Briefing on the situation in the Sahel
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel
Date | 20 July 2023
Tomorrow (20 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1162nd session to receive an update on the situation in the Sahel region.
Following opening remarks by Mohamed Lamine Thiaw, Permanent Representative of Senegal and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL); representatives of the Republic of Ghana as the Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) may also participate in the session.
The last time the PSC convened a session to assess the situation in the Sahel region was at its 1116th meeting held in October 2022. In addition to reflecting on the overall security situation in the Sahel region, the session served the PSC to follow-up on the status of transition processes in specific member states undergoing political transition, specifically Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea. At the session, the PSC also made the commitment to revisit the possible deployment of 3000 troops to the Sahel as directed by the decision of the AU Assembly [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)]. Tomorrow’s session serves both as an opportunity for the PSC to follow-up on this commitment and to receive updates on the status of transitions in concerned member states in the region. It also presents the chance to for the PSC to reflect on the continuing deterioration of the security situation and spread of terrorism in the wider region.
Since the end of 2022, conflicts, political instability and violence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea have intensified. In the first half of 2023 alone, UN-OCHA has reported that the number of refugees in the region has doubled, reaching 1.3 million people. A total of 5.8 million people are currently displaced in the Sahel.
The region continues to face serious threats from al-Qaida and Islamic State-affiliated groups. While the Liptako-Gourma region, a border triangle between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, experiences significant terrorist activity, the threat has also spread to other countries in the Sahel and coastal West Africa. This has prompted regional countries to enhance their cooperation through the Accra initiative, a security mechanism established in 2017. The current members of the Accra initiative include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Togo.
The Group of Five Sahel countries, consisting of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, have been at the forefront of efforts to counter terrorism in the Sahel region through the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S). However, the withdrawal of Mali from the force in May 2022 created a major setback. On its 1087th session on June 1, 2022, the PSC had expressed its concern over the withdrawal of Mali from the G5 Sahel joint force as its withdrawal is considered to negatively impact the “momentum, achievements recorded and required unity and effectiveness” of the task force. . On a November 16, 2022 G5 Sahel joint force briefing, the Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel Eric Tiaré described how Mali’s withdrawal “plunged the sub-regional organization into an institutional crisis”. The remaining G5 Sahel countries have been appealing to Mali to rejoin the force, and this appeal was reiterated by Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani at the opening of the 4th session of the General Assembly of the Sahel Alliance held in Nouakchott on July 10, 2023.
Creating further uncertainty about the multilateral response to the terrorism challenge in the Sahel is Mali’s request for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which has been deployed in the country for the past decade, to withdraw without delay. Various issues including the charges of failure of the mission to curb the spread of terrorism and disputes over a fact-finding report on 12 May 2023 by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, implicating the Malian Armed Forces and foreign military personnel in the killing and summary execution of over 500 people during a military operation in Moura, boiled over into Mali’s call for withdrawal of MINUSMA. The Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop who addressed the Security Council on 16 June, 2023 stated that his government was left with “no choice but to come to the objective conclusions of the assessment of the ten-year presence of MINUSMA, which has not been able to provide adequate responses to the security situation in Mali, and whose prospects for continuation do not meet the security imperatives of the Malian people”. In response to Mali’s request for MINUSMA’s immediate withdrawal, the Security Council adopted resolution 2690 (2023), terminating the mission’s mandate as of June 30, 2023 and providing a six-month timeline for its drawdown and exit. The upcoming PSC meeting will provide an opportunity to discuss and react to this significant development.
In response to the developments related to MINUSMA, ECOWAS leaders have also decided to establish a Presidential Task Force comprising Benin, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria to further reflect on the MINUSMA withdrawal and related security matters. An extraordinary session of ECOWAS will be convened in Nigeria by the end of August 2023 to discuss concrete measures to address regional security challenges. Additionally, the ECOWAS leaders also directed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to propose a comprehensive response mechanism within 90 days to address concerns related to the withdrawal and the presence of foreign private armies in the region.
Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a Russia Private Security Company, has been operating in Mali. Yet, after this group’s fallout with the Russian government following its mutiny in June 2023, the implications for its operations in Africa including in Mali remain uncertain. Nevertheless, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has reportedly assured Mali and Central African Republic authorities that the Wagner Group personnel will not be withdrawn. Yet, the crisis of reliance on such forces also highlights the imperative for a more effective and robust multilateral mechanism for the challenges in Mali and Sahel.
The complex security situation in the Sahel has been fueled by various factors, including weak governance, porous borders, poverty, and inter-communal conflicts. Extremist groups exploit these vulnerabilities to establish bases, launch attacks, and recruit followers across the region. In response, on September 25, 2022, the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, and the FC-G5S jointly launched a high-level independent panel led by the former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to conduct a strategic assessment of the underlying challenges in the Sahel. The assessment includes the surge in violent extremism, the growing fragility of the region’s economies due to climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as complex political transitions. The panel’s report and findings, expected to be released in September, are anticipated to recommend a coordinated regional and international response to address the political, security, and development challenges in the Sahel.
The ongoing transition processes in the Sahel region, aiming to restore constitutional order following military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, will also be a focus of the PSC meeting.
In Burkina Faso, the transitional authorities have prioritized military campaigns in their efforts to address the security situation, and ECOWAS has faced challenges in agreeing on a transition timetable with the Burkinabe authorities, including the cancellation of a visit by its Mediator, former President Mahamadou Issoufou, in January. ECOWAS expressed regret over the minimal cooperation received from the transition authorities in the three countries, emphasizing the need to reassess mediation efforts.
Mali conducted a referendum in June 18, 2023 on a controversial draft constitution, where 97% of the voters reportedly voted in favor of the new constitution. However, it was only 39.40% of the registered voters that actually casted their votes. According to the opposition, this new constitution concentrates too much power in the presidency, including the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and members of the cabinet. The referendum is also expected to pave the way for elections in February 2024. ECOWAS took note of the referendum as an important step toward the restoration of constitutional order in Mali.
On December 4, 2022 ECOWAS announced that it welcomed the consolidated 24 months transition timetable in Guinea, commencing the same month, which included ten priority issues for the transition authority. The regional bloc also instructed the ECOWAS Commission ‘to support an inclusive national dialogue’ and called on international partners to support the transition process with the necessary material, financial and technical resources. This 24 months transition timetable mandates Guinea to hold elections by January 2025. Until such elections are held, Guinea will continue to be suspended from ECOWAS.
The regional bloc ECOWAS has urged the three countries to remain committed to implementing the agreed transition timetables in a transparent, inclusive, and consultative manner with all relevant stakeholders. In the meantime, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali have been seeking to strengthen their tripartite relations in the face of security, economic, and humanitarian challenges they collectively encounter.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the surge in violent extremism as well as the increasing economic fragility experienced in the Sahel region. It may note with concern the security vacuum that could be created as a consequence of MINUSMA’s withdrawal from Mali and what this could entail to the wider Sahel region. Having regard to that, the PSC may discuss how implementation of the decision for the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel can be expedited. The PSC may also welcome ongoing regional initiatives including ECOWAS’s decision to establish a Presidential Task Force to reflect on MINUSMA’s withdrawal and related security matters. It may also express that it looks forward to the outcome of the high-level independent panel led by the former president of Niger to assess the underlying challenges in the Sahel region and encourage coordination and coherence to boost effectivity of these and other initiatives deployed to respond to the crisis in the Sahel region. With respect to member states in the region undergoing political transitions, the PSC may commend steps taken in each member state to pave the way for elections and urge the transition authorities to strictly abide by the agreed transition timelines and urge that those in the transitional authorities not to run for elections to be held to restore constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate its call on the AU Commission to effectively operationalize the transitional support mechanisms for effectively and materially accompany the transitional process. It may also reiterate that all military operations conducted in the Sahel region including those deployed against non-state armed groups, should be done in full compliance with principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and in a manner that ensures the full protection of civilian populations.
Informal consultation with countries in political transition
Informal consultation with countries in political transition
Date | 26 April 2023
Tomorrow (26 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an informal consultation with representatives of member states undergoing political transitions (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan). The consultation mainly aims to serve as an opportunity for direct engagement between the PSC and representatives of member states suspended from the activities of the AU in relation to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).
The meeting is being convened on the basis of Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol and Rule 16 of the PSC Rules of Procedure which envisage informal consultations of the PSC ‘with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration’. As Amani Africa’s Handbook on the AUPSC discusses, although a format yet to be properly operationalised, PSC’s informal consultation – along with closed and open sessions – forms one of the three types of meetings stipulated under the provisions of Article 8, sub-articles 9 to 11 of the PSC Protocol. Despite the presence of the mechanism, tomorrow’s consultation forms the first time for the PSC to explore this meeting format as a way to overcome the limitation from the other two forms of PSC meetings to engage with member states suspended from the activities of the AU.
The immediate background that precipitated the activation of this format of PSC’s meeting from its long dormancy is traced back to the challenges for effective PSC engagement in countries facing complex transitions induced by military seizure of power. At the 14th Retreat on the Working Methods of the PSC held in November 2022, one of the issues which formed part of the discussions was PSC’s interface with AU member states that are suspend from the activities of the union. Highlighting the relevant provision of the PSC Protocol to enable informal consultations with such member states – Article 8(11) – the conclusions of the 14th Retreat underscored how the PSC may utilise such consultations to engage with AU member states suspended for UCG, to gather first-hand information on the situation on the ground and to work towards finding durable solution.
Additionally, during the AU summit in February, the ministers of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali were present for holding side meetings, although they were not allowed entry into the formal meetings of the summit. One of the issues that they highlighted in their engagement and presence during the summit without access to and presence in the sessions of the Executive Council and AU Assembly sessions was the unfairness of their exclusion while the AU did not suspend a neighbouring country, Chad, where similar military seizure of power took place, and allowed its full participation despite continuing military transitional rule.
It was also in this context that the concrete idea for the convening of the informal consultation was conceived. This emerged during one of the engagements of these ministers. This engagement involved a meeting with the minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia. After the meeting, Tunisia’s foreign minister agreed to explore the convening of an informal consultation that gives the opportunity for the PSC to have direct engagement and hear first-hand from the parties. According to the information Amani Africa received in the consultation on the program of work for April under the Tunisia’s chairship, the informal consultation may see the participation of the three countries at the level of ministers. At the time the program was developed and adopted, in addition to the three West African countries suspended for UCG, Sudan was also anticipated to participate. It is to be seen if Sudan will participate in the light of its recent descent to the ongoing deadly fighting.
The suspension of member states from AU’s activities at the occurrence of UCG is not an end by itself, but rather a means to the desired end result of ensuring the restoration of constitutional order in the concerned member state. The 2000 Lomé Declaration on UCG is in fact clear on the importance of sustained engagement of the AU with the perpetrators of a coup in order to exert the necessary pressure to ascertain a speedy return to constitutional order. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) also clarifies under Article 25(3) that notwithstanding the suspension of a given member state, the AU ‘shall maintain diplomatic contacts and take any initiatives to restore democracy’ in that member state. In light of these guiding norms therefore, it is important to conceptualise suspension as a tool to register displeasure over the breach of agreed community rules and as a lever to use diplomatic efforts in member states affected by UCG for the initiation and implementation of roadmap for relevant reforms that facilitate both the return to constitutional order and its sustainability by preventing recurrence of UCG through addressing the conditions for its occurrence.
Upon suspension from the AU, representatives of member states are not invited to address the PSC as concerned country when the PSC convenes a meeting on their country situation. At the very best, those countries have to present their case by proxy either through members of the PSC or if their view is canvased as part of the report, briefing or statement that the AU Commission presents to the PSC. As a result, with the exception of the only time the PSC has been able to conduct a field visit to one of these member states (the PSC’s evaluation mission to Mali conducted in July 2021 following the coup of May 2021), its direct interface with authorities in charge of the transition processes has been lacking. After the October 2021 military power grab experienced in Sudan, the PSC had also planned to conduct a similar evaluation mission to engage Sudanese actors but the visit could not be carried out as intended. There have also been no PSC missions to the other two member states suspended for UCG, Burkina Faso and Guinea. This is seen by PSC members as having the effect of limiting both PSC’s understanding of perspectives of the de facto authorities and the full scope of the issues and dynamics at play as well as its diplomatic leverage over the authorities. Tomorrow’s informal consultation is accordingly designed to address these perceived challenges around the direct engagement between the PSC and the de facto authorities of countries suspended on account of UCG.
Another critical area the informal consultation could contribute to is in responding to concerns that have been raised from various stakeholders, regarding inconsistencies observed in the way the AU has responded to UCG that occurred in the course of 2021 and 2022. After the consecutive coups that took place in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan in 2021 (Burkina Faso’s coming in 2022), only Chad has remained immune from suspension in line with Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol. Despite Chad’s specific circumstances which led to the PSC’s decision to refrain from imposing immediate suspension, not only has this decision brought up questions around the consistent application of the AU principles and norms banning UCG, it has also raised concern over the perceived differential treatment accorded to Chad – whose representatives had direct access to the PSC during its sessions on the situation in Chad while the other countries were restricted from the same privilege, having been suspended. Although it may not respond to the complex issues that arise from these experiences, the envisaged informal consultation could in part address some of the concerns that have been raised in this regard.
While appreciating the advantages of an informal consultation of the PSC with member states suspended from the AU, it is also important to maintain the established practice through which the PSC keeps track of the status of developments in countries in political transitions. Although it has not had direct exchanges with suspended member states, the PSC constantly maintains engagement on the developments in these countries through the AU Commission and its Chairperson, though the PSC has not been receiving updates as regularly as the period as stipulated in PSC decisions. Indeed, even with PSC’s direct engagement the best way to facilitate effective political transition for restoring constitutional order is through deploying diplomatic initiative (through a special envoy or high-representative or transition support mechanism and through the provision of technical support to transition authorities in required specific transitional tasks) as envisaged the Lomé Declaration and Article 25(3) of ACDEG. The role of the PSC would largely be to mandate the establishment or launching of such diplomatic initiative, the accompanying and monitoring of such initiative, and the review of its decision on suspension based on assessment of progress made.
No formal outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s informal consultation. The consultation is expected to emphasise the importance of AU norms on democracy, good governance and constitutionalism, not only to avert the occurrence of coups, but also to ensure sustained peace, security and stability in Africa. It may commend member states currently undergoing political transitions for their ongoing efforts to restore constitutional order in their respective territories and urge them to continue abiding by the agreed terms in their transition charters and to fully handover authority to democratically elected civilian governments by the envisaged timelines. Highlighting the importance of occasional informal consultations to enable direct interaction between the PSC and member states suspended from the AU, it may stress the need for maintaining the established method of engagement through the auspices of the AU Commission, particularly the Chairperson.
Update on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region
Update on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region
Date | 16 December 2022
Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1127th meeting to receive update on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region. The update will be one of the two agenda items that the PSC is set to consider in this session and the meeting is expected to take place in-person.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Mamane Sidikou, and the representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel may deliver statements.
The decision to deploy 3000 troops to Sahel was made by the AU Assembly at its 33rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] in February 2020. While PSC discussed the situation in the Sahel several times this year, including during its 1087th session in June and 1116th session in October, the last time that PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the deployment of the 3000 troops was its 950th meeting that took place on 30 September 2020. In that meeting, PSC endorsed the Revised Strategic Concept Note on Planning Guidance for the Deployment of 3000 Troops to the Sahel and requested the AU Commission together with the G5 Sahel and the ECOWAS to develop and submit the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the deployment of the troops. At its 1087th session of 1 June 2022, PSC also requested the Chairperson of the Commission to ‘intensify consultations with the concerned stakeholders, inclusive of ECOWAS, ECCAS, and G5 Sahel Joint Force’ on the deployment and ‘promptly brief the PSC on the outcomes of the consultations for due consideration’. Most recently, during its 1116th session, PSC expressed its commitment to ‘revisit the possible deployment of 3000 troops for six months’. Tomorrow’s session is an opportunity to assess progress made in that regard and deliberate on actions that should be taken to expedite the deployment.
The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated as the region continues to experience increasing terrorist attacks and geographical spread of these attacks, which makes the deployment of the Force even more important today than two years ago when the decision for the deployment was made. Bilateral and multilateral security arrangements in the Sahel are facing enormous challenges at a time when strong cooperation and coordination is desperately needed, raising the fear of creating security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorist groups. One month after its decision to leave the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on 14 June, Mali’s military authorities announced to end the commitment of Malian personnel serving in the western zone (Mali-Mauritania) and central zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger) as of 30 June. The operating environment for United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has become very challenging. Growing number of troops contributing countries are announcing either suspension of activities or the intention to terminate troop contribution for various reasons. The last French military unit of Barkhane forces also left Mali on 15 August after a fallout between the two countries following the 24 May coup.
Against the backdrop of the expanding threat of terrorism and ever deteriorating security situation of the Sahel marked by the spike in asymmetric warfare, there is also a growing call for a more robust AU-led peace support mission in the Sahel. On this point, UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, was quoted, in his 5 May 2022 interview with French radio station RFI, saying that ‘but it [MINUSMA] is operating in circumstances that really call not for a peacekeeping force, but a strong force to enforce peace and fight terrorism.’ He further called for an African-led mission with a ‘Chapter Seven Security Council mandate’ and ‘obligatory financing’ as more fitting to the security situation in Mali than MINUSMA. Recent developments and regional dynamics in the region as highlighted above could make now an opportune time to take the implementation of the 3000 troops deployment forward.
Challenges remain abound while pursuing the implementation of the deployment. The first is the funding issue. Mobilizing funds for another deployment while the existing AU peace support operations are experiencing enormous financial and logistical challenges would remain an arduous task for the AU. It is to be recalled that Assembly decision 792 requested the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to explore funding options, as well as ECOWAS to take necessary steps for the ‘urgent disbursement of its pledged 100 million USD’ to support the deployment.
The second challenge would be generating the required number of troops. The July 2020 revised Concept Note envisaged AU in coordination with ECOWAS to lead the force generation process within the AU Member State but excluding the G5 Sahel Countries (Burkina Faso, Chad Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). Generating 3000 troops in a context where many African countries have been already overstretched in the fight against multiple security threats within their respective regions is not expected to be an easy task.
The third challenge is lack of cohesion among members of the G5 Sahel. If the original plan of integrating the 3000 troops into the G5 Sahel Force with a unified command is to remain intact, there is a need for achieving shared commitment among the countries of the Sahel for the effectiveness of the 3000 troops deployment.
Fourth and most important is the assumption underpinning the proposed deployment of the 3000 troops. The experience thus far shows that the military response, while necessary, has failed to deliver in terms of reversing the trend in the incidents of terrorist attacks and geographic spread of attacks. There is therefore a need for asserting the primacy of the political. As such, attention should focus on rolling out a multidimensional strategy that aims at mobilizing governance, development, environmental and humanitarian interventions into which the military response is integrated. As such, it may as well be necessary for the PSC to await the join AU-UN assessment that former Nigerian President Mahamadou Issoufou is undertaking in order to consider the deployment of troops as part of the recalibration of regional and international efforts for addressing the security situation in the Sahel.
The expected outcome from tomorrow’s session is a communique. PSC is expected to express its concern over the persistence of growing terrorist attacks in the Sahel region and the spread of such attacks towards West African coastal states. It may note the unfavorable developments around the different collective security arrangements operating in the region, and in that regard, PSC may express concern over the possibility of creating security vacuum likely to be exploited by terrorist groups. Against the backdrop of worsening security situation in the Sahel and the challenges that existing security arrangements are facing, PSC may stress the need to expedite the implementation of Assembly decision 792 for the deployment of additional 3000 troops in the Sahel. To that end, PSC may wish to set a timeline for the finalization of the CONOPs for the deployment, which is critical to its operationalization. PSC may also request the Commission to step up engagement with relevant regional mechanisms, Member States, as well as international partners to address issues of funding and force generation of the deployment. The PSC may further emphasize the importance of harmonization and coordination among the various security forces and actors. Finally, and most importantly, it may re-emphasize the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach that would address not only the immediate security challenges but also the underlying causes of the security crisis in the Sahel. The PSC in this light may request the AU Commission to continue working on the planning for the deployment of the troops having regard to and with a view of making it informed by and anchored on the outcome of the ongoing AU-UN joint assessment.
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Date | 31 October 2022
Tomorrow (31 October), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1116th session to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sahel region as one of the two agenda items tabled for its consideration.
The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Mohammed Arrouchi, the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Mamane Sambo Sidikou, AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, as well as the representatives of the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) are also expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Guinea Bissau and Democratic Republic of Congo will make statements as the current chairs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), respectively. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) is also among the speakers.
The last time the PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the situation in Sahel was during its 1087th session on 1 June 2022. However, it also considered the political transitions in the countries of the region, namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad at its 1106th sessions in September.
The past few years have shown the spike in the intensity and frequency of terrorist attacks and expansion in the geographic spread of terrorism in the region. The security outlook of the region is even more bleak in 2022 as a recent report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) confirms. ACLED’s 2022 mid-year update on Sahel notes that instability in Sahel is ‘persisting, expanding, and escalating’. Same update indicates that ‘2022 is on track to be the deadliest year for both Burkina Faso and Mali’ since the onset of the crisis more than a decade ago. Conflict intensity remains highest in Burkina Faso among Sahelian states in the first half of 2022, while Mali takes the lead in terms of the reported fatalities. Recent spike of fatalities in Mali puts the country back to its place as ‘the epicentre of the crisis after being surpassed by Burkina Faso in the count of conflict-related deaths in two of the last three years’. However, the situation in Niger seems to be improving in 2022 after registering 129% increase of fatalities in 2021. Worsening security situation is also fuelling political instability in the region as observed in Burkina Faso, which witnessed a coup within a coup this month. The coup came few days after an ambush on a supply convoy on its way to the town of Djibo, capital of the Soum province which remains under blockade for months, reportedly killed 27 soldiers and 10 civilians.
Trends of fatalities
(Source: Jeune Afrique and ACLED)
International security partnerships in the region are facing major setbacks at a time when strong cooperation and coordination is desperately needed. One month after its decision to leave the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on 14 June, Mali’s military authorities announced to end the commitment of Malian personnel serving in the western zone (Mali-Mauritania) and central zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger) as of 30 June. Following this step, Mission’s headquarters were relocated from Bamako to N’djamena while terminating its operational and logistics support for the Malian battalions. The security situation in the three-border area worsened as cross-border cooperation decreased, resulting in the spike of civilian casualties. According to the 3 October 2022 UN Secretary-General report on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), ‘the death toll for just the first half of 2022 represented more than 90 per cent of the annual toll for 2021’. The last French military unit of Barkhane forces also left Mali on 15 August after a fallout between the two countries following the 24 May coup. Relations between Mali’s transitional authorities and MINUSMA have become increasingly strained, compromising MINUSMA’s ability to discharge its mandate.
Meanwhile, in September, the Independent High-Level Panel led by former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou was launched to undertake an Independent Strategic Assessment of the situation in Sahel. Its findings are expected to be presented to the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in February 2023. Up on its conclusion, the assessment is hoped to offer a deeper understanding of the complex security-governance-development crisis in Sahel and provide guidance on how to effectively address the challenge at a structural level.
On the political front, the region is marked by setbacks in political transitions in Burkina Faso and Chad. In Burkina Faso, on 30 September, army Captain Ibrahim Traore deposed military leader President Paul-Henri Damiba who himself came to power on 24 January of this year overthrowing democratically elected President Roch Kabore. New coup leaders announced the dissolution of interim government and transitional national legislative, and suspension of the transitional charter. Both ECOWAS and AU issued statements condemning the military coup, also calling upon the military authorities to ensure strict compliance to the already agreed transition timetable of 24 months with electoral deadlines for the restoration of constitutional order by 1 July 2024. Two weeks after seizure of power, on 14 October, a national forum of 300 delegates from different groups opened to consider a transition charter and appoint a new interim president in line with a charter. Accordingly, Traore was appointed as transition president until elections are held in July 2024, who in turn named a civilian Prime Minister on 21 October. The forum also adopted part of the charter that prohibits transition president from standing in the upcoming elections. Against this backdrop, two main concerns of ECOWAS and AU on transition timeline and eligibility of interim president in upcoming elections seem to be addressed by the military authorities, which may help the latter to avoid further sanctions from the regional bodies.
In Mali, on 11 October, a Constitutional Commission handed over the preliminary draft of a new Constitution to the President of the transition, Colonel Assimi Goita, which is expected to be put to a referendum in March 2023. The draft of a new constitution could be seen as a right step towards laying out a new social contract that presents Mali a fresh opportunity to forge consensus around the nature, aspirations, and principles of the political state. The draft constitution also forms part of series of decisions by Mali’s transitional authorities in recent months, including the adoption of a new electoral law and the creation of the Independent Electoral Management Authority, and submission of acceptable transition timetable of 24 months. In light of these progress made, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS lifted the economic and financial sanctions in July although it maintains the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups. During the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) in September, Mali requested the lifting of the remaining sanctions imposed by AU and the regional bloc. The PSC in its last session of 19 September 2022 took note of Mali’s progress but this did not lead to the lifting of the sanction that Council imposed during its 1001st meeting of June 2021.
In Chad, the transition has backtracked following Chad’s Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue extended the transition period for additional 24 months and allowed members of the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) to run in upcoming elections. Accordingly, on 10 October, Chad’s military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno was sworn in as President of a two-year transitional period, triggering deadly protests on 20 October that left around 50 people dead and hundreds injured. Both the proposed new timeline and participation of members of the TMC in the upcoming elections contradict the list of conditions of transition set out by the Council during its 996th session of May 2021. It is to be recalled that PSC went out of step with its own established norms and practices when it failed to sanction Chad for the April 2021 military takeover of power. Instead, Council, at its 996th session, requested the TMC, among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. These conditions, reiterated during Council’s 1106th meeting convened on 19 September 2022, have now been breached. Given that the PSC withheld the application of Article 7(1)(g) on suspension of a member state upon the occurrence of unconstitutional change of government such as by seizure of power by the military and suspension of constitutional processes as happened in Chad on the premise of these conditions, the breach of these conditions necessitate the revisiting of PSC’s decision on applying suspension pursuit to Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol.
On the humanitarian front, the condition has not showed any improvement since Council’s lasting meeting on the situation in Sahel in June. The rising insecurity, political volatility, climatic and demographic pressures coupled with elevated global prices for agricultural commodities are exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, forced displacement is at ‘an unprecedented high, with over 4 million refugees and internally displace peoples’ across the Sahel in 2022. In Burkina Faso, ‘Violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crisis in the world, according to a latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. Food insecurity has reached ‘alarming levels’ in the region. WFP and FAO recent report highlights that during the June–August 2022 period, around 13 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure, at Crisis level or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the region. This is a nearly 50 percent increase compared to 2021, and over 120 percent higher than the five‑year average. With terrorist activity expanding geographically, some sources claim that up to 40 per cent of Burkina Faso’s territory is outside state control. Several towns including Djibo are under the blockade of terrorist groups, cutting off population’s access to basic goods and services.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its grave concern over the expanding and escalating threat of terrorism in the Sahel, as well as its impact on the political stability and humanitarian situation of the region. While Council may stress the importance of coordinated military response against terrorist groups in the region, it may also emphasize the importance of a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that would address the multi-layered structural drivers of the scourge. In this respect, Council is likely to welcome the formal launch of the Independent High-Level Panel led by Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou and may look forward to its outcome before the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Given that Mali remains a key theatre for the fight against terrorism in the region and taking G5 Sahel joint Force’s critical role in this context, Council may urge countries of the G5 Sahel to engage in dialogue to iron out difference on the presidency of the institution and other underlying contentions. On Mali-Cote d’Ivoire tension over the 46 Ivorian soldiers, Council may echo the call made by ECOWAS summit for their unconditional release. On the political transitions in countries of the region, Council is likely to express its disappointment over transition rollback in Burkina Faso and Chad. In relation to Burkina Faso, Council may reiterate the call of the chairperson of the AU Commission for military authorities to ‘ensure strict compliance with electoral deadlines for the restoration of Constitutional order by 1 July 2024, at the latest’. On Chad, the PSC is well placed to revise its earlier decision of not applying suspension if conditions set out for transition were not fulfilled and use its Article 7(1)(g) responsibility for ensuring the credibility of its decision and the relevant norm on unconstitutional changes of government. In addition, Council may condemn the violence that occurred on 20 October against protesters and may further call for a credible investigation into the killings of the protesters.
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - OCTOBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - OCTOBER 2022
Date | October 2022
In October, the Kingdom of Morocco was the monthly rotating chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The provisional program of work initially envisaged five substantive sessions of which two agenda items were dedicated to country/region specific issues. Two more agenda items with country/region focus were added in the course of the month. Accordingly, situations in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and the Sahel were considered during the month. Overall the PSC convened seven (7) sessions and one joint consultative meeting addressing a total of eight (8) agenda items plus the consultative meeting.
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Date | 19 September 2022
Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1106th session to receive updates on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali.
The session starts with opening remarks from Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Ndjamena are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements as relevant country and regional mechanisms, in addition to the representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
It will be for the second time that Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one agenda item. The first was held on 14 April 2022 at its 1076th session where Council discussed the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. It is not clear why Council has not included Sudan in the agenda item this time. It has been now more than five months since the PSC considered the political transition in Sudan despite its decision, at its 1041st session, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to review the political developments in the four countries since its last meeting in April. It also presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of some of its key decisions taken at its 1076th session, including the establishment of a monitoring dashboard of the situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan; the organization of a Needs Assessment Mission to Guinea; the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea; and the establishment of a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF).
On Burkina Faso, a major development since the last session is the decision of Burkinabe authorities to set a shorter transition period than its initial 36 months timetable. Duration of the transition was a source of disagreement between Burkinabe authorities and ECOWAS as the latter found the 36 months proposal in early March unacceptable. As part of the effort to support the transition in Burkina Faso and resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS appointed former President of Niger Mahamadou ISSOUFOU as its mediator. Subsequent engagement between ECOWAS and Burkinabe authorities through the mediator bridged differences between the two sides. While the communique of the 61st ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority stated that the progress made led to lifting of economic and financial sanctions, there was no specified list of economic & financial sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso. What is lifted could only be the threat of immediate application of unspecified economic and financial sanctions to which reference was made in the March 2022 ECOWAS Authority meeting. Despite various policy measures including the reshuffling of the army command & the understanding reached on the duration of the transition, the security situation in the country did not show any improvement. If anything, the dire security situation has continued to deteriorate since the coup. According to ACLED data, more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May 2022, showing a 115 percent year-on-year increase. The humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. According to the latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September, ‘violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’ in Burkina Faso, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crises in the world. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. The same source indicates that the ‘rate of severe food insecurity has nearly doubled compared to last year, with over 600,000 people in emergency hunger levels during this lean season’. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation underscore the need for ending the political and constitutional crisis and implementing the necessary political and institutional reforms.
On Mali, like in the case of Burkina Faso, diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali culminated in acceptable transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022. With Malian transitional authorities submitting a new timetable of 24 months and taking other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE), the 61st ordinary session of ECOWAS authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on 9 January while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups.
The convening of the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) took place on 6 September in Togo pursuant to 1027th and 1076th sessions of the Council. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. It remains to be seen how Council will respond to the call for lifting also of suspension, which under current circumstances could realistically happen only with agreement with ECOWAS. Mali’s request of the lifting of sanction also brings the gap in AU’s normative framework of sanctions into the spotlight as there is still unclarity on the issue of how and when sanctions are lifted.
On Guinea, the country has witnessed deteriorating political situation as tension erupted between the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (an alliance of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups and a leading opposition group that spearheaded protests against former president Alpha Conde), and the military authority that took over-power unconstitutionally on 5 September 2021. The opposition group staged protests in late July and on 17 August over concerns of military authority’s ‘unilateral management’ of the transition towards a civilian rule. On 8 August, the transition authorities dissolved the FNDC, a further blow to the country’s transition towards democracy. Following the same pattern in Mali and Burkina Faso, the National Transition Council of Guinea set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May, which ECOWAS rejected. ECOWAS at its 61st ordinary session requested the transition authorities either to propose an acceptable transition timeline until 1 August 2022 or face economic and financial sanctions as well as targeted sanctions. The authorities did not comply with the provided deadline, and it is accordingly susceptible for ECOWAS sanctions. ECOWAS mediator, former Beninese President Boni Yayi, was reportedly in Conakry in August trying to convince the transition authorities to agree for a shorter duration of transition period, but no indication that such diplomatic engagements bore fruit so far.
On Chad, the situation in Chad is marked by two significant developments since Council’s last session in April. The first is the signing of peace agreement between Chad’s transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), main rebel group which was behind the April attack that cost the life of former President Idriss Déby Into, remains a holdout group, denting the success of the Doha peace talk. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement. The dialogue gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders. After the launch, the dialogue ran into procedural challenges, its scheduled end has been pushed back by ten days, to 30 September. Apart from FACT, the dialogue was also boycotted by Wakit Tamma, a large coalition of opposition groups and civil society groups. Last week, Chadian forces fired tear gas on supporters of the leader of Transformers, one of the parties of the coalition that boycotted the dialogue, after he was summoned for questioning by authorities. The authorities have been cracking down on members of Transformers, with about 200 having been arrested and held for several days before their release for planning to stage a rally.
In apparent departure to its own norms and established practices, PSC did not sanctioned Chad for the military seizure of power in April 2021 but outlined list of conditions that Chad’s transition authorities should meet. During its 996th session held on 14 May 2021, Council requested the Transitional Military Council (TMC), among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. PSC’s 18-months deadline will lapse this October and it is unlikely that the deadline will be met. The question therefore remains: will the PSC proceed with sanction or extend the transition timeline? The PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the timeline and conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996th session.
The expected outcome is a communique. Council is expected to welcome the agreement reached between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso as well as Mali on the new timetable of the transition and the resultant lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on these countries by ECOWAS. It may also note the convening of the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the single election management body in relation to Mali and the need for enhancing closer working relationship and support for the transitional process in Mali; and the signing of Doha peace agreement between Chadian Transitional Authorities and politico-military groups, the launch of the ‘inclusive national dialogue’ in relation to Chad as steps in the right direction towards the restoration of constitutional order and ensure lasting peace in these countries. While commending the signing of the peace agreement, it may call upon the holdout groups to join the peace process. It may also reiterate the demands it set in its 996th session and call on the transitional authorities to respect the freedom of assembly and protest of opposition groups and ensure full inclusion of all political and social forces in the national dialogue by addressing concerns of various stakeholders. On Guinea, Council may express its dissatisfaction over the Transitional authorities’ proposal of 36 months transition, and thus, it may urge the authorities to engage with ECOWAS in good faith with the view to reaching agreement on acceptable timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order and call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea for working with ECOWAS to get a transitional roadmap agreeable to all. It may also express concern over the deteriorating socio-political situation in Guinea due to the political disagreement with opposition groups over the transition. In this regard, Council may urge transition authorities to respect political rights as enshrined in the relevant instruments of the AU and hold inclusive national dialogue to resolve underlying issues. Council may also express its grave concern over the worsening security and humanitarian situation particularly in the context of Burkina Faso and Mali, which Council may call upon international partners to step up efforts to address these situations.
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 2022
Date | September 2022
In September, Ghana was the monthly Chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). From the items making up the agenda of the Provisional Program of Work at the beginning of the month, the PSC did not consider one agenda item and another item that did not initially feature in the program of work was added during the month. In total, the PSC convened six sessions. Four of these sessions were committed to thematic agenda, while two addressed country/region specific issues.
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022
Date | June 2022
During June, the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), under the chairship of the Republic of Congo, convened five sessions. Three of these were committed to thematic issues while the other two addressed a country/region specific issue. All sessions convened during the month took place at Ambassadorial level. The outcomes for the four sessions were adopted as Communiqués while no outcome document was released for one session. On average, it took about two weeks for the release of outcome documents.
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Mali and Sahel
Date | 1 June 2022
Tomorrow (01 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its first session of the month to receive briefing on the situation in the Sahel region.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver statement. Mamane Sambo Sidikou, AU High Representative for Mali and Head of AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) is expected to make statement. General Oumar Bikimo, G5 Sahel Joint Force Commander is also scheduled to make a presentation. The representative of Ghana as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Chair and the representatives of the three members of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, namely Chad, Mauritania, and Niger are expected to make statements. In addition, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the AU and Head of United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, may also deliver statement.
This item is put on the agenda of the PSC by the AU Commission, coming in the context of worrying security, political and humanitarian developments in the Sahel region. The last dedicated session of the Council on the general security situation in the Sahel region was at its 939th session that took place in July 2020. This is apart from PSC sessions dedicated to situations in specific countries of the region including the latest one at its 1076th session in April 2022 where it considered the political transition processes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, among others.
The data from various sources that document acts of terrorist attacks, including the Global Terrorism Index 2022 published in March 2022, show that there is continuing rise both in the number of attacks and of fatalities from attacks in the Sahel region. Incidents of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso increased from 191 in 2020 and to 216 in 2021, pushing the number of fatalities from 657 to 732. With 333 incidents, the attacks from terrorism in Mali increased by 56% in 2021 compared to 2020 and led to more than 100% increase in fatalities, representing the highest number of terrorist attacks and deaths in the last decade in Mali. Although the number of incidents did not increase in Niger, the attacks in the country led to 129% increase in fatalities.
With such spike in attacks and fatalities, the Sahel has now become the region with countries most affected by terrorism in the world. Various factors account for these. These include weak capacity of security forces, absence of state presence in border areas increasingly affected by terrorism, socio-economic and political marginalization of affected territories and climatic and demographic pressures on the lives and livelihoods of communities. Added to these is the expansion in operational capacity and geographic stretch of the two main terrorist groups operating in the region, the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al Qaeda-affiliated Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen (JNIM).
Making matters worse, the Sahel is also experiencing heightened levels of political volatility, partly on account of the worsening security situation. All the three Sahelian countries most affected by terrorism and Chad have experienced attempted military coups. While the coup attempt in Niger failed, those in Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso were successful. Apart from the suspension from the AU and ECOWAS, the disagreement between ECOWAS and Mali over the timelines for the return to constitutional order led ECOWAS to impose further sanctions on Mali. While it has not as yet led to similar sanctions ECOWAS imposed on Mali, Burkina Faso and ECOWAS also remain unable to agree on a timeline for the transition and return of constitutional order. Apart from the political uncertainties these disagreements have created in both countries, the situation, further aggravated by tensions over the role of international actors, is straining diplomatic relations among ECOWAS countries and impeding mobilization of cohesive regional and continental policy measures.
Dealing further blow to effective policy responses to the growing threat of terrorism is the deepening tension afflicting the international security partnership in the Sahel. Apart from the withdrawal from Mali of Operation Berkhane, the diplomatic fallout between Mali and France and the disaffection from the reported deployment of personnel of the Russian private security company, Wagner Group, in Mali in December 2021 have led to the announcement on 17 February by members of the Task Force Takuba of a decision to start the ‘coordinated withdrawal of their respective military resources’ from Mali within six months.
G5 Sahel joint force is caught in the crossfires of the diplomatic tensions in the Sahel involving both regional and international actors. In his 11 May 2022 report on the G5 Sahel to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General expressed his deep concern ‘by the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Sahel, as well as by the potentially debilitating effect that the uncertain political situation in Mali, Burkina Faso and beyond will have on efforts to further operationalize the G5 Sahel Joint Force and to address the underlying causes of instability and improve governance.’ On 15 May 2022, the transitional authorities of Mali announced the withdrawal of Mali from the G5 Sahel joint force protesting against its exclusion from assuming the rotating presidency of G5 Sahel. Ordinary session was supposed to happen in February in Bamako where Mali was due to take up the baton of the rotating presidency of the body from Chad. Amid the fallout between Mali and France and the tension over the deployment of the Wagner group, some members of the G5 Sahel opposed Mali’s takeover of the presidency of the regional group. Mali pointed its finger on ‘a state outside the region for desperately seeking to isolate Mali.’
Mali’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel is not without serious consequences for counter terrorism in the region. The UN mission in Mali has reported worrying levels of spike in insecurity on Mali’s border with Burkina Faso and Niger. Highlighting the significance of Mali’s continued engagement in G5 Sahel, Niger’s President went as far as stating that its withdrawal will mark the end of the alliance.
The rising insecurity, political volatility and tension combined with climatic and demographic pressures on the livelihoods of people in the region are aggravating already dire humanitarian situation in the region. People continue to be displaced. According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, forced displacement is at ‘an unprecedented high, with over 4 million refugees and internally displaced peoples’ across the Sahel in 2022. The spate of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso has already led in record numbers of displaced people, numbering 1.5 million in that country alone. OCHA’s 20 May Briefing Highlights reported that food insecurity has reached ‘alarming levels’ in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, where people will experience ‘emergency levels of food insecurity during the lean season between June and August.’ Despite the deteriorating humanitarian condition, the declining level of funding for humanitarian and stabilization activities, as noted by the UN Secretary-General António Guterres during his recent visit to Niger, remains extremely concerning.
During tomorrow’s session one of the issues of concern for the PSC is how to resolve the political uncertainties in the countries affected by military coups. This should include not only Burkina Faso and Mali but also Chad. Perception of inconsistent treatment opens regional, continental and international policy responses to charges of double standard, severely impeding effectiveness and undermining cohesion. In terms of resolving the diplomatic crisis between ECOWAS and its two member States Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also a need for finding consensual timelines for the transitions that is informed by the urgency of ending the adverse impact of this difference on the security situation in the region.
The other area of concern for the PSC is the uncertainty facing the G5 Sahel joint force following the withdrawal of Mali. Member states may inquire AU’s assessment of the situation and how the AU can help to facilitate the resolution of the recent disagreement among countries of the G5 Sahel. This is critical to restore cohesion of members of the G5 Sahel and the effective functioning of the joint force.
In terms of security partnerships in the Sahel, similar issue of concern for the PSC is the impact of the disagreement involving international partners undertaking security operations in the region. It is to be recalled that Council, at its 1006th session convened on 6 July 2021, requested the Chairperson of the Commission to dispatch ‘a joint technical assessment mission to the Sahel region’ to, among others, assess the possible implications of the exit of Operation Barkhane. Considering more recent withdrawals within the framework of operation Takuba and concerns about deterioration of conditions optimal for the effective operation of MINUSMA, tomorrow’s session is expected to examine measures required for addressing both the implications of these developments and the deteriorating security.
In this context, PSC members may also revisit how the AU can revive more forcefully the follow up of the implementation of the decision for the deployment of the 3000 AU force. The need for such force received major boost during the UN Secretary-General’s visit to West Africa. While he was in Niger, he said that the ‘operating in circumstances … call not for a peacekeeping force, but a strong force to enforce peace and fight terrorism.’ Elaborating further, the UNSG said the force would need to be ‘from the African Union, but with a Chapter Seven Security Council mandate and obligatory financing.’
In terms of the multidimensional challenges facing the Sahel, the other issue of concern for tomorrow’s session is ways of giving greater attention in diplomatic, institutional and diplomatic terms to address the underlying conditions and drivers of instability, such as underdevelopment, weak governance and climate change. Indeed, as argued in our latest special report on the growing threat of terrorism in Africa, there is an urgent need to move beyond military measures and pay due attention to non-military strategies that put politics front and center to address underlying structural conditions including deep poverty, exclusion, and governance deficits. In this context, member states may inquire about the plan for the joint AU-UN strategic assessment of the Sahel. It was announced during the Secretary-General’s visit that an independent high – level panel on security and development in the Sahel, chaired by former President of the Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, will lead the strategic assessment.
In terms of addressing immediate concerns, there is also the pressing need for the PSC, against the backdrop of the AU humanitarian summit, to mobilize more efforts to address the deteriorating humanitarian situation, which is having a toll on civilians.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council may express its grave concern over the persistence of terrorist attacks, political crisis, and the accompanying deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Sahel. It may recognize the multidimensional nature of the instability in the region, and in this respect, Council may re-emphasize the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach that would address not only the immediate security challenges but also its underlying causes. It may also welcome the joint initiative by the Chairperson of the Commission and the UN Secretary-General on the AU-UN Joint Strategic Assessment on the situation in the Sahel. The PSC may affirm the importance of the role of the G5 Sahel joint force and urge the members of the G5 Sahel countries to initiate dialogue with Mali to retain the cohesion of the Joint Force and reverse the negative impact of Mali’s withdrawal on the unity and effectiveness of the Force. The PSC may call for the urgent need for ECOWAS and Mali to reaching at a consensual understanding on the timelines for the transition as a necessary means for focusing the attention of all stakeholders on addressing the growing security challenges. In relation to the disagreement between Mali and ECOWAS, Council may commend Algeria and Togo for taking the initiative to facilitate consultation between Mali and the regional bloc and it may further ask the two countries to coordinate their efforts. Finally, Council, recalling its decision at its 1006th session that requested the Chairperson of the Commission to continue engagement with relevant stakeholders on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel and report back the Council on the outcome of the engagement, may request the Chairperson of the Commission to submit an updated plan within the framework of the joint strategic assessment of the AU and the UN and the recent support the UN Secretary General expressed for the deployment of an AU force.
Addressing the recent resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government: Policy Recommendations for the AU Extraordinary Summit
Mali and Sahel
Date | 26 May 2022
INTRODUCTION
On 28 May, the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government are scheduled to hold the 16th extraordinary session in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. One of the two major agenda items for the extraordinary summit will be to deliberate on and adopt measures to address the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) that the continent experienced during the past few years.