Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for August 2026

Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for August 2026

Date | August 2026

In August, the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) (see In the Words of the PSC Chairperson for an overview of Algeria’s chairship). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages nine substantive sessions, a field mission and an Extraordinary AU Summit. All the sessions planned during the month are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. Of the nine sessions, only two will focus on country/conflict-specific situations, while the other seven will address thematic issues, alongside PSC’s meetings with other relevant bodies. In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC subsidiary bodies – the Committee of Experts (CoE) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) – are also expected to meet during the month.

The first session of the month, scheduled for 3 August, will be an open session on the theme, ‘Education in Conflict Situation.’ The last time the PSC considered this theme was during Algeria’s Chairship of the PSC in August 2025, during its 1296th session on 13 August 2025, following the decision of the PSC to have a dedicated session on education in conflict situations on an annual basis at its first session on education held in August 2024, at its 1229th session, during Botswana’s chairship. It is to be recalled that the 1229th PSC session decided to institutionalise the ‘Open Session on Inclusive Education in Conflict Situation as an annual event of the Council.’ This year’s session will therefore build on, and is expected to follow up on, the commitments made at the 1229th meeting which included a call to improve data collection and evidence-based policymaking to address the unique challenges facing education in conflict situations, as well as those from the 1296th, which tasked the AU Commission ‘to develop a policy on the protection and provision of education services during conflicts on the Continent.’ The 1296th session also tasked the Commission with issuing ‘periodic Scorecards on the Elimination of Harmful Practices, tracking trends in child marriage and other violations in conflict-affected areas.’ Of importance will also be to follow up on the status of the task of developing a comprehensive and dynamic matrix listing all AU legal frameworks, strategies and initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive education for all, particularly ensuring continuity of education in times of conflict in Africa, and to develop an action plan on activities to be undertaken in this area from 2025 onwards.

The session also comes just a few months after Jainaba Jagne, former Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and former Co-Chair of the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflict (AP-CAAC), was appointed as the first-ever AU Special Envoy for Children Affected by Armed Conflict tasked to ensure sustained continental leadership and coordinated follow-up on the CAAC mandate. Indeed, the Special Envoy would be the most suited institutional structure of the AU for following up and advancing the agenda of protection and continuation of education in conflict situations, and the session thus could anchor its engagement on the role of the Envoy.

On 5 August, the PSC will receive its quarterly briefing from the A3 on their activities within the UNSC,  conducted from April to June 2026. This engagement traces back to the Inaugural Meeting of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa held in December 2013 in Algiers, Algeria, in which it mandated the A3 to provide the PSC with quarterly briefings on African issues before the UNSC. The commitment was reaffirmed at the 11th Oran Process in 2024 and further formalised through the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3. This was then endorsed at the PSC’s 1289th session held on 24 July 2025, setting out clear requirements for regular reporting and structured engagement. The 12th Oran Process, held in December 2025, further urged the PSC and A3 to ‘regularise and institutionalise their interactions at the level of Permanent Representatives, Political Coordinators and Experts on African issues.’

While it has not been held regularly on a quarterly basis, the most recent briefing of the A3 to the PSC was during Council’s 1340th session held on 20 April 2026, in which it briefed the PSC on its activities in the UNSC during the first quarter of 2026. During that session, the Council reiterated ‘the importance of regular briefings by the A3 to the PSC, on a quarterly basis, and as may be necessary, on African issues under consideration by the UNSC.’ It further directed the Commission to assess the feasibility of conducting one of the quarterly briefings at the AU Headquarters. The session will also give an opportunity to follow up on several tasks from that session, including directing the AU Commission ‘to develop, in full respect of AU Assembly Decisions, a Matrix of Common African Positions on peace and security matters,’ as well as an ‘Annual Plan of Action’ to advance this.

Following this, on 7 August, the PSC will receive an ‘Update on the Situation in the Sahel.’ The region continues to face deepening crises through 2026. Earlier in July, the AU Commission’s Chairperson undertook a series of visits to the region, beginning with a two-day visit to Mali on 12 July 2026 aimed at strengthening engagement with the AU, followed by a visit to Burkina Faso on 15 July 2026 to ‘convey the Union’s solidarity with the Government and people of Burkina Faso in their efforts to restore peace, combat terrorism and promote stability.’ Just days later, terrorist attacks were launched against a detachment of the Nigerien Armed Forces on the Bankilaré–Téra axis in the Tillabéri region on 17 July 2026, followed by an ambush on 18 July 2026 against a convoy of the Malian Armed Forces between Anéfis and Gao. The resurgent groups, JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), now control more territory collectively than at any point since the 2012 Mali crisis, with JNIM combining guerrilla attacks with governance and service provision in areas it holds. The session affords the PSC an opportunity to seriously rethink AU’s approach to the situation in the Sahel, moving away from the exclusively legalistic and constitutionalism-centric approach to mobilising collective action to contain the existential threat facing the central Sahelian states and the accompanying spillover into coastal West Africa.

On 12 August, the PSC will hold a session to get an update on the ‘Progress made in Silencing the Guns in Africa roadmap.’ It is worth recalling that at its 14th Extraordinary Session, held in Johannesburg on 6 December 2020, the AU Assembly decided to extend the Silencing the Guns (STG) timeline by a decade, to 2030. To strengthen implementation of this goal, a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism for the STG 2030 was adopted in June 2021, following a recommendation from the 28th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State. Falling within this framework, the upcoming session will offer an opportunity to take stock of the continent’s current security landscape, assess how far implementation has advanced, and identify effective strategies for closing the gap between Africa’s ambition to end conflict and the evolving realities on the ground, as extensively documented in Amani Africa special research report reviewing the first ten-year implementation of Silencing the Guns. The last time the PSC held a session on this theme was at its 1252nd session held in December 2024. The session scheduled for this month will also serve as an occasion to follow up on some of the outcomes of that session, including the decision to comprehensively assess the progress and challenges to the agenda of silencing the guns through a high-level reflection forum and for the High-Representative on Silencing the Guns to brief the Council twice a year.

The next session will be held on 14 August. It will be a consultation between the PSC and the African Governance Architecture-African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA-APSA) Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG). The PSC last held such a consultation at its 1295th session in August 2025, where it requested the AU Commission, in coordination with the AGA-APSA Platform, the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG, and APRM, to develop a comprehensive matrix of all AU legal frameworks on governance, human rights, peace and security, and to assess whether these frameworks remain fit for purpose in addressing the continent’s complex governance and security challenges, as part of the broader review of governance, peace and security frameworks. This joint format was first established at the 1167th session in August 2023, which brought the AGA-APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG together for the first time. Before that, the PSC had engaged each body separately, first with the AGA-APSA Platform at its 1098th session in August 2022, and then with the PRC Sub-Committee at its 1095th session that same month.

Following this, the PSC is scheduled to undertake a field visit to Sudan on 16 and 17 August. It is to be recalled that the PSC undertook a one-day visit to Port Sudan in October 2024.

After the field visit to Sudan, the PSC will convene a consultation with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) on 19 August. It is worth recalling that the annual engagement will be held in accordance with the outcome of the last consultative meeting of the two bodies held in June 2023, contained in the 1160th Communiqué of the PSC. From the meeting, the two bodies committed to institutionalise and regularise their annual joint meeting on peace and security in Africa, to be hosted alternately in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Midrand, South Africa. In this respect, this year’s meeting will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, building on the 1290th meeting held in July 2025, in which it adopted the Conclusions of the Inaugural Joint Consultative meeting between the two bodies, held on 17 and 18 July 2025, Midrand, South Africa. The session will receive an update on the development of a roadmap and work plan for collaboration between the PSC and PAP, as tasked during the 1290th meeting.

A day later, on 21 August, there will be the annual PSC and the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Consultation. The consultative meeting will be convened pursuant to Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in promoting peace, security and stability across Africa. Building on this provision, the PSC, at its 866th meeting of August 2019, resolved to institutionalise this engagement through annual joint consultative meetings with the ACHPR. The most recent joint meeting was held in June 2025, as the 1284th session, during which the PSC requested the ACHPR to give particular attention to the human rights situation of vulnerable groups disproportionately affected by armed conflict, including women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees. The meeting also reiterated the commitment to continue strengthening the PSC collaboration with the ACHPR, including through regular information sharing, as well as institutionalisation and regularisation of the consultation as an annual event.

On 24 August, there will be a coordination meeting of the AUCTC, APRM, CISSA and AFRIPOL on Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), focusing on ‘Validation of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool and APRM Early Warning.’ It is worth noting that at the 1320th meeting of December 2025 on the ‘Continental Early Warning System and Security Outlook,’ the PSC underlined the need to strengthen the analytical convergence between AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL and the RECs/RMs. The Commission was further tasked to collaborate with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM to introduce and institutionalise a dynamic tool for mapping risks and threats to peace and security in Africa. The upcoming session will provide an opportunity to follow up on this.

The last substantial meeting will be held on 26 August, in which the PSC will receive a briefing by the C5 and the AU Special Envoy to South Sudan on the latest developments in the country. This will be the second session the PSC convenes this year, focusing substantially on the developments in the country as four months remain until the December 2026 elections. The session will build up from the 1343rd meeting of 30 April 2026, in which the PSC, through official emails, adopted a communiqué endorsing the Report of the PSC Field Mission to the country conducted from 23 to 25 April 2026. Several tasks were raised from the communiqué worth following up on, including a call for the convening of an extraordinary IGAD ministerial meeting, and tasking the AU Commission Chairperson to expedite the deployment of a multidimensional technical needs assessment team to South Sudan ahead of the elections. The R-TGoNU was also tasked to subsequently submit its election-related needs to the AU Commission to help secure the support required for free, fair, democratic and inclusive elections.

The session comes against the backdrop of stalled progress in implementing major transitional tasks of the R-ARCSS, amid challenges including political tension and growing mistrust resulting from the continued house arrest of First Vice President Riek Machar. At the beginning of July, South Sudan’s parliament approved controversial amendments to the R-ARCSS, removing requirements for a population census and a permanent constitution before elections. President Kiir formally assented to the amendment on 22 July 2026, clearing the legal pathway, as per government framing, for the country to hold general elections in December 2026, delinking the permanent constitution and national census from the electoral timeline — a move seen as fundamentally altering the R-ARCSS’s structure by repealing provisions that had established the agreement’s supremacy over conflicting laws, thereby weakening its legitimacy. Recently, at a workshop in Juba on enhancing the role of South Sudanese stakeholders in implementing the Revitalised Peace Agreement, convened by IGAD, the Chairperson of R-JMEC stated that implementation of the R-ARCSS continues to be stalled, citing incomplete Transitional Security Arrangements, inadequate funding, population displacement, insecurity in various parts of the country, and uncertainty surrounding the inclusivity of the political process.

This session comes against the background of intensifying diplomatic efforts, which so far have produced no major breakthrough. IGAD’s Special Envoy’s visit to Juba on 16 June for a meeting focused on the country’s ongoing political transition and preparations for the 2026 elections. Ten days later, former President of Tanzania and AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, Jakaya Kikwete, briefed the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the C5 and the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, on the findings and outcomes of his recent visit to South Sudan. In addition, in July, the C5 — led by South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Roland Lamola, in his capacity as Chair of the ministerial committee — visited Juba to assess progress on implementing the Declarations of the C5 Plus Summit, held on the margins of the 39th AU Summit in February 2026 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC subsidiary bodies are also scheduled to meet during the month. On 6 August, the Military Staff Committee (MSC) will meet on matters relating to the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding of the African Standby Force (ASF). On 10 August, the Committee of Experts (CoE) will meet for consultations on the ‘Consideration of the Continental Threats Assessment and Risks Mapping Tool.’ Another CoE meeting will be held on 25 August to consider ‘the Guidelines on listing and delisting.’

On 29 and 30 August, there will be an Extraordinary AU Summit on ‘Strengthening Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa,’ to be held in Luanda, Angola. This comes following the AU Assembly Decision of February 2026, in which the Luanda Summit was seen as a strategic convening devoted exclusively to conflict prevention in Africa, with concrete, measurable and time-bound deliverables, rather than a declarative forum.

The footnote of the PPoW also provides for the PSC Chairperson to chair the 2nd Political Meeting of the AGA-APSA Platform on 4 August. The Chairperson is also expected to participate in the Opening Ceremony of ‘Youth, Peace and Security,’ to be held in Bujumbura, Burundi, on 10 August 2026. Finally, there is also a planned monthly exchange between the PSC and the UNSC Chairs.


Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2026

Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2026

Date | June 2026

In June, under the chairship of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, standing in for the Republic of Sierra-Leone, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering five agenda items. Following the revision of the PPoW, three substantive sessions took place, covering four agenda items. Out of the four agenda items, only one focused on a country-specific issue, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All the substantive sessions during the month were held at the level of ambassadors.

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Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2026

Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2026

Date | June 2026

In June, under the chairship of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, standing in for the Republic of Sierra-Leone, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering five agenda items. Following the revision of the PPoW, three substantive sessions took place, covering four agenda items. Out of the four agenda items, only one focused on a country-specific issue, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All the substantive sessions during the month were held at the level of ambassadors.

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Why the African Union and Somalia need to plan for the worst-case scenario of AUSSOM’s withdrawal

Why the African Union and Somalia need to plan for the worst-case scenario of AUSSOM’s withdrawal

 

Date | 30 July 2026

On 29-30 July, once again Kampala plays host to the technical, ministerial and summit-level meetings of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Troop Contributing and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) plus Somalia. The meeting kicked off yesterday with a session of the Chiefs of Defence Forces of TCCs/PCCs of AUSSOM.

Initially, this meeting was requested by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU in view of the existential financial crisis facing AUSSOM. It was the 1317th session of 15 December 2025 of the PSC that tasked ‘the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit a detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ This request was further reiterated by the PSC during its 1342nd session of April 2026.

It was the letter that the United States (US) Mission to the AU (USAU) sent to the African Union on 1 July 2026 that led to the speedy convening of this meeting. In the letter, the US informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of AUSSOM comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal if it includes UNSOS or any UN logistical or operational support.’

While the decision was not completely surprising given that it came in a context in which the US has been reconsidering its funding of UN missions and an earlier decision cutting 25% of UNSOS budget, it came before the AU and Somalia acted timely on PSC’s request and put in place a plan on the immediate future of AU’s long-running and largest peace operation to date.

As pointed out in an earlier Amani Africa article, the end of UNSOS and the critical logistics support on which AUSSOM depends for all its operations would practically make the continuation of the AU mission, which suffers from major funding shortfalls, untenable. The unplagging of UNSOS from AUSSOM is like pulling the life support from a patient whose life depends on it. While AUSSOM has sustained and can continue its operation while facing a major shortfall of funds, it cannot continue with its operations without UNSOS logistics support or without finding, within the short time left, an alternative logistics support arrangement fully replacing UNSOS.

The Kampala meeting comes following a series of meetings in response to the US letter, including ‘an information briefing’ of 3 July for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM, an informal consultation of the PSC of 8 July, and a meeting of experts of TCCs & PCCs of AUSSOM plus Somalia of 24 July. The key meeting of 24 July deliberated on the three options on the future of AUSSOM referenced in the 1317th session of the PSC of 15 December 2025.

The three options PSC proposed for further interrogation, were initially outlined in the AU Commission Chairperson’s report to the 1317th session of the PSC. The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions. The second option involved transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.

It emerged from the meeting of 24 July that the options further updated without UNSOS were not deemed feasible due to the significant risks they posed to operational continuity, force sustainment and the potential for security gaps. The meeting proposed the presentation of the three options to the Chiefs of Defence Forces of AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs along with this conclusion on the options and a proposal for engaging the US ‘to negotiate for the continuation of’ the 2024-2029 transition supported by UNSOS. The three options as updated and the report of the 24 July meeting were presented to the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Forces held yesterday in Kampala, Uganda.

The proposal for preserving UNSOS for the duration of the transition is understandable from the point of view of avoiding a security gap, getting Somali forces to a level where they are able to preserve the security gains made and ensuring a planned withdrawal. However, its feasibility is contingent on having the US reverse its decision. Addressing the Chiefs gathered in Kampala, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces called for ‘African-led alternative arrangements that would sustain the mission beyond 2026,’ noting the indications that the US would not support the current UN support framework. As a recent policy brief cogently argued, another option that the Kampala summit may consider envisages minimal logistic support through a hybrid mechanism from funds other than UN assessed contributions, including AU, anchored on a negotiated transition compact.

These are best-case scenario options but with significant variation. They assume either reversal of the US decision on unplugging UNSOS or the possibility of the establishment of a viable alternative option within the very short time available to ensure the sustenance of AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

In addition to a plan for exploring these options, the Kampala summit needs to consider and adopt a contingency plan for the worst-case scenario too. This is a scenario where reversal of the US decision on supporting UNSOS mandate beyond December 2026 could not be secured, or an alternative to it or any middle ground could not be arranged to sustain AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

Given the risks identified during the 24 July meeting of experts and the dangers that AUSSOM’s withdrawal by December 2026 poses, planning for this worst-case scenario should accordingly involve ways of managing such risks. This necessitates the designing and implementation of measures that mitigate the risks to the minimum possible and ensure as orderly a withdrawal as possible while simultaneously facilitating alternative security support to Somalia that may involve a combination of bilateral support along with a regional joint force modelled on the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin adapted to the Somalia context.

The worst-case scenario is not necessarily inevitable. Nor is it one to be embraced. However, the AU, TCCs/PCCS of AUSSOM and Somalia could not afford not to plan for it.


Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger

Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger

Date | 26 July 2026

Tomorrow (27 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene a session dedicated to an update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger.

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for July, followed by a statement by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Special Representative of the AU Commission for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Mamadou Tangara, is expected to brief the Council.

The last time the PSC formally considered the situation in Burkina Faso and Niger was on 30 September 2025, during its 1304th session, when it addressed the Sahel region as a whole. That session, convened at ministerial level and attended by AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, produced perhaps the most notable Sahel-related decision the Council has taken in years: a request to the Chairperson of the Commission to establish a Task Force to support the countries of the Sahel in fighting terrorism, addressing the security, socio-economic and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. It endorsed Angola’s proposal, advanced through its Chairmanship of the AU, to convene a Summit on the region. The Council has also engaged the situation in both countries directly using its informal consultation; the last one being held in February 2026 when the PSC held an informal consultation with suspended Member States in political transition, in which representatives of Burkina Faso and Niger took part.

Since April, the Council’s country-specific engagement on the central Sahel has also become more differentiated in response to evolving security dynamics. Mali has effectively been addressed through a separate track. Following the deadly attacks of 25 April 2026, the PSC convened its 1342nd session on Mali on 28 April, engaging MISAHEL and ECOWAS, and subsequently held an informal consultation on 14 May with Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Abdoulaye Diop. Against this backdrop, Mali does not feature on tomorrow’s agenda, reflecting the Council’s recent and sustained engagement on the country.

On the ground, Burkina Faso continues to face a severe and evolving terrorist threat, with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) remaining the dominant armed group while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) maintains operations in parts of the country. Signifying some shifts in the terrorist conflict dynamics in the country, terrorism-related deaths and attacks declined significantly in 2025, according to the Global Terrorism Index, despite the country being the second country on the list of most impacted countries by terrorism. JNIM accounted for more than 80 per cent of attacks during the year and has continued to intensify its campaign through coordinated assaults. Following major early-year operations targeting Titao, Kourakou and Tondobi, JNIM carried out coordinated, multi-pronged assaults between 4–5 July 2026 that overran a military camp in Di (Sourou province) and struck Dalan and Tiéré, inflicting casualties on Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP). These actions underscore the group’s growing operational reach into Central-North and Sahel urban perimeters.

Niger presents the starker deterioration. The AU Counter Terrorism Centre’s data for the second quarter of 2026 shows both attacks and fatalities in Niger nearly tripling compared to the equivalent period in 2025, with the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and ISGS the most active perpetrators across the Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso regions. Two attacks on Niamey’s international airport, one in January, claimed by ISSP, and a second on 18 June that killed 11 members of the armed forces and two civilians, illustrate a widening geographic reach that now touches the capital itself. The Chairperson of the Commission’s own statement, issued after the 17 July ambush of a Nigerien detachment on the Bankilaré–Téra axis in Tillabéri, described a resurgence of terrorist attacks across the Sahel exacting a heavy toll on both security forces and civilians. Nigerian authorities responded with the December 2025 declaration of a ‘general mobilisation,’ and the March 2026 plan to establish territorial self-defence organisations, echoing what Burkina Faso adopted earlier. Since then, clashes were reported between self-defence militias and armed Islamist groups in Tillabéri, leading to a fresh wave of reprisal killings and displacement.

The humanitarian toll behind these trend lines is severe. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) figures for the first quarter of 2026 record 2,640 conflict-related deaths and 1,179 security incidents across the Central Sahel. The region hosts 2.8 million internally displaced persons, 2.1 million of them in Burkina Faso and 283,000 in Niger, alongside 444,400 refugees. An estimated 11.4 million people require food assistance, including 2.7 million facing IPC Phase 3-or-worse acute food insecurity, and 401,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition. These figures give texture to what the Council is likely to describe, once again, as a humanitarian emergency inseparable from the security crisis.

Politically, with the withdrawal of AES states becoming effective, the states are entrenching their own independent trajectory. In Burkina Faso, in February, the Transitional Legislative Assembly made a move that went beyond a transitional measure by voting unanimously to abolish political parties, effectively nullifying the 2001 charter and the 2009 legislation governing party financing and opposition status. The transitional Legislative Assembly unanimously adopted a new ‘Charter of the Popular Progressive Revolution’ on 27 March 2026, replacing the 2022 Transition Charter and its 2024 amendment outright. The new text does not merely extend the timeline; it retires the word ‘transition’ altogether, formally enshrining what Traoré has termed the ‘Progressive Popular Revolution’ as the governing framework, renaming Parliament the ‘People’s Legislative Assembly,’ abolishing the seat quota previously reserved for political parties and movements, and confirming Traoré’s own eligibility to contest future elections whenever these are eventually held. Traoré also assumed the rotating chairmanship of the AES College of Heads of State in December 2025.

Niger’s trajectory mirrors this pattern. The ‘Refoundation Charter’, promulgated in March 2025, granted General Abdourahmane Tchiani a five‑year mandate lasting until 2030. It simultaneously dissolved all political parties, required that any future establishment of foreign military bases be subject to a referendum, and authorised extensions of the transition period based on the ‘security situation’, without providing a definitive timeline for a return to constitutional order.

In terms of AU’s engagement, a major development, which follows the PSC’s call in its 1304th session for the ‘intensification of diplomatic engagements with the countries of the Sahel’, was the AU Commission Chairperson Youssouf’s first visit to Ouagadougou, on 15-16 July, meeting Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré and Prime Minister Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo. In view of the existential threat facing the countries of the Sahel, this is a long overdue mission. Youssouf stated that his visit was ‘intended to convey the Union’s solidarity with the Government & people of Burkina Faso in their efforts to restore peace, combat terrorism & promote stability.’ He went on to reaffirm ‘the Commission’s commitment to accompanying Burkina Faso, through the relevant organs & institutions of the AU, in support of humanitarian response, public health & sustainable development.’

This mission was undertaken as part of what the PSC at its 1304th session called ‘constructive engagement’ for restoring the strained relations through direct and high-level AU Commission engagement with the AES states. In this context, Youssouf underscored the importance of strengthening regional cooperation to address shared peace, security & development challenges. He also called for revitalising the Nouakchott Process on security cooperation and for closer AES-ECOWAS harmony, while committing the Commission to a three-pillar Sahel strategy of governance, security and development. In what signals the recognition of the need for a multidimensional approach inclusive of addressing governance issues, the Chairperson noted that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance ‘remains an important continental framework for promoting good governance & responsive institutions.’

Tomorrow’s session will follow up on its earlier decisions. In this context, it is of interest for the Council to receive an update on the establishment of the Task Force adopted at the 1304th session of the PSC. It may also follow up on whether the PCRD Centre has developed its promised Sahel programming, and whether Ndayishimiye’s mandated field visit to all three AES countries, so far realised only in Burkina Faso, will be completed. Other previous decisions of the PSC that warrant follow-up during tomorrow’s session include the 1279th session that called for an AFRIPOL-anchored mechanism to map transnational criminal networks and a joint AUC-AFRIPOL-CISSA study on organised crime in the Sahel.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC could express deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso and Niger, particularly the persisting terrorist activities by groups affiliated with JNIM, ISGS and ISSP, and underscore the urgent need for strengthened regional and continental coordination to address the evolving threat landscape. The Council may condemn continued terrorist attacks targeting civilians, national defence forces and security institutions, while expressing solidarity with the people of Burkina Faso and Niger and emphasising the importance of responses that address not only immediate security threats but also the governance, development and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. The PSC may call for enhanced coordination among the AU, ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and other regional and international actors, to ensure that the limited resources available are organised around addressing the growing threat endangering the collective existence of affected countries. The PSC may welcome the visit that the AU Commission undertook to the Sahel countries and encourage the AU Commission to sustain its engagement with Burkina Faso and Niger through high-level diplomatic channels. The PSC may request that the Chairperson to develop a strategy to deliver on the commitment he expressed during his visit for AU’s accompaniment of the Sahel countries in their quest for restoring peace, addressing humanitarian challenges and advancing regional cooperation. The PSC may also reiterate its decision on the establishment of the AU Task Force for supporting the Sahel countries in the fight against terrorism and efforts for restoring peace and security. The PSC may also emphasise the importance of addressing governance challenges alongside efforts for restoring peace, including through taking steps that progressively facilitate the creation of conditions for implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance thereby ensuring that suspension of fundamental rights can only be justified for a limited period of time and be carried out only in the public interest and in strict compliance with the principles of necessity, legality and proportionality. The PSC may express concern about and call for enhanced effort for ameliorating the severe humanitarian consequences of the crisis, and may encourage the AU Commission, in coordination with humanitarian actors and regional organisations, to reinforce interventions anchored on a peace-security-development nexus approach that recognises the interconnected nature of the sources of vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs in the Sahel.


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