Briefing on the situation in South Sudan

Briefing on the situation in South Sudan

Date | 26 February 2024

Tomorrow (27 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to receive updates on the situation in South Sudan, as an agenda item of its 1202nd session.

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief the Council on what he gathered from his recent visit to South Sudan on the state of the transition and the progress towards the holding of elections scheduled for end of 2024. As the country concerned, a representative of South Sudan is also expected to deliver a statement. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office, Joram Mukama Biswaro; representative of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); representative of Djibouti as Chair of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom are also expected to participate in tomorrow’s session.

As the country prepares to hold its first elections in December 2024 since its independence, President Salva Kiir Mayardit appointed the leadership of the National Elections Commission (NEC); the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and the Political Parties Council (PPC) on 3 November 2023. In its last meeting on the situation in South Sudan – the 1186th session held on 16 November 2023 –, the PSC welcomed the decision as an important step towards facilitating the constitution-making and electoral processes.

The December elections are expected to pave the way for the end of the transition period as envisaged in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement to the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). With only 10 months left before this important milestone in the country’s political trajectory, however, there appear to be serious concerns that the conditions necessary for holding credible elections are not yet in place. UNMISS Head Haysom explained these conditions in his most recent media briefing on 13 February. He underscored the need to decide on the type of elections to be held; agree on a realistic electoral calendar, taking into account operational, logistical, legal, and security issues; fast-track the implementation of the transitional security arrangements, agree on an electoral security plan, and deploy the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) to provide a secure environment.

There seems to be an emerging consensus that if these conditions are not met by April 2024, South Sudan may not be in a position to conduct free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. In the words of Haysom, ‘elections can be held in December, but only if the country’s leaders take urgent action to overcome key obstacles’. Similarly, RJMEC reported last month that ‘without adequate funding towards the unification of the Necessary United Forces, & the effective functioning of the Agreement Institutions & Mechanisms, including the recently reconstituted Political Parties Council, National Constitutional Review Commission & the National Elections Commission, South Sudan will continue to struggle to adhere to the implementation schedule of the R-ARCSS, & this could seriously jeopardise the holding of elections in Dec. 2024.’

The AU has been working closely with the UN and IGAD through the Trilateral mechanism to engage with the Government on the constitution-making and electoral processes. The South Sudanese government also set up a joint task force in July 2023 to coordinate efforts on these issues. At tomorrow’s meeting, the Trilateral mechanism is likely to report to the PSC on the state of constitution-making and electoral processes. All indications are that the AU needs to prioritise South Sudan in terms of the provision of support for the implementation of the key transitional processes necessary for the elections. More importantly, the AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.

“The AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.”

In the meantime, the security situation in South Sudan remains volatile. In a sign of the precariousness of the transitional process, on 24 January 2024, it was reported that fighting erupted in northern Unity State between SSPDF and SPLA-IO, in violation of a longstanding cessation of hostilities under the R-ARCSS and the current efforts to unify the national army under one command. The volatility of the security situation also involves the continued impact of inter-communal violence in various parts of the country including in Unity, Jonglei, Lakes, and Warrap states. According to UNMISS, ‘Warrap, in particular, has witnessed persistent cross-border clashes between the Dinka Twic and Dinka Ngok communities over territorial disputes in the Abyei Administrative Area, which has led to [the] loss of lives and properties, abductions as well as largescale displacement since last year’. The National Salvation Front (NAS), a non-signatory armed group, also continues to wage war against the South Sudanese government.

It seems that the South Sudanese government requested Kenya in December 2023 to take over the Rome process, which was initiated by the Community of Sant’ Egidio, a lay Catholic association, to facilitate talks between the South Sudanese government and non-signatory parties of the R-ARCSS.  The Rome talks had been stalled for several months after the government withdrew its delegation but the parties met in March 2023 after the visit of Pope Francis to South Sudan in February 2023. Although there was a plan to hold a follow-up meeting in May 2023, apparently it did not take place. The PSC has been urging the parties to the Rome peace talks to resume negotiations, given the limited time available before the end of the transition period. After South Sudan’s request for Kenya to take over the Rome process, Kenya’s President William Ruto reportedly met and held discussions with officials of Sant’ Egidio in Rome during the Italy-Africa Summit in January and expressed his commitment to work with the former mediators.  On 12 January 2024, he delivered message through the Principal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Korir Sing’Oei to General Paul Malong Awan Anei, Chairman, South Sudan United Front and through him to other key leaders of the South Sudan Opposition Movement (SSOMA). After a phone call he held with President Kirr on 23 January 2024, President Ruto reported on his X platform that he ‘reached out to all the hold-out opposition parties under the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance expressing my desire to ensure an all-inclusive and equitable mediation.’

The security situation coupled with the impact of climate change and increasing socioeconomic difficulties has worsened the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. This has been further compounded by the massive influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees due to the ongoing fighting in that country. According to OCHA, more than half a million Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees have entered South Sudan since the onset of the war in Sudan in April 2023. This is in addition to the 2.2 million internally displaced people in the country. However, the security and humanitarian situation in South Sudan does not seem to be getting the necessary attention because of other crises around the world. There also appears to be donor fatigue which limits the availability of resources.

On the margins of the 37th AU Summit, the AU Ad hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5) met at the Ministerial level to discuss the situation in South Sudan and exchange views on how to support the country in conducting successful elections by the end of this year. The C5 seems to have decided to undertake a ministerial visit to South Sudan to engage with all the parties and stakeholders to assess the situation on the ground and discuss the way forward.

Tomorrow’s meeting of the PSC happens ahead of the UNMISS mandate renewal in March. The outcome of the meeting is likely to provide the necessary guidance to the three African members of the Security Council as they engage in the upcoming mandate renewal negotiations. Given the prevailing concerns over various outstanding transitional processes and the holding of elections before the end of this year, there are speculations that the Security Council may opt for a technical rollover of the mandate until April pending South Sudan’s progress in its elections preparations and other outstanding tasks related to the implementation of the R-ARCSS.

In May, the Security Council is also expected to renew the sanctions regime imposed on South Sudan. The country has been calling for the lifting of the sanctions regime arguing that this will be critical to arm and equip the NUF for their effective deployment. In its most recent communique adopted on 16 November 2023 following its meeting on the situation in South Sudan, the PSC reiterated its call for the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the South Sudanese government to implement the R-ARCSS, particularly relating to transitional security arrangements.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for taking some of the necessary steps for the conduct of elections by December this year. It may urge the government to expedite implementation of key pending tasks required for the conduct of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. It may welcome the ongoing efforts being made in the constitution-making process and call on the Trilateral mechanism to strengthen and fast-track the process, in collaboration with the government of South Sudan. The PSC may also welcome the efforts of President Ruto to bring the hold-out armed rebel groups into the peace fold. It may also welcome the visit that Bankole undertook to South Sudan and may in this respect highlight the need for maintaining high-level and sustained attention and engagement in view of the current delicate stage of the transitional process in South Sudan. It may further call for the establishment of a preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections. The PSC may also call on all relevant stakeholders, particularly the R-TGoNU to avail conducive political and civic space to enable citizens’ free participation in the electoral processes. It may note and express concern over the recently reported fighting involving the armed elements of the signatories of R-ARCSS and the continued intercommunal violence in parts of the country and caution against its potential to reverse the gains made thus far. The PSC may also take note of the aggravated humanitarian situation which is compounded by the impacts of climate change and socioeconomic difficulties and appeal to partners and the international community to extend support and assistance to affected communities, including South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees.


Drama filled 37th African Union summit triggering question if it is an institution reforming or deforming

Drama filled 37th African Union summit triggering question if it is an institution reforming or deforming

Date | 24 February 2024

Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa

Tsion Hagos
Program Director, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa

As the dust of the 37th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly that ended on 19 February 2024 at the headquarters of the AU, in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa settles, questions abound about what the dramatic scenes witnessed during the summit highlight about the state of the Union.

This Assembly came at a critical moment when the leadership and collective action of the membership of the AU to address the plethora of political, socio-economic and security challenges facing Africa are in huge demand. The opening speech of the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, made this clear when he rightly asked, for example, ‘[h]ow should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries without doing anything?’.

Regrettably, the summit did not fit the bill in terms of delving into and adopting meaningful policy action for addressing the pressing issues of this ‘heroic and glorious time’, as Faki dubbed it. However, it is not because, as one report erroneously put it, the summit ignored the ‘continent’s conflicts and political crises’. Indeed, from Faki’s clarion call for collective action through the various high-level meetings, these issues were not ignored.

“The summit did not fit the bill not because, as one report erroneously put it, it ignored ‘the continent’s conflicts and political crises.’”

A mini-summit was convened on the escalating conflict in Eastern DRC. The AU ad-hoc committee of five on South Sudan held a ministerial meeting. The Horn of Africa’s regional body the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Chairperson, Djibouti’s President, also initiated steps for the convening of an IGAD meeting on Somalia and Sudan, although this plan collapsed in the face of the drama that followed an incident involving Somalia’s President.

Apart from such high-level meetings on these conflict situations on the margins of the summit, the AU Assembly considered and deliberated on a report of the high-level committee on the situation in Libya. The summit also deliberated on all these and a range of other conflict situations as part of its consideration of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security.

Rather than lack of attention, what this summit could be faulted for is the inability of the conveners and participants of the summit to marshal consensus and adopt concrete measures for at least mitigating, if not effectively managing, the escalating tensions, crises and conflicts. Considering the global policy process for reform of the multilateral system, particularly within the framework of the Summit of the Future which is of strategic interest for Africa, this summit was also a missed opportunity for outlining an African common position as we argued here.

“Rather than lack of attention, what this summit could be faulted for is the inability of the conveners and participants of the summit to marshal consensus and adopt concrete measures for at least mitigating, if not effectively managing, the escalating tensions, crises and conflicts.”

Apart from the solid work done around AU’s priorities and modalities for the activation of its permanent membership in the G20 and the timely engagement on the reform of the global financial architecture, it is not evident what the AU can show for in finishing the summit at dawn on 19 February rather than as initially planned on 18 February.

“It is not evident what the AU can show for in finishing the summit at dawn on 19 February rather than as initially planned on 18 February.”

Beyond failing to deliver on the pressing issues facing the continent, as some including delegations of member states observed, this year’s summit was also unlike earlier summits in other respects. It was filled with dramatic events that highlighted lack of decorum, dwindling regard for AU processes and a complete absence of amity between governments of some countries.

“It was filled with dramatic events that highlighted lack of decorum, dwindling regard for AU processes and a complete absence of amity between governments of some countries.”

During the opening session of the heads of state and government meeting, about a dozen people staged a protest on the conflict in Eastern DRC from the press and observer gallery of Mandela Hall. The incident, involving shouting of slogans and displaying banners and physical signs, briefly disrupted the proceedings.

Before the start of the main summit, a mini-summit bringing together key regional states was held on the escalating conflict in Eastern DRC. Rather than serving as a platform for bridging the divide between the two countries, the mini-summit became a site for trading of accusations between the two countries.

Nothing came out of the mini-summit. Even more worryingly, the bitter exchanges between the leaders of DRC and Rwanda might have hardened the positions of the two countries, hence worsening the situation further.

Another dramatic event involved the protocol dispute concerning the President of Somalia. Apart from the bitter exchanges that were on display both in the closed-closed segment of the summit and persisted during the summit, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia insinuated that Ethiopian authorities tried to sabotage his participation in the AU summit. Rather than the use of institutional and diplomatic channels of the AU and perhaps signifying a lack of confidence in such channels, the President convened a press conference on the incidents that almost overshadowed the coverage of other aspects of the summit. In opting for taking the matter to the wider public and litigating it in the court of public opinion, it is far from clear that, beyond galvanizing Somalia’s public opinion, President Mohamud’s approach has actually earned the sympathy and support of the wider AU membership.

In respect of both the escalating tension between DRC and Rwanda and that of Somalia and Ethiopia, what is problematic is not simply the resort to grandstanding and its deleterious consequences on the AU and its processes. Perhaps more damaging for the AU is the failure of the conveners and the wider AU membership to prevail over the representatives of these countries and provide leadership for helping establish appropriate channels and mechanisms, at the very least, for helping ease the escalating tensions.

It was not any less dramatic to observe the AU Commission Chairperson lamenting that the ‘rampant tendency to make decisions without real political will to apply them has grown to such an extent that it has become devastating to our individual and collective credibility,’ noting that 93% of the decisions adopted during the past three years have not been implemented. As a statement of one delegation delivered during the summit that we have seen rightly pointed out, this implementation deficit is also due to ‘the continued proliferation of decisions, emanating from the plethora of items on the Assembly’s agenda,’ contrary to the aim of the AU reform to focus on strategic priorities of continental scope by rationalizing the agenda of the summit, addressing the decision-to-implementation gap and streamlining the working methods.

All of these highlight that the AU’s standing and credibility are under tremendous strain. It is no surprise that there are increasing questions, in view of the foregoing dynamics, about whether the AU is an institution in deforming rather than reforming. Indeed, the deeper issues these incidents signify and the breakdown of trust between the AU Commission and member States and among States themselves, the critical intangible ingredient for the effective functioning of international public service institution like the AU, suggest that nothing short of the very soul of the AU is at stake.

There is no single actor to blame for this state of affairs of our Union. All those with direct role in agenda-setting and decision-making on the part of the AU Commission, organs and member states bear responsibility. It is incumbent on each of them to assume their respective responsibilities for restoring decorum and spirit of cooperation to avoid the risk of a complete collapse of the credibility and legitimacy of this institution as a locomotive of collective pan-African action. A corollary to this is also reversing the underlying crises of ideas and leadership that Faki aptly described in terms of ‘a real decline in the beautiful spirit of African solidarity and Pan-Africanism, the soul of our renaissance.’

“There is no single actor to blame for this state of affairs of our Union. All those with direct role in agenda-setting and decision-making on the part of the AU Commission, organs and member states bear responsibility.”

The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’


Fight against terrorism and violent extremism

Fight against terrorism and violent extremism

Date | 22 February 2024

Tomorrow (23 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1202nd session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is also expected to make a presentation.

The AU Commission Chairperson’s report on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism was last considered by the PSC at its 1182nd session held on 27 October 2023. One of the concerning trends identified in this report was the alarming geographical spread of terrorism in the continent, particularly in the Sahel region and the growing risk of expansion to the coastal sates of west Africa.  The latest report of the Chairperson to be considered by the PSC tomorrow is expected to demonstrate the continuing increase both in incidences and geographic spread of terrorism in Africa.

Heading into 2024, the threat of terrorism and violent extremism is predicted to remain one of the most pressing peace and security concerns the continent will continue to grapple with. By the end of 2023, ACSRT’s database indicated 99% increase in the number of terrorist attacks and 53% in the number of terrorist related deaths noted in the period from January to December 2023, as compared to the previous year of 2022. The database further registered 8 terrorist attacks and 43 terrorism-related deaths per day, for the same period.

Aside from the geographic spread and growing prevalence of terrorist activities, what makes the threat even more concerning is the increasing complexity it involves associated with geo-politics, involvement of external actors and local dynamics of countries affected by terrorism. As may be observed in the Chairperson’s report, there is a noted intersect between terrorist groups, some of whom are affiliated with global radical religious movements, and local militia groups engaged in armed conflict with member states. This intersection between terrorist groups and local conflict dynamics manifests in either one of two ways – a collaboration between terrorist groups and local militias, or contestations between the two actors for resources and control over territories. Needless to say, both of these dynamics entail serious challenges. In those cases where states, in their fight against terrorists, resort to the use of militias to effectively take advantage of their knowledge of local terrain and their understanding of cultural contexts, issues associated with human rights abuse and violations have also proven to become widespread.

Another important trend worth noting is the increasing shift in the perpetration of terrorist attacks, from civilians to military personnel and equipment. While civilians still continue to be the predominant primary victims of terrorist attacks in the continent, terrorist groups seem to be gradually demonstrating their capabilities to successfully orchestrate attacks against state security apparatus. According to data recorded by the ACSRT for the period from January to December 2023, ‘out of 2,952 terrorist attacks, 1,597 were against civilian targets, 1,218 were against military/security targets and installations, 89 were against International Organizations and deployments, and 48 were against Government Officials, Institutions, and Infrastructure’.

In terms of regional concentration of terrorist attacks and activities, the Sahel region continues to dominate, taking up 35% of the total attacks recorded in the course of 2023. Jihadist groups including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are the main terrorist sects that are currently active in this region. With Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the three states in the region most affected by the scourge of terrorism, currently undergoing complex political transitions and faced with serious governance crisis, the conditions are tilted in favour of these terrorist groups to further intensify their insurgency and meet their objectives of expanding their operations into coastal west African countries. Amid withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from Mali and the decision made by transition authorities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) – opting to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as an architecture of collective defence and mutual assistance mechanism – the region is experiencing major shifts and uncertainties that create a fertile environment for terrorist actors to strengthen their positions. This is further complicated by geopolitical contestations and involvement of foreign actors in the region.

The issue for the AU and the PSC in the face of such challenging dynamics is how to prioritize and enhance support and engagement in the effort to contain and ultimately overcome the terrorism menace in the central Sahelian states without being restrained by the post-coup complex transition that the countries are going through.

Following the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Lake Chad basin and the Great Lakes Region respectively registered significant increase in violent incidents related to terrorist actors. In the Horn of Africa, one of the critical developments has been the strengthening of attacks by Al-Shabaab against military and security personnel. With the deadline for final withdrawal of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) fast approaching and little indication of full readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to take on complete security responsibilities, the intensification of Al-Shabaab’s activities as demonstrated through some of its more recent attacks against local administrations and protected locations in the capital city, Mogadishu, is definitely a worrying sign.

In the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP and Boko Haram continue their insurgencies targeting particularly the north-eastern parts of Nigeria and the north of Cameroon. Trends of power struggle between these two main terrorist groups has been one of the concerning developments in the region which may interest the PSC to reflect on with an emphasis on the kind of impact such insurgent infighting will have on the already dire security situation.

The Great Lakes Region also continues to experience a spike in incidents associated with terrorist actors, mainly the Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF)/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which has allegiance to Daesh/ISIS. Majority of the terrorist attacks recorded in the region took place in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) although Uganda also experienced some attacks. According to data registered by the ACSRT, DRC accounts for the majority of the total terrorism related civilian deaths in the continent and has the highest number of civilian casualties recorded in a single country.

In addition to these region-specific trends, the PSC may also take note of the emerging concern related to the use of technological advancements for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups in the continent increasingly use technologic advancements in at least three ways. The first one of these is the use of new technologies such as cryptocurrencies to finance their activities in a manner that avoids the risk of being tracked by law enforcement. The use of cyberspace such as ‘Dark Web’ for conducting transactions including trade of drugs and weapons as well as human trafficking is another way through which terrorist groups make use of technology to fund their operations. The second use of technology for terrorist actors is the ease it creates for the dissemination of their ideology and propaganda. This enables recruitment of members and coordination of activities with speed and in an untraceable manner. Lastly, terrorist actors in the continent are increasingly using technologies such as AI and Drones for purposes of surveillance and spying. Further to infiltrating state positions, the use of Drones by terrorist groups for carrying out attacks is also an impending concern.

Despite the deployment of counter-terrorism efforts at the national and regional levels across the continent, the threat not only continues to persist but evidently intensifies over time. In addition to fortifying collaborations centred around the cross-boundary and transnational nature of the threat, it is also critical to re-examine the predominantly hard-security natured response deployed to eliminate the threat of terrorism in Africa.

In this respect, aside from receiving updates regarding counter-terrorism operations in the continent, the PSC may also reflect on bolstering the deployment and expanded use of non-military response approaches beyond the existing hard-security measures. It is expected that tomorrow’s session in this respect would build on earlier sessions to put emphasis on support for expansion of local governance structures and delivery of basic public and social services, the provision of livelihood support and humanitarian assistance and the design and implementation of development programs tailored to the conditions of areas affected by and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Not any less important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation as vehicle for both facilitating the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters and achieving political settlement of the conflict dynamics that made the emergence of such groups possible.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the continuing increase in the spread of terrorism in the continent. Noting and commending the AU Commission and the ACSRT for the ongoing efforts to support member states in their counter-terrorism efforts including through capacity-building activities, the PSC may urge member states to allocate adequate resources for the development and implementation of strategies for counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. Emphasising the major contribution of governance crisis to fuelling the threat of terrorism in Africa, the PSC may also call on member states to work towards addressing governance issues that serve as underlying root causes. The PSC may call on the ACSRT to work closely with the AUDA/NEPAD and the relevant development and infrastructure departments of the AU as well as the AU PCRD Centre for promoting the design and implementation of non-security interventions as critical measures for expanding state authority. It may also reiterate its endorsement of the use of negotiation and reconciliation processes as the means for the final settlement of conflicts involving terrorist groups. In this respect, the PSC  may request the AU Commission to develop guidelines on the use of negotiations, reconciliation and mediation for settling conflicts involving terrorist groups drawing on avenues for such possibilities from countries affected by terrorism. Having regard to the transnational nature of terrorism, the PSC may further underscore the importance of enhanced collaboration and coordination between member states as well as with Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), including through the deployment of joint operations. Taking into account the growing use of technologies for supporting and perpetrating terrorist activities, the PSC may highlight the need for undertaking a study on the effect of technological advancements on the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.


2024 ELECTION OF THE 10 MEMBERS OF THE PSC: CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS

2024 ELECTION OF THE 10 MEMBERS OF THE PSC: CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS

Date | 20 February 2024

One of the key outcomes of the 44th ordinary session of the Executive Council was the election of ten members of the AU Peace and Security Council, for two-year terms. Our latest policy brief provides analysis on the conduct and outcome of the elections and what the election means and tells us about the new composition of the PSC and the implications thereof.

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Peace, security and development nexus

Peace, security and development nexus

Date | 20 February 2024

Tomorrow (21 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1201st session to deliberate on the theme ‘peace, security and development nexus: follow-up to the Tangier’s conference’.

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Mohammed Arrouchi, the Permanent Representative of Kingdom of Morocco and Chairperson of PSC for the month of February followed by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is also expected to deliver a statement. The meeting is also expected to receive statements from H.E. Ambassador Albert Muchanga, AU Commissioner for Economic Development, Tourism, Trade, Industry and Mining, statements from representatives of AUDA-NEPAD African Union Development Agency,  the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This session comes as a follow-up on the commitments of the Tangier Declaration. The “Tangier Process,” an AU Conference focusing on the nexus between Peace, Security and Development, takes place annually in October in Tangier, Kingdom of Morocco. The conference is primarily attended by the 15 members of the AU PSC, although other member states may be invited on a case-by-case basis, subject to mutual agreement among all partners and the host country. The conference collaborates closely with four key partners: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). The main goal is to put into action development policies, with a focus on large-scale initiatives known as “nexus projects,” across African nations, regions and border areas.

The 2022 Tangier Conference, held from 25 to 27 October conference served as a platform for policy and decision makers, as well as peace, security and development practitioners, to explore ways to advance the AU-led strategic partnerships. The focus was on building peace, resilience and prosperity on the continent. Through the adoption of the ‘Tangier Declaration’, which was considered to outline the key outcomes of the three-day discussions, thereby charting a path for enhanced engagement in delivering on the triple nexus while promoting regional integration, the binding document encapsulated the outcomes and commitments of the deliberations of the conference. The conference aimed to enhance synergies between development, regional integration, peace and security. It also sought to explore mechanisms to respond to the complex security challenges facing African development. In addition, the conference offered a unique opportunity for the policy development and knowledge communities to exchange views on the practical implementation of the triple nexus: peace, security and development. It also launched new initiatives that seek to foster the effective delivery of the nexus.

The convening is held in line with the AU PSC communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM.1(DCCCLXXXIII) adopted during the 883rd meeting held at ministerial level on 27 September 2019, in the margins of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on “the Interdependence between peace, security and development: towards a collective engagement for action”, as well as in accordance to the commitment of the AU member states to realize the seven (7) Aspirations and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within the frameworks of the AU Agenda 2063 and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development respectively, with particular reference to Aspirations 1, 3 and 4 and Goal 16 relating to the promotion of peace, justice and strong institutions.

The previous session PSC convened on this subject was during its 1134th session held on 27 January 2023 in which it adopted the Declaration of the AU Policy Conference on Promoting the Peace, Security and Development nexus in Africa, referred to as Tangier Declaration, which was later submitted for consideration and endorsement by the Assembly of the Union at the 36th Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government held in February 2023. It is against this context that the PSC is convening this meeting, as a follow-up to the 2022 conference. It should be noted that Morocco did not chair the PSC in 2023. However, during its last chairship in October 2022, it included this agenda item on the programme of work. The session comes a day after the conclusion of the 37th AU Summit in which, among others, member states recognized the interdependence of these three elements, which is a key aspect of the AU’s Agenda 2063. Albeit regardless the significance of these interlinkage, the challenges in achieving socio-economic development, particularly through the full implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) still hinder the full realization of this outfit. Member states also emphasized the need for preventive diplomacy, in line with the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa, to effectively prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to give an update on the nexus between peace, security humanitarian and developmental programmes. In particular, the Tangier Declaration highlighted that the AU Member States, in coordination with the relevant RECs/RMs and the AU Commission and other Organs, to establish programmes of economic integration for border communities including internally displaced persons, refugees and migrants. Furthermore, in order to foster socio-economic development, the African Development Bank Group, the African Export-Import Bank, International Financial Institutions, along with the UN Agencies and other development partners were urged to step up efforts to identify financial options that minimize the high-risk premium associated with investments in Africa and leverage their positions and instruments to address the structural causes of conflicts in Africa, reduce growth volatility and consolidate development outcomes for a more secure and resilient continent.

During the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held on 5 – 6 February 2022, in Addis Ababa, there was a proposal regarding the need of a Security-Indexed Investment Bonds: a financial instrument aiming to mobilize scalable and flexible resources to address the root causes of insecurity, enhance the capacity of formal institutions and rehabilitate communities and infrastructure adversely impacted by insecurity. This convening will be a significant platform to get an update of the implementation of this mechanism in relation to implementation of the AU Assembly decision (Assembly/AU/Dec. 817(XXXV)).

Commissioner of the PAPS Department is also expected to give a statement on the state of peace, security and development in Africa. The situation of peace and security in Africa is a multifaceted issue, deeply connected with the wider subjects of development and governance. Recently, Africa has encountered substantial hurdles, with intense conflicts leading to forced migration and displacement. The detrimental impacts of climate change have put the livelihoods of millions at risk, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The AU on the other hand possesses ambitious commitments and resources for mediation and peacekeeping, but it falls short in terms of political and financial capacity to fully leverage them. Regarding development, the just concluded AU Summit took decisive actions on the continent’s security situation as several member states continue to grapple with security issues. The reemergence of military coups, violence surrounding elections, humanitarian crises due to warfare and climate change effects were underscored as grave threats that could undo the progress made in the continent’s development agenda.

One key aspect of tomorrow’s deliberation is expected to be a follow-up on the UNDP and AU Commission’s PAPS Department establishment of the Africa Facility for Supporting Inclusive Transition (AFSIT), to prevent and effectively respond to unconstitutional changes of government, and other forms of complex political transitions in line with the Declaration of the 16th Extraordinary Session of AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Malabo, in May 2022. In the same vein, it will be prudent for the meeting to have an update discussion on the operationalization progress of the Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange (I-RECKE) on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, which was jointly launched by the AU, RECs/RMs in July 2022 in Lusaka, Zambia, which called on all the stakeholders, as ‘Watchdogs’ of democratic governance, to use the platform designed to improve cross-regional learning on best practices, conflict prevention and resilience building against the propagating factors and triggers of conflicts especially ineffective governance, unconstitutional changes of government, terrorism, violent extremism and climate-induced insecurity.

In light of the above, the session is likely to address some of complex security challenges on the continent and identify mechanisms to respond to this. The deliberation is also expected to provide a platform to the PSC to chart a path for enhanced engagement in delivering on the peace, security and development nexus.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. PSC may take the opportunity to emphasize the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of Africa’s development and integration agenda. PSC may highlight the significance of strengthening the synergies between AGA and the APSA through robust engagement between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). Council is also likely to welcome the renewed commitment of the AU to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) through its revised Policy framework. PSC may also urge all the African stakeholders and sponsoring partners to work collaboratively on a common nexus agenda-setting and prioritized programming covering the five (5) regions of the Union through operational triple nexus projects in member states.


The Peace and Security Council in 2023: The Year in Review

Amani Africa

Date | 16 February 2024

WHAT THIS REVIEW IS ABOUT AND WHY

How did the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), Africa’s premier peace and security decision-making body, fare in delivering on its mandate in the face of the prevailing peace and security challenges on the continent during the just concluded year? What are the salient features of PSC’s role in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa in 2023? These and related questions are the focus of our annual review of the PSC which presents analysis on the work of the PSC in 2023. As in the previous years, this year’s review draws on the data and research work we carried out on the PSC in 2023.

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2024 ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL: OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND CANDIDATES

2024 ELECTIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL: OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND CANDIDATES

Date | 12 February 2024

The 44th ordinary session of the Executive Council will hold the elections of the ten members of the Peace and Security Council. Our policy brief has all that you need to know about the 2024 PSC elections and how and why they matter.

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