Africa in a New Era of Insecurity and Instability: The 2024 Review of the Peace and Security Council
Amani Africa
Date | 14 February 2025
WHAT THIS REVIEW IS ABOUT AND WHY IT MATTERS
From an institutional perspective, the review’s value lies in systematically documenting the work of the PSC during the year and providing data and analysis-driven picture of the peace and security performance of the AU. It also contributes to identifying lessons from what transpired in 2024 that could be instructive for enhancing the effective functioning of the PSC in the execution of its mandate. Strategically, it draws out the geopolitical dynamics, threats and macro-level developments signifying the shifts affecting both the peace and security landscape and the functioning of the AU and its peace and security work, characterised by the various attributes of the emergence of a new era of insecurity and instability.
Consideration of the situation in Sudan
Consideration of the situation in Sudan
Date | 13 February 2025
Tomorrow (14 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1261st session at the heads of state and government level to consider the situation in Sudan on the margins of the AU Summit.
The session will commence with an opening remark by Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of Equatorial Guinea and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for February 2025, followed by introductory remarks of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat. Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti and Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations are also expected to make interventions. Since Sudan is suspended following the October 2021 coup that laid the foundation for the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, it would not be invited to make a statement during the summit.
The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which is nearing its second anniversary in April 2025, has caused massive destruction, civilian casualties, and an unprecedented humanitarian disaster. The violence has taken a devastating toll on the Sudanese people, exacerbating pre-existing economic and political challenges. Most notably, the current dynamics have raised risks of the country’s division into various territories under the control of rival armed groups and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
When the PSC met last on 9 October 2024 at its 1235th session to consider the report of the PSC’s field mission to Port Sudan requested for the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration of 11 May 2023. It also demanded that the parties to the conflict ensured a safe and unhindered access to the population in need and particularly demanded the RSF urgently lifts the siege on El Fasher.
The developments that have unfolded since then have seen intensified military confrontation with the SAF and RSF engaging in fierce territorial battles. The SAF has made significant advances, regaining several parts of central Sudan, including parts of Khartoum, lifting a months-long siege on its general command headquarters. As the SAF is moving to establish a new government, Taqaddum, one of Sudan’s largest civilian alliances that is accused of supporting RSF, also recently announced its split over differences over the formation of a parallel government. The fragmentation of civilian alliances, along with the fragmentation of armed groups that is underway, further complicates prospects for a political resolution. Moreover, despite the changes in the battlefield dynamics that currently seem to favour SAF in some areas, a decisive military victory for either side remains unlikely. Given that both sides remain bent on continuing fighting, Sudan remains faced with the perpetuation of a protracted war. Most worryingly, this also pushes Sudan ever closer to the worst-case scenarios of fragmentation (Libya scenario) or collapse (Somalia scenario). This danger has become more imminent following the declaration of SAF to amend the constitutional declaration of 2019 to give more power to the military-dominated Sovereign Council and form a government headed by a prime minister and RSF’s declaration for forming a government in areas under its control. Given Sudan’s strategic location, its collapse or division would have far-reaching consequences across the Lake Chad, Great Lakes, North Africa, and Horn of Africa regions. The stakes for the heads of state and government of the PSC meeting tomorrow could not, therefore, be higher and more pressing.
The humanitarian crisis has also deteriorated significantly, with more than 14 million internally displaced and more than half of the Sudanese population requiring urgent assistance. Blocked access to humanitarian corridors also remains a major challenge, preventing critical food and medical aid from reaching affected populations. Famine conditions have been confirmed in multiple areas, including IDP camps in North Darfur and the Western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. Reports indicate that only 25% of health facilities remain operational, heightening the risk of disease outbreaks and compounding the already dire humanitarian crisis.
Reports indicate both warring parties have committed grave human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, and ethnic-targeted attacks, particularly in Darfur and Al-Jazirah states. In a statement issued on 29 October, the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, expressed deep concerns over escalating violence, including mass killings, summary executions, abductions, and sexual violence, warning that the full scale of atrocities remains obscured due to a telecommunications blackout. A significant development in recognition of the widespread human rights violations has been the U.S. government’s determination that the RSF has committed acts of genocide. In light of these, tomorrow’s session may wish to follow up on a previous decision it passed in its 1213th session, for the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan to directly engage with the AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, to develop proposals on how to address ongoing atrocities and develop a plan for the protection of civilians.
In light of the urgency for operationalising PSC decisions on ensuring the protection of civilians, there is a need for the PSC to facilitate the effective functioning of the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Atrocities by tasking him to take the responsibility of monitoring and reporting on civilian protection challenges for identifying ways and means of mitigating the challenges. The PSC may also accord Sudanese local actors engaged in facilitating humanitarian support diplomatic recognition and urge their protection from attacks and support by the international community by channelling support to them as well as ensuring that they are protected from violent attacks. It may also specifically consider putting in place an internationally monitored humanitarian corridor to halt the expansion of famine and ensure that those in need have access to life-saving humanitarian support.
Multiple regional and international actors have attempted to mediate the conflict, yet no effective peace process has as yet emerged. The AU itself has deployed multiple diplomatic mechanisms, but all these efforts have largely remained ineffective to change the course of events in the fighting in Sudan and in ameliorating the plight of Sudanese caught up in the crossfire of the raging war.

The latest initiative of the PSC, the Ad Hoc Committee of Five Heads of State and Government also fell into paralysis, with some of the members of the Committee either rejected by one of the parties or perceived to be partisan in the ongoing conflict. The resulting stalling of the Committee’s operation has undermined confidence in its role as an important body. This necessitates that the PSC considers to reconstitute the presidential ad hoc committee.
On this proliferation and fragmentation of the peace process, the PSC, in its 1218th session, reiterated its concern about the proliferation of mediation initiatives and emphasised the need for enhanced coordination and complementarity of peace efforts through AU-established coordinating mechanisms. In late January 2025, Mauritania, the current AU chair, hosted the third consultative meeting aimed at enhancing coordination of peace efforts for Sudan with the UN, AU, EU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, and key state actors like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Yet, the coordination mechanism’s very ad hoc and sporadic convenings and the lack of shared strategy anchoring continues to impede its role of facilitating coherence and coordination of various initiatives for halting the war and facilitating peace in Sudan. In the light of this, the PSC may consider changing the current arrangement and constitute a more functional and effective framework. One option for this could be the establishment of an International Contact Group of Sudan as a mechanism that would facilitate coordination, enhance diplomatic leverage and align peace efforts. This mechanism, anchored on a shared strategy crafted by drawing on the AU roadmap, would streamline actions by various international actors, ensuring a unified approach toward achieving a ceasefire, improving humanitarian access and advancing peace negotiations.
Another critical issue that has been complicating the conflict’s resolution has been foreign involvement on either side of the parties to the conflict. The 1218th PSC session had directed the Sub Committee on sanction to collaborate with the AU Commission and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA) to ‘identify all external actors supporting the warring factions militarily, financially and politically, as well as make proposals on how to contain each of them within a stipulated timeframe.’ While the initial timeframe, set to three months, was due in September 2024, the Council is yet to receive the proposals. In this context as well, one of the factors that seem to get in the way of delivering on this mandate is the level of sensitivity of the matter and the fact that both the AU Commission and CISSA are constrained by political sensitivities. As such, the Summit may seek to establish a high-level task force headed by a credible former head of state and task it to investigate, document, and report the sources and channels of supply to the Council. The task force could also mobilise diplomatic and institutional pressure and action on foreign actors supplying arms and finances to the warring parties.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC may express its deep concern about the deepening fighting and its consequences for the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and for the peace and stability of the region. It may reiterate its call for an urgent cessation of hostilities and, in light of the upcoming Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which is set to begin on the first of March, call on parties to the conflict to observe a total humanitarian ceasefire throughout the month of Ramadan. The PSC may decide to establish a high-level task force headed by a credible former head of state and task it to investigate, document and report the sources and channels of supply to the Council. It may also decide to establish an International Contact Group of Sudan as a mechanism that would facilitate coordination, enhance diplomatic leverage and align peace efforts. The PSC may additionally decide to reconstitute the presidential ad hoc committee by confining the membership to countries that are not neighbours of and geographically far from Sudan and requesting its activation within three weeks period. Given the famine conditions threatening the lives of people in the affected areas, the PSC may call for the establishment of an internationally monitored humanitarian corridor. Council may call for the task the AU Commission to prepare a plan for the deployment of a humanitarian ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The Council may also call for the restoration of the national telecommunication networks as part of the urgent measures for the protection of civilians.
PSC summit on the situation in Eastern DRC
PSC summit on the situation in Eastern DRC
Date | 13 February 2025
Tomorrow (14 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to meet at the level of heads of state and government to discuss the situation in eastern DRC.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of Equatorial Guinea and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for February 2025. Moussa Faki Mahamat, AU Commission Chairperson, is expected to make introductory remarks on the situation. This is followed by briefings from Felix Tshisekedi, President of the Republic of the DRC, and Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, as concerned countries. Others that are scheduled to make interventions are João Lorenço, President of Angola and Mediator of the Luanda Process; Samia Suluhu Hassan, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairperson of the Sothern Africa Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; Emmerson Mnangagwa, President of Zimbabwe and Chair of SADC; William Ruto, President of Kenya and Chairperson of the East African Community (EAC); Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa; Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of Kenya and Facilitator of the EAC-led Nairobi Process for Peace in Eastern DRC; and Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
This session is being held as a follow-up to the 1256th emergency ministerial session that the PSC held on 28 January following the renewed escalation of the fighting and the territorial expansion of the armed rebel group, the Mouvement du Mars (M23). It is to be recalled that the communique of that session called for the convening of a PSC meeting of heads of state and government on the margins of the AU Summit.
Tomorrow’s summit comes as the volatile situation on the ground continues to evolve. The regional tension this escalation unleashed remains worrying. It also comes against the background of a flurry of regional and international diplomatic actions.
Despite the ceasefire agreement that took effect on 4 August 2024, fighting between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the M23 has escalated following the collapse of the summit-level Luanda process meant to take place on 15 December 2024. Angola’s President Lourenço had been working to facilitate face-to-face talks between Presidents Felix Antoine Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame and had convened a tripartite summit in Luanda on 15 December 2024. However, the issue of M23 created complications, with Rwanda insisting that the matter be addressed, while the DRC resisted the involvement of M23 in the Luanda process.
M23 has significantly expanded its territorial control in North Kivu since December. By the end of January, M23 captured Goma, the provincial capital, sparking international condemnation. The news triggered violent protests in the capital, Kinshasa, with protesters attacking several embassies, including Belgium, France, Kenya, Rwanda, the US, and Uganda.

The situation in Goma appears stable now, except for sporadic gunshots in the city, according to UN officials. M23 continues to deepen its grip on the territories it has seized. Most notably, it is instituting its own administrative structures in those territories, marginalising the structures under the current constitutional arrangement of the DRC. This has understandably triggered fears of the fragmentation of the territory of the DRC.
M23 had declared a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire on 4 February, but it did not hold as fighting resumed in South Kivu with M23 advancing southwards and capturing Nyabibwe, a mining town on Lake Kivu 40 miles from Bukavu, the provincial capital. After a few days of lull, fighting has reportedly resumed in South Kivu. According to UN officials, M23 is targeting Kavumbu Airport, a major airport in the province, and Bukavu is likely to be next. The fighting in South Kivu appears to have created fears in Burundi which borders the province and has its forces deployed in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government.
These major changes in the battlefield conditions of the conflict involving the M23 brought about very adverse consequences to the presence of UN and regional third-party mechanisms. The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), deployed in the region since December 2023 with an offensive mandate, attempted to halt M23’s advance but were unsuccessful. Tragically, three MONUSCO peacekeepers and 19 SAMIDRC troops (14 South Africans, three Malawians and two Tanzanians) lost their lives.
Beyond the loss of peacekeepers, the very continuation of these missions has emerged to be a major issue. With the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by the troop contributing countries of SAMIDRC, the mission exists only in name. For all practical purposes, the M23’s military gains have pushed the SAMIDRC into implosion. Similarly, it remains unclear whether and how MONUSCO can pursue its current mandate under the new realities established on the ground as a result of these gains.
In light of the regional tension that followed these recent developments, there are also understandable concerns about the heightened risk of the situation degenerating into a wider regional conflict, with the loss of lives involving peacekeepers from Southern Africa and the anxiety that the threat of the fall of Bukavu into the hands of M23 triggered in Burundi. Uganda, another neighbouring country that has its forces in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government, also reportedly decided to adopt an ‘offensive defence’ posture by deploying 1000 additional troops for this purpose. These dimensions of the volatile situation necessitate urgent de-escalation initiatives by the AU, building on the decisions that the PSC ministers adopted and the outcomes of the EAC-SADC summit.
The last session of the PSC held on 28 January on the situation condemned the attacks by M23 and expressed grave concerns about the escalating tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It also condemned ‘any foreign military support’ to M23, a euphemism to refer to Rwanda. It further called for the immediate withdrawal of ‘any external party’ from Congolese territory, though without explicitly referencing Rwanda, which has been implicated by UN reports for supporting the group and demanded the cessation of such support while also condemning support for the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), once again without specifying the sources of this support, and demanding its immediate cessation. The FDLR is an ethnic Hutu armed group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsis, which operates in eastern DRC and has been supported by the Congolese government, as corroborated by UN reports.
In New York, the Security Council convened on the same day to discuss the situation. Council members have had divergent views on the role of external forces, with the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) previously resisting any explicit reference to Rwanda due to concerns that it might complicate ongoing mediation efforts. However, the group softened its position after the fall of Goma. In its 28 January joint statement at the Security Council, the A3 Plus, for the first time, urged ‘the Government of Rwanda to withdraw its troops from DRC territories without preconditions and without delay, and cease its reported support for the M23.’ At that meeting, Security Council members expressed hope that regional efforts would lead to a reinvigoration of mediation processes to find a lasting solution to this longstanding and intractable conflict.
Following the AUPSC and Security Council meetings, the EAC and SADC met in an extraordinary session to discuss the situation in eastern DRC on 29 and 31 January, respectively. The EAC, among other things, strongly urged the Congolese government to engage directly with M23 and other armed groups. It is to be recalled that the EAC spearheaded a peace process focusing on facilitating dialogue between the Congolese government and a wide array of armed groups operating in eastern DRC. This process had been stuck for some time because the Congolese government was not willing to engage in direct dialogue with M23. Instead, it preferred to engage with Rwanda, which was accused of supporting the M23. The platform for this has been another regional initiative known as the Luanda process under the auspices of the Angolan President João Lourenço, who was designated by the AU to facilitate dialogue between the two countries to ease their diplomatic tensions.
There has also been a regional and international push to revive the Nairobi process, considering the evolving security situation and the need to address the issue of M23. The Congolese government’s position also seems to have shifted recently; it is now open to allowing M23 to participate in the Nairobi process. However, it remains unclear if Kinshasa would engage in direct talks with M23 while the latter remains to be in control of the territories it seized during the past few months and is seen to be undermining the constitutional administrative structure of DRC in Eastern DRC by establishing its own administrative structures.
Ahead of the EAC and SADC joint summit, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) met on 7 February in an extraordinary session in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. It condemned ‘M23 supported by Rwanda and order[s] it to immediately cease its offensive and leave the illegally occupied territories’. It also calls for ‘the immediate withdrawal of the Rwandan Defence Forces from the Congolese territory, including the normalisation of the operations of the Goma airport in order to facilitate the return of members’ of the various verification mechanisms deployed in Goma under the Luanda process. Angola withdrew these members due to the worsening security situation.
The joint EAC/SADC summit took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 8 February with the participation of several leaders from eastern and southern Africa, preceded by a preparatory ministerial meeting of the two regional bodies on 7 February.
The joint summit decided to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes and mandated the appointment of additional facilitators from other African regions to support the mediation effort. Furthermore, the joint summit called for the resumption of direct dialogue with all armed groups, including M23, under the merged process. It called for the implementation of the Concept of Operations of the harmonised plan for the neutralisation of FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures as agreed within the framework of the Luanda process.
At the UN Security Council, a draft resolution was circulated to all Council members last week. Currently, Security Council members are negotiating the draft, which, among other things, demands the M23 to stop further territorial expansion and withdraw from Goma and all other controlled areas. It also called on the Rwandan Defense Forces to cease support to the M23 and withdraw from the Congolese territory. Additionally, it expresses its intention to consider additional targeted sanctions against the leadership of M23 and its external backers.
The other issue of concern for the PSC, when the heads of state and government meet tomorrow, is how to ameliorate the dire humanitarian situation in Eastern DRC, which is one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. Apart from interrupting the operation of MONUSCO, including its peacekeeping mission, the fighting in Goma has curtailed humanitarian access and activities. Further to heightening inter-communal tension and violence, it is also forcing a large number of people into displacement. About 3 thousand people have been reportedly killed in this latest round of fighting. An estimated 178,000 people fled the surrounding areas, with 34,000 of them seeking refuge in already overcrowded camps for internally displaced persons within Goma. The worsening humanitarian situation has been compounded by the disruption of critical infrastructure and basic services. The UN Human Rights Council, after an emergency session it held on 7 February, adopted unanimously a resolution on the establishment of ‘an independent fact-finding mission on the serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’
One of the issues for the heads of state and government to address is how to institute a complete cessation of hostilities and de-escalate the mounting regional tension and the attendant risk of countries in the region being sucked into the conflict. The other issue that tomorrow’s session needs to address is how to build on and take forward the steps outlined in the communiqués of the 1256th PSC ministerial session, the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the ECCAS meeting. Beyond the question of implementation of the outcomes of these sessions, there is also the issue of the additional urgent measures that the PSC summit may need to consider for a more effective peace process. The PSC also needs to clarify the proposed merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its call for an unconditional cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the M23 from areas it has occupied. Building on the outcome of the EAC-SADC summit, the PSC may request the AU Commission to establish the territories held by the M23 as neutral territories and the constitution of a neutral force from countries outside of EAC, SADC and ECCAS that will facilitate the neutral status of these territories pending peace talks. It may call on the DRC on its part to cooperate with the inter-Congolese peace process initiated under the Nairobi process by allowing the participation of the M23, as there is no military solution to the conflict in Eastern DRC, including the one involving the M23. The PSC may also urge a follow-up of the discussions under the Lunda Process for the neutralisation of the FDLR. The PSC may call for the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire concluded under the Launda process. It is also expected to call for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and restate its call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces operating in the DRC. The PSC may call for urgent dispatching of a high-level delegation of Heads of State and Government from countries that are not members of SADC, EAC, and ECCAS to Kinshasa and Kigali for urgent implementation of de-escalation measures. As a follow-up to the EAC-SADC summit communiqué, the PSC may propose the formation of a high-level ad hoc committee of Heads of State from outside of SADC, EAC, and ECCAS to support and reinforce the enhanced complementary resumption of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.
Exclusive interview: H.E. Ambassador Selma Hadaddi, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and UNECA
Exclusive interview: H.E. Ambassador Selma Hadaddi, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and UNECA
Feb 9, 2025
In the latest edition of Amani Africa’s podcast, The Pan-Africanist, we get to have a deep dive into why the election of the AU Commission leadership taking place next week matters, the kind of leadership that the AU needs and the role of the AU Deputy Chairperson in this respect as well as the changes the AU needs with one of the candidates of for the position of Deputy Chairperson, H.E. Ambassador Selma Hadaddi. Take a listen to The Pan-Africanist for these & related issues, offering rich insights into the AU.
The 2025 Elections of the African Union Peace and Security Council: The Process, Candidates and Dynamics
The 2025 Elections of the African Union Peace and Security Council: The Process, Candidates and Dynamics
Date | 8 February 2025
The mandate of the five (5) Members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), who were elected for a three-year term in February 2022 during the 35th AU Summit, will end on 31 March 2025. The rotating three-year term five seats are accordingly up for grabs during the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly scheduled to take place on 12-16 February 2025 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
THE SEQUENCE, PROCEDURE, DYNAMICS AND SCENARIOS FOR THE 2025 AU COMMISSION LEADERSHIP ELECTIONS
THE SEQUENCE, PROCEDURE, DYNAMICS AND SCENARIOS FOR THE 2025 AU COMMISSION LEADERSHIP ELECTIONS
Date | 7 February 2025
INTRODUCTION
The elections of the African Union (AU) Commission leadership are expected to dominate the 38th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly (AU Summit) scheduled to take place from 12 to 16 February 2025. The elections of the AU Commission leadership are significant on their own, considering the influence that they wield in the decision-making processes of the AU. Additionally, and perhaps more significantly, these elections occupy special significance on account of the timing and geopolitical context in which they are being held.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - December 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - December 2024
Date | December 2024
In December 2024, the Republic of Djibouti chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). During the month, the Council planned to conduct four substantive sessions covering five agenda items, and an informal consultation on countries in political transition, with only one session dedicated to country-specific situation. The remaining four items focused on thematic matters. Except one session held at ministerial level, all the sessions of the month were held at the ambassadorial level.
Exclusive interview: Mr. Brian Kagoro, Managing Director, Programs, OSF
Exclusive interview: Mr. Brian Kagoro, Managing Director, Programs, OSF
Feb 5, 2025