Abdul Mohammed

I have sat across from men who command armies, knowing that some of them were responsible for the very violence we were trying to stop.

There is a particular silence that fills such rooms. It is not the silence of diplomacy. It is the silence of moral tension — the unspoken awareness that peace, if it is to be achieved, may require engaging those whose actions have made peace necessary in the first place.

This is the uncomfortable truth at the heart of modern conflict mediation. It is what Pierre Hazan described as ‘negotiating with the devil.’ In many places such as the Horn of Africa today, it is not a metaphor. It is a daily reality.

Yet the challenge confronting mediators today extends beyond the moral dilemma of negotiating with armed actors. What we are witnessing in various conflict settings in the continent and beyond including across Sudan and the wider Horn is something more profound and more consequential: a growing structural mismatch between mediation as it is currently practiced and the realities it is meant to address.

Mediation in a fragmented geopolitical landscape

The world in which modern mediation evolved has fundamentally changed.

The assumptions that once underpinned international peacemaking — shared norms, coherent multilateral leadership, and a broadly agreed international order — are steadily eroding. In their place is a far more fragmented and competitive geopolitical landscape, one in which conflicts have become increasingly regionalized, internationalized, and economically embedded.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Horn of Africa.

The region is no longer experiencing isolated national crises. It is increasingly evolving into an interconnected regional system of conflict shaped by cross-border armed networks, external intervention, fragmented sovereignties, war economies, ideological polarization, and intensifying geopolitical competition along the Red Sea corridor.

Sudan illustrates this reality in its starkest form.

Sudan is no longer simply a country at war. It is a state and society being hollowed out. Its institutions are collapsing, its cities are being destroyed, and millions have been displaced by a conflict whose consequences increasingly transcend Sudan itself. The war has become deeply entangled with broader regional rivalries and international strategic interests.

And yet, for all the urgency surrounding Sudan, the path to peace partially runs through the very actors who are sustaining the war.

Mediation in a changing conflict landscape

The new era of conflicts and insecurity characterized by shifts in the nature and drivers of conflicts presents further challenge to the current model of mediation. Contemporary conflicts are no longer primarily about seizing state power or achieving decisive military victory.

They increasingly resemble wars of permanence—open-ended struggles sustained by political fragmentation, economic incentives, and geopolitical rivalry. As the conflicts in the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel show, some of today’s conflicts tend to be transnational, entangled with regional and international criminal and economic networks.

Today’s wars have also become more intractable and easier to wage due to the profound changes in the means of warfare. In many conflict settings from Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel to DRC and Sudan, drones have become the weapon of choice, signaling further rapid evolution with the emergence of AI-enabled warfare technologies in a normative context designed for earlier technologies.

Digital technologies have become the dominant information platform that shape not only the conflict environment but also the mediation landscape.

Mediation in the current and emerging context thus needs to adapt to these new and changing conflict dynamics.

The uncomfortable moral realities of ending conflicts

This remains the central dilemma of mediation. The men who can stop the war are often the same men fighting it.

It is tempting to believe that peace can be built by excluding such actors — that legitimacy alone can substitute for power. But experience suggests otherwise. Wars do not end because we morally isolate those who wage them. They end when those actors are brought, however reluctantly and imperfectly, into a political process capable of reshaping their incentives and constraining their violence.

This is not a comfortable proposition. Nor should it be.

Every mediation effort forces a version of the same question: Is it better to engage and risk legitimizing violent actors, or to refuse engagement and risk prolonging the war?

There are no clean answers. Only consequences.

In much of the Horn of Africa, power is not exercised primarily through formal institutions. It is embedded in networks of patronage, coercion, economic extraction, and armed mobilization. Alex de Waal has described this as a ‘political marketplace,’ where loyalties are transactional, alliances are fluid, and violence itself becomes a tool of political bargaining.

Peace processes that fail to engage these underlying realities often collapse under the weight of their own assumptions. Agreements may appear coherent on paper while remaining disconnected from the actual structures that sustain conflict.

This is one of the defining weaknesses of much contemporary mediation.

Too often, mediation has shifted from shaping political outcomes to managing diplomatic processes. Meetings proliferate. Statements multiply. Tracks expand. Yet leverage weakens and coherence declines.

The result is the paradox increasingly visible across many conflicts today: more mediation, but less peace.

The Horn of Africa vividly illustrates this crisis.

Different actors pursue different initiatives through overlapping and sometimes competing tracks. Regional organizations, international institutions, bilateral powers, and external geopolitical actors often engage simultaneously without strategic alignment.

The multiplication of forums has not necessarily produced greater effectiveness. In some cases, it has deepened fragmentation.

This is not merely an operational problem. It reflects a deeper transformation in the international system itself.

Mediators must negotiate a fiercely contested diplomatic environment

The era in which mediation could rely on relatively coherent multilateral consensus is fading. What is emerging instead is a far more contested diplomatic environment shaped by geopolitical rivalry, transactional partnerships, declining trust in institutions, and the growing influence of middle and regional powers.

For mediators, this creates a new level of complexity. It is no longer enough to navigate the conflict itself. One must also navigate the competing interests of those seeking to shape the conflict’s outcome.

This emerging reality is most evident in the Red Sea corridor. Gulf powers, global powers, regional actors, and non-state networks increasingly intersect across the Horn in ways that blur the line between domestic conflict and wider geopolitical competition. Proximity to the Middle East has transformed the Horn into part of a wider and deeply interconnected security arena.

Mediation frameworks, however, have often failed to evolve accordingly.

Many still operate according to assumptions rooted in an earlier era — one in which conflicts were more localized, mediation tracks more centralized, and multilateral authority more coherent. But today’s wars, economically embedded and digitally amplified, do not lend themselves to this conventional approach.

This demands a fundamental rethinking of mediation itself.

The challenge is not simply to improve mediation processes. It is to redefine mediation politically, strategically, and institutionally for an entirely different era of conflict.

Three deficits increasingly define contemporary mediation efforts.

Key challenges facing modern mediation

First, there is a deficit of political strategy.

Mediation has too often become procedural rather than transformational. Process has become a substitute for strategy. Yet mediation that is disconnected from a clear political understanding of power, incentives, and end states risks becoming performative rather than consequential.

Second, there is a deficit of coherence.

Multiple actors engage without alignment, weakening leverage and creating opportunities for conflict actors to exploit divisions among mediators themselves. Fragmented diplomacy frequently mirrors the fragmentation of the conflicts it seeks to resolve.

Third, there is a deficit of legitimacy.

Formal peace processes often remain disconnected from societal realities and civilian constituencies most affected by war. Inclusion is frequently symbolic rather than meaningful, while local actors capable of sustaining peace remain marginalized.

These deficits are particularly dangerous in contexts such as Sudan, where the collapse of state structures risks generating prolonged fragmentation with regional consequences extending far beyond national borders.

The ongoing tensions between peace and justice

At the same time, mediation confronts another enduring tension: the relationship between peace and justice.

Victims of conflict do not speak in abstractions about stabilization. They speak about accountability, dignity, recognition, and historical grievance. They demand not only the cessation of violence but also justice for the violence already committed.

Yet here too mediation encounters difficult realities.

Actors who fear immediate accountability are often unwilling to negotiate. Insisting on maximalist justice demands at the outset may, in some circumstances, foreclose opportunities to stop the violence itself.

This does not mean justice should be abandoned. It means justice must be sequenced carefully within broader political transitions.

Mahmood Mamdani has long argued that violence in Africa is often rooted not merely in individual criminality but in deeper political structures and historical systems of exclusion. Sustainable peace therefore requires more than prosecutions alone. It requires transforming the conditions that continuously reproduce violent conflict.

In practical terms, this means prioritizing the cessation of violence while preserving pathways toward accountability, institutional reform, reconciliation, and political transformation.

It is not a perfect approach. But in the midst of war, perfection is rarely available.

And this is precisely where African agency becomes indispensable.

It is such normative and socio-political imperatives that informed and animate the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. It is premised on both the necessity of justice and accountability and the recognition that wars are extraordinary events that are not amenable to the application of systems of justice that are designed for normal and peace times.

On 1 July, the United States (US) Mission to the African Union (AU) (USAU) informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of the African Union (AU) Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal of the mandate ‘if it includes UNSOS (UN Support Office in Somalia) or any UN logistical and operational support.’

This announcement represents a death knell for a mission that already faces an existential crisis. Yet, depending on how the end of AUSSOM is managed and the level of greater responsibility that Somali leaders are willing to assume, safeguarding the fundamentals of the security gains and avoiding disorganised exit are not impossible.

AUSSOM is the latest iteration of AU’s long-running and largest peace support operations, which came into existence nearly two decades ago in March 2007. Operating in an environment where the UN was unable and unwilling to deploy, the mission, as the primary security entity for the maintenance of international peace and security in Somalia, received UN logistics support from UN assessed contributions since 2009, delivered through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) until 2015 and UNOAS successor, UNSOS, from November 2015 to date.

UNSOS provides a wide range of supplies critical to the functioning of the mission, ranging from life support and operational services, fuel and maintenance, movement and transportation support to reimbursement of contingent self-sustainment costs, all of which are critical to the survival of the mission. Arguably, in the face of the huge financial deficit facing AUSSOM, it is not clear how the mission can survive without these critical supplies from UNSOS.

An operation that registered substantial gains, with immeasurable price, that Somalia struggles to consolidate  

AUSSOM and its predecessor missions made substantial contributions in Somalia. Most importantly, they paved the way for the re-establishment of state institutions and authority across a large swath of territory. This was realised by wresting control of such territories from the armed militant terrorist group, Al Shabaab, with several thousand women and men that served under the AU flag for advancing international peace and security paying an immeasurable price with their lives and limbs.

After 19 years, Somalia’s failure to mobilise and deploy security forces capable of consolidating the territorial gains secured by the AU mission at the required scale and pace has resulted in a mission creep, as the AU’s operation had to cover for the responsibilities of both Somalia and the international community. As pointed out in an earlier analysis, the result is that the military approach has come to take primacy and the prolonged presence of the AU peace operation is used to perpetually shortchange the required investment in a political strategy and the effective rebuilding of Somali security forces.

With the mission rendered incapable of pursuing a realistic mission exit plan that can be implemented within agreed timelines, it found itself in the unenviable position of continuing its operations against Al Shabaab not only in the absence of a workable political strategy but also with ever-shrinking sources of funding.

The announcement by the US has come at a time when financial, operational and political sustenance of the mission has increasingly become a major area of policy concern on the part of the AU, as revealed in the analysis of the 1342^nd session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Financially, despite the conservative $166.5 million budget of the mission for the June 2025 to July 2026 period, only a fraction of the budget was raised, even after various efforts. To make matters worse, AUSSOM inherited substantial debt from its predecessor, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Outstanding arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 amount to $93.9 million. The mission had to find ways of accommodating the $130 million reduction from the approved UNSOS budget of $520 million for the financial year June 2025 to July 2026.

Not surprisingly, this was one of several areas of major concern that the PSC expressed during its most recent meeting relating to AUSSOM during its 1342^nd session. Expressing deep concern over the lack of predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AUSSOM, the PSC recommended the use of part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment, including the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), to ‘substantially’ contribute to addressing funding gaps in the mission’s 2025 and 2026 budgets.

Following the communication from the US and the resultant near unviability of AUSSOM without UNSOS, any amount of such manoeuvre on the part of the AU is unlikely to save the mission beyond December 2026.

Politically and strategically, the slow pace of mobilisation and deployment of Somali security forces has been the centre of major concern. When the summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) was held in Kampala in April 2025, this led the summit to propose the TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism as an oversight, accountability, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan. However, this proposal was left out of the final outcome of the summit due to opposition from Somalia.

This persisting lack of the requisite progress in organizing, building and deploying security capability for taking over responsibility led the PSC at its 1342^nd session to once again urge the government ‘to enhance force generation, regeneration and capacity building, including the recruitment of Community/ Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and mobile forces to hold areas, and undertake operations as part of the clear, hold and build strategy, so as to preserve the gains made and as an overarching factor to inform the exit strategy.’ Recognising the inadequacies on the part of Somalia in holding areas liberated from Al Shabaab, the PSC additionally urged the Government ‘to support effective stabilisation programs in the areas liberated from Al Shabaab…as well as the establishment of effective state institutions.’

These issues correspond with the explanations the US gave for its position that the USAU communicated to the AU in its letter of 1 July 2026. The US stated that ‘[d]espite more than a decade of international support, Somalia has been unable to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.’ It went on to state that ‘[i]nternal rivalries and political infighting continue to undermine the fight against al-Shabaab and ISIS, and the benefits of international support will remain limited until Somalia’s leaders unite to address the country’s security and governance challenges.’

The options for AUSSOM policy makers

It is anticipated that the letter from the US could trigger the convening of an urgent meeting of the TCCs and the PSC. On 3 July, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) convened ‘an information briefing’ for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM.

Ironically, the US letter may end up being the catalyst for the implementation of the call that the PSC made including during its 1342^nd session ‘for the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss on the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ However, the new dynamics that the US letter introduced are sure to necessitate the updating of the options prepared in 2025.

In terms of the next course of actions, the first of the steps that could be taken is to develop a contingency plan for an orderly exit of AUSSOM. The remaining six months should provide the window that the AU could use for revising and implementing the exit plan of the mission.

To avoid major reversal of the gains secured by AU operations, the AU along with the UN and TCCs/PCCs as well as host country would need to develop a plan for a short transitional arrangement of providing security support beyond December 2026. Parallel to that, consideration should be given to enable Somalia in how to leverage the growing bilateral support from countries such as Turkey that Somalia has come to rely on more heavily (see here and here) for filling in some of the vacuum that the departure of AUSSOM may induce. This is also likely to include mobilisation of support for the sustenance and possible expansion by some of the TCCs of AUSSOM of their bilateral deployment.

However, such a shift from a multilateral to a bilateral arrangement would not resolve the fundamental issues that inhibited the translation of the security gains that the AUSSOM and its predecessor missions secured into strategic success in Somalia.

Thus, beyond managing the consequences of the end of UNSOS, the notice that the US gave could be used as an opportunity for the much-needed shift of the primary focus of AU support to be on the primacy of politics in the search for resolving the crisis in Somalia. This would mean adopting as part of the existing plan a strategy for transitioning AUSSOM into a political mission in the same way the AU transitioned its mission in Mali into the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHL).

While the US plan to unplug UNSOS would cripple AUSSOM and induce a short-term policy crisis, paradoxically, it may also end up being the catalyst for ending the complacency and opening up space for putting in place a workable peace plan that both commands the firm support and commitment of various Somali political and social forces and ensures the sustained and well-paced mobilisation and deployment of national security forces for taking over security responsibility. Indeed, such a shift, along with the prioritisation of political strategy, may induce Somalia’s political and social forces to extend far greater support for and invest more resolutely in prioritising national reconciliation and inclusive political settlement than advancing partisan self-interest, thereby perpetually outsourcing national responsibility.

By Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi

Convener and Chairperson, Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement

Africa is in danger of becoming accustomed to war.

What would have shocked the conscience of the continent a generation ago is increasingly being treated as routine. Daily reports of bombed villages, displaced populations, massacred civilians, sexual violence, starvation, collapsing states, and endless humanitarian crises no longer generate the urgency they deserve.

The tragedy is not only that war is spreading, and Africa is in a new era of conflict and insecurity. The greater tragedy is that war is becoming normalized.

From Sudan to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, from the Sahel to parts of the Horn of Africa, violence is increasingly becoming a defining feature of political life itself. Armed conflict is no longer appearing as an exception to politics; in too many places it is becoming a substitute for politics.

Africa today confronts a profound and dangerous reality: war is increasingly becoming systemic, self-sustaining, and in some places permanent.

Many of the continent’s contemporary conflicts are also increasingly shaped by external interference and geopolitical competition. Local conflicts are becoming entangled with regional and international rivalries, giving rise to proxy wars that often outlive their original causes. External sponsorship, competition for strategic influence, and access to resources can prolong violence, complicate peace efforts, and transform local conflicts into seemingly endless wars. In too many places, Africa is paying the human cost of struggles that extend far beyond its borders.

The return of war is not simply a security challenge. It is an existential challenge to Africa’s future. It threatens every major aspiration Africans have articulated for themselves—from Agenda 2063 and regional integration to democratic governance, economic transformation, poverty reduction, social justice, and women’s empowerment.

Across the continent, conflicts are becoming more fragmented, more regionalized, and more resistant to traditional approaches to peacemaking.

In too many places, war has become an economic system, a method of governance, a pathway to political power, and a means of negotiating access to state resources. For some actors, peace has become a threat while war has become an opportunity.

Even more troubling is the changing status of civilians. In many contemporary conflicts, civilians are no longer unfortunate victims caught between warring parties. They are increasingly becoming deliberate targets (see here).

No group bears the burden of Africa’s wars more heavily than women and children.

Women carry responsibilities that extend far beyond their own survival. They become caregivers, providers, protectors, and custodians of communities under conditions of extraordinary hardship. They face displacement, loss of livelihoods, hunger, sexual violence, forced migration, and the collapse of essential social services. Yet, they remain significantly underrepresented in the political decisions that determine war and peace.

Children are perhaps the greatest victims of all. Millions are growing up amid violence, displacement, interrupted education, hunger, and profound psychological trauma. Many have never known a society at peace.

The destruction of civilian life is no longer merely collateral damage. It is increasingly part of the logic of war itself.

Entire societies are being traumatized. Communities that have lived together for generations are being torn apart. Reconciliation becomes more difficult. State-building becomes more fragile. Democratic transitions become more elusive. Development becomes impossible.

Africa’s peace institutions are under immense strain. Existing approaches are not matching the scale of the challenge. Conflict prevention remains weak, mediation efforts are fragmented, and civilian protection remains inadequate.

Most importantly, leadership for peace is becoming increasingly scarce, while leadership for war often appears more visible.

It is against this backdrop that the Beijing+30 African Women’s Movement is advancing the Women for Peace in Africa Initiative.

Peace is too precious to be left to governments and formal institutions alone. Sustainable peace requires the active participation of citizens, women’s organizations, youth movements, faith communities, intellectuals, traditional leaders, humanitarian actors, and civil society. The defense of peace must become a shared societal responsibility.

The initiative recognizes that sustainable peace requires organized civic leadership capable of defending civilians, promoting accountability, supporting mediation efforts, strengthening social cohesion, and generating public pressure for political solutions.

Africa has reached a moment when silence is no longer an option. The scale of suffering demands action. The erosion of peace demands leadership. The future of the continent demands a broad-based civic movement committed to ensuring that war does not become a permanent feature of African political life.

The defense of peace must once again become a continental cause.

Africa must rise against the normalization of war.

Abdul Mohammed

At a time when Africa confronts multiple and overlapping crises—devastating wars, democratic uncertainty, economic pressures, geopolitical competition, and an increasingly fragmented international order—it is fitting to pause and celebrate one of the continent’s most consequential leaders and thinkers.

The 84^th birthday of President Thabo Mbeki on 18 June offers a valuable opportunity to reflect on the kind of leadership this time demands and how African can exercise agency in order both to limit the adverse impacts of these challenges but also create conditions for addressing them. For he is not only a former President of South Africa but also one of the principal architects of contemporary Pan-Africanism. For more than four decades, he has helped shape continental debates on governance, development, peace, integration, and Africa’s place in the world.

For many Africans of my generation, Thabo Mbeki represents a rare combination of statesman, intellectual, strategist, and Pan-African visionary. He belongs to a generation of leaders who understood that political liberation was only the beginning of Africa’s journey. The greater challenge was transforming independence into development, political sovereignty into agency, and aspiration into institutions.

His presidency coincided with one of the most transformative periods in Africa’s contemporary history. The establishment of the African Union, the advancement of NEPAD, the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism, anchored on the articulation of the African Renaissance in advancing contemporary Pan-Africanism all bore his intellectual imprint. He challenged Africans to reject narratives of dependency and victimhood and instead embrace responsibility, dignity, and self-confidence.

Compared to his peers, what makes him standout is that Mbeki consistently treated ideas as instruments of transformation. He invested in thought as much as action. Whether through speeches, essays, ANC Today, or countless public engagements, he sought to elevate political discourse and encourage Africans to think strategically about their future.

This unique trait of Mbeki comes to full view on the occasion of the launch of an important and timely book, The Two Sudans by Alex de Waal. The book documents one of the most complex and far-reaching mediation efforts undertaken by the African Union under President Mbeki’s leadership as Chair of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan. It offers valuable insight into the challenges of peacemaking in deeply divided societies and stands as a testament to Mbeki’s patient, principled, and determined pursuit of African-led solutions to conflicts on the continent.

What has always distinguished Mbeki is his unwavering commitment to African solutions to problems in Africa. His mediation work presents a compelling testament to this commitment.

I had the privilege and honor of working closely with President Mbeki as Chief of Staff of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan. For nearly a decade, I witnessed his leadership at close quarters. Those years remain among the most rewarding, intellectually stimulating, and professionally fulfilling years.

Working with him was an education in leadership.

He approached mediation with extraordinary seriousness. Every document was read. Every argument was examined. Every historical detail mattered. He understood that sustainable peace requires more than ceasefires and agreements. It requires understanding history, identity, institutions, grievances, and aspirations.

The book, The Two Sudans, provides valuable insight into that period. It captures the depth of Mbeki’s engagement and his determination to pursue a genuinely African-led mediation process. His work demonstrated that peacebuilding requires patience, rigor, intellectual honesty, and political courage.

What stands out most was his discipline and strategic focus. He never sought publicity. He sought solutions. He believed that mediation was a responsibility to the people affected by conflict rather than a platform for diplomatic recognition.

While differed in style, but he shares important characteristics with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Both took ideas seriously. Both understood the importance of institution-building. Both were committed to transforming Africa’s position in the world. Both believed that Pan-Africanism required practical expression through policy, development, integration, peacebuilding, and strategic engagement with global realities.

Both were deeply intellectual yet intensely practical. Neither was interested in slogans or superficial politics. They believed that ideas must translate into policy, institutions, and measurable outcomes. They approached governance as a serious undertaking requiring discipline, preparation, and strategic clarity. Above all, they shared a conviction that Africa must become an active architect of its own destiny rather than a passive subject of global power politics. They both understood that Africa’s destiny requires the transformation of the socio-economic realities of the mass of the people.

Their generation understood that Pan-Africanism was not simply an aspiration; it was a practical project of state-building, regional integration, peace-making, and economic transformation.

They represented a practical Pan-Africanism—one rooted not in rhetoric but in action and deep commitment to the needs and interests of the mass of the people.

Today, that tradition of intellectually grounded and strategically engaged leadership is increasingly rare. The continent faces immense challenges that require strategic thinking, historical perspective, and moral courage. The wars in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sahel, and elsewhere have exposed weaknesses in both continental and international systems. At the same time, intensifying competition among global powers is reshaping Africa’s strategic environment.

On these issues, Mbeki’s voice remains indispensable.

Long before discussions of multipolarity became fashionable, he argued that Africa must strengthen its own institutions and strategic capabilities in order to navigate shifts in the global balance of power. His reflections on global governance, multilateral reform, development, and sovereignty remain remarkably relevant today.

His recent interventions against xenophobia and Afrophobia in South Africa are equally important. At a moment when economic hardship and social tensions risk fueling hostility toward migrants, Mbeki has reminded South Africans that the source of the social and economic ills afflicting South Africans are not people from other parts of the continent, who stood with them during the anti-apartheid struggle. He has consistently argued that attacks on fellow Africans betray the very values upon which democratic South Africa was built.

That moral consistency has been one of the defining features of his public life.

His continuing engagement is also reflected in recent collections of his writings and letters, including those drawn from ANC Today. These writings reveal a leader still deeply concerned about governance, political ethics, democratic accountability, and the future of the liberation movement that shaped modern South Africa.

History will continue to debate aspects of his presidency, as it should. That is inevitable for any consequential leader. Yet no serious assessment of modern Africa can ignore the scale of his contribution.

At a time when leadership for peace appears increasingly scarce and leadership for conflict often dominates headlines, Mbeki’s example offers an important reminder. He has consistently demonstrated that political leadership must be anchored in principle, patience, and long-term vision. Throughout his public life, he has defended dialogue over confrontation, institutions over personalities, and strategic thinking over political expediency. Africa’s current crises underscore the continued relevance of these values.

For those of us fortunate enough to have worked alongside him, President Mbeki’s legacy is not confined to history books or institutional achievements. It lives on in the lessons he imparted, the standards he set, and the enduring belief that Africa can and must shape its own future.

At eighty-four, many in Africa are delighted to have him as one of the continent’s most important voices—a statesman whose influence extends beyond office, beyond country, and beyond generation.

As we wish you a happy 84^th birthday, President Thabo Mbeki, may your continued wisdom, intellectual courage, and unwavering commitment to Africa continue to inspire those who believe that another Africa remains possible.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Previne Habu, Researcher, Amani Africa

 

The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its application across various fields are unfolding at a speed that has outpaced the development of appropriate guardrails both at national and multilateral levels. In Africa, the emergence of AI was greeted with enthusiasm and its adoption is accelerating across Africa. Despite the transformative impact of AI on how societies function across various fields and its potential to help overcome some of the structural constraints for development, the experience with AI, including in parts of the world at the forefront of its development and adoption, has also revealed major downsides.

Both the pace of advancement of AI and the various risks and issues identified with its adoption in various areas of social, economic, security and governance fields have prompted policy debates, including in multilateral forums.  As a multilateral platform that is known for its norm entrepreneurship, the African Union (AU), particularly its Peace and Security Council (PSC), took an interest in AI, with the PSC focusing on its implications for governance and peace and security.

Initially, reflecting the prevailing early enthusiastic discourse on digital technology and AI, PSC’s take on the subject was characterised by what experts call techno-optimism. Thus, its first meeting on AI during the 1214^th session came across as an AI optimist. This was reflected in its enthusiastic expression of its expectation of the contribution of AI ‘towards the promotion of peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, as well as in accelerating global development and the achievement of the aspirations of AU Agenda 2063 and the UN Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals.’

Certainly, the potential of AI to make such a contribution is not totally misplaced. Reports show that AI is projected to contribute between $2.9 trillion and $4.8 trillion to Africa’s economy by 2030, creating substantial opportunities for the continent’s predominantly youthful population. From agriculture and healthcare to education and finance, key sectors are poised for profound transformation as AI-driven innovations reshape production, service delivery, and governance systems.

Yet, the reality is also that, as new technology that is disruptive and in the process of continuous refinement, not only is AI not free from risks, but also its impact on various areas of the lives of societies and individuals is not without downsides. The prevailing optimism surrounding its transformative potential, particularly in Africa, warrants careful scrutiny. This is particularly important given the lack of consideration of the realities of parts of the world, such as Africa, in the design and development of AI systems, the algorithmic bias associated with most AI systems, the regulatory gaps, and the safety and human rights compliance risks.

For Africa, there are other factors that complicate the adoption of AI, including regional disparities and structural constraints such as technical gaps, infrastructural limitations, including pressure on the use of electricity (on a continent with nearly half of its people without access to electricity and an uneven data governance regime. Relatedly, the policy engagement of the AU and its member states including through the PSC need to pay particular attention to key issues, including data protection, bridging the digital divide, strengthening capacities to adapt and develop AI solutions suited to African realities, closing regulatory and technical gaps, safeguarding vulnerable groups, and ensuring the responsible use and human control in the use of AI in the military domain. Also, of significance is ensuring coherence and preventing emerging risks of policy fragmentation across the AU system.

The latest ministerial session of the PSC, its 1339^th meeting, held on 16 April 2026, on the theme ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security,’ marked the start of the PSC’s shift from optimism to realism. While the session built on previous PSC’s engagement of the nexus between AI, governance, peace and security in Africa, particularly its 1214^th Meeting held on 13 June 2024 and its 1267^th meeting held on 20 March 2025, it approached the subject with a sense of realism while still cognisant of its enormous potential. Accordingly, the PSC emphasised the imperative for Africa to shape, develop, and control its own AI technologies in order to guarantee the continent’s sovereignty across the entire AI ecosystem. Recognising the strategic importance of digital independence, the PSC underscored the need to safeguard Africa’s digital and data sovereignty. It emphasised the importance of developing AI systems in African languages as a means of promoting inclusivity, preserving cultural heritage, and strengthening social cohesion.

In terms of governance of AI, the PSC emphasised that the development and deployment of AI technologies must be guided by the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusivity, ethical governance, benefit- sharing, social cohesion, and full respect for international law. It further advocated for the progressive development of context-specific and adaptable AI governance and regulatory frameworks or charters aligned with international humanitarian law and the principle of meaningful human control. Having regard to Africa’s place in the global AI systems, the Council stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in global norm-setting processes through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement within multilateral platforms.

The 1339^th session, per the communiqué, reflected a discussion that was strategically ambitious and geopolitically informed with regard to Africa’s stance in the evolving global AI landscape. This clearly sets a useful foundation for shaping a more productive engagement that enables the harnessing of the benefits of AI in advancing Africa’s priorities while also seeking to put in place arrangements for limiting, if not avoiding, the perils and downsides of this disruptive yet transformative technology.

As the PSC and the AU take the policy engagement forward, some of the developments that merit closer scrutiny include the rapid evolution of AI-enabled warfare capabilities and the emergence of drones as weapons of choice in several conflict settings across Africa. As such, first, greater consideration could be given to the risks associated with lethal autonomous weapons systems, AI-driven and autonomous drone warfare, and algorithmic targeting.

Second, it will be imperative for the AU and the PSC to examine the huge environmental implications of expanding AI infrastructure. The growing energy requirements of data centres and the increasing demand for water resources associated with AI development raise important sustainability concerns, particularly in a continent already facing significant climate vulnerabilities and energy deficits.

Third, the Council could consider the potential socio-economic consequences of AI-driven automation. Given Africa’s large youth population, persistent unemployment challenges, and fragile labour markets, the implications of automation for employment, livelihoods, and social stability deserve greater policy attention.

Finally, while the 1339^th meeting highlighted the importance of including women and youth in AI governance processes, the PSC may wish to strengthen its approach through a more comprehensive human rights framework. Such a framework, apart from ensuring integration of safeguards for protection of vulnerable groups and key sectors of society, could address emerging concerns related to biometric surveillance, the misuse of facial recognition technologies, data privacy, and the proliferation of digital authoritarian tools.

There is also a need to address the risk of policy fragmentation within the AU system in view of the multiple initiatives in various parts of the AU. This underscores the need to have an AU-wide AI governance framework that is coherent across AU institutions and firmly grounded in existing African normative and legal instruments, particularly human and peoples’ rights standards, as well as continental frameworks on data protection and cybersecurity. The PSC should explore how the commitments made by Member States through the ratification of the AU Malabo Convention can be leveraged to strengthen AI governance and promote the safe, responsible, and peace-advancing use of AI across Africa.

The turn to AI realism that the 1339^th session marked could signify a useful baseline framework that all AU bodies and member states at the national level could draw on for informing their policy approach relating to AI.

By: Dr. Francis Deng and Dr. Amir Idris

Dr. Francis Deng is Sudan’s former Ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the United States, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs, and South Sudan’s first Permanent Representative to the UN

Dr. Amir Idris is a professor of African history and politics in the Department of History at Fordham University, New York. His latest book is Race, Ethnicity, and Violence in South Sudan (2024)

South Sudan’s transition remains unfinished, not only because of weak institutions, repeated political crises, and a lack of political will, but also because the country has yet to agree on a shared common ground. At the heart of the problem is a deeper question: what kind of state, system of governance, and form of citizenship should define South Sudan?

It is more accurate to describe South Sudan not as a failed state, but as a country with an unfinished transition. The structures of a state are there. Government institutions exist, administrative systems function, and legal frameworks are in place. However, what is missing is a shared foundation that can make these structures work in a democratic, responsive, and legitimate way.

This is not just a theoretical argument. It is grounded in the country’s own experience, through the Revitalized Peace Agreement, the National Dialogue, and the constitution-making process. Across all these efforts, one pattern is clear: a persistent gap between formal agreements and real consensus, between international support and national ownership, and between elite decision-making and the expectations of ordinary citizens.

South Sudan has not collapsed as a state. What remains incomplete is the transition toward a fully functioning, accountable, and legitimate political system. The principles, institutional culture, and governance practices needed for democracy are still weak or missing. The state has a skeleton, but it lacks the strength to function effectively.

In this context, expectations of credible elections in December 2026 are difficult to sustain. Elections are not simply about procedures. They depend on trust, accountability, inclusion, and the rule of law, all of which remain fragile.

If South Sudan’s transition is unfinished, then the question is: what is holding it back?

One major obstacle is the absence of common ground. Over the years, national initiatives have often worked against each other instead of reinforcing one another. The peace process and the National Dialogue became competing projects rather than complementary ones. Each side questioned the legitimacy of the other. Some saw the peace process as foreign-driven and biased toward opposition groups, while others viewed the National Dialogue as a government-led effort to consolidate power. Attempts were made to bridge these divides. Some opposition groups joined, others withdrew. The result was not consensus, but continued fragmentation, evidence of how fragile trust remains and how deep political and ethnic divisions continue to shape the country.

More broadly, political leaders have engaged in parallel processes without building a shared national framework. These initiatives have too often become arenas of competition over power and resources, rather than genuine efforts to build unity and reconciliation.

The Revitalized Peace Agreement itself reflects this problem. While leaders projected unity at the signing, serious disagreements remained unresolved. Many sought to avoid appearing obstructive before international mediators while maintaining fundamentally different positions on key issues such as power-sharing and resource distribution. The result was an agreement that was formally accepted but lacked deep national commitment. The ongoing challenges in implementation, and the continued emergence of new initiatives, highlight the gap between what is agreed on paper and what happens in practice.

Equally troubling is the expectation that external actors should finance basic elements of peace implementation. Requests for food, uniforms, and equipment for cantonment sites point to a deeper issue: peacebuilding is often treated as an international responsibility rather than a national obligation. Without ownership, peace agreements risk becoming external projects rather than national commitments.

The same pattern appears in the constitution-making process. New bodies are formed, members are appointed, and workshops are held, often funded by external donors, but real progress remains slow. There is also heavy reliance on foreign experts applying general models that may not reflect South Sudan’s realities. But a constitution cannot be imported. It must reflect the values, history, and experiences of the people. It requires broad participation and must speak directly to the country’s challenges. It should express a collective national will, not simply meet technical standards. Despite international support for South Sudan’s independence, the country has yet to convene a truly sovereign national constitutional conference to define its shared future. Political and military elites have not delivered the transition to democracy.

Another major weakness lies in the exclusion of ordinary citizens. Peace and constitutional processes have focused overwhelmingly on political elites, on power-sharing, positions, and security arrangements, while the broader population remains on the margins. Yet many of the country’s conflicts are local: disputes over land, cattle, resources, and representation. These conflicts persist even when national agreements are signed. As a result, elite peace deals do not always translate into peace in people’s daily lives. A sustainable transition requires broader participation. Peace cannot come only from agreements among leaders; it must reflect the needs and concerns of communities across the country.

Transitional justice presents another unresolved challenge. South Sudan must balance accountability with reconciliation as it confronts its violent past and the painful memories it continues to carry. While international approaches often emphasize punishment, many African traditions focus on healing and restoring relationships. The country will need a system that brings these approaches together, one that delivers justice while also promoting national healing. The central lesson is clear: South Sudan’s unfinished transition is, at its core, a crisis of shared vision and national ownership.

Moving forward requires more than institutions and agreements. It requires a common understanding of the values that should guide the state. It requires leadership that prioritizes inclusion, equality, and human dignity. It requires using national resources, especially oil, to support development, particularly in agriculture. It requires decentralizing governance, so communities have a greater voice. And it requires investing in infrastructure, especially roads, to connect the country and strengthen national unity.

Above all, it requires shifting from externally driven processes and elite bargains to a truly national project shaped by the people of South Sudan. Until that happens, until leaders and citizens find common ground on governance, justice, inclusion, and development, the transition will remain unfinished. Only then can South Sudan turn its formal structures into a functioning democracy capable of delivering peace, dignity, and prosperity for all.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The weakest link in Somalia’s quest to end the protracted conflict is the fragmentation and infighting between the political elites of the country. The constitutional revision process and the conduct of elections have become major sites of power struggle and confrontation between rival political elites, although these are not the only sites of confrontation between these elites.

Five years ago, the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. In a development that mimicked the resultant violent confrontation of April 2021, Somalia’s weakest link struck again as political leaders failed to agree on a constitutional amendment and the modality for holding parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The clashes occurred ahead of a planned protest scheduled for 4 June against the one-year extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term, which opponents argue expired in mid-May. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The latest violence is the culmination of months of growing tensions between the FGS and opposition forces organised under the Somali Future Council—a coalition established in October 2025 by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, together with other opposition figures, to coordinate positions on major national issues, including constitutional amendment, notably those relating to electoral reform and the role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) vis-à-vis Federal Member States (FMS).

Five years ago, Somalia plunged into political and security turmoil after the lower house of Somalia’s parliament adopted a bill extending its own term of office and that of the President and President Farmajo’s assenting of the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model. The latest eruption of political showdown and armed confrontation in Mogadishu followed, as in April 2021, the adoption by Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament of amendments to the 2012 Provisional Constitution, among others, extending the terms of the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years and introducing a highly contested direct electoral system. Just like former President Farmajo, President Mohamud did exactly what he opposed five years ago and signed the constitutional amendments into law on 8 March. As in 2021 (which sought to extend elections by two years), the constitutional changes extended the incumbent president’s tenure by one year beyond its expiry on 15 May and postponed federal elections until 2027.

As in 2021, opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s mandate and maintain that his constitutional term ended in May.

The political impasse that these amendments and Mohamud’s continuation in power after the expiry of his term in May eventually escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was against this backdrop that the opposition sought to organise demonstrations in Mogadishu on 4 June, but the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President amid rising tension tipped the situation into armed confrontation.

The confrontation has alarmed both domestic and international actors because of the risk that the escalation could spiral into a broader and less controllable conflict. Such an outcome would have profound implications for Somalia’s fragile stability and could undermine years of hard-won security gains achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab. There are growing concerns that the militant group could exploit political divisions and security vacuums created by the crisis to expand its influence and operational reach.

International and regional actors responded swiftly to the violence. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on all parties to cease hostilities immediately, exercise maximum restraint, protect civilians, and avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. The Chairperson also urged Somali stakeholders to resolve their differences through dialogue and established constitutional mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for de-escalation to protect Somalia’s stability and future. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement, underscoring the urgent need for all stakeholders to resume dialogue and identify a way forward to preserve the progress Somalia has achieved over recent years.

Although the immediate violence appears to have subsided following intense mediation efforts by traditional leaders and international actors, the underlying political disagreements remain unresolved, leaving open the possibility of renewed escalation.

Beyond the immediate security implications, the crisis constitutes a major test of Somalia’s state-building project, the resilience of its institutions, and the maturity of political actors in managing disputes before they evolve into wider conflict. The developments also warrant close attention from international partners, particularly the AU, which has deployed peace support operations in Somalia since 2007 and secured substantial, albeit fragile, security gains through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of thousands.

The timing of the crisis is particularly concerning given the challenges facing the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is currently grappling with significant political, operational, and financial constraints as it seeks to preserve security gains and support the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

For years, Somali political actors have continued to defer the assumption of full responsibility, as they continue to outsource security responsibility with their heavy reliance on AU-led security support. Despite notable progress, Somalia, on account of the weakest link in the equation for its stability, has yet to develop the level of institutional and security capacities necessary to fully assume responsibility for its own security. The latest political confrontation, if not resolved promptly, undermines confidence about progress for achieving a level of organisation and capability of Somalia’s security institutions for them to assume full security responsibility.

The crisis also reinforces a broader lesson for the AU: security interventions alone cannot provide a sustainable solution to Somalia’s challenges. Without an accompanying political strategy capable of addressing the underlying causes of instability and fostering political consensus, even significant security achievements remain vulnerable to reversal. AU’s interest and role are not just that of any third party. It has a direct and major stake in what is unfolding in Somalia and as such cannot afford to simply limit its engagement for de-escalating the situation and securing agreement on the holding of elections at the level of issuing statements.

First, as it did during the April 2021 political crisis, the AU Peace and Security Council could convene an emergency session to provide strategic guidance and adopt firm and principled policy decisions for urgent consensus on the holding of elections. In 2021, the PSC condemned the extension of the mandate of the president and the parliament. Second, the Chairperson of the AU Commission could undertake a high-level diplomatic mission to Mogadishu to engage directly with key stakeholders and encourage a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Third, the AU could work with IGAD, the United Nations, and international partners with leverage on Somali political actors—including the United States and Türkiye—to establish a coordinated mediation framework aimed at establishing a consensual and mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, while creating conditions for a broader political settlement that permanently ends Somalia’s weakest link.

In the short term, one of the intriguing questions is whether the incumbent, President Mohamud, would succeed in what his predecessor, former President Farmajo, tried and failed five years ago. This will determine the trajectory of the political dimension of Somalia’s protracted conflict.

The question of financing is taking centre stage in the policy discussions on the African Union’s (AU) role in peace and security. It is in this context that the Eminent Panel of Experts on the review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the AU Champion on Institutional Reform proposed to increase the capitalisation of the Peace Fund from its current $400 million to $1billion, although this did not receive the enthusiastic support of AU member states.

In addition to the near existential financial crisis afflicting the AU Stabilisation Support Mission to Somalia (AUSSOM), the financing challenge facing the AU can also be drawn from the fact that the lion’s share of the peace and security fund of the AU in 2025 was not from member states contributions.  When it comes to member states’ contribution to peace operations, the lack of progress in meeting the Johannesburg target of 25% becomes even more glaring. The July 2024 Executive Council decision (EX.CL/Dec.1265(XLV) carrying the 2025 budget indicated that ‘peace support operations with a budget of US$52,929,131’ was ‘funded by International Partners.’

In the context of the major shifts in the nature of international relations involving, among others, the drying up of traditional sources of financing, enhanced self-reliance has become a strategic imperative. This was highlighted in the context of Donald Kaberuka’s recent engagement with the AU. Last March, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) held consultations with Donald Kaberuka, the AU Special Envoy on Sustainable Financing for the Union and Financing for Peace in Africa. Kaberuka informed member states that times have changed and Africa needs to adapt accordingly. On the preceding day, the High Representative also met with the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

During his engagement with the PSC, Kaberuka underscored the imperative for the AU to rely more decisively on its own financing mechanisms, including the Peace Fund, while expanding partnerships with the private sector and African financial institutions.

He also emphasised the importance of equitable access to UN-assessed contributions through fair burden-sharing arrangements to support African-led peace operations. While this proposition is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719, it is worth recalling that as far as AU-led PSOs authorized under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council is concerned emphasis should be put on the legal and institutional responsibility of the UN for bearing the cost of such mission with AU and its member states bearing the burden that is paid with the lives and limbs of troops and the financial costs associated with the mobilization of such troops.

While its sustainability remains to be seen, the Peace Fund Secretariat has initiated efforts to source funds from such sources as the private sector and African financial institutions, as well as high-net-worth individuals. Thus, high-level pledging events convened in 2024 and 2025 mobilised some commitments. For instance, in 2024, Afreximbank pledged $210 million over three years, while Standard Bank Group and Ethiopian Airlines committed $1 million each. In 2025, additional contributions were secured from institutions such as Africa Reinsurance (Africa Re) ($1 million), United Bank for Africa (UBA) ($500,000), and the African Trade & Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI). Despite these contributions, available resources remain inadequate to meet the continent’s growing peace and security needs.

Across his engagements at the AU in March, Kaberuka stressed the broader objective of strengthening the Union’s financial sovereignty, particularly in light of shifting geopolitical dynamics that are placing increasing strain on the financial position of multilateral institutions. In his X post, Kaberuka further noted that while international solidarity remains important, the AU should fund itself, characterising the financing challenge as ‘longstanding’ but now requiring resolution.

One of the important avenues for advancing the aspiration of self-financing lies in the implementation of decision AU/Dec.605(XXVII) of July 2016, which instituted the 0.2% import levy on eligible imports as a sustainable financing mechanism for the Union. However, progress in this regard has been limited. In 2018, the AU reported that only 16 Member States were implementing the Kigali Decision on the 0.2% levy; by 2025, that number had increased by only one.

The dismal state of progress in meeting the Kigali targets is not without consequences. As the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission pointed out in her address to the opening of the 50^th ordinary session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU on 9 June 2025, apart from perpetuating heavy reliance on external funding and thereby deferring the ambition of ownership, the funding challenge significantly ‘constrained the AUC’s capacity to effectively implement the decisions of the Policy Organs and strategic priorities.’ Additionally, this funding constraint, Haddadi pointed out, ‘has significantly hindered the effective implementation of security and safety standards.’

In addition to the adverse impacts of the funding challenges to AU’s mandate, Kaberuka’s engagements took place against the backdrop of decisions adopted by the AU Assembly at its 39^th Ordinary Session on financing the Union. The Assembly adopted several key measures aimed at strengthening the Union’s financial sustainability. Among others, it:

• Requested the High Representative for Financing the Union, with the support of the Commission, to undertake further consultations with Member States to strengthen consensus on key strategic financing issues.
• Requested the High Representative to expedite consultations on progress made in the overall financing of the Union.
• Directed the Executive Council to convene an Extra-Ordinary Session, bringing together Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance of Member States to strengthen the Financing of the Union and the Peace Fund, in line with Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.687 (XXX) of January 2018, not later than November 2026.
• Requested the AU High Representative for Financing the Union to present a report to the above-mentioned Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council.
• Decided to leverage internal financial resources and the support of African Financial Institutions to complement Member States’ contributions in financing the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
• Directed the Executive Council to invite Chief Executive Officers of African Financial Institutions to participate in the Extraordinary Session to consider funding modalities for the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
• Requested the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU High Representative for Financing, in close consultation with the Bureau of the Assembly, the PSC and the three African Members of the UN Security Council (A3+), to re-engage and advocate for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

It remains to be seen if this upcoming executive council extraordinary session will adopt a decision that fundamentally changes the current funding trajectory of the AU.