On the eve of Christmas, the UN Security Council (UNSC), against the background of its deepening polarization over its failure to mobilize collective action on the war in Gaza, pulled off a Christmas surprise. In a rare show of unity, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 2719 (2023). After years of, sometimes unsuccessful efforts, this resolution establishes a framework towards providing predictable and sustainable financing for African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations (PSOs) authorized by the Security Council through UN assessed contributions, seizing the new momentum that arose in 2023.

The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, welcomed the resolution calling it rather enthusiastically a historic development. Not surprisingly and considering the strong view that members of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) expressed on the issue of capping access to UN assessed contributions to a particular percentage, this resolution was not greeted with as warm a reception from all its member states.

The first opportunity for the PSC’s reaction to resolution 2719 following its adoption was in the context of the preparation of the report on its activities and the state of peace and security for submission to the 37^th AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government. The PSC report deemed the resolution as constituting an ‘initial step’, ‘inconsistent with the guidance provided by the Assembly’ and ‘contrary to the guidance provided by the PSC to the A3’. As we have reported in an earlier analysis based on extensive engagements and exchanges, this was not completely unexpected.

To the extent that AU’s deployment is in lieu of UN peacekeeping and as one avenue for implementing the primary responsibility of the UNSC, the expectation for the use of UN assessed contributions with no cap is not without merit. After all, the issue of predictable, adequate and sustainable funding of AU PSOs is principally about ‘the kind of arrangement that can best deliver on the pledge of the UN Charter for saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ rather than being about money, as we have argued in our briefing to the UN Security Council.

“To the extent that AU’s deployment is in lieu of UN peacekeeping and as one avenue for implementing the primary responsibility of the UNSC, the expectation for the use of UN assessed contributions with no cap is not without merit.”

At the same time, it is also important to put the adoption of this resolution in a historical perspective. This resolution was a result of more than a decade-old discussion and several attempts by the African members of the UN Security Council (A3) over the years. Particularly, in 2018, the A3 (Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia) managed to get an endorsement from the AUPSC for a draft resolution which they put in blue but was ultimately halted due to a U.S. veto threat, reticence by other Council members including the P5, and internal A3 divisions.

A comparative analysis of these two texts clearly highlights the global shift in perspectives. As discussed in our special research report and became apparent during the 25 May 2023 UNSC briefing on the subject, this shift includes, particularly among key Security Council members, greater appreciation of the role of AU PSOs and the need to finance them in a more sustainable and predictable manner, including through UN assessed contributions.

The two texts (the 2018 draft and resolution 2719) have significant similarities along with some major differences. Both underscore the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security and emphasize the oversight responsibilities of the Council for AU PSOs. They highlight the importance of cooperation between the UN and the AU, in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, to address conflicts in Africa effectively and acknowledge the need for collaboration with regional organizations, neighboring countries, and other relevant partners to address conflicts on the continent.

Both 2719 and the 2018 draft draw upon the Report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454) particularly in the areas of joint or consultative planning, mandating and decision-making, financing and budgeting processes, and human rights compliance and oversight.  However, Resolution 2719, unlike the 2018 draft resolution that was put in blue, notably emphasizes that AU PSOs will be ‘under the direct, and effective command and control of the African Union.’

“Resolution 2719, unlike the 2018 draft resolution that was put in blue, notably emphasizes that AU PSOs will be ‘under the direct, and effective command and control of the African Union.’”

Resolution 2719 specifies detailed procedures for decision-making and authorization, including consultations, joint strategic assessments, and clear mandates. Conversely, the 2018 draft focuses more on the Security Council’s role in decision-making, with fewer details on specific procedures. While resolution 2719 clearly stipulates a joint decision-making process, the draft of 2018 gives the primary political role to the Security Council in areas such as planning, development, mandating (including renewal) and reporting of any AU PSO receiving financial support through UN assessed contributions.

In terms of financial arrangements, resolution 2719 establishes financial arrangements with detailed provisions on compliance with UN financial regulations, reimbursement frameworks, and the use of assessed contributions. It sets a hybrid approach to funding, with 75% from assessed contributions and the rest mobilized jointly by the AU and UN from the international community. The 2018 draft acknowledges the complementary role of UN Peacekeeping operations and stipulates the Council’s decision ‘in principle’ to use (on a case-by-case basis) UN-assessed contributions, not exceeding 75%, for AU-led peace support operations. However, it stays silent about how the 25% should be covered and provides fewer details on financial arrangements and oversight mechanisms.

Regarding financial burden sharing, the 2018 draft welcomed the AU’s commitment to fund 25% of AU peace support operation costs by 2021. While it envisages a joint AU-UN exercise to fill the 25% gap, resolution 2719 does not impose any specific financial contribution to be shared by the AU. Furthermore, it stipulates the Council’s commitment to consider all viable options in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilization.

“While it envisages a joint AU-UN exercise to fill the 25% gap, resolution 2719 does not impose any specific financial contribution to be shared by the AU.”

On human rights, resolution 2719 specifies compliance frameworks in detail, highlighting the operational necessity for AU-led PSOs to adhere to international law and other compliance frameworks, including human rights and humanitarian law. It emphasizes the protection of civilians, women’s participation, and collaboration in operational support. On the other hand, though draft resolution 2018 also emphasizes the importance of human rights protection, compliance with international law, and cooperation between the UN and AU, it provides fewer specifics on compliance frameworks.

The 2023 resolution includes detailed reporting and monitoring requirements, with mission specific reports every 180 days, an annual report, and a review three years after adoption. It emphasizes joint reports by the UN Secretary-General and AU Chairperson. Both expressed the Council’s intention to review any determination to provide financial support three years after such a decision.

Both the level of detail outlined in the resolution and the level of autonomous control that the AU maintains under resolution 2719 constitute positive gains over the 2018 draft. Indeed, the PSC report also did not stop at registering reservations both on process and substance. It took a realistic approach on how to take resolution 2719 forward.

“Both the level of detail outlined in the resolution and the level of autonomous control that the AU maintains under resolution 2719 constitute positive gains over the 2018 draft.”

The PSC report accordingly recommended to the AU Assembly to ‘take note’ of the resolution as ‘an initial step’ towards securing predictable, adequate and sustainable financing of AU-led PSOs. The AU Assembly, welcomed the decision as a ‘significant step forward towards securing predictable, adequate and sustainable funding’, with some leaders expressing strong support for it. Most significantly, the PSC recommended for the AU Assembly to urge the ‘full implementation of the resolution, in good faith, honoring the purpose and principles of the Charter… and …Article 24 of the Charter.’ Thus, despite the reservations or misgivings expressed on the part of AU policy bodies, the call for full implementation avails the opportunity for harnessing the value proposition of this resolution with all its limitations. A saying that aptly captures this take of the AU on resolution 2719 is ‘the taste of the pudding is in the eating.’ Indeed, whether this resolution constitutes a landmark development in responding to the long quest for predictable, adequate and sustainable funding would depend on its activation and implementation.

“A saying that aptly captures this take of the AU on resolution 2719 is ‘the taste of the pudding is in the eating.’”

Beyond its expected contribution to financing, the value of resolution 2719 in reinforcing the role of the AU in deploying PSOs and in bringing the application of its multilateral and normative policies and rules to all missions seeking to benefit from UN assessed contributions cannot and should not be overemphasized. This is made evident from the provision in the resolution that the Council will consider requests for support from UN assessed contributions only to those AU PSOs under the AU’s direct and effective command and control. The nature of the interactions and engagement that the decision-making processes and the reporting requirements entail are also sure to transform the working relationship between the AU and the UN.

Admittedly, while the extent to which it would indeed contribute towards addressing the perennial issue of predictable, adequate and sustainable funding of AU PSOs would become known and tested when the first test case arises, it should also be borne in mind that the devil lies in the implementation details. At the operational level, AU Commission personnel have started to indicate that the administrative and procedural requirements of 2719 may, in the end, limit speedy deployment and operational effectiveness considering the type of kinetic heavy role expected of AU PSOs. This reality is despite the recognition in the resolution of the aim of ‘early action and rapid deployment to prevent violent conflict and its escalation.’

Clarity on the details and the effective operationalization of resolution 2719 depends on answering a number of key questions. These include:

• How would the diagram of consultative decision making that the Secretary-General presented in his report on options for authorization and support for AU PSOs be translated into action?
• What are the processes for activation of the resolution? Who from the AU and the UN plays what role in the activation of the resolution?
• What kind of working arrangements need to be put in place in New York and Addis Ababa to this end?
• What kind of working processes and relationships need to be established or enhanced between the AU and the UN? Should a standing joint taskforce or working group of AUC PAPS and the UN Secretariat be established to interface continuously from the outset of any indication of the need for a 2719-type mission?
• How can the ‘primacy of political solutions’ be maintained in 2719-type missions, recognizing that such solutions are the best pathway for sustainable peace? How can APSA tools be effectively strengthened and leveraged toward that end?
• What kind of capacities need to be reinforced on the part of the UN, including in terms of the role of the UN Office to the AU in Addis Ababa to provide continuing support to the AU not only in mission planning, but also in mission management and, in due course, liquidation?
• What of the capacities at the level of the AU in areas such as planning, monitoring, reporting, strategic assessment, compliance, budgeting, financial compliance and reporting, etc?
• Does it matter how the 25% is mobilized? Should there be and is there a relationship between the 75% and the remaining balance?
• What are the processes, not only just for decision-making, the authorization and use of UN assessed contributions but also for mandate review and renewals?

Clearly, a lot of work has to be undertaken to clarify these and related questions while bearing in mind that the answers to some of the questions may vary from case to case. It is only after such clarification and in the course of implementation that the actual worth of resolution 2719 would become apparent. Various commentaries and articles have recently been published to help enhance understanding on resolution 2719. A nice such recent work that actually offers some useful materials for responding to some of these questions is here.

“Clearly, a lot of work has to be undertaken to clarify these and related questions while bearing in mind that the answers to some of the questions may vary from case to case.”

We recognise that not all the answers may be immediately available and that the resolution may be vague in certain critical areas to maintain ‘constructive ambiguity’ and ensure consensus in the Security Council. Hence, the proof of the 2719 pudding will be in its operationalization in specific cases. Pending the required level of clarification to all these and related questions and to avoid disappointments on both sides, it is worthwhile that the AU and the UN engage in exchanges for developing the minimum required shared understanding of what resolution 2719 means and may require for its implementation.

By Dr Tekeda Alemu
Former State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the UN

It is perhaps important to highlight two perspectives with respect to how the reform of the Security Council is more often than not, assessed and evaluated – one which is negative and considers the whole effort as almost worthless and essentially ‘unproductive quagmire’ and the other, rather hopeful and ambitious with perhaps a little unrealistic expectation which is rooted in the tendency to understate the obstacles. In fact, as we shall see in due course those obstacles are indeed huge, and nearly insurmountable.

The New Agenda for Peace, which is essentially a sequel to the 1992 Agenda for Peace, makes it all too apparent how much the world has changed in the last thirty-two years. It might not be proper to embellish the early 90s with exaggerated adulation, for it was also a period of the marginalization of Africa, but, no doubt, in terms of peace the world was in a much better situation than today. The security council was also less dysfunctional at the time. Now, we are in a new period which has potentially become more dangerous.

In the New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General of the United Nations does, among other things, two things which are equally very important. On one hand, he shows how much there is disappointment among nations and people over the failure of governments and international organizations to deliver  for them.

As a consequence, he stresses, lack of trust in the potential of multilateral solutions has been growing. But the Secretary-General doesn’t stop there and is far from proposing that we wallow in despair. There could be a way out of this situation which nonetheless can be achieved only if the benefits of international cooperation become tangible and equitable, and states manage to overcome their division and seek pragmatic solutions to their problems. This is essentially a call for new multilateralism which, as he says, ‘demands that we look beyond our security interests’ and can be ‘pursued only alongside sustainable development and human rights’. Then the Secretary-General makes in the same New Agenda for Peace a very important point which makes the focus on the reform of the Security Council so critical. The following is what he says and deserves to be cited in full:

‘Building this new multilateralism must start with action for peace; not only because war undermines progress across all our agendas, but because it was the pursuit of peace that in 1945 united states around the need for global governance and international organization.’

As was said   earlier,   and   as   has   now   become universally accepted, the Security Council has become dysfunctional. Even earlier, the Council has never been fully functional. It is to be recalled that at the height of the Cold War, efforts to avert crisis leading to war, which would have been suicidal was handled through bilateral contact and negotiation between the two Super Powers of the day whereby third parties and the United Nations were mere spectators. One recalls the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

But, no doubt, the very philosophy and principle underpinning the special mandate of the Security Council as it relates to the Permanent Five and the veto power allows those countries to enjoy special privileges. At the creation of the United Nations and the drafting and approval of the Charter, it was felt that those privileges accorded to the Permanent Five though indicating asymmetry among  member  states,  nonetheless helped maintain the peace and contributed to protecting the security of all.

The question now is, does this continue to be the case? Does the special privilege the Permanent Five continue to have help maintain peace and promote security? Or is it the case that what we see is in fact the opposite and that the Permanent Five far from contributing to peace and security have indeed become the source of the problem.

It is thus impossible to deny that there is a clear anomaly here which would have called for action if such action were to lead to the resolution of the problem. But under the circumstances, the hands of member states are tied by Article 108 and 109 of the Charter which make it impossible to amend the Charter without the consent of the Permanent Five. Article 109 allows the convening of a General Conference by a two-thirds vote of members for reviewing the present Charter, but as in Article 108, any change of the Present Charter requires agreement by all members of the Security Council.

What is aggravating the whole problem is the fact that those from whom so much is expected for peace are seen to do very little and, in fact, have become a bane for peace. In what is becoming very alarming, the situation continues to deteriorate and global goods are becoming bereft of reliable custodians. In the meantime, we realize that efforts are continuing at the United Nations by various groups among whom are the Africa Group, the group calling itself United for Consensus and the Group of Four, to promote their interests by securing positions in the Security Council that would allow them have greater voice.

At the end of the day, for most, perhaps unlike the Africa Group, the interest in having greater voice in the Security Council is in most cases a matter of prestige. There is also, no doubt, the possible potential reform of the Security Council has drawn the attention particularly of the Permanent Five, regarding the implication of the expansion of the membership of the Council for geopolitical matters and the balance of forces. Consequently, whatever is said by member states,  particularly by the Permanent Five without exception, what is most prominent behind those statements is consideration of national interest. That is bound to make it very difficult for Groups such as the Africa Group for whom the reform of the Security Council is indeed of great importance to make real progress.  This is going to require Africa to be wise, realistic and practical as it pursues it interest via the reform of the Security Council.

It might indeed be very fruitful to consider how Africa could take advantage of the situation if it found itself within a Security Council that has undergone through reform. Well, it all depends, among other things, on the kind of reform that the council might have gone through. With the situation of the Security Council remaining the same and the same Permanent Five wielding the same power, it is very difficult to imagine that there would be much difference in the situation from what it is today. But this perhaps deserves a closer look.

The Ezulwini Consensus is a common Africa position on the reform of the Security Council adopted in 2005. It calls for democratizing the Council and expanding its membership. The specific demand on the part of Africa is for two permanent seats and additional three non-permanent ones.

It is perfectly possible and legitimate to raise issues surrounding matters regarding the implementation of the demand, provided that the initial obstacle is overcome, i.e, there is consensus on accepting the Africa demand. What is important, first of all, is the acceptance of the legitimacy of the demand by Africa in light of its democratic nature and also given the totally dysfunctional nature of the Security Council at present, with little prospect that it would improve. When judging the Africa request it is very critical to consider how much effectively the present Council has assisted Africa to resolve its security challenges. The mantra or the phrase, African solutions to African problems, may not be fully in line with the principle of universality that underlines the very existence of the United Nations, but, on the other hand, that it might reflect the frustration of Africa at the double standard Africa often faces cannot be ruled out.

What all this seems to suggest is that the outcome document of the Summit of the Future, the Pact for the Future, if it is to be taken seriously, would need to take seriously the African common position. It wouldn’t help to focus on the potential weakness of the common position which can be rectified in due course. Obviously, as already indicated, the likelihood that the Permanent Five would allow amendments of the Charter to proceed, despite the creation of the impression to the contrary, is nearly zero.

Under these circumstances, one course of action that should be considered is the convening under Article 109 of the Charter, of a General Conference of the members of the United Nations for the purposes of reviewing the Charter. This can be done at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. But then paragraph 2, of the same Article109 requires the recommendation of the Conference to be ratified by all Permanent members of the Security Council. It seems no matter what we do, it appears that the hands of Africa would continue to be tied as far as finding a way out of this predicament.

But the advantage of the review conference is it might help to hold the feet of the Permanent Five to the fire, thus making it difficult for them to pretend to be supportive of the reform without actually doing so. But all the same, it might be useful to stress that the idea of the General Conference may need to be pursued seriously, including with the view to ensuring the idea to be included as part of the Pact for the Future.

However, there is a need for an important caveat here. What Africa needs to consider very seriously is what it needs to do to sort out its internal problems, both at individual country level as well as at  the  multilateral  level, both at continental and regional levels. Let us be honest, we are not in good shape in all those levels. Our demand, our wishes and recommendations would be taken seriously when we also work hard in putting our house in order.

There is a lot of work that needs to be carried out in this regard. There is no other way to ensure that our interests are promoted.