Abdul Mohammed

At a time when Africa confronts multiple and overlapping crises—devastating wars, democratic uncertainty, economic pressures, geopolitical competition, and an increasingly fragmented international order—it is fitting to pause and celebrate one of the continent’s most consequential leaders and thinkers.

The 84^th birthday of President Thabo Mbeki on 18 June offers a valuable opportunity to reflect on the kind of leadership this time demands and how African can exercise agency in order both to limit the adverse impacts of these challenges but also create conditions for addressing them. For he is not only a former President of South Africa but also one of the principal architects of contemporary Pan-Africanism. For more than four decades, he has helped shape continental debates on governance, development, peace, integration, and Africa’s place in the world.

For many Africans of my generation, Thabo Mbeki represents a rare combination of statesman, intellectual, strategist, and Pan-African visionary. He belongs to a generation of leaders who understood that political liberation was only the beginning of Africa’s journey. The greater challenge was transforming independence into development, political sovereignty into agency, and aspiration into institutions.

His presidency coincided with one of the most transformative periods in Africa’s contemporary history. The establishment of the African Union, the advancement of NEPAD, the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism, anchored on the articulation of the African Renaissance in advancing contemporary Pan-Africanism all bore his intellectual imprint. He challenged Africans to reject narratives of dependency and victimhood and instead embrace responsibility, dignity, and self-confidence.

Compared to his peers, what makes him standout is that Mbeki consistently treated ideas as instruments of transformation. He invested in thought as much as action. Whether through speeches, essays, ANC Today, or countless public engagements, he sought to elevate political discourse and encourage Africans to think strategically about their future.

This unique trait of Mbeki comes to full view on the occasion of the launch of an important and timely book, The Two Sudans by Alex de Waal. The book documents one of the most complex and far-reaching mediation efforts undertaken by the African Union under President Mbeki’s leadership as Chair of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan. It offers valuable insight into the challenges of peacemaking in deeply divided societies and stands as a testament to Mbeki’s patient, principled, and determined pursuit of African-led solutions to conflicts on the continent.

What has always distinguished Mbeki is his unwavering commitment to African solutions to problems in Africa. His mediation work presents a compelling testament to this commitment.

I had the privilege and honor of working closely with President Mbeki as Chief of Staff of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan. For nearly a decade, I witnessed his leadership at close quarters. Those years remain among the most rewarding, intellectually stimulating, and professionally fulfilling years.

Working with him was an education in leadership.

He approached mediation with extraordinary seriousness. Every document was read. Every argument was examined. Every historical detail mattered. He understood that sustainable peace requires more than ceasefires and agreements. It requires understanding history, identity, institutions, grievances, and aspirations.

The book, The Two Sudans, provides valuable insight into that period. It captures the depth of Mbeki’s engagement and his determination to pursue a genuinely African-led mediation process. His work demonstrated that peacebuilding requires patience, rigor, intellectual honesty, and political courage.

What stands out most was his discipline and strategic focus. He never sought publicity. He sought solutions. He believed that mediation was a responsibility to the people affected by conflict rather than a platform for diplomatic recognition.

While differed in style, but he shares important characteristics with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Both took ideas seriously. Both understood the importance of institution-building. Both were committed to transforming Africa’s position in the world. Both believed that Pan-Africanism required practical expression through policy, development, integration, peacebuilding, and strategic engagement with global realities.

Both were deeply intellectual yet intensely practical. Neither was interested in slogans or superficial politics. They believed that ideas must translate into policy, institutions, and measurable outcomes. They approached governance as a serious undertaking requiring discipline, preparation, and strategic clarity. Above all, they shared a conviction that Africa must become an active architect of its own destiny rather than a passive subject of global power politics. They both understood that Africa’s destiny requires the transformation of the socio-economic realities of the mass of the people.

Their generation understood that Pan-Africanism was not simply an aspiration; it was a practical project of state-building, regional integration, peace-making, and economic transformation.

They represented a practical Pan-Africanism—one rooted not in rhetoric but in action and deep commitment to the needs and interests of the mass of the people.

Today, that tradition of intellectually grounded and strategically engaged leadership is increasingly rare. The continent faces immense challenges that require strategic thinking, historical perspective, and moral courage. The wars in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sahel, and elsewhere have exposed weaknesses in both continental and international systems. At the same time, intensifying competition among global powers is reshaping Africa’s strategic environment.

On these issues, Mbeki’s voice remains indispensable.

Long before discussions of multipolarity became fashionable, he argued that Africa must strengthen its own institutions and strategic capabilities in order to navigate shifts in the global balance of power. His reflections on global governance, multilateral reform, development, and sovereignty remain remarkably relevant today.

His recent interventions against xenophobia and Afrophobia in South Africa are equally important. At a moment when economic hardship and social tensions risk fueling hostility toward migrants, Mbeki has reminded South Africans that the source of the social and economic ills afflicting South Africans are not people from other parts of the continent, who stood with them during the anti-apartheid struggle. He has consistently argued that attacks on fellow Africans betray the very values upon which democratic South Africa was built.

That moral consistency has been one of the defining features of his public life.

His continuing engagement is also reflected in recent collections of his writings and letters, including those drawn from ANC Today. These writings reveal a leader still deeply concerned about governance, political ethics, democratic accountability, and the future of the liberation movement that shaped modern South Africa.

History will continue to debate aspects of his presidency, as it should. That is inevitable for any consequential leader. Yet no serious assessment of modern Africa can ignore the scale of his contribution.

At a time when leadership for peace appears increasingly scarce and leadership for conflict often dominates headlines, Mbeki’s example offers an important reminder. He has consistently demonstrated that political leadership must be anchored in principle, patience, and long-term vision. Throughout his public life, he has defended dialogue over confrontation, institutions over personalities, and strategic thinking over political expediency. Africa’s current crises underscore the continued relevance of these values.

For those of us fortunate enough to have worked alongside him, President Mbeki’s legacy is not confined to history books or institutional achievements. It lives on in the lessons he imparted, the standards he set, and the enduring belief that Africa can and must shape its own future.

At eighty-four, many in Africa are delighted to have him as one of the continent’s most important voices—a statesman whose influence extends beyond office, beyond country, and beyond generation.

As we wish you a happy 84^th birthday, President Thabo Mbeki, may your continued wisdom, intellectual courage, and unwavering commitment to Africa continue to inspire those who believe that another Africa remains possible.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Previne Habu, Researcher, Amani Africa

The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its application across various fields are unfolding at a speed that has outpaced the development of appropriate guardrails both at national and multilateral levels. In Africa, the emergence of AI was greeted with enthusiasm and its adoption is accelerating across Africa. Despite the transformative impact of AI on how societies function across various fields and its potential to help overcome some of the structural constraints for development, the experience with AI, including in parts of the world at the forefront of its development and adoption, has also revealed major downsides.

Both the pace of advancement of AI and the various risks and issues identified with its adoption in various areas of social, economic, security and governance fields have prompted policy debates, including in multilateral forums.  As a multilateral platform that is known for its norm entrepreneurship, the African Union (AU), particularly its Peace and Security Council (PSC), took an interest in AI, with the PSC focusing on its implications for governance and peace and security.

Initially, reflecting the prevailing early enthusiastic discourse on digital technology and AI, PSC’s take on the subject was characterised by what experts call techno-optimism. Thus, its first meeting on AI during the 1214^th session came across as an AI optimist. This was reflected in its enthusiastic expression of its expectation of the contribution of AI ‘towards the promotion of peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, as well as in accelerating global development and the achievement of the aspirations of AU Agenda 2063 and the UN Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals.’

Certainly, the potential of AI to make such a contribution is not totally misplaced. Reports show that AI is projected to contribute between $2.9 trillion and $4.8 trillion to Africa’s economy by 2030, creating substantial opportunities for the continent’s predominantly youthful population. From agriculture and healthcare to education and finance, key sectors are poised for profound transformation as AI-driven innovations reshape production, service delivery, and governance systems.

Yet, the reality is also that, as new technology that is disruptive and in the process of continuous refinement, not only is AI not free from risks, but also its impact on various areas of the lives of societies and individuals is not without downsides. The prevailing optimism surrounding its transformative potential, particularly in Africa, warrants careful scrutiny. This is particularly important given the lack of consideration of the realities of parts of the world, such as Africa, in the design and development of AI systems, the algorithmic bias associated with most AI systems, the regulatory gaps, and the safety and human rights compliance risks.

For Africa, there are other factors that complicate the adoption of AI, including regional disparities and structural constraints such as technical gaps, infrastructural limitations, including pressure on the use of electricity (on a continent with nearly half of its people without access to electricity and an uneven data governance regime. Relatedly, the policy engagement of the AU and its member states including through the PSC need to pay particular attention to key issues, including data protection, bridging the digital divide, strengthening capacities to adapt and develop AI solutions suited to African realities, closing regulatory and technical gaps, safeguarding vulnerable groups, and ensuring the responsible use and human control in the use of AI in the military domain. Also, of significance is ensuring coherence and preventing emerging risks of policy fragmentation across the AU system.

The latest ministerial session of the PSC, its 1339^th meeting, held on 16 April 2026, on the theme ‘Artificial Intelligence: Governance, Peace and Security,’ marked the start of the PSC’s shift from optimism to realism. While the session built on previous PSC’s engagement of the nexus between AI, governance, peace and security in Africa, particularly its 1214^th Meeting held on 13 June 2024 and its 1267^th meeting held on 20 March 2025, it approached the subject with a sense of realism while still cognisant of its enormous potential. Accordingly, the PSC emphasised the imperative for Africa to shape, develop, and control its own AI technologies in order to guarantee the continent’s sovereignty across the entire AI ecosystem. Recognising the strategic importance of digital independence, the PSC underscored the need to safeguard Africa’s digital and data sovereignty. It emphasised the importance of developing AI systems in African languages as a means of promoting inclusivity, preserving cultural heritage, and strengthening social cohesion.

In terms of governance of AI, the PSC emphasised that the development and deployment of AI technologies must be guided by the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusivity, ethical governance, benefit- sharing, social cohesion, and full respect for international law. It further advocated for the progressive development of context-specific and adaptable AI governance and regulatory frameworks or charters aligned with international humanitarian law and the principle of meaningful human control. Having regard to Africa’s place in the global AI systems, the Council stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in global norm-setting processes through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement within multilateral platforms.

The 1339^th session, per the communiqué, reflected a discussion that was strategically ambitious and geopolitically informed with regard to Africa’s stance in the evolving global AI landscape. This clearly sets a useful foundation for shaping a more productive engagement that enables the harnessing of the benefits of AI in advancing Africa’s priorities while also seeking to put in place arrangements for limiting, if not avoiding, the perils and downsides of this disruptive yet transformative technology.

As the PSC and the AU take the policy engagement forward, some of the developments that merit closer scrutiny include the rapid evolution of AI-enabled warfare capabilities and the emergence of drones as weapons of choice in several conflict settings across Africa. As such, first, greater consideration could be given to the risks associated with lethal autonomous weapons systems, AI-driven and autonomous drone warfare, and algorithmic targeting.

Second, it will be imperative for the AU and the PSC to examine the huge environmental implications of expanding AI infrastructure. The growing energy requirements of data centres and the increasing demand for water resources associated with AI development raise important sustainability concerns, particularly in a continent already facing significant climate vulnerabilities and energy deficits.

Third, the Council could consider the potential socio-economic consequences of AI-driven automation. Given Africa’s large youth population, persistent unemployment challenges, and fragile labour markets, the implications of automation for employment, livelihoods, and social stability deserve greater policy attention.

Finally, while the 1339^th meeting highlighted the importance of including women and youth in AI governance processes, the PSC may wish to strengthen its approach through a more comprehensive human rights framework. Such a framework, apart from ensuring integration of safeguards for protection of vulnerable groups and key sectors of society, could address emerging concerns related to biometric surveillance, the misuse of facial recognition technologies, data privacy, and the proliferation of digital authoritarian tools.

There is also a need to address the risk of policy fragmentation within the AU system in view of the multiple initiatives in various parts of the AU. This underscores the need to have an AU-wide AI governance framework that is coherent across AU institutions and firmly grounded in existing African normative and legal instruments, particularly human and peoples’ rights standards, as well as continental frameworks on data protection and cybersecurity. The PSC should explore how the commitments made by Member States through the ratification of the AU Malabo Convention can be leveraged to strengthen AI governance and promote the safe, responsible, and peace-advancing use of AI across Africa.

The turn to AI realism that the 1339^th session marked could signify a useful baseline framework that all AU bodies and member states at the national level could draw on for informing their policy approach relating to AI.

By: Dr. Francis Deng and Dr. Amir Idris

Dr. Francis Deng is Sudan’s former Ambassador to the Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the United States, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs, and South Sudan’s first Permanent Representative to the UN

Dr. Amir Idris is a professor of African history and politics in the Department of History at Fordham University, New York. His latest book is Race, Ethnicity, and Violence in South Sudan (2024)

South Sudan’s transition remains unfinished, not only because of weak institutions, repeated political crises, and a lack of political will, but also because the country has yet to agree on a shared common ground. At the heart of the problem is a deeper question: what kind of state, system of governance, and form of citizenship should define South Sudan?

It is more accurate to describe South Sudan not as a failed state, but as a country with an unfinished transition. The structures of a state are there. Government institutions exist, administrative systems function, and legal frameworks are in place. However, what is missing is a shared foundation that can make these structures work in a democratic, responsive, and legitimate way.

This is not just a theoretical argument. It is grounded in the country’s own experience, through the Revitalized Peace Agreement, the National Dialogue, and the constitution-making process. Across all these efforts, one pattern is clear: a persistent gap between formal agreements and real consensus, between international support and national ownership, and between elite decision-making and the expectations of ordinary citizens.

South Sudan has not collapsed as a state. What remains incomplete is the transition toward a fully functioning, accountable, and legitimate political system. The principles, institutional culture, and governance practices needed for democracy are still weak or missing. The state has a skeleton, but it lacks the strength to function effectively.

In this context, expectations of credible elections in December 2026 are difficult to sustain. Elections are not simply about procedures. They depend on trust, accountability, inclusion, and the rule of law, all of which remain fragile.

If South Sudan’s transition is unfinished, then the question is: what is holding it back?

One major obstacle is the absence of common ground. Over the years, national initiatives have often worked against each other instead of reinforcing one another. The peace process and the National Dialogue became competing projects rather than complementary ones. Each side questioned the legitimacy of the other. Some saw the peace process as foreign-driven and biased toward opposition groups, while others viewed the National Dialogue as a government-led effort to consolidate power. Attempts were made to bridge these divides. Some opposition groups joined, others withdrew. The result was not consensus, but continued fragmentation, evidence of how fragile trust remains and how deep political and ethnic divisions continue to shape the country.

More broadly, political leaders have engaged in parallel processes without building a shared national framework. These initiatives have too often become arenas of competition over power and resources, rather than genuine efforts to build unity and reconciliation.

The Revitalized Peace Agreement itself reflects this problem. While leaders projected unity at the signing, serious disagreements remained unresolved. Many sought to avoid appearing obstructive before international mediators while maintaining fundamentally different positions on key issues such as power-sharing and resource distribution. The result was an agreement that was formally accepted but lacked deep national commitment. The ongoing challenges in implementation, and the continued emergence of new initiatives, highlight the gap between what is agreed on paper and what happens in practice.

Equally troubling is the expectation that external actors should finance basic elements of peace implementation. Requests for food, uniforms, and equipment for cantonment sites point to a deeper issue: peacebuilding is often treated as an international responsibility rather than a national obligation. Without ownership, peace agreements risk becoming external projects rather than national commitments.

The same pattern appears in the constitution-making process. New bodies are formed, members are appointed, and workshops are held, often funded by external donors, but real progress remains slow. There is also heavy reliance on foreign experts applying general models that may not reflect South Sudan’s realities. But a constitution cannot be imported. It must reflect the values, history, and experiences of the people. It requires broad participation and must speak directly to the country’s challenges. It should express a collective national will, not simply meet technical standards. Despite international support for South Sudan’s independence, the country has yet to convene a truly sovereign national constitutional conference to define its shared future. Political and military elites have not delivered the transition to democracy.

Another major weakness lies in the exclusion of ordinary citizens. Peace and constitutional processes have focused overwhelmingly on political elites, on power-sharing, positions, and security arrangements, while the broader population remains on the margins. Yet many of the country’s conflicts are local: disputes over land, cattle, resources, and representation. These conflicts persist even when national agreements are signed. As a result, elite peace deals do not always translate into peace in people’s daily lives. A sustainable transition requires broader participation. Peace cannot come only from agreements among leaders; it must reflect the needs and concerns of communities across the country.

Transitional justice presents another unresolved challenge. South Sudan must balance accountability with reconciliation as it confronts its violent past and the painful memories it continues to carry. While international approaches often emphasize punishment, many African traditions focus on healing and restoring relationships. The country will need a system that brings these approaches together, one that delivers justice while also promoting national healing. The central lesson is clear: South Sudan’s unfinished transition is, at its core, a crisis of shared vision and national ownership.

Moving forward requires more than institutions and agreements. It requires a common understanding of the values that should guide the state. It requires leadership that prioritizes inclusion, equality, and human dignity. It requires using national resources, especially oil, to support development, particularly in agriculture. It requires decentralizing governance, so communities have a greater voice. And it requires investing in infrastructure, especially roads, to connect the country and strengthen national unity.

Above all, it requires shifting from externally driven processes and elite bargains to a truly national project shaped by the people of South Sudan. Until that happens, until leaders and citizens find common ground on governance, justice, inclusion, and development, the transition will remain unfinished. Only then can South Sudan turn its formal structures into a functioning democracy capable of delivering peace, dignity, and prosperity for all.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The weakest link in Somalia’s quest to end the protracted conflict is the fragmentation and infighting between the political elites of the country. The constitutional revision process and the conduct of elections have become major sites of power struggle and confrontation between rival political elites, although these are not the only sites of confrontation between these elites.

Five years ago, the expiry of the terms of parliament and the president in December 2020 and February 2021 respectively, without any political consensus on the time and modality of elections plunged Somalia into a constitutional crisis and political uncertainty. In a development that mimicked the resultant violent confrontation of April 2021, Somalia’s weakest link struck again as political leaders failed to agree on a constitutional amendment and the modality for holding parliamentary and presidential elections.

On 3 June, fighting erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and armed groups loyal to opposition leaders near the residences of former Prime Minister Hassan Khaire and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The clashes occurred ahead of a planned protest scheduled for 4 June against the one-year extension of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term, which opponents argue expired in mid-May. The confrontation continued into 4 June before subsiding following mediated talks.

The latest violence is the culmination of months of growing tensions between the FGS and opposition forces organised under the Somali Future Council—a coalition established in October 2025 by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, together with other opposition figures, to coordinate positions on major national issues, including constitutional amendment, notably those relating to electoral reform and the role of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) vis-à-vis Federal Member States (FMS).

Five years ago, Somalia plunged into political and security turmoil after the lower house of Somalia’s parliament adopted a bill extending its own term of office and that of the President and President Farmajo’s assenting of the bill into a ‘Special Election Law’ purporting to return Somalia to a one-person one-vote electoral model. The latest eruption of political showdown and armed confrontation in Mogadishu followed, as in April 2021, the adoption by Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament of amendments to the 2012 Provisional Constitution, among others, extending the terms of the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years and introducing a highly contested direct electoral system. Just like former President Farmajo, President Mohamud did exactly what he opposed five years ago and signed the constitutional amendments into law on 8 March. As in 2021 (which sought to extend elections by two years), the constitutional changes extended the incumbent president’s tenure by one year beyond its expiry on 15 May and postponed federal elections until 2027.

As in 2021, opposition groups have strongly rejected the constitutional changes. They argued that the changes were adopted unilaterally and without the broad political consensus required for such fundamental reforms. Consequently, they do not recognise the extension of President Mohamud’s mandate and maintain that his constitutional term ended in May.

The political impasse that these amendments and Mohamud’s continuation in power after the expiry of his term in May eventually escalated into armed confrontation, when opposition groups sought to stage protests on 4 June. It was against this backdrop that the opposition sought to organise demonstrations in Mogadishu on 4 June, but the deployment by the Government of security forces to the residences of the former Prime Minister and former President amid rising tension tipped the situation into armed confrontation.

The confrontation has alarmed both domestic and international actors because of the risk that the escalation could spiral into a broader and less controllable conflict. Such an outcome would have profound implications for Somalia’s fragile stability and could undermine years of hard-won security gains achieved in the fight against Al-Shabaab. There are growing concerns that the militant group could exploit political divisions and security vacuums created by the crisis to expand its influence and operational reach.

International and regional actors responded swiftly to the violence. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission called on all parties to cease hostilities immediately, exercise maximum restraint, protect civilians, and avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. The Chairperson also urged Somali stakeholders to resolve their differences through dialogue and established constitutional mechanisms. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for de-escalation to protect Somalia’s stability and future. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement, underscoring the urgent need for all stakeholders to resume dialogue and identify a way forward to preserve the progress Somalia has achieved over recent years.

Although the immediate violence appears to have subsided following intense mediation efforts by traditional leaders and international actors, the underlying political disagreements remain unresolved, leaving open the possibility of renewed escalation.

Beyond the immediate security implications, the crisis constitutes a major test of Somalia’s state-building project, the resilience of its institutions, and the maturity of political actors in managing disputes before they evolve into wider conflict. The developments also warrant close attention from international partners, particularly the AU, which has deployed peace support operations in Somalia since 2007 and secured substantial, albeit fragile, security gains through the sacrifice of the lives and limbs of thousands.

The timing of the crisis is particularly concerning given the challenges facing the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The mission is currently grappling with significant political, operational, and financial constraints as it seeks to preserve security gains and support the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somali forces.

For years, Somali political actors have continued to defer the assumption of full responsibility, as they continue to outsource security responsibility with their heavy reliance on AU-led security support. Despite notable progress, Somalia, on account of the weakest link in the equation for its stability, has yet to develop the level of institutional and security capacities necessary to fully assume responsibility for its own security. The latest political confrontation, if not resolved promptly, undermines confidence about progress for achieving a level of organisation and capability of Somalia’s security institutions for them to assume full security responsibility.

The crisis also reinforces a broader lesson for the AU: security interventions alone cannot provide a sustainable solution to Somalia’s challenges. Without an accompanying political strategy capable of addressing the underlying causes of instability and fostering political consensus, even significant security achievements remain vulnerable to reversal. AU’s interest and role are not just that of any third party. It has a direct and major stake in what is unfolding in Somalia and as such cannot afford to simply limit its engagement for de-escalating the situation and securing agreement on the holding of elections at the level of issuing statements.

First, as it did during the April 2021 political crisis, the AU Peace and Security Council could convene an emergency session to provide strategic guidance and adopt firm and principled policy decisions for urgent consensus on the holding of elections. In 2021, the PSC condemned the extension of the mandate of the president and the parliament. Second, the Chairperson of the AU Commission could undertake a high-level diplomatic mission to Mogadishu to engage directly with key stakeholders and encourage a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Third, the AU could work with IGAD, the United Nations, and international partners with leverage on Somali political actors—including the United States and Türkiye—to establish a coordinated mediation framework aimed at establishing a consensual and mutually acceptable arrangement for holding elections, while creating conditions for a broader political settlement that permanently ends Somalia’s weakest link.

In the short term, one of the intriguing questions is whether the incumbent, President Mohamud, would succeed in what his predecessor, former President Farmajo, tried and failed five years ago. This will determine the trajectory of the political dimension of Somalia’s protracted conflict.

The question of financing is taking centre stage in the policy discussions on the African Union’s (AU) role in peace and security. It is in this context that the Eminent Panel of Experts on the review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the AU Champion on Institutional Reform proposed to increase the capitalisation of the Peace Fund from its current $400 million to $1billion, although this did not receive the enthusiastic support of AU member states.

In addition to the near existential financial crisis afflicting the AU Stabilisation Support Mission to Somalia (AUSSOM), the financing challenge facing the AU can also be drawn from the fact that the lion’s share of the peace and security fund of the AU in 2025 was not from member states contributions.  When it comes to member states’ contribution to peace operations, the lack of progress in meeting the Johannesburg target of 25% becomes even more glaring. The July 2024 Executive Council decision (EX.CL/Dec.1265(XLV) carrying the 2025 budget indicated that ‘peace support operations with a budget of US$52,929,131’ was ‘funded by International Partners.’

In the context of the major shifts in the nature of international relations involving, among others, the drying up of traditional sources of financing, enhanced self-reliance has become a strategic imperative. This was highlighted in the context of Donald Kaberuka’s recent engagement with the AU. Last March, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) held consultations with Donald Kaberuka, the AU Special Envoy on Sustainable Financing for the Union and Financing for Peace in Africa. Kaberuka informed member states that times have changed and Africa needs to adapt accordingly. On the preceding day, the High Representative also met with the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

During his engagement with the PSC, Kaberuka underscored the imperative for the AU to rely more decisively on its own financing mechanisms, including the Peace Fund, while expanding partnerships with the private sector and African financial institutions.

He also emphasised the importance of equitable access to UN-assessed contributions through fair burden-sharing arrangements to support African-led peace operations. While this proposition is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719, it is worth recalling that as far as AU-led PSOs authorized under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council is concerned emphasis should be put on the legal and institutional responsibility of the UN for bearing the cost of such mission with AU and its member states bearing the burden that is paid with the lives and limbs of troops and the financial costs associated with the mobilization of such troops.

While its sustainability remains to be seen, the Peace Fund Secretariat has initiated efforts to source funds from such sources as the private sector and African financial institutions, as well as high-net-worth individuals. Thus, high-level pledging events convened in 2024 and 2025 mobilised some commitments. For instance, in 2024, Afreximbank pledged $210 million over three years, while Standard Bank Group and Ethiopian Airlines committed $1 million each. In 2025, additional contributions were secured from institutions such as Africa Reinsurance (Africa Re) ($1 million), United Bank for Africa (UBA) ($500,000), and the African Trade & Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI). Despite these contributions, available resources remain inadequate to meet the continent’s growing peace and security needs.

Across his engagements at the AU in March, Kaberuka stressed the broader objective of strengthening the Union’s financial sovereignty, particularly in light of shifting geopolitical dynamics that are placing increasing strain on the financial position of multilateral institutions. In his X post, Kaberuka further noted that while international solidarity remains important, the AU should fund itself, characterising the financing challenge as ‘longstanding’ but now requiring resolution.

One of the important avenues for advancing the aspiration of self-financing lies in the implementation of decision AU/Dec.605(XXVII) of July 2016, which instituted the 0.2% import levy on eligible imports as a sustainable financing mechanism for the Union. However, progress in this regard has been limited. In 2018, the AU reported that only 16 Member States were implementing the Kigali Decision on the 0.2% levy; by 2025, that number had increased by only one.

The dismal state of progress in meeting the Kigali targets is not without consequences. As the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission pointed out in her address to the opening of the 50^th ordinary session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU on 9 June 2025, apart from perpetuating heavy reliance on external funding and thereby deferring the ambition of ownership, the funding challenge significantly ‘constrained the AUC’s capacity to effectively implement the decisions of the Policy Organs and strategic priorities.’ Additionally, this funding constraint, Haddadi pointed out, ‘has significantly hindered the effective implementation of security and safety standards.’

In addition to the adverse impacts of the funding challenges to AU’s mandate, Kaberuka’s engagements took place against the backdrop of decisions adopted by the AU Assembly at its 39^th Ordinary Session on financing the Union. The Assembly adopted several key measures aimed at strengthening the Union’s financial sustainability. Among others, it:

• Requested the High Representative for Financing the Union, with the support of the Commission, to undertake further consultations with Member States to strengthen consensus on key strategic financing issues.
• Requested the High Representative to expedite consultations on progress made in the overall financing of the Union.
• Directed the Executive Council to convene an Extra-Ordinary Session, bringing together Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance of Member States to strengthen the Financing of the Union and the Peace Fund, in line with Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.687 (XXX) of January 2018, not later than November 2026.
• Requested the AU High Representative for Financing the Union to present a report to the above-mentioned Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council.
• Decided to leverage internal financial resources and the support of African Financial Institutions to complement Member States’ contributions in financing the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
• Directed the Executive Council to invite Chief Executive Officers of African Financial Institutions to participate in the Extraordinary Session to consider funding modalities for the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
• Requested the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU High Representative for Financing, in close consultation with the Bureau of the Assembly, the PSC and the three African Members of the UN Security Council (A3+), to re-engage and advocate for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

It remains to be seen if this upcoming executive council extraordinary session will adopt a decision that fundamentally changes the current funding trajectory of the AU.

By Fadhel Kaboub and Joab Okanda

In a manoeuvre dripping with historical irony and geopolitical desperation, French President Emmanuel Macron is set to land in Nairobi on May 11. He will be in Kenya to co-host the “Africa Forward Summit: Africa-France Partnership for Innovation and Growth.” To the uninitiated, the title suggests a progressive leap into a shared future.

However, to those who have watched the sun set on Françafrique in the West, the subtext is clear: having been unceremoniously evicted from its traditional ‘stomping grounds’ in the Sahel, Paris is pitching its tent in East Africa, hunting for new deals to cover the haemorrhaging fortunes of a dying empire. Ahead of his arrival — incidentally on the Ides of March — three French warships docked at the port of Mombasa, carrying with them over 800 military personnel. They were riding on the wave of newfound defence cooperation between the governments of Kenya and France. Through this pact, France now has a new hunting ground in East Africa, complete with boots on the ground, sea and air. Kenya’s 142,400 Square Kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean, reputed for riches in fish, oil and gas, is in for a rude shock.

The irony is almost pathological. For over a century, France treated West Africa as a private warehouse. It did not merely colonize; it plundered, looted, and systematically attempted to dismantle the resilient African civilizations that predated its arrival. Its ‘assimilation’ policy remains the most abhorrent, ignoble of colonial concepts; a cultural and political mis-philosophy designed to supplant African languages, customs, and identities with French surrogates.

When other colonial powers were loosening—however reluctantly— their grip, France was tightening its hold through a web of lopsided financial and military pacts.

With the rising tide of political ‘wokeness’ across the continent, however, France now finds itself sorely ostracized, and endangered. Yet, rather than offering atonement, the French leadership has chosen to grandstand. The mask slipped definitively earlier this year when Macron, frustrated by the anti-French revolts sweeping through former colonies, dropped the pretence of diplomacy. ‘I think someone forgot to say thank you,’ he remarked, with the chilling entitlement of a landlord demanding gratitude for a house he broke into.

Fast forward five months, and this same ‘savior’ is now knocking on East Africa’s door, hat in hand, seeking a ‘new partnership built on equal ground.’

The sudden pivot is driven by a cold reality: France’s ‘green’ future is powered by African minerals. While the lights of Paris stayed bright on the back of Niger’s uranium, Africa remained in the dark.

But as the Nairobi summit approaches, Africa must move beyond being a passive host. If Macron and his European contemporaries truly seek a partnership of equals, they must meet a set of non-negotiable demands that protect African interests, specifically within the environment and energy sectors.

First, a mandate for local beneficiation and value addition. Africa will no longer be a mere pit stop for raw material extraction. The Nairobi summit must establish a framework where no critical mineral—lithium, cobalt, or uranium—leaves the continent in its raw state.

Africans must demand that French and European companies invest in local processing plants and refineries. If the ‘Green Transition’ requires African minerals, then the ‘Green Industrialization’ must happen on African soil, creating African jobs and keeping the value chain within our borders.

Second, total transformation of the financial architecture and the CFA Franc. For a nation that has enforced financial slavery through the CFA Franc since 1945, Macron’s talk of “financial reform” must be met with scepticism.  Africa must demand the total dismantling of the colonial financial umbilical cord. Africa requires a global financial system that does not penalize African nations with ‘sovereign risk’ premiums that make green energy projects three times more expensive here than in Europe. It must demand the unconditional return of foreign currency reserves held in Paris and a shift toward independent, African-led monetary policies.

Third, energy sovereignty over ‘green exportation’. France proposes to ‘decarbonize’ Africa, yet many of our nations have barely “carbonized” to begin with. African ‘partners’ must demand energy justice. This means the right to achieve universal electrification. Africa must reject a ‘Green Deal’ that forces Africa to export its renewable energy (like green hydrogen) to Europe while her own hospitals and schools remain off the grid.

African energy needs must be met first; exports to Europe come second.

Fourth, technology transfer, not just licensing. True innovation is not found in buying French software; it is found in owning the source code. The Nairobi summit must secure commitments for the unconditional transfer of green technologies. Africa should not be a ‘market’ for European patents; it must be a co-owner of the intellectual property that will define the 21st century. 

Fifth, climate reparations and debt cancellation. Already, France is active in ‘debt-for-development’ swaps. Africa must demand that these are not treated as ‘gifts’ but as partial down-payments on a century of ecological and economic debt.  Africa should also insist on total cancellation of debts that were accrued through colonial-era structures. Climate finance must be provided as grants, not loans that further burden Africa’s children for a climate crisis they did not create.

Sixth, accountability for multinational conglomerates. Total Energies, Orano, and Eramet – over 60 CEO’s from French corporations at the summit – must answer tough questions at the summit. They ought to answer for their extractive interests that have historically disadvantaged the continent. Across Africa, communities have borne the environmental, social, and economic costs of such operations, with countries like Mozambique offering stark reminders of the consequences.

The companies must agree to be held to African environmental standards, not just French ones, and a legal framework that allows communities to sue French corporations in both African and French courts for environmental degradation and human rights abuses.

There can be no ‘partnership’ where companies operate with impunity in the Global South while preaching ‘ESG’ values in the North.

Seventh, an end to paternalistic ‘security’ pacts. Finally, Africa demands an end to the ‘policing’ of the continent. True peace and security come from economic dignity, not from the 60+ military interventions France has conducted since 1960 to protect its interests.  Africa must demand the closure of foreign military bases that serve extractive interests and a shift toward supporting African-led, autonomous security architectures. If partnership means equality, then reciprocity is simple – every French soldier granted access and immunity in Africa should be matched by an African soldier with the same rights in France, and every square metre of African soil used by French armed forces in Africa should be matched by an equal measure of French territory granted to African armed forces.

The ‘New Scramble’ is couched in the language of ‘climate resilience’ and ‘debt-for-development swaps.’ But beneath these green platitudes lie a hidden quest: to re-establish unfettered access to Africa’s critical minerals.

Africa must stay circumspect. The convergence of military signalling and corporate presence must worry all countries participating in Nairobi. They must watch out for unequal relationships under new language.

The ‘disinherited’ continent has found its voice. Africa is no longer interested in being a marginal chapter in a European story, not even with a thousand summits. If President Macron wants a ‘thank you,’ he should start by returning what was stolen from Africa and respecting the sovereignty he so arrogantly claimed to have authored. The era of the ‘political orchestra’ directed from Paris is over. The music has changed, and Africa is finally playing its own tune.

Fadhel Kaboub is Associate Professor of Economics at Denison University, President of the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, a member of the United Nations High-Level Advisory Board on Economic and Social Affairs at UN-DESA, and author of Global South Perspectives on Substack.

Joab Okanda is a Kenyan author and climate, energy, and development expert with extensive experience in research, policy, and advocacy at regional, continental and global levels. He is a Pan-African voice on just transition, climate and economic Justice, with a strong commitment to advancing just and equitable systems across Africa.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

The major breakthrough of the international conference on Sudan held in Berlin was the adoption of a joint declaration by the civilian forces convened during the conference. On 15 April, marking the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States convened the third international Sudan conference in Berlin.

This meeting, which brought together ministers and representatives from 55 countries, alongside donors, regional organisations, United Nations entities, and other partners, as well as 38 international and Sudanese NGOs, follows earlier conferences in Paris (2024) and London (2025).

As with its predecessors, the convening was not without controversy—particularly regarding participation and representation. The exclusion of the warring parties (the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)) drew criticism from both sides. Sudan’s foreign ministry denounced the conference for proceeding without consultation with Khartoum, characterising it as a ‘colonial tutelage approach.’ Meanwhile, the Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS), a coalition aligned with the RSF, raised concerns over the perceived inclusion of actors linked to the SAF and the Islamic movement, warning that such participation could dilute the civilian voice and hinder peace efforts.

Additionally, the countries that participated in the conference were unable to agree on a joint communique. Despite the joint statement that the members of the Quad negotiated and adopted in September 2025, divisions that resurfaced during the technical negotiations, reportedly over language relating to the preservation of ‘state institutions’, forced the convening to end without a joint communique of the participating states, as in London. Consequently, the conference closed with a co-hosts’ communiqué.

Despite these drawbacks, Berlin registered some positive outcomes for a situation that needs some flicker of progress. In this respect, the outcomes of the conference should be assessed against its stated objectives, rather than against expectations it was not designed to fulfil. Some commentary has downplayed the conference’s significance, criticising its format for failing to deliver a ceasefire or immediate relief for civilians. The conference instead focused on three core objectives: mobilising humanitarian support, elevating global attention to the Sudan crisis, and creating space for civilian and political dialogue. Its success should be evaluated accordingly.

A major outcome of Berlin was the creation, for the first time in three years, of a platform for Sudanese civilian and political actors to convene and agree on a joint statement calling for an end to the war. This process was facilitated by the Quintet. Building on consultations initiated in Addis Ababa and concluded in Berlin, some 46 representatives endorsed a joint call structured around seven key priorities: an immediate ceasefire; protection of civilians and infrastructure; humanitarian access; civilian democratic governance; a Sudanese-owned political process; international support; and justice.

This development is particularly significant given the persistent fragmentation of civilian actors and the limitation, to date, to collectively influence the trajectory of the conflict. Previous efforts by the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, established in January 2024, facilitated preparatory consultations in July and August 2024 and February 2025 but did not achieve comparable convergence. In this context, the progress made under the Quintet framework in Berlin should be seen as a meaningful step toward a unified civilian platform and lays the groundwork for a Sudanese-led political dialogue.

On the humanitarian front, the Sudan conflict has generated the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA’s February report, an estimated 33.7 million people need assistance, with 28.9 million requiring food security and livelihood support in 2026. Famine conditions have been confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli, with similar patterns observed in Dilling. As the conflict persists, humanitarian needs continue to rise, yet responses have not kept pace. Instead, significant funding shortfalls have led to reductions in life-saving assistance. The 2026 humanitarian response plan stands at USD 2.6 billion—a decrease of nearly one-third from the previous year—reflecting a constrained funding environment. Only 35 per cent of the 2025 plan was funded, and in 2026, just 16 per cent of the required funding has been secured to date.

Against this backdrop, one of the conference’s tangible outcomes is the mobilisation of financial commitments. International donors pledged €1.5 billion, with more than half (€811 million) contributed by the European Union and its member states, reflecting a significant increase compared to the London conference, where pledges totalled around €950 million. While insufficient to meet overall needs, this represents a substantial and concrete contribution that should not be understated, despite the lack of clarity about how much of the pledged money is additional to the amount pledged during the humanitarian convening held in Washington, D.C.

Third, the conference succeeded in bringing Sudan’s crisis to the forefront of international attention. Despite constituting the world’s most severe humanitarian emergency, Sudan has increasingly been overshadowed by other geopolitical crises, including those in Ukraine, Gaza, and, more recently, Iran. The Berlin conference, at least temporarily, served to re-centre global focus on Sudan.

Overall, the Berlin conference has helped generate momentum for Sudanese civilian and political actors to engage more cohesively and to shape the country’s transition toward civilian-led governance. This is a major development given the persisting deadlock in the SAF-RSF-focused processes. Sustaining this momentum now falls to the Quintet. A key next step will be to engage those actors not represented in Berlin and ensure broader inclusivity. Encouragingly, plans are reportedly underway to convene follow-up meetings in May to incorporate additional stakeholders. The success registered in Berlin with the adoption of a joint statement of civilians presents a unique opportunity to take forward the question of how to pursue proposals towards the constitution of a civilian transitional authority.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

15 April 2026 marks the 3^rd-year anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war in Sudan, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti).

On that same day, the international conference on Sudan will be held in Berlin, hosted by Germany together with the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), France, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).

With the US-Israel war on Iran dominating international attention, this conference brings a rare focus to the war in Sudan.

Breaking the Saf-RSF death and destruction trap

The war grinds on unabated. There is little sign of its resolution on the horizon (see here).

There is no prospect of either of the warring parties securing total military victory. Neither a ceasefire freezing of the war (and hence the crystallisation of the partition of Sudan) nor a power-sharing arrangement between SAF-RSF guarantees sustainable peace.

The coalescing of peace efforts into two tracks (the truce/ceasefire track championed by the US-led Quad and the political dialogue track spearheaded by the African Union leaning multilateral organisations making up the Quintet) carries little prospect of changing either the battlefield or the mediation dynamics.

It is long past time to abandon the SAF-RSF-centric template that guided international engagement for the past three years.

During the last three years, the warring parties carried out hostilities with no regard to the rules of war. They both unleashed violence in an atmosphere of near-total impunity. The UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that RSF’s violence in Darfur is of such a nature, ‘the hallmarks of which point to a genocide.’

The war has claimed the lives of more than 150,000 people. Living up to Kholood Khair’s apt observation that ‘Sudan’s catastrophe can now only be described in superlatives’, Sudan now bears the status of being ‘the world’s largest hunger, protection and displacement crisis.’ It is now the world’s worst famine, on top of being the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and largest child displacement crisis.

Much of the peace processes in Sudan since the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir prised the role of the SAF and RSF. This approach has persisted since the outbreak of this war three years ago. It is seen as a pragmatic necessity. Yet, instead of facilitating peace, this SAF-RSF-centric approach (along with growing Sudanese polarisation and deepening external support for the warring parties) has only incentivised the warring parties to persist in the military showdown.

Making the 3^rd international conference count

Apart from the enormous human suffering and the destruction it precipitated, this war has now resulted in the de facto partition of Sudan into two between the SAF-controlled northern, eastern and parts of southern Sudan, and the RSF-dominated western and parts of southern Sudan. This has put the very survival of Sudan in grave peril.

As Abdul Mohammed pointed out, ‘without new thinking, a ceasefire risks freezing disaster in place.’ As such, breaking the death and destruction trap that the fighting between SAF and RSF imposed on Sudan requires giving a chance to a new approach – a civilian transitional authority.

The international conference on Sudan in Berlin, marking the 3rd year of the outbreak of the war, can be the forum for setting in motion the process towards the establishment of a civilian transitional authority.

Ahead of this anniversary, Chatham House, the United Kingdom’s international relations think tank, bestowed on Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) the most befitting recognition with the institution’s 2025 prize. This is a reminder that after three years of war and with no end in sight, the Sudanese civilian realm is the only avenue not only for breaking the stalemate between the two warring factions but also for forcing them into changing their calculations.

Why a civilian-centric process is a strategic necessity

The issue is no longer about including civilians. It is rather whether peace is possible without making them the centre of gravity.

Anchoring the peace efforts on and prioritising the civilian realm constitutes a critical antidote to the accelerating disintegration of Sudan.

Reinforcing the role played by the ERRs in the provision of aid and basic services and helping in maintaining infrastructure, this approach operates as an autonomous state-preservation instrument around which all Sudanese can rally.

The establishment of such technocratic civilian administration by Sudanese social and civic actors and the diplomatic recognition of such government by the international community carry additional benefits.

First, by creating an entity as the main locus of diplomatic efforts and separate from either of the two fighting parties, it ends the glorification of the people with guns. The idea is not that this will dispense with the necessity of engaging the warring parties, but it disrupts the incentive structure.

Second, it thus has the potential to break the logic of total victory and total defeat by which the action of the warring parties is currently dictated.

Third, this would incentivise the warring parties to opt for committing to a ceasefire as a means of limiting their loss in any future dispensation.

Fourth, by the sheer fact of its presence, it is also possible that the warring parties would be put into a position of pursuing their interests by choosing to accept the role of such technocratic civilian administration.

A two-phase transitional framework

As argued previously, the central idea to secure a breakthrough in breaking the SAF-RSF grip on the fate of Sudan is the establishment of a two-phased transitional process. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Yet the fragmentation that the war unleashed is not insurmountable. The alternative is the perpetuation of the three years of disaster. Given the trajectory of the war, there is neither a cleaner nor an easier approach than this for arresting Sudan’s deepening downward spiral.

Taking further the arguments that analysts such as Alex de Waal made, this two-staged process to a civilian-centric transitional process injects a measure of pragmatism into the proposal of establishing a civilian administration as a way of breaking the SAF-RSF trap.

The first phase involves the establishment of a civilian technocratic transitional administration. This is a government whose only raison d’etre is the salvation of the Sudanese state by creating the space for a Sudanese-led peace process that brings to the centre of diplomatic efforts the agency of Sudanese civic actors. The mandate of this caretaker administration is envisaged to be further limited in three ways. First, it has a limited substantive mandate focusing on facilitating humanitarian support and creating the space for charting a process for an all-inclusive civilian transitional government. Second, its term of office will also be limited in time. Third, to break the transitional governance trap, no member of this technocratic administration will be eligible to participate in the composition of the civilian transitional government.

As a body with such limited emergency and technocratic power for saving the Sudanese state, there is a need for its urgent establishment, whose narrow focus can mitigate, if not dissolve, fragmentation and contestation, which have been used against effective engagement with Sudanese civic actors. The impact of polarisation can also be reduced by mobilising the engagement of Sudanese social and political forces around the definition of the criteria for determining who and what needs to be done during the tenure of the technocratic administration.

Sudanese civilian forces working with the AU and others in the international community can take the lead in initiating the process for the constitution of such a technocratic civilian administration. It is necessary that the upcoming conference on Sudan in Berlin can be the platform for making a declaration of support for such a process, with Sudanese civilian leadership. Among others, the international community will play a critical role not only in extending diplomatic recognition but also, importantly, in providing substantial institutional support for it to restore the effective functioning of such state institutions as the bureaucracy and the Central Bank.

Apart from creating opportunities for silencing the guns, the technocratic civilian administration’s main role is the creation of the conditions for the holding of a national popular convention based on principles and formats to be agreed to by the Sudanese.  This is a convention that will bring together various political and social forces of Sudan for the elaboration of a transitional roadmap and the establishment of the transitional government for the implementation of the roadmap, involving various reforms that will culminate in the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of a constitutional government, inaugurating a new dispensation in Sudan.

Whether or not this could work and how it could be made to work depends first and foremost on the Sudanese civic actors and the creativity and willingness of those engaging in the search for peace in Sudan. Barlin could be where the journey towards working on making this civilian-centric approach work begins.