Africa Must Rise Against the Normalization of War
Africa Must Rise Against the Normalization of War
Date | 2 July 2026
By Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi
Convener and Chairperson, Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement
Africa is in danger of becoming accustomed to war.
What would have shocked the conscience of the continent a generation ago is increasingly being treated as routine. Daily reports of bombed villages, displaced populations, massacred civilians, sexual violence, starvation, collapsing states, and endless humanitarian crises no longer generate the urgency they deserve.
The tragedy is not only that war is spreading, and Africa is in a new era of conflict and insecurity. The greater tragedy is that war is becoming normalized.
From Sudan to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, from the Sahel to parts of the Horn of Africa, violence is increasingly becoming a defining feature of political life itself. Armed conflict is no longer appearing as an exception to politics; in too many places it is becoming a substitute for politics.
Africa today confronts a profound and dangerous reality: war is increasingly becoming systemic, self-sustaining, and in some places permanent.
Many of the continent’s contemporary conflicts are also increasingly shaped by external interference and geopolitical competition. Local conflicts are becoming entangled with regional and international rivalries, giving rise to proxy wars that often outlive their original causes. External sponsorship, competition for strategic influence, and access to resources can prolong violence, complicate peace efforts, and transform local conflicts into seemingly endless wars. In too many places, Africa is paying the human cost of struggles that extend far beyond its borders.
The return of war is not simply a security challenge. It is an existential challenge to Africa’s future. It threatens every major aspiration Africans have articulated for themselves—from Agenda 2063 and regional integration to democratic governance, economic transformation, poverty reduction, social justice, and women’s empowerment.
Across the continent, conflicts are becoming more fragmented, more regionalized, and more resistant to traditional approaches to peacemaking.
In too many places, war has become an economic system, a method of governance, a pathway to political power, and a means of negotiating access to state resources. For some actors, peace has become a threat while war has become an opportunity.
Even more troubling is the changing status of civilians. In many contemporary conflicts, civilians are no longer unfortunate victims caught between warring parties. They are increasingly becoming deliberate targets (see here).
No group bears the burden of Africa’s wars more heavily than women and children.
Women carry responsibilities that extend far beyond their own survival. They become caregivers, providers, protectors, and custodians of communities under conditions of extraordinary hardship. They face displacement, loss of livelihoods, hunger, sexual violence, forced migration, and the collapse of essential social services. Yet, they remain significantly underrepresented in the political decisions that determine war and peace.
Children are perhaps the greatest victims of all. Millions are growing up amid violence, displacement, interrupted education, hunger, and profound psychological trauma. Many have never known a society at peace.
The destruction of civilian life is no longer merely collateral damage. It is increasingly part of the logic of war itself.
Entire societies are being traumatized. Communities that have lived together for generations are being torn apart. Reconciliation becomes more difficult. State-building becomes more fragile. Democratic transitions become more elusive. Development becomes impossible.
Africa’s peace institutions are under immense strain. Existing approaches are not matching the scale of the challenge. Conflict prevention remains weak, mediation efforts are fragmented, and civilian protection remains inadequate.
Most importantly, leadership for peace is becoming increasingly scarce, while leadership for war often appears more visible.
It is against this backdrop that the Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement is advancing the Women for Peace in Africa Initiative.
Peace is too precious to be left to governments and formal institutions alone. Sustainable peace requires the active participation of citizens, women’s organizations, youth movements, faith communities, intellectuals, traditional leaders, humanitarian actors, and civil society. The defense of peace must become a shared societal responsibility.
The initiative recognizes that sustainable peace requires organized civic leadership capable of defending civilians, promoting accountability, supporting mediation efforts, strengthening social cohesion, and generating public pressure for political solutions.
Africa has reached a moment when silence is no longer an option. The scale of suffering demands action. The erosion of peace demands leadership. The future of the continent demands a broad-based civic movement committed to ensuring that war does not become a permanent feature of African political life.
The defense of peace must once again become a continental cause.
Africa must rise against the normalization of war.
This article previously featured in The Sunday Times. Geraldine Joslyn Fraser-Moleketi, the Convenor of the Beijing +30 Women’s Movement, is the Chairman of the Thabo Mbeki Board of Trustees.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for July 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for July 2026
Date | July 2026
In July 2026, the Republic of Uganda is set to chair the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Council’s Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions alongside an informal consultation on ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action’ and an engagement with the AU Commission Chairperson. Of the four substantive sessions, two will focus on country-specific issues while the rest will address thematic issues. Except for one session planned to be held at the ministerial level, the remaining sessions will be held at the ambassadorial level. In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC subsidiary bodies – the Committee of Experts (CoE), the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the Sub-Committee on Sanctions – are also expected to meet during the month.
The first activity of the month will be the Third Accra Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Accra III process on UCGs), which will be held on 3 and 4 July, in Accra, Ghana. This year’s theme will be held under the theme ‘Youth Inclusion for African Stability.’ Despite the conclusions of the inaugural convening held in March 2022 and the second forum held in March 2024, the policy approach and the trends did not show any improvement. For example, a key aspect of the AU norm proscribing coups, on non-eligibility of coup makers for elections contained in Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, has in practice been abandoned. In 2025, two coups and one attempted coup took place. It remains uncertain if and how the Accra III Forum will produce an outcome that will change the dynamics both in the policy approach to and the recent trends in unconstitutional changes of government on the continent.
The first substantive session of the month, scheduled for 8 July, will be an update on the Situation in Abyei. In March 2024, the PSC had scheduled an informal consultation and a briefing on the situation in Abyei on 12 March. This session, however, did not happen as planned. It later emerged that in preparation for the session, the PSC sought to obtain Sudan’s views through an informal consultation, given that Sudan remains suspended from participating in AU activities, but both the planned informal consultation and the scheduled PSC session were unable to proceed as intended due to Sudan’s refusal to engage. In response to the diplomatic note inviting its participation in the informal consultation, Sudan’s representative in Addis Ababa declined the invitation and submitted a letter requesting that the PSC refrain from proceeding with its planned engagement on Abyei. Sudan further called for the removal of the Abyei issue from the PSC meeting’s agenda. However, this request is contrary to the PSC Protocol, which clearly states that no country may oppose the inclusion of an agenda.
The ongoing war in Sudan, coupled with persistent instability in South Sudan, has continued to deepen insecurity in the disputed Abyei region while further delaying efforts to resolve its long-standing final political status. Over the past six months, the security situation has deteriorated significantly. During this period, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) recorded 196 security incidents and 58 fatalities—a sharp increase compared with the preceding six months. Reports also indicate that South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and police have maintained ‘unauthorised checkpoints’ and continued occupying civilian infrastructure in southern Abyei, while the presence of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces around Goli and Diffra in northern Abyei remains a major source of concern. The relations between Sudan and South Sudan continue to be shaped by the conflict that erupted in Sudan in 2023. The last time the PSC convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Abyei was in September 2022, at its 1108th session, before the outbreak of the war in Sudan. In addition to following up on the issues identified in the 1108th session, there are new dynamics that the 8 July session needs to address in view of the changing security situation in Sudan and its implications on the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan.
On the same day, there will be an informal consultation on the ‘Proposed AU Model on Trigger Mechanism for Early Warning and Early Action.’ The proposed AU Model is a key institutional development designed to bridge the gap between receiving early warning about a conflict and timely executing preventive action. It is worth recalling that the call for the establishment of a ‘trigger mechanism and indicators’ was first made during the Cairo Retreat of the PSC held in October 2018, to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls for an early action by the Council. This was further reiterated in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. The development of the trigger is premised on the recognition that it is only when the risks of conflict have to meet a certain threshold, including an indication that national processes are unable or unwilling to address them, and thereby requiring the action of the AU.
On 21 July, Council will convene its only ministerial-level meeting on the theme ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa.’ The session will build on Council’s March 2025 1266th session on ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa.’ In the session, the Council, among other decisions, called for the need to incorporate the fight against radicalisation and extremist ideologies into the AU action plan on the prevention and fight against terrorism and violent extremism. It is worth recalling that PSC’s 1111th meeting held in October 2022 marked a notable shift in the approach, expanding the instruments in the toolbox of responses by emphasising the importance of dialogue and negotiation as means to encourage the voluntary surrender, disengagement and rehabilitation of members of terrorist groups. The session also adopted several significant decisions, including requesting the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African national reconciliation best practices. In addition to building and following up on the outcome of these earlier sessions, the ministerial session is expected to review recent developments and trends both in conflicts involving terrorist groups on the continent and the state of policy action and response to address these conflicts, having regard to the specificities of how the threat that terrorism and violent extremism manifests itself in various parts of the continent.
Following this, on 27 July, the PSC will get an ‘Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger.’ This will be the third time that the Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one substantive agenda item.
The last substantive session of the month will be held on 28 July to consider the bi-annual Report of the AU Commission on Elections in Africa covering the Period of January – June 2026. As per the PSC’s decision from its 424th session in March 2014, which mandates periodic updates on African electoral developments, the Chairperson presents a mid-year elections report. The previous update was delivered during the 1327th PSC session on 26 January 2026, and covered electoral activities from July to December 2025, and the Outlook for 2026. Tomorrow’s briefing will similarly provide accounts of elections conducted from January to June 2026 – covering elections held in Benin, Uganda, Congo, Djibouti, Cape Verde, Guinea and Ethiopia – while also outlining the electoral calendar for the second half of 2026.
The last activity of the PSC will be an ‘Engagement with the AU Commission Chairperson.’ It is to be recalled that in September 2019, the PSC held, for the first time, an interactive session with the then Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, on the working relationship between the PSC and the Commission in the context of Article 2 of the PSC Protocol within the spirit of enhancing coordination on peace and security efforts. During that meeting, there was a commitment for convening it periodically.
In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC subsidiary bodies will also meet during the month. On 14 July, the Committee of Experts (CoE) will meet to prepare for the PSC Ministerial Meeting on ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa.’ In addition, the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions will also meet on 15 July for an ‘Engagement on political and socio-economic developments on preventive measures against UCG.’ It is to be recalled that the inaugural session of the Committee was held on 12 June 2024.
The Military Staff Committee (MSC), on the other hand, will have their first engagement of the year on 24 July, on an ‘Update on the CLB operations.’
The footnote of the PPoW also provides for the PSC Chairperson’s participation in a Policy Conference on ‘Peace, Security and Development Nexus,’ to be held in Mombasa, Kenya, from 10 to 13 July. On 24 July, the PSC Chairperson will also have an engagement with the Pan-African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa. Lastly, it is expected that the Chairpersons of the PSC for the months of May and June 2026 will present communications on the activities undertaken by the Council during their respective terms as Chair of the PSC.
African Union's Role in Elections: Promoting Democracy or Whitewashing Illegitimacy?
African Union's Role in Elections: Promoting Democracy or Whitewashing Illegitimacy?
Date | 30 June 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The African Union (AU)’s role in elections in Africa is conducted through two interrelated processes. The first is AU’s election observation activities and the other is the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) agenda on elections in Africa. Between 2021 and 2025, the PSC progressively consolidated its focus on elections, moving beyond episodic observation toward sustained engagement that recognises elections as extended political processes with significant implications for political and institutional stability. This period registered some notable institutional gains, including improved professionalism of AU Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs), support for professionalization of election observation bodies, increased attention to inclusivity of women and youth, and the launch of knowledge-generation initiatives.
These advances (not central to the political factors that shape the conduct of elections), however, were offset by persistent weaknesses, notably the normalisation of minimalist electoral assessments that privilege calm over credibility, inconsistent enforcement of continental norms, most critically Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in post-coup contexts and weak follow-up on election observation recommendations and the lack of consistent use of preventive diplomacy. AU’s uneven handling of elections following a) unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), b) constitutional and electoral manipulation and c) cases where electoral and military illegality converged (in Gabon in 2024 and in Guinea Bissau in November 2025) have not only eroded the deterrent value of AU norms and strained the Council’s preventive credibility but also are exposing the AU to charges of being complicit in the increasing perversion of elections in Africa.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2026
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2026
Date | May 2026
In May, under the chairship of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, standing in for Sierra Leone, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering six agenda items. Following the revision of the PPoW, which included the addition of three more agenda items, a total of nine agenda items were considered during the month.
Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC
Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU PSC and ECOWAS MSC
Date | 29 June 2026
Tomorrow (30 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mediation and Security Council (MSC), in Abuja, Nigeria.
Following opening remarks by Julius Sandy, Chair of the ECOWAS MSC, and Nasir Aminu, Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the AU and stand-in PSC Chairperson for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), and Dr Alieu Omar Touray, President of the ECOWAS Commission, are expected to deliver statements.
The last Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS MSC was held on 16 May 2025 in Addis Ababa. The meeting, among others, agreed on the need to continue engaging the three countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES); developing a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with these countries; reinvigoration of the Nouakchott Process, the ECOWAS Plan of Action Against Terrorism, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Gulf of Guinea maritime security initiatives; a Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell under an AU-ECOWAS counter-terrorism coordination platform; closer cooperation between the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN); and joint field missions, retreats, chairperson-level consultations, focal points and staff exchanges. Against this background, the third consultation, framed around the theme ‘Strengthening Regional Cooperation in Resources Mobilization to Address Evolving Peace and Security Threats in Africa’, may serve as a test of whether annual dialogue can be translated into measurable follow-up, including through a joint assessment of West Africa’s peace and security situation, particularly terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and transitions; deeper collaboration on financing peace support operations, including discussion on the practical operationalisation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 for regional peace support needs; and concrete steps for strengthening coordination and coherence between the PSC and MSC within APSA and AGA.
That test comes against a deteriorating security, humanitarian and climate backdrop. The central Sahel remains the epicentre of militant Islamist violence on the continent, with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger accounting for a major share of fatalities linked to such groups. Yet the threat is no longer confined to the central Sahel. The Lake Chad Basin recorded a 28 per cent increase in fatalities from the previous year, underscoring the continued operational threat posed by Boko Haram and ISWAP. At the same time, insecurity increasingly connects Sahelian theatres, northern Nigeria, the Lake Chad islands and coastal borderlands. These dynamics strengthen the case for closer AU-ECOWAS coordination on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and cross-border stabilisation, but also show that regional stabilisation cannot be treated as a purely security question. The PSC’s 1344th session on the impact of climate change on the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel further reinforces the need to connect security responses with local resilience, climate adaptation and conflict-sensitive recovery. Around 55 million people in West and Central Africa are projected to face crisis-level hunger or worse during the June-August 2026 lean season, while more than 13 million children are expected to suffer from malnutrition in 2026. Conflict, displacement, economic turmoil, funding shortfalls and extreme weather risks therefore make humanitarian access, resilience and recovery programming integral to any credible regional response.
Another area that may receive the attention of the consultative meeting is early warning. The AU-ECOWAS early warning cooperation engagement, held from 8-10 June 2026 in Abuja, involved the AU West Africa Regional Desk, CEWS Situation Room, ECOWAS directorates, and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). It was built on the September 2025 desk-to-desk process for joint conflict analysis and governance monitoring. It is imperative that CEWS-ECOWARN cooperation is linked to political decision-making, preventive diplomacy and rapid response, rather than remain a technical exchange. This is also where the proposed AU-ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform and Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell become important. The Councils may therefore deliberate on how such mechanisms could be operationalised.
Of immediate political concern is the AES question and its effect on ECOWAS’s institutional cohesion. The previous joint communiqué’s call for engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger gave institutional expression to the logic of moving from estrangement to engagement. The 67th ECOWAS Ordinary Summit endorsed the appointment of a Chief Negotiator to lead discussions with the three states on an orderly withdrawal process, safeguarding institutional and citizens’ interests and minimising regional disruption. At the same time, the 68th Summit urged Member States and directed the ECOWAS Commission to sustain engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to strengthen collaboration on the deteriorating security situation. The AU Commission Chairperson’s consultations with the Ambassadors of the three countries on 27 May 2025, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel’s visit to Niger in April 2026, the 22 May 2025 meeting in Bamako between the President of the ECOWAS Commission and Ministers of the three countries of the AES similarly signalled efforts to keep channels open and cooperate on shared challenges, particularly terrorism. ECOWAS has since begun to give this dialogue a more dedicated form through the appointment of former Guinean Prime Minister and former ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyaté as Chief Negotiator with the AES countries, followed by his engagement with Burkina Faso’s transitional president and current AES Chair, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, in May 2026. While near-term reintegration remains unlikely, it is in the interest of both Councils to prevent the rupture from paralysing practical cooperation on security, stability and free movement. Tinubu’s warning at the 68th Ordinary Session that ‘We are most vulnerable not when challenged from outside, but when weakened from within’ speaks directly to the wider significance of the AES rupture. Beyond the question of membership, it touches on political trust, security coordination and the common regional purpose needed to sustain collective action.
Governance and constitutional order are expected to be another major pillar, as transitions and UCG remain central to West Africa’s stability agenda. The previous meeting encouraged inclusive responses to governance deficits and reaffirmed zero tolerance for UCG, but recent developments, such as the November 2025 military coup in Guinea-Bissau and the December 2025 attempted coup in Benin, demonstrate that UCG remains a persistent challenge in the region.
Peace Support Operations and financing are expected to be crucial issues for deliberation, particularly regarding how AU-ECOWAS cooperation can support more effective resource mobilisation and the practical operationalisation of Resolution 2719 to meet peace support needs. This is particularly relevant in light of the 67th ECOWAS Ordinary Summit’s decisions on missions in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, which point to mandate readjustment, final extensions, drawdown and liquidation planning, as well as the 68th Summit’s decisions on Guinea-Bissau, which indicate renewed stabilisation needs, including the protection of political leaders and national institutions. The MNJTF may also serve as a related test case, particularly given the PSC’s concern at its 1347th session over funding gaps and its request that the AUC liaise with the A3 to explore the possible application of Resolution 2719 to fund MNJTF activities.
The expected outcome is a Joint Communiqué. The meeting is expected to welcome the convening of the Third Annual Joint Consultative Meeting as further consolidation of the AU PSC–ECOWAS MSC consultation process and to reaffirm the two Councils’ commitment to collaboration and shared responsibility in addressing peace and security challenges in West Africa and the wider continent. It may also welcome steps to strengthen AU-ECOWAS early warning cooperation and to encourage stronger links among CEWS, ECOWARN, and rapid response. It may also call for clearer coordination mechanisms to operationalise decisions taken by statutory organs, including agreed workstreams, focal points, timelines and reporting arrangements. The Councils may highlight the need for a practical mechanism to facilitate the operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 in ways relevant to West African peace support needs, including the MNJTF, ECOWAS peace support capacities and other regional security arrangements. The communiqué may further encourage the revitalisation of existing cooperation mechanisms, including the Nouakchott Process, the Accra Initiative, the MNJTF and Gulf of Guinea maritime security arrangements, alongside steps towards operationalising the previously proposed AU–ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform and Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell. It may also stress continued dialogue with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, reaffirm ECOWAS as a key pillar of regional integration and continental peace and security, and underscore that stronger AU-ECOWAS coordination is indispensable to addressing the region’s interconnected security, governance and humanitarian pressures.
Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review
Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review
Date | 24 June 2026
Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial June 2026 Programme of Work had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.
The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.
Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).
The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s 360th session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.
During its 463rd session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its 901st meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.
The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its 1251st session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’
Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251st session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report validation meeting was held in November 2025, and the Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.
It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35th AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35th session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.
Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework
Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework
Date | 24 June 2026
Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the AU’s Compliance and Accountability Framework.
The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for June, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).
The session takes place as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is set to review the implementation of Resolution 2719 (2023) later this year, three years after its adoption, as required under the resolution. The Resolution stresses the operational necessity for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions to be planned and conducted in compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and aligns with relevant UN frameworks and policies. Although Resolution 2719 has yet to be applied, the AU and the UN have, over the past two and a half years, undertaken a range of preparatory efforts to facilitate its implementation. These efforts have included a series of meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, culminating in the development of a joint roadmap for the implementation of Resolution 2719, which is structured around four workstreams, one of which focuses on compliance and the protection of civilians.
In tomorrow’s session, the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC on where the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) currently stands, progress made in strengthening and operationalising the Framework, the state of AU–UN coordination and institutional readiness for the implementation of Resolution 2719 in the context of compliance requirements, challenges encountered so far, and the way forward.
The issue of compliance began to feature prominently within the AU in the context of institutional reform efforts and the revitalisation of the Peace Fund from 2016 onwards. The Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, prepared by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and endorsed by the AU Assembly at its 27th Ordinary Session in July 2016, recommended the development of an AU Compliance Framework outlining applicable international legal obligations and due diligence requirements. The recommendation reflected the AU’s growing role in the deployment of PSOs across the continent and the legal and moral imperative for such operations to adhere to obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Strengthening compliance was seen not only as essential to enhancing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and credibility of AU peace operations, fostering trust among local populations, and contributing to sustainable peace and stability, but also as one of the conditions for AU-led PSOs to access UN-assessed contributions.
The PSC subsequently reinforced this agenda at its 689th session, held on 30 May 2017, where it underscored the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law, human rights standards, and conduct and discipline requirements in the conduct of PSOs. The Council further agreed that the operationalisation of financing arrangements for AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC should be predicated, inter alia, upon strengthening the AU’s human rights due diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse.
Efforts to strengthen the AU’s compliance framework gained further momentum during negotiations on a UNSC resolution on the financing of AU-led PSOs, which intensified between 2018 and 2023 and culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023. Throughout these negotiations, several UNSC members repeatedly emphasised the need for the AU to establish a robust compliance framework capable of meeting UN standards on human rights due diligence, conduct and discipline, and accountability. In response, the AU progressively consolidated its compliance architecture.
Notable milestones included the adoption by the PSC, at its 813th session in November 2018, of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs, both of which were subsequently endorsed by the 32nd AU Assembly in February 2019. Compliance and accountability principles were further mainstreamed into the 2021 AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations. Additional progress was made through the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) during its 14th ordinary session. The framework received a further boost in January 2023 when the 15th STCDSS adopted three key instruments: the AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, and the AU Policy on Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSOs.
To further institutionalise the compliance and accountability framework and strengthen implementation efforts, the AU entered into a Tripartite Project with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations in February 2022 on AUCF for PSOs. The project aims to ensure that AU-led PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this initiative, the AU has benefited from additional staffing, technical expertise and dedicated programmatic resources to support the implementation of the framework. Currently, there is a dedicated AUCF Project Focal Point within the Peace Support Operations Division of the Conflict Management Directorate.
Recent developments indicate continued progress in strengthening the framework. In May 2026, the AU–EU–UN Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) of the AUCF launched the next phase of the project covering the period 2026–2030. AU also officially launched the Case Management System (CMS) for PSOs under the AUCF. The CMS serves as a critical mechanism for the prevention, reporting, investigation, tracking and management of allegations relating to violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as other forms of misconduct. It is also intended to facilitate corrective action, accountability processes and redress for affected individuals. In addition, a Third-Party Compensation Policy has been developed, while the AU’s compliance training curriculum—originally developed in 2018—has undergone a comprehensive review to ensure its continued relevance and responsiveness to the evolving operational requirements of AU-mandated and authorised PSOs.
Encouraging steps have also been taken to integrate the AU’s compliance architecture into ongoing peace operations. The March 2026 report on joint AU–Federal Government of Somalia–UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan highlighted several advances, including the role of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The mechanism enables the mission to identify, assess and analyse incidents involving civilian harm and supports the implementation of mitigation measures, operational adjustments and accountability actions where necessary. To strengthen accountability and transparency, AUSSOM has also established Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) at both contingent and Mission Headquarters levels. These bodies serve as formal investigative mechanisms responsible for examining incidents involving potential violations, operational failures, and breaches of conduct and discipline.
Despite these progresses, challenges remain in the implementation of the compliance and accountability framework. AU PSOs are often deployed in highly volatile and complex conflict environments characterised by asymmetric warfare involving terrorist and other non-state armed groups, which complicates compliance efforts. Mission management dynamics can also pose challenges. In some instances, troop-contributing countries retain varying degrees of operational control over their contingents, which may constrain the AU’s authority over mission personnel and impede the consistent application of compliance and accountability measures. Most of all, at the continental level, the growing emergence of ad hoc security arrangements and regionally led deployments operating outside established continental frameworks highlights major challenges in the effective implementation of the AUCF. Sustained support is required not only to uphold compliance standards but also to facilitate investigations, disciplinary processes, remedial measures, and cooperation with oversight mechanisms.
Institutionally, the project-based nature of elements of the framework raises questions regarding sustainability and continuity. While external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the framework, long-term institutionalisation will require predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity. Adequate resources are particularly important to support continuous training, monitoring and evaluation, investigations, victim assistance, and compensation mechanisms.
Challenges also persist in AU–UN coordination, particularly in the context of operationalising Resolution 2719. While the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have maintained regular engagement on the technical and operational requirements for the application of the resolution through the various workstream configurations, progress in unpacking and operationalising compliance-related requirements appears to have been relatively limited. While major progress has been registered on all workstreams, including compliance, compared to other workstreams—most notably joint planning, decision-making and reporting, and mission support— there are areas in which the Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians workstream lags behind, such as the existence of a full staff complement dedicated to this at strategic headquarters towards full operational readiness.
It is not yet clear whether tomorrow’s session will adopt an outcome document in the form of a communiqué or press statement. However, the PSC may welcome the achievements of the first phase of the AU–EU–UN tripartite project on the AUCF, as well as the launch of its second phase covering the period 2026–2030. The Council may also take note of the progress made over the years in strengthening the AU’s compliance architecture and its institutionalisation and operationalisation, including the adoption of key policy instruments, the recent launch of the AUCF Case Management System, the development of a Third-Party Compensation Policy, and the revision of the compliance training curriculum. While acknowledging progress made in unpacking and operationalising Resolution 2719 through the four workstreams, the PSC may request the AU Commission to intensify engagements with the UN Secretariat in order to develop a common understanding of the compliance requirements under the Resolution and the steps necessary to meet them, as the UN Security Council prepares to review its implementation later this year.
Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework
Update on the Compliance and Accountability Framework
Date | 24 June 2026
Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the AU’s Compliance and Accountability Framework.
The session will commence with opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for June, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).
The session takes place as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is set to review the implementation of Resolution 2719 (2023) later this year, three years after its adoption, as required under the resolution. The Resolution stresses the operational necessity for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to access UN-assessed contributions to be planned and conducted in compliance with the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and aligns with relevant UN frameworks and policies. Although Resolution 2719 has yet to be applied, the AU and the UN have, over the past two and a half years, undertaken a range of preparatory efforts to facilitate its implementation. These efforts have included a series of meetings of the AU–UN Joint Task Force, culminating in the development of a joint roadmap for the implementation of Resolution 2719, which is structured around four workstreams, one of which focuses on compliance and the protection of civilians.
In tomorrow’s session, the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC on where the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) currently stands, progress made in strengthening and operationalising the Framework, the state of AU–UN coordination and institutional readiness for the implementation of Resolution 2719 in the context of compliance requirements, challenges encountered so far, and the way forward.
The issue of compliance began to feature prominently within the AU in the context of institutional reform efforts and the revitalisation of the Peace Fund from 2016 onwards. The Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, prepared by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, and endorsed by the AU Assembly at its 27th Ordinary Session in July 2016, recommended the development of an AU Compliance Framework outlining applicable international legal obligations and due diligence requirements. The recommendation reflected the AU’s growing role in the deployment of PSOs across the continent and the legal and moral imperative for such operations to adhere to obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Strengthening compliance was seen not only as essential to enhancing the legitimacy, effectiveness, and credibility of AU peace operations, fostering trust among local populations, and contributing to sustainable peace and stability, but also as one of the conditions for AU-led PSOs to access UN-assessed contributions.
The PSC subsequently reinforced this agenda at its 689th session, held on 30 May 2017, where it underscored the importance of adherence to international humanitarian law, human rights standards, and conduct and discipline requirements in the conduct of PSOs. The Council further agreed that the operationalisation of financing arrangements for AU-led PSOs authorised by the UNSC should be predicated, inter alia, upon strengthening the AU’s human rights due diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuse.
Efforts to strengthen the AU’s compliance framework gained further momentum during negotiations on a UNSC resolution on the financing of AU-led PSOs, which intensified between 2018 and 2023 and culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2719 in December 2023. Throughout these negotiations, several UNSC members repeatedly emphasised the need for the AU to establish a robust compliance framework capable of meeting UN standards on human rights due diligence, conduct and discipline, and accountability. In response, the AU progressively consolidated its compliance architecture.
Notable milestones included the adoption by the PSC, at its 813th session in November 2018, of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in PSOs, both of which were subsequently endorsed by the 32nd AU Assembly in February 2019. Compliance and accountability principles were further mainstreamed into the 2021 AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations. Additional progress was made through the adoption of the Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs and the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) during its 14th ordinary session. The framework received a further boost in January 2023 when the 15th STCDSS adopted three key instruments: the AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, the AU Policy on Protection of Civilians in PSOs, and the AU Policy on Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSOs.
To further institutionalise the compliance and accountability framework and strengthen implementation efforts, the AU entered into a Tripartite Project with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations in February 2022 on AUCF for PSOs. The project aims to ensure that AU-led PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this initiative, the AU has benefited from additional staffing, technical expertise and dedicated programmatic resources to support the implementation of the framework. Currently, there is a dedicated AUCF Project Focal Point within the Peace Support Operations Division of the Conflict Management Directorate.
Recent developments indicate continued progress in strengthening the framework. In May 2026, the AU–EU–UN Strategic Steering Committee (SSC) of the AUCF launched the next phase of the project covering the period 2026–2030. AU also officially launched the Case Management System (CMS) for PSOs under the AUCF. The CMS serves as a critical mechanism for the prevention, reporting, investigation, tracking and management of allegations relating to violations of IHL and IHRL, as well as other forms of misconduct. It is also intended to facilitate corrective action, accountability processes and redress for affected individuals. In addition, a Third-Party Compensation Policy has been developed, while the AU’s compliance training curriculum—originally developed in 2018—has undergone a comprehensive review to ensure its continued relevance and responsiveness to the evolving operational requirements of AU-mandated and authorised PSOs.
Encouraging steps have also been taken to integrate the AU’s compliance architecture into ongoing peace operations. The March 2026 report on joint AU–Federal Government of Somalia–UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan highlighted several advances, including the role of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC). The mechanism enables the mission to identify, assess and analyse incidents involving civilian harm and supports the implementation of mitigation measures, operational adjustments and accountability actions where necessary. To strengthen accountability and transparency, AUSSOM has also established Boards of Inquiry (BOIs) at both contingent and Mission Headquarters levels. These bodies serve as formal investigative mechanisms responsible for examining incidents involving potential violations, operational failures, and breaches of conduct and discipline.
Despite these progresses, challenges remain in the implementation of the compliance and accountability framework. AU PSOs are often deployed in highly volatile and complex conflict environments characterised by asymmetric warfare involving terrorist and other non-state armed groups, which complicates compliance efforts. Mission management dynamics can also pose challenges. In some instances, troop-contributing countries retain varying degrees of operational control over their contingents, which may constrain the AU’s authority over mission personnel and impede the consistent application of compliance and accountability measures. Most of all, at the continental level, the growing emergence of ad hoc security arrangements and regionally led deployments operating outside established continental frameworks highlights major challenges in the effective implementation of the AUCF. Sustained support is required not only to uphold compliance standards but also to facilitate investigations, disciplinary processes, remedial measures, and cooperation with oversight mechanisms.
Institutionally, the project-based nature of elements of the framework raises questions regarding sustainability and continuity. While external partnerships have played a critical role in advancing the framework, long-term institutionalisation will require predictable funding, dedicated staffing, and enhanced technical capacity. Adequate resources are particularly important to support continuous training, monitoring and evaluation, investigations, victim assistance, and compensation mechanisms.
Challenges also persist in AU–UN coordination, particularly in the context of operationalising Resolution 2719. While the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have maintained regular engagement on the technical and operational requirements for the application of the resolution through the various workstream configurations, progress in unpacking and operationalising compliance-related requirements appears to have been relatively limited. While major progress has been registered on all workstreams, including compliance, compared to other workstreams—most notably joint planning, decision-making and reporting, and mission support— there are areas in which the Human Rights Compliance and Protection of Civilians workstream lags behind, such as the existence of a full staff complement dedicated to this at strategic headquarters towards full operational readiness.
It is not yet clear whether tomorrow’s session will adopt an outcome document in the form of a communiqué or press statement. However, the PSC may welcome the achievements of the first phase of the AU–EU–UN tripartite project on the AUCF, as well as the launch of its second phase covering the period 2026–2030. The Council may also take note of the progress made over the years in strengthening the AU’s compliance architecture and its institutionalisation and operationalisation, including the adoption of key policy instruments, the recent launch of the AUCF Case Management System, the development of a Third-Party Compensation Policy, and the revision of the compliance training curriculum. While acknowledging progress made in unpacking and operationalising Resolution 2719 through the four workstreams, the PSC may request the AU Commission to intensify engagements with the UN Secretariat in order to develop a common understanding of the compliance requirements under the Resolution and the steps necessary to meet them, as the UN Security Council prepares to review its implementation later this year.
Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review
Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review
Date | 24 June 2026
Tomorrow (25 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting with two agenda items, one of them being a ‘Briefing on the 10-Year Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) Review.’ Although the session is scheduled for tomorrow, the initial June 2026 Programme of Work had scheduled it to happen on 30 June.
The Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of June, Nasir Aminu, will deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is entrusted with a relevant mandate, may also brief the PSC on its critical role.
Structural conflict prevention is closely linked to the AU’s core principles as set out in its Constitutive Act, which requires Member States to uphold democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, while also advancing socio-economic development and regional integration. Over the years, the AU has adopted several normative and policy instruments designed to facilitate the structural prevention of conflicts. In addition to the APRM that proved effective in detecting risks and vulnerabilities of reviewed AU member states, within the framework of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), steps were taken to develop tools aimed at facilitating the identification of a country’s structural vulnerability to conflict at an early stage. Of significance in this respect is the CSVRA and the accompanying Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).
The CSVRA, developed as a follow-up to PSC’s 360th session, held in March 2013, forms part of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). The CSCPF has been developed to facilitate a Commission-wide and coordinated approach to structural conflict prevention with the aim of identifying and addressing structural weaknesses that have the potential to cause violent conflicts if left unaddressed.
During its 463rd session of October 2014, the PSC, taking note of its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF and the development of the CSVRA, requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools, and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to provide all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict. At its 901st meeting of December 2019, the PSC encouraged Member States to make full use of the Commission’s tools for structural conflict prevention, including the CSVRA.
The PSC’s last meeting on the theme was held in December 2024, as its 1251st session, in which, it tasked the AU Commission in partnership with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), ‘to take the necessary measures, in accordance with the rules and procedures of each organ and in compliance with their respective mandates, to establish a harmonised framework for the CSVRA and the CSVMS, including integration of CSVRA/CSVM into the APRM Questionnaire for the improvement of governance in Africa, by adopting coordinated and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at promoting the peace, security and development nexus on the continent.’ It further urged the AU Commission ‘to submit the draft harmonised framework to the PSC for approval.’ This was taken further when the PSC tasked the AU Commission to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the CEWS, CSVRA and CSVMS with a view to reengineering the tools to effectively respond to threats to peace and security and proposing appropriate interventions’; and to ‘establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the APRM, aimed at optimising resource utilisation, strengthening synergy, and effectively integrating national, regional, and continental early warning systems, and submit the proposed coordination mechanism for its consideration by June 2025.’
Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to give an update on the ten-Year CSVRA review, and follow up on the tasks from the 1251st session. Of concern, however, as the CSVRA undergoes its ten-year review, several persistent challenges have come into sharper focus. One of the issues that would be in the spotlight is the concern that the PSC expressed during that session, over the limited accession of Member States to the CSCPF tools – CSVRA and CSVMS, nine (9) years after adoption. Since then, the Malawi draft report validation meeting was held in November 2025, and the Strategic Review of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) methodology was held in Rwanda in November 2025, which included reviewing the CSCPF implementation (which considered the CSVRA and CSVMS). Additionally, the restructuring that integrated the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments into the PAPS Department effectively dismantled the dedicated CEWS division, leaving the CSVRA without a clear institutional anchor or dedicated personnel to promote and implement the mechanism. There is also the question of the alignment between and integration of the CSVRA into the APRM review processes to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.
It would also be of interest to the PSC to look into the decision of the February 2022 35th AU summit requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision. The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the update that the AU Commission may provide on the lessons learned from the implementation of the CSVRA on how it helps identify risks or vulnerabilities for conflict and facilitating the initiation of measures to mitigate or address those risks or vulnerabilities in the countries that volunteered to undertake the CSVRA review.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of enhanced action for addressing structural causes of conflicts and the need for the full utilisation of the CSVRA towards mitigating and resolving the underlying causes and drivers of conflicts in Africa. The PSC may also reiterate the need for strengthening coordination between relevant entities for enhancing the effective implementation of the CSVRA without duplication. It may, in this regard, underscore the importance of the Monitoring and Oversight Committee that the AU Assembly tasked the AU Commission to establish at its 35th session in February 2022. The PSC may also encourage both the AU Commission and member states that undertook the CSVRA review to document and share lessons learned from the review in order to improve the role of the CSVRA to tackle the underlying causes and drivers of conflict. The PSC may encourage Member States to fully take advantage of the CSVRA and CSVMS as instruments for the consolidation of peace and stability.
Celebrating an Enduring Voice for Africa in a Time of Uncertainty
Celebrating an Enduring Voice for Africa in a Time of Uncertainty
Date | 18 June 2026
Abdul Mohammed
At a time when Africa confronts multiple and overlapping crises—devastating wars, democratic uncertainty, economic pressures, geopolitical competition, and an increasingly fragmented international order—it is fitting to pause and celebrate one of the continent’s most consequential leaders and thinkers.
The 84th birthday of President Thabo Mbeki on 18 June offers a valuable opportunity to reflect on the kind of leadership this time demands and how African can exercise agency in order both to limit the adverse impacts of these challenges but also create conditions for addressing them. For he is not only a former President of South Africa but also one of the principal architects of contemporary Pan-Africanism. For more than four decades, he has helped shape continental debates on governance, development, peace, integration, and Africa’s place in the world.
For many Africans of my generation, Thabo Mbeki represents a rare combination of statesman, intellectual, strategist, and Pan-African visionary. He belongs to a generation of leaders who understood that political liberation was only the beginning of Africa’s journey. The greater challenge was transforming independence into development, political sovereignty into agency, and aspiration into institutions.
His presidency coincided with one of the most transformative periods in Africa’s contemporary history. The establishment of the African Union, the advancement of NEPAD, the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism, anchored on the articulation of the African Renaissance in advancing contemporary Pan-Africanism all bore his intellectual imprint. He challenged Africans to reject narratives of dependency and victimhood and instead embrace responsibility, dignity, and self-confidence.
Compared to his peers, what makes him standout is that Mbeki consistently treated ideas as instruments of transformation. He invested in thought as much as action. Whether through speeches, essays, ANC Today, or countless public engagements, he sought to elevate political discourse and encourage Africans to think strategically about their future.
This unique trait of Mbeki comes to full view on the occasion of the launch of an important and timely book, The Two Sudans by Alex de Waal. The book documents one of the most complex and far-reaching mediation efforts undertaken by the African Union under President Mbeki’s leadership as Chair of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan. It offers valuable insight into the challenges of peacemaking in deeply divided societies and stands as a testament to Mbeki’s patient, principled, and determined pursuit of African-led solutions to conflicts on the continent.
What has always distinguished Mbeki is his unwavering commitment to African solutions to problems in Africa. His mediation work presents a compelling testament to this commitment.
I had the privilege and honor of working closely with President Mbeki as Chief of Staff of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan. For nearly a decade, I witnessed his leadership at close quarters. Those years remain among the most rewarding, intellectually stimulating, and professionally fulfilling years.
Working with him was an education in leadership.
He approached mediation with extraordinary seriousness. Every document was read. Every argument was examined. Every historical detail mattered. He understood that sustainable peace requires more than ceasefires and agreements. It requires understanding history, identity, institutions, grievances, and aspirations.
The book, The Two Sudans, provides valuable insight into that period. It captures the depth of Mbeki’s engagement and his determination to pursue a genuinely African-led mediation process. His work demonstrated that peacebuilding requires patience, rigor, intellectual honesty, and political courage.
What stands out most was his discipline and strategic focus. He never sought publicity. He sought solutions. He believed that mediation was a responsibility to the people affected by conflict rather than a platform for diplomatic recognition.
While differed in style, but he shares important characteristics with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Both took ideas seriously. Both understood the importance of institution-building. Both were committed to transforming Africa’s position in the world. Both believed that Pan-Africanism required practical expression through policy, development, integration, peacebuilding, and strategic engagement with global realities.
Both were deeply intellectual yet intensely practical. Neither was interested in slogans or superficial politics. They believed that ideas must translate into policy, institutions, and measurable outcomes. They approached governance as a serious undertaking requiring discipline, preparation, and strategic clarity. Above all, they shared a conviction that Africa must become an active architect of its own destiny rather than a passive subject of global power politics. They both understood that Africa’s destiny requires the transformation of the socio-economic realities of the mass of the people.
Their generation understood that Pan-Africanism was not simply an aspiration; it was a practical project of state-building, regional integration, peace-making, and economic transformation.
They represented a practical Pan-Africanism—one rooted not in rhetoric but in action and deep commitment to the needs and interests of the mass of the people.
Today, that tradition of intellectually grounded and strategically engaged leadership is increasingly rare. The continent faces immense challenges that require strategic thinking, historical perspective, and moral courage. The wars in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sahel, and elsewhere have exposed weaknesses in both continental and international systems. At the same time, intensifying competition among global powers is reshaping Africa’s strategic environment.
On these issues, Mbeki’s voice remains indispensable.
Long before discussions of multipolarity became fashionable, he argued that Africa must strengthen its own institutions and strategic capabilities in order to navigate shifts in the global balance of power. His reflections on global governance, multilateral reform, development, and sovereignty remain remarkably relevant today.
His recent interventions against xenophobia and Afrophobia in South Africa are equally important. At a moment when economic hardship and social tensions risk fueling hostility toward migrants, Mbeki has reminded South Africans that the source of the social and economic ills afflicting South Africans are not people from other parts of the continent, who stood with them during the anti-apartheid struggle. He has consistently argued that attacks on fellow Africans betray the very values upon which democratic South Africa was built.
That moral consistency has been one of the defining features of his public life.
His continuing engagement is also reflected in recent collections of his writings and letters, including those drawn from ANC Today. These writings reveal a leader still deeply concerned about governance, political ethics, democratic accountability, and the future of the liberation movement that shaped modern South Africa.
History will continue to debate aspects of his presidency, as it should. That is inevitable for any consequential leader. Yet no serious assessment of modern Africa can ignore the scale of his contribution.
At a time when leadership for peace appears increasingly scarce and leadership for conflict often dominates headlines, Mbeki’s example offers an important reminder. He has consistently demonstrated that political leadership must be anchored in principle, patience, and long-term vision. Throughout his public life, he has defended dialogue over confrontation, institutions over personalities, and strategic thinking over political expediency. Africa’s current crises underscore the continued relevance of these values.
For those of us fortunate enough to have worked alongside him, President Mbeki’s legacy is not confined to history books or institutional achievements. It lives on in the lessons he imparted, the standards he set, and the enduring belief that Africa can and must shape its own future.
At eighty-four, many in Africa are delighted to have him as one of the continent’s most important voices—a statesman whose influence extends beyond office, beyond country, and beyond generation.
As we wish you a happy 84th birthday, President Thabo Mbeki, may your continued wisdom, intellectual courage, and unwavering commitment to Africa continue to inspire those who believe that another Africa remains possible.
