PSC ministerial meeting on Libya

PSC ministerial meeting on Libya

Date | 18 April 2023

Tomorrow (18 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1149th meeting to assess the situation in Libya, with a particular focus on promoting national reconciliation. This session is expected to take place at a ministerial level.

The session is set to commence with the statement of the Chairperson of the PSC, Nabil Ammar, Foreign Minister of Tunisia followed by statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The PSC is expected to receive statements from Jean-Claude Gakosso, Chair of the AU High-Level Committee for Libya and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) and Head of UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSML), Abdoulaye Bathily. As the concerned country, the representative of the State of Libya is also expected to make a statement.

It is to be recalled that on 08 January 2023, a preparatory meeting for a Libyan national reconciliation conference took place in Tripoli, with the support of the AU, particularly the High-Level Committee on Libya chaired by the Republic of Congo.

The 36th AU Summit that took place on 18-19 February 2023 in Addis Ababa also recognised the significance of the National reconciliation process in the run up to the national elections and welcomed the convening of the preparatory meeting in January with the support of the AU High-Level Committee. It also encouraged continued efforts by the Libyan authorities and the AU High-Level Committee towards the organisation of the national reconciliation conference in an inclusive manner. At its previous session dedicated to the situation in Libya – the 1136th meeting – the PSC commended efforts geared towards the convening of the national reconciliation conference and underscored the critical need for continued AU role in promoting national reconciliation and stabilisation in Libya. Tomorrow’s session provides the opportunity for the PSC to follow up on efforts being made to organise the national reconciliation conference which is expected to take place over the coming months. The AU Commission and the Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee are expected to provide details on progress made with respect to finalizing the plan for the convening of the reconciliation conference. In this respect, it would be of interest to members of the PSC to get information on details of the precautions including modalities of determining participation to ensure inclusivity, state of agreement with key stakeholders on the agenda of the reconciliation conference, follow up on outcomes including coordination with other processes such as the effort to achieve agreement on the constitutional framework and the timelines for convening elections, with a view to finding a lasting and comprehensive solution to the country’s protracted political crisis.

In its 1136th meeting, the PSC also decided to undertake a field mission to the country to demonstrate solidarity with the Libyan people and engage with all key stakeholders ahead of the national reconciliation conference. At tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC may also follow up on this decision and preparations of the plans for this field mission.

This year marks the 12th anniversary of the Libyan revolution but ‘Libya’s political class is going through a major legitimacy crisis’, as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Abdoulaye Bathily, informed the Security Council in his 27 February 2023 briefing. Since the postponement of elections that were supposed to be held in December 2021, the political impasse between the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, Abdulhamid Al Dabiba, and Fathi Bashagha, the Prime Minister-designate nominated by the House of Representatives (HoR), remains unresolved. The Libyan people appear to be extremely frustrated by the status quo which has become untenable. A major focus of regional and international efforts has, therefore, been to resolve this political crisis in order to pave the way for the completion of the Libyan transition through the holding of presidential and legislative elections.

Since his appointment in September 2022, Bathily has been undertaking extensive consultations with the Libyan stakeholders as well as other regional and international partners in an effort to break the political impasse. The Special Representative has already informed the Security Council of his decision to establish a High-Level Panel for Elections (HLPE) which will be comprised of all relevant Libyan stakeholders, including representatives of political institutions, major political figures, tribal leaders, civil society organizations, security actors, women, and youth representatives. Its main responsibility, according to Bathily, will be to facilitate the adoption of the legal framework and roadmap for the holding of elections in 2023 and provide a platform for building consensus on matters such as election security and the adoption of a Code of Conduct for all candidates. Yet, the success of this formation depends on the buy-in from the rival political and security forces, the composition of the Panel and the modalities it uses for resolving disputes. Equally important is how this Panel can function effectively in the context of the continuing division involving two rival executive bodies of government. As critical is the follow up to the announcement made in Egypt by Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the HoR and Khaled Al-Mishri, Chairman of the High State Council (HSC) that they agreed to draw up a roadmap for completion of all measures necessary for the conduct of elections.

In February 2023, the Libyan HoR adopted an amendment to the 2011 Constitutional Declaration which set up a committee of 12 members, comprising six members from the HoR (the Libyan legislative body based in Tobruk) and six from the HSC (an advisory body established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement), to prepare for elections. In his briefing to the Security Council on 27 February 2023, however, Bathily said that the amendment does not address issues such as the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates which has been contentious. It does not also provide a clear road map and timelines for the holding of elections, Bathily noted, expressing his fear that further controversy may arise because of issues such as the regional representation in the Senate. The HoR disapproved this assertion and characterized it as inaccurate in a statement issued on 28 February 2023.  Nevertheless, in his briefing to the press on 11 March 2023, Bathily expressed hope that the 6+6 committee will address some of those issues and come up with a reasonable timeframe for the holding of elections. He also expressed the UN’s readiness to support the committee in discharging its responsibilities.

Security Council members issued a presidential statement on 16 March 2023, welcoming the progress in terms of the constitutional framework for the elections and encouraged the HoR and the HSC to continue building momentum towards the holding of elections in the country. They also expressed strong support for the efforts being exerted by Bathily and were encouraged by his initiative to set up the high-level panel, thus urging all stakeholders to cooperate and constructively engage with him. But the difference between 6+6 committee and the High-Level Panel does not seem to be very clear and is something that needs to be clarified.

While ensuring the conduct of elections remains critical to achieve full stability in Libya, success of the election depends on overcoming the institutional divisions reflected in the existence of rival executive arms of government and the lack or legitimacy afflicting much of the current Libyan institutions in the eyes of the Libyan public. The national reconciliation conference can accordingly be organized to mobilize and provide platform for the engagement of the wider society and to further buttress ongoing efforts to achieve consensus on modalities for convening of national elections including through the establishment of the High-Level Panel that Bathily proposed.

In the security front, with continued sporadic clashes between different armed groups and criminal gangs, the overall security in the country remains tense.  The situation has been further exasperated by external interference, including the activities of foreign fighters and mercenaries deployed in the country and the continued violation of the arms embargo imposed on Libya under Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) [S/RES/1970 (2011)]. The AU has been calling for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries and this was the subject of discussion at a meeting held by the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission (JMC) and liaison committees from Libya, Sudan and Niger in Cairo on 8 February 2023, which agreed on an integrated mechanism to facilitate this objective. The JMC also held its meeting in Benghazi on 7 April 2023 to enhance confidence among the Libyan military and security institutions in support of the political process and create a conducive environment for holding free and fair elections.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its full support and encourage efforts for the convening of the Libyan national reconciliation conference and urge all Libyan parties to participate in good faith in this process. It may further call on Libyan parties to work towards reaching consensus on finalising the necessary constitutional and electoral frameworks for the conduct of national elections. The PSC may welcome the ongoing effort for the convening of the national reconciliation conference under the auspices of the AU. It may urge all Libyan actors to collaborate with the AU to ensure the convening of an all-inclusive national reconciliation conference. It may also condemn and totally reject any external interference in the internal affairs of Libya and urge Libyan actors to prioritise unification and refrain from taking actions that will put at risk the country’s fragile stability. The PSC may express its concern over the continuing humanitarian and human rights crises affecting in particular migrants and refugees, and call on the relevant Libyan authorities as well as international actors to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and protection of populations in need. It may also reiterate the call made at its previous sessions, regarding the ‘urgent need for the AU Commission to ensure that the AU Mission in Libya is relocated to Tripoli and is sufficiently capacitated, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate and adequately support the AU’s efforts on Libya, in line with the Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.819(XXXV)] adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly’.


The Situation in Libya

The Situation in Libya

Date | 01 February 2023

Tomorrow (01 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), is scheduled to convene the very first meeting of the month at its 1136th session to receive updates on the situation in Libya.

Following opening remarks by Edward Xolisa Makaya, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of February, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to deliver a statement. Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson in Libya is expected to provide update on the situation in Libya. Republic of the Congo, as Chairperson of the High-Level Committee for Libya is also expected to make a presentation. The representative of the State of Libya, as the country concerned will also deliver statement. Representatives of the Libya Contact Group and Libya’s immediate neighbouring countries, as well as representatives from Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), North African Regional Capability (NARC), and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), as relevant Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to make statements. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) will also deliver a statement.

The last time the PSC convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Libya was at its 1091st session which took place on 29 June of the previous year. The challenges that continue hindering the conduct of general elections in Libya formed one of the main issues the PSC addressed at that session. In this regard, it is to be recalled that the PSC, while acknowledging and expressing full support to on-going political processes in Libya aimed at resolving issues impeding the conduct of elections, it urged Libyan stakeholders to reach consensus on the necessary constitutional framework and electoral laws and enable registered 2.8 million voters elect their leaders. In addition to providing general overview on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Libya, tomorrow’s session is expected to provide latest updates related to on-going efforts for the conduct of the much-delayed general elections.

One key new development with respect to processes aimed at resolving the political crisis in Libya has been the appointment of Senegalese Abdoulaye Bathily, as the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL. Since the former SRSG for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, Jan Kubis stepped down in late November 2021, the post has remained vacant while the UN chief appointed US diplomat Stephanie Williams as his Special Advisor considering her previous engagement as a UN deputy Special Representative in Libya. Since resignation of Williams in the end of July 2022, the mission has been functioning without the required leadership. Tomorrow’s session therefore presents the opportunity to welcome the appointment of Bathily to lead UNSMIL, and commend the Secretary-General and the UN Security Council (UNSC) for responding to PSC’s call for appointment of an African candidate.

Since the PSC’s last deliberation on the situation, the political impasse between the Tripoli based Government of National Unity (GNU) headed by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh on the one hand, and Fathi Bashagha, the Prime Minister-designate nominated by the east based House of Representatives (HoR) on the other hand, persisted with little to no progress. Although talks resumed between the speakers of the HoR and the High State Council (HSC) which functions as Libya’s Senate, agreement is yet to be reached between the two institutions on the necessary frameworks for the conduct of elections. On the economic track as well, Libya’s financial institutions continue to be divided despite on-going efforts to implement reform and reunification measures for the Central Bank.

While international efforts have predominantly been focused on the holding the general elections, the current reality on the ground seems to be revealing the need for strengthening parallel approaches that aim to resolve the political impasse and dispute over executive power. Without the necessary concerted international effort to overcome the fragmentation of government institutions and achieve integration, progress in the effort for reaching agreement on the necessary legal frameworks for the conduct of the national elections is likely to remain elusive.

The launch of Libya’s reconciliation process has been a welcome development on the other hand. Preparatory meeting for the Libyan national reconciliation conference was initiated on 08 January, in Tripoli, under the auspices of the AU. From the AU’s side, in attendance were President Macky Sall of Senegal in his capacity as the AU Chair; Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat and Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Claude Gakosso, on behalf of the Chairperson of the High-Level Committee for Libya, Denis Sassou Nguesso. From the side of Libya, key actors including Head of the Libyan Presidential Council, Mohammed Menfi as well as members of the HSC and HoR tool part in the meeting. If implemented in an inclusive manner that ensures the participation and involvement of all the pertinent institutions and sectors of society including civil society actors, the national reconciliation process can potentially serve to create the conducive political and social environment that would lend societal support to the effort to bring Libyan parties a step closer towards forging unity and reaching agreement on the modalities for conducting elections and forming a legitimate government.

The security situation in Libya remains worrying. Although sporadic, incidents of clashes between supporters of the two rival governments as well as attacks against civilians have characterised the security landscape over the past year. In late August 2022, the worst fighting the country has experienced in couple years broke out in Tripoli between armed fighters backing the GNU and Bashagha’s loyalists, reportedly claiming the lives of over 30 people and injuring hundreds more. The incident occurred as supports of Fathi Bashagha attempted for a second time to gain territory within Tripoli, the first attempt already staged earlier in the year, in mid-May. Further to constituting a clear violation of the October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement, these incidents complicate and impose considerable challenge to efforts aimed at the unification of Libya’s armed forces. Added to this is the continued presence of foreign forces in parts of Libya which compounds the security challenges that confront the country.

A critical aspect that warrants a close follow-up is also the nature of geo-politics in the wider eastern Mediterranean region and the consequent impact it entails to Libya’s internal affairs. With Turkey’s demonstrated political and military backing to the GNU and the signing of an agreement between the two in early October 2022 that allows the former to explore energy resources in disputed areas of the eastern Mediterranean Sea, tensions are likely to increase between Turkey and other countries in the region that are opposed to its military and economic reach in Libya. Left unchecked and with continued lack of unity among Libyan actors, such developments have the potential to revive divided foreign support either through open or tacit backing of the two governments in Libya, threatening to plunge the country back to a full-blown conflict.

Due to the protracted political crisis and the years-long armed conflict that only came to an end very recently, public services in Libya have been weakened considerably and struggle to properly address the humanitarian needs of affected populations. The UN estimates that nearly 526,000 people (including nearly 200,000 children) will require humanitarian assistance in 2023. Migrants and refugees hosted in both state operated and non-state operated centres continue to experience serious humanitarian and protection challenges and endure grave human rights violations. According to the UN Secretary General’s report of 09 December 2022, there are 4,001 migrants as of November 2022, being held in government operated detention centres.

Tomorrow’s session also serves as an opportunity for reviewing the state of implementation of various AU and PSC decisions regarding enhancing AU’s role in the Libya peace process and with respect to addressing the plight of African refugees and migrants.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the appointment of Abdoulaye Bathily as the SRSG for Libya and Head of UNSMIL and commend the Secretary-General, African three members of the UN Security Council (A3) and the wider UNSC for supporting the appointment of Bathily, in line with previous Communiqués of the PSC. The PSC may also welcome the initiation of the Libyan national reconciliation conference and urge all Libyan parties to participate in good faith in this process. It may further call on Libyan parties to work towards reaching consensus on finalising the necessary constitutional and electoral frameworks for the conduct of national elections and urge international and regional stakeholders to fortify efforts aimed at finding diplomatic settlement for the dispute over executive power in Libya. It may urge all Libyan actors to exercise utmost restraint to avoid incidents similar to the August 2022 armed clash and to refrain from further breach of the 23 October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement in order to preserve the relative peace and security achieved since its signing. The PSC may reiterate its call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya in line with the 23 October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement. It may also condemn and totally reject any external interference in the internal affairs of Libya and urge Libyan actors to prioritise unification and refrain from taking actions that will put at risk the country’s fragile stability. The PSC may take note of the continuing humanitarian and human rights crises affecting in particular migrants and refugees, and call on the relevant Libyan authorities as well as international humanitarian actors to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and protection of populations in need. It may also reiterate the call made at its previous session, regarding the ‘urgent need for the AU Commission to ensure that the AU Mission in Libya is relocated to Tripoli and is sufficiently capacitated, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate and adequately support the AU’s efforts on Libya, in line with the Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.819(XXXV)] adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly’.


Briefing on the situation in Libya

Briefing on the situation in Libya

Date | 29 June 2022

Tomorrow (29 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1091st session to receive a briefing on the situation in Libya.

Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Libya; the representative of the State of Libya as the country concerned and representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) are also expected to deliver statements. Other invited guests expected to participate at the session include representatives of the immediate neighboring countries of Libya – Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Tunisia and representatives of the relevant regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) – Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).

The AU position on Libya is encapsulated in the relevant AU Assembly and PSC decisions. The 997th PSC Communique which was adopted on 18 May 2021 following the holding of a Ministerial level meeting on the situation in Libya stressed the importance of an inclusive, comprehensive national reconciliation process, as well as the need to implement confidence-building measures such as a framework to put to an end to divisions and to restore social cohesion among Libyans. Tomorrow’s meeting will afford an opportunity for PSC members to take stock of the developments in Libya since their last meeting and pronounce themselves on the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, the political consultation process in Cairo and the holding of elections to conclude the prolonged transition period which is deemed critical to respond to the needs and aspiration of the Libyan people.

After more than a decade since the Libyan revolution, the country remains mired in a protracted political crisis. There was hope that the organization of inclusive, free, fair and credible elections would have helped in ending the long transition period. Although 2.8 million people were registered to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections which were scheduled to be held on 24 December 2021 based on the roadmap agreed within the framework of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), the elections were postponed and the Libyan political stakeholders have yet to agree on a new timeline. The mandate of the Libyan Government of National Unity within the framework of the LPDF is set to expire by the end of this month.  The transitional phase was due to expire on 22 June, according to the LPDF roadmap, had the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on 24 December 2021, which did not happen.

Following the postponement of the elections, the Tobruk based House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha, a former minister of interior and one of the presidential candidates, as the new prime minister for the remaining transition period arguing that the incumbent prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh failed to organize elections. However, Debeibeh insisted that he will only handover power following the holding of elections. The political rivalry between the Dbeibeh and Bashagha has escalated tensions in Libya leading to clashes in Tripoli in May when Bashagha tried to take over the government but was met with resistance from Dbeibeh’s forces. Another round of fighting took place on 10 June between rival forces supporting Dbeibeh and Bashagha. This latest crisis is threatening to divide the country and plunge it into yet another cycle of conflict and violence. It also led to the partial blockade of Libya’s oil facilities.

UN Special Advisor Stephanie Williams has been trying to resolve the political impasse and engaged with both Dbeibeh and Bashagha to encourage them to resolve their disputes through dialogue. She is also facilitating a discussion on the constitutional basis for the holding of elections through the establishment of a Joint Committee comprising of representatives from the High State Council and the House of Representative. The Joint Committee has met three times and the latest meeting taking place in Cairo. During the two previous sessions held in April and May, the Joint Committee reached agreement on 137 of 197 articles on the form and nature of the state; basic rights and freedoms, including women rights; the structure and powers of a bicameral Parliament; and some of the prerogatives of the President and Prime Minister, including on the prerogative of president and Prime Minister”, according to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosmary Dicarlo who briefed the Security Council on the matter on 26 May 2021.

There are, however, outstanding issues that need to be addressed and the hope was that during the third and final round the joint committee will finalize the constitutional arrangements for the holding of national elections. Stephanie Williams underscored the need to continue working towards building the necessary consensus on the constitutional framework to pave the way for the holding of elections. As the final round came to a close on 20 June, Stephanie Williams released a press statement stating that ‘the Joint Committee achieved a great deal of consensus on the contentious articles in the Libyan Draft Constitution’ also highlighting differences on the ‘measures governing the transitional period leading to elections’. The Special Advisor urged the Presidencies of the two Chambers ‘to meet within ten days at an agreed upon location to bridge outstanding issues’.

Some observers have been expressing concerns about the ongoing consultation process including the lack of openness to involve the wider Libyan populace. The other complication is the involvement of regional and international actors in the situation in Libya through their backing of different parties. In the meantime, Stephanie Williams is expected to leave her position as Special Advisor by the end of June. Consultations are underway to appoint a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The AU has been insisting that this post should be filled by an African and the African members have been advancing this same position in the Security Council.

The AU is part of the Libya Quartet which involves the UN, the EU and League of Arab States. The UN has been in the lead in terms of facilitating the Libyan political dialogue but it is not clear how much the AU has been involved and/or consulted within the framework of the latest UN led talks in Cairo.  The AU has a Liaison Office which was based in Tunis. The 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to relocate the office to Tripoli.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its concern over the recent flare up of tension between armed groups in support of the two rival governments. Council may further urge the rival groups to avoid any violence and resort to dialogue to reach at a consensus on a unified Libyan government that would steer the country towards the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. It may also urge all international actors to refrain from taking any actions that may re-ignite divided foreign support and engage instead in a more constructive role that will contribute to ensuring peaceful resolution of the current impasse. It may further call on the AU High-Level Committee on Libya chaired by H.E. President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, to convene a consultative meeting on the current infighting between rival parties. While noting the consultations made by the Joint Committee of the House of Representatives and High Council of State on the constitutional basis for the holding of the elections and progresses made in this regard, Council is also expected to call upon them to reach agreement over the remaining outstanding issues.


MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022

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Date | June 2022

During June, the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), under the chairship of the Republic of Congo, convened five sessions. Three of these were committed to thematic issues while the other two addressed a country/region specific issue. All sessions convened during the month took place at Ambassadorial level. The outcomes for the four sessions were adopted as Communiqués while no outcome document was released for one session. On average, it took about two weeks for the release of outcome documents.

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The growing threat of terrorism in Africa: A product of misdiagnosis and faulty policy response?

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May 25, 2022

On 28 May 2022, the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the supreme decision-making organ of the AU, will hold its 16th extraordinary session. The thematic focus of the extraordinary summit is on terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government. The summit is convened based on the AU Assembly February 2022 decision on the proposal of the Republic of Angola for the convening of ‘Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa’.

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THE MAJOR PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA IN THE YEAR THE AU MARKS ITS 20 YEARS

Libya

March 2022

2022 marks the 20th anniversary of the inauguration of the African Union (AU). In reviewing the record of the AU in its two decades of existence, the aspect of AU’s role that is sure to attract the most scrutiny relates to the area of peace and security. While this special research report is not meant to provide such a comprehensive review, it seeks to provide an analysis of the major peace and security issues in Africa in 2022 as a useful lens for understanding where the AU’s peace and security order stands 20 years after AU’s launch. In presenting the analysis on the various major peace and security issues afflicting the continent, this report attests to both the importance of AU’s role and how its role has become more, not less, important today than at the time of its establishment, notwithstanding recent regressions in its performance.

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Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - September 2021

Libya

Date | September 2021

Chad assumed chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in September. In total, eight sessions were convened throughout the month. Although Council planned to convene a session to consider strategic priorities for the utilization of the AU Peace Fund and the zero draft African consensus paper on financing AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) through UN assessed contributions, that session was postponed to October. On the other hand, two of Council’s sessions took place outside of the programme of work to address the emergency situation in Guinea, following the coup of 5 September 2021.

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Ministerial session on the situation in Libya

Libya

Date | 18 May, 2021

Tomorrow (18 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) convenes its 997th session on the situation in Libya. The session is set to be held at the level of ministers.

Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, who will preside over the session, will make the opening remark. The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat will deliver a remark, while the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present a briefing to the Council. The representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as Chairperson of the AU for 2020, and the Republic of Congo, as Chair of the AU High Level Committee, are also expected to make statement during the partially open segment of the session. As the country concerned, Libya’s Foreign Minister, Najla Mangouch, is also expected to provide update on the peace process and the transitional government. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Wahida Ayari, the Head of United Nation (UN) Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), M. Jan Kubis, and a representative of the League of Arab States are also expected to deliver a statement.

PSC’s last session on Libya was held on 3 November 2020 following the breakthrough in the Libya peace process which resulted in the signing by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (5+5 JMC)—consisting of five representatives each from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the self- styled Libyan National Army (LNA) – of a permanent ceasefire on 23 October 2020. The agreement envisaged the immediate identification and categorization of armed groups to carry out a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as for urgent opening of three main roads joining the East to the West and the North to the South of the Country. It also provided for the withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries operating in Libya.

The communique of the 961st session of the PSC endorsed the permanent ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020, and emphasised the importance of supporting the full implementation of the agreement including through the participation of AU in the applicable monitoring mechanisms. It also demanded the ‘immediate and unconditional’ departure of foreign fighters within the timeframe envisaged in the ceasefire agreement; called for the ‘unconditional and urgent closure of all illegal detention centres housing African migrants connected to the trafficking of migrants’.

Since then, Libya has registered additional major milestones towards the restoration of peace and stability in the country. In the political front, UNSMIL successfully convened the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)- composed of 75 participants representing all regions and main political and social constituencies in Libya- from 9 to 15 November 2020 in Tunisia. The LPDF adopted a political roadmap that provided for the convening of parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 December 2021. They also agreed on the formation of a transitional government with a reformed executive authority having a three-member Presidency Council and a separate Prime Minister with two deputies.

On 6 February 2021, delegates of the LPDF elected members of the new executive authority, resulting in the election of Mohammad Younes Menfi to head the three- member Presidency Council and Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah as a Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. A new cabinet composed of 35 members submitted by the Prime Minister was approved by the House of Representatives convened in Sirte on 10 March. The Parliament reconvened a session on 15 March in Tobruk for the swearing-in ceremony of the new government, followed by power handover ceremony in Tripoli.

Despite these major developments, the political process is not firmly secure. One illustration of remaining challenges is the postponement of a planned cabinet meeting scheduled to take place in Benghazi following prevention by civilians and armed men affiliated with LNA of an advance team for Prime Minister Dbeibah from leaving the airport following their arrival. As the Permanent Representative of Libya to the UN rightly asserted during his statement to the UN Security Council in February this year, all the tracks that Libya has been following for years are ‘essentially fragile’ in the absence of a dialogue of national reconciliation, which would ensure the sustainability of any outcome.

The legal frameworks for the convening of parliamentary and presidential elections are not yet in place. In its recent resolution on Libya (2570), UN Security Council made its expectation clear that the parliament and relevant authorities need to ‘clarify the constitutional basis for elections and the enactment of legislations’ by 1 July 2021 to allow an orderly preparation by the High National Elections Commission. Given that the time left before the 24 December date for the election is only seven months, there is a need for finalizing the outstanding legal and constitutional issues and equip the High National Elections Commission with the requisite institutional and financial resources to make the necessary preparations.

As far as the implementation of the permanent ceasefire agreement is concerned, it is worth noting that the ceasefire is holding. It is also to be recalled that initially the 5+5 JMC unanimously decided to establish a ‘Libyan- led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism’ in November 2020. Subsequently, the JMC requested that the ceasefire monitoring is undertaken through the deployment of international monitors under the auspices of UNSMIL. Against this background, last month on 16 April the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 2570 on UN support for the Libyan Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism. As highlighted in resolution 2570, one possible avenue for AU to support the monitoring mechanism is through the provision of individual monitors under the auspices of UNSMIL.

In respect of the ceasefire agreement as well, challenges abound. First, despite the fact that the three-month deadline for the withdrawal of foreign fighters ended on 23 January, foreign fighters and mercenaries continue to be present in the country. It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its 957th and 961st sessions, requested ‘immediate and unconditional’ withdrawal of all foreign fighters and further warned to ‘name and shame’ all those that are sponsoring foreign fighters. Second, illicit flow of arms in breach of the UNSC arms embargo remains a major problem. As a recent report of the UN Panel of Experts on violations of the UN arms embargo observed, the continuing flouting the embargo has rendered it ‘totally ineffective’. PSC members are expected to deliberate on this issue from the perspective of the serious ramifications of the continuing presence of foreign fighters and the illicit flow of arms to the peace and stability of the region against the backdrop of recent developments in Chad.

Third, the different armed groups and militias that the conflict generated still keep a tight grip over the areas they control; and it remains unclear how far the new government could assert control over them. The recent brief seizure by militias in Tripoli of a hotel that serves as headquarter for the interim government, allegedly because of their unhappiness with the choice of a new chief of intelligence agency, is illustrative of the threat that militia groups continue to pose for the transitional government and the peace process in Libya. Finally, the reopening of the coastal roads is not yet fully realized.

The economic front also showed a steady progress as well, benefiting from successes registered in the security and political sector. Libya’s oil production continues to surge. The output has significantly risen to 1.3 million barrels per day from the low of 228,000 prior to September 2020. It is expected that production capacity would increase to reach a target of 1.45 million b/d at the end of this year. This is critical in reviving Libya’s shattered economy given the importance of the sector to the economy which accounts for 60 percent of aggregate economic output. Further economic reforms including the unification of the Board of Directors of the Libyan Central Bank, the unification of exchange rate, devaluation of the Libyan dinar, the presentation of a unified 2021 budget for the interim government have been also undertaken.

The PSC is also expected to deliberate on the human rights and humanitarian conditions in Libya, particularly in the context of African migrants and refugees. The death of African migrants while crossing the Mediterranean continued unabated. In the latest tragedy, more than 130 migrants lost their lives after a shipwreck off the Libyan coast. According to the UN migration agency (IOM), 557 deaths were recorded on the Central Mediterranean Sea route this year, which nearly tripled compared to the same period last year. Alarmed by the spike of deaths in this route, the two UN agencies (IOM and UNHCR) recently called on the international community to take urgent steps including the ‘reactivation of search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, enhanced coordination with all rescue actors, ending returns to unsafe ports, and establishing a safe and predictable disembarkation mechanism’ to avoid further loss of life.

In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also expected to follow up on its request at its 961st session for the ‘unconditional and urgent closure of all illegal detention centres’. Migrants and refugees are held in captives both at official and unofficial detention centres in harsh and life- threatening conditions, subjecting them to serious human right violations including torture, rape, sexual exploitation, and forced labour. They are also targeted by trafficking organizations, armed groups and militias operating in Libya as part of their criminal networks to generate income through engaging in human trafficking. In the light of these persisting challenges, the PSC is expected to receive update from the AU Commission on the outcome of the conclusion of a two-day working visit to Libya by the AU Commission Chairperson along with the Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development in April last month.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to congratulate Mohammad Menfi and Abdul Hamid Dbeiba for their appointment as President and Prime Minister, respectively, and hail the smooth transfer of power to the new interim government as set out in the political roadmap adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. As far as the political process is concerned, the PSC is likely to avail the support of the AU for facilitating and supporting a national reconciliation process in Libya. On the preparation for elections slated for 24 December, the PSC may urge relevant authorities to take action regarding outstanding legal and constitutional issues and the provision of institutional and financial resources to the Elections Commission necessary for the convening of the elections on time and to this end may request the AU Commission to initiate electoral support to enable the Libyan authorities finalize relevant legal and institutional preparations for the convening of the elections. On illegal detention centres and the treatment of migrants, apart from reiterating its call for the closure of these illegal centres that expose migrants to grave violations, the PSC may welcome the agreement the AU delegation of the recent visit to Libya reached with the interim government to reactivate the process of dignified and voluntary repatriation and resettlement of African migrants. On the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the PSC may welcome the adoption of resolution 2570 by the UN Security Council on the Ceasefire monitoring arrangements in Libya, and express its readiness to support the Ceasefire monitoring mechanism including through the provision of individual monitors under the auspice of UNSMIL. With respect to the continuing presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries, the PSC may express its deep concern about the lack of progress for their withdrawal and reiterate its demand for their immediate and unconditional withdrawal. In this respect, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to initiate the establishment of a joint mechanism that oversees and verifies the speedy withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya. The PSC may also call on the UNSC to ensure the enforcement of the arms embargo and institute sanctions against those flouting the embargo. The PSC may also endorse the call, in the joint statement of the recent meeting of the Libyan Quartet, for the ‘sustained implementation of measures to fully identify and dismantle’ armed groups and militias, and ‘ensure the subsequent reintegration of those individuals meeting the requirements into national institutions’.


Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - May 2021

Libya

Date | May 2021

In May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Algeria. Out of the nine sessions that were convened throughout the month, three were held at ministerial level while the remaining took place at ambassadorial level.

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Consideration of the Situation in Libya

Libya

Date | 3 November, 2020

Tomorrow (3 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the situation in Libya. The session is expected to take place through VTC.

AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui and the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson for Libya expected to brief the PSC. The Representative of Libya is also anticipated to make a statement. The United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the European Union (EU) are also expected to address the Council.

This is the first time that the PSC considers the situation in Libya since its February session on the situation in Libya held at a level of Heads of State and Government. Tomorrow’s session has come after the warring parties in Libya, the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the self-styled Libya National Army headed by the renegade General Khalifa Haftar, signed a permanent ceasefire on 23 October after talks in Geneva under the facilitation of the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL).

It is to be recalled that in an attempt to avert further escalation of military confrontation among the rival external backers of the LNA and the GNA, Germany hosted an international conference aimed at establishing the conditions that enable the UNSMIL facilitate peace talks between Libya’s warring parties. The Berlin Conference that concluded with the adoption of a communique which outlined a peace plan organized around the six baskets: ceasefire, arms embargo, political process, security, economic and financial, international humanitarian law and human rights law matters.

Despite the official support expressed to the outcome of the Berlin Conference and the commencement of indirect talks for ceasefire in early February, the fighting continued unabated. The LNA imposed a blockade on the export of oil in Libya, seeking to deprive the GNA of its major source of revenue and further expanding the economic woes of the country. In the ensuing months, fighting continued unabated with the direct participation of the foreign backers of the two warring parties (UAE and Russia on the side of LNA and Turkey on the side of GNA).

It was only after the LNA lost the campaign to seize Tripoli in May and a stalemate emerged in June with the frontline of the fighting shifting to the strategic city of Sirte and major backers of Haftar, notably Russia and to a lesser extent UAE, accepting Haftar’s loss, that a terrain more favourable to the peace process has emerged. In the following months, diplomatic efforts have gained new momentum with the US playing a more active role taking advantage of the stalemate and the Speaker of the Tobruk based LNA aligned House of Representative (HoR), Aguila Saleh, assuming increasingly prominent diplomatic role. Signalling a path for signing of a ceasefire, in August Prime Minister Serraj and Speaker of the HoR Saleh issued separate statements calling for a ceasefire, the lifting of the oil blockade and a return to the political process.

In the fourth round of talks in Geneva in October, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission met face to face for the first time. This round culminated in the signing of a permanent ceasefire. According to the terms of the agreement, the ceasefire includes the departure of foreign fighters and mercenaries from all sovereign Libyan spaces (land, sea and air) within three months starting the same day. Calling for immediate suspension of foreign military training, including the departure of respective training personnel and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed elements, the agreement also expresses the intention to set up a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the agreement.

For tomorrow’s session, one of the major issues of interest for the PSC is the chances of success of the ceasefire agreement. There are positive signs. One of the major positive outcomes of the ceasefire agreement is the lifting of the blockade of oil export. Control over the oil fields and its revenues have been at the center of the struggle between adversaries racing for influence. The lifting of the oil blockade plays a key role in reviving the national economy, which will trickle down to the livelihoods of the ordinary citizens. The resumption of commercial flight from Libya to Benghazi after a hiatus of more than a year is also widely seen as a positive gesture.

While these are positive signs, they do not guarantee success. Indeed, in the face of the entrenched polarization of the parties and opposed interests of the external actors involved in the conflict, it is no exaggeration to say that the agreement stands on shaky grounds. It is difficult to see how some of the elements of the agreement notably that which calls for the expulsion of all foreign fighters from Libya in three months can be realistically implemented. Not surprisingly given its decisive role in ending Haftar’s military campaign for controlling Tripoli, Turkey expressed doubt on whether the parties will successfully heed the terms of the agreement. UAE, whose supply of weaponry and deployment of air power in support of the LNA was a major factor in escalating the conflict and precipitating the direct involvement of rival powers in the Libya conflict, is also a major factor.

In the context of the stalemate, one of the concerns for Libya is the risk of its de facto division, threatening the territorial integrity of the country.

A further complicating factor is the real risk of internal fragmentation on both sides to the conflict. Although Sarraj’s announcement of his plan to resign by end of October has since been retracted pending agreement on a negotiated new government, it has unleashed internal rivalries among those vying for succeeding him. In the Eastern front, Haftar’s diminishing clout due to blows from the Tripoli offensive is met by the rise of Aguila Saleh, the president of the opposition parliament based in the East. The recent move by the EU to delist him from the sanction blacklist has further reinforced Saleh’s power position in the Eastern bloc.

In the context of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, one development that is of particular interest for the PSC is the fifth-round meeting of the JMC that is expected to take place on 2-4 November in Libya for the first time.

Another development that would be of interest for tomorrow’s session include the first in-person meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which is scheduled to take place on 9 November in Tunisia. This political track of the Berlin Conference outcome seeks to ‘generate consensus on a unified governance framework, and arrangements that will lead to the holding of national elections in the shortest possible timeframe in order to restore Libya’s sovereignty and the democratic legitimacy of Libyan institutions.’ A virtual meeting has been already kicked off in October.

Although its influence remains to be limited, the AU has continued its engagement on the situation in Libya both on its own and as one of the participants in the UNSMIL led peace process. It is to be recalled that the decision of the February 2020 AU Summit, Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII), provided for the establishment of a Contact Group, chaired by the Republic of Congo, deriving from the Members of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, and any other country the Chair of the Contact Group may wish to add, to provide political leadership, as well promote coordination of international efforts in the search for a solution to the Libyan crisis. Since then, the Contact Group met twice. The first meeting, held on 11-12 March in Oyo, the Republic of Congo with the participation of South Africa, Algeria, Chad and Egypt, decided to convene the Inter- Libyan National Reconciliation Conference, in July 2020, at the AU Headquarters, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in conformity with the decision of the AU Assembly adopted in 2018, although this did not materialize due, among others, the COVID19 pandemic. Most notably, it reiterated condemnation of foreign interference, the violation of the arms embargo, the presence, deployment and utilisation of foreign fighters on Libyan soil, saying that ‘such continued interference’ was ‘motivated by national interests and looting of Libyan natural resources.’

The second meeting of the Contact Group took place on 19 May. The Group ‘condemned the numerous violations of the International Humanitarian Law that could constitute war crimes, such as the attacks on hospitals and vital facilities, the persistent indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and the impediments to humanitarian access. It called upon all the parties to the conflict to comply with the obligations imposed by the International Humanitarian Law and to take the necessary measures to prevent and immediately put an end all those acts.’

The PSC at its 929th session expressed particular concern over the continued fighting in Libya, which, it said, ‘has undermined efforts against the COVID-19 pandemic and is also aggravating an already precarious socio-economic situation in the country, as well as worsening the plight of migrants and asylum-seekers’.

In a statement on 8 June, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, called upon the ‘warring parties to ensure strict compliance with international humanitarian law’ and called ‘upon the Security Council to apply sanctions as provided for in various resolutions on the arms embargo’. In a statement issued on 23 October welcoming the signing of a permanent ceasefire, Mahamat expressed AU’s ‘readiness to assist in the implementation of the ceasefire and to contribute to create the necessary conditions for the resumption of dialogue between all Libyan stakeholders for a durable solution.’

A major issue of interest for PSC members in tomorrow’s session would be how the AU could ‘assist in the implementation of the ceasefire’ that Mahamat indicated. This is linked to one of the outcomes of the February 2020 summit decision on Libya which called for the dispatching of a military reconnaissance mission to Libya jointly with the UN and the announcement, by Chergui when declaring the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Taskforce on Libya on 17 February, as a follow up to this decision that the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) was charged to begin preparations for the deployment of a multidimensional mission once a ceasefire agreement is reached between the Libyan parties.

The other issue that may be of interest for PSC members is the follow up to the AU Assembly decision 792 for the to upgrade to the level of mission the current AU Liaison Office in Libya, and to equip it with the necessary political, diplomatic and military capacity, with a view to ensuring greater contribution and participation of the AU in the efforts. In this respect one notable development has been the offer of the UN Secretary General, within the framework of the AU-UN Framework Partnership for Peace and Security, to host the African Union Mission within UNSMIL, which the AU Contact Group on Libya welcomed.

In the course of the fighting, various violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been perpetrated.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the ceasefire between GNA and LNA under the framework of 5+5 Joint Military Commission and call upon the parties to honour the terms of the agreement. The PSC may also commend the positive steps taken by the parties in terms of the resumption of oil production and commercial flights between Tripoli and Benghazi and encourage their continued constructive engagements. The PSC may express its strong support for the successful convening of the upcoming in-person meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Tunis, on November 9. The PSC may further reiterate its strong desire to assume a central role in resolving the Libyan crisis and encourage the AU to enhance active participation in the various tracks of the Libya peace process. It may also welcome the launching of the AU Contact Group on Libya and the two meetings that the Group held. In terms of the concrete role that the AU may play, the PSC may request the AU Commission to submit to the PSC proposals on how the AU can directly support implementation of the ceasefire agreement including as a follow up to the Assembly decision 792 and the assignment given to PSOD upon the establishment of the Inter-Departmental Taskforce on Libya to make preparation for deployment of a multidimensional mission for supporting implementation of ceasefire. The PSC may also reiterate its call on external actors involved in the conflict in Libya to desist from their destructive role and respect the independence and territorial integrity of Libya. In the light of the dire humanitarian condition and perpetration of numerous violations which may amount to war crimes, the PSC may also consider to establish a mechanism for monitoring and reporting on compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law standards for the protection of civilians in Libya.