Briefing by the Panel of the Wise, FemWise and WiseYouth on their activities in Africa
Briefing by the Panel of the Wise, FemWise and WiseYouth on their activities in Africa
Date | 12 March 2024
Tomorrow (13 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1205th session to receive a briefing by the Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary bodies, FemWise and WiseYouth, on their activities in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Emilia Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Prof. Babacar Kante, Chairperson of the Panel of the Wise is also expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC.
The meeting which was initially planned for 19 March 2024, is being convened in accordance with PSC’s decision during its 665th meeting in March 2017, in which it requested for quarterly briefings from the Panel of the Wise. The last convening of the PSC on the Panel of Wise was in May 2023 at its 1152nd session which focused on the Report of the Panel of the Wise on its mission to the Republic of Chad. Prior to that, PSC convened it’s 1142nd session on 3 March 2023, but no outcome document was released.
Prior to the 1142nd session, there was no session with the Panel for most of the years since 2017. Thus, despite the expectation for this engagement to be regular, the meetings have not been regular and are yet to be fully institutionalised. This has affected the harmonisation and collaboration between the two organs around the role of the Panel on conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy. Tomorrow’s session accordingly presents the opportunity for discussing on how to maintain the momentum and institutionalize the regularity of engagement.
The session is also expected to discuss on the work of the Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary mechanisms (PanWise, FemWise-Africa and WiseYouth) from the period 1 March 2023 to 1 March 2024. An area that is expected to receive particular attention in the Panel’s briefing is its efforts to assist countries in political transitions. On the situation in Chad, the Panel undertook a fact-finding mission to the country in May 2023 to evaluate Chad’s political and security situation in accordance with a November 2022 decision of the PSC. The Panel also undertook a mission to the Central African Republic. The field mission, in which the outcome was discussed during PSC’s 1157th session, sought to evaluate the political and security situation, assess the progress of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR-CAR) and suggested strategies to support the country in achieving peace, reconciliation and democracy. Regarding South Sudan, the Panel undertook a mission to the country in December 2023 to evaluate the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The mission also aimed to assess advancements and challenges in the political, security, humanitarian and financial aspects crucial for South Sudan’s peace and stability.
Considering that this year is a critical year in the transition process in Chad, it would be of interest for the PSC to reflect on how the Panel follows up on issues identified from its mission to Chad including on the issue of candidacy of the members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) of Chad, for elections. It is worth recalling in this respect that AU rules and PSC’s decision itself made it clear that TMC members are barred from standing for elections. Yet, earlier this month the transitional President, despite his earlier assurances, announced that he would run for elections. No doubt coming against the background of the failure of the PSC to sanction Chad for military coup, this development constitutes a test for the PSC’s credibility.
In terms of South Sudan, which finds itself at the most delicate stage of its transitional process, it would also be of interest for the PSC to hear from the Panel on its assessment of the situation and importantly on how the Panel can have sustained role for addressing disagreements that may arise on how to manage this phase of the transition including the lack of progress in key transitional tasks necessary for holding elections.
Another area of the Panel’s work that tomorrow’s session is expected to focus on concerns the Panel’s role in dealing with election related crises including its participation in election observation and electoral preventive diplomacy missions. Through its involvement in crucial Election Observation and electoral Preventive Diplomacy missions, the Panel is expected to brief the PSC on its engagement in recent pre-, during and post-election processes in several member states in 2023. The Panel carried out election observation and preventive diplomacy missions in Nigeria (February 2023), Sierra Leone (June 2023), Zimbabwe (August 2023), the Liberian presidential election (October 2023), the DRC (December 2023) as well as the 2024 Comoros Presidential elections.
In this context, an issue that may be of interest for PSC members is how these efforts by the Panel will and can contribute to the PSC’s ongoing engagement in these countries and the work of the various mechanisms of the AU dealing with these country situations.
Regarding the subsidiary organs of the Panel of the Wise, these are mechanism that contribute to its mission of conflict prevention, management and resolution. During the 25th Statutory Meeting, held on 12 and 13 May 2023, the Panel members assessed the advancements made by the Subsidiary Mechanisms, the PanWise Network, FemWise-Africa and WiseYouth and underscored the importance of enhancing the efficiency of decision-making and governance structures within these mechanisms. Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to provide the PSC an update on these subsidiary bodies of the Panel, particularly regarding the revitalization of the PanWise Network, which was proposed in 2022, as well as the 8th PanWise Network Retreat which was held from 7 – 8 December 2023 in Kigali, Rwanda, under the theme “Enhancing Electoral Preventive Diplomacy during Elections: Best Practices and Lessons Learnt.”
Furthermore, the PSC is likely to get an update on the operationalization of the FemWise-Africa Network and how members of FemWise are being deployed in various AU peace and security processes. In this context, it is expected that the briefing will highlight, among others, the involvement of the FemWise-Africa Network in AU-led election processes, including through deployments to Election Observation Missions (EOMs) and Preventive Diplomacy Missions (PDMs). In addition, the Panel is expected to brief the Council on the activities of the WiseYouth. As recalled, the establishment of the WiseYouth Network came into being through a decision made during the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in February 2022 (Assembly/AU/Dec.815(XXXV)). The network’s purpose is to strategically engage youth in preventive diplomacy, mediation and dialogue across the African continent. Following the Consultative Meeting with all Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the G5-Sahel, held on 31 August to 1 September 2023 in Bujumbura, Burundi, whereby the Operational Modalities and Terms of Reference for Members of the Network were finalized and validated, tomorrow’s meeting is expected to get an update on the process of launching an Open Call for Applications for the 1st Cohort of the WiseYouth Network which is expected to happen in 2024.
Finally, the session is expected to have a discussion on the challenges the Panel faces and propose recommendations. These are expected to include the issues on quick deployment to situations in areas not yet on PSC’s agenda; coordination challenges with RECs and RMs; absence of post-mission follow-up mechanisms and the challenge of political will to systematically and consistently include women and youth as equal stakeholders in all high-level peace processes.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may commend the Panel of the Wise for the activities that the Panel undertook during the reporting period including the missions to countries in transition and the electoral preventive diplomacy missions. It may welcome the progress made with respect to FemWise and WiseYouth. The PSC may call for enhanced coordination, and joint deployments by the AU-RECs/RMs during elections. It may also take note of the 2nd Joint Annual Retreat of the African Peer Review (APR) Panel of Eminent Persons and the AU Panel of the Wise, held on December 10-11 2023 in Johannesburg, South Africa and welcome the adoption of the Framework of Cooperation. It may underline the importance of reinvigorating early warning and conflict prevention by working closely with the Panel. It may further underline the importance of enhancing coordination with the Panel in supporting complex transitions, sustaining peace in fragile contexts and ensuring early action to deescalate looming crises. To this end the PSC may reiterate its previous decision and call for the institutionalization of conflict prevention and preventive deployment briefing by the Panel of the Wise. The PSC may also request that the AU Commission continues its support for the Panel including, in working together with the Panel to address the challenges it faces.
Briefing on the situation in Abyei
Briefing on the situation in Abyei
Date | 11 March 2024
Tomorrow (12 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1204th session on the situation in Abyei.
The session commences with an introductory statement from the PSC Chairperson for March 2024, Emilia Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU. The statement will be followed by a briefing by Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner of Political Affairs and Peace and Security (PAPS). Representative of the Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and a representative of the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. As a concerned country, South Sudan will also make a statement through its representative. Considering that the other concerned state, Sudan cannot participate in PSC meetings, the PSC envisaged to hold an informal consultation to canvas the views of the representative of Sudan with respect to the situation in Abyei.
During its 1108th session when it last considered the situation in Abyei in 2022, the PSC highlighted the need for the acceleration of the implementation of the Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements for Abyei and the Cooperation Agreement signed in 2012 which includes the actualization of the demarcation of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) and the Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). Additionally, the PSC requested the AU Commission to nominate a facilitator for the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC) to support the implementation of the agreements and decided to conduct a field mission to the region. Tomorrow’s session will provide a chance for the PSC to receive an update on the progress of these issues and developments since the last session.
Despite some positive developments concerning the rival communities in Abyei, during the last part of 2023 and in early 2024, Abyei experienced deadly clashes inducing major displacement. Not only that armed clashes between the two adversary communities of Misseriya and Dinka Ngok in Abyei have diminished, the two communities signed a peace deal in December 2023 to prevent tensions during the annual migration through among others, identifying migration corridors.
Unfortunately, during the past few months, Abyei experienced a deterioration of its security situation. Two factors account for this deteriorating security condition. The first relates to the adverse impact of the war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023. In her briefing to the UN Security Council in November, it is to be recalled that Tetteh warned about the likely adverse consequences of the expansion of the war in Sudan into the border areas of South Sudan including on the fragile social cohesion of Abyei. This development has affected the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in various ways. First, as the fighting expanded to Sudan’s West Kordofan state and the Rapid Support Forces (RPF) captured oilfields there and the resultant worsening security situation, UNISFA evacuated all international UN staff from Kadugli to Entebbe and Abyei town. Second, the UN Secretary-General’s report in October also observed that the JBVMM’s implementation of its mandate was affected significantly by the closure of Sudanese airspace in connection with the conflict, making aerial patrols impossible for the JBVMM bases in Sudan.
The other source of the deterioration of the security situation in Abyei is the spike in intercommunal clashes. In November 2023, various incidents of attacks were recorded. An attack on 19 November in three villages claimed the lives of 27 people and injured 14 others. In another incident during the same month, violence in Warrap State, South Sudan and Southern Abyei Administrative Area claimed the lives of 75 people. A similar incident in Abyei in early December led to the killing of 10 people. An ambush in Agok claimed the lives of six people including Abyei Deputy Chief Administrator, Deng Nyok. The various incidents involve clashes between armed Twic Dinka youth (also known as Titweng) and the Ngok Dinka of Abyei. Incidents of attacks and clashes involving these groups persisted into January with at least four such incidents.
In one of these deadliest incidents since 2021 that took place on 27 January 2024, UNISFA reported that 52 civilians lost their lives and 64 others were gravely injured in the incident. In this particular incident, the attack also led to the death of two UNISFA peacekeepers, prompting the Secretary-General to issue a statement expressing deep concern over the incident and UNISFA expressing concern by ‘continuing inter-communal clashes.’ At least two such clashes were reported in February as well. UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix expressed his concern about hate speech and disinformation in Abyei, which according to him, ‘can increase tensions and fuel violence’.
In light of these various concerning developments, tomorrow’s session should even have come earlier. As such it presents an opportunity for the PSC to consider the increasing fragility of the situation in Abyei and how to mitigate and avoid the danger of the region being overwhelmed by the security pressures from the rising intercommunal clashes and the consequences of the Sudan war.
Beyond the security situation, the humanitarian dimension of the situation would also be of interest to the PSC. Due to the recent intercommunal clashes, people were displaced. UNISFA in late January and early February received for providing protection, more than 2000 of those displaced. The inflow of a large number of refugees and returnees from Sudan further exacerbates the existing humanitarian situation in Abyei. According to the UNHCR, as of 7 March 2024, some 20,000 people crossed from Sudan to South Sudan through Abyei fleeing the war in Sudan since its outbreak in April 2023.
In the political front, the war in Sudan has completely changed the process for the resolution of the final status of Abyei. Since the PSC’s last session, there have been positive developments most notably towards the revival and enhancement of the efforts by the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan to identify a long-lasting solution to the issue of Abyei region. The May 2023 report of the UN Security-General on UNISFA observed that there was ‘high-level engagement between the Sudan and South Sudan aimed at enhancing cooperation on Abyei and border issues, and paving the way for discussion on its final status.’ It in particular noted that ‘on 24 October 2022, the chairpersons of the national committees established by both South Sudan and the Sudan – Tut Gatluak Manime, Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs of South Sudan, and Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan and Head of the Rapid Support Forces – met to discuss the final status of Abyei, which resulted in an agreement to enhance cooperation and address outstanding issues.’ They held a second meeting in Khartoum with the presence of UNISFA and representatives of the UN, AU and IGAD on 9 and 10 April, only days before the outbreak of the Sudan war. With the war in Sudan raging, further engagement to take these discussions forward was disrupted. The result is that the process for the final settlement of the status of Abyei is unlikely to be back on the agenda of the talks between Sudan and South Sudan in the near future before any progress is made in containing the war in Sudan itself.
In light of these various developments, the role of UNISFA and the JBVMM has acquired particular significance. Thus PSC’s 1108th session assertion of ‘the need to maintain the presence of UNISFA in order to continue maintaining peace and stability in the Abyei region’ is even more important in the current context than when the PSC held the meeting in September 2022. It is a welcome development in this context that members of the UN Security Council were unanimous in their support of the important role of UNISFA and the JBVMM. On 14 November 2023, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2708, renewing the mandate of UNISFA for another year, until 15 November 2024. The resolution also extended UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM for one year.
Tomorrow’s session also serves for taking stock of the follow up to the decisions of PSC’s 1108th meeting when it last discussed Abyei, in September 2022. Beyond those already highlighted above including the nomination of a facilitator for the AJOC, the PSC in this respect may also consider the role of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP). It is to be recalled that, following the update by President Thabo Mbeki, Chair of AUHIP during the 1108th session, the PSC expressed its gratitude to AUHIP ‘for the sustained efforts over the years, which contributed to the stabilization of the Abyei Area; in this regard, requests the AU Commission to scale up the mobilization of the requisite resources to ensure the success of this undertaking aimed at negotiating solutions to the challenges in Abyei; and looks forward to receiving the comprehensive report of the activities of the AUHIP.’
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may condemn the increase in the frequency and impact of intercommunal conflicts in the region and the attack on UNISFA peacekeepers that claimed the lives of two peacekeepers. It may urge South Sudan to enhance its efforts for taking measures that help deescalate the situation, particularly the tension involving the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka. Further, the PSC may reaffirm the increasing importance of the role of UNISFA in view of changing dynamics affecting Abyei and welcome the decision by the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of UNISFA and the latter’s support to the JBVMM. The PSC may also highlight the importance of the role of the AU and IGAD including the continuing importance of the role of the AUHIP and in this respect, may express its expectation to receive the report of the AIHIP. It may commend the efforts of UNISFA to protect those affected by recent conflicts including through the provision of shelter to the displaced and encourage the mission to expedite the humanitarian response and call for other humanitarian providers to scale up their contribution for humanitarian assistance to the region. The PSC may welcome a peace deal that the Misseriya and Dinka Ngok signed in December 2023 to prevent tensions during the annual migration and encourage community leaders to sustain such peace efforts. The PSC may call on Sudan and South Sudan to not let the conflict in Sudan waver the commitment of the two parties to the Agreement on Temporary Security and Administrative Arrangements.
Briefing on the situation in Somalia: Post ATMIS
Briefing on the situation in Somalia: Post ATMIS
Date | 7 March 2024
Tomorrow (8 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an informal meeting on the situation in Somalia: post-AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).
Following opening remarks by the Permanent Representative of Namibia and PSC Chairperson for March, Emilia Mkusa, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to deliver a statement. Souef Mohamed El-Amine, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS may also brief the PSC.
The PSC last discussed the situation in Somalia and ATMIS operations during its 1173rd session on 14 September of the previous year, amidst the approaching deadline for the phase 2 drawdown of ATMIS troops, originally slated for 30 September 2023. While initially opting to proceed with the troop drawdown as per the original plan, Somalia’s subsequent request for a three-month technical pause in the drawdown led the PSC, during its 1177th session, to reverse its earlier decision and postpone the withdrawal until 30 December 2023. Previous sessions of the PSC on ATMIS emphasized the importance of adhering to the agreed timelines for the phased troops drawdown and eventual exit, while also safeguarding against potential security vacuums and reversal of the hard-won gains.
It was in this context that PSC’s 1173rd session requested the Commission to ‘work out a viable ATMIS exit strategy, which should include proposals on AU’s continued engagement with and support to Somalia post 31 December 2024.’ Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to follow up on this request. In this context, the PSC could receive critical updates on recent political, economic, and security developments in Somalia since its last session in September, including updates on the completion of phase 2 drawdown, preparations for phase 3, and ongoing discussions regarding post-ATMIS security arrangements.
On the political and economic front, Somalia has made significant strides in recent months. Notably, it was admitted to the East African Community (EAC) in November 2023 and achieved the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point in December 2023, providing total debt service savings for Somalia of USD4.5 billion. According to the IMF, following the HIPC Completion Point, Somalia’s external debt has fallen from 64% of GDP in 2018 to less than 6% of GDP by end 2023, which further facilitates access to critical additional financial resources that will help Somalia strengthen its economy.
Recognizing the benchmarks reached on implementing the security transition, the Somalia Transition Plan and the national security architecture, in December 2023, the UN Security Council (UNSC) also unanimously adopted resolution 2714 (2023) lifting the arms embargo on Somalia, which had been in place since January 1992. ATMIS hailed this decision as ‘a key step’ in bolstering the operational capabilities of the Somali Security Forces (SSF). The 44th Ordinary Session of AU’s Executive Council, held in February, also endorsed Somalia as the candidate from East Africa for the non-permanent seat on the UNSC for 2025-2026.
Another significant development on the political front is the initiative to finalize the long-awaited constitutional review process. On January 24, Somalia’s Parliament, comprising both chambers, approved the adoption procedure for constitutional amendments, albeit amid a chaotic session. Earlier, in May 2023, the National Consultative Council (NCC), which brought together leaders from the FGS and Federal Member States (FMS), reached a consensus on the form of government and electoral system.
Another development with potentially adverse implications for the political and security dynamics relate to the tension that erupted between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa following an MoU the latter signed with Somaliland that the PSC addressed during its 1192nd session on 17 January. It is to be recalled that the PSC issued a press statement urging both parties to exercise restraint, de-escalate tensions, and engage in meaningful dialogue to peacefully resolve the matter.
On the security front, the meeting is expected to highlight ongoing operations against Al-Shabaab, and the milestone of completing the phase 2 ATMIS troops drawdown on 2 February, in line with PSC’s 1177th session and UNSC resolution 2710 (2023). This phase witnessed the departure of 3000 troops, the transfer of seven Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and the closure of two others. With the withdrawal of a total of 5000 troops during phase 1 and 2, ATMIS force strength currently stands at 13,586. Preparatory efforts are underway for phase 3, slated to further reduce troop numbers by 4000 as of 30 June, leading towards a final exit on 31 December 2024. In this respect, PSC Members could be interested to hear more about the implementation of phase 2 drawdown and the lessons identified from it, and emphasize the importance of leveraging these lessons while conducting the upcoming drawdown. Moreover, assessing the prevailing context in the country—taking into account factors such as the security situation, the status of force generation and the overall readiness of the FGS to take on greater security responsibilities—will remain critical in determining the viability of moving forward with phase 3. It is recalled that the UNSC, under resolution 2710, requested the FGS and the AU to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 March 2024 to evaluate phase 2 drawdown, and provide an update by 30 April on their preparations for phase 3 drawdown.
The other major aspect of tomorrow’s informal meeting will be the post-ATMIS security arrangement. As the December 2024 deadline for final departure of ATMIS troops approaches, discussions are underway regarding the follow-on mission after ATMIS exists. On 12 December 2023, during the Somalia security conference held in New York, Somalia requested for a post-ATMIS ‘limited and new multilateral mission’ to provide protection of strategic population centres and key Mogadishu and Federal Member State infrastructure. In tomorrow’s briefing, PSC Members may receive detailed information about the proposed mission, informed by engagements between AU high-level delegation led by Alhadji Sarjoh Bah, AUC’s Director for Conflict Management, and Somalia’s authorities during his five-day working visit in Somalia in January/February 2024. During his visit, Sarjoh noted that the strength, mandate, posture, composition and the overall architecture that will replace ATMIS will be based on ‘a very comprehensive security assessment that focuses on the threats and other variables’. Furthermore, on 13 February, the AU convened the Core Security Partners Group high-level consultative meeting in Addis Ababa, which brought together key partners, to explore avenues for supporting ‘Somali-led and owned security arrangements post-ATMIS’.
In this context, it would be of interest for the PSC to learn about whether there is an established arrangement for joint monitoring, assessment and consultation between the AU and Somalia in order to ensure that Somalia plays active and leading role in the drawdown and exit of ATMIS and importantly in planning the post-ATMIS mission. This is critical not only to avoid communication gaps but also to ensure ownership and responsibility by Somalia as the host state. Also of interest for the PSC are the issues that require clarification in terms of planning the post ATMIS mission. These include the scope of the mandate of the mission, the size of the force, its composition, and whether and how elements of ATMIS would constitute part of this new mission to avoid vacuum that may arise due to complete lack of continuity. In clarifying these issues, as well as how the mission will be organized and how it interfaces with FGS and its security forces, the request Somalia made during the Somalia security conference last December and the lessons from AMISOM and ATMIS provide useful basis.
Financing is likely to be the other key aspect to be discussed. This can be approached from two perspectives: the persistent financing challenges confronting ATMIS and funding sources for the post-ATMIS mission. Regarding the former, the AUC may highlight the considerable financial resource required for ATMIS operation until its December exit, surpassing USD 100 million. This estimate assumes no further delays in forthcoming drawdown. Despite this, there are encouraging efforts on the side of the AU to bridge the USD25,895,129 funding gap, disbursing USD3.5 million from the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) of the AU Peace Fund and USD 19,068,914 from the AU Members States contributions. In relation to post-ATMIS mission, a critical issue will be how to secure predictable, adequate and sustainable funding for the mission. During the 19 February UNSC briefing on Somalia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Catriona Laing, alluded to the use of UN assessed contribution within the framework of resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of the AU-led peace support operations as one of the potential funding modalities. Indeed, this presents the first test for the practical application of resolution 2719.
No formal outcome document is expected to be issued from tomorrow’s informal meeting. The PSC may welcome positive developments that Somalia registered in recent months, including its admission to the East African Community, the lifting of arms embargo, the attainment of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Completion Point, and its candidacy for a non-permanent seat at the UNSC for the 2025-2026 slot. The PSC may also commend the FGS for initiating the constitutional review process, while emphasizing the imperative of inclusive dialogue among Somali stakeholders. Regarding the ATMIS drawdown, the PSC is expected to welcome the completion of phase 2, and urge ATMIS and the FGS to make all necessary preparations for the next phase of the drawdown, involving the withdrawal of 4,000 troops by 30 June, 2024. It may highlight that this withdrawal, as outlined by UNSC resolution 2710, should be based on a comprehensive assessment of the security landscape and Somalia’s readiness to assume increasing security responsibilities to ensure that the preparations as well as the departure of the troops are not exploited by Al-Shabaab. In relation to financing, PSC may commend the AU member states for the efforts to bridge the funding gap in ATMIS operations, and may call upon international partners to scale up their support, given the significant USD100 million required to sustain ATMIS operation until its scheduled exit in December. On the post-ATMIS mission, PSC may welcome and express its support to the outcome of the 12 December 2023 Somalia Security Conference held in New York, notably Somalia’s request for a ‘limited’ and ‘multilateral’ post-ATMIS mission. To ensure a plan that is mutually owned by Somalia and AU and adequately reflects the needs and expectations of Somalia, the PSC may encourage the AU Commission and Somalia to establish a joint monitoring, assessment, consultation and planning mechanism that will, among others, help clarify critical questions relevant to the development of the concept of operations for the Post-ATMIS mission.
Le Conseil de Paix et de Securite de l'Union Africaine - Manuel 2023
Amani Africa
2023
REMERCIEMENTS
Le Manuel du Conseil de paiX et de sécurité de l’Union africaine est une initiative d’Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa), qui fournit des informations et des analyses faisant autorité sur le CPS et son travail. Comme pour les deux éditions précédentes du Manuel, la présente édition du Manuel a bénéficié de l’engagement d’Amani Africa avec les acteurs clés du travail du CPS. Je tiens à remercier les membres du CPS, en particulier les présidents mensuels du CPS, les Secrétariats du CPS et les membres du Comité d’experts pour leur soutien à la préparation de cette troisième édition du Manuel.
Je tiens à remercier tout particulièrement S.E. Bankole Adeoye, Commissaire aux Affaires politiques, la Paix et la Sécurité (PAPS) pour avoir honoré le présent manuel d’un avant-propos, soulignant l’importance de la recherche et de l’analyse pour soutenir la mise en œuvre du Protocole relatif à la création du CPS.
J’adresse un mot de remerciement à nos partenaires et parties prenantes qui ont fourni leurs réfleXions sur la valeur du Manuel du CPS de l’UA. À cet égard, je tiens à citer Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général auprès de l’UA et chef de l’UNOAU, Comfort Ero, Président-directeur général de l’International Crisis Group, Bruce Mokaya, chef de la délégation du CICR auprès de l’UA et des organisations internationales, ainsi que Tim Murithi, chef des interventions de consolidation de la paiX à l’Institut pour la justice et la réconciliation et Professeur des études africaines.
Permettez-moi également de reconnaitre avec appréciation le soutien habituel du personnel du Secrétariat du CPS, en particulier Neema Nicholaus Chusi, chef par intérim du Secrétariat du CPS.
La présente édition du Manuel est le produit de l’engagement d’Amani Africa avec l’ensemble du personnel du Département du PAPS à qui nous eXprimons également notre gratitude.
Nous tenons à remercier le Gouvernement de la Suisse qui a apporté son soutien en tant que partenaire au projet de rédaction et de publication du présent Manuel.
Dr. Solomon Ayele Dersso, au nom de l’équipe d’Amani Africa
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Update briefing on the Operations of SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
Update briefing on the Operations of SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
Date | 3 March 2024
Tomorrow (4 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1203rd session for an updated briefing on the operations of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique.
The session opens with the opening remarks of Emilia Mkusa, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia and the Chairperson of the PSC for March. This will be followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Additionally, a representative from the Republic of Mozambique, as the concerned state and Kula Ishmael Theletsane, the Director of Politics and Security Affairs of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are also expected to give briefings. The representative of Rwanda, which has deployed troops to Mozambique based on bilateral arrangements, may also deliver a statement.
The SADC Mission in Mozambique also known as SAMIM, was initially deployed in July 2021 following an approval by the extraordinary summit of the SADC that was held on 23 June 2021 in Maputo, Mozambique. The peace support operation was initially intended for a six-month duration, but it has since been extended three times. The first extension came in January 2022, extending the mission for three months, while the second extension in August 2022 extended the mission for a year. The PSC’s last discussion on the issue also took place following SAMIM’s second extension. The outcome of this meeting (1119th session) held on 7 November 2022 led to the PSC endorsing two significant decisions from the 42nd Ordinary Summit of SADC held in August 2022. The first decision was to extend SAMIM’s mandate for another year and the second was to de-escalate the intervention from scenario 6 to scenario 5 and eventually to scenario 4.
The most recent extension, which was officially confirmed on 28 January was a result of the decision made at the 43rd Ordinary Summit of SADC, held on 17 August 2023 in Luanda, Republic of Angola. This summit endorsed the decision of the Organ Troika Summit of 16 August 2023 to extend the SAMIM’s mandate by 12 months, making the new end date 15 July 2024. Beyond the extension, the Summit instructed the leadership of SAMIM to initiate a step-by-step drawdown starting from 15 December 2023, with the complete withdrawal to be finalized by 15 July 2024.
The decision to withdraw SAMIM has raised questions, particularly in light of the attacks by the Islamic-State of Mozambique (ISM) resurgence in the Cabo Delgado province since September 2023. This has since escalated in January 2024 following the launch of ‘kill them where you find them’ campaign by the ISM. Until June 2023, the Islamic-State armed insurgency, which took root in October 2017 in Cabo Delgado province, has resulted in the death of more than 6,500 people. Additionally, as reported by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCA), the attacks have displaced over a million people throughout the years. By August 2023, a significant number of these internally displaced persons, totalling 571,468, returned to their homes. Notably, 540,958 of these returnees are from Cabo Delgado. The districts that are home to the most returnees include Mocímboa da Praia, Palma and Muidumbe people. However, since January 2024, the attacks have spread to Mocímboa da Praia district and the neighbouring districts of Palma and Muidumbe, including the district of Mocomia coast stretching to Mecufi. In the last two months, it is estimated that more than 67,000 individuals have evacuated the southern districts of Cabo Delgado, according to government officials. These are new developments indicate the security forces deployed in Mozambique including SAMIM are strained.
When the second extension of SAMIM was approved by SADC in 2022, its mandate shifted from an African Standby Force Scenario 6 military only operation (in the words of the PSC ASF based ‘peace-enforcement mission to neutralise the terrorist threat and restore state-authority in the affected districts in Cabo Delegado’) towards a more comprehensive approach, emphasizing peace building and governance. Despite some of the gains registered by SAMIM, its efforts toward peacebuilding and good governance have faced numerous challenges including funding shortages. Even the progress made through military offensives is put to the test as ISM insurgents adapt their strategies. They now operate in smaller groups, directing attacks on civilians and military targets and integrating into local communities, which makes them more difficult to detect and counteract. This situation casts doubt on the timeliness of the decision to withdraw SAMIM. One incident that highlights this issue is when Mozambican security forces, who have been struggling with food shortages and months of unpaid salaries, effectively gave up control of the crucial village of Mucojo on January 18. This withdrawal allowed the insurgents unrestricted access to the Macomia coast.
Given the persisting insurgency and the planned withdrawal of SAMIM, it is expected that Kula Ishmael Theletsane’s briefing to the PSC will shed light on the preparedness of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) to step in and address the potential ensuing security vacuum. Furthermore, the briefing may also elaborate on the withdrawal plan of SAMIM. It would also be of interest to the PSC to learn about the plan on how to fill in the potential vacuum that may arise on the departure of SAMIM and the role of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). The role of the RDF is one of the aspects of the meeting between President Paul Kagame and President Filipe Nyusi held on January 25.
Tomorrow’s session is also an opportunity to follow up on the Council’s previous decisions with regard to AU’s equipment support to the SAMIM. During its 1119th session, the PSC expressed concern over the delayed shipment of the second batch of equipment, which China had pledged to donate and ship directly to Mozambique. This decision was first made during the 1062nd PSC session in January 2022. Due to this lack of progress, the PSC during its previous session on SAMIM requested the AU Commission to continue coordinating with the Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa to expedite the delivery. The Director for Conflict Management in the AU Peace and Security Department undertook a field mission to Pemba, Mozambique on 17 November 2023. This action aligns with the PSC’s request for the AU Commission to deliver the donated equipment to the SAMIM support operation.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communique. The PSC may express concerns over the resurgence of attacks in Cabo Delgado and the persistence of the insurgency and the threat it poses to the various neighbouring districts of Cabo Delgado. The Council may endorse the communique of the 43rd ordinary summit of SADC that extended the mandate of SAMIM. The PSC may also emphasize the need for ensuring that the exit of SAMIM does not lead to a security vacuum that may lead to the reversal of the gains made by the deployment of SAMIM. The Council may also emphasise on the need for enhanced coordination and cooperation between SAMIM, FADM and RDF. Cognizant of the need to address the structural causes of the scourge in northern Mozambique for lasting peace and stability in the region, the Council may emphasize the importance of enhancing the implementation of peacebuilding and reconstruction measures for the rehabilitation of affected communities, rebuilding of legitimate local government structures. The PSC may further emphasise the need for strategies for promoting long-term stability in Mozambique, including supporting initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and promoting inclusive development and governance. Lastly, the Council may reiterate its request for the Commission and SADC Secretariat to provide regular progress updates to the Council on the process of drawdown and withdrawal of SAMIM’s mandate and the plan for avoiding the emergence of a security vacuum on the departure of SAMIM.
Briefing on the situation in Eastern DRC and deployment of the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC)
Briefing on the situation in Eastern DRC and deployment of the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC)
Date | 3 March 2024
Tomorrow (04 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will consider the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the deployment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), as one of the agenda items of its 1203rd session.
Emilia Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month, will deliver opening remarks. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is also expected to make a statement. This will be followed with statements by a representative of DRC as well as a representative of the Republic of Zambia, SADC Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs. Kula Ishmael Theletsane, Director of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs is also expected to brief the PSC. Force Commander of the SAMIDRC may also participate in the session.
In the previous year, the PSC considered the situation in eastern DRC at the Heads of State and Government level, at its 1140th session held in February. It also committed its 1145th session held in March to the consideration of the report of its filed mission to the DRC conducted from 20 to 23 March 2023. Since then, there have been major developments in relation to the situation in the region as well as the response mechanisms deployed to manage the crisis, including SADC’s deployment of SAMIDRC on 08 May 2023. Tomorrow’s session offers the opportunity to discuss these developments.
Since October 2023, the security situation in eastern DRC has significantly worsened increasing regional tensions. While much attention has been directed towards the ongoing conflict involving the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) alongside allied militias and the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), other domestic and foreign armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Red Tabara, and Mai-Mai also continue to wreak havoc in the region, significantly impacting the civilian population.
There have been ongoing regional initiatives under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) known as the Nairobi and Luanda processes to address the situation in eastern DRC. An EAC Regional Force (EACRF) was also deployed in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi process but EACRF eventually withdrew from the region in December 2023 due to the Congolese government’s disappointment over the EACRF’s inability to resolve the issue of the M23 and its unwillingness to renew the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).
Even before EACRF’s departure, the Congolese government had already turned its attention towards SADC, which on 8 May decided to deploy SAMIDRC with a mandate to support restoring peace and stability in eastern DRC. On 17 November, SADC signed a SOFA with the DRC to pave the way for the mission’s deployment in December 2023. SAMIDRC is comprised of contingents from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania which are actively engaged in providing support to the FARDC in the ongoing fight against M23. Tomorrow’s session marks the first time when the PSC will discuss the decision of SADC Heads of State and Government on the deployment of troops to the DRC on 08 May 2023.
Following EACRF’s departure, the M23 reportedly retook control of the areas that it handed to the force and made advances towards Goma, the capital of North Kivu. The ongoing fighting near Sake, a town 27 kilometres from Goma has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region and the massive displacement of people has heightened international concerns. The situation has also increased regional tensions with escalatory rhetoric and accusations between DRC and its neighbours. For instance, recently, DRC accused Rwanda of targeting a Congolese military aircraft stationed at the Goma airport that reportedly sustained minor damage in a drone attack on 17 February 2023. Rwanda also accused DRC of posing a threat to its security by violating its air space and, announced its decision to adjust its security posture including measures to ensure complete air defense of Rwanda, and to degrade offensive air capabilities. Additionally, Rwanda accused DRC and Burundi of publicly declaring their support for regime change in Rwanda following the 12 February visit of Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye to Kinshasa, where he reportedly met with his Congolese counterpart to discuss the security situation in eastern DRC.
Burundi has deployed its forces in eastern DRC under a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government. Tensions between Rwanda and Burundi escalated after Burundi’s decision in January to close its borders with Rwanda, citing allegations of Rwandan support for Burundian armed groups—a charge Rwanda denies. Burundi’s border closure came in response to a 22 December 2023 attack by Red Tabara, a Burundian armed group operating in eastern DRC, which targeted a village near Burundi’s western border with the DRC, resulting in the loss of 20 lives, including 12 children. Another attack by Red Tabara on 26 February reportedly claimed nine lives and left several others injured.
On the margins of the AU Summit, Angolan President and Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Joao Lourenço, convened a mini-summit on 16 February which saw the participation of regional leaders and AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. The mini-summit discussed ways of restoring a cessation of hostilities and facilitating direct talks between the DRC and Rwanda to avoid the further expansion of the conflict into a regional crisis. With the mini-summit ending without any concrete outcome and the two sides descending into heated exchanges, President Lourenço held bilateral meetings with the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda on 17 February. He continued his diplomatic engagement in Luanda meeting with President Felix Tshisekedi on 27 February who reportedly agreed in principle to meet with President Paul Kagame.
During the AU summit, there was also a tripartite meeting of the leaders of Burundi, the DRC, and South Africa in Addis Ababa on 17 February, which focused on the coordination of forces operating in eastern DRC in support of the FARDC. Burundi and South Africa are actively involved in providing support to the Congolese government in its military operations in North Kivu, with Burundi operating within a bilateral arrangement and South Africa participating as part of the SAMIDRC mission. The three leaders met again in Windhoek, during the funeral ceremony of the late Namibian President, to continue the discussion in the tripartite format.
On 14 February, two SAMIDRC troops from South Africa were killed and three others injured in a mortar attack, according to a 15 February press release of the South African National Defence Force. South Africa reaffirmed its commitment to continue assisting the Congolese people and underscored SAMIDRC’s role as a ‘bulwark against the expansion of the conflict to the whole country’. However, Rwanda alleged that SAMIDRC ‘is not a neutral force in the current crisis’, accusing it of supporting the DRC government’s ‘belligerent posture, which bears the potential for further escalation of the conflict and increased tensions in the region’, according to a letter the country sent to the Security Council.
This came against the backdrop of discussions about possible UN operational and logistical support to SAMIDRC. On 22 November 2023, SADC formally requested UN assistance for SAMIDRC, including the provision of facilities, equipment, air asset services, medical support, and information and intelligence sharing, among other forms of support. In resolution 2717 of 19 December 2023, which most recently renewed the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Security Council expressed its intention to evaluate the conditions under which ‘limited logistical and operational support may be provided to an AU-mandated regional force deployed within the area of MONUSCO’s deployment, in furtherance of MONUSCO’s mandate, and within existing resources’. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report in June, which will include his recommendations on this matter.
It is in this context that the PSC is meeting tomorrow to receive a briefing on the deployment of SAMIDRC. Unlike the East African Force which was tied to the political track of the Nairobi process and the inter-state focused Luanda process, there is no indication that SAMIDRC has a political and peace track on which it is anchored. As part of the discussion on possible support from the AU, one of the issues that tomorrow’s session may discuss includes whether and how SAMIDRC deployment is tied to and supports the Nairobi and Luanda processes. PSC members are also likely to explore possible AU support to SAMIDRC, including from the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) of the AU Peace Fund and to enable the force to airlift donated equipment from the AU Continental Logistics Base in Cameroon, as well as other support from partners such as the UN.
In line with resolution 2717, the only way that SAMIDRC gets the desired support from the UN is if the AU mandates it. Endorsement by the PSC may not be necessarily the same as mandating the mission and there could be further discussion on this when the issue is considered in New York in due course. Nevertheless, the PSC’s decision on the matter is likely to feed into the Secretary-General’s June report and recommendations on the provision of limited operational and logistical support through MONUSCO. These recommendations could also be premised on the assumption that MONUSCO stays in DRC beyond December 2024.
MONUSCO is currently implementing a disengagement plan agreed with the Congolese government and endorsed by the Security Council. It is expected to withdraw in April from one of the three provinces—South Kivu—where it is currently operating but the decision to withdraw from the remaining two provinces—North Kivu and Ituri—will be made based on an evaluation of the progress in the disengagement process and the evolving security situation on the ground. It is because of this reason that the Security Council intentionally avoided setting an artificial deadline for the mission’s exit, but Kinshasa seems to be of the view that MONUSCO should leave come December 2024. DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Francophonie, Christophe Lutundula said that his government is ‘fighting for everything to be done by the end of this year’, in a joint press conference with the Special Representative and Head of MONUSCO, Bintou Keita on 13 January. ‘As of December 31 of this year, we are at the end of the withdrawal process’, he emphasized.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may endorse SADC’s deployment of SAMIDRC. It may stress the importance of ensuring coordination of efforts deployed in the region and draw attention to the importance of aligning the force’s deployment with existing peace and political processes including the Nairobi and Luanda processes and the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF), in order to achieve lasting and sustainable results in the resolution of the crisis. The PSC is also expected to emphasise concern over the intensification of hostilities in eastern DRC and the reversal of some of the key gains achieved including withdrawal of negative forces from strategic territories in the region. It may express serious concern over the deterioration of the relationship between DRC and Rwanda and urge the leaders of both countries to uphold commitments made under and commit to the Nairobi and Luanda processes. In this respect, the PSC may welcome Angolan president, President Lourenço’s recent efforts to facilitate direct talks between the two leaders and urge the two countries to extend full cooperation for the facilitation role of President Laurenço. The PSC may further call on all neighbouring countries of DRC to engage constructively towards averting further escalation of the situation into a regional crisis. On support to SAMIDRC, the PSC may request the AU Commission to work out modalities for using the CRF funds for supporting SAMIDRC.