Briefing by the Panel of the Wise on its Activities in Africa

Briefing by the Panel of the Wise on its Activities in Africa

Date | 16 March 2026

Tomorrow (17 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1336th meeting to receive a briefing from the AU Panel of the Wise on its activities in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March 2026, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make an introductory statement. Domitien Ndayizeye, Chair of the Panel of the Wise, is expected to brief the Council.

The Panel of the Wise, one of the key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) for preventive diplomacy, last briefed the PSC in March 2025. Although the PSC’s 665th session in March 2017 envisaged quarterly briefings by the Panel, engagement between the two has in practice remained largely annual. During its 1264th session of 11 March 2025, the Panel reaffirmed the Panel’s central role in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding. That session drew particular attention to tensions in South Sudan and underscored the need for strengthening both resources and the AU presence on the ground. The Council also highlighted growing expectations on the Panel, including responding rapidly to emerging crises, sustaining engagement in fragile transitions and working more closely with partners. To support this, the PSC directed the AU Commission to strengthen early warning analysis for the Panel and undertake joint scenario-building with experts such as NeTT4Peace.

Broadly speaking, three sets of activities are expected to feature during tomorrow’s session. The first relates to the core mandate of the Panel, preventive diplomacy initiatives with respect to risks of eruption of conflicts or relapse into conflict. The second relates to the Panel’s engagement in election-related activities. The final one relates to the activities of the subsidiary bodies of the Panel, such as FemWise.

In terms of preventive diplomacy work of the Panel, the Panel’s missions to South Sudan and Madagascar are expected to receive particular attention.  The Panel’s continued engagement in South Sudan, while not enough to reverse the deteriorating situation, is expected to be of interest to the PSC. Following the PSC’s 1270th meeting of 31 March 2025, which requested a high-level delegation led by the Panel of the Wise to help ‘de-escalate the tensions, cease-fire, and to mediate between the parties’, the Panel undertook a four-day mission to Juba in early April 2025 and engaged key stakeholders. A major gap was the denial of access to Riek Machar. The Panel also convened a consultative roundtable with South Sudanese civil society in Addis Ababa in June 2025. The Panel reportedly later recommended the appointment of an AU High-Level Representative, and at its 1297th session, the PSC called on the Commission Chairperson to ‘urgently appoint’ one, although this had yet to be acted upon. The Council renewed the same appeal at its 1326th meeting on 23 January 2026. Tomorrow’s session may therefore allow the Council to assess how this engagement can enable conditions for effective peacemaking, urgently needed for arresting South Sudan’s relapse back to full civil war currently underway.

Another area likely to feature in the briefing concerns the Panel’s engagement in Madagascar. It is to be recalled that at its 1306th emergency meeting of 15 October 2025, the PSC suspended Madagascar following the unconstitutional change of government. In the same session, the Council reiterated ‘its recommendation to the Chairperson of the Union, with the support of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, to immediately dispatch a high-level delegation to Madagascar to engage with the stakeholders concerned’. This followed a similar recommendation made by the PSC at its 1305th meeting two days earlier. On 16 October 2025, the AU Commission announced the deployment of a high-level delegation to Madagascar, coordinated with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), aimed at engaging state authorities, political parties, civil society and youth representatives in support of a Malagasy-owned, inclusive and civilian-led national dialogue geared toward restoring constitutional democratic governance.

The delegation to Madagascar, led by Domitien Ndayizeye and undertaken alongside AU Special Envoy Mohamed Idris Farah, visited Antananarivo from 7 to 11 November 2025. During the visit, the AU delegation consulted transitional leader Michael Randrianirina, Prime Minister Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo, Foreign Minister Christine Razanamahasoa and other stakeholders. The PSC’s 1313th  meeting of 20 November 2025 received briefings from both Ndayizeye and Farah. Tomorrow’s session may therefore provide the PSC with an opportunity to take stock of the Panel’s engagement in Madagascar and to encourage sustained coordination between the Panel, the AU Special Envoy and SADC in support of mediation and an inclusive path toward restoring constitutional order.

In electoral contexts, the Panel continued with efforts to promote peaceful electoral conditions in countries involved in electoral processes. Accordingly, it undertook missions, among others, to Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Malawi and Tanzania through pre-election assessments, dialogue with political actors and institutions, confidence-building measures and post-electoral follow-up, helping to promote restraint, sustain political dialogue and reinforce trust in constitutional and electoral processes. As events in Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania illustrated, these efforts did not change electoral instability and violence. Tomorrow’s session would afford both the PSC and the Panel the opportunity to reflect on ways of improving the working methods and approaches to the Panel’s engagement in elections to make it more impactful than performative.

Another activity likely to receive attention is the Panel’s engagement in the Sahel and West Africa. On 15–16 December 2025, the Panel of the Wise convened a two-day consultative roundtable with eminent religious and traditional leaders in support of preventive diplomacy, dialogue, peace and social cohesion. The discussions highlighted the role of these leaders in promoting peaceful coexistence and stressed inclusive, community-based approaches involving women, youth, faith leaders, traditional authorities and state institutions, while also exploring more sustained mechanisms for collaboration with the PSC and the AU Commission.

Tomorrow’s session is also expected to review the work of the Panel’s subsidiary mechanisms and their contribution to AU preventive diplomacy. A key milestone for FemWise-Africa was the onboarding of its second continental cohort of members, conducted in collaboration with RECs/RMs and NeTT4Peace, through which 50 experienced women mediators were selected, expanding the pool available for AU deployment and concluding the Network’s re-conceptualisation to strengthen its support for AU-led mediation. FemWise-Africa also held a reflective meeting in Dakar in December 2025 on lessons from its decentralisation process, generating recommendations on membership, resource mobilisation and practical engagement to strengthen its chapters. Similarly, the AU WiseYouth Network held the first African Youth Consultation on Mediation, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Processes in Kigali from 30 September to 2 October 2025, bringing together youth mediators, policymakers and emerging leaders to reflect on youth participation, share best practices and develop recommendations for expanding the role of youth in peace processes. Together, these efforts deepened the integration of gender-sensitive and youth-sensitive perspectives into AU preventive diplomacy and reflected closer coordination between the Panel and its subsidiary bodies, including through joint deployments to Gabon, Malawi, Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire.

Another development that may feature in tomorrow’s briefing is the participation of members of the Panel, together with AU Special Envoys and High Representatives, representatives of regional organisations, and international partners, in the 16th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa held in Aswan, Egypt, from 21 to 22 October 2025 under the theme ‘Reframing AU Mediation – Consolidating African Leadership and Ownership’. The retreat reflected on ways of strengthening Africa-led mediation and preventive diplomacy and underscored the importance of more inclusive peace processes that engage women, youth, traditional and religious leaders, and local communities as indispensable actors in building sustainable peace and reconciliation.

In addition, on 19 December 2025, the Panel was hosted by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, at AU Headquarters for discussions on preventive diplomacy strategies, ongoing reforms within the peace and security architecture and the changing security threats facing the continent. During that meeting, the Chairperson expressed appreciation for the Panel’s proactive engagement in conflict prevention and mediation and reiterated the Commission’s commitment to supporting the Panel’s role in advancing African-owned and African-led peace initiatives.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the Panel’s preventive diplomacy missions, particularly in South Sudan and Madagascar, as well as its missions to countries in transition and its electoral preventive diplomacy efforts. It may urge efforts for enhanced integration of FemWise and AU WiseYouth network into the various preventive diplomacy initiatives and peacemaking processes. The PSC may also call for an assessment of the efficacy of the working methods and approaches of the Panel, as well as the institutional and working arrangements of the Panel, as a critical measure for reinvigorating the role of the Panel in view of the escalation and complexity of insecurity and conflicts. It may stress the need to reinvigorate early warning and conflict prevention through closer collaboration with the Panel, while also calling for stronger coordination in supporting complex transitions, sustaining peace in fragile contexts and enabling early action to de-escalate emerging crises. The Council may further emphasise the need for better resourcing and more systematic follow-up to Panel missions, while encouraging closer cooperation with RECs/RMs and the UN, as well as other AU good offices. It may also welcome the first African Youth Consultation on Mediation, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Processes held in Kigali from 30 September to 2 October 2025.


Macky Sall is not an African Union endorsed candidate for the position of UN Secretary General

Macky Sall is not an African Union endorsed candidate for the position of UN Secretary General

Date | 12 March 2026

The news of Former Senegalese President, Macky Sall’s nomination as a candidate for the position of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General came as a surprise for many. One of the notable aspects of the nomination relates to the confusion on whether Sall received the support of the continental body, the African Union (AU). On 4 March 2026, one media report stated ‘[N]ow the official candidate of the African Union in a race to succeed António Guterres as UN Secretary-General, Macky Sall is currently in Paris, where he is expected to meet with the French president.’

Rather than the merit of Sall’s candidature (which is worthy of interrogation as a matter of public interest), the issue that this media report raises is the factual question of whether Sall’s candidacy was processed through the AU’s established mechanism regarding the nomination of nationals of African states as candidates for positions on international bodies. It is thus necessary to address two questions: How is Sall nominated? What are the established processes for AU endorsement of such a nomination?

It was through a letter of the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the UN in New York, dated 2 March 2026, addressed to the Presidents of the UN General Assembly and the March 2026 President of the UN Security Council, that Sall was nominated as a candidate for the UN’s top job. In the most relevant part, the letter states, ‘…my government, current Chair of the African Union, nominates His Excellency Macky Sall, former President of the Republic of Senegal, for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations.’ What this makes clear is that Sall, who is a Senegalese, is a nominee of the Government of Burundi, which happened to be the Chairperson of the AU Assembly for 2026.

It is clear from the letter that the Government of Burundi did not submit Sall’s nomination in its capacity as Chairperson of the AU. It is, however, clear that Sall made a ‘smart’ move in approaching Burundi, rather than any other country, including his own Senegal. What is significant about Burundi as the country nominating him is its current role at the AU, which undoubtedly Sall sought to leverage.

Considering the strategic importance of candidatures for positions in international organisations, both for member states and in advancing Africa’s agency, the AU has established a process and mechanism for nomination for such positions. The process ordinarily entails the submission of the nomination by the nominating member states of the AU through a Note Verbale addressed to the AU Commission. After review of the submissions within the regional groups, usually through the Permanent Representatives Committee, to avoid fragmentation through competitive bidding from several candidates from the continent, the list is submitted for further consideration to the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System, a standing subsidiary body of the Executive Council of the AU. Then, the list is presented by the Committee to the Executive Council for endorsement or for noting, as the case may be.

This is the Committee that processed the endorsement of many of the African nationals leading various international bodies, such as the WTO and the WHO. The most recent of such nominations that the Committee endorsed, which led to a successful election for the position of Director-General of UNESCO, was the candidacy of Dr Khaled El-Enany, a known Egyptologist and former Minister of Antiquities of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This Ministerial Committee presented its report during the 39th AU Assembly, when Burundi assumed the role of chairing the AU, to the 48th ordinary session of the Executive Council. The report contains a list of candidatures of individuals submitted by governments for endorsement, including, for example, for the post of Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for the period of 2027-2032 or for noting which is the case, for example, for the post of Director General of FAO. Conspicuously absent from the Ministerial Committee’s report list is the name of Macky Sall for the most important of post in the international system.

Not only is his name absent from the report of the Ministerial Committee, but Sall also made no attempt to have his name considered during the AU Assembly, which took place only two weeks before the submission of his name as a candidate to the UN. He was even spotted during the summit. The proximity of the time between the 39th ordinary session of the AU Assembly and his nomination as a candidate (two weeks) raises important questions of both process and transparency around his candidacy.

Does not the approach he took undermine AU’s established process? Doesn’t it show contempt for following a process? Is such contempt also reflective of a trend on the part of Sall, who plunged Senegal into a constitutional crisis in attempting to circumvent the constitutional process ahead of Senegal’s last election? Or why seek nomination by a government, which happened to be the Chair of the AU, if not interested in following the AU process, unless the intention is to leverage the status of AU Chairperson for his candidacy?

There are reasons why processes exist and why AU’s process on candidatures for positions in international bodies matter. First, it is to provide equal opportunity for all who may seek leadership positions in international bodies. Second, such a process also provides member states of the AU the opportunity to exercise their sovereign prerogative and satisfy themselves that the best candidate receives the endorsement of the wider membership. Third, it also ensures transparency. Sall’s approach to his candidacy flies in the face of all of these important public policy reasons for the process. It unnecessarily risks creating confusion and, as a news report noted, division in the AU.

This process should apply to everyone. It applied to many statespersons previously. Sall cannot and should not be the exception, irrespective of his view of himself or the support he may have from his friends or states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, such as France, as a news report indicated.

Contrary to what Sall would like many to believe and the news report referenced above, there is no basis, even from the letter nominating him, that suggests that Sall is an official candidate of the AU. After reporting that Sall’s candidacy sparks division in the AU, the same news entity qualified him as an official candidate of the AU, while there is no official AU endorsement of Sall’s candidacy. It should be stated plainly and clearly that such a categorical report represents misinformation. The hard truth is that Macky Sall is not an official candidate of the AU!


KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY H.E. AMBASSADOR BANKOLE ADEOYE

H.E. AMBASSADOR BANKOLE ADEOYE 

COMMISSIONER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACE AND SECURITY

KEYNOTE ADDRESS ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: 'SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AMIDST A DYNAMIC GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT'

In terms of timing, today’s discussions are both propitious and challenging! We have a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that must save itself from paralysis in the face of complex conflicts. Hence, the compelling need to expedite action in ongoing negotiations to reform it.

In this, the role of ‘We the Peoples of the United Nations’, that is Non-State Actors and citizens of the world, would be crucial. I would therefore like to commend Amani Africa for creating this platform which enables us to cross-fertilize ideas as practitioners in government and non-governmental spaces.

As the UN Secretary-General has repeatedly warned, including during the 80th Session of the General Assembly, the reform of the Security Council is no longer optional; it is urgent. The global order is changing faster than our institutions are adapting. Africa has been at the forefront of this reform movement.

Africa remains the only region that has articulated a unified institutional framework for the Security Council reform. For decades, our continent has insisted on a more representative Council, as articulated in the African Common Position, The Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration which unveiled Africa’s demand for fair representation which is at least two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for African States in a reformed Security Council. Africa’s position has not changed. This is not a mere aspiration but a prescription for justice.

On the Continent our ongoing focus is driven by the following approaches:

  1. Right to development;
  2. Building of strong and capable States;
  3. Peace and reconciliation as basis for viable African society;
  4. Primacy of politics, including a greater role for Women and Youth in governance;
  5. Peace enforcement not mere peacekeeping; and
  6. SMART partnerships (Inclusive of African Regional Actors).

Against this background, we seek in our common African position to be a strong united, resilient and influential global player and partner. On the global scene we hope to work with partners to:

  1. Promote global identity and representation in rich diversity;
  2. Global shared values;
  3. Global platforms for experience and good practice sharing; and
  4. Global peace and development as shared public goods.

It is important to recall that at the UN Summit of the Future, African leaders campaigned successfully to include Africa’s issues as a top priority (See here). The resulting Pact explicitly frames reforming the Council as a task of justice.

This support must translate into text-based negotiations. Text must translate into amendment, and amendment must translate into ratification. The intergovernmental negotiations process cannot remain an annual ritual of repetition.

These are not yet breakthroughs but they are not stagnation either. The momentum must be seized and turned into progress.

How do we sustain the momentum when global politics are so polarized?

We must be honest about the nature of this process. The Security Council Reform is not stalled because the arguments are weak. It is stalled because power is entrenched. The Charter amendment requires ratification by the Permanent Members, giving each of them decisive influence over the outcome. Support for the reform would seem to exist in principle while remaining limited in practice. Intermediate proposals that exclude veto equality or permanent status, continue to circulate in diplomatic discussions. Such proposals risk institutionalizing a hierarchy in which Africa is permanently represented but never equal. This is incompatible with the Common African Position.

Critical Questions we must answer:

  • Is the current and apparent consensus that reforms are necessary real?
  • Are reforms a matter of justice/global peace enhancement or mere procedure in a political chess game.
  • Are the reforms a matter of when, how and to what effect, or a ritual of inconsequential efforts.
  • Are we moving on the track of negotiated reform in the context of sober peace time or drifting towards reform on the back of devastating war like happened after WW2?
  • Are We the People’s taken along, differently from 1945?

Recommendations:

To keep the Security Council Reform at the top of the global agenda, we must pursue at least four lines of efforts:

  • Reinvigorate the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) process with the AU Model:

The IGN process has produced areas of convergence that can serve as a foundation for text-based negotiations. The African Model on the UNSC Reform, our unified proposal of 2 permanent (with equal rights) and 5 non-permanent seats for Africa, has been endorsed by all 55 AU Member States. It was formally tabled in the UNGA’s negotiations. The Pact itself calls for such a consolidated model to guide talks. As negotiations continue, let us reiterate the moral logic that without Africa’s inclusion, there can be no truly legitimate Council. Africa’s unity under C10 negotiating leadership, remains key in maintaining coherence, and this leadership must continue. Our think tanks and other non-state actors would need to align and support.

  • Expand the coalition of support:

Africa cannot do this alone. We must sustain outreach to key partners and regional groups. Africa’s position is one among several competing reform frameworks including the G4 proposal, the Uniting for Consensus model, incremental expansion models, and intermediate membership proposals. These competing visions divide support among UN Member States and slow convergence. Africa must therefore focus not only on defending principles but on building a winning coalition. This should include intra and intercontinental platforms for advocacy and sharing ideas like the one AMANI provides.

Leadership of the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government in negotiations must be supported based on the African common position which necessarily includes no discussion at this time of who the two Members would be. We will cross the bridge when we get there.

  • Leverage UN informal mechanisms.

While negotiations continue, we need to also keep an eye on low hanging fruits especially addressing Security Council Working Methods through membership of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group of Friends. This should contribute to the nature and quality of anticipated and substantive reform.

  • Emphasize urgency and fairness.

In all our messages, we must highlight that reform is not a luxury but a necessity. We will remind colleagues that peace operations now often rely on African troops and that sustainable security solutions increasingly come from African initiatives. If the Council fails to evolve, it risks losing credibility in Africa and beyond. As the UN’s High-Level Advisory Panel warned, without meaningful reform, the Security Council risks irrelevance. Consequentially, the very survival of multilateralism and global peace would be unpredictably and dangerously compromised.

Geopolitical volatility makes reform harder, but also more compelling. If the multilateral system does not evolve, fragmentation will be deepened. Parallel coalitions and alternative governance structures will proliferate. Reform, therefore, is not only about justice for Africa. It is about preserving the relevance of the United Nations itself and global peace.  Inclusive and constructive dialogue with a sense of urgency, is the way to go.


Confronting Instability in Africa, Rebuilding Agency in a Fractured World: Why Africa Must Rethink Its Peace Architecture Now

Confronting Instability in Africa, Rebuilding Agency in a Fractured World

Why Africa Must Rethink Its Peace Architecture Now

Date | 9 March 2026

Désiré Assogbavi

Advisor at the Open Society Foundations

Across Africa, what once appeared as isolated crises are now merging into a broader continental conflict belt stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, through Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and increasingly toward parts of coastal West Africa.

These conflicts are complex and interconnected (see here). Violent extremism, unconstitutional changes of government, transnational crime, communal tensions, and intensifying geopolitical competition are combining to reshape the continent’s security landscape, representing the ‘crystalisation of new era of insecurity’.

A Peace Architecture Designed for Another Era

Over the past two decades, the African Union has built one of the most ambitious regional security frameworks in the world, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), anchored on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), AU’s premier standing peace and security decision-making body. APSA is made up of the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund and represented the most significant step towards the realization of the longstanding quest for Pax-Africana.  Yet today’s crises look very different from those of the early 2000s.

Conflicts are now more transnational, and more intertwined with economic and environmental pressures. Security responses alone cannot address conflicts whose roots lie in governance failures, demographic pressure, economic fragility, and climate stress. It is now long overdue that the tools that are deployed for addressing twenty‑first century crises fully embrace and systematically integrate the full range of governance, institution building and development instruments as envisaged in both the PSC Protocol and the Solemn African Common Position on Defense and Security.

The decision by African leaders to convene an Extraordinary Summit on Conflicts later this year in Luanda therefore represents a critical opportunity, not just to discuss ongoing wars, but to rethink how Africa organizes and pursues its collective security.

The Structural Drivers of African Conflicts

Africa’s conflicts cannot be understood purely through a military or security lens.

Governance deficits remain central. Weak institutions, contested political transitions, and declining public trust in the state create fertile ground for instability. Youth marginalization is also reshaping political dynamics. Africa is the youngest region in the world, with roughly 60 percent of its population under the age of 25.

Economic fragility and rising debt pressures reduce governments’ capacity to invest in social stability. At the same time, climate pressures are intensifying competition over land, water, and natural resources in fragile regions.

Taken together, these drivers show that peacebuilding must link governance, development, and economic transformation. They also signify the necessity of sustained high-level collective push for the reform of international financial system.

Critical Minerals, Strategic Competition, and Conflict Risks

Another structural factor that deserves far greater attention is the growing connection between critical minerals and conflict dynamics in Africa. The global energy transition has sharply increased demand for minerals such as cobalt, lithium, manganese, graphite, rare earths, and platinum group metals, many of which are concentrated in African countries.

This surge in demand is turning parts of Africa into frontlines of global geo-strategic competition. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and parts of the Sahel, mineral-rich regions are increasingly exposed to armed group activity, illicit trade networks, and external geopolitical interests seeking to secure supply chains. Without strong governance frameworks, the race for these resources’ risks reinforcing patterns long associated with the ‘resource curse,’ where wealth beneath the soil fuels instability rather than prosperity.

Illicit mineral trafficking already finances armed groups in several conflict zones. In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, control of mining sites and smuggling routes continues to sustain armed movements, inter-state tensions and criminal networks. Similar risks are emerging in other regions where weak state presence, corruption, and fragile institutions intersect with rapidly rising mineral demand. For this reason, the upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Luanda should also examine the security implications of Africa’s critical mineral boom. If managed strategically, these resources could help finance development, industrialization, and economic transformation across the continent. But if governance remains weak, the global scramble for minerals could deepen local grievances, empower armed actors, and intensify geopolitical rivalry on African soil.

The challenge therefore is not simply about resource extraction. It is about building governance systems that prevent mineral wealth from becoming a driver of conflict. This includes strengthening transparency, ensuring local communities benefit from resource revenues, securing mining areas from armed exploitation, and promoting regional cooperation against illicit mineral trafficking.

In this sense, the debate on peace and security cannot be separated from Africa’s broader economic transformation agenda. How Africa governs its critical minerals may become one of the defining security questions of the next decade.

Africa in the Middle of Global Power Competition

Africa’s conflicts are increasingly shaped by external geopolitical dynamics (See here). Global powers are expanding their presence across the continent as security partners, investors, or strategic competitors.

The question is not whether Africa should work with international partners. The real question is who sets the strategic direction. Africa must remain firmly in the driver’s seat of its own conflict resolution processes.

The Need to Redefine Unconstitutional Change of Government & Adopt an effective Sanction Regime

Since 2020, Africa has experienced several military coups, concentrated largely in the Sahel. The African Union’s primary response, suspension from AU activities, has not been sufficient to deter unconstitutional changes of government.

Africa therefore needs a stronger and more credible sanctions regime including against coup administrations that return to power through self-organized elections.

Today, democracy in Africa is threatened not only by soldiers entering presidential palaces, but also by leaders quietly rewriting the rules of the game. This happens through manipulation of constitutions and the gradual capture of democratic institutions. In several countries, constitutional amendments have been used to remove or weaken presidential term limits, allowing incumbents to prolong their stay in power while maintaining the appearance of legal legitimacy. Electoral processes themselves are sometimes undermined through the politicization of electoral commissions, the misuse of state resources, or restrictions on opposition and civil society. In this context, defending constitutional order must go beyond reacting to military coups alone. The African Union and our regional economic communities must also address what could be described as ‘constitutional coups’, situations in which the letter of the law is manipulated to undermine its democratic spirit. Protecting constitutional governance therefore requires stronger norms, more credible political pressure, and a renewed commitment to democratic accountability across the continent.

Preventing Conflicts Before They Explode

Preventive diplomacy remains one of the most underutilized instruments within the African Union system (see here and here). Strengthening the political authority and operational capacity of the AU Commission (as extensively outlined in the final part of African Union floating adrift) could significantly improve the continent’s ability to prevent crises before they escalate.

Making the Extraordinary Summit Matter

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Angola represents an important moment. But its success will depend on whether it avoids the trap of business as usual. Communities living in conflict‑affected areas, women peacebuilders, youth networks, civil society organizations, and traditional mediation structures must be included in the conversation. Across Africa, local communities possess rich traditions of mediation and reconciliation that should be integrated into continental peace strategies.

In closing

Peace and security are no longer standalone policy domains. They are deeply connected to governance legitimacy, economic resilience, and geopolitical shifts.

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit offers an opportunity to rethink how Africa organizes its collective security and rebuilds strategic agency in a fragmented world.

Africa does not need incremental adjustments. It needs bold thinking, institutional renewal, and political leadership capable of confronting the new realities of instability on the continent.


Confronting Instability in Africa, Rebuilding Agency in a Fractured World: Why Africa Must Rethink Its Peace Architecture Now

Confronting Instability in Africa, Rebuilding Agency in a Fractured World

Why Africa Must Rethink Its Peace Architecture Now

Date | 9 March 2026

Désiré Assogbavi

Advisor at the Open Society Foundations

Across Africa, what once appeared as isolated crises are now merging into a broader continental conflict belt stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, through Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and increasingly toward parts of coastal West Africa.

These conflicts are complex and interconnected (see here). Violent extremism, unconstitutional changes of government, transnational crime, communal tensions, and intensifying geopolitical competition are combining to reshape the continent’s security landscape, representing the ‘crystalisation of new era of insecurity’.

A Peace Architecture Designed for Another Era

Over the past two decades, the African Union has built one of the most ambitious regional security frameworks in the world, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), anchored on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), AU’s premier standing peace and security decision-making body. APSA is made up of the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund and represented the most significant step towards the realization of the longstanding quest for Pax-Africana.  Yet today’s crises look very different from those of the early 2000s.

Conflicts are now more transnational, and more intertwined with economic and environmental pressures. Security responses alone cannot address conflicts whose roots lie in governance failures, demographic pressure, economic fragility, and climate stress. It is now long overdue that the tools that are deployed for addressing twenty‑first century crises fully embrace and systematically integrate the full range of governance, institution building and development instruments as envisaged in both the PSC Protocol and the Solemn African Common Position on Defense and Security.

The decision by African leaders to convene an Extraordinary Summit on Conflicts later this year in Luanda therefore represents a critical opportunity, not just to discuss ongoing wars, but to rethink how Africa organizes and pursues its collective security.

The Structural Drivers of African Conflicts

Africa’s conflicts cannot be understood purely through a military or security lens.

Governance deficits remain central. Weak institutions, contested political transitions, and declining public trust in the state create fertile ground for instability. Youth marginalization is also reshaping political dynamics. Africa is the youngest region in the world, with roughly 60 percent of its population under the age of 25.

Economic fragility and rising debt pressures reduce governments’ capacity to invest in social stability. At the same time, climate pressures are intensifying competition over land, water, and natural resources in fragile regions.

Taken together, these drivers show that peacebuilding must link governance, development, and economic transformation. They also signify the necessity of sustained high-level collective push for the reform of international financial system.

Critical Minerals, Strategic Competition, and Conflict Risks

Another structural factor that deserves far greater attention is the growing connection between critical minerals and conflict dynamics in Africa. The global energy transition has sharply increased demand for minerals such as cobalt, lithium, manganese, graphite, rare earths, and platinum group metals, many of which are concentrated in African countries.

This surge in demand is turning parts of Africa into frontlines of global geo-strategic competition. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and parts of the Sahel, mineral-rich regions are increasingly exposed to armed group activity, illicit trade networks, and external geopolitical interests seeking to secure supply chains. Without strong governance frameworks, the race for these resources’ risks reinforcing patterns long associated with the ‘resource curse,’ where wealth beneath the soil fuels instability rather than prosperity.

Illicit mineral trafficking already finances armed groups in several conflict zones. In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, control of mining sites and smuggling routes continues to sustain armed movements, inter-state tensions and criminal networks. Similar risks are emerging in other regions where weak state presence, corruption, and fragile institutions intersect with rapidly rising mineral demand. For this reason, the upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Luanda should also examine the security implications of Africa’s critical mineral boom. If managed strategically, these resources could help finance development, industrialization, and economic transformation across the continent. But if governance remains weak, the global scramble for minerals could deepen local grievances, empower armed actors, and intensify geopolitical rivalry on African soil.

The challenge therefore is not simply about resource extraction. It is about building governance systems that prevent mineral wealth from becoming a driver of conflict. This includes strengthening transparency, ensuring local communities benefit from resource revenues, securing mining areas from armed exploitation, and promoting regional cooperation against illicit mineral trafficking.

In this sense, the debate on peace and security cannot be separated from Africa’s broader economic transformation agenda. How Africa governs its critical minerals may become one of the defining security questions of the next decade.

Africa in the Middle of Global Power Competition

Africa’s conflicts are increasingly shaped by external geopolitical dynamics (See here). Global powers are expanding their presence across the continent as security partners, investors, or strategic competitors.

The question is not whether Africa should work with international partners. The real question is who sets the strategic direction. Africa must remain firmly in the driver’s seat of its own conflict resolution processes.

The Need to Redefine Unconstitutional Change of Government & Adopt an effective Sanction Regime

Since 2020, Africa has experienced several military coups, concentrated largely in the Sahel. The African Union’s primary response, suspension from AU activities, has not been sufficient to deter unconstitutional changes of government.

Africa therefore needs a stronger and more credible sanctions regime including against coup administrations that return to power through self-organized elections.

Today, democracy in Africa is threatened not only by soldiers entering presidential palaces, but also by leaders quietly rewriting the rules of the game. This happens through manipulation of constitutions and the gradual capture of democratic institutions. In several countries, constitutional amendments have been used to remove or weaken presidential term limits, allowing incumbents to prolong their stay in power while maintaining the appearance of legal legitimacy. Electoral processes themselves are sometimes undermined through the politicization of electoral commissions, the misuse of state resources, or restrictions on opposition and civil society. In this context, defending constitutional order must go beyond reacting to military coups alone. The African Union and our regional economic communities must also address what could be described as ‘constitutional coups’, situations in which the letter of the law is manipulated to undermine its democratic spirit. Protecting constitutional governance therefore requires stronger norms, more credible political pressure, and a renewed commitment to democratic accountability across the continent.

Preventing Conflicts Before They Explode

Preventive diplomacy remains one of the most underutilized instruments within the African Union system (see here and here). Strengthening the political authority and operational capacity of the AU Commission (as extensively outlined in the final part of African Union floating adrift) could significantly improve the continent’s ability to prevent crises before they escalate.

Making the Extraordinary Summit Matter

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Angola represents an important moment. But its success will depend on whether it avoids the trap of business as usual. Communities living in conflict‑affected areas, women peacebuilders, youth networks, civil society organizations, and traditional mediation structures must be included in the conversation. Across Africa, local communities possess rich traditions of mediation and reconciliation that should be integrated into continental peace strategies.

In closing

Peace and security are no longer standalone policy domains. They are deeply connected to governance legitimacy, economic resilience, and geopolitical shifts.

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit offers an opportunity to rethink how Africa organizes its collective security and rebuilds strategic agency in a fragmented world.

Africa does not need incremental adjustments. It needs bold thinking, institutional renewal, and political leadership capable of confronting the new realities of instability on the continent.


Update on the Situation in Madagascar

Update on the Situation in Madagascar

Date | 9 March 2026

Tomorrow (10 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1335th session to receive an update on the situation in Madagascar. Although the agenda was initially framed as ‘Coordinated AU–SADC Support for Madagascar,’ its focus has since shifted, with SADC indicating that there has been no substantive coordination initiated between the two sides.

The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Mohamed Idris Farah, Special Envoy to the Republic of Madagascar, and a representative of the Republic of South Africa, in its capacity as Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, are also expected to deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session marks the fourth meeting of the PSC to consider the situation in Madagascar in the context of the political crisis the country has faced since anti-government protests began in late September 2025, culminating in the military seizure of power on 14 October 2025. The PSC convened two emergency sessions within 48 hours in October, at its 1305th and 1306th meetings, as three weeks of protests took a dramatic turn when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protesters and eventually assumed power. During its 1306th session held on 15 October 2025, it is recalled that the PSC suspended Madagascar from participation in all AU activities until constitutional order is restored in the country.

The PSC last considered the Situation in Madagascar on 20 November 2025 at its 1313th meeting. In its communiqué, the Council underscored the urgent need for ‘continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of the situation in Madagascar’ and explicitly mandated the ‘undertaking of a Field Mission in early 2026 to gather first-hand information on the realities on the ground.’ During its 1306th session, the PSC demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections’ and directed ‘the AU Commission, in close cooperation with SADC, to provide the requisite support to Madagascar to ensure a swift return to constitutional order.’ It should also be recalled that at its 1305th meeting, the PSC called on the Government of Madagascar to urgently organise an all-inclusive political dialogue as the only viable path towards consensual and sustainable solutions to the socio-economic and political challenges currently facing the country; stressing on the reactivation of the implementation of the 2011 Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, enacted into Malagasy law under Act Number 2011-014 of 13 December 2011. The Council went further and urged for coordinated support towards the restoration of peace and stability in Madagascar under the auspices of the AU and SADC, among other decisions.

Tomorrow’s session is particularly important in light of the divergence between the PSC and SADC regarding the characterisation of the October 2025 military seizure of power and the response adopted. While the PSC, at its 1306th session, decided to suspend Madagascar on the grounds of unconstitutional change of government, SADC opted instead to dispatch a fact-finding mission. Subsequently, the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, held in December 2025, directed the Transitional Government of Madagascar to submit a dialogue-readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026. The Summit further approved, by March 2026, the deployment of the SADC Panel of Elders, led by former President Joyce Banda of Malawi, and called for coordination with the AU and broader international partners to avoid fragmentation of efforts. In late January 2026, the Panel of Elders commenced its mission in Antananarivo to facilitate an inclusive dialogue.

In this context, tomorrow’s session is timely, as it provides an opportunity to reinforce the imperative of coordination and complementarity between the AU and the regional bloc, SADC, to ensure coherent political messaging and the coordinated mobilisation of the necessary technical and financial support, including through Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), for a consensual, inclusive, and time-bound transition process towards the swift restoration of constitutional order. Such a process should be consistent with AU norms, including Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The session is also in line with Paragraph 5 of the PSC’s 1313th Communiqué and Paragraph 13 of the SADC Communiqué adopted during its December 2025 extraordinary summit, which both stress the imperative of ‘enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity’. In addition, it offers an opportunity to receive updates on the respective diplomatic measures undertaken by the AU and SADC in accompanying Madagascar towards the restoration of constitutional order, as well as to discuss emerging challenges and ways forward in coordinating efforts.

One of the updates from the SADC side in this regard could be the engagement undertaken on 20 January by the SADC Executive Secretary, Elias M. Magosi, with the leadership of Madagascar and Seychelles on regional priorities, peace and development. The Executive Secretary paid a courtesy call on General Maminirina Eli Razafitombo, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and substantive Minister of National Defence of Madagascar. The visit took place ahead of his formal meeting with Colonel Randrianirina. Discussions focused on the ongoing transitional governance process, the importance of an inclusive national dialogue, and efforts to stabilise essential services, including water and energy infrastructure. Madagascar also reaffirmed its decision to step aside from the SADC Chairmanship due to the ‘exceptional national context,’ while reiterating its commitment to the Community’s values and principles.

During his meeting with Randrianirina, the Executive Secretary was briefed on progress in constitutional reforms and preparations for future democratic elections. The President confirmed that the report requested by the SADC Extraordinary Heads of State and Government Summit in December 2025 would be submitted by the end of February 2026. He further emphasised that electoral reform remains a priority. While Parliament ‘currently functions as a unicameral legislature, institutional reforms will be informed by the outcomes of the inclusive national dialogue process.’

Meanwhile, the military authorities have been consolidating power and launching diplomatic engagements. Following the swearing in of the military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, as Madagascar’s new president in October 2025, and the appointment of Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as the country’s prime minister, the commander of the CAPSAT unit pledged elections in 18 to 24 months after his swearing in. Since ‘assuming office,’ Randrianirina has embarked on a series of high-level diplomatic visits. His recent visit to France came directly on the heels of a visit to Moscow, where he secured military equipment and the dispatch of Russian instructors to train Malagasy forces, including in drone warfare. Despite the optics, Randrianirina has been quick to downplay any geopolitical friction. Before departing for Paris, he emphasised that his engagements with Russia and France are entirely independent of one another, framing them as part of a results-oriented foreign policy designed to secure tangible benefits for his citizens.

The two nations committed to a ‘renewed, balanced and forward-looking partnership anchored by a two-year roadmap that aligns with Madagascar’s transition timeline and focuses on several key areas: strengthening diplomatic channels and mutual respect through enhanced political relations, accelerating investment and infrastructure to support economic development, and continuing collaborative efforts to promote regional stability through security and defence cooperation. In this context, President Emmanuel Macron reinforced France’s support for a return to constitutional order, emphasising the importance of holding free and transparent elections within the established timeframe.

It is worth noting that Madagascar’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean and its vast reserves of nickel and cobalt have turned the island nation into a focal point for global powers. As China, India and Russia ramp up their local presence, maintaining influence has become a critical priority for French diplomacy. By adding Russia and France to a list of visits that already includes the UAE and South Africa, Antananarivo is signalling that it is no longer wedded to a single patron, but is instead seeking every available avenue for investment and support.

On the other hand, the ousted Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina met King Mswati III of Eswatini in February, a development that appeared to anger the Malagasy authorities. This prompted Madagascar’s military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, to issue a statement expressing his ‘strongest condemnation’ of the visit, describing it as ‘politically unacceptable.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to emphasise the importance of ensuring enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity of efforts between the AU, SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission, as well as other relevant regional and international organisations, in order to facilitate a smooth political transition in Madagascar. The PSC is also likely to emphasise its previous decision on the need for continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of situation in Madagascar, and the need for undertaking a Field Mission, as soon as practicably possible, to gather first-hand information on the realities of the situation on ground, which is critically necessary in informing the next steps the Council may need to take in supporting the transition process. Council may also emphasise the need for the Government of Madagascar to holistically address the structural root causes of the multidimensional challenges facing the country, using a ‘whole of government- whole of society’ approach that brings on board all critical Malagasy stakeholders, including women and the youth. Finally, it may also encourage the Malagasy authorities to undertake trust and confidence-building measures to facilitate the conduct of the national dialogue in a conducive environment, to respect the timetable set transition with a view to returning to constitutional order and democratic governance; and to establish an inclusive, consensual and objective roadmap, with short and precise deadlines, relating to the transition and the return to constitutional order.


Update on the Situation in Madagascar

Update on the Situation in Madagascar

Date | 9 March 2026

Tomorrow (10 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1335th session to receive an update on the situation in Madagascar. Although the agenda was initially framed as ‘Coordinated AU–SADC Support for Madagascar,’ its focus has since shifted, with SADC indicating that there has been no substantive coordination initiated between the two sides.

The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Mohamed Idris Farah, Special Envoy to the Republic of Madagascar, and a representative of the Republic of South Africa, in its capacity as Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, are also expected to deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session marks the fourth meeting of the PSC to consider the situation in Madagascar in the context of the political crisis the country has faced since anti-government protests began in late September 2025, culminating in the military seizure of power on 14 October 2025. The PSC convened two emergency sessions within 48 hours in October, at its 1305th and 1306th meetings, as three weeks of protests took a dramatic turn when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protesters and eventually assumed power. During its 1306th session held on 15 October 2025, it is recalled that the PSC suspended Madagascar from participation in all AU activities until constitutional order is restored in the country.

The PSC last considered the Situation in Madagascar on 20 November 2025 at its 1313th meeting. In its communiqué, the Council underscored the urgent need for ‘continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of the situation in Madagascar’ and explicitly mandated the ‘undertaking of a Field Mission in early 2026 to gather first-hand information on the realities on the ground.’ During its 1306th session, the PSC demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections’ and directed ‘the AU Commission, in close cooperation with SADC, to provide the requisite support to Madagascar to ensure a swift return to constitutional order.’ It should also be recalled that at its 1305th meeting, the PSC called on the Government of Madagascar to urgently organise an all-inclusive political dialogue as the only viable path towards consensual and sustainable solutions to the socio-economic and political challenges currently facing the country; stressing on the reactivation of the implementation of the 2011 Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, enacted into Malagasy law under Act Number 2011-014 of 13 December 2011. The Council went further and urged for coordinated support towards the restoration of peace and stability in Madagascar under the auspices of the AU and SADC, among other decisions.

Tomorrow’s session is particularly important in light of the divergence between the PSC and SADC regarding the characterisation of the October 2025 military seizure of power and the response adopted. While the PSC, at its 1306th session, decided to suspend Madagascar on the grounds of unconstitutional change of government, SADC opted instead to dispatch a fact-finding mission. Subsequently, the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, held in December 2025, directed the Transitional Government of Madagascar to submit a dialogue-readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026. The Summit further approved, by March 2026, the deployment of the SADC Panel of Elders, led by former President Joyce Banda of Malawi, and called for coordination with the AU and broader international partners to avoid fragmentation of efforts. In late January 2026, the Panel of Elders commenced its mission in Antananarivo to facilitate an inclusive dialogue.

In this context, tomorrow’s session is timely, as it provides an opportunity to reinforce the imperative of coordination and complementarity between the AU and the regional bloc, SADC, to ensure coherent political messaging and the coordinated mobilisation of the necessary technical and financial support, including through Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), for a consensual, inclusive, and time-bound transition process towards the swift restoration of constitutional order. Such a process should be consistent with AU norms, including Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The session is also in line with Paragraph 5 of the PSC’s 1313th Communiqué and Paragraph 13 of the SADC Communiqué adopted during its December 2025 extraordinary summit, which both stress the imperative of ‘enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity’. In addition, it offers an opportunity to receive updates on the respective diplomatic measures undertaken by the AU and SADC in accompanying Madagascar towards the restoration of constitutional order, as well as to discuss emerging challenges and ways forward in coordinating efforts.

One of the updates from the SADC side in this regard could be the engagement undertaken on 20 January by the SADC Executive Secretary, Elias M. Magosi, with the leadership of Madagascar and Seychelles on regional priorities, peace and development. The Executive Secretary paid a courtesy call on General Maminirina Eli Razafitombo, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and substantive Minister of National Defence of Madagascar. The visit took place ahead of his formal meeting with Colonel Randrianirina. Discussions focused on the ongoing transitional governance process, the importance of an inclusive national dialogue, and efforts to stabilise essential services, including water and energy infrastructure. Madagascar also reaffirmed its decision to step aside from the SADC Chairmanship due to the ‘exceptional national context,’ while reiterating its commitment to the Community’s values and principles.

During his meeting with Randrianirina, the Executive Secretary was briefed on progress in constitutional reforms and preparations for future democratic elections. The President confirmed that the report requested by the SADC Extraordinary Heads of State and Government Summit in December 2025 would be submitted by the end of February 2026. He further emphasised that electoral reform remains a priority. While Parliament ‘currently functions as a unicameral legislature, institutional reforms will be informed by the outcomes of the inclusive national dialogue process.’

Meanwhile, the military authorities have been consolidating power and launching diplomatic engagements. Following the swearing in of the military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, as Madagascar’s new president in October 2025, and the appointment of Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as the country’s prime minister, the commander of the CAPSAT unit pledged elections in 18 to 24 months after his swearing in. Since ‘assuming office,’ Randrianirina has embarked on a series of high-level diplomatic visits. His recent visit to France came directly on the heels of a visit to Moscow, where he secured military equipment and the dispatch of Russian instructors to train Malagasy forces, including in drone warfare. Despite the optics, Randrianirina has been quick to downplay any geopolitical friction. Before departing for Paris, he emphasised that his engagements with Russia and France are entirely independent of one another, framing them as part of a results-oriented foreign policy designed to secure tangible benefits for his citizens.

The two nations committed to a ‘renewed, balanced and forward-looking partnership anchored by a two-year roadmap that aligns with Madagascar’s transition timeline and focuses on several key areas: strengthening diplomatic channels and mutual respect through enhanced political relations, accelerating investment and infrastructure to support economic development, and continuing collaborative efforts to promote regional stability through security and defence cooperation. In this context, President Emmanuel Macron reinforced France’s support for a return to constitutional order, emphasising the importance of holding free and transparent elections within the established timeframe.

It is worth noting that Madagascar’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean and its vast reserves of nickel and cobalt have turned the island nation into a focal point for global powers. As China, India and Russia ramp up their local presence, maintaining influence has become a critical priority for French diplomacy. By adding Russia and France to a list of visits that already includes the UAE and South Africa, Antananarivo is signalling that it is no longer wedded to a single patron, but is instead seeking every available avenue for investment and support.

On the other hand, the ousted Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina met King Mswati III of Eswatini in February, a development that appeared to anger the Malagasy authorities. This prompted Madagascar’s military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, to issue a statement expressing his ‘strongest condemnation’ of the visit, describing it as ‘politically unacceptable.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to emphasise the importance of ensuring enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity of efforts between the AU, SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission, as well as other relevant regional and international organisations, in order to facilitate a smooth political transition in Madagascar. The PSC is also likely to emphasise its previous decision on the need for continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of situation in Madagascar, and the need for undertaking a Field Mission, as soon as practicably possible, to gather first-hand information on the realities of the situation on ground, which is critically necessary in informing the next steps the Council may need to take in supporting the transition process. Council may also emphasise the need for the Government of Madagascar to holistically address the structural root causes of the multidimensional challenges facing the country, using a ‘whole of government- whole of society’ approach that brings on board all critical Malagasy stakeholders, including women and the youth. Finally, it may also encourage the Malagasy authorities to undertake trust and confidence-building measures to facilitate the conduct of the national dialogue in a conducive environment, to respect the timetable set transition with a view to returning to constitutional order and democratic governance; and to establish an inclusive, consensual and objective roadmap, with short and precise deadlines, relating to the transition and the return to constitutional order.


WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence

Date | 8 March 2026

Tomorrow (9 March), the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1334th open session on Women’s Leadership in Addressing Emerging Threats to Peace and Security: Artificial Intelligence and Technology-Facilitated Violence. The meeting will take place virtually and forms part of the Council’s continued engagement with the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda across Africa.

Following opening remarks by Almon Mahlaba Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the African Union and Chairperson of the PSC for March 2026, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, will deliver introductory remarks. Liberata Mulamula, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), is also expected to make a presentation to the Council, followed by a statement from Justice Effie Ewuor, Co-Chair of FemWise-Africa, and a presentation by the Representative of UN Women. Additionally, statements are also expected from PSC Members, AU Member States, and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

The 1334th session continues the PSC’s institutionalised engagement with the WPS agenda, formalised as a standing item at its 223rd meeting in March 2010. Since institutionalising the WPS agenda, the PSC has convened 28 dedicated sessions, with this 1334th meeting extending its thematic scope to women’s leadership against AI and technology-facilitated violence. While the Council has made evident progress through thematic expansions, encompassing women’s roles in preventing violent extremism, displacement/refugee protection, media accountability, economic integration, and WPS linkages to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), these advances remain ad hoc and inconsistent.

The session convenes amid a sharply deteriorating continental peace and security landscape, marked by protracted conflicts in Sudan, eastern DRC, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, where women’s leadership proves indispensable for tackling both AI-driven threats and technology-facilitated violence. Protracted conflicts in the Sahel, Great Lakes region, and Horn of Africa, exacerbated by Sudan’s war, renewed eastern DRC violence, and Somalia’s instability, continue fueling mass displacement, humanitarian crises, and civilian atrocities. Women and girls suffer disproportionately, facing conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), early/forced marriage, economic exclusion, and barriers to peace processes. In many contexts, sexual violence serves as a deliberate war tactic, while shrinking civic space stifles activism; now, AI-amplified disinformation, cyber-harassment, and online gender-based violence compound these risks, demanding women-led strategies for digital resilience and accountability.

This backdrop renders tomorrow’s PSC session pivotal, as the rapid proliferation of digital technologies and AI is reshaping political communication, conflict dynamics, and social interactions across Africa. Artificial intelligence and emerging digital technologies are also expected to become a major driver of economic transformation on the continent, with projections indicating that they could add around $1.5 trillion to Africa’s GDP by 2030. While offering avenues for economic growth, innovation, and governance gains, including the emergence of women-led digital peacebuilding tools, these technological advancements are also generating new risks. In particular, they have enabled forms of technology-facilitated violence that disproportionately target women in public life, including peacebuilders, journalists, activists, and leaders.

Tomorrow’s session offers an opportunity for the PSC to rigorously assess how AI-driven threats and digital technology violence are intensifying conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), eroding civic space, and systematically targeting women peacebuilders, journalists, activists, and leaders amid governance erosion and escalating crises on the continent. A 2024 UNU-Interpeace report on sub-Saharan Africa reveals AI-generated deep fakes and botnets fueling ethnic polarization and undermining peacekeeping efforts in the DRC, while a 2025 study across 11 countries documents devastating cases: Ethiopia’s Mayor endured deep fake pornography viewed 562,000 times (90% believed it is real), and Cameroon’s Brenda Biya faced coordinated harassment reaching 8.9 million via 92 identical posts evading moderation through ‘spamouflage.’ Binding Hook’s 2026 analysis escalates the urgency, showing generative AI’s low-cost scalability in gendered disinformation, exemplified by election deep fakes targeting women politicians in Ghana, Namibia, and Kenya that inflict reputational harm, psychological trauma, and civic exclusion by exploiting patriarchal norms. These platform-amplified attacks, where outrage boosts engagement 15-20%. In highlighting these challenges, the PSC may explore the gaps that exist in the legal and policy instruments, including the AU Continental Results Framework (CRF), such as missing tech-threat indicators and the need for digital impact assessments in PSOs and WPS-tech reports, and harmonised monitoring to safeguard women’s roles in peace processes.

Beyond the digital information environment, the Council may consider how AI-enabled technologies are also reshaping the conduct of warfare itself. Emerging battlefield technologies also highlight the growing intersection between AI and the changing nature of warfare on the continent. Recent analysis, including Amani Africa’s annual review on emerging weapons trends, points to the rapid proliferation of drones as a new ‘weapon of choice’ in several African conflicts. In contexts such as Sudan, their use has had devastating consequences for civilians, particularly in urban areas, with women and girls often bearing disproportionate impacts through civilian deaths, injury, displacement, loss of livelihoods, and heightened insecurity. These developments underscore the urgent need for stronger regulatory and accountability mechanisms governing AI-enabled and algorithm-assisted weapons systems to prevent further civilian harm and deepening gendered vulnerabilities in conflict settings.

The AU has forged a robust normative architecture to tackle AI-driven threats within the WPS agenda. Key instruments include the African Union Digital Transformation Strategy (2020–2030), which promotes inclusive digital ecosystems but lacks WPS-specific mandates; the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), establishing data safeguards yet ratified by only 16 states as of 2026; and the PSC’s recent call for a continental AI-governance-peace advisory mechanism. Complementing these, WPS pillars draw strength from the Maputo Protocol (2003) and the landmark AU Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (2025), which explicitly criminalises ‘cyber violence’, encompassing deep fakes, doxing, and algorithmic harassment, while the Continental Results Framework (CRF) drives gender-disaggregated monitoring. Yet weak domestication, chronic underfunding, and missing tech-threat indicators hobble enforcement.

Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s 1334th session may be used by the PSC to strategically operationalise these frameworks amid AI’s profound disruption of conflict dynamics, governance, and gender equality. The PSC may probe tech-WPS intersections, such as disinformation undermining women mediators in Sudan/DRC, and champion targeted measures: embedding cyber violence indicators in CRF/NAPs; accelerating Malabo ratifications; empowering the AI advisory mechanism with women leaders; and mandating gender audits of peace operations’ digital protocols. This decisive pivot could convert aspirations into accountable action, fortifying women’s leadership in tech-resilient peace architectures.

The Council may also consider how to strengthen coherence between national and continental frameworks by encouraging the alignment of the growing number of National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security, now adopted by more than 37 AU Member States, with emerging digital threat assessments and technology governance initiatives. Integrating considerations such as AI-driven risks, cyber harassment, and technology-enabled gender-based violence into these NAPs could support more comprehensive prevention strategies while enabling Member States and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms to better anticipate the intersection between technological change and existing conflict drivers. In this context, the PSC may further emphasise the importance of promoting women’s participation in digital governance and technology policy spaces. As artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies increasingly shape governance and security systems, ensuring that women contribute to policy design and decision-making processes will be essential for preventing technological innovation from reinforcing existing gender inequalities and for advancing more inclusive, gender-responsive peacebuilding approaches.

The session also offers the PSC a critical opportunity to assess progress in women-led innovations addressing emerging AI-driven security risks, including AI-enabled early-warning systems and gender-responsive digital mediation platforms. While African women demonstrate strong potential in the technology ecosystem, accounting for 47% of STEM graduates globally, the highest share worldwide, their participation sharply declines in the technology workforce, where they constitute only 23–30% of professionals in the tech sector. Moreover, structural barriers continue to limit access to the digital ecosystem: only about 31–32% of women in Africa use the internet compared to 42–43% of men, significantly constraining women’s ability to develop digital and AI-related skills and to contribute to technological governance and innovation.

It is therefore expected that the Council may use the session to evaluate how initiatives such as women-focused AI training and entrepreneurship programmes, such as those supporting over 100 African women entrepreneurs trained in data science, machine learning, and AI innovation through UNESCO-supported initiatives, can be scaled to strengthen women’s leadership in digital peacebuilding. At the same time, the PSC could address persistent structural barriers, including women’s underrepresentation in technology policy spaces and limited access to investment for women-led tech ventures. Building on AU’s gender-parity commitments, the Council may prioritise targeted capacity-building in cybersecurity, AI governance, and digital peacebuilding, while encouraging Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to deploy women experts and establish women-led digital security task forces capable of developing scalable, Africa-rooted responses to AI-enabled threats.

Beyond the rapidly expanding digital domain, the session may also situate AI- and technology-facilitated violence within the broader spectrum of structural and emerging threats affecting women and girls across Africa. These include climate-related insecurity, violent extremism, protracted displacement, and deepening economic marginalisation, issues highlighted during the 2025 Cotonou Meeting on Women, Peace and Security as key drivers of gendered insecurity on the continent. Economic governance frameworks may also feature in this discussion, particularly where digital transformation intersects with gender inequality. For instance, while continental initiatives such as the AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol aim to expand digital markets and cross-border trade, their largely gender-neutral design risks overlooking structural constraints that continue to limit women-owned MSMEs, including restricted access to finance, high transaction costs, and persistent digital connectivity gaps. In this regard, the session may provide an opportunity for the PSC to deliberate on how gender-responsive approaches can be more systematically mainstreamed across the tools of the AU peace and security architecture, including early warning mechanisms and regular Council briefings, while ensuring that responses to emerging technological threats are linked to broader socio-economic and governance reforms.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The Council may call for stronger measures to address the growing risks posed by artificial intelligence and technology-facilitated violence within the framework of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. In this regard, the PSC may urge Member States to integrate digital threats, including AI-driven disinformation, deep fakes, and online gender-based violence, into National Action Plans on WPS and to align these frameworks with continental instruments and emerging technology governance initiatives. The Council may also encourage accelerated ratification and domestication of the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection and call for the inclusion of indicators on technology-facilitated violence within the African Union Continental Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security to strengthen monitoring and accountability. The PSC may further underscore the importance of promoting women’s leadership in digital governance and AI policy processes, including through the expansion of women-led innovation and mediation networks such as FemWise-Africa, while encouraging Member States, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms and the African Union Commission to invest in digital literacy, cybersecurity capacity-building and women-led technological solutions for early warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.


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