Africa’s irreducible minimums for a renewed ‘partnership’ with France founded on a Sovereign Future
Africa’s irreducible minimums for a renewed ‘partnership’ with France founded on a Sovereign Future
Date | 12 May 2026
By Fadhel Kaboub and Joab Okanda
In a manoeuvre dripping with historical irony and geopolitical desperation, French President Emmanuel Macron is set to land in Nairobi on May 11. He will be in Kenya to co-host the “Africa Forward Summit: Africa-France Partnership for Innovation and Growth.” To the uninitiated, the title suggests a progressive leap into a shared future.
However, to those who have watched the sun set on Françafrique in the West, the subtext is clear: having been unceremoniously evicted from its traditional ‘stomping grounds’ in the Sahel, Paris is pitching its tent in East Africa, hunting for new deals to cover the haemorrhaging fortunes of a dying empire. Ahead of his arrival — incidentally on the Ides of March — three French warships docked at the port of Mombasa, carrying with them over 800 military personnel. They were riding on the wave of newfound defence cooperation between the governments of Kenya and France. Through this pact, France now has a new hunting ground in East Africa, complete with boots on the ground, sea and air. Kenya’s 142,400 Square Kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean, reputed for riches in fish, oil and gas, is in for a rude shock.
The irony is almost pathological. For over a century, France treated West Africa as a private warehouse. It did not merely colonize; it plundered, looted, and systematically attempted to dismantle the resilient African civilizations that predated its arrival. Its ‘assimilation’ policy remains the most abhorrent, ignoble of colonial concepts; a cultural and political mis-philosophy designed to supplant African languages, customs, and identities with French surrogates.
When other colonial powers were loosening—however reluctantly— their grip, France was tightening its hold through a web of lopsided financial and military pacts.
With the rising tide of political ‘wokeness’ across the continent, however, France now finds itself sorely ostracized, and endangered. Yet, rather than offering atonement, the French leadership has chosen to grandstand. The mask slipped definitively earlier this year when Macron, frustrated by the anti-French revolts sweeping through former colonies, dropped the pretence of diplomacy. ‘I think someone forgot to say thank you,’ he remarked, with the chilling entitlement of a landlord demanding gratitude for a house he broke into.
Fast forward five months, and this same ‘savior’ is now knocking on East Africa’s door, hat in hand, seeking a ‘new partnership built on equal ground.’
The sudden pivot is driven by a cold reality: France’s ‘green’ future is powered by African minerals. While the lights of Paris stayed bright on the back of Niger’s uranium, Africa remained in the dark.
But as the Nairobi summit approaches, Africa must move beyond being a passive host. If Macron and his European contemporaries truly seek a partnership of equals, they must meet a set of non-negotiable demands that protect African interests, specifically within the environment and energy sectors.
First, a mandate for local beneficiation and value addition. Africa will no longer be a mere pit stop for raw material extraction. The Nairobi summit must establish a framework where no critical mineral—lithium, cobalt, or uranium—leaves the continent in its raw state.
Africans must demand that French and European companies invest in local processing plants and refineries. If the ‘Green Transition’ requires African minerals, then the ‘Green Industrialization’ must happen on African soil, creating African jobs and keeping the value chain within our borders.
Second, total transformation of the financial architecture and the CFA Franc. For a nation that has enforced financial slavery through the CFA Franc since 1945, Macron’s talk of “financial reform” must be met with scepticism. Africa must demand the total dismantling of the colonial financial umbilical cord. Africa requires a global financial system that does not penalize African nations with ‘sovereign risk’ premiums that make green energy projects three times more expensive here than in Europe. It must demand the unconditional return of foreign currency reserves held in Paris and a shift toward independent, African-led monetary policies.
Third, energy sovereignty over ‘green exportation’. France proposes to ‘decarbonize’ Africa, yet many of our nations have barely “carbonized” to begin with. African ‘partners’ must demand energy justice. This means the right to achieve universal electrification. Africa must reject a ‘Green Deal’ that forces Africa to export its renewable energy (like green hydrogen) to Europe while her own hospitals and schools remain off the grid.
African energy needs must be met first; exports to Europe come second.
Fourth, technology transfer, not just licensing. True innovation is not found in buying French software; it is found in owning the source code. The Nairobi summit must secure commitments for the unconditional transfer of green technologies. Africa should not be a ‘market’ for European patents; it must be a co-owner of the intellectual property that will define the 21st century.
Fifth, climate reparations and debt cancellation. Already, France is active in ‘debt-for-development’ swaps. Africa must demand that these are not treated as ‘gifts’ but as partial down-payments on a century of ecological and economic debt. Africa should also insist on total cancellation of debts that were accrued through colonial-era structures. Climate finance must be provided as grants, not loans that further burden Africa’s children for a climate crisis they did not create.
Sixth, accountability for multinational conglomerates. Total Energies, Orano, and Eramet – over 60 CEO’s from French corporations at the summit – must answer tough questions at the summit. They ought to answer for their extractive interests that have historically disadvantaged the continent. Across Africa, communities have borne the environmental, social, and economic costs of such operations, with countries like Mozambique offering stark reminders of the consequences.
The companies must agree to be held to African environmental standards, not just French ones, and a legal framework that allows communities to sue French corporations in both African and French courts for environmental degradation and human rights abuses.
There can be no ‘partnership’ where companies operate with impunity in the Global South while preaching ‘ESG’ values in the North.
Seventh, an end to paternalistic ‘security’ pacts. Finally, Africa demands an end to the ‘policing’ of the continent. True peace and security come from economic dignity, not from the 60+ military interventions France has conducted since 1960 to protect its interests. Africa must demand the closure of foreign military bases that serve extractive interests and a shift toward supporting African-led, autonomous security architectures. If partnership means equality, then reciprocity is simple – every French soldier granted access and immunity in Africa should be matched by an African soldier with the same rights in France, and every square metre of African soil used by French armed forces in Africa should be matched by an equal measure of French territory granted to African armed forces.
The ‘New Scramble’ is couched in the language of ‘climate resilience’ and ‘debt-for-development swaps.’ But beneath these green platitudes lie a hidden quest: to re-establish unfettered access to Africa’s critical minerals.
Africa must stay circumspect. The convergence of military signalling and corporate presence must worry all countries participating in Nairobi. They must watch out for unequal relationships under new language.
The ‘disinherited’ continent has found its voice. Africa is no longer interested in being a marginal chapter in a European story, not even with a thousand summits. If President Macron wants a ‘thank you,’ he should start by returning what was stolen from Africa and respecting the sovereignty he so arrogantly claimed to have authored. The era of the ‘political orchestra’ directed from Paris is over. The music has changed, and Africa is finally playing its own tune.
Fadhel Kaboub is Associate Professor of Economics at Denison University, President of the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, a member of the United Nations High-Level Advisory Board on Economic and Social Affairs at UN-DESA, and author of Global South Perspectives on Substack.
Joab Okanda is a Kenyan author and climate, energy, and development expert with extensive experience in research, policy, and advocacy at regional, continental and global levels. He is a Pan-African voice on just transition, climate and economic Justice, with a strong commitment to advancing just and equitable systems across Africa.
Fifteen Years of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda at the AU Peace and Security Council
Fifteen Years of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda at the AU Peace and Security Council
Date | 8 May 2026
INTRODUCTION
Against the background of the persistence and escalation of threats to physical & social security of women and girls amid escalating and persisting conflicts, shrinking civic space, and the marginalisation of women from peace processes in various settings on the continent, this special research report examines the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) fifteen-year engagement with the WPS agenda, assessing both progress achieved and enduring gaps. It situates PSC deliberations within Africa’s evolving conflict dynamics and evaluates the extent to which normative advances have translated into operational impact across conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations, and accountability mechanisms. The report argues that renewed political will, institutional coherence, and sustained resourcing are essential to ensure that the WPS agenda functions not only as a set of principles, but as a strategic tool for addressing Africa’s contemporary peace and security challenges.
Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa
Discussion on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime in Africa
Date | 5 May 2026
Tomorrow (6 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1345th session on African Strategies for Combating Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Briefings are expected from representatives of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL).
In 2019, during its 845th session, the Council decided to institutionalise an annual session on TOC as a standing agenda item. Beyond dedicated sessions, the Council has repeatedly expressed concern over TOC in conflict-specific and thematic sessions, particularly those on terrorism, illicit economy and small arms proliferation, and has acknowledged the convergence between TOC and terrorism.
The last time the Council convened on this issue was at its 1279th meeting, held on 14 May 2025, under the theme ‘Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region.’ Unlike that meeting, tomorrow’s session is not region-specific, offering an opportunity to consider the trends and developments at a continental level and to follow up on key outcomes of the 1279th session.
The Global Organised Crime Index 2025 provides an important evidence base on recent developments and trends relating to TOC. Its Africa-specific findings show steady growth in criminal markets and actors since 2019, with financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, counterfeit goods and arms trafficking among the most pervasive TOC markets on the continent. It also highlights regional diversity: human trafficking, arms trafficking and human smuggling in East Africa; financial crimes and cannabis trade, along with human trafficking in North Africa; non-renewable resource crimes in Central Africa; cocaine trafficking in West Africa; and wildlife crime in Southern Africa. This calls for tailored and regionally grounded responses.
A central issue for the PSC is that TOC is no longer merely a law-enforcement concern, but a structural peace and security threat that erodes sovereignty, weakens institutions, fuels corruption, sustains conflict economies and creates structures that undermine legitimate sources of authority. In various conflict settings from the Sahel, Sudan, Somalia and Great Lakes, terrorist armed groups, insurgents, and militias increasingly intersect with and draw on TOC networks and markets. In the Sahel, terrorist groups and criminal groups draw revenue from illegal gold mining, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, kidnapping, fuel smuggling and drug trafficking, while exploiting livelihood vulnerabilities in a region where informal work and artisanal mining sustain millions. Similar dynamics affect the Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, Libya, Somalia, North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The PSC may therefore stress a multidimensional response to TOC that goes beyond criminal justice, combining borderland development, legitimate governance, service delivery, law enforcement and community resilience, including livelihood support.
The link between TOC and illicit arms flows is another major concern. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, described small arms proliferation as ‘a cancer’ driving instability across the continent, from the Sahel to the Great Lakes. In West Africa alone, around 12 million illicit arms are circulating, used by terrorist groups, vigilantes, self-defence groups, bandits and civilians who feel abandoned by the state. Their proliferation transforms local disputes into deadly conflict. Counter-TOC relating to illicit arms flows should therefore be linked to efforts at curbing SLW stockpile management, arms tracing, diversion control, and disarmament initiatives.
These include the call for an AFRIPOL-anchored continental criminal intelligence mechanism, criminal corridor mapping and tailored responses to criminal flows. It further requested the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on TOC, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations, and to present the study to the PSC.
It is of interest to the PSC that the networks and corridors of TOC are mapped to inform targeted response. In this respect, several criminal corridors have been identified. These include: the Lagos–Kano–Agadez–Tripoli route for migrant smuggling and Tramadol trafficking; the Bamako–Gao–Tamanrasset route for arms and fuel trafficking; the Dakar–Ziguinchor–Bissau route for cocaine from Latin America, the Diffa–Lake Chad–Maiduguri route linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) logistics, and the Port Sudan–Khartoum–Bangui corridor for arms trafficking. The Global Initiative-TOC Risk Bulletin on arms trafficking routes in Mali shows that disrupted routes pushed traffickers and armed groups to seek alternative routes and weapons sources. The Illicit Hub Mapping in West Africa 2025 report maps 350 illicit hubs across 18 countries and identifies five accelerant markets: kidnapping, cattle rustling, illicit arms, illicit gold and extortion/protection racketeering. The tracing and operation of these various routes highlights the importance of following up on one of the outcomes of the last PSC session on TOC. It is to be recalled that the PSC tasked the AU Commission to coordinate AFRIPOL and others in ‘developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’
Corruption and state-embedded criminality are also central to the discussion. TOC often thrives where institutions are weak, compromised or penetrated by criminal interests, enabling illicit networks to evade accountability, influence decision-making and undermine the rule of law. As Global Initiative-TOC’s analysis of the role of state actors and armed groups in the conflict in Eastern DRC shows, conflicts can become structurally criminalised where armed actors and state-linked networks benefit from illicit resource extraction. African strategies should therefore treat anti-corruption, institutional resilience, financial investigation, asset recovery, judicial cooperation and public integrity as core peace and security tools, integrating them into conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding, stabilisation, security sector reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).
Given the transnational character of TOC, border governance remains a major issue. Borderlands are often areas of weak state presence, but also livelihood spaces where communities depend on cross-border trade, pastoral mobility, family networks and informal markets. Criminal networks exploit these same routes. The Niamey Convention remains relevant not only for border security but also for local development, cross-border governance and conflict prevention.
The session may also benefit from considering emerging and non-traditional forms of TOC, which are increasingly shaped by new technology and artificial intelligence (AI). African strategies should therefore address conventional trafficking alongside cybercrime, AI-enabled fraud, online exploitation, digital finance, crypto-enabled laundering and the criminal use of logistics and technology platforms, consistent with the 1279th session’s concern over the co-option of new technologies by criminal actors.
Institutionally, addressing the transnational dimension of organised crime requires leveraging the role of AFRIPOL, CISSA and AUCTC. The 1320th meeting on Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Security Outlook adds an operational layer by calling for AUCTC–CISSA–AFRIPOL horizon-scanning briefings, a dynamic risk-mapping tool, stronger cyber and digital-threat monitoring, and a continental working group on illicit financing, including hawala/mobile-money networks used by extremist groups.
Another policy area concerns peace operations. Recent work on TOC and peacekeeping and TOC and UN peace operations underlines that organised crime can undermine peace operations by financing armed groups, distorting local economies and weakening political settlements. AU-led and AU-authorised missions, therefore, need a stronger analytical capacity to understand criminal economies without being transformed into anti-crime agencies.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express deep concern about the growing threat of TOC in Africa and its linkages with terrorism, illicit arms flows, corruption, illicit financial flows, trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, illegal mining, cybercrime and environmental crime. It may underscore the need for adopting a multidimensional African strategy that goes beyond security and law enforcement instruments. It may call for targeted enforcement, financial investigations, criminal justice cooperation, border governance, anti-corruption measures, livelihood alternatives, legitimate local governance, service delivery and community resilience as critical measures to address the underlying factors that make TOC possible. The PSC may reiterate its call for enhanced cross-border cooperation, leveraging the Niamey Convention, improved weapons management, joint border management and strengthened coordination of police, intelligence, customs, border-control, financial intelligence and judicial institutions. It may further urge Member States to domesticate and implement relevant continental and international instruments, combat money laundering and illicit financial flows. The Council may also call for the AU Commission to present a comprehensive report on trends in TOC in Africa, including criminal corridors, sources of financing, links with armed actors and impacts on local populations. The Council may also underscore the need for a whole-of-AU system approach, emphasising coordination among AFRIPOL, CISSA, AUCTC, the AU Border Programme, the African Governance Architecture, the AU Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA-NEPAD), the PCRD Centre, the African Development Bank and RECs/RMs.
The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions
The impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions
3 May 2026
Tomorrow (04 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1344th session to consider the impact of climate change on the crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions.
The session will open with remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are also expected from Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE); Mamadou Tangara, High Representative and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Mali/Sahel; and Marie Jose Samba Ovono Obono, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Chad. Representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are also expected to deliver statements.
The climate, peace and security agenda has been a standing item on the PSC’s programme since its 585th session in March 2016, when the Council committed to annual deliberations on the nexus between climate change and security. This engagement has since intensified, with the PSC now holding two sessions annually on the theme—amounting to over 18 sessions to date—reflecting the growing prominence of the issue. While previous deliberations have referenced the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel within broader discussions, the upcoming session appears to be the first dedicated engagement focused specifically on these regions.
The crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel unfolds within a complex socio-ecological system in which environmental stress, livelihoods, demographic pressures, governance deficits, and insecurity interact in mutually reinforcing ways. In line with the PSC’s consistent framing, climate change operates as a ‘threat multiplier,’ exacerbating existing vulnerabilities rather than acting as a direct cause of conflict. As underscored in its 1301st session in September 2025, climate change is a ‘risk multiplier’ that aggravates vulnerabilities, heightens insecurity, and undermines livelihoods, thereby exacerbating existing conflicts and creating new security challenges or social, economic, and environmental factors that can lead to food insecurity, forced migration, conflict and economic disruption through extreme weather events like droughts and floods.
In the context of the Lake Chad Basin, as highlighted in the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for Boko Haram-affected areas, the shrinkage of Lake Chad is often attributed to climate change and desertification, with associated livelihood losses sometimes linked to increased vulnerability to violent extremism. The lake’s surface area declined dramatically from 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to about 1,300 km² in the 1980s—a reduction of nearly 90 per cent. Today, it fluctuates between 8,000 and 14,000 km² depending on rainfall patterns. However, the environmental reality is more complex. Communities around the lake have historically adapted to cyclical flooding and fluctuating water levels, developing resilient livelihood strategies over generations. In recent years, however, more frequent and intense flooding, combined with long-term environmental changes, has placed a growing strain on these adaptive capacities. This pressure is compounded by rapid population growth, which has significantly increased competition over limited and variable natural resources. At the same time, ongoing conflict has further degraded environmental conditions by disrupting agricultural systems, destroying infrastructure, and eroding local knowledge. These intersecting pressures—climate variability, demographic change, and insecurity—have reinforced longstanding marginalisation and underdevelopment, creating conditions in which radical narratives and armed groups persist.
The Sahel is among the regions most vulnerable to climate change globally. Temperatures are rising about 1.5 times faster than the global average, with projections indicating an increase of at least 2°C by 2040. This has profound implications for populations whose livelihoods depend heavily on climate-sensitive sectors, with 60 to 80 percent engaged in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing. According to the African Climate Risk Assessment, climate-related security risks in the Sahel stem from the interaction of environmental stress and structural fragility. Livelihood insecurity is central, as dependence on climate-sensitive sectors like farming and pastoralism makes land and water disputes a flashpoint for conflict. Armed groups exploit weakened state presence and economic hardship to recruit, while coping strategies such as charcoal production and artisanal mining worsen deforestation and finance insurgency. Migration, once an adaptation tool, now often fuels displacement, resource competition, and trafficking. Notably, in the Lake Chad Basin, instability is driven less by absolute resource decline than by environmental variability.
Governance and institutional capacity remain central to the climate–security nexus. The PSC has consistently underscored that climate stress translates into insecurity primarily in contexts where state institutions are weak, absent, or unable to manage competing demands over scarce resources. In such settings, limited capacity to regulate resource use, mediate disputes, and deliver basic services allows localised tensions to escalate into broader violence. Armed groups have proven adept at exploiting these conditions. Across both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, extremist organisations have embedded themselves within local socio-economic systems, leveraging grievances linked to marginalisation, livelihood loss, and state neglect. Climate-induced economic hardship expands the pool of individuals vulnerable to recruitment, while weak governance enables these groups to operate with relative freedom and, in some cases, to position themselves as alternative providers of order and livelihoods. As noted during the PSC’s 1301st session, inadequate adaptation systems can transform climate shocks into insecurity, whereas effective governance can channel similar pressures into cooperation.
This governance challenge is compounded by limitations in existing early warning systems, which remain largely reactive and insufficiently equipped to integrate climate indicators such as rainfall variability, drought cycles, and water stress. The PSC’s 1114th session of 18 October 2022 emphasised the need to incorporate such indicators into early warning frameworks, thereby linking environmental stress more directly to peace and security responses. At the same time, structural constraints—including limited access to climate finance, technological gaps, and broader global inequalities—continue to restrict the capacity of countries in these regions to respond effectively to climate-related risks.
Mobility adds further complexity to this landscape. Movement in search of water, pasture, and economic opportunity has long been a defining feature of communities in the regions and a key adaptation mechanism to environmental variability. However, the scale and patterns of mobility have shifted in recent years. Poorly regulated cross-border movements have contributed to localised clashes between farmers and herders, particularly in resource-scarce areas, illustrating how climate-induced mobility, absent cooperative governance, can undermine stability. Large-scale displacement driven by both conflict and climate shocks has also placed considerable pressure on host communities, especially in urban and peri-urban areas with limited infrastructure and services. At the same time, restrictions on movement, whether due to insecurity or policy measures, can undermine traditional coping strategies and exacerbate vulnerability. Mobility thus presents a paradox: it remains essential for resilience, yet, when poorly managed, can become a source of tension.
These dynamics are further reinforced by feedback loops between climate stress and conflict. Insecurity disrupts agricultural production, limits access to land, and damages critical infrastructure, thereby weakening the capacity of communities to cope with environmental shocks. In turn, climate stress deepens poverty, displacement, and governance fragility—conditions that sustain and intensify conflict. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle in which environmental degradation and insecurity mutually exacerbate one another, making stabilisation through conventional security responses alone increasingly difficult.
The AU has established important normative frameworks to address this nexus, including the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032), the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, and the draft Common African Position on climate, peace and security. At the regional level, the revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) for the Lake Chad Basin provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the multidimensional nature of the crisis. For the Sahel, the Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance and Development, led by former Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou and jointly launched by the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel in September 2022, provided a strategic assessment of the region’s underlying challenges, including climate change. The report was discussed during the 8th AU–UN annual conference in October 2024, but its uptake within AU processes and practical relevance as a policy framework remains unclear.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, particularly in Mali, and may highlight the role of climate change in amplifying existing vulnerabilities. It may also underscore the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS SRR 2.0) as a robust framework for addressing the multidimensional challenges facing the Lake Chad Basin, and stress the need to mobilise adequate support for its effective implementation. The PSC may further reiterate the importance of integrating climate indicators into early warning systems to strengthen risk analysis and enable timely preventive action. Echoing the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment, it may emphasise the need for greater horizontal integration between climate and weather-related early warning systems and conflict early warning mechanisms, as well as stronger vertical coordination across continental, regional, national, and local levels. Recognising the transboundary nature of climate-induced mobility and resource competition, the PSC may call for enhanced collaboration among Member States, regional mechanisms, and relevant climate institutions, including the Sahel Climate Commission. In addition, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening governance and state presence, including improving service delivery and rebuilding trust between states and communities, as essential conditions for preventing climate pressures from translating into conflict. Finally, the PSC may underline the importance of adequate and equitable access to climate finance, which requires increased international support and strengthened African-led financing mechanisms, including the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Climate Change, as decided at its 984th session.
Mediation in a fragmented world, Speech of IGAD Executive Secretary
Mediation in a fragmented world, Speech of IGAD Executive Secretary
Date | 28 April 2026
Excellencies,
Honorable Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Affairs
Distinguished participants,
Colleagues and friends,
We gather today at a moment of profound consequence—
not only for our region,
but for the very idea of peace mediation itself.
This is not an ordinary moment.
And this is not an ordinary gathering.
We meet at a time when the foundations that once sustained mediation are under visible—and growing—strain.
The world that made mediation possible—anchored in shared norms, functioning multilateralism, and a minimum level of trust among states—is fragmenting before our eyes.
We are not simply living through a period of crisis.
We are living through a transformation.
An era in which mediation is no longer insulated from geopolitics—but shaped by it.
An era of competing initiatives, fragmented authority, and diminishing coherence.
An era in which legitimacy is no longer assumed—but must be earned, patiently and politically.
At the same time, mediation is unfolding in an increasingly transactional environment.
The space for principled, consensus-based engagement is narrowing, while short-term deal-making is gaining ground.
And yet—precisely because of this—mediation has never been more necessary.
Before I proceed further, allow me to express our profound appreciation to our host country.
We are honored to convene this important gathering here in Nairobi.
I wish to extend our deepest gratitude to His Excellency President William Ruto, to his government, and to the people of Kenya for their unflinching and consistent commitment to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.
Kenya’s role in advancing mediation and peaceful resolution in this region is both distinguished and enduring.
Its leadership—political and material—has been indispensable to IGAD’s work.
We are equally blessed by the presence of our Guest of Honour, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, the Honourable Musalia Mudavadi.
Your Excellency, your diplomatic skill, your generosity toward IGAD, and your consistent service to peace are deeply valued.
It is therefore most fitting that we are holding this reflection here in Nairobi—in recognition of Kenya’s leadership and commitment to peaceful solutions.
May I respectfully request that you convey to His Excellency the President and to the people of Kenya the collective gratitude of all those gathered here and of IGAD.
For IGAD, mediation is not optional.
It is our most visible political responsibility.
Our people do not measure us by what we promise—they measure us by what we prevent.
By the wars that do not happen.
By the conflicts that do not escalate.
And by the peace that becomes possible.
Mediation is where the credibility of multilateralism is tested.
And in our region, it is where history will judge us.
The Horn of Africa stands at a dangerous crossroads.
What we are witnessing is not a series of isolated crises—but the emergence of a system.
A system of conflict that is interconnected, regionalized, and deeply entangled with external dynamics.
The boundaries between internal and external have blurred.
The lines between political conflict and geopolitical competition have all but disappeared.
Wars today are fragmented, prolonged, and sustained by war economies.
There is no longer a single center to negotiate with.
What does mediation look like in a world without a center?
We are not starting from zero.
IGAD carries a proud legacy of mediation.
These efforts succeeded because they were anchored in legitimacy, guided by political clarity, and supported by real coordination.
But if our past gives us confidence—our present demands honesty.
Mediation today is under strain.
Too often, it risks becoming crisis management rather than conflict resolution.
Because mediation is not technical.
It is political.
It is about power.
It is about legitimacy.
And ultimately—it is about building a shared future.
We must confront a growing tension.
Between principled mediation and transactional deal-making.
How do we end violence quickly—without undermining sustainable peace?
This is the central dilemma of our time.
This is why this conference matters.
We must reclaim mediation as a political strategy.
Restore multilateral coherence.
And place people—not processes—at the center.
Distinguished participants,
We must also speak plainly about Sudan.
Three years into a devastating war, mediation has not stopped the carnage.
Despite sustained efforts, the latest being the Berlin Conference—including by multilateral institutions—we have neither halted the fighting nor secured a credible political process.
This is failure.
And it must be acknowledged.
Sudan is fast becoming the epicenter of a deeper crisis—the erosion of mediation itself.
If mediation cannot make a difference in Sudan, its credibility everywhere is at risk.
What must change is clear: mediation must become unified, politically anchored, and strategically coherent—or it will continue to be outpaced by the wars it seeks to resolve.
The cost of failure is not abstract.
We cannot normalize permanent war.
We cannot accept fragmentation as destiny.
What the Horn of Africa requires is not management, but resolution.
It requires political courage.
And strategic clarity.
Let this be a moment of decision.
A decision to restore mediation.
A decision to act with urgency and purpose.
Mediation is what we can do.
Mediation is what we must do better.
Let this conference mark the beginning of that commitment.
I thank you.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2026
Date | May 2026
In May, the Federal Republic of Nigeria will take over the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions, covering six agenda items. The PPoW additionally envisages the induction of the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) and a joint retreat of the PSC, the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) sub-committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, (GSC) and Administrative Matters and the Board of Trustees (BoT) of the AU Peace Fund.
All four sessions are scheduled to happen at the ambassadorial level. No provision is made for an open session of the PSC. Except for one session, all the sessions are envisaged to be held virtually. Except for one country-specific session, all the other sessions focus on thematic issues, including the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force for the Lake Chad Basin. Many of the agenda items have a regional focus covering West Africa and adjacent areas.
The first session of the month is scheduled to be held on 4 May on the theme ‘Impact of Climate Change on the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions.’ This will be the second session of the PSC this year to be held under the climate change theme, building up from its 1331st session held on 19 February 2026. However, this focuses on the climate shock impacts in relation to the crises in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the Sahel regions. The session is expected to review recent developments on the impact of climate change in LCB and the Sahel and the ways in which such impact intersects with insecurity in these regions.
In the LCB region, the local economy of the people depends on the lake activities such as fishing, agriculture and pastoralism, especially in the upper catchment of the lake. Historically, Lake Chad covered about 25,000 km² but has reduced to less than 2,500 km², drastically affecting livelihoods and economic activity. Lake Chad’s shrinkage in a context of heightened need and greater weather extremes is driving loss of livelihoods, displacement and rising tensions over access to depleting resources. The vulnerability that this induces in a context of growing demands and lack of alternative sources of livelihoods, along with the weak presence of the state, is taken advantage of by Boko Haram and its factions, including Islamic State West Africa Province and JAS, for recruitment and to sustain their operations in the region. The Sahel is one of the world’s most vulnerable regions in terms of the effects of climate change. It has been projected that temperatures in the Sahel will rise by at least 2°C in the short term (2021-2040), a rate 1.5 times higher than the global average. While the resultant climatic conditions do not on themselves lead to conflict, they heighten existing vulnerabilities and accelerate existing conditions of insecurity in the Sahel, which is experiencing farmer-herder conflicts and conflicts involving terrorist groups.
The next session, set for 6 May, will focus on a ‘Discussion on African strategies for combating Transnational Organised Crime (ToC) in Africa.’ It is worth recalling that during its 845th session held on 25 April 2019, the PSC had decided to hold an annual session on the theme of ‘transnational organised crime and peace and security in Africa.’ Since then the PSC has held five sessions the PSC has since then held five annual sessions with a hiatus in 2023. This session comes against the backdrop of deepening security challenges, increasingly marked by the expanding nexus between transnational organised crime and terrorism. The 2025 Africa Organised Crime Index reported that the most pervasive organised criminal activities were financial crimes, human trafficking, non-renewable resource crimes, the trade in counterfeit goods and arms trafficking. This session thus provides an opportunity for looking into updates on recent trends and developments in organised crimes in Africa and the impact thereof on peace and security.
The last time the PSC convened to discuss this theme was during its 1279th session held on 14 May 2025, which focused on ‘Discussion on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel.’ Among other decisions, Council tasked the AU Commission to ‘coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities.’ Another assignment was for the AU Commission, in coordination with AFRIPOL, AUCTC and CISSA, to carry out a comprehensive study on organised transnational crime, peace and security in the Sahel region, detailing its nature, origin, sources of financing and impacts on local populations and to present the study to the PSC. This session thus additionally serves as an opportunity to receive an update on the progress made in these respects.
On 8 May, the PSC will have a Joint Retreat with the PRC GSC Bureau and BoT of the AU Peace Fund. This retreat comes almost two months following an engagement between the PSC and Donald Kaberuka, the AU Special Envoy on Sustainable Financing for the Union and Financing for Peace in Africa. The meeting focused on enhancing the utilisation of the Peace Fund and advancing efforts to secure sustainable and predictable financing for peace operations in Africa. In October 2024, the PSC convened virtually for its 1236th meeting for an engagement with the Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial, and Administrative Matters (GSCBFAM). A session which widely focused on the Financing of PSOs and AU peace and security activities. The session called for the review of the annual budget ceiling for PSC activities, and, in the spirit of diversification of funding, highlighted the need for ‘developing innovative financial mechanisms to allow for the AU to respond to emerging security threats.’ This retreat will therefore provide an opportune platform for discussions on strategic engagement around new funding sources and appropriate modalities for accounting for their use, as well as enhanced coordination between the key bodies on the use of the Peace Fund.
The next session, scheduled for 15 May, will be on the theme ‘Update on the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).’ The last time the Council considered this agenda item was on 30 January 2025, during its 1257th session, in which the discussions touched on the continued support for the RECs/RMs in establishing and sustaining regional logistics depots, sustainable financing for PSOs, and the integration of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL and IHRL) into the ASF doctrine, as captured in Amani Africa’s January 2025 Monthly Digest. It is expected that the PSC will receive updates on recent developments and the next steps towards the full operationalisation of the ASF.
On the same day, the PSC will get a ‘Briefing on efforts towards the Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’ During Council’s 1275th meeting held in April 2025, it emphasised the need for the ‘Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) to report on its activities regularly to the Council’ following its endorsement by the Council as a ‘standing, ready–to–deploy force, capable of rapid and coordinated regional maritime security responses in the Gulf of Guinea Region.’ Apart from review of the state of operaitonalisaiton of the CMTF, the session will be expected to give an update following Council’s requests to the AU Commission, through the PSOD, to ‘take practical steps to collaborate with the CMTF in the Gulf of Guinea to identify the capacity needs of the Task Force and to provide such support, including from the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) to position the Task Force as a critical naval component of the ASF, operating in the Gulf of Guinea region.’ Additionally, the session will provide the opportunity to build up discussions on the Council’s previous request on the ‘need for establishing a multidisciplinary task team to follow up on the operationalisation of the CMTF.’
On 18 May, the PSC will have the last substantive session, covering two agenda items. The first item will be ‘Update on the Stabilisation activities of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin.’ A session which is expected to provide update on implementation of previous PSC decisions including from its last 1318th session held on 15 December 2025, in which Council tasked the AU Commission, in consultation with the UN to consider the application of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to fund the MNJTF activities, and the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understanding and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) that guides the provision of the AU’s additional support to the MNJTF for a period of one year, starting from 1 February 2026 to 31 January 2027. Additionally, Council was also tasked to support the mobilisation of resources that include air, amphibious assets, anti-drones and anti-IEDs before the commencement of Operation Lake Sanit III. The session is also expected to evaluate the Lake Chad Basin’s security situation and the MNJTF’s operations against Boko Haram and its offshoots, JAS and ISWAP, which remain significant threats to regional stability.
The second agenda item will be ‘Update on the political transition and security situation in Guinea-Bissau.’ This will be the second session on the situation in Guinea-Bissau held this year, building up on the 1333rd session, and the third time the PSC convenes to consider the situation in the country since the military coup of 26 November 2025, which disrupted the 23 November electoral process. Council directed the AU Commission to sustain engagements with the transition government of Guinea-Bissau, including providing technical support to the National Election Commission with a view to promoting its independence, transparency and institutional integrity. The session will offer a platform to review progress so far toward restoring constitutional order and to follow up on decisions adopted at the 1333rd meeting, especially on the Council’s request for the development of an integrated plan for security sector reform, with the support of the AU Commission and international partners.
In addition to the PSC sessions, the PPoW envisages two sessions of the PSC sub-committees. The first of this is the meeting of the PSC CoE for an ‘Informal Experts (AU-wide) Session on the AU Liaison Offices (AULOs) Assessment Report.’ This is expected to be the session where the PSC CoE will receive a briefing on the assessment carried out on the state of AULOs. It is worth recalling that on 15 August 2025, the PSC added to its programme an agenda item covering, among others, ‘…CoE Report on the Review of the AU Liaison Offices’; however, the Report on the Review of the AULOs was not finalised as of the time of the convening. Currently, AULOs established by the PSC decisions are: the AULO in Burundi and the Great Lakes Region (Bujumbura), in CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Libya (Tripoli, which was temporarily relocated to Tunis), in Madagascar, AULO for Mali and Sahel (Bamako), in South Sudan, and in Sudan (Khartoum, temporarily relocated to Addis Ababa). Meanwhile, the AULO in Liberia was closed in June 2019, and the AULO in Comoros was closed in May 2017. The AULO in Western Sahara was also closed in March 2016.
On 13 May, the other PSC Subcommittee, the Counter-Terrorism Subcommittee, will meet for a discussion on the Draft 5-year AU Continental Counter Terrorism Strategic Plan of Action. It is worth recalling that the CoE convened for its 78th meeting on 1 August 2025 for discussions on the reactivation of this PSC Sub-Committee, in particular the development of the ToR of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter Terrorism. Two weeks later, on 15 August 2025, the PSC met for its 1297th meeting to adopt the ToR of the Sub-Committee, which outlines the Sub-Committee’s objectives, mandate, composition and operational modalities, aiming to enhance the PSC’s ability to respond to terrorism through African-led strategies, coordination with the RECs/RMs and collaboration with AU bodies like the AUCTC, AFRIPOL and CISSA.
In addition to the foregoing sessions of the PSC and its sub-committees, the PPoW also envisages the 17th High-Level Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa to be held in Libreville, Gabon, from 20 to 22 May. In addition, on 25 and 26 May, there will be the induction of the sixteenth cohort of the PSC CoE to be held in Abuja, Nigeria. This will also involve engagement with the Sub-committee on Counter terrorism and the National Counter Terrorism Centre.
In the footnote, the PPoW also envisages a possible engagement of the Chairperson of the PSC at the Fourth India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-IV) to be held on 31 May in New Delhi, India.
IGAD mediation conference warns risk of ‘nations’ or ‘parts of nations’ becoming objects of acquisition as ‘peace’ gets commercialized
IGAD mediation conference warns risk of ‘nations’ or ‘parts of nations’ becoming objects of acquisition as ‘peace’ gets commercialized
Date | 28 April 2026
Speaking about the challenge that the shifting global dynamics poses to mediation, Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary and Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs, Musalia Mudavadi, warned that ‘Peace has been privatized. Perhaps even commercialized’. ‘Because it is about transactions,’ he explained. And ‘[i]t is no longer (about) humanity. It is no longer about lives.’
Kenya’s chief diplomat said this in his opening address at the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) conference underway in Nairobi Kenya, under the theme ‘Reimagining Mediation in a Fragmented World: The Challenge to African Multilateral Leadership’, a mediation reflection conference being held on 27 and 28 April 2026 as part of the 40 years anniversary of the regional body.
The conference that brought together seasoned mediators, mediation experts and researchers from the IGAD region, other parts of Africa and the world came at a time when, as the Executive Secretary of IGAD and host of the conference, Dr Workneh Gebeyehu pointed out in his address, Africa, specifically the Horn of Africa’ stands at a critical moment, the same as the world, characterised by the emergence of a system of conflict’.
Mudavadi made the point about commercialization of peace while expounding on his core argument that ‘the mediation landscape’ faces the ‘dual challenge of protracted and mutating conflicts’ and ‘rapidly shifting global dynamics’. In this shifting global dynamics, he posed a blunt question, asking ‘when you go to mediation, are you going there as a business negotiator? Are you going there as an arbitrator of transactions? or are you going there genuinely as mediator to see peace in the countries facing conflict?
Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary was not alone in drawing attention to the challenge posed by transactional approaches. IGAD’s chief underscored the need for confronting ‘a growing tension between principled mediation and transactional deal making.’ According to Dr Gebeyehu, ‘the central dilemma of our time’ is: ‘How do we end the violence quickly without undermining sustainable peace?’
Experts noted that mediation was never free from transaction. Indeed, experts admitted that ending the fighting, which is what transactional peace deals focus on, is necessary. However, as Martin Grifith, Former UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, pointed out, a truce or even ceasefire alone will not be enough to bring about sustainable peace.
Abdul Mohamed, a leading expert who played leading role in conceptualizing the conference as senior advisor to the IGAD Executive Secretary, agreed with Grifith that, without peace agreement on the substantive or underlying issues, such truce or ceasefire faces collapse.
IGAD’s chief echoed this point in his framing address when he said ‘too often’ mediation ‘risks becoming a crisis management rather than a conflict resolution (instrument).’
It is not simply the fact that transactional deal making stops at securing truce or ceasefire and does not concern itself with the underlying issues that makes it concerning when compared to what Dr Gebeyehu called ‘principled mediation’. It is the fact that it centres deal making or business negotiation rather than the issues that precipitated the conflicts.
For Kenya’s Prime Cabinet Secretary, this has a bigger danger. That danger has to do with the question he asked of whether ‘we are facing a new definition of sovereignty.’ Rather than just ordinary deal making or transaction, he said ‘we are now seeing in conversations discussions that talk of possible acquisition of nations or part of nations, a completely new dynamic is taking place.’
In some of the most pressing conflicts in Africa such as Sudan, this carries very alarming dangers. Thus, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Ambassador Mohamed Belaiche was emphatic in affirming the centrality of the principles relating to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan. These principles, he argued, ‘serve as a legal and moral safeguard against the…imposition of fete accompli.’ Thus, he insisted that ‘any serious political process must begin with a clear rejection of any infringement upon the unity of Sudan.’
In a remark he made while moderating the morning sessions, Solomon Dersso, Amani Africa’s Founding Director, noted that if the emerging trend is terrifying to the world, it must be more terrifying for us in Africa both because of our vulnerability and Africa’s own bitter experience with earlier processes of ‘acquisition of nations’. He stated that the grave dangers the emerging dynamics carry should remove any sense of complacency we in Africa may have to fend off against the grave dangers of transactionalism.
