The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions

The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions

3 May 2026

Tomorrow (04 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1344th session to consider the impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions.

The session will open with remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are also expected from Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE); Mamadou Tangara, High Representative and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Mali/Sahel; and Marie Jose Samba Ovono Obono, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Chad. Representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are also expected to deliver statements.

The climate, peace and security agenda has been a standing item on the PSC’s programme since its 585th session in March 2016, when the Council committed to annual deliberations on the nexus between climate change and security. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding two sessions annually on the theme—amounting to over 18 sessions to date—reflecting the growing prominence of the issue. While previous deliberations have referenced the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel within broader discussions, the upcoming session appears to be the first dedicated engagement focused specifically on these regions.

The crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel unfolds within a complex socio-ecological system in which environmental stress, livelihoods, demographic pressures, governance deficits, and insecurity interact in mutually reinforcing ways. In line with the PSC’s consistent framing, climate change operates as a ‘threat multiplier,’ exacerbating existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as a direct cause of conflict. As underscored in its 1301st session in September 2025, climate change is a ‘risk multiplier’ that aggravates vulnerabilities, heightens insecurity, and undermines livelihoods, thereby exacerbating existing conflicts and creating new security challenges or social, economic, and environmental factors that can lead to food insecurity, forced migration, conflict and economic disruption through extreme weather events like droughts and floods.

In the context of the Lake Chad Basin, as highlighted in the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for Boko Haram-affected areas, the shrinkage of Lake Chad is often attributed to climate change and desertification, with associated livelihood losses sometimes linked to increased vulnerability to violent extremism. The lake’s surface area declined dramatically from 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to about 1,300 km² in the 1980s—a reduction of nearly 90 per cent. Today, it fluctuates between 8,000 and 14,000 km² depending on rainfall patterns. However, the environmental reality is more complex. Communities around the lake have historically adapted to cyclical flooding and fluctuating water levels, developing resilient livelihood strategies over generations. In recent years, however, more frequent and intense flooding, combined with long-term environmental changes, has placed a growing strain on these adaptive capacities. This pressure is compounded by rapid population growth, which has significantly increased competition over limited and variable natural resources. At the same time, ongoing conflict has further degraded environmental conditions by disrupting agricultural systems, destroying infrastructure, and eroding local knowledge. These intersecting pressures—climate variability, demographic change, and insecurity—have reinforced longstanding marginalisation and underdevelopment, creating conditions in which radical narratives and armed groups persist.

The Sahel is among the regions most vulnerable to climate change globally. Temperatures are rising about 1.5 times faster than the global average, with projections indicating an increase of at least 2°C by 2040. This has profound implications for populations whose livelihoods depend heavily on climate-sensitive sectors, with 60 to 80 percent engaged in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing. According to the African Climate Risk Assessment, climate-related security risks in the Sahel stem from the interaction of environmental stress and structural fragility. Livelihood insecurity is central, as dependence on climate-sensitive sectors like farming and pastoralism makes land and water disputes a flashpoint for conflict. Armed groups exploit weakened state presence and economic hardship to recruit, while coping strategies such as charcoal production and artisanal mining worsen deforestation and finance insurgency. Migration, once an adaptation tool, now often fuels displacement, resource competition, and trafficking. Notably, in the Lake Chad Basin, instability is driven less by absolute resource decline than by environmental variability.

Governance and institutional capacity remain central to the climate–security nexus. The PSC has consistently underscored that climate stress translates into insecurity primarily in contexts where state institutions are weak, absent, or unable to manage competing demands over scarce resources. In such settings, limited capacity to regulate resource use, mediate disputes, and deliver basic services allows localised tensions to escalate into broader violence. Armed groups have proven adept at exploiting these conditions. Across both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, extremist organisations have embedded themselves within local socio-economic systems, leveraging grievances linked to marginalisation, livelihood loss, and state neglect. Climate-induced economic hardship expands the pool of individuals vulnerable to recruitment, while weak governance enables these groups to operate with relative freedom and, in some cases, to position themselves as alternative providers of order and livelihoods. As noted during the PSC’s 1301st session, inadequate adaptation systems can transform climate shocks into insecurity, whereas effective governance can channel similar pressures into cooperation.

This governance challenge is compounded by limitations in existing early warning systems, which remain largely reactive and insufficiently equipped to integrate climate indicators such as rainfall variability, drought cycles, and water stress. The PSC’s 1114th session of 18 October 2022 emphasised the need to incorporate such indicators into early warning frameworks, thereby linking environmental stress more directly to peace and security responses. At the same time, structural constraints—including limited access to climate finance, technological gaps, and broader global inequalities—continue to restrict the capacity of countries in these regions to respond effectively to climate-related risks.

Mobility adds further complexity to this landscape. Movement in search of water, pasture, and economic opportunity has long been a defining feature of communities in the regions and a key adaptation mechanism to environmental variability. However, the scale and patterns of mobility have shifted in recent years. Poorly regulated cross-border movements have contributed to localised clashes between farmers and herders, particularly in resource-scarce areas, illustrating how climate-induced mobility, absent cooperative governance, can undermine stability. Large-scale displacement driven by both conflict and climate shocks has also placed considerable pressure on host communities, especially in urban and peri-urban areas with limited infrastructure and services. At the same time, restrictions on movement, whether due to insecurity or policy measures, can undermine traditional coping strategies and exacerbate vulnerability. Mobility thus presents a paradox: it remains essential for resilience, yet, when poorly managed, can become a source of tension.

These dynamics are further reinforced by feedback loops between climate stress and conflict. Insecurity disrupts agricultural production, limits access to land, and damages critical infrastructure, thereby weakening the capacity of communities to cope with environmental shocks. In turn, climate stress deepens poverty, displacement, and governance fragility—conditions that sustain and intensify conflict. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle in which environmental degradation and insecurity mutually exacerbate one another, making stabilisation through conventional security responses alone increasingly difficult.

The AU has established important normative frameworks to address this nexus, including the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032), the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, and the draft Common African Position on climate, peace and security. At the regional level, the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for the Lake Chad Basin provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the multidimensional nature of the crisis. For the Sahel, the Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance and Development, led by former Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou and jointly launched by the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel in September 2022, provided a strategic assessment of the region’s underlying challenges, including climate change. The report was discussed during the 8th AU–UN annual conference in October 2024, but its uptake within AU processes and practical relevance as a policy framework remains unclear.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, particularly in Mali, and may highlight the role of climate change in amplifying existing vulnerabilities. It may also underscore the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) as a robust framework for addressing the multidimensional challenges facing the Lake Chad Basin, and stress the need to mobilise adequate support for its effective implementation. The PSC may further reiterate the importance of integrating climate indicators into early warning systems to strengthen risk analysis and enable timely preventive action. Echoing the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, it may emphasise the need for greater horizontal integration between climate and weather-related early warning systems and conflict early warning mechanisms, as well as stronger vertical coordination across continental, regional, national, and local levels. Recognising the transboundary nature of climate-induced mobility and resource competition, the PSC may call for enhanced collaboration among Member States, regional mechanisms, and relevant climate institutions, including the Sahel Climate Commission. In addition, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening governance and state presence, including improving service delivery and rebuilding trust between states and communities, as essential conditions for preventing climate pressures from translating into conflict. Finally, the PSC may underline the importance of adequate and equitable access to climate finance, which requires increased international support and strengthened African-led financing mechanisms, including the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Climate Change, as decided at its 984th session.


Mediation in a fragmented world, Speech of IGAD Executive Secretary

Mediation in a fragmented world, Speech of IGAD Executive Secretary

Date | 28 April 2026

Excellencies,

Honorable  Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Affairs

Distinguished participants,

Colleagues and friends,

We gather today at a moment of profound consequence—

not only for our region,

but for the very idea of peace mediation itself.

This is not an ordinary moment.

And this is not an ordinary gathering.

We meet at a time when the foundations that once sustained mediation are under visible—and growing—strain.

The world that made mediation possible—anchored in shared norms, functioning multilateralism, and a minimum level of trust among states—is fragmenting before our eyes.

We are not simply living through a period of crisis.

We are living through a transformation.

An era in which mediation is no longer insulated from geopolitics—but shaped by it.

An era of competing initiatives, fragmented authority, and diminishing coherence.

An era in which legitimacy is no longer assumed—but must be earned, patiently and politically.

At the same time, mediation is unfolding in an increasingly transactional environment.

The space for principled, consensus-based engagement is narrowing, while short-term deal-making is gaining ground.

And yet—precisely because of this—mediation has never been more necessary.

Before I proceed further, allow me to express our profound appreciation to our host country.

We are honored to convene this important gathering here in Nairobi.

I wish to extend our deepest gratitude to His Excellency President William Ruto, to his government, and to the people of Kenya for their unflinching and consistent commitment to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.

Kenya’s role in advancing mediation and peaceful resolution in this region is both distinguished and enduring.

Its leadership—political and material—has been indispensable to IGAD’s work.

We are equally blessed by the presence of our Guest of Honour, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, the Honourable Musalia Mudavadi.

Your Excellency, your diplomatic skill, your generosity toward IGAD, and your consistent service to peace are deeply valued.

It is therefore most fitting that we are holding this reflection here in Nairobi—in recognition of Kenya’s leadership and commitment to peaceful solutions.

May I respectfully request that you convey to His Excellency the President and to the people of Kenya the collective gratitude of all those gathered here and of IGAD.

For IGAD, mediation is not optional.

It is our most visible political responsibility.

Our people do not measure us by what we promise—they measure us by what we prevent.

By the wars that do not happen.

By the conflicts that do not escalate.

And by the peace that becomes possible.

Mediation is where the credibility of multilateralism is tested.

And in our region, it is where history will judge us.

The Horn of Africa stands at a dangerous crossroads.

What we are witnessing is not a series of isolated crises—but the emergence of a system.

A system of conflict that is interconnected, regionalized, and deeply entangled with external dynamics.

The boundaries between internal and external have blurred.

The lines between political conflict and geopolitical competition have all but disappeared.

Wars today are fragmented, prolonged, and sustained by war economies.

There is no longer a single center to negotiate with.

What does mediation look like in a world without a center?

We are not starting from zero.

IGAD carries a proud legacy of mediation.

These efforts succeeded because they were anchored in legitimacy, guided by political clarity, and supported by real coordination.

But if our past gives us confidence—our present demands honesty.

Mediation today is under strain.

Too often, it risks becoming crisis management rather than conflict resolution.

Because mediation is not technical.

It is political.

It is about power.

It is about legitimacy.

And ultimately—it is about building a shared future.

We must confront a growing tension.

Between principled mediation and transactional deal-making.

How do we end violence quickly—without undermining sustainable peace?

This is the central dilemma of our time.

This is why this conference matters.

We must reclaim mediation as a political strategy.

Restore multilateral coherence.

And place people—not processes—at the center.

Distinguished participants,

We must also speak plainly about Sudan.

Three years into a devastating war, mediation has not stopped the carnage.

Despite sustained efforts, the latest being the Berlin Conference—including by multilateral institutions—we have neither halted the fighting nor secured a credible political process.

This is failure.

And it must be acknowledged.

Sudan is fast becoming the epicenter of a deeper crisis—the erosion of mediation itself.

If mediation cannot make a difference in Sudan, its credibility everywhere is at risk.

What must change is clear: mediation must become unified, politically anchored, and strategically coherent—or it will continue to be outpaced by the wars it seeks to resolve.

The cost of failure is not abstract.

We cannot normalize permanent war.

We cannot accept fragmentation as destiny.

What the Horn of Africa requires is not management, but resolution.

It requires political courage.

And strategic clarity.

Let this be a moment of decision.

A decision to restore mediation.

A decision to act with urgency and purpose.

Mediation is what we can do.

Mediation is what we must do better.

Let this conference mark the beginning of that commitment.

I thank you.


Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2026

Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2026

Date | May 2026

In May, the Federal Republic of Nigeria will take over the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions, covering six agenda items. The PPoW additionally envisages the induction of the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) and a joint retreat of the PSC, the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) sub-committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, (GSC) and Administrative Matters and the Board of Trustees (BoT) of the AU Peace Fund.

All four sessions are scheduled to happen at the ambassadorial level. No provision is made for an open session of the PSC. Except for one session, all the sessions are envisaged to be held virtually. Except for one country-specific session, all the other sessions focus on thematic issues, including the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force for the Lake Chad Basin. Many of the agenda items have a regional focus covering West Africa and adjacent areas.

The first session of the month is scheduled to be held on 4 May on the theme ‘Impact of Climate Change on the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions.’ This will be the second session of the PSC this year to be held under the climate change theme, building up from its 1331st session held on 19 February 2026. However, this focuses on the climate shock impacts in relation to the crises in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the Sahel regions. The session is expected to review recent developments on the impact of climate change in LCB and the Sahel and the ways in which such impact intersects with insecurity in these regions.

In the LCB region, the local economy of the people depends on the lake activities such as fishing, agriculture and pastoralism, especially in the upper catchment of the lake. Historically, Lake Chad covered about 25,000 km² but has reduced to less than 2,500 km², drastically affecting livelihoods and economic activity. Lake Chad’s shrinkage in a context of heightened need and greater weather extremes is driving loss of livelihoods, displacement and rising tensions over access to depleting resources. The vulnerability that this induces in a context of growing demands and lack of alternative sources of livelihoods, along with the weak presence of the state, is taken advantage of by Boko Haram and its factions, including Islamic State West Africa Province and JAS, for recruitment and to sustain their operations in the region. The Sahel is one of the world’s most vulnerable regions in terms of the effects of climate change. It has been projected that temperatures in the Sahel will rise by at least 2°C in the short term (2021-2040), a rate 1.5 times higher than the global average. While the resultant climatic conditions do not on themselves lead to conflict, they heighten existing vulnerabilities and accelerate existing conditions of insecurity in the Sahel, which is experiencing farmer-herder conflicts and conflicts involving terrorist groups.

The next session, set for 6 May, will focus on a ‘Discussion on African strategies for combating Transnational Organised Crime (ToC) in Africa.’ It is worth recalling that during its 845th session held on 25 April 2019, the PSC had decided to hold an annual session on the theme of ‘transnational organised crime and peace and security in Africa.’ Since then the PSC has held five sessions the PSC has since then held five annual sessions with a hiatus in 2023. This session comes against the backdrop of deepening security challenges, increasingly marked by the expanding nexus between transnational organised crime and terrorism. The 2025 Africa Organised Crime Index reported that the most pervasive organised criminal activities were financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, the trade in counterfeit goods and arms trafficking. This session thus provides an opportunity for looking into updates on recent trends and developments in organised crimes in Africa and the impact thereof on peace and security.

The last time the PSC convened to discuss this theme was during its 1279th session held on 14 May 2025,  which focused on ‘Discussion on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel.’ Among other decisions, Council tasked the AU Commission to ‘coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’ Another assignment was for the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, AUCTC and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on organised transnational crime, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations and to present the study to the PSC. This session thus additionally serves as an opportunity to receive an update on the progress made in these respects.

On 8 May, the PSC will have a Joint Retreat with the PRC GSC Bureau and BoT of the AU Peace Fund. This retreat comes almost two months following an engagement between the PSC and Donald Kaberuka, the AU Special Envoy on Sustainable Financing for the Union and Financing for Peace in Africa. The meeting focused on enhancing the utilisation of the Peace Fund and advancing efforts to secure sustainable and predictable financing for peace operations in Africa. In October 2024, the PSC convened virtually for its 1236th meeting for an engagement with the Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM). A session which widely focused on the Financing of PSOs and AU peace and security activities. The session called for the review of the annual budget ceiling for PSC activities, and, in the spirit of diversification of funding, highlighted the need for ‘developing innovative financial mechanisms to allow for the AU to respond to emerging security threats.’ This retreat will therefore provide an opportune platform for discussions on strategic engagement around new funding sources and appropriate modalities for accounting for their use, as well as enhanced coordination between the key bodies on the use of the Peace Fund.

The next session, scheduled for 15 May, will be on the theme ‘Update on the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).’ The last time the Council considered this agenda item was on 30 January 2025, during its 1257th session, in which the discussions touched on the continued support for the RECs/RMs in establishing and sustaining regional logistics depots, sustainable financing for PSOs, and the integration of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL and IHRL) into the ASF doctrine, as captured in Amani Africa’s January 2025 Monthly Digest. It is expected that the PSC will receive updates on recent developments and the next steps towards the full operationalisation of the ASF.

On the same day, the PSC will get a ‘Briefing on efforts towards the Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’ During Council’s 1275th meeting held in April 2025,  it emphasised the need for the ‘Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) to report on its activities regularly to the Council’ following its endorsement by the Council as a ‘standing, ready–to–deploy force, capable of rapid and coordinated regional maritime security responses in the Gulf of Guinea Region.’ Apart from review of the state of operaitonalisaiton of the CMTF, the session will be expected to give an update following Council’s requests to the AU Commission, through the PSOD, to ‘take practical steps to collaborate with the CMTF in the Gulf of Guinea to identify the capacity needs of the Task Force and to provide such support, including from the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) to position the Task Force as a critical naval component of the ASF, operating in the Gulf of Guinea region.’ Additionally, the session will provide the opportunity to build up discussions on the Council’s previous request on the ‘need for establishing a multidisciplinary task team to follow up on the operationalisation of the CMTF.’

On 18 May, the PSC will have the last substantive session, covering two agenda items. The first item will be ‘Update on the Stabilisation activities of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin.’ A session which is expected to provide update on implementation of previous PSC decisions including from its last 1318th session held on 15 December 2025, in which Council tasked the AU Commission, in consultation with the UN to consider the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to fund the MNJTF activities, and the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understanding and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) that guides the provision of the AU’s additional support to the MNJTF for a period of one year, starting from 1 February 2026 to 31 January 2027. Additionally, Council was also tasked to support the mobilisation of resources that include air, amphibious assets, anti-drones and anti-IEDs before the commencement of Operation Lake Sanit III. The session is also expected to evaluate the Lake Chad Basin’s security situation and the MNJTF’s operations against Boko Haram and its offshoots, JAS and ISWAP, which remain significant threats to regional stability.

The second agenda item will be ‘Update on the political transition and security situation in Guinea-Bissau.’ This will be the second session on the situation in Guinea-Bissau held this year, building up on the 1333rd session, and the third time the PSC convenes to consider the situation in the country since the military coup of 26 November 2025, which disrupted the 23 November electoral process. Council directed the AU Commission to sustain engagements with the transition government of Guinea-Bissau, including providing technical support to the National Election Commission with a view to promoting its independence, transparency and institutional integrity. The session will offer a platform to review progress so far toward restoring constitutional order and to follow up on decisions adopted at the 1333rd meeting, especially on the Council’s request for the development of an integrated plan for security sector reform, with the support of the AU Commission and international partners.

In addition to the PSC sessions, the PPoW envisages two sessions of the PSC sub-committees. The first of this is the meeting of the PSC CoE for an ‘Informal Experts (AU-wide) Session on the AU Liaison Offices (AULOs) Assessment Report.’ This is expected to be the session where the PSC CoE will receive a briefing on the assessment carried out on the state of AULOs. It is worth recalling that on 15 August 2025, the PSC added to its programme an agenda item covering, among others, ‘…CoE Report on the Review of the AU Liaison Offices’; however, the Report on the Review of the AULOs was not finalised as of the time of the convening. Currently, AULOs established by the PSC decisions are: the AULO in Burundi and the Great Lakes Region (Bujumbura), in CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Libya (Tripoli, which was temporarily relocated to Tunis), in Madagascar, AULO for Mali and Sahel (Bamako), in South Sudan, and in Sudan (Khartoum, temporarily relocated to Addis Ababa). Meanwhile, the AULO in Liberia was closed in June 2019, and the AULO in Comoros was closed in May 2017. The AULO in Western Sahara was also closed in March 2016.

On 13 May, the other PSC Subcommittee, the Counter-Terrorism Subcommittee, will meet for a discussion on the Draft 5-year AU Continental Counter Terrorism Strategic Plan of Action. It is worth recalling that the CoE convened for its 78th meeting on 1 August 2025 for discussions on the reactivation of this PSC Sub-Committee, in particular the development of the ToR of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter Terrorism. Two weeks later, on 15 August 2025, the PSC met for its 1297th meeting to adopt the ToR of the Sub-Committee, which outlines the Sub-Committee’s objectives, mandate, composition and operational modalities, aiming to enhance the PSC’s ability to respond to terrorism through African-led strategies, coordination with the RECs/RMs and collaboration with AU bodies like the AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA.

In addition to the foregoing sessions of the PSC and its sub-committees, the PPoW also envisages the 17th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa to be held in Libreville, Gabon, from 20 to 22 May. In addition, on 25 and 26 May, there will be the induction of the sixteenth cohort of the PSC CoE to be held in Abuja, Nigeria. This will also involve engagement with the Sub-committee on Counter terrorism and the National Counter Terrorism Centre.

In the footnote, the PPoW also envisages a possible engagement of the Chairperson of the PSC at the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-IV) to be held on 31 May in New Delhi, India.


IGAD mediation conference warns risk of ‘nations’ or ‘parts of nations’ becoming objects of acquisition as ‘peace’ gets commercialized

IGAD mediation conference warns risk of ‘nations’ or ‘parts of nations’ becoming objects of acquisition as ‘peace’ gets commercialized

Date | 28 April 2026

Speaking about the challenge that the shifting global dynamics poses to mediation, Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary and Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Musalia Mudavadi, warned that ‘Peace has been privatized. Perhaps even commercialized’. ‘Because it is about transactions,’ he explained. And ‘[i]t is no longer humanity. It is no longer about lives.’

Cabinet Secretary of Kenya

Kenya’s chief diplomat said this in his opening address at the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) conference underway in Nairobi Kenya, under the theme ‘Reimagining Mediation in a Fragmented World: The Challenge to African Multilateral Leadership’, a mediation reflection conference being held on 27 and 28 April 2026 as part of the 40 years anniversary of the regional body.

The conference that brought together seasoned mediators, mediation experts and researchers from the IGAD region, other parts of Africa and the world came at a time when, as the Executive Secretary of IGAD and host of the conference, Dr Workneh Gebeyehu pointed out in his address, Africa, specifically the Horn of Africa’ stands at a critical moment, the same as the world,’ characterised by the emergence of a system of conflict’.

Mudavadi made the point about commercialization of peace while expounding on his core argument that ‘the mediation landscape’ faces the ‘dual challenge of protracted and mutating conflicts’ and ‘rapidly shifting global dynamics’. In the current dynamics, he posed a blunt question, asking ‘when you go to mediation, are you going there as a business negotiator? Are you going there as an arbitrator of transactions? or are you going there genuinely as mediator to see peace in the countries facing conflict?

Executive Secretary of IGAD

Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary was not alone in drawing attention to the challenge posed by transactional approaches. IGAD’s chief underscored the need for confronting ‘a growing tension between principled mediation and transactional deal making.’ According to Dr Gebeyehu, ‘the central dilemma of our time’ is: ‘How do we end the violence quickly without undermining sustainable peace?’

Experts noted that mediation was never free from transaction. Indeed, experts admitted that ending the fighting, which is what transactional peace deals focus on, is necessary. However, as Martin Grifith, Former UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, pointed out, a truce or even ceasefire alone will not be enough to bring about sustainable peace.

Abdul Mohamed, a leading expert who played leading role in conceptualizing the conference as senior advisor to the IGAD Executive Secretary, was agreed with Grifith that, without peace agreement on the substantive or underlying issues, such truce or ceasefire faces collapse.

IGAD’s chief echoed this point in his framing address when he said ‘too often’ mediation ‘risks becoming a crisis management rather than a conflict resolution (instrument).’

It is not simply the fact that transactional deal making stops at securing truce or ceasefire and does not concern itself with the underlying issues that makes it concerning when compared to what Dr Gebeyehu called ‘principled mediation’. It is the fact that it centres deal making or business negotiation rather than the resolution of the issues that precipitated the conflicts.

For Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary, this has a bigger danger. That danger has to do with the question he asked of whether ‘we are facing a new definition of sovereignty.’ Rather than even ordinary deal making or transaction, he ‘we are now seeing in conversations discussions that talk of possible acquisition of nations or part of nations, a completely new dynamic is taking place.’

In some of the most pressing conflicts in Africa such as Sudan, this carries very alarming dangers. Thus, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Ambassador Mohamed Belaiche was emphatic in affirming the centrality of the principles relating to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan.’ These principles, he argued, ‘serve as a legal and moral safeguard against the…imposition of fete accompli.’ Thus, he insisted that ‘any serious political process must begin with a clear rejection of any infringement upon the unity of Sudan.’

In a remark he made while moderating the morning sessions, Solomon Dersso, Amani Africa’s Founding Director, noted that if the emerging trend is terrifying to the world, it must be more terrifying for us in Africa both because of our vulnerability and Africa’s own bitter experience with earlier processes of ‘acquisition of nations’. He stated that the grave dangers the emerging dynamics carry should remove any sense of complacency we in Africa may have to fend off against the dangers of transactionalism.


Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2026

Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2026

Date | March 2026

In March, under the chairship of the Kingdom of Eswatini, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of five substantive sessions. Following a revision to the PPoW, five sessions were held – although not in accordance with the initial PPoW, as one agenda item was added and another removed. The month also had the induction of the new members of the PSC.

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IGAD mediation conference warns risk of ‘nations’ or ‘parts of nations’ becoming objects of acquisition as ‘peace’ gets commercialized

IGAD mediation conference warns risk of ‘nations’ or ‘parts of nations’ becoming objects of acquisition as ‘peace’ gets commercialized

Date | 28 April 2026

Speaking about the challenge that the shifting global dynamics poses to mediation, Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary and Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Musalia Mudavadi, warned that ‘Peace has been privatized. Perhaps even commercialized’. ‘Because it is about transactions,’ he explained. And ‘[i]t is no longer humanity. It is no longer about lives.’

Cabinet Secretary of Kenya

Kenya’s chief diplomat said this in his opening address at the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) conference underway in Nairobi Kenya, under the theme ‘Reimagining Mediation in a Fragmented World: The Challenge to African Multilateral Leadership’, a mediation reflection conference being held on 27 and 28 April 2026 as part of the 40 years anniversary of the regional body.

The conference that brought together seasoned mediators, mediation experts and researchers from the IGAD region, other parts of Africa and the world came at a time when, as the Executive Secretary of IGAD and host of the conference, Dr Workneh Gebeyehu pointed out in his address, Africa, specifically the Horn of Africa’ stands at a critical moment, the same as the world,’ characterised by the emergence of a system of conflict’.

Mudavadi made the point about commercialization of peace while expounding on his core argument that ‘the mediation landscape’ faces the ‘dual challenge of protracted and mutating conflicts’ and ‘rapidly shifting global dynamics’. In the current dynamics, he posed a blunt question, asking ‘when you go to mediation, are you going there as a business negotiator? Are you going there as an arbitrator of transactions? or are you going there genuinely as mediator to see peace in the countries facing conflict?

Executive Secretary of IGAD

Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary was not alone in drawing attention to the challenge posed by transactional approaches. IGAD’s chief underscored the need for confronting ‘a growing tension between principled mediation and transactional deal making.’ According to Dr Gebeyehu, ‘the central dilemma of our time’ is: ‘How do we end the violence quickly without undermining sustainable peace?’

Experts noted that mediation was never free from transaction. Indeed, experts admitted that ending the fighting, which is what transactional peace deals focus on, is necessary. However, as Martin Grifith, Former UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, pointed out, a truce or even ceasefire alone will not be enough to bring about sustainable peace.

Abdul Mohamed, a leading expert who played leading role in conceptualizing the conference as senior advisor to the IGAD Executive Secretary, was agreed with Grifith that, without peace agreement on the substantive or underlying issues, such truce or ceasefire faces collapse.

IGAD’s chief echoed this point in his framing address when he said ‘too often’ mediation ‘risks becoming a crisis management rather than a conflict resolution (instrument).’

It is not simply the fact that transactional deal making stops at securing truce or ceasefire and does not concern itself with the underlying issues that makes it concerning when compared to what Dr Gebeyehu called ‘principled mediation’. It is the fact that it centres deal making or business negotiation rather than the resolution of the issues that precipitated the conflicts.

For Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary, this has a bigger danger. That danger has to do with the question he asked of whether ‘we are facing a new definition of sovereignty.’ Rather than even ordinary deal making or transaction, he ‘we are now seeing in conversations discussions that talk of possible acquisition of nations or part of nations, a completely new dynamic is taking place.’

In some of the most pressing conflicts in Africa such as Sudan, this carries very alarming dangers. Thus, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Ambassador Mohamed Belaiche was emphatic in affirming the centrality of the principles relating to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan.’ These principles, he argued, ‘serve as a legal and moral safeguard against the…imposition of fete accompli.’ Thus, he insisted that ‘any serious political process must begin with a clear rejection of any infringement upon the unity of Sudan.’

In a remark he made while moderating the morning sessions, Solomon Dersso, Amani Africa’s Founding Director, noted that if the emerging trend is terrifying to the world, it must be more terrifying for us in Africa both because of our vulnerability and Africa’s own bitter experience with earlier processes of ‘acquisition of nations’. He stated that the grave dangers the emerging dynamics carry should remove any sense of complacency we in Africa may have to fend off against the dangers of transactionalism.


Remarques par M. El-Ghassim Wane : Session ouverte du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine sur le thème: « Les opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique », Addis-Abeba (Éthiopie), 27 avril 2026

Session ouverte du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de lUnion africaine sur le thème: « Les opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique », Addis-Abeba (Éthiopie), 27 avril 2026

Remarques par M. El-Ghassim Wane, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et Chef de la MINUSMA, ancien sous-Secrétaire général des Nations unies aux opérations de maintien de la paix, et ancien Directeur du Département paix et sécurité de la Commission de lUA

Date | 27 avril 2026

Permettez-moi tout d’abord d’exprimer mes remerciements à la présidence éthiopienne du Conseil de paix et de sécurité pour m’avoir invité à participer à cette session sur les opérations de soutien à la paix.

Cette discussion se tient dans un contexte particulier, tant sur le continent qu’au niveau mondial.

Premièrement, nous assistons à la persistanceet, dans certains cas, à laggravationdes conflits et des tensions à travers lAfrique. La situation au Soudan est sans aucun doute la plus alarmante. C’est une crise qui devrait tenir tous les Africains en alerte et susciter une mobilisation totale et concrète.

Deuxièmement, limplication dacteurs extérieurs dans les conflits africains est de plus en plus manifeste, et ce dans un contexte dintensification de la compétition géopolitique et des rivalités entre eux. Si certaines de ces interventions peuvent être constructives, elles ont aussi pour effet de réduire la marge d’action des institutions africaines et d’amoindrir leur rôle dans la gestion des questions de paix et de sécurité. Les initiatives prises en dehors du continent déterminent de plus en plus la trajectoire des crises africaines.

Il s’agit là d’une rupture avec une période antérieure où les initiatives africaines étaient au cœur des efforts de règlement des conflits—une époque illustrée par des processus et accords portant le nom de villes africaines, de Sodore en Éthiopie et Arta à Djibouti à Accra, Pretoria, Ouagadougou et Libreville, en passant par Arusha, Alger, Machakos et Sun City, pour n’en citer que quelques-unes.

Troisièmement, et de manière plus générale, nous sommes confrontés à un affaiblissement du multilatéralisme. Celui-ci se manifeste par la multiplication des mesures unilatérales et des atteintes croissantes au droit international.

Prises ensemble, ces évolutions sont préoccupantes pour l’Afrique.

Il ne peut y avoir de développement durable sans paix. Les tensions persistantes entre États compromettent l’intégration continentale. L’implication croissante d’acteurs extérieurs sape l’appropriation et le leadership africains. L’érosion du multilatéralisme et du droit international réduit la capacité du continent à défendre ses intérêts, en même temps qu’elle accentue la vulnérabilité des pays africains et les menaces à leur souveraineté.

Aussi l’Afrique doit-elle s’attaquer à ses défis internes avec une urgence renouvelée pour pouvoir faire face à l’environnement géopolitique actuel; à défaut, elle risque d’être façonnée par des dynamiques externes plutôt que de les façonner.

C’est dans cette entreprise plus large visant à renforcer l’autonomie stratégique de l’Afrique que doivent s’inscrire les opérations de paix. Bien conçues et utilisées, elles peuvent jouer un rôle important dans la gestion des défis de paix et de sécurité du continent.

Cependant, pour remplir efficacement cette fonction, quatre considérations sont essentielles.

Premièrement, les opérations de soutien à la paix ne sont quun instrument parmi beaucoup dautres dans la gestion et le règlement des conflits. La prévention, la médiation et la consolidation de la paix—telles que prévues par le Protocole relatif au CPS—sont des outils tout aussi, sinon plus, importants.

Il convient de revenir ici sur l’architecture du Protocole. Si celui-ci a, sans ambiguïté, introduit les opérations de paix dans le cadre normatif de l’Union africaine, l’approche qu’il articule n’en reste pas moins beaucoup plus équilibrée qu’on ne le pense généralement.

En substance, le Protocole accorde une place centrale à la prévention des conflits et au rétablissement de la paix. Cette orientation se reflète dans ses objectifs et principes, ainsi que dans les pouvoirs importants conférés au Président de la Commission et au Groupe des Sages. Les règles de procédure du CPS renforcent cette logique: aucun État membre ne peut empêcher l’inscription d’une question à l’ordre du jour du Conseil, et les pays parties à un conflit ne peuvent participer aux délibérations y relatives.

La conclusion est claire: il faut se garder de surinvestir dans les opérations de paix au détriment de ces autres instruments, souvent plus accessibles et, dans bien des cas, plus efficaces pour l’UA.

Cette conclusion est d’autant plus fondée que le CPS et la Commission ont, au fil des ans, développé des outils non militaires innovants qui ont permis à l’UA d’affirmer son leadership dans la gestion de certains conflits.

Parmi ceux-ci figurent les « communiqués-cadres », à travers lesquels le CPS énonce des éléments de sortie de crise, assortis d’échéances claires et d’attentes spécifiques à l’égard des parties concernées. Le communiqué du 24 avril 2012 sur le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud en est un exemple probant.

L’UA a également efficacement recouru à des mécanismes ad hoc de haut niveau—souvent composés de chefs d’État et de gouvernement en exercice ou d’anciens dirigeants—pour interagir au plus haut niveau avec les parties concernées et des acteurs internationaux clés. Tel fut notamment le cas avec le Groupe de mise en œuvre de haut niveau sur le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud, le Groupe de haut niveau sur la Côte d’Ivoire et le Groupe de haut niveau pour l’Égypte.

Enfin, l’UA a mis en place des groupes internationaux de contact, pour coordonner les interventions extérieures et éviter des réponses fragmentées, notamment en Guinée, à Madagascar et en République centrafricaine.

Ces expériences montrent que l’Afrique dispose déjà d’une boîte à outils diversifiée et éprouvée. Les opérations de paix en sont une partie intégrante, mais elles ne doivent pas en devenir l’élément dominant.

Deuxièmement, les opérations de soutien à la paix ne sont pas une fin en soi. Elles sont des instruments au service de solutions politiques. Dans les conflits internes en particulier, elles ne peuvent réussir sans processus politiques crédibles. En leur absence, même les opérations les plus robustes peinent à produire des résultats durables.

La réponse au terrorisme dans plusieurs régions d’Afrique l’illustre clairement. Si les mesures sécuritaires sont impératives, elles sont loin d’être suffisantes. Dans de nombreux contextes, ce fléau a été aggravé par une gouvernance déficiente, la marginalisation de segments de la société et les exactions commises lors des opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme.

Là où des progrès ont été enregistrés, ils n’ont pas résulté uniquement de l’action militaire, mais plutôt d’approches combinant mesures sécuritaires, dialogue, réconciliation et réformes de gouvernance.

C’est pourquoi la tentation croissante à privilégier l’imposition de la paix doit être abordée avec prudence. Sans stratégie politique crédible en parallèle, ces approches ont peu de chances de produire des résultats durables.

Troisièmement, les opérations de soutien à la paix sont, par nature, coûteuses et exigeantes sur le plan logistique. Cela explique pourquoi, pendant longtemps, les dirigeants africains ont hésité à les intégrer pleinement dans la panoplie des outils de l’OUA, comme en témoigne la Déclaration du Caire de 1993, qui n’autorisait que des missions limitées dans leur portée et leur durée.

Le tournant est intervenu avec le Protocole relatif au CPS, largement influencé par l’échec—de l’OUA et, surtout, de l’ONU, alors présente sur le terrain—à prévenir et à arrêter le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda.

Le cadre ainsi développé reposait sur deux postulats: les États membres de l’UA augmenteraient leur financement des activités de paix et de sécurité à la faveur de la dynamique générée par la nouvelle Union, et l’ONU répondrait favorablement aux demandes de soutien du continent.

Plus de vingt ans après, aucun de ces postulats ne s’est fondamentalement vérifié. Les États membres de l’UA n’ont pas mobilisé les ressources nécessaires, en particulier pour les opérations de grande envergure. Quant à l’ONU, son appui est resté en deçà des attentes. Si la résolution 2719 marque une avancée, elle souffre aussi de limites. Les récentes baisses de contributions au budget des Nations unies compliquent encore davantage la situation, contraignant à des réductions importantes dans les missions.

De fait, une approche plus réaliste est requise. L’UA devrait privilégier des opérations plus ciblées, de taille réduite et limitées dans le temps, adaptées à ses capacités financières et à l’environnement budgétaire mondial actuel. À cet égard, les modèles présentés dans l’étude des Nations unies d’octobre 2024 sur l’avenir du maintien de la paix offrent des orientations utiles. Ils peuvent être mis en œuvre par l’UA seule ou conjointement avec l’ONU selon différentes configurations, y compris dans le cadre de la résolution 2719, et—du fait de leur portée limitée—prennent en compte les sensibilités politiques des États membres qui pourraient percevoir les déploiements de grande ampleur comme des atteintes à leur souveraineté.

Les grandes opérations multidimensionnelles devraient, en règle générale, relever de la responsabilité de l’ONU, qui dispose d’avantages comparatifs indéniables: un financement prévisible, une expertise avérée, des capacités logistiques robustes et des mécanismes de redevabilité bien établis. L’UA ne devrait s’y engager que lorsque l’ONU est manifestement incapable ou pas disposée à agir, notamment dans des situations extrêmes liées au terrorisme ou au crime de génocide, aux crimes contre l’humanité et aux crimes de guerre.

Quatrièmement, lefficacité des opérations de soutien à la paix en Afrique dépend dun partenariat étroit entre l’UA et l’ONU. Les opérations de l’UA et de l’ONU ne constituent pas des options concurrentes, mais des composantes complémentaires d’un même système multilatéral, chacune avec ses atouts propres. Pourtant, au regard des progrès accomplis par l’UA, l’idée d’un rôle accru de cette dernière, au point de reléguer l’ONU à une fonction d’appui, a progressivement gagné du terrain—en particulier face à des menaces comme le terrorisme, où le maintien de la paix traditionnel a montré ses limites.

Cette lecture est trompeuse. L’UA et l’ONU ne sont pas interchangeables: elles sont des partenaires complémentaires et indissociables. L’ONU conserve des atouts majeurs, comme indiqué plus haut, tandis que l’UA a démontré une inclination à intervenir dans des environnements complexes et à haut risque, malgré de lourdes contraintes capacitaires et financières.

Les performances des deux organisations sont étroitement liées. Des opérations onusiennes efficaces confortent les approches multilatérales, qui sous-tendent également l’action de l’UA. Les succès des missions de l’UA renforcent les solutions régionales, lesquelles participent de la sécurité collective telle qu’articulée par la Charte des Nations unies. À l’inverse, les échecs de l’une ou de l’autre de ces deux institutions fragilisent la confiance dans l’architecture globale de paix et de sécurité.

Dans ce contexte, lUA et lONU doivent, à titre prioritaire, renforcer leur coopération, notamment en appui aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies en Afrique. Il y va de leur intérêt mutuel. Les missions onusiennes tirent parti de l’influence politique de l’UA et de sa proximité avec les théâtres de crise, ainsi que du rôle des A3: lorsque les membres africains portent, au niveau du Conseil, les questions relatives aux missions, ils aident à recentrer les débats et à limiter l’impact des tensions géopolitiques globales. L’UA a, pour sa part, un intérêt direct dans l’issue des opérations onusiennes sur le continent, l’Afrique étant la première à bénéficier de leurs succès et la première à pâtir de leurs échecs.

À cette fin, l’ONU devrait systématiquement informer l’UA des activités de ses missions et des défis auxquels elles sont confrontées. Il en résultera une plus grande appropriation africaine et une capacité accrue de l’UA à apporter un appui rapide et déterminé.

Par ailleurs, il conviendrait denvisager le déploiement d’équipes de liaison de lUA auprès des missions des Nations unies. Celui-ci permettrait à l’UA d’avoir une meilleure appréciation des opérations onusiennes et de leur apporter un appui plus ciblé. Dans le même esprit, l’ONU devrait associer plus systématiquement l’UA aux revues stratégiques de ses missions.

Comme indiqué plus haut, pour être efficace, le maintien de la paix doit aller de pair avec une action plus soutenue de rétablissement de la paix. D’où la nécessité d’une coordination plus étroite entre l’UA et l’ONU, notamment à travers la désignation d’envoyés conjoints ou la mise en place de groupes de contact co-dirigés, afin d’imprimer davantage de cohérence à des efforts de médiation de plus en plus fragmentés.

Enfin, la préservation des acquis du maintien de la paix exige un investissement accru dans la consolidation de la paix. Cela implique un partenariat renforcé entre l’UA et l’ONU sur les questions de gouvernance, afin de pérenniser la paix et de prévenir la rechute dans la violence. L’objectif est de combiner le riche cadre normatif de l’UA en matière de gouvernance, de démocratie et de droits humains avec les capacités techniques et les ressources des Nations unies.

Je voudrais conclure en soulignant à nouveau la complexité de lenvironnement international dans lequel lAfrique opère. Cet environnement, bien que porteur de risques, offre également l’opportunité de promouvoir un système international plus inclusif et plus équitable, mais à condition que l’Afrique mette de l’ordre dans ses propres affaires. Cela suppose avant tout de faire taire les armes—par des actions concrètes, et non par des déclarations. Les opérations de paix constituent un levier important à cet égard.

L’UA dispose déjà des outils nécessaires. L’urgence est d’assurer leur mise en œuvre, plutôt que de chercher à les perfectionner sans fin. Cela suppose une discipline collective accrue et une meilleure coordination à l’échelle de l’ensemble du système de l’UA, fondées sur l’indivisibilité de la paix et de la sécurité sur le continent, ainsi que sur un engagement renouvelé en faveur de la solidarité africaine.

Dans ce contexte, la revue proposée des opérations de soutien à la paix de l’UA constitue une opportunité pour: renforcer la mobilisation en faveur de la mise en œuvre des instruments existants, avec la créativité et l’agilité requises; traiter la question cruciale du financement—qui exige des États membres qu’ils assumer pleinement leurs obligations; et libérer tout le potentiel du partenariat UA–ONU, y compris dans le cadre de la résolution 2719.

Je vous remercie.


Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane: Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: "Peace Support Operations in Africa", Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026

Open Session of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the theme: "Peace Support Operations in Africa", Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27 April 2026

Remarks by El-Ghassim Wane, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali and Head of MINUSMA and United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, and Former Director of the African Union Commission Peace and Security Department

Date | 27 April 2026

Let me start by thanking the Ethiopian Presidency of the Peace and Security Council for inviting me to participate in this session on peace support operations.

This discussion takes place against a particular backdrop, both on the continent and globally.

First, we are witnessing the persistence—and in some cases escalation—of conflicts and tensions across Africa. The situation in Sudan is undoubtedly the most alarming. It is a crisis that should keep all Africans alert and prompt full and practical mobilization.

Second, the involvement of external actors in African conflicts is growing, in a context of intensifying geopolitical competition and rivalries among them. While some of this involvement can be constructive, it has narrowed the space for African institutions to act and reduced their role in addressing peace and security challenges. Processes led from outside the continent are now increasingly shaping outcomes in Africa.

This marks a departure from an earlier period, when African-led initiatives were at the forefront of conflict resolution—an era reflected in processes and agreements named after African cities, from Sodore (Ethiopia) and Arta (Djibouti) to Arusha (Tanzania), Algiers, Machakos (Kenya), Sun City (South Africa), Accra, Pretoria, Ouagadougou, and Libreville, to name but a few.

Third, we are confronted with a broader weakening of multilateralism. This is reflected in the rise of unilateral measures, as well as in the growing frequency of breaches to international law.

Taken together, these trends are concerning for Africa.

Sustainable development cannot take place without peace. Persistent tensions between states undermine continental integration. Increased external engagement affects African ownership and leadership. The erosion of multilateralism and international law reduces the continent’s ability to advance its interests, while increasing the exposure of African countries and undermining the safeguards that protect their sovereignty.

Consequently, Africa must first address its internal challenges to navigate the current geopolitical environment; otherwise, it risks being shaped by external dynamics rather than shaping them.

It is within this broader effort to strengthen African agency that peace support operations must be situated. Properly conceived and used, they can play an important role in helping address the continent’s peace and security challenges.

However, for peace operations to effectively serve this purpose, four considerations are essential.

First, peace support operations are only one instrument among many for conflict management and resolution. Prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding—as set out in the PSC Protocol—are equally, and often more, important.

It is useful to recall what the PSC Protocol actually did. While it firmly introduced peace operations into the African Union’s normative framework, it nonetheless established a far more balanced approach than is often assumed.

At its core, the Protocol places strong emphasis on prevention and on peacemaking. This is reflected in its objectives and principles. It is also reflected in the significant powers given to the Chairperson of the Commission and to the Panel of the Wise. The PSC’s own rules of procedure reinforce this logic: no member state can block the inclusion of an item on the Council’s agenda, and countries that are party to a conflict do not take part in the related deliberations.

The implication is clear. We should not over-invest in peace operations at the expense of these other tools, which are often more feasible and, in many cases, more effective for the AU.

This is all the more important because the PSC and the Commission have, over the years, developed innovative non-military instruments that enabled AU’s leadership in the management of some conflicts.

These include what could be termed as “framework communiqués”, through which the PSC sets out comprehensive pathways to resolve crises, with clear timelines and concrete expectations for the parties. A notable example is the 24 April 2012 communiqué on Sudan and South Sudan.

The AU has also made effective use of high-level ad hoc mechanisms—often composed of current or former heads of state and government—to engage both the parties concerned and international stakeholders at the highest level. Examples include the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan, the High-Level Panel on Côte d’Ivoire, and the High-Level Panel for Egypt.

Finally, the AU has convened international contact groups, to coordinate external engagement and avoid fragmented responses. This approach has been notably used in Guinea, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic.

These experiences show that Africa already has a diverse and effective toolbox. Peace operations are an important part of it—but they are not, and should not become, the dominant one.

Second, peace support operations are not an end in themselves. They are tools to support political solutions. In intrastate conflicts in particular, they cannot succeed without credible peace processes. Absent such a foundation, even the most robust operations are unlikely to produce lasting results.

The response to terrorism in several parts of Africa illustrates this clearly. While security measures are an imperative, they are not sufficient. In many contexts, the challenge has been compounded by weak governance, lack of inclusion, and abuses during counterterrorism operations.

Where progress has been achieved, it has not come from military action alone, but from a broader approach combining security efforts with dialogue, reconciliation, and governance reforms.

This is why the growing tendency to valorize peace enforcement on the continent should be treated with caution. Without a parallel and credible political strategy, such approaches are unlikely to deliver sustainable outcomes.

Third, peace operations are inherently resource- and logistics-intensive. This explains why, for a long time, African leaders resisted expanding the OAU toolbox to include such operations. This reluctance was clearly reflected in the 1993 Cairo Declaration, which authorized only limited missions in both scope and duration.

The shift came later with the PSC Protocol, influenced in large part by the failure—by both the OAU and, more significantly, the UN, which had a mission on the ground—to prevent and stop the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

This framework rested on two key assumptions: first, that AU Member States—building on the momentum of the new Union—would provide increased funding for peace and security activities; and second, that the UN would respond positively when called upon to support AU operations.

More than two decades after the launching of the PSC, it is clear that neither assumption has truly held. AU Member States have been unable or unwilling to mobilize the level of resources needed to sustain peace operations, especially large-scale missions. At the same time, UN support has fallen short of expectations. While Security Council resolution 2719 represents progress, it did not go as far as the AU had hoped. Moreover, recent reductions in contributions to the UN have further complicated the outlook, forcing deep cuts in current missions.

This calls for a more realistic approach. The AU should prioritize smaller, targeted, time-bound operations aligned with its financial capacity and the current global fiscal environment. In this regard, the models outlined in the October 2024 UN study on the future of peacekeeping offer useful guidance. They can be implemented by the AU alone or jointly with the UN in various configurations, including under resolution 2719, and—given their limited scope—also help address the political sensitivities of Member States that may view large-scale deployments as infringements on sovereignty.

As a general rule, large multidimensional operations should remain the responsibility of the UN, given its comparative advantages: predictable financing, specialized expertise, strong logistics, and established accountability. The AU should undertake such missions only where the UN is clearly unable or unwilling to act, including in extreme situations such as terrorism or genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Fourth, the effectiveness of peace support operations in Africa depends on a very close partnership between the AU and the UN. AU and UN operations are not competing options, but complementary parts of the same multilateral system, each with distinct strengths. Yet, with the progress made by the AU, a view has emerged that it could largely replace the UN, reducing it to a support role—especially in contexts such as terrorism, where traditional peacekeeping faces limits.

This view is misleading. The two are not substitutes, but essential partners. The UN retains clear advantages, as noted earlier, while the AU has shown readiness to deploy in complex, high-risk environments despite capacity and funding constraints.

The performance of both organizations is closely linked. Effective UN missions strengthen multilateral approaches that benefit the AU. Successful AU missions strengthen regional solutions, as part of the collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter. Conversely, failure on either side weakens confidence in the broader peace and security architecture.

Against this backdrop, the AU and the UN should prioritize stronger cooperation in support of ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. This serves both sides. UN missions benefit from the AU’s political influence and proximity, as well as from the role of the A3: when African members take the lead in raising mission-related issues, they help keep discussions focused and limit the impact of broader geopolitical tensions. The AU, in turn, has a direct stake in outcomes, as Africa bears the consequences of both success and failure.

To this end, the UN should systematically share information on its missions activities and challenges with the AU. This would strengthen African ownership and make it more likely that the AU provides timely and proactive support.

Additionally, consideration should be given to embedding AU liaison teams in UN missions. This would improve understanding of operations and allow the AU to provide more targeted support. In the same spirit, the UN should more systematically involve the AU in the strategic reviews of its missions.

As stressed above, effective peacekeeping must go hand in hand with enhanced peacemaking. This calls for closer coordination between the AU and the UN, including joint envoys or jointly-led contact groups, to bring coherence to increasingly fragmented mediation efforts.

Finally, sustaining peacekeeping gains requires greater investment in peacebuilding. This means closer AU–UN cooperation on governance to consolidate peace and avert relapse into violence. The aim is to combine the AU’s rich normative framework on governance, democracy, and human rights with the UN’s technical expertise and resources.

I would like to conclude by underlining the complexity of the international environment in which Africa navigates. This environment, while full of risks, also offers a chance to push for a more inclusive and fair system—but only if Africa first puts its own house in order. This starts with silencing the guns through concrete action, not rhetoric. Peace operations are an important part of that effort.

The AU already has the necessary tools. Focus should be on delivery, not on endlessly refining instruments. This requires stronger collective discipline and coordination across the AU system—Member States, the Commission, and other organs—grounded in the indivisibility of peace and security on the continent and in a renewed sense of African solidarity.

In this context, the proposed review of AU peace support operations can be a useful step to focus on implementing existing tools with greater creativity and agility, addressing the critical issue of financing with Member States fully meeting their obligations, and unlocking the untapped potential of the AU–UN partnership, including within the framework of resolution 2719.

I thank you.


Consideration of the Report on Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Configuration Plan

Consideration of the Report on Joint AU-FGS-UN Progress against Benchmarks and AUSSOM Configuration Plan

Date | 27 April 2026

Tomorrow (28 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1342nd session to consider the report on joint African Union–Federal Government of Somalia–United Nations progress against benchmarks and the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) configuration plan.

The session will commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representatives of Somalia and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM, is expected to present the report on joint AU-FGS-UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan.

The last time the PSC considered AUSSOM was during its 1330th session, convened in February at ministerial level, but a more directly related session of relevance to the progress report and mission configuration plan is the PSC’s 1287th session, which was also held at ministerial level in July 2025. At that session, the PSC recognized the evolving security context since the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for AUSSOM and requested the Commission to provide updates regarding the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and their logistical support and aviation requirements, and to submit these new requirements within six weeks for consideration and transmission to the UN Security Council (UNSC), to enable continued United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) logistical support to AUSSOM on this basis. In line with this, UNSC Resolution 2809 (2025), which renewed AUSSOM’s mandate until the end of this year, encouraged the AU, jointly with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), to transmit to the Security Council updated plans for AUSSOM’s configuration by 30 April 2026. Further to that, the resolution, under its paragraph 27, requested the UN, jointly with the AU and FGS, and in consultation with donors, to continue regular, joint technical assessments of progress made, including against the benchmarks detailed in the joint AU-UN report of November 2024, and to provide an updated assessment of progress to the Security Council by 31 October 2026. The AU Commission is therefore submitting this joint report to the PSC for its consideration in light of the above requests.

The report has two components, merging the two requests above into a single document. The first is the report on progress against the seven benchmarks guiding the transition of security responsibilities in Somalia for the period from September 2025 to February 2026, while the second part provides a report on the AUSSOM configuration plan, which is shaped by the findings of the progress report against the seven benchmarks.

AU Mission Transition in Somalia: Key Timelines and Delays

It is recalled that AUSSOM operations are to be undertaken in a four-phased approach (see below), starting from phase 1 of realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS, its predecessor, at the end of June 2025, to AUSSOM, through to phase 4, which envisages mission exit at the end of 2029. The first phase has been postponed twice by the PSC, during its 1287th and 1317th sessions, pending deployment by Egypt.

AUSSOM operations and key timelines (Source: @aussom_)

AUSSOM Head El Hadji is expected to brief the Council, highlighting key findings of the report. Among others, he is likely to highlight progress made against the seven benchmarks (preparation and planning for transition to AUSSOM; AUSSOM support to Somali Security Forces (SSF) offensive operations; progressive extension of state authority across recovered areas; development of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF)/Somali Police Force (SPF) in line with defence and rule of law white papers; enhanced logistics support and sustainment for SNAF and AUSSOM; AUSSOM and SSF enhanced accountability and compliance; and post-mission management), key challenges, and considerations as the mission transition phases advance. Similarly, the briefing is expected to cover the second aspect of the report that assesses progress against the AUSSOM mandate, the joint operational environment and coordination with the FGS, accountability measures and protection of civilians, UNSOS adaptability to provide support and sustainment capacity to AUSSOM and SSF, as well as funding modalities.

The report paints a mixed picture of AUSSOM’s operations, with measurable success registered in discharging its mandate but also facing key challenges, which, without being addressed, could result in a significant reversal of security gains. The report confirms measurable progress in joint operational coordination, institutional development within Somali security institutions, and increasing Somali-led operational initiatives. Joint planning and operational coordination mechanisms between AUSSOM and SSF, such as the National Joint Operations Coordination Centre (JOCC) and the SSF-AUSSOM Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), are now functioning more coherently and consistently and have moved beyond ad hoc practices, improving coordination, information-sharing, and alignment with Somali-led security priorities. AUSSOM-SSF joint operations have delivered some tactical gains, including territorial recovery and improved security along key Main Supply Routes (MSRs), disrupted Al-Shabaab’s command structures, and contributed to increased defections and reduced recruitment capacity in some areas. Somali forces are showing growing operational initiative, with partner-supported enablers such as air operations playing a critical role in sustaining momentum against the terrorist group, reinforced by bilateral troop deployments in line with the decision of the extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the troop-contributing countries to AUSSOM, held in Kampala, Uganda, on 25 April 2025, adopting a ‘whole-of-government’ approach integrating military operations with political engagement. The report also finds that state authority is gradually expanding in recovered areas, with SSF increasing their presence and building community confidence, particularly in HirShabelle, Galmudug, and Southwest States. Progress has also been recorded in strengthening compliance and accountability frameworks, including the implementation of the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework, enhanced training on international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and the operationalisation of the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) and Boards of Inquiry, which enhance civilian protection, transparency, and operational legitimacy.

Despite these gains, the report highlights key challenges that make these gains fragile. Al-Shabaab remains resilient and adaptive, continuing asymmetric attacks, particularly through improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, and economic coercion. The territorial gains registered remain vulnerable to reversal, as the transition from ‘clear’ to ‘hold’ and ‘build’ is not consistently matched by government deployment, stabilisation efforts, and service delivery. AUSSOM is also constrained by structural and capability gaps. The mission is operating with reduced troop levels relative to its mandate, with current deployment in 49 locations against the envisaged 23 locations in the CONOPs. Critical capability gaps notably in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), mobility, aviation assets, and Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) persist. These gaps, together with the significant budget cuts of 25 per cent, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which remains the backbone of logistical support, have reduced operational support capacity, constraining mission sustainability and support to Somali-led operations. Most of all, the mission remains in an existential funding crisis.

As the report highlights, AUSSOM’s effectiveness and the success of the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces depend on many factors. First and foremost, the mission’s effectiveness heavily depends on closing critical capability gaps, ensuring full deployment of enablers, and aligning force configuration with operational demands to avoid overstretch and sustain gains. It also depends on the Somali forces’ capacity generation, without which the transition may outpace local absorption capacity, leading to reversals. Sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding, as well as logistical support, remain central to the effectiveness of the mission, requiring stronger AU-UN coordination and broader partner engagement to close the prevailing funding and logistics gap and ensure a smooth exit. The severity of the challenges facing AUSSOM also highlights the imperative for taking decisions on force configuration that align with realistically supportable sustainment capacity.

There are a few key strategic issues that the report did not address. The first of these relates to the growing confrontation between the Federal Government and Federal Member states, the political instability and uncertainty arising from the lack of consensus about major constitutional issues and related governance challenges and the resultant vacuum these conditions create for Al Shabaab to take advantage of and with respect to force generation and in the fight against Al Shabaab. The other concerns the lack of strategic clarity about the conclusive end of the AU mission in the form that it has run since 2007, and the creation of conditions for Somali actors to end the perpetual outsourcing of the full responsibility that they should bear for their political and security governance. Instead of operating as a gap-filling multilateral support measure, the AU mission is increasingly being seen as a regime security instrument, thereby becoming an excuse for Somali actors not to get their acts together. This is neither compatible with the objective of a multilateral peace support operation nor the pathway for the resolution of the underlying factors of the security crisis, which require the Somali government to deliver on its part of the bargain through both setting up and making fully functional the institutions for assuming security responsibility and securing political consensus and national reconciliation.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome the finalisation of the report on joint AU-FGS-UN progress against benchmarks and the AUSSOM mission configuration plan, adopt the same, and request the Commission to transmit it to the UN Security Council pursuant to the PSC’s 1287th session and UNSC Resolution 2809 (2025). Echoing the report, the PSC may welcome the operational momentum achieved against Al-Shabaab and the gradual strengthening of Somali institutions, but may also emphasise that the transition of responsibilities remains conditions-based and requires careful sequencing to ensure that drawdowns in AUSSOM do not outpace Somali absorption capacity or undermine recently consolidated gains. Beyond expressing concerns over the prevailing challenges that AUSSOM is currently facing, it may also emphasise the critical importance of sustainable, predictable, and adequate funding and logistical support for AUSSOM; the provision of adequate operational enablers such as aviation assets, ISR capabilities, and other force multipliers; accelerating capacity-building, force generation, and integrated operational planning mechanisms between AUSSOM and Somali forces; prioritising the security of key infrastructure and population centres to avoid overstretch; consolidating offensive operations with state presence through a ‘clear-hold-build’ approach; and adherence to the compliance and accountability framework. Again echoing the report, the PSC is also likely to establish an AU-FGS-UN monitoring and evaluation mechanism to track benchmark progress, operational conditions, and sustainment capacity.


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