October 2026
In October, the Republic of Cameroon assumes the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages six substantive sessions covering seven agenda items alongside PSC engagements with other bodies, including the African Group and the A3; the 9th AUPSC/UNPBC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting; the 11th Informal Joint Seminar between the AUPSC and the UNSC; and the 20th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC. The month will also feature an informal engagement with the Chairperson of the AU Commission on early warning. Apart from one session which will be held at the ministerial level, all the five remaining substantive sessions will be held at the ambassadorial level. Two of the sessions will focus on country-specific situations, while the remaining will address thematic issues. In addition to the activities of the PSC, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) is also expected to hold a meeting.
The PSC will convene its first session of the month on 1 October to receive an update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. The Council last considered the situation in the country at its 1347th session, held on 18 May 2026. The PSC is expected to receive an update on developments since its May session, particularly preparations for the elections scheduled for 6 December 2026. At its previous session, the Council stressed the importance of creating conditions for credible, transparent and inclusive elections, including by strengthening the institutional independence and operational capacity of the National Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court. One issue likely to confront the PSC is whether the envisaged electoral process will comply with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), particularly following former President Umaro Sissoco Embaló’s reported announcement that he intends to return to Guinea-Bissau and contest the presidential election. His prospective candidacy raises questions under Article 25(4) of ACDEG, which bars perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections held to restore democratic order, in light of reports concerning his involvement in the events surrounding the November 2025 coup.
Following this, on 4 October, there will be the 8th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting of the AU and the RECs, which will be held in Al Alamein, Egypt. The AU Mid-Year Coordination Summit is an annual high-level meeting that serves as the main institutional platform for advancing regional and continental integration. It brings together the AU and the RECs to align their policies and coordinate the implementation of their plans.
On 9 October, the PSC will convene a session on ‘Information Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa.’ It is worth recalling that in September 2024, during Cameroon’s chairship, the Council held its 1230th session (its inaugural session) focusing on the ‘Protection of Journalists and Access to Information in Situation of Armed Conflicts in Africa.’ It then convened its 1311th session in November 2025, on Media, Peace and Security. This upcoming 8 October session will therefore provide an opportunity for the PSC to get an update on the different decisions from the previous two sessions, including for the AU Commission to: produce a comprehensive study on the legal, institutional and policy framework and map the protection of journalists and access to information in Africa; develop a Continental Media Regulatory Framework and Observatory and establish an AU Continental Media House; and develop a Matrix of all PSC decisions and instruments on the role of the Media in popularisation of peace and security initiatives as well as the protection of journalists. This was, however, to be submitted to Council before March 2026. Of significance will be a follow-up on its call for developing a Continental Framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity in Africa, from the same 1311th session. The session will also come just nine days after the commemoration of the International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI), celebrated every 28 September. The 2026 International Day for Universal Access to Information theme is ‘Upholding Information Integrity in the Digital Age: The role of access to information in addressing information disorder.’ The Day explores how access to reliable official information, proactive disclosure, media and information literacy, credible data and digital technologies can contribute to a healthier information environment.
On 13 October, there will be the ‘Annual Briefing by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its Activities in Africa’ and a ‘Briefing by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).’ Since it became a statutory meeting in 2007, the session is expected to include a briefing on key humanitarian concerns in Africa and trends in humanitarian assistance. It is expected that the focus will also include an aspect of humanitarian disarmament. IFRC, on the other hand, is expected to brief the council on its work in supporting local humanitarian action, from disaster response to health emergencies.
Following this, on 21 October, the PSC will be in the U.S. for a Consultative Meeting with the African Group and the A3, and the 9th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN Peacebuilding Commission. On the same day, there will be an activity, ‘Greentree Fireside Consultation.’
On 22 October, the 11th Informal Joint Seminar between the AUPSC and the UN Security Council will take place. The annual meeting rotates between Addis Ababa and New York, and this year New York will be hosting the meeting. The joint seminar is expected to address five agenda items: review of the AU Peace Support Operations and UN Peace Operations, including the implementation of Resolution 2719; youth, peace and security; AU/UN joint efforts in addressing and countering terrorism in Africa, including the Sahel region; children and armed conflicts; and natural resources management as a factor that exacerbates armed conflicts.
On 23 October at the UN Headquarter , the PSC and the UNSC will hold their 20th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting. The consultative meeting will address four agenda items: identifying and optimizing future resources and support mechanism for AUSSOM, and the situations in Sudan, South Sudan and Eastern DRC. It is worth recalling that on 17 September 2026, Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the PSC Chairperson for October 2026, together with the Greek Ambassador to the UN and President of the UNSC for October 2026, Aghi Balta, convened the monthly coordination meeting for October 2026 to discuss the planned activities of the two Councils for October 2026 including the 11th Informal Joint Seminar and the 20th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the two Councils.
That same day, the AU Permanent Mission will also hold an informal engagement with Mr. Atul Khare, Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support.
After New York, on 26 August, the PSC will hold an informal engagement with the Chairperson of the AU Commission on early warning. It is worth recalling that, in September 2019, the PSC held its first interactive session with the then Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat. The session focused on the working relationship between the PSC and the Commission under Article 2 of the PSC Protocol, aiming to strengthen coordination on peace and security efforts. The meeting committed to convening such sessions periodically. The last such engagement was held in July 2026.
This will be followed by a book launch, ‘New Wine in Old African Calabashes,’ by the Chairperson of the PSC.
The PSC will then convene a session on 27 October for a briefing by the AU Facilitators on the Situation in Eastern DRC. It is worth recalling that a high-level meeting in Lomé in January 2026 endorsed a revised mediation architecture, including an Independent Joint Secretariat to support the AU Panel of Facilitators. The panel comprises former presidents of Nigeria, Kenya, the Central African Republic, Botswana and Ethiopia. Faure Gnassingbé of Togo serves as AU Mediator. In mid-February, on the sidelines of the 39th AU Summit, the AU Commission reaffirmed its role in anchoring the Independent Joint Secretariat. On 25 and 26 July 2026, the High-Level Harmonisation Meeting of the Panel of Facilitators and the Independent Joint Secretariat (IJS) for the Eastern DRC Peace Process was held in Gaborone, Botswana, to deliberate on a Six-Month Roadmap and Operational Action Plan for the period July to December 2026. The meeting aimed to advance the AU-led peace process in eastern DRC. According to the AU press release, the roadmap covers workstreams on coordination and strategic advisory support; political analysis; military and security issues; humanitarian access; dialogue with armed groups; regional economic cooperation and natural resources; and civil society, reconciliation, women and youth. It is also meant to strengthen coordination with the Washington and Doha processes. The Panel of Facilitators agreed to present the Roadmap and Operational Plan to the AU Mediator for endorsement, with their next Harmonisation Session to be held before the end of 2026 in Arusha, Tanzania.
On 29 October, there will be the only ministerial-level session of the month, which will be the Annual Consultations between the AU PSC and RECs/RMs on the Luanda Decisions and Plan of Action. The consultative meeting is convened within the framework of Article 16 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC (PSC Protocol) and the various PSC retreats that highlighted the need for closer working engagement between the PSC and RECs/RMs. The meeting also takes place in line with the decision of the PSC and RECs/RMs, during their inaugural joint consultative meeting held on 24 May 2019, to convene the consultative meeting annually. However, these consultations have not taken place as regularly as envisaged, with the last annual consultative meeting having been held in August 2023. The upcoming consultative meeting is expected to focus on the implementation of the outcomes of the 21st Extraordinary Summit of the AU on Strengthening Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, held on 30 August 2026 in Luanda, Angola.
Lastly, on 30 August, the PSC will receive a briefing by the Secretary-General of INTERPOL. The session is expected to examine INTERPOL’s support to African law enforcement agencies in tackling transnational organised crime and terrorism, as well as ways to strengthen its partnership with the AU and AFRIPOL. During its 1345th meeting held on 6 May 2026 on ‘African strategies for combating transnational organised crime in Africa,’ the Council’s meeting featured the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the AU. From the session, the AU Commission, working in close collaboration with AFRIPOL, was tasked with establishing a structured and integrated continental mechanism inspired by the INTERPOL system of notices, coupled with an African ‘continental warrant’ framework. This will provide an opportunity to follow through on this decision.
In addition to the foregoing engagements, the PSC subsidiary body, the Committee of Experts, will meet on 2 October for preparation for the AUPSC/UNSC Annual Joint Consultative Meeting. The footnote also envisages that from 15 to 19 October, the PSC Chairperson and Commissioner PAPS will engage with Diaspora Communities in Washington, D.C. and Atlanta under the theme ‘Diaspora for Peace.’
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2026
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - August 2026
Date | August 2026
In August, under the chairship of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of nine substantive sessions and a field mission. Following the revision of the PPoW, ten substantive sessions were held, covering eleven agenda items.
Of the eleven agenda items, three focused on country/conflict-specific situations, while four addressed thematic issues and PSC’s statutory engagements with other relevant bodies. All the sessions were held at the level of permanent representatives.
Update on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Update on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Date | 30 September 2026
Tomorrow (1 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene to receive an update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chair for October, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. AU Special Envoy Patrice Émery Trovoada and Ovídio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, Special Representative of the AUC Chairperson to Guinea-Bissau, are also expected to brief the Council, while ECOWAS is expected to make a statement.
The PSC last considered Guinea-Bissau at its 1347th session on 18 May, expressing concern over the ‘continued fragile political situation’. It called for the immediate and unconditional release of Domingos Simões Pereira and other political detainees, restoration of political and civic space, stronger CNE and Supreme Court independence, military non-interference, due process and fundamental freedoms. It also requested accelerated security-sector reform (SSR), sustained AU engagement, an AU–ECOWAS joint assessment and a PSC fact-finding mission.
The session comes at a consequential stage of the transition established after the 26 November 2025 military seizure of power. Since May, the census has advanced, the constitutional referendum has been held, and elections remain scheduled for 6 December. The central test is whether these milestones are restoring constitutional order and constraining military influence. Article 23 of the Transitional Charter prohibits interim President Horta Inta-a and Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té from contesting. Although the 1333rd and 1347th communiqués reaffirmed the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), they did not expressly address Article 25(4), which bars perpetrators of unconstitutional changes from elections held to restore democratic order. Clarifying eligibility before nominations are finalised is therefore important. In February 2026, the military-led authorities also replaced the electoral commission leadership, created a new secretariat and revised legislation on political parties, the electoral code and the military legal framework. Taken in a restricted political environment, these measures intensify concern over the independence of electoral institutions and rules. The question is not simply whether elections are held, but whether the transition prevents authority acquired through the coup from being converted into electoral advantage and returns political competition to rule-bound civilian institutions.
A notable political development since the last session was the 30 August referendum. The framework drew critiques that it ‘aims to consolidate power within the office of the president’. PAIGC, historically the dominant political party in Guinea-Bissau, also called for a boycott over concerns about inclusiveness. Official sources nevertheless reported about 70 per cent support, with turnout reported to have exceeded 55 per cent. The Constitution expands presidential authority over appointment and dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet, reduces the National People’s Assembly from 102 to 65 seats and constituencies from 29 to 12, and introduces a five-year continuous-residency requirement for presidential candidates. In effect, it moves the system from semi-parliamentary toward a fully presidential model in which parliament’s role is significantly curtailed. PAIGC rejects the result, describing it as ‘fraudulent’ and ‘another coup d’état’.
Another politically significant development was the launch of a national census. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1347th meeting took note of the census scheduled for June 2026. Cognizant of its significance, the PSC underscored that the census should be conducted in a ‘transparent, inclusive and credible manner.’ UNFPA reported that field enumeration for the fourth General Population and Housing Census began on 1 June 2026, the first since 2009.
Political and civic space remains another central test of the transition. At its 1347th meeting, the PSC called for restoration of political and civic spaces and a ‘transparent, independent and credible investigation’ into the killing of activist Vigário Luís Balanta. Subsequent reporting indicated that Po’ di Terra, the opposition political movement founded by Balanta in 2023, had gone underground amid security concerns. The post-coup period also involved bans on demonstrations and press conferences, intimidation of human-rights defenders, closure of party headquarters and suspension of radio stations. In September, the Military High Command ordered political parties to relocate, within seven working days, headquarters situated less than 500 metres from sovereign institutions, hospitals, diplomatic missions or military and paramilitary facilities. The authorities presented the measure as enforcement of the February 2026 Political Parties Framework Law and justified it as necessary to preserve the country’s ‘climate of peace and security’. The measure directly affected, among others, PAIGC and MADEM-G15, whose national headquarters are located close to the presidential complex. PAIGC rejected the directive as ‘absolutely illegal’, arguing that the Military High Command lacked the legitimacy and legal authority to order the relocation of party premises and that any eviction should be determined by judicial authorities. The PAI–Terra Ranka coalition similarly rejected the measure as unlawful and questioned the military authorities’ competence to regulate political-party operations. These restrictions bear directly on whether opposition parties and civil society can organise, campaign and participate on equal terms. Electoral preparedness is thus not merely technical: an enabling environment for political competition is itself a substantive condition for credible elections.
There has been partial movement on the situation of PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira. On 24 July, he was allowed to leave detention for medical treatment in Portugal, with his family describing the release as ‘conditional’. This did not resolve the underlying allegations, due-process concerns or broader restrictions on opposition participation. Read with continuing constraints on party activity and civic space, a substantial part of the conditions set by the PSC at its 1347th meeting remains outstanding as the electoral deadline approaches.
Of particular significance is the extent to which earlier PSC decisions have been implemented. The 1333rd meeting called for an ‘expeditious’ integrated SSR plan, stronger CNE capacity and Supreme Court independence, an AU–ECOWAS assessment and a PSC field mission; the 1347th communiqué reiterated these priorities and linked SSR to ‘civilian oversight and constitutional governance’. The key questions are whether an integrated, sequenced and costed SSR framework exists and whether progress has been made on military neutrality, command accountability and civilian oversight.
Taken together, these outstanding issues mean that electoral credibility depends on considerably more than adherence to the 6 December calendar. The interrupted 2025 election showed that orderly polling is insufficient if institutions cannot complete tabulation, adjudication and transfer of power. In this context, readiness should be assessed across four linked dimensions: technical preparedness, including an updated voter register, logistics, financing and ballot preparations; institutional and legal readiness, particularly the independence and capacity of the CNE and Supreme Court; political readiness, including freedom to organise, campaign and challenge decisions; and security readiness, requiring military neutrality and protection for all contestants. Against these benchmarks, 2026 developments suggest deepening military influence and constrained political and civic space, raising the question of whether the minimum conditions for credible elections are in place before 6 December.
Continental and regional diplomacy has intensified. After Fernando Dias da Costa’s campaign denounced ECOWAS remarks on the referendum as ‘inadmissible interference’, ECOWAS clarified on 29 June that its mission had ‘neither announced nor validated any constitutional process’. The 69th ECOWAS Summit entrusted Senegal with facilitation; on 6 August, Foreign Minister Cheikh Niang, accompanied by Armed Forces Minister Yancoba Diémé, discussed the mandate with transitional authorities and reaffirmed readiness to support ‘a swift return to constitutional order’. Nigeria remains engaged through the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission and deployed a new contingent in August. It is to be recalled that Fernando Dias da Costa had also taken refuge at the Nigerian embassy following the 26 November 2025 military takeover, while a Senegalese mission sought arrangements for his safe passage. More broadly, the 69th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority, in addition to entrusting Senegal with the facilitation role, urged an inclusive transition, human rights and judicial safeguards, release of detained political figures, technical support and security guarantees.
The AU has maintained a parallel channel through Special Envoy Patrice Émery Trovoada. The AUC Chairperson met Trovoada on 18 August, reiterating support for ‘peace, stability and an inclusive political process’. During a September visit, Trovoada stressed that elections should be ‘as transparent and inclusive as possible’. On 24 September, the AUC Chairperson met Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té in New York and reiterated support for restoration of constitutional order; Té later stated at the UN that elections would be inclusive, free, transparent and credible. The PSC’s concern is whether political and institutional conditions substantiate these commitments. AU and ECOWAS engagement would therefore benefit from common pre-election benchmarks and consolidated reporting on political inclusion, electoral institutions and military neutrality.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome progress on the census, referendum and transition calendar while stressing that credible, inclusive and peaceful elections on 6 December require the necessary political and institutional conditions. It may reiterate fundamental rights, due process and the rule of law; call for the restoration of political and civic space; renew its demand for a credible investigation into Vigário Luís Balanta’s killing; and seek clarification on political detainees, restrictions on opposition participation and candidate eligibility. The Council may request an AU–ECOWAS electoral assessment to determine whether the minimum political, institutional, technical and security conditions for credible elections are in place, identify support needs, seek an update on the outstanding joint assessment and set a timeline for the PSC fact-finding mission. It may expressly invoke Article 25(4) of ACDEG, reaffirming that perpetrators of an unconstitutional change of government cannot participate in elections held to restore democratic order, and recall the Transitional Charter’s exclusion of interim President Horta Inta-a and Prime Minister Ilídio Vieira Té. In this regard, it may seek a reaffirmation of the commitment by the coup-making authorities that they will not contest the elections. The Council may further call for the non-participation of former President Umaro Sissoco Embaló in light of reports by opposition figures and regional political figures that he was involved in orchestrating the 26 November takeover. It may call for the lifting of restrictions on political and civic freedoms and concrete measures to create an enabling environment in which all political parties and candidates can freely undertake political activities, including organising and campaigning, and in which media and civil-society actors can operate without intimidation or undue restriction. It may further welcome Senegal’s facilitation and encourage closer coordination among the AU Special Envoy, ECOWAS facilitator and other partners, while requesting the status of the integrated SSR plan and urging military neutrality throughout the electoral process.
