Kenya's President Ruto proposes an African foreign policy for repositioning Africa at the 39th AU Assembly
Kenya's President Ruto proposes an African foreign policy for repositioning Africa at the 39th AU Assembly
Date | 14 February 2026
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa
In a report he presented to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly on 14 February 2026 underway at the AU Headquarters in his capacity as the African Union (AU) Champion for the Institutional Reform of the AU, President Ruto proposed the development of ‘African foreign policy’ by five ‘foreign policy experts’ for submission and adoption by the AU Assembly during its 40th ordinary session.
This is one of many proposals put forward by the Champion in the quest to overhaul the AU institutions and make the AU fit for the challenges and changes taking place in the world. As the report pointed out, ‘[i]n an era shifting global power dynamics, Africa must reposition itself as a coherent and influential actor in shaping international norms, security and governance.’
There are at least two factors that make such repositioning imperative for Africa and the AU. The first relate to the expanding profile of the AU in global governance and the increasing demand and need for Africa to adopt position on matters of global governance. These expectations arise, among others, in the context of AU’s membership in the G20 and the role of the African three plus (A3) members of the UN Security Council. The second factor is the emergence of what Abdul Mohamed called ‘assertive external actors pursuing bilateral advantage at the expense of collective order.’
As the report that Amani Africa released on the eve of the AU Assembly observed, ‘[d]espite growing demand for the continent’s resources, diplomatic support, and political alignment, Africa continues to approach international partnerships largely through fragmented bilateral channels.’ This continues to cost Africa enormously as it limits collective leverage and reinforces asymmetrical relationships.
As natural resources, particularly critical minerals, increasingly become sites of geopolitical contestation, in a time when multilateral frameworks are unravelling and transactional and extractivist approaches take primacy, African states are exposed to another scramble for Africa, with major and middle powers targeting them individually & hence at their weakest. As Amani Africa’s report pointed out, Africa risks remaining exposed to competitive external pressures and transactional and extractive arrangements that avail Africa, and prioritise fleeting benefits that are no more than crumbs over substantive and strategic immediate and long-term interests.’
It would indeed be irresponsible for Africa to continue in a business-as-usual manner as far as international relations are concerned in the face of the unravelling of the multilateral system. Doing so would be condemning Africa to the vagaries of global disorder. It is against this background that Amani Africa’s report situated the development of common African foreign policy both as strategic imperative and a timely act. It thus held, Institutionalising a common pan-African foreign policy would provide the political and strategic framework on how Africa can advance its collective interests and project its voice effectively. Apart from serving as a necessary tool for shielding African states from the predatory tendencies of a time in which ‘anarchy is loosed upon the world’, such a common pan-African foreign policy would provide the framework for more effectively negotiating and coordinating common positions.’
The Champion’s proposal for African Common Foreign Policy avails Africa additional advantages. Such a common foreign policy also becomes ‘the basis for undertaking periodic continental strategic assessment that could avail unified analysis of global trends, external actors’ strategies, and emerging risks, thereby enabling Africa to plan and engage proactively rather than reactively.
For the AU as well, such a common African foreign policy would also provide the much-needed point of reference for reorganising and reimagining the role of the AU’s representational offices.’
Surely, adopting such a common foreign policy is necessary but not sufficient. Without commitment to such a policy and willingness to act collectively, Africa is unlikely to harness the opportunities such a foreign policy avails. It thus needs to be backed by an institutional framework that catalyses political will and commitment for the implementation of the policy.
African Union Floating Adrift as a New Era of Insecurity Entrenches in Africa & Anarchy is Loosed upon the World: The 2025 Review of the Peace and Security Council
AFRICAN UNION FLOATING ADRIFT AS A NEW ERA OF INSECURITY ENTRENCHES IN AFRICA & ANARCHY IS LOOSED UPON THE WORLD
The 2025 Review of the Peace and Security Council
Date | 13 February 2026
ABOUT THIS REVIEW
2025 turned out to be a year when ‘[t]hings fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.’ The conflicts and crises as well as geopolitical events shaping the political and security landscape of Africa unfolded during the year as ‘things fall apart’ in the world. Fundamentally, the bleak peace and security situation of the continent of the past years have become acute, crystalising the continent’s ‘new era of insecurity and instability’. As noted in a recent article prefacing this annual review, ‘[a] cross the continent, armed conflict, state fragmentation, humanitarian collapse, economic distress, climate shocks, democratic erosion, and geopolitical entanglement are converging with a simultaneity and intensity unseen in recent decades.’ The presence of such conflict and crisis situations is not fundamentally particular to 2025. Apart from their intensification, what stands out and became apparent from the political, diplomatic and security events of 2025 is that many of the conflicts and crises are here to stay for the foreseeable future.
African Union Floating Adrift as a New Era of Insecurity Entrenches in Africa & Anarchy is Loosed upon the World: The 2025 Review of the Peace and Security Council
AFRICAN UNION FLOATING ADRIFT AS A NEW ERA OF INSECURITY ENTRENCHES IN AFRICA & ANARCHY IS LOOSED UPON THE WORLD
The 2025 Review of the Peace and Security Council
Date | 13 February 2026
ABOUT THIS REVIEW
2025 turned out to be a year when ‘[t]hings fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.’ The conflicts and crises as well as geopolitical events shaping the political and security landscape of Africa unfolded during the year as ‘things fall apart’ in the world. Fundamentally, the bleak peace and security situation of the continent of the past years have become acute, crystalising the continent’s ‘new era of insecurity and instability’. As noted in a recent article prefacing this annual review, ‘[a] cross the continent, armed conflict, state fragmentation, humanitarian collapse, economic distress, climate shocks, democratic erosion, and geopolitical entanglement are converging with a simultaneity and intensity unseen in recent decades.’ The presence of such conflict and crisis situations is not fundamentally particular to 2025. Apart from their intensification, what stands out and became apparent from the political, diplomatic and security events of 2025 is that many of the conflicts and crises are here to stay for the foreseeable future.
The State and Scenarios of Sudan Mediation Peace, Pause, or Prolonged Uncertainty
The State and Scenarios of Sudan Mediation
Peace, Pause, or Prolonged Uncertainty
Date | 12 February 2026
Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa
A Moment of Convergence — and Risk
After nearly three years of devastating war, Sudan stands at a dangerous but decisive moment. Millions are displaced. Famine advances. Civilians are targeted deliberately. The state has been hollowed out. What began as a power struggle within the security establishment has evolved into a regionalised conflict system sustained by external actors, war economies, and geopolitical competition.
Yet, amid this devastation, something important is happening. Mediation efforts that once moved in parallel — African, trans-regional, and international — are slowly, painfully, and hesitantly moving toward some form of convergence. This convergence, however incomplete and thin, opens a window of opportunity.
That window must not be wasted.
The immediate imperative is clear: the war must stop. An immediate humanitarian truce is indispensable. It is not a concession. Sparing Sudanese from further death, mayhem and displacement is a moral and political necessity. But a truce cannot become an end in itself. It must be explicitly and credibly linked to a parallel political process aimed at restoring civilian authority and democratic self-determination.
This is very difficult — but it is doable.
War dynamics and deal-making among powerful external actors, particularly within the Quad, may shift the sequencing of negotiations. Adjustments may be necessary. The order in which security, humanitarian, and political tracks unfold may need recalibration. But if the overarching objective remains Sudan’s unity and sustainable peace, then maintaining convergence around a common political end-state of a comprehensive political settlement is indispensable.
Sudan’s predicament cannot be remedied by reverting to failed ideologies or procedural fixes. The crisis reflects long cycles of militarisation, exclusion, and broken democratic promises. Yet across decades and in the current difficult context— from uprisings to neighbourhood resistance committees — the Sudanese people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a persistent demand for dignity and self-rule.
The challenge now is to craft a political order that finally matches the integrity and democratic aspirations of the Sudanese populace. That will require honesty, new thinking, and a break from formalistic responses that confuse activity with progress.
Sudan’s war has outgrown the mediation models currently applied to it. Unless that mismatch is addressed directly, even well-intentioned initiatives risk stabilising violence rather than resolving it.
A War Beyond Traditional Mediation
Sudan’s war is no longer primarily sustained by internal political disagreement. It has evolved into a regionalised conflict system driven by three forces: a struggle over sovereignty and coercive authority inside Sudan; a transnational war economy benefiting domestic and external actors; and sustained political, military, and financial intervention by regional and extra-regional powers.
Most mediation efforts have focused on elite bargaining between belligerents while treating war economies and external sponsors as secondary factors. The result has been repeated cycles of talks that unravel as battlefield realities or external incentives shift.
Mediation has been procedural when it needed to be structural.
Against this backdrop, five possible trajectories now confront Sudan.
Scenario One: Procedural Mediation and Strategic Drift
Under this scenario, mediation continues largely as it has. Ceasefires are negotiated. Conferences are convened. Civilian actors are consulted but not empowered. External actors are acknowledged but not structurally engaged.
The assumption is that persistence and incremental sequencing will eventually yield progress.
The likely outcome is a prolonged stalemate. Armed actors participate tactically. Civilian forces grow disillusioned. Institutional credibility erodes slowly. Mediation becomes a permanent process without transformation — a technical ritual bereft of strategic significance and outcome.
Scenario Two: Humanitarian De-escalation Without Political Settlement
Here, the immediate priority becomes stopping violence through negotiated truces and humanitarian access arrangements, even if political questions are deferred.
This approach may save lives in the short term. Such an outcome is of itself significant for civilians. It should not be dismissed. Indeed, a humanitarian truce is urgently needed.
But if such de-escalation is not explicitly linked to a political process, it risks entrenching militarised governance. Ceasefires become instruments of consolidation rather than transition. Relief becomes conditional on compliance by armed actors.
The danger is a frozen conflict — quieter, but structurally unchanged.
Scenario Three: Civilian Convergence Without Leverage
In this trajectory, Sudanese civilian forces and segments of the international community align around a shared vision for civilian rule. Declarations multiply. Political clarity increases. Fragmentation is reduced.
This convergence is necessary and welcome, although the pathway to that is yet to be found.
But without leverage over war economies and external sponsors, alignment alone cannot shift power on the ground. Expectations rise without mechanisms to meet them. Civilian unity risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.
Convergence without leverage produces frustration.
Scenario Four: Deal-Driven Stabilisation — The Board of Peace Model
A more consequential trajectory is emerging. With the establishment of a Board of Peace under U.S. chairmanship and the growing centrality of the Quad, Sudan may become a candidate for essentially a deal-driven stabilisation.
Under this model, similar to scenario two, the priority is immediate cessation of fighting. Negotiations focus on belligerents and their sponsors. Political settlement is deferred. Unlike scenario two, material incentives and strategic bargains replace structural transformation.
Multilateral institutions may provide retrospective endorsement, converting power arrangements into formally legitimate ones.
Such a model may produce rapid de-escalation. It may mobilise leverage unavailable to traditional mediation.
But such an arrangement could entail: Sovereignty may be functionally outsourced. Civilian politics may be indefinitely postponed. Sudan could enter a trusteeship-like condition governed through external deal-making.
For Africa, the precedent could be consequential: the deferring of multilateralism in favour of ad hoc power arrangements and the total loss of any agency on the governance of the affairs of the continent.
Scenario Five: Re-Engineered Mediation — Convergence with Leverage
The final scenario does not reject the others. It learns from them.
From Scenario One, it retains procedural discipline and institutional continuity. From Scenario Two, it affirms the urgent necessity of a humanitarian truce. From Scenario Three, it preserves and deepens civilian convergence. From Scenario Four, it recognises that real leverage — including that held by powerful external actors — cannot be ignored.
But it integrates these elements into a redesigned, power-aware mediation architecture.
This approach would secure an immediate humanitarian truce; explicitly link that truce to a parallel, time-bound political process; structure engagement with external sponsors; introduce mechanisms to disrupt war economies; reframe neutrality as principled engagement with power; and preserve African multilateral relevance while utilising available leverage responsibly.
Sequencing may shift. Tactical adjustments may be necessary. But the end-state — a united Sudan governed through a constitutional trajectory — must remain explicit and non-negotiable.
Durable stability for citizens, neighbours, and investors alike depends on democratic self-determination. Anything less will produce only temporary calm.
Choosing Intention Over Drift
Sudan is at a crossroads — not only between war and peace, but between competing doctrines of mediation.
Stopping the war is imperative. A humanitarian truce is urgent. But peace cannot be reduced to containment, nor politics postponed indefinitely.
Sudan’s people have repeatedly demonstrated courage, dignity, and resistance. What is required now is a mediation strategy worthy of that resilience — one that matches moral clarity with structural realism.
The choice before Sudan and its partners is not between realism and principle. It is between managed disorder and intentional transformation.
Peace remains possible — but only if convergence is secured and preserved, leverage is structured, and Sudanese political agency, buttressed by pan-African multilateral support, is placed at the centre.
The State and Scenarios of Sudan Mediation Peace, Pause, or Prolonged Uncertainty
The State and Scenarios of Sudan Mediation
Peace, Pause, or Prolonged Uncertainty
Date | 12 February 2026
Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa
A Moment of Convergence — and Risk
After nearly three years of devastating war, Sudan stands at a dangerous but decisive moment. Millions are displaced. Famine advances. Civilians are targeted deliberately. The state has been hollowed out. What began as a power struggle within the security establishment has evolved into a regionalised conflict system sustained by external actors, war economies, and geopolitical competition.
Yet, amid this devastation, something important is happening. Mediation efforts that once moved in parallel — African, trans-regional, and international — are slowly, painfully, and hesitantly moving toward some form of convergence. This convergence, however incomplete and thin, opens a window of opportunity.
That window must not be wasted.
The immediate imperative is clear: the war must stop. An immediate humanitarian truce is indispensable. It is not a concession. Sparing Sudanese from further death, mayhem and displacement is a moral and political necessity. But a truce cannot become an end in itself. It must be explicitly and credibly linked to a parallel political process aimed at restoring civilian authority and democratic self-determination.
This is very difficult — but it is doable.
War dynamics and deal-making among powerful external actors, particularly within the Quad, may shift the sequencing of negotiations. Adjustments may be necessary. The order in which security, humanitarian, and political tracks unfold may need recalibration. But if the overarching objective remains Sudan’s unity and sustainable peace, then maintaining convergence around a common political end-state of a comprehensive political settlement is indispensable.
Sudan’s predicament cannot be remedied by reverting to failed ideologies or procedural fixes. The crisis reflects long cycles of militarisation, exclusion, and broken democratic promises. Yet across decades and in the current difficult context— from uprisings to neighbourhood resistance committees — the Sudanese people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a persistent demand for dignity and self-rule.
The challenge now is to craft a political order that finally matches the integrity and democratic aspirations of the Sudanese populace. That will require honesty, new thinking, and a break from formalistic responses that confuse activity with progress.
Sudan’s war has outgrown the mediation models currently applied to it. Unless that mismatch is addressed directly, even well-intentioned initiatives risk stabilising violence rather than resolving it.
A War Beyond Traditional Mediation
Sudan’s war is no longer primarily sustained by internal political disagreement. It has evolved into a regionalised conflict system driven by three forces: a struggle over sovereignty and coercive authority inside Sudan; a transnational war economy benefiting domestic and external actors; and sustained political, military, and financial intervention by regional and extra-regional powers.
Most mediation efforts have focused on elite bargaining between belligerents while treating war economies and external sponsors as secondary factors. The result has been repeated cycles of talks that unravel as battlefield realities or external incentives shift.
Mediation has been procedural when it needed to be structural.
Against this backdrop, five possible trajectories now confront Sudan.
Scenario One: Procedural Mediation and Strategic Drift
Under this scenario, mediation continues largely as it has. Ceasefires are negotiated. Conferences are convened. Civilian actors are consulted but not empowered. External actors are acknowledged but not structurally engaged.
The assumption is that persistence and incremental sequencing will eventually yield progress.
The likely outcome is a prolonged stalemate. Armed actors participate tactically. Civilian forces grow disillusioned. Institutional credibility erodes slowly. Mediation becomes a permanent process without transformation — a technical ritual bereft of strategic significance and outcome.
Scenario Two: Humanitarian De-escalation Without Political Settlement
Here, the immediate priority becomes stopping violence through negotiated truces and humanitarian access arrangements, even if political questions are deferred.
This approach may save lives in the short term. Such an outcome is of itself significant for civilians. It should not be dismissed. Indeed, a humanitarian truce is urgently needed.
But if such de-escalation is not explicitly linked to a political process, it risks entrenching militarised governance. Ceasefires become instruments of consolidation rather than transition. Relief becomes conditional on compliance by armed actors.
The danger is a frozen conflict — quieter, but structurally unchanged.
Scenario Three: Civilian Convergence Without Leverage
In this trajectory, Sudanese civilian forces and segments of the international community align around a shared vision for civilian rule. Declarations multiply. Political clarity increases. Fragmentation is reduced.
This convergence is necessary and welcome, although the pathway to that is yet to be found.
But without leverage over war economies and external sponsors, alignment alone cannot shift power on the ground. Expectations rise without mechanisms to meet them. Civilian unity risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.
Convergence without leverage produces frustration.
Scenario Four: Deal-Driven Stabilisation — The Board of Peace Model
A more consequential trajectory is emerging. With the establishment of a Board of Peace under U.S. chairmanship and the growing centrality of the Quad, Sudan may become a candidate for essentially a deal-driven stabilisation.
Under this model, similar to scenario two, the priority is immediate cessation of fighting. Negotiations focus on belligerents and their sponsors. Political settlement is deferred. Unlike scenario two, material incentives and strategic bargains replace structural transformation.
Multilateral institutions may provide retrospective endorsement, converting power arrangements into formally legitimate ones.
Such a model may produce rapid de-escalation. It may mobilise leverage unavailable to traditional mediation.
But such an arrangement could entail: Sovereignty may be functionally outsourced. Civilian politics may be indefinitely postponed. Sudan could enter a trusteeship-like condition governed through external deal-making.
For Africa, the precedent could be consequential: the deferring of multilateralism in favour of ad hoc power arrangements and the total loss of any agency on the governance of the affairs of the continent.
Scenario Five: Re-Engineered Mediation — Convergence with Leverage
The final scenario does not reject the others. It learns from them.
From Scenario One, it retains procedural discipline and institutional continuity. From Scenario Two, it affirms the urgent necessity of a humanitarian truce. From Scenario Three, it preserves and deepens civilian convergence. From Scenario Four, it recognises that real leverage — including that held by powerful external actors — cannot be ignored.
But it integrates these elements into a redesigned, power-aware mediation architecture.
This approach would secure an immediate humanitarian truce; explicitly link that truce to a parallel, time-bound political process; structure engagement with external sponsors; introduce mechanisms to disrupt war economies; reframe neutrality as principled engagement with power; and preserve African multilateral relevance while utilising available leverage responsibly.
Sequencing may shift. Tactical adjustments may be necessary. But the end-state — a united Sudan governed through a constitutional trajectory — must remain explicit and non-negotiable.
Durable stability for citizens, neighbours, and investors alike depends on democratic self-determination. Anything less will produce only temporary calm.
Choosing Intention Over Drift
Sudan is at a crossroads — not only between war and peace, but between competing doctrines of mediation.
Stopping the war is imperative. A humanitarian truce is urgent. But peace cannot be reduced to containment, nor politics postponed indefinitely.
Sudan’s people have repeatedly demonstrated courage, dignity, and resistance. What is required now is a mediation strategy worthy of that resilience — one that matches moral clarity with structural realism.
The choice before Sudan and its partners is not between realism and principle. It is between managed disorder and intentional transformation.
Peace remains possible — but only if convergence is secured and preserved, leverage is structured, and Sudanese political agency, buttressed by pan-African multilateral support, is placed at the centre.
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 11 February 2026
Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet at ministerial level on the margins of the AU Summit to discuss the situation in Sudan, as agreed during its last meeting on the country in December.
The session commences with the opening address of Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February. This will be followed by the statement that the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, introducing his report on the situation. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations are also expected to deliver a statement. While Sudan, as a country concerned, will not participate in the session due to its suspension, there was a plan for an informal consultation by the PSC with the representative of Sudan before this session. Among the issues expected to feature are PSC’s support for the National Initiative for Peace proposal presented by the representative of Sudan to the UN Security Council in December 2025.
Since the last PSC session in December, the war has intensified across multiple fronts, with both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seeking to gain the upper hand by consolidating territorial control. The latest round of fighting has centred on the Kordofan region, though clashes continue elsewhere in the country. Last month, the SAF reportedly captured Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, and Dilling, the region’s second largest and strategically important town, both of which had been under siege by the RSF for nearly two years.
The RSF has recently intensified its attacks on El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which remains under SAF control. It is also seeking to consolidate its hold over Darfur following its capture of El-Fasher in Northern Darfur in October, while the SAF is attempting to regain lost territory. Meanwhile, the security situation in Blue Nile State, bordering Ethiopia and South Sudan, has deteriorated as the RSF and its allied forces have increased their presence in an apparent effort to open a new front against the SAF, with the bordering region in Ethiopia reportedly being used for facilitating the movement of RSF and allied forces into the region.
The regional ramifications of the war have been a major concern since its outbreak three years ago. There have been reports of some neighbouring states implicated for allowing the use of their territories or supporting one of the sides. There have been reports of the use of Ethiopian territory in facilitating support to the RSF. In the aftermath of the seizure by the RSF of El Fasher and the resulting de facto division of Sudan, some countries, notably Egypt, expressed serious concern and objection to any threat to the territorial integrity of Sudan, deeming it a direct threat to their security. While it has allegedly provided logistical and technical support to the SAF, it has also reportedly conducted targeted air strikes against the RSF over the past six months.
External intervention has come to be a major driver of the conflict in Sudan, with the UAE in particular reported for its extensive supply of weapons to the RSF. With Mogadishu cancelling all its bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi and countries denying the latter flight permits, the UAE appears to be facing growing challenges in sustaining its support for the RSF. There are growing fears that the widening rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has transformed the war in Sudan into an intense proxy competition, with Riyadh backing the SAF and Abu Dhabi continuing to support the RSF. Riyadh has reportedly mobilised several countries from the region and beyond in an effort to shift the military balance. This dynamic has become more evident on the battlefield in recent months, with the SAF gaining the upper hand in the ongoing fighting in the Kordofan region.
At its last meeting, the AUPSC strongly condemned the involvement of external actors in the conflict and tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions, in close coordination with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), with identifying those actors and recommending appropriate measures for consideration by the AUPSC. However, almost two years after the PSC adopted a similar decision, there has been no progress.
As fighting in Sudan has escalated, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. On 5 February, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)—a global, multi-partner initiative that informs urgent humanitarian response—confirmed that famine-level malnutrition is spreading in North Darfur after nearly three years of conflict, warning of catastrophic, life-threatening, and man-made starvation conditions. According to humanitarian actors, some 21 million people across Sudan require emergency assistance, making it the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Over the past three years, the conflict has forcibly displaced an estimated 11.7 million people, including seven million internally displaced persons and 4.5 million refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.
The appalling human rights situation in Sudan has been another major concern, with serious atrocities and crimes allegedly committed by the parties to the conflict. During his visit to Sudan in January, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated that ‘the war has plunged the country into an abyss of unfathomable proportions.’ He further noted that ‘the proliferation of advanced military equipment, in particular unmanned aerial vehicles—or drones—across Sudan has enhanced the military capabilities of both the RSF and the SAF to inflict vast damage, prolonging hostilities and deepening the crisis for civilians.’ At its last meeting, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) underscored the need to document atrocities being committed in Sudan and requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report on crimes across the country. It also commended the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, Adama Dieng, with Sudanese authorities and national human rights entities in this regard. Despite the finalization of an investigation report undertaken by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights carried out upon the request of the PSC, there has been no reference to and consideration of this report which presented widespread and grave violations of human and peoples’ rights, indicating that the scale and nature warrants the invocation of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.
As Security Council President in February, the UK intends to focus on Sudan. The UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, who visited Addis Ababa earlier this month to consult with regional countries and the AU on steps to halt the fighting and alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people, will chair a Council meeting on Sudan on 19 February. In April, Germany and the UK are also expected to convene an international conference on Sudan in Berlin.
The humanitarian crisis was also the focus of a meeting convened by the United States on 5 February, aimed at mobilising $1.5 billion to respond to Sudan’s urgent humanitarian needs. At the meeting, the US reportedly indicated that it has been working with other members of the Quad on a Sudan peace plan. The Quad—comprising the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—has been advancing a roadmap first outlined in September last year, which called for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to enable the rapid delivery of aid across Sudan, followed immediately by a permanent ceasefire. At the time, the SAF rejected the initiative, citing concerns over the UAE’s involvement, while the RSF—widely condemned by the international community for committing mass atrocities and war crimes—welcomed it in what was widely seen as a tactical move to rehabilitate its image.
The peace plan, which is expected to be announced soon, reportedly includes measures to address the humanitarian crisis; protect civilians and coordinate their safe return; transition to a permanent ceasefire; launch a political process toward a civilian-led government; and support reconstruction. At its last meeting, the AUPSC welcomed the establishment of the Quintet—comprising the AU, UN, EU, and the League of Arab States—under AU leadership to enhance coordination of mediation efforts aimed at convening an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. It also reiterated its call for the Quintet and the Quad to work closely together to avoid duplication and ensure a coherent approach to achieving a negotiated and lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan. At tomorrow’s meeting, Egypt, which presides over the AUPSC in February, may highlight the consultative meeting it convened in Cairo last month. The meeting brought together several bilateral and multilateral partners.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its grave concern over the escalating fighting in Sudan. It may condemn the atrocities being committed in the course of the escalating violence, including those perpetrated particularly by the RSF since the PSC’s last meeting. Welcoming the Fact-Finding report of the ACHPR and noting the mission undertaken by the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, the PSC may reaffirm the need for continuous documentation of the atrocities and violations being perpetrated in the course of the War in Sudan. including the AU, IGAD, the UN, and the EU, to discuss the situation in Sudan. The PSC may welcome the role of the Quintet and the AU’s leadership role in that context, particularly in advancing the convening of the political dialogue. The PSC may also take a decision to undertake a field mission to Sudan.
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the operations of AUSSOM
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the operations of AUSSOM
Date | 11 February 2026
Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1330th session at ministerial level to receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), as one of its agenda items.
Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an introductory statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Statements are expected from the representatives of Somalia, as the concerned state, and Djibouti in its capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as from the representatives of the League of Arab States and the United Nations (UN). The representatives of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are also expected to deliver statements.
The consideration of Somalia and Sudan under a single session may signal a deliberate effort to frame the discussion around the growing risk of state fragmentation in the Horn of Africa and its broader implications for regional peace and stability. The ministerial session will also discuss progress in the operationalisation of AUSSOM, the challenges it continues to face, and ways forward. The discussions on AUSSOM are likely to build on PSC’s 1317th session held on 15 December 2025 and the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted to that session.
Tomorrow’s session is also likely to situate the discussion within the context of the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly following Israel’s recognition of the self-declared region of Somaliland in December, as well as the increasingly visible rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
On 26 December 2025, Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland—a move that was strongly rejected by many states and regional and international organisations, including the AU and the League of Arab States. Beyond its legal and political ramifications, the decision has intensified regional geopolitical tensions. Emerging alignments among external and regional actors appear to be taking shape, with potentially serious consequences for peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Djibouti, and several other states firmly opposed the recognition. By contrast, the UAE— the first Arab state to formally sign the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020—is widely perceived as having facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.
Against this backdrop, on 12 January, the Federal Government of Somalia terminated all agreements with the UAE relating to port operations, government institutions, and security and defence cooperation. This decision followed Somaliland’s recognition by Israel and the transit of a pro-UAE separatist figure from Yemen through Somali airspace without Mogadishu’s knowledge. Meanwhile, Israel’s Foreign Minister visited Somaliland in January to consolidate relations, while Somaliland authorities publicly expressed expectations of concluding a trade deal with Israel and indicated willingness to grant access to valuable mineral resources as part of a broader arrangement.
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has been simmering for some time and has become more pronounced amid divergences over developments in Yemen, now appears to be drawing countries of the Horn of Africa more directly into its orbit. In this context, Somalia risks becoming an arena within a wider geopolitical contest. The emerging alignment around Saudi Arabia appears particularly opposed to the normalisation of parallel political entities that undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It is recalled that the PSC convened its 1324th ministerial session on 6 January, dedicated to the preservation of Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and stability. The Communiqué adopted at that session strongly condemned and rejected Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland and called for its immediate revocation. The PSC further emphasised that such a declaration is null and void and without legal effect under international law, warning that it risks undermining peace and stability on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa.
Tomorrow’s ministerial session will therefore be confronted with the challenge of how to mitigate the growing risks posed by intensifying regional rivalries as they play out in Somalia. These external pressures are compounded by Somalia’s internal political and security challenges, especially as the current government mandates are set to expire in May 2026. Persistent disagreements over electoral models and proposed constitutional amendments—both among Somali political actors and between the Federal Government and some of the Federal Member States, notably Puntland and Jubaland—remain unresolved.
In December, district council elections were conducted peacefully in the Banadir region, including Mogadishu, marking the first implementation of direct elections in the capital in over five decades. This development aligns with the Federal Government’s stated objective of transitioning to a nationwide one-person, one-vote electoral model. However, while the Government has reiterated its intention to extend district elections to Federal Member State capitals and secondary cities, opposition leaders, along with the authorities in Puntland and Jubaland, continue to reject a shift toward direct elections and any extension of the current government’s mandate beyond May. In the absence of inclusive dialogue with Mogadishu, they have threatened to proceed with their own electoral processes, further heightening political uncertainty. Meanwhile, the Presidents of Puntland and Jubaland arrived in Mogadishu on 10 February for high-level talks on contentious issues, including the upcoming elections.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s discussions is expected to be AUSSOM. At its last session, held on 15 December, the PSC considered the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, which highlighted progress and challenges in the implementation of AUSSOM’s mandate during the period from July to December 2025 and outlined three options regarding the future of the Mission.
AUSSOM continues to face a range of serious complications. First, the Mission has been unable to secure multi-year, predictable, and adequate financing, despite the AU’s efforts to convince the UN Security Council to activate its Resolution 2719 for AUSSOM. Troops have gone extended periods without receiving stipends, likely to affect morale and operational readiness, while compelling troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to subsidise the Mission—an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable. The estimated budget for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 stands at approximately USD 190 million, in addition to substantial financial liabilities inherited from ATMIS, including unpaid troop allowances and outstanding reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE). While there are indications that the European Union (EU) may commit to covering up to 85 per cent of troop stipends, the sustainability of this support, as well as the availability of additional funding to address the remaining budget gap, remains uncertain. PSC members are therefore likely to seek clarification on the status of the disbursement of the USD 20 million allocated by the AU for the Mission, as a follow-up to its 1317th session, which directed the Commission to fast-track the release of these funds and report on their implementation at the subsequent meeting.
A second major complication arises from the United Nations’ liquidity crisis and its implications for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which is funded through the UN peacekeeping assessed budget and mandated to provide logistical and related support to AUSSOM. UNSOS has faced a 25 per cent budget reduction—approximately USD 130 million—from its approved USD 520 million budget for the current financial year (June 2025 to July 2026). This reduction is expected to have significant repercussions for AUSSOM’s core operational capabilities, particularly aviation support, COE management, force sustainment, and broader logistical support.
Operational challenges have also emerged in relation to troop realignment. The transition of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was expected to be completed by the end of June 2025 and required the repatriation of Burundian forces alongside the deployment of Egyptian troops. Pending the latter’s deployment, the PSC has been compelled to suspend the repatriation of Burundian contingents. The Chair of the PSC for the month may brief the Council on progress toward deployment, including the technical assessment conducted in August 2025 in preparation for deployment planning, as well as updates on AU-UN coordination efforts. Meanwhile, uncertainty over the future of the mission has been further compounded by a public statement posted on 26 January by Uganda’s army chief, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, indicating an intention to withdraw Ugandan forces from Somalia after 19 years of engagement. Although it remains unclear whether this reflects official government policy, the statement underscores growing uncertainty surrounding the Mission’s future.
Against this backdrop of financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in his report to the 1317th session, outlined three options for the PSC’s strategic consideration regarding the future of AUSSOM.
The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions, resulting in the continued accumulation of deficits with no certainty regarding resource predictability. The second option entails transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.
Rather than providing immediate strategic direction, the PSC requested the Commission to submit a more detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council also requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of AUSSOM TCCs and PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to deliberate on the three options and submit their recommendations for the PSC’s consideration. As highlighted above, the financial, logistical, operational, and political challenges confronting the Mission have reached a critical point, requiring serious consideration of the options proposed by the Chairperson of the Commission. Tomorrow’s engagement is therefore expected to follow up on PSC’s request for a detailed report by the Commission on these options.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to reiterate its condemnation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reaffirm its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia. It may further urge Member States and international partners to refrain from any action that undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The PSC may also express its concern over the geopolitical competition among regional and global powers in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and its potential in turning Somalia into a geopolitical theatre with serious repercussions to its peace and security. It may reiterate its call on the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and political actors to engage in an inclusive political dialogue to address outstanding issues on the election model and constitutional amendments and the importance of such dialogue for the conduct of a credible election. In this connection, the PSC may welcome the high-level talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States on the upcoming elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC is expected to follow up on its request for a detailed report on the three options outlined by the Chairperson of the Commission on the future of the mission, based on consultations with the TCCs/PCCs, and to provide strategic guidance on the way forward.
LE SOUDAN: UNE TRAGÉDIE AFRICAINE QUI EXIGE UN SURSAUT COLLECTIF
LE SOUDAN: UNE TRAGÉDIE AFRICAINE QUI EXIGE UN SURSAUT COLLECTIF
Date | 10 février 2026
INTRODUCTION
Le Soudan est aujourd’hui l’épicentre de l’un des conflits les plus meurtriers au monde et de l’une de ses pires crises humanitaires. Les chiffres parlent d’eux-mêmes : depuis 2023, plus de 150 000 personnes ont perdu la vie du fait des violences perpétrées par les belligérants et d’autres causes connexes ; environ 7,3 millions ont été nouvellement déplacées à l’intérieur du pays – s’ajoutant aux 2,3 qui l’avaient déjà été avant le déclenchement du conflit actuel, ce qui porte le chiffre total des déplacées à 9,6 millions ; 4,3 millions ont trouvé refuge dans les États voisins; et plus de 30 millions de personnes –soit les deux tiers de la population – dépendent désormais de l’aide humanitaire. Les atrocités commises dépassent l’entendement. La bataille pour le contrôle d’El-Fasher – sa chute aux mains des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et les récits insoutenables qui ont suivi – a ravivé les échos les plus sombres d’une tragédie antérieure : la politique de la terre brûlée pratiquée au Darfour en réaction à la rébellion armée qui y éclata en 2003. La crainte est aujourd’hui vive de voir ce qui s’est déroulé dans cette localité se reproduire ailleurs.
The 2026 Elections of the Ten Members of the Peace and Security Council: The Dynamics, Process and Candidates
The 2026 Elections of the Ten Members of the Peace and Security Council: The Dynamics, Process and Candidates
Date | 5 February 2026
INTRODUCTION
30 March 2026 will mark the end of the mandate of 10 members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) who were elected for a two-year term in February 2024 during the 37th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Since the election for the three-year term was held during the 38th AU Assembly in February 2025, the 2026 election of the PSC will be limited to these ten two-year term seats in the Council. Unlike the three-year term seats, which are allocated equally to the five regions of the AU, the regional allocation of the ten two-year term seats is based on the number of states in the different regions at the time of the adoption of the PSC Protocol. Thus, pursuant to the Protocol Establishing the PSC and the Modalities on the Elections of the PSC, the two-year term membership of the PSC is allocated for the five regions as follows: three seats for West Africa, two seats for Central, East and Southern Africa regions, and one seat for North Africa.
