Consideration of the situation in the Central African Republic
Consideration of the situation in the Central African Republic
Date | 8 April 2026
Tomorrow (9 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene to receive a briefing on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR).
The session will start with the opening remarks of Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026. It will be followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). It is also anticipated that the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson will brief the PSC. The representatives of the CAR, as the country concerned, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as the concerned Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism, and the UN are also expected to deliver statements.
This session is convened for the first time since the country held presidential, parliamentary and local elections in December 2025. The last time the AU PSC met to discuss the situation in the CAR was on 19 September, in which it took note of the preparations for the harmonised elections and requested the chairperson of the Commission to mobilise the necessary resources to facilitate the completion of the electoral processes.
The December 2025 elections marked a major milestone in the quest for institutional and political consolidation in the CAR. The elections brought together four elections, including the presidential. parliamentary and regional elections in a single electoral process, unprecedented in the recent history of the country. It also included the municipal elections, a key component of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation-Central African Republic (APPR-RCA), that took place in the country for the first time since 1988. While reflective of progress registered in the CAR, the organisation and conduct of the elections also benefited from support by MINUSCA. The support involved the transportation of electoral materials to various parts of the country through flights and road convoys, the training of election agents, supervisors and polling station staff and security assistance through strengthened patrols by MINUSCA personnel and provision of vehicles and motorcycles to CAR forces and security personnel.
On 5 January, the National Elections Authority (ANE) announced the results of the presidential election, with incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra winning approximately 76 per cent of the vote. He was widely expected to secure a third term following the controversial 2023 constitutional referendum that removed presidential term limits. The results were subsequently certified by the Constitutional Court on 19 January. The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, congratulated Touadéra on his re-election. Touadéra was sworn in for his third term at an inauguration ceremony held in Bangui on 30 March, in the presence of regional leaders, with the AU Commission Chairperson represented by the Chief of Staff of the Commission Souef Mohamed El-Amine. Under the country’s new constitution, the presidential term lasts seven years.

According to the AU, which deployed its observers under the leadership of Rwanda’s former Prime Minister Bernard Makuza, the elections were conducted peacefully overall, with the exception of the Haut-Mbomou prefecture in the southeast, where the security situation has remained precarious largely due to attacks from the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) militia accused of serious human rights violations. The militia carried out attacks against local security forces, state officials, soldiers and police, including on election day. Makuza praised the election both as a ‘step forward towards democracy’ and ‘incomparable with the electoral processes of 2016 and 2020’ for its compliance with the legal framework. The ECCAS also issued a statement supporting the AU’s observations, while noting some logistical challenges and issues related to inclusion in the electoral processes. Similarly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Mission in CAR, MINUSCA, Valentine Rugwabiza, told the UN Security Council that elections were conducted ‘in a peaceful and secure manner across most of the country, despite isolated security incidents.’
However, two other presidential candidates challenged the outcome, alleging electoral irregularities. The main opposition coalition, the Bloc Républicain pour la Défense de la Constitution du 30 mars 2016 (BRDC), boycotted the electoral process, citing concerns about its credibility and fairness. It also issued a 12 January statement making similar allegations about the conduct of the elections and calling for dialogue to ease political tensions. Voter turnout was around 52%, reflecting mixed public engagement amid ongoing instability, even as the election technically proceeded peacefully and without widespread unrest reported.
On 8 January, ANE released provisional results for the first round of legislative elections for 140 seats in the National Assembly, with 74 candidates elected. The ruling party, the United Heart Movement (MCU), won the largest share of seats and is expected to secure a majority. The second round of legislative elections for the remaining seats was held on 5 April. On 18 January, ANE also released provisional results for the local elections, with by-elections expected in areas where voting could not take place due to insecurity or a lack of candidates. The holding of these elections is expected to help consolidate peace by supporting the extension of state authority across the country.
Tomorrow’s session is also expected to pay attention to the implementation of the APPR-RCA. The combined elections took place against the backdrop of progress in implementing the 2019 APPR-RCA. In April 2025, two-armed groups—the Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R) and the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC)—agreed to cease hostilities and rejoin the APPR-RCA, initiating the disarmament and demobilisation of their former combatants. According to the UN, 1,202 former combatants have been disarmed and demobilised since July 2025, bringing the total number of demobilised ex-combatants to 6,000 since the agreement was signed. On 10 July, the CAR government held a meeting in Bangui to mark the official return of 3R and UPC to the APPR-RCA. The event was attended by leaders of both armed groups and a high-level delegation from Chad, which had facilitated the April agreement between the government and the two groups.
The situation in CAR highlights the need for enhanced high-level political attention and international support for sustaining the momentum in the implementation of APPR-RCA. Most specifically, there is a particular need for elevated political commitment and resource provision, as well as well-organised sustainment of the disarmament and demobilisation process, which is critical to prevent relapse back to conflict. Relatedly, consolidating security gains requires high-level political commitment and support for security sector reform in the CAR. For all of these, the contribution of MINUSCA and increased high-level engagement of the AU would be critical.

Despite a noticeable decline in security incidents that the country experienced following the cessation of hostilities by these two armed groups, insecurity persists in some parts of the country. Indeed, during the election, attacks by the AAKG militia in the south-eastern Haut-Mbomou prefecture near the border with South Sudan prevented voting from taking place in the locality. Insecurity is also driven by armed group activities around mining sites and transhumance corridors, as well as cross-border incursions along the borders with Sudan and South Sudan. Particularly, the ongoing conflict in Sudan has affected the CAR, causing increased insecurity in border regions and exacerbating the country’s humanitarian situation through the influx of refugees.
The CAR continues to face serious economic challenges, including large budget deficits and a heavy debt burden. In response, the government has launched an ambitious National Development Plan (2024–2028) aimed at rebuilding the country after decades of conflict. The plan focuses on rehabilitating roads and energy infrastructure, improving healthcare and education, and promoting agricultural and digital transformation to reduce poverty. At an investment roundtable held in Casablanca, Morocco, in September 2025, the CAR government reportedly mobilised nearly $9 billion to support the implementation of the plan.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC may welcome the ‘peaceful’ and ‘orderly’ conduct and conclusion of the four levels of elections held in CAR as marking a major milestone in the consolidation of peace and the strengthening of the legitimacy of the state and its authority. The PSC may commend MINUSCA for its support for the electoral process and the implementation of the APPR-RCA. The PSC may encourage political organisations disaffected with the elections to resolve any grievances through peaceful means, including dialogue and legal recourse. It may welcome the progress in the peace process and the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants and encourage other non-signatory armed groups to join the APPR-RCA and the DDR process. It may also encourage the CAR authorities to sustain political support and ensure high-level commitment to the SSR involving the security sector and the implementation of the DDR process in a well-organised and coordinated way, with the provision of all the support for those engaging in the DDR process as a critical step to prevent relapse. In light of the pressure from the influx of refugees from Sudan, the PSC may reiterate its call for urgent humanitarian assistance to address needs on the ground. It may also welcome the National Development Plan and the funds mobilised during the investment roundtable held in Morocco. PSC may also reiterate calls for international financial institutions to provide debt relief to CAR.
Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Date | 7 April 2026
Tomorrow (8 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1337th session as an open session to deliberate on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Presentations are expected from Adama Dieng, AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, a Representative of the Republic of Rwanda and the Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
The session is being convened pursuant to the PSC decision adopted at its 678th meeting of 11 April 2017, which decided to hold an annual session on the prevention of hate ideology, genocide and hate crimes in Africa in the context of the commemoration of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It also forms part of the AU’s annual commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, following Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.695 of 2 July 2018, designating 7 April as the AU Day of Commemoration. This year marks the 32nd commemoration of the 1994 genocide. Coming amid mounting atrocity risks in several conflict settings, this year’s session may be shaped not only by remembrance but also by a sharper focus on prevention.
It is to be recalled that the last session of the Council on this theme at its 1272nd session called on member states to put in place legislative and institutional measures to prevent hate ideology, hate crimes and genocide, to confront genocide denialism and urged improved collection of data on hate crimes including through strengthening of the cyber capabilities of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). In addition to encouraging collaboration with digital platforms, the media and civil society to counter content that incites hatred and violence, it also called for the establishment of a continental research centre on hate speech and genocide ideology. Yet many of the priorities identified in that session remain unfinished, and events observed in some conflict situations underscore the urgency of some of the measures.
Among the key unfinished items is also the long-pending review by the Panel of the Wise on the status of implementation of the recommendations issued by the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events. This review carries particular weight given the enduring relevance of the Panel’s own warning that, ‘if there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen.’ That conclusion speaks to a central lesson of the 1994 Genocide: the atrocity was not inevitable, but was enabled in part by the failure of both African and international actors to act preventively before the violence escalated and to stop it once it was underway. It was precisely in response to that failure that, during the transition from the OAU to the AU, Africa’s continental body departed from a rigid reliance on non-interference and instead anchored itself in the principle of non-indifference, as reflected in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. In this respect, the memory of Rwanda is not merely historical; it is bound up with the very normative and institutional foundation of the AU. The issue is equally salient for the PSC, particularly in light of Article 7 of its Protocol, which mandates the Council ‘to anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity.’
The fight against genocide ideology, together with the observance of the commemoration of the 1994 genocide, is also about reaffirming a collective responsibility to the promise of ‘never again’ and the principle of non-indifference. Indeed, remembrance was not just about paying respect to the victims and survivors, but an occasion to renew commitment to prevention. In that context, Dieng underscored that when honouring the victims of the genocide against the Tutsi, ‘we should be looking back, but we should also be looking forward,’ since ‘the commitment not to forget and the commitment to prevent are two sides of the same coin.’ Developments over the past year, and the realities still unfolding today, have only reinforced the urgency of that message.

Most notable in this respect is the situation in Sudan. In April 2025, amid rising hate speech and ethnically driven violence in Darfur, the UN Fact-Finding Mission warned that the ‘darkest chapters’ of the conflict may still lie ahead. By February 2026, the same Mission found that the Rapid Support Force (RSF) had carried out a coordinated campaign of destruction against non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher, the hallmarks of which point to genocide. At the Human Rights Council’s 38th Special Session on the situation in and around El Fasher in November 2025, Adama Dieng, presenting a joint statement also on behalf of Mr Chaloka Beyani, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, stressed that ‘the risk of genocide exists in Sudan. It is real, and it is growing, every single day.’ The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)-led joint fact-finding mission report further underscores Sudan’s relevance to the upcoming PSC session. It documents racially and ethnically motivated violence, including attacks on non-Arab communities such as the Massalit, Fur and Zaghawa, as well as hate speech, incitement and patterns of abuse that may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. For the PSC, Sudan thus stands as the clearest contemporary illustration of the cost of failing to translate early warning into timely political and protective action.
There are also concerns over the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the nexus between armed conflict, identity-based mobilisation and hate speech has become increasingly pronounced. By September 2025, the UN Human Rights Office warned that hate speech and ethnically motivated attacks had increased in Kinshasa and the Kasai provinces against people presumed to be associated with the M23. Human Rights Watch (here and here) has also documented the targeting of Banyamulenge communities and pointed to the growing salience of anti-Banyamulenge and anti-Tutsi sentiment within the broader conflict environment. Taken together, these developments illustrate how identity-based hostility, inflammatory rhetoric and communal targeting not only inflame the conflict but also make the resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC more difficult. It would therefore be of interest for PSC members to hear from Dieng on his assessment of the principal risk theatres on the continent and on the practical steps needed to ensure that the AU reverses the betrayal of its foundational promise of ‘never again’.
Beyond Sudan and eastern DRC, developments elsewhere on the continent show that the risks associated with hate speech, exclusionary narratives and identity-based targeting are neither confined to conventional conflict settings nor limited to active war zones. The digital sphere is emerging as an increasingly important risk domain, with Africa-focused analysis warning that artificial intelligence (AI)-generated disinformation, deepfakes and the amplification of hate speech are reshaping the continent’s information environment. A similar preventive concern arises in North Africa, including notably in Libya and Tunisia. In Libya, the UN envoy warned the Security Council of a surge in xenophobic and racist hate speech inciting violence against migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and humanitarian organisations. In Tunisia, the forcible dismantling of camps housing sub-Saharan African migrants and the deportation of some of them revived concerns over racialised incitement. Taken together, these cases underscore the wider relevance of the upcoming session by showing that the danger posed by hate speech and identity-based hostility cuts across conflict, migration and digital spaces.
It is also expected that emphasis will be put on prevention through education and memory. In April 2025, UNESCO and Rwanda announced measures to strengthen the educational role of genocide memorial sites, including training staff to receive school groups, enhancing exhibitions, developing educational content for use in schools, digitising survivor testimonies and supporting social media campaigns to counter the falsification of historical facts and online misinformation about the Genocide against the Tutsi. During the AU’s 2025 commemoration, speakers similarly stressed the importance of the responsible use of media, both digital and non-digital, as well as AI and education, in preventing genocide and other mass atrocity crimes.
While not central to the immediate conflict-driven risk theatres likely to dominate the session, the UN General Assembly’s recent recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as the gravest crime against humanity carries wider normative relevance for the PSC’s discussion. It reinforces the importance of confronting the historical and contemporary legacies of racialised dehumanisation, denial and exclusion, and lends further weight to the view that remembrance, historical truth and accountability are integral to preventing hate-driven violence and atrocity crimes.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its concern over the persistent spread of hate ideologies, genocide denialism and incitement to violence in Africa. It may renew its call for AU member states to adopt legislation and institutions for the prevention and punishment of hate crimes and genocide, and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. The Council may also call for accelerated follow-up on the strengthening of CEWS cyber capacity, the improvement of hate-crime data collection and the development of partnerships with digital platforms, the media and civil society. The Council may further urge greater attention to contemporary situations where genocide and atrocity risks are manifest, particularly in Darfur, Sudan. It may welcome the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy, encourage closer collaboration with RECs/RMs, civil society, women and youth actors, and call for follow-up on the Continental Research Centre on Hate Speech and Genocide Ideology, the Panel of the Wise review, and the operational linkage between remembrance, education and prevention.
Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Open Session on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa
Date | 7 April 2026
Tomorrow (8 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1337th session as an open session to deliberate on Hate Crimes and Fighting Genocide Ideology in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Presentations are expected from Adama Dieng, AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, a Representative of the Republic of Rwanda and the Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
The session is being convened pursuant to the PSC decision adopted at its 678th meeting of 11 April 2017, which decided to hold an annual session on the prevention of hate ideology, genocide and hate crimes in Africa in the context of the commemoration of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It also forms part of the AU’s annual commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, following Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.695 of 2 July 2018, designating 7 April as the AU Day of Commemoration. This year marks the 32nd commemoration of the 1994 genocide. Coming amid mounting atrocity risks in several conflict settings, this year’s session may be shaped not only by remembrance but also by a sharper focus on prevention.
It is to be recalled that the last session of the Council on this theme at its 1272nd session called on member states to put in place legislative and institutional measures to prevent hate ideology, hate crimes and genocide, to confront genocide denialism and urged improved collection of data on hate crimes including through strengthening of the cyber capabilities of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). In addition to encouraging collaboration with digital platforms, the media and civil society to counter content that incites hatred and violence, it also called for the establishment of a continental research centre on hate speech and genocide ideology. Yet many of the priorities identified in that session remain unfinished, and events observed in some conflict situations underscore the urgency of some of the measures.
Among the key unfinished items is also the long-pending review by the Panel of the Wise on the status of implementation of the recommendations issued by the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events. This review carries particular weight given the enduring relevance of the Panel’s own warning that, ‘if there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen.’ That conclusion speaks to a central lesson of the 1994 Genocide: the atrocity was not inevitable, but was enabled in part by the failure of both African and international actors to act preventively before the violence escalated and to stop it once it was underway. It was precisely in response to that failure that, during the transition from the OAU to the AU, Africa’s continental body departed from a rigid reliance on non-interference and instead anchored itself in the principle of non-indifference, as reflected in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. In this respect, the memory of Rwanda is not merely historical; it is bound up with the very normative and institutional foundation of the AU. The issue is equally salient for the PSC, particularly in light of Article 7 of its Protocol, which mandates the Council ‘to anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity.’
The fight against genocide ideology, together with the observance of the commemoration of the 1994 genocide, is also about reaffirming a collective responsibility to the promise of ‘never again’ and the principle of non-indifference. Indeed, remembrance was not just about paying respect to the victims and survivors, but an occasion to renew commitment to prevention. In that context, Dieng underscored that when honouring the victims of the genocide against the Tutsi, ‘we should be looking back, but we should also be looking forward,’ since ‘the commitment not to forget and the commitment to prevent are two sides of the same coin.’ Developments over the past year, and the realities still unfolding today, have only reinforced the urgency of that message.

Most notable in this respect is the situation in Sudan. In April 2025, amid rising hate speech and ethnically driven violence in Darfur, the UN Fact-Finding Mission warned that the ‘darkest chapters’ of the conflict may still lie ahead. By February 2026, the same Mission found that the Rapid Support Force (RSF) had carried out a coordinated campaign of destruction against non-Arab communities in and around El Fasher, the hallmarks of which point to genocide. At the Human Rights Council’s 38th Special Session on the situation in and around El Fasher in November 2025, Adama Dieng, presenting a joint statement also on behalf of Mr Chaloka Beyani, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, stressed that ‘the risk of genocide exists in Sudan. It is real, and it is growing, every single day.’ The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)-led joint fact-finding mission report further underscores Sudan’s relevance to the upcoming PSC session. It documents racially and ethnically motivated violence, including attacks on non-Arab communities such as the Massalit, Fur and Zaghawa, as well as hate speech, incitement and patterns of abuse that may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. For the PSC, Sudan thus stands as the clearest contemporary illustration of the cost of failing to translate early warning into timely political and protective action.
There are also concerns over the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the nexus between armed conflict, identity-based mobilisation and hate speech has become increasingly pronounced. By September 2025, the UN Human Rights Office warned that hate speech and ethnically motivated attacks had increased in Kinshasa and the Kasai provinces against people presumed to be associated with the M23. Human Rights Watch (here and here) has also documented the targeting of Banyamulenge communities and pointed to the growing salience of anti-Banyamulenge and anti-Tutsi sentiment within the broader conflict environment. Taken together, these developments illustrate how identity-based hostility, inflammatory rhetoric and communal targeting not only inflame the conflict but also make the resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC more difficult. It would therefore be of interest for PSC members to hear from Dieng on his assessment of the principal risk theatres on the continent and on the practical steps needed to ensure that the AU reverses the betrayal of its foundational promise of ‘never again’.
Beyond Sudan and eastern DRC, developments elsewhere on the continent show that the risks associated with hate speech, exclusionary narratives and identity-based targeting are neither confined to conventional conflict settings nor limited to active war zones. The digital sphere is emerging as an increasingly important risk domain, with Africa-focused analysis warning that artificial intelligence (AI)-generated disinformation, deepfakes and the amplification of hate speech are reshaping the continent’s information environment. A similar preventive concern arises in North Africa, including notably in Libya and Tunisia. In Libya, the UN envoy warned the Security Council of a surge in xenophobic and racist hate speech inciting violence against migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and humanitarian organisations. In Tunisia, the forcible dismantling of camps housing sub-Saharan African migrants and the deportation of some of them revived concerns over racialised incitement. Taken together, these cases underscore the wider relevance of the upcoming session by showing that the danger posed by hate speech and identity-based hostility cuts across conflict, migration and digital spaces.
It is also expected that emphasis will be put on prevention through education and memory. In April 2025, UNESCO and Rwanda announced measures to strengthen the educational role of genocide memorial sites, including training staff to receive school groups, enhancing exhibitions, developing educational content for use in schools, digitising survivor testimonies and supporting social media campaigns to counter the falsification of historical facts and online misinformation about the Genocide against the Tutsi. During the AU’s 2025 commemoration, speakers similarly stressed the importance of the responsible use of media, both digital and non-digital, as well as AI and education, in preventing genocide and other mass atrocity crimes.
While not central to the immediate conflict-driven risk theatres likely to dominate the session, the UN General Assembly’s recent recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as the gravest crime against humanity carries wider normative relevance for the PSC’s discussion. It reinforces the importance of confronting the historical and contemporary legacies of racialised dehumanisation, denial and exclusion, and lends further weight to the view that remembrance, historical truth and accountability are integral to preventing hate-driven violence and atrocity crimes.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its concern over the persistent spread of hate ideologies, genocide denialism and incitement to violence in Africa. It may renew its call for AU member states to adopt legislation and institutions for the prevention and punishment of hate crimes and genocide, and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. The Council may also call for accelerated follow-up on the strengthening of CEWS cyber capacity, the improvement of hate-crime data collection and the development of partnerships with digital platforms, the media and civil society. The Council may further urge greater attention to contemporary situations where genocide and atrocity risks are manifest, particularly in Darfur, Sudan. It may welcome the continued engagement of the AU Special Envoy, encourage closer collaboration with RECs/RMs, civil society, women and youth actors, and call for follow-up on the Continental Research Centre on Hate Speech and Genocide Ideology, the Panel of the Wise review, and the operational linkage between remembrance, education and prevention.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - February 2026
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - February 2026
Date | February 2026
In February, under the chairship of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering five agenda items. All four substantive sessions happened as planned, including two informal consultations.
Out of the four substantive sessions, one session, had two agenda items, focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. The two agenda items were the only sessions held at the ministerial level during the month, while the rest were conducted at the level of permanent representatives. It is also worth noting that, among all the sessions, only one was held in an open format.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for April 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for April 2026
Date | April 2026
In April, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia will assume the Chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month outlines five substantive sessions covering a total of six agenda items. With the exception of one session scheduled at the ministerial level, all meetings are expected to be convened at the ambassadorial level. Of the six agenda items, two are country-specific, while the remaining four focus on thematic issues. In addition to these sessions, the PSC is also expected to undertake a field mission to South Sudan and travel to Kuriftu for the 5th Annual Joint Retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
On 8 April, the PSC will convene its first substantive open session on ‘Hate Crimes and the Fight Against Genocidal Ideology in Africa’, a meeting likely to be framed both as a standing thematic session and as a remembrance session taking place in close proximity to the AU’s annual commemoration of the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Institutionalized as an annual open session since the PSC’s 678th session, this year’s discussion is expected to build on the outcome of the Council’s 1272nd session held on 2 April 2025, which emphasized accountability, the fight against impunity, stronger national legal and institutional frameworks for prevention, enhanced early warning including cyber monitoring of online disinformation, and closer cooperation with digital platforms, media, and civil society. It is recalled that the AU appointed Adama Dieng as the first AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities in April 2024.
On 9 April, the PSC will hold its second session on the situation in the Central African Republic, shifting from the pre-election focus of its 1302nd session of 19 September 2025 toward a post-election assessment. While its previous meeting noted progress in electoral preparations, encouraged continued political engagement and confidence-building, and expressed deep concern over the humanitarian situation driven by insecurity, the upcoming session is likely to assess the aftermath of the polls. The confirmation of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s victory in January 2026 came amid opposition allegations of fraud. It may also be noted that the December polls, described by the UN as the ‘most extensive electoral operation’ ever undertaken in CAR and including the first municipal elections since 1988, marked an important political milestone, though one whose gains remain fragile. Council is likely to examine the management of post-election grievances while considering the need for continued political dialogue and institutional support. On the security front, some reduction in fighting was registered during 2025 following ceasefire and disarmament steps involving Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R). Yet, armed group activity, grave child-rights violations, attacks affecting civilians, and constraints on humanitarian access have persisted.
On 16 April, PSC is scheduled to convene a session on ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security in Africa’. On 20 March 2025, the PSC held its 1267th ministerial-level session on ‘Artificial Intelligence and its Impact on Peace and Security in Africa’, building on its earlier dedicated session (1214th) on the issue held on 13 June 2024. That initial session highlighted both the opportunities and risks associated with AI in peace and security contexts and tasked the AU Commission with undertaking a comprehensive study and proposing governance frameworks. The 1267th session further advanced these deliberations by proposing the mainstreaming of AI in peace support operations, early warning systems, and preventive diplomacy, while also calling for the development of an African Common Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. Some progress has since been made in implementing these decisions, notably through the establishment of the AU AI Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security. In December 2025, the Advisory Group convened in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss its future plans, including the development of a Common African Position on AI, and to deliberate on emerging AI trends, opportunities, and risks in Africa, as well as their implications for governance, conflict prevention, and stability. Additionally, the Strategic Assessment and Review of the Continental Early Warning System, held in November 2025 in Kigali, Rwanda, resulted in the adoption of a joint AU–RECs/RMs Roadmap to integrate AI into early warning processes. It is expected that the upcoming session will build on and further expand the PSC’s consideration of AI and governance, as well as peace and security in Africa. Following this session, the PSC is scheduled to undertake a field visit on 18 April to the Ethiopian AI Institute and the Science and Technology Museum.
On 20 April, the Council will convene for a briefing by the A3 on its activities. Since 1 January 2026, the DRC and Liberia have joined Somalia as part of the United Nations Security Council’s African members (A3) for the 2026 – 2027 period. The briefing is happening in line with longstanding commitments to strengthen coordination between the AU and the UNSC. This engagement originates from the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa held in Algiers in December 2013, which established that the A3 would provide quarterly briefings to the PSC on African issues on the UNSC agenda. This commitment was later reaffirmed during the 11th Oran Process in 2024 and was subsequently reaffirmed during the 11th Oran Process in 2024 and further institutionalised through the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at the PSC’s 1289th session on 24 July 2025, formalising requirements for regular reporting and structured engagement. In this context, the A3 are expected to brief the Council on their coordinated engagements in the UNSC over the past quarter, including efforts to harmonise positions, deliver joint statements, and assume a more assertive role within the UNSC, including as penholders or co-penholders on African files. The session is also likely to assess how effectively the A3 have navigated UNSC dynamics to influence deliberations and outcomes on key situations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and the Sahel.
Before convening its final session for the month, the PSC is scheduled to undertake a field mission to South Sudan from 23 to 25 April. This will mark the Council’s second visit since the renewed escalation of political and security tensions that continue to threaten the already fragile gains of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The mission comes at a critical juncture, as the country moves, under very tense security conditions, towards the planned elections in December 2026, amid persistent delays in implementing key provisions of the peace agreement, including transitional security arrangements, constitutional-making, and the unification of forces. Against this backdrop, the visit is expected to provide the PSC with an opportunity to directly engage with national stakeholders on the state of the transition, press on follow-up to its decisions, including the release of political prisoners and the return to political dialogue, and explore avenues for rebuilding trust among the parties.
The final session of the month, scheduled for 27 April, will consider two agenda items. The first will be addressed in an open session dedicated to deliberations on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa. Building on its previous engagements, the Council is expected to provide the PSC with an opportunity to take stock of ongoing deliberations on the future, effectiveness, and sustainability of AU-led and AU-mandated PSOs. In particular, the Council is likely to reflect on the shifting landscape in which these operations are deployed, including increasingly complex conflict environments, the rise of asymmetric threats, and the impact of evolving geopolitical dynamics on multilateral peace operations. It is expected that the session will reflect on how to reposition and repurpose AU-led peace operations in light of changing realities in terms of models, funding, and political legitimacy. The session is also anticipated to draw on emerging insights from the independent study on the future of peacekeeping commissioned by the UN Department of Peace Operations, with a view to distilling lessons relevant to the African context, particularly regarding mandate design, adaptability, partnerships, and the protection of civilians. However, a central focus of the discussion will likely remain the perennial question of financing AU PSOs.
The second agenda item will focus on the Council’s consideration of its field mission report to South Sudan.
As the final activity of the month, the PSC is scheduled to convene its 5th Annual Joint Retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on 29 and 30 April. It is recalled that, at its 1274th session, which considered the conclusions of the 4th Joint Retreat, the PSC requested the AU Commission and the APRM Continental Secretariat to ensure the implementation of the agreed conclusions and to report back at the subsequent retreat. This request builds on earlier decisions, including at the PSC’s 1191st session, where the Council called for the development of a matrix to track the implementation of past retreat outcomes for review and adoption. Against this backdrop, the upcoming retreat is expected to assess progress made in implementing previous conclusions and advance discussions on key priority areas, particularly early warning and conflict prevention.
Beyond the substantive sessions and activities, 7 April will feature the Flag Day ceremony for the newly elected members of the PSC, during which the flags of the newly constituted Council will be installed in the PSC Chamber. The ceremony will be accompanied by a briefing from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), as well as an exhibition marking the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. Commemorated annually on 4 April pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/97 of 8 December 2005, the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action has been observed by the PSC through dedicated sessions since 2019.
Beyond Communiqués: Charting the path for making the PSC fit to restore AU's agency in peace & security
Beyond Communiqués: Charting the path for making the PSC fit to restore AU's agency in peace & security
Date | 30 March 2026
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa
Ahead of the 1 April 2026, when the states elected during the 39th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly, including Somalia, which was elected for the first time, assume their seats in the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU is holding the induction of newly elected and returning members of the PSC in the Kingdom of Eswatini, starting today, 30 March 2026. In view of the expansion and entrenching of conflicts and crises on the continent and the need for a more effective role for the AU, a pressing issue for the newly constituted PSC is how to shift from the failing business-as-usual approach to its work and make itself fit for the peace and security needs of the continent in a time of major global shifts.

As extensively documented in, among others, the review of the PSC for 2025, the PSC did not garner a meaningful level of influence in either limiting the dynamics of conflicts on its agenda or in shaping peace processes relating to those conflict situations. As a result, the PSC and the AU are ignored or otherwise displaced. Such is the case in Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel and the DRC. For example, the six sessions that the PSC held on Sudan were of no consequence either in avoiding the de facto partition of Sudan or in contributing to the emergence of a credible civilian process that the AU is meant to lead on. Even in terms of the mechanisms it decided to institute, neither the mechanisms for investigating external interference in Sudan nor the presidential committee came into operation. In DRC, AU’s role in advancing peace got displaced, with the Luanda process giving way to the Washington DC and Doha processes.
The declining effectiveness of the PSC mirrors a broader erosion of political commitment to continental collective security. It is also importantly a product of PSC’s work, becoming more performative than consequential, at times its engagement dominated by thematic issues and often no effective action on specific conflict situations. Poor agenda setting and the reduction of PSC activities into a routine ritual-like processes are among the factors that account for this state of affairs in which the dire conflict situations are not approached with the urgency and seriousness they deserve.
Making the PSC fit for purpose and relevant to the peace and security situation of the continent requires changing these conditions. The agenda setting of the PSC and the policy deliberation of the PSC should prioritise and deploy the limited diplomatic institutional resources exclusively for addressing existing conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones. The PSC should thus have as a standing agenda on the most critical conflict situations, such as Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel, DRC and Somalia at least, on a quarterly if not on a monthly basis, during which the AU Commission presents reports for adapting AU engagement to the rhythm and needs of the conflict dynamics.
In the interest of optimising its very finite resources and ensuring sustained engagement on addressing these priority conflict situations with resolve and impact, the PSC should also adopt a moratorium on having thematic issues on its agenda.
Further to the foregoing, the PSC should also use its sessions for substantive deliberations rather than the ritualistic process of making formulaic statements, issuing communiques and meeting again to repeat the same cycle. It is necessary for the PSC to review its working methods on its decision-making process for making it results-oriented rather than the current focus on output, involving the adoption of a communique for every meeting. Not every PSC meeting has to result in the adoption of a communique, but it provides a platform for building consensus and negotiating on actionable decisions, deliberating on advancing implementation and undertaking strategic review. It is also necessary that PSC members focus on negotiating and adopting actionable decisions as opposed to the declaratory ones that dominate outcomes of PSC deliberations. To this end, they should negotiate on the actionable decisions required to respond to new developments, either in the conflict situation or in the peace process relating to that conflict situation. They should also use such negotiation sessions for clarifying on the financial and institutional implications of such decisions as well as on the modalities of implementation and clear assignment of responsibility for implementation and timelines for reporting back on follow-up and implementation.
Additionally, the effectiveness of the PSC is also affected by the willingness and ability of its members to shoulder the responsibilities of PSC membership as set out in Article 5, particularly its sub-paragraph 2. The current approach to PSC membership that puts a premium on rotation to the detriment of Article 5(2) criteria is undermining the effectiveness of the Council. It has limited the PSC’s normative and political weight, creating an enormous gulf between PSC decisions and their effective follow-through.
A criteria-based approach is essential to the PSC’s credibility, ensuring members demonstrate commitment, diplomatic capacity, and adherence to AU norms, preventing deliberations from becoming mere symbolism. Eroded standards have also diminished peer accountability, fostering weak enforcement, selective engagement, and inconsistent follow-through, much like past consensus-driven arrangements lacking commitment. Restoring effectiveness demands recommitment to criteria-based membership rooted in political credibility, capacity, and norm respect, bolstering authority and collective responsibility.
Not any less important for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is the need to align its current posture and practice with the statement of commitment it adopted during its solemn launching in 2004. Of significance in this respect is the commitment that ‘we shall ensure that the authority vested in the Peace and Security Council is fairly and proactively exercised.’ (emphasis added) The lack of alignment in recent times between the practice of the PSC and this commitment is one of the factors for the erosion of the credibility of the PSC. This has manifested itself not only in inconsistent application of AU policies and norms, such as in relation to unconstitutional changes of government, but also in the lack of fairness in the attention given in dealing with various conflict situations.
The PSC should also be proactive in its engagement with key peace and security events on the continent. This entails that the PSC operates as the first to speak on African peace and security issues and to ensure that it occupies the space for holding a leadership role. These (speaking first and holding the policy space) are necessary both for setting the agenda and exercising agency in peace and security decision-making on the continent.
All of the foregoing, however, requires the recommitment of PSC member states to the values and principles of the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. It also requires reestablishing the primacy of collective responsibility and solidarity over individual national interest in setting the program of work of the PSC and steering the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Council. Not any less important is the need for exercising a higher sense of responsibility both on the part of member states and the AU Commission, such as through making the requisite preparations for PSC sessions, upholding and ensuring respect for AU norms and principles and respecting decisions of the PSC, including in the timely submission of reports or updates.
Amani Africa welcomes the Global Solidarity Award bestowed on our Executive Director
Amani Africa welcomes the Global Solidarity Award bestowed on our Executive Director
Date | 30 March 2026
The Founding Executive Director of Amani Africa Media and Research Services, Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, received the Global Solidarity Award. Dr Dersso received the award at the annual award ceremony that the Coalition of Human Rights Defenders Kenya held in collaboration with the European Union Mission to Kenya on 27 March 2026 in Nairobi, Kenya.
The Annual Prestigious Award was launched in 2016 by the Defenders Coalition and the Working Group on Human Rights Defenders (HRD) as a protective strategy for human rights defenders and recognition of their work.

The 10th HRD Award event that brought together human rights defenders from across the 47th counties of Kenya and representatives of the UN, representatives of diplomatic missions and civil society organisations bestowed the award in four categories: Human Rights Defender of the Year, which went to CNN’s journalist Larry Madow, Upcoming human rights defender went to Kilifi-based Damaris Aswa, Munir Mazrui Lifetime Achievement Award went to Mombasa-based Human Rights Defender-Khelef Khalifa, and the Global Solidarity Award that Amani Africa chief received.
Dr Dersso received the award for ‘exemplary leadership and solidarity with diverse human rights struggles and…passionate contributions to peace, security, and justice in Africa.’ Commenting on the recognition, Dr Dersso stated that he is grateful for being associated with ‘the ten-year HRD Award and most importantly for the opportunity to celebrate the incredible women and men of courage whose struggle keeps the fire for justice, freedom and equality burning, making Kenya a shining global example and place of refuge (for many in the region).’ He further expressed his delight in being in the company of all those honoured during the ceremony.

Amani Africa welcomes the award as an inspiring recognition that will encourage us to further enhance the contribution and impact of the work of our institution.
Nicholas “Fink” Haysom: A Diplomat of Conscience in a Time of Diminishing Craft
Nicholas “Fink” Haysom: A Diplomat of Conscience in a Time of Diminishing Craft
Date | 19 March 2026
Abdul Mohammed
I write this with a heavy heart, but also with deep gratitude for a life that gave so much to the cause of peace, justice, and human dignity.
Nicholas “Fink” Haysom was not just another senior United Nations diplomat. He belonged to a fading breed — those who approached diplomacy and peacemaking not as a profession, but as a vocation. For him, diplomacy was not about position or protocol; it was about purpose, conviction, and an enduring commitment to humanity.
He was shaped in the crucible of the anti-apartheid struggle — a defining historical experience that produced a generation of leaders who understood injustice intimately and resisted it with both moral clarity and political discipline. From that struggle, Fink carried forward a rare combination: a principled legal mind, grounded in public service, and a political sensibility anchored in justice.
I first encountered Fink during the negotiations of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement. From the outset, I found myself under his wing. His style was neither loud nor imposing. He did not dominate the room; he stabilized it. He did not rush to solutions; he cultivated them patiently, with care and respect for complexity.
What distinguished him most was his discipline of listening.
Fink listened not as a formality, but as a moral act. He understood that conflicts are not merely technical problems to be solved, but historical and human realities to be understood. He gave conflict — and those shaped by it — the respect it deserved. He was meticulous in defining the problem before attempting to resolve it, a quality that is increasingly rare in today’s fast-paced and often superficial diplomatic engagements.
I later had the privilege of working closely with him again when he succeeded Haile Menkerios as the United Nations envoy during the final and most delicate phase of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. This was a moment without precedent in Africa — a negotiated separation of two states. The stakes were immense, the tensions acute, and the risks of failure catastrophic.
In that moment, Fink’s experience and judgment proved invaluable.
He played a supportive role not only in the negotiations themselves but also in managing the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. Under his stewardship, cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council reached a level of alignment and effectiveness that remains a benchmark in multilateral peacemaking.
He enjoyed the trust of President Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. Their relationship — forged in the shared experience of the anti-apartheid struggle — brought both political depth and personal trust to a process that required both in equal measure.
Fink was, in every sense, a diplomat’s diplomat.
But more than that, he was what I would call a people’s negotiator.
He was accessible, persuasive, and deeply grounded in the political realities of the conflicts he engaged with. He was never confined by the narrow boundaries of job descriptions. He worked tirelessly. He made time to listen. He was consistently — and quietly — the adult in the room.
In today’s landscape of mediation and diplomacy, there is a discernible deficit of such qualities.
Much of contemporary diplomacy has become procedural, transactional, and at times detached from the human realities it seeks to address. Even where technical competence exists, it is often not accompanied by the deeper attributes that defined Fink — care, moral seriousness, intellectual discipline, and a genuine commitment to the human consequences of conflict.
Fink was not an elitist negotiator. He did not practice diplomacy from a distance. His approach was people-centered. He remained constantly aware that behind every negotiation were lives at stake — communities disrupted, futures uncertain, and human dignity in peril.
He ensured that all parties remained mindful of the consequences of failure. Not through grandstanding, but through quiet, persistent reminder of what war does to people and societies.
Beyond the negotiating table, I recall with great fondness the many conversations we shared — political, reflective, and often filled with humor. There was laughter, even in the most demanding circumstances. There was ease without loss of seriousness.
Those of us who worked with him did not only grow professionally; we became better human beings.
Fink had a way of addressing those he held in regard: he would call you “comrade.”
In his usage, this was not a casual term. It was not merely a friendly gesture. It carried weight. It signified a shared commitment — to justice, to fairness, and to the collective struggle for a better world. It reflected a relationship grounded not just in familiarity, but in shared purpose.
In this, he embodied what we, as Africans, understand as Ubuntu — the idea that our humanity is bound up with one another.
He often spoke with admiration of President Mbeki’s “I Am an African” speech. And indeed, though South African by birth, Fink was, in the truest sense, a quintessential African diplomat and statesman.
As his friend in struggle observed, His life traced a seamless arc — from the struggle against apartheid, to service in democratic South Africa, to global peacemaking through the United Nations. There was no rupture, no loss of moral center. The values that defined him in struggle remained intact in power.
“This continuity is what made him rare.”
In a world where proximity to power often alters individuals, Fink remained anchored. He reminds us that leadership is not about office, but about the consistency of values across time and circumstance.
His passing invites not only reflection, but also introspection.
It compels us to ask whether the current generation of diplomats and mediators is equipped — not only technically, but morally — to meet the demands of our time. It challenges us to recover a diplomacy that is grounded in humanity, not merely in process; in substance, not only in form.
Fink did not simply practice diplomacy.
He dignified it.
His legacy will endure — in the peace processes he helped advance, in the institutions he strengthened, and in the lives he touched.
But more importantly, it endures as a standard.
A standard of what diplomacy can be at its best.
Farewell, Comrade.
May Allah grant him eternal peace, and may we find the courage to carry forward the work to which he devoted his life.
