By Fadhel Kaboub and Joab Okanda

In a manoeuvre dripping with historical irony and geopolitical desperation, French President Emmanuel Macron is set to land in Nairobi on May 11. He will be in Kenya to co-host the “Africa Forward Summit: Africa-France Partnership for Innovation and Growth.” To the uninitiated, the title suggests a progressive leap into a shared future.

However, to those who have watched the sun set on Françafrique in the West, the subtext is clear: having been unceremoniously evicted from its traditional ‘stomping grounds’ in the Sahel, Paris is pitching its tent in East Africa, hunting for new deals to cover the haemorrhaging fortunes of a dying empire. Ahead of his arrival — incidentally on the Ides of March — three French warships docked at the port of Mombasa, carrying with them over 800 military personnel. They were riding on the wave of newfound defence cooperation between the governments of Kenya and France. Through this pact, France now has a new hunting ground in East Africa, complete with boots on the ground, sea and air. Kenya’s 142,400 Square Kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone in the Indian Ocean, reputed for riches in fish, oil and gas, is in for a rude shock.

The irony is almost pathological. For over a century, France treated West Africa as a private warehouse. It did not merely colonize; it plundered, looted, and systematically attempted to dismantle the resilient African civilizations that predated its arrival. Its ‘assimilation’ policy remains the most abhorrent, ignoble of colonial concepts; a cultural and political mis-philosophy designed to supplant African languages, customs, and identities with French surrogates.

When other colonial powers were loosening—however reluctantly— their grip, France was tightening its hold through a web of lopsided financial and military pacts.

With the rising tide of political ‘wokeness’ across the continent, however, France now finds itself sorely ostracized, and endangered. Yet, rather than offering atonement, the French leadership has chosen to grandstand. The mask slipped definitively earlier this year when Macron, frustrated by the anti-French revolts sweeping through former colonies, dropped the pretence of diplomacy. ‘I think someone forgot to say thank you,’ he remarked, with the chilling entitlement of a landlord demanding gratitude for a house he broke into.

Fast forward five months, and this same ‘savior’ is now knocking on East Africa’s door, hat in hand, seeking a ‘new partnership built on equal ground.’

The sudden pivot is driven by a cold reality: France’s ‘green’ future is powered by African minerals. While the lights of Paris stayed bright on the back of Niger’s uranium, Africa remained in the dark.

But as the Nairobi summit approaches, Africa must move beyond being a passive host. If Macron and his European contemporaries truly seek a partnership of equals, they must meet a set of non-negotiable demands that protect African interests, specifically within the environment and energy sectors.

First, a mandate for local beneficiation and value addition. Africa will no longer be a mere pit stop for raw material extraction. The Nairobi summit must establish a framework where no critical mineral—lithium, cobalt, or uranium—leaves the continent in its raw state.

Africans must demand that French and European companies invest in local processing plants and refineries. If the ‘Green Transition’ requires African minerals, then the ‘Green Industrialization’ must happen on African soil, creating African jobs and keeping the value chain within our borders.

Second, total transformation of the financial architecture and the CFA Franc. For a nation that has enforced financial slavery through the CFA Franc since 1945, Macron’s talk of “financial reform” must be met with scepticism.  Africa must demand the total dismantling of the colonial financial umbilical cord. Africa requires a global financial system that does not penalize African nations with ‘sovereign risk’ premiums that make green energy projects three times more expensive here than in Europe. It must demand the unconditional return of foreign currency reserves held in Paris and a shift toward independent, African-led monetary policies.

Third, energy sovereignty over ‘green exportation’. France proposes to ‘decarbonize’ Africa, yet many of our nations have barely “carbonized” to begin with. African ‘partners’ must demand energy justice. This means the right to achieve universal electrification. Africa must reject a ‘Green Deal’ that forces Africa to export its renewable energy (like green hydrogen) to Europe while her own hospitals and schools remain off the grid.

African energy needs must be met first; exports to Europe come second.

Fourth, technology transfer, not just licensing. True innovation is not found in buying French software; it is found in owning the source code. The Nairobi summit must secure commitments for the unconditional transfer of green technologies. Africa should not be a ‘market’ for European patents; it must be a co-owner of the intellectual property that will define the 21st century. 

Fifth, climate reparations and debt cancellation. Already, France is active in ‘debt-for-development’ swaps. Africa must demand that these are not treated as ‘gifts’ but as partial down-payments on a century of ecological and economic debt.  Africa should also insist on total cancellation of debts that were accrued through colonial-era structures. Climate finance must be provided as grants, not loans that further burden Africa’s children for a climate crisis they did not create.

Sixth, accountability for multinational conglomerates. Total Energies, Orano, and Eramet – over 60 CEO’s from French corporations at the summit – must answer tough questions at the summit. They ought to answer for their extractive interests that have historically disadvantaged the continent. Across Africa, communities have borne the environmental, social, and economic costs of such operations, with countries like Mozambique offering stark reminders of the consequences.

The companies must agree to be held to African environmental standards, not just French ones, and a legal framework that allows communities to sue French corporations in both African and French courts for environmental degradation and human rights abuses.

There can be no ‘partnership’ where companies operate with impunity in the Global South while preaching ‘ESG’ values in the North.

Seventh, an end to paternalistic ‘security’ pacts. Finally, Africa demands an end to the ‘policing’ of the continent. True peace and security come from economic dignity, not from the 60+ military interventions France has conducted since 1960 to protect its interests.  Africa must demand the closure of foreign military bases that serve extractive interests and a shift toward supporting African-led, autonomous security architectures. If partnership means equality, then reciprocity is simple – every French soldier granted access and immunity in Africa should be matched by an African soldier with the same rights in France, and every square metre of African soil used by French armed forces in Africa should be matched by an equal measure of French territory granted to African armed forces.

The ‘New Scramble’ is couched in the language of ‘climate resilience’ and ‘debt-for-development swaps.’ But beneath these green platitudes lie a hidden quest: to re-establish unfettered access to Africa’s critical minerals.

Africa must stay circumspect. The convergence of military signalling and corporate presence must worry all countries participating in Nairobi. They must watch out for unequal relationships under new language.

The ‘disinherited’ continent has found its voice. Africa is no longer interested in being a marginal chapter in a European story, not even with a thousand summits. If President Macron wants a ‘thank you,’ he should start by returning what was stolen from Africa and respecting the sovereignty he so arrogantly claimed to have authored. The era of the ‘political orchestra’ directed from Paris is over. The music has changed, and Africa is finally playing its own tune.

 

Fadhel Kaboub is Associate Professor of Economics at Denison University, President of the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, a member of the United Nations High-Level Advisory Board on Economic and Social Affairs at UN-DESA, and author of Global South Perspectives on Substack.

Joab Okanda is a Kenyan author and climate, energy, and development expert with extensive experience in research, policy, and advocacy at regional, continental and global levels. He is a Pan-African voice on just transition, climate and economic Justice, with a strong commitment to advancing just and equitable systems across Africa.

Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa

The major breakthrough of the international conference on Sudan held in Berlin was the adoption of a joint declaration by the civilian forces convened during the conference. On 15 April, marking the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States convened the third international Sudan conference in Berlin.

This meeting, which brought together ministers and representatives from 55 countries, alongside donors, regional organisations, United Nations entities, and other partners, as well as 38 international and Sudanese NGOs, follows earlier conferences in Paris (2024) and London (2025).

As with its predecessors, the convening was not without controversy—particularly regarding participation and representation. The exclusion of the warring parties (the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)) drew criticism from both sides. Sudan’s foreign ministry denounced the conference for proceeding without consultation with Khartoum, characterising it as a ‘colonial tutelage approach.’ Meanwhile, the Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS), a coalition aligned with the RSF, raised concerns over the perceived inclusion of actors linked to the SAF and the Islamic movement, warning that such participation could dilute the civilian voice and hinder peace efforts.

Additionally, the countries that participated in the conference were unable to agree on a joint communique. Despite the joint statement that the members of the Quad negotiated and adopted in September 2025, divisions that resurfaced during the technical negotiations, reportedly over language relating to the preservation of ‘state institutions’, forced the convening to end without a joint communique of the participating states, as in London. Consequently, the conference closed with a co-hosts’ communiqué.

Despite these drawbacks, Berlin registered some positive outcomes for a situation that needs some flicker of progress. In this respect, the outcomes of the conference should be assessed against its stated objectives, rather than against expectations it was not designed to fulfil. Some commentary has downplayed the conference’s significance, criticising its format for failing to deliver a ceasefire or immediate relief for civilians. The conference instead focused on three core objectives: mobilising humanitarian support, elevating global attention to the Sudan crisis, and creating space for civilian and political dialogue. Its success should be evaluated accordingly.

A major outcome of Berlin was the creation, for the first time in three years, of a platform for Sudanese civilian and political actors to convene and agree on a joint statement calling for an end to the war. This process was facilitated by the Quintet. Building on consultations initiated in Addis Ababa and concluded in Berlin, some 46 representatives endorsed a joint call structured around seven key priorities: an immediate ceasefire; protection of civilians and infrastructure; humanitarian access; civilian democratic governance; a Sudanese-owned political process; international support; and justice.

This development is particularly significant given the persistent fragmentation of civilian actors and the limitation, to date, to collectively influence the trajectory of the conflict. Previous efforts by the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, established in January 2024, facilitated preparatory consultations in July and August 2024 and February 2025 but did not achieve comparable convergence. In this context, the progress made under the Quintet framework in Berlin should be seen as a meaningful step toward a unified civilian platform and lays the groundwork for a Sudanese-led political dialogue.

On the humanitarian front, the Sudan conflict has generated the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA’s February report, an estimated 33.7 million people need assistance, with 28.9 million requiring food security and livelihood support in 2026. Famine conditions have been confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli, with similar patterns observed in Dilling. As the conflict persists, humanitarian needs continue to rise, yet responses have not kept pace. Instead, significant funding shortfalls have led to reductions in life-saving assistance. The 2026 humanitarian response plan stands at USD 2.6 billion—a decrease of nearly one-third from the previous year—reflecting a constrained funding environment. Only 35 per cent of the 2025 plan was funded, and in 2026, just 16 per cent of the required funding has been secured to date.

Against this backdrop, one of the conference’s tangible outcomes is the mobilisation of financial commitments. International donors pledged €1.5 billion, with more than half (€811 million) contributed by the European Union and its member states, reflecting a significant increase compared to the London conference, where pledges totalled around €950 million. While insufficient to meet overall needs, this represents a substantial and concrete contribution that should not be understated, despite the lack of clarity about how much of the pledged money is additional to the amount pledged during the humanitarian convening held in Washington, D.C.

Third, the conference succeeded in bringing Sudan’s crisis to the forefront of international attention. Despite constituting the world’s most severe humanitarian emergency, Sudan has increasingly been overshadowed by other geopolitical crises, including those in Ukraine, Gaza, and, more recently, Iran. The Berlin conference, at least temporarily, served to re-centre global focus on Sudan.

Overall, the Berlin conference has helped generate momentum for Sudanese civilian and political actors to engage more cohesively and to shape the country’s transition toward civilian-led governance. This is a major development given the persisting deadlock in the SAF-RSF-focused processes. Sustaining this momentum now falls to the Quintet. A key next step will be to engage those actors not represented in Berlin and ensure broader inclusivity. Encouragingly, plans are reportedly underway to convene follow-up meetings in May to incorporate additional stakeholders. The success registered in Berlin with the adoption of a joint statement of civilians presents a unique opportunity to take forward the question of how to pursue proposals towards the constitution of a civilian transitional authority.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

15 April 2026 marks the 3^rd-year anniversary of the outbreak of the civil war in Sudan, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti).

On that same day, the international conference on Sudan will be held in Berlin, hosted by Germany together with the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), France, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).

With the US-Israel war on Iran dominating international attention, this conference brings a rare focus to the war in Sudan.

Breaking the Saf-RSF death and destruction trap

The war grinds on unabated. There is little sign of its resolution on the horizon (see here).

There is no prospect of either of the warring parties securing total military victory. Neither a ceasefire freezing of the war (and hence the crystallisation of the partition of Sudan) nor a power-sharing arrangement between SAF-RSF guarantees sustainable peace.

The coalescing of peace efforts into two tracks (the truce/ceasefire track championed by the US-led Quad and the political dialogue track spearheaded by the African Union leaning multilateral organisations making up the Quintet) carries little prospect of changing either the battlefield or the mediation dynamics.

It is long past time to abandon the SAF-RSF-centric template that guided international engagement for the past three years.

During the last three years, the warring parties carried out hostilities with no regard to the rules of war. They both unleashed violence in an atmosphere of near-total impunity. The UN International Independent Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan concluded that RSF’s violence in Darfur is of such a nature, ‘the hallmarks of which point to a genocide.’

The war has claimed the lives of more than 150,000 people. Living up to Kholood Khair’s apt observation that ‘Sudan’s catastrophe can now only be described in superlatives’, Sudan now bears the status of being ‘the world’s largest hunger, protection and displacement crisis.’ It is now the world’s worst famine, on top of being the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and largest child displacement crisis.

Much of the peace processes in Sudan since the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir prised the role of the SAF and RSF. This approach has persisted since the outbreak of this war three years ago. It is seen as a pragmatic necessity. Yet, instead of facilitating peace, this SAF-RSF-centric approach (along with growing Sudanese polarisation and deepening external support for the warring parties) has only incentivised the warring parties to persist in the military showdown.

Making the 3^rd international conference count

Apart from the enormous human suffering and the destruction it precipitated, this war has now resulted in the de facto partition of Sudan into two between the SAF-controlled northern, eastern and parts of southern Sudan, and the RSF-dominated western and parts of southern Sudan. This has put the very survival of Sudan in grave peril.

As Abdul Mohammed pointed out, ‘without new thinking, a ceasefire risks freezing disaster in place.’ As such, breaking the death and destruction trap that the fighting between SAF and RSF imposed on Sudan requires giving a chance to a new approach – a civilian transitional authority.

The international conference on Sudan in Berlin, marking the 3rd year of the outbreak of the war, can be the forum for setting in motion the process towards the establishment of a civilian transitional authority.

Ahead of this anniversary, Chatham House, the United Kingdom’s international relations think tank, bestowed on Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) the most befitting recognition with the institution’s 2025 prize. This is a reminder that after three years of war and with no end in sight, the Sudanese civilian realm is the only avenue not only for breaking the stalemate between the two warring factions but also for forcing them into changing their calculations.

Why a civilian-centric process is a strategic necessity

The issue is no longer about including civilians. It is rather whether peace is possible without making them the centre of gravity.

Anchoring the peace efforts on and prioritising the civilian realm constitutes a critical antidote to the accelerating disintegration of Sudan.

Reinforcing the role played by the ERRs in the provision of aid and basic services and helping in maintaining infrastructure, this approach operates as an autonomous state-preservation instrument around which all Sudanese can rally.

The establishment of such technocratic civilian administration by Sudanese social and civic actors and the diplomatic recognition of such government by the international community carry additional benefits.

First, by creating an entity as the main locus of diplomatic efforts and separate from either of the two fighting parties, it ends the glorification of the people with guns. The idea is not that this will dispense with the necessity of engaging the warring parties, but it disrupts the incentive structure.

Second, it thus has the potential to break the logic of total victory and total defeat by which the action of the warring parties is currently dictated.

Third, this would incentivise the warring parties to opt for committing to a ceasefire as a means of limiting their loss in any future dispensation.

Fourth, by the sheer fact of its presence, it is also possible that the warring parties would be put into a position of pursuing their interests by choosing to accept the role of such technocratic civilian administration.

A two-phase transitional framework

As argued previously, the central idea to secure a breakthrough in breaking the SAF-RSF grip on the fate of Sudan is the establishment of a two-phased transitional process. Admittedly, this is easier said than done. Yet the fragmentation that the war unleashed is not insurmountable. The alternative is the perpetuation of the three years of disaster. Given the trajectory of the war, there is neither a cleaner nor an easier approach than this for arresting Sudan’s deepening downward spiral.

Taking further the arguments that analysts such as Alex de Waal made, this two-staged process to a civilian-centric transitional process injects a measure of pragmatism into the proposal of establishing a civilian administration as a way of breaking the SAF-RSF trap.

The first phase involves the establishment of a civilian technocratic transitional administration. This is a government whose only raison d’etre is the salvation of the Sudanese state by creating the space for a Sudanese-led peace process that brings to the centre of diplomatic efforts the agency of Sudanese civic actors. The mandate of this caretaker administration is envisaged to be further limited in three ways. First, it has a limited substantive mandate focusing on facilitating humanitarian support and creating the space for charting a process for an all-inclusive civilian transitional government. Second, its term of office will also be limited in time. Third, to break the transitional governance trap, no member of this technocratic administration will be eligible to participate in the composition of the civilian transitional government.

As a body with such limited emergency and technocratic power for saving the Sudanese state, there is a need for its urgent establishment, whose narrow focus can mitigate, if not dissolve, fragmentation and contestation, which have been used against effective engagement with Sudanese civic actors. The impact of polarisation can also be reduced by mobilising the engagement of Sudanese social and political forces around the definition of the criteria for determining who and what needs to be done during the tenure of the technocratic administration.

Sudanese civilian forces working with the AU and others in the international community can take the lead in initiating the process for the constitution of such a technocratic civilian administration. It is necessary that the upcoming conference on Sudan in Berlin can be the platform for making a declaration of support for such a process, with Sudanese civilian leadership. Among others, the international community will play a critical role not only in extending diplomatic recognition but also, importantly, in providing substantial institutional support for it to restore the effective functioning of such state institutions as the bureaucracy and the Central Bank.

Apart from creating opportunities for silencing the guns, the technocratic civilian administration’s main role is the creation of the conditions for the holding of a national popular convention based on principles and formats to be agreed to by the Sudanese.  This is a convention that will bring together various political and social forces of Sudan for the elaboration of a transitional roadmap and the establishment of the transitional government for the implementation of the roadmap, involving various reforms that will culminate in the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of a constitutional government, inaugurating a new dispensation in Sudan.

Whether or not this could work and how it could be made to work depends first and foremost on the Sudanese civic actors and the creativity and willingness of those engaging in the search for peace in Sudan. Barlin could be where the journey towards working on making this civilian-centric approach work begins.

Abdul Mohammed

The passing of Ambassador Konjit is a painful loss for Ethiopia, for Africa, and for all those who still believe that diplomacy, at its best, is one of the noblest instruments of public service.

She belonged to a generation of diplomats who did not reduce diplomacy to protocol, access, or maneuver. They understood it as statecraft in its highest form: the disciplined, principled, and intelligent pursuit of national interest, conducted with dignity, restraint, and strategic purpose. Ambassador Konjit represented that tradition with distinction. She was one of Ethiopia’s finest diplomats, and unquestionably one of Africa’s too.

Her death comes at a sobering historical moment. We are living through a time when diplomacy has been globally diminished, hollowed out, and in far too many places displaced by transactional deal-making. Multilateralism is under strain. Norm-based mediation has declined. Transactional approaches, short-term bargains, and interest-driven alignments are increasingly replacing serious, principled diplomatic engagement.

At the epicenter of this troubling shift lies the erosion of diplomatic culture within major global powers in the west, particularly the United States, where diplomacy has increasingly been subordinated to coercive instruments and short-term power calculations. This has contributed significantly to the global weakening of diplomacy as a credible and primary tool of statecraft.

This decline is not an abstract institutional matter. It has consequences written in blood. When diplomacy loses stature, war gains ground. When foreign ministries are weakened, when mediators are sidelined, force ceases to be the last resort and becomes the default instrument.

In this sense, the passing of Ambassador Konjit is not simply the death of an accomplished individual. It feels, too, like the fading of a certain diplomatic ethic—one grounded in seriousness, intellectual discipline, discretion, patriotism, and service.

Ethiopia produced diplomats of exceptional caliber. Ethiopian diplomacy was forged not only in the defense of sovereignty, but also in the service of Africa’s wider quest for dignity, multilateralism, and collective voice. Ambassador Konjit is the embodiment and towering practitioner of that tradition.

She represented a foreign policy inheritance that was credible, professional, ethically grounded, and larger than any one regime. She served across political eras with consistency and integrity, embodying continuity where politics often produced rupture.

In serving under successive regimes—from the imperial period to the present—Ambassador Konjit upheld a rare and vital distinction: the difference between the state and the government of the day. Governments come and go; regimes rise and fall. But the state endures as the embodiment of a people’s history, sovereignty, and continuity. Professional diplomats, as her life so clearly illustrates, serve the state in its perpetuity. In doing so, they anchor national continuity amid political change.

She was deeply Pan-African, and deeply committed to multilateralism. She understood that Ethiopia’s strength—and Africa’s—lies in unity of voice and principled engagement with the world.

Diplomats are among the least acknowledged servants of the state. Their greatest successes are often invisible, because they prevent crises rather than react to them. When diplomacy works, it is quiet. When it fails, the consequences are loud and devastating.

That is why its current global decline is so dangerous. Ceasefires without political vision, negotiations without legitimacy, and short-term bargains have begun to substitute for real diplomacy.

The African Union and African institutions must take note of a deeper and more troubling dimension of this decline. The erosion of principled, committed diplomats—those capable of serving as serious negotiators—is increasingly at the heart of the failure of mediation to avert, manage, and resolve conflicts across the continent. The passing of Ambassador Konjit should serve as a moment of reckoning. It should trigger serious reflection on the state of African mediation, the caliber of its diplomatic cadres, and the trajectory of its diplomatic traditions.

It is also a warning. Africa must resist the growing normalization of transactional deal-making approaches, often externally driven and increasingly promoted through short-term arrangements that lack legitimacy, political vision, and sustainability. The continent must not succumb to these approaches at the expense of principled, strategic diplomacy.

Ambassador Konjit represented the opposite of this decline. She embodied diplomacy as service, discipline, and responsibility.

She also mentored generations of Ethiopian diplomats, shaping not only careers, but values. Her influence will endure through those she trained, mentored and inspired.

Her passing should therefore not only invite mourning, but celebrating her legacy and reflection.

What kind of diplomats does Ethiopia need today?

What kind of diplomats must Africa produce in an age of fragmentation and crisis?

These are strategic questions.

If diplomacy is to recover, it will require the return of seriousness, principle, and professionalism and the stubbornness for finding solutions and common ground —the very qualities Ambassador Konjit represented.

She leaves behind more than memory. She leaves behind a standard.

A standard of patriotism, Pan-Africanism, professionalism, and principled service.

In mourning her, we honor not only her life, but a diplomatic tradition that must be sustained and renewed.

May she rest in eternal peace.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

The candidacy of former Senegalese President Macky Sall for the top United Nations (UN) job has unleashed enormous controversy both in his homeland and at continental level since Burundi, the 2026 Chairperson of the African Union (AU), submitted his name as a candidate to the UN on 2 March 2026.

This issue almost plunged Africa and the AU into a major diplomatic and institutional crisis.

In a development that raised serious questions about the scope of discretion of the Chairperson of the AU and the Bureau and after reports claiming AU support for Sall’s candidacy were exposed, At the behest of Burundi in its capacity as AU Chairperson, the Bureau of the AU Assembly (made up of Burundi, Ghana, Tanzania and Angola, minus a North African representative yet to be agreed by the region) convened on 26 March 2026 to consider the proposal for endorsement of the candidacy of Sall through a silent procedure outside of AU’s established process for on candidatures. At the bureau meeting, two out of four members of the Bureau, including Burundi, reportedly supported the motion. One member reportedly did not participate. The lack of objection meant that Burundi’s motion to table a draft decision of endorsement for AU member states carried the day.

As a follow-up to the Bureau meeting and under the direction of Burundi’s President as AU Chairperson, the AU Commission sent out a letter on the same day, 26 March, addressed to AU Member States carrying a draft decision for endorsing Sall’s candidacy. The letter, referencing Rule 19(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly on decision-making by consensus or by two-thirds majority, presented the draft decision for adoption through a silent procedure. The letter offered no explanation as to why the established process of considering candidatures through the Ministerial Committee on African Candidatures within the International System on the basis of the AU Executive Council decision EX.CL/213(VIII) was circumvented. Neither was there any compelling reason for displacing the role of the Ministerial Committee nor any consultation that established that AU member states are disposed to support Sall’s candidature and outside of the regular process.  Additionally, in an unprecedented departure from established practice, the letter gave AU member states only 24 hours to communicate their views. Also unprecedentedly, it set a threshold of one-third of member states to breaking the silence for the draft decision to be considered as not adopted.

By the close of business on Friday, 27 March, 20 AU member states, representing more than the unprecedently high threshold of 1/3^rd majority, broke the silence. The total number of countries that broke the silence increased to 21 after receipt of a communication from Tunisia apparently after close of business on the same day. As a result, the AU Commission stated, in a letter dated 27 March, that the draft decision ‘on UN Secretary General candidacy of H.E. Macky Sall…has not been adopted.’ The fact that more than 1/3^rd of AU members broke the silence within the very tight (less than) 24hrs time limit highlighted the resolve of AU member states to avert the institutional crisis the situation posed.

‘Gross breach of AU rules’ and ‘jettisoning of …established practice’ of regional rotation 

Both substantive and procedural irregularities led to this outcome. First and substantively, the draft decision would have led to the flouting of the AU’s rules and regular processes on the endorsement of African candidatures in the international system. Not surprisingly, member states that broke the silence, including South Africa, thus observed that ‘the established rules…for submission of States Candidacies appear to have been bypassed.’ This outcome also reflected concerns about the lack of transparency and due process, which are guaranteed under the AU Ministerial Committee on Candidatures. Thus, for Nigeria, as stated in its letter responding to the AU Commission letter of 26 March, the proposal to present Sall as an AU consensus candidate came ‘as a surprise as the candidate is being fielded for such a coveted position…without subjecting it to the scrutiny of the Ministerial Committee of the African Union.’ Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs went further and stated that ‘a direct rush to a 24-hour “silence procedure”, through which the AU Chairperson would wish to force a 2/3 “silent” majority endorsing his solo and irregular decision, without any attempt to seek an open discussion and a consensus on the African candidate for the position of UNSG, is also a gross breach of AU rules and regulations.’

Second, and procedure-wise, unless the plan was to constrain member states, there was no justification for limiting the timeline for the silence procedure to 24 hours rather than the established standard of at least 48 to 72 hours. Burundi’s Permanent Representative publicly acknowledged that the AU Legal Counsel and the Secretariat objected to the 24-hour timeline. Yet their objection was apparently overruled despite there being no compelling reason for not heeding the opinion of the Legal Counsel and the AU Commission, who are duty-bound to defend and ensure respect for established AU rules and processes. Additionally, as pointed out in the letter by South Africa, ‘the standard practice is that silence procedure is broken if one or more members raise an objection within the designated timeline.’ South Africa’s letter thus held that the requirement that silence can only be broken by one-third of the majority ‘is not standard practice within the international system.’

Third, there is an established, albeit legally non-binding, informal rule and practice of regional rotation that allows alteration of the position of the Secretary-General to candidates from various regional groups of the world. According to this rule and practice, the turn for taking the position of the Secretary-General is for a candidate from the Latin America and Caribbean group. As pointed out in Nigeria’s response, ‘…Africa considers the Caribbean as the sixth region of the continent. By jettisoning this established practice (of regional rotation), the Federal Republic of Nigeria believes the African Union is putting its position and interest in jeopardy now and in the future.’

It is worth noting that the 21 March Declaration of the summit of Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC), with whom Africa held the first joint high-level forum co-chaired by Burundi and Colombia on the same day committing to strengthen ties between the two regions, affirmed that ‘the time has come for a national of Latin America and the Caribbean to assume the responsibility of holding the position of Secretary- General of the United Nations, in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical balance and diversity in the leadership of the Organization.’ Under the circumstances, let alone endorsement by AU member states Sall’s candidacy on its own undermines the spirit of the CELAC-Africa high-level forum and South-South cooperation as well as the principle of regional rotation. This is never in the interest of Africa, as it will be the turn of the Africa group for the next round of the election of the Secretary-General.

A win for Africa and AU’s institutional stability

The outcome rejecting the proposed endorsement by AU of Sall’s candidacy is a major win for Africa’s diplomacy and AU’s established rules and processes. It prevented the emergence of an unjustifiable precedent that would have scuttled established AU rules and processes on the consideration and endorsement of candidates for leadership positions within the UN and the international system writ large.

Through this decision, AU member states saved from collapse the most important diplomatic device that was in place since the time of the Organisation of African Unity and served Africa well in putting Africans in leadership roles within the international system, including such important UN agencies as WTO, WHO, ILO and UNESCO.

Equally important is the rejection of the draft decision that saved Africa from breaching the informal rule of regional rotation, hence from undermining its own ‘current and future’ interests.

No –the silence of the rest of the AU members is not a signifier of support for Sall

Despite the collapse of the proposal for AU endorsement and Africa’s interests at stake, Sall’s candidacy and campaign continue to be imbued with misinformation and deceitful propaganda. Indeed, Sall’s campaign is doubling down on the claim of having wide support from AU member states, arguing that only a minority of countries registered their objection. Yet, the claim that ‘the silence’ of those who did not respond to the silence procedure is a signifier of wide support for Sall could not be far from the truth. First, even Senegal, from where Sall hails, distanced itself from his candidacy. Second, if Sall was confident about the support from this ‘silent’ majority, he would have subjected his candidacy to the scrutiny of the AU Ministerial Committee.

Despite the fact that the planning for his candidacy started in 2025 and he had the possibility of even having his candidacy considered during the AU summit in February 2026, he did not opt for it. There was no other reason for opting for an irregular and rules upending route for securing AU support other than Sall’s fear that he would not succeed in securing the support of the so-called ‘silent’ majority that his supporters claim he continues to enjoy even after the rejection of his endorsement by the AU.

Honourable path – Withdrawal of Sall’s candidacy

These dynamics, together with the candidacy’s ethically questionable practices involving both misinformation and the bending or circumventing of AU rules and established multilateral practice of particular interest for Africa warrant the reconsideration of the continuation of the candidacy. As chairperson of the AU and the country that sponsored the candidacy, Burundi has a responsibility to take a lead in this regard for reaffirming respect for established AU rules and the practice of regional rotation. In view of all the foregoing and the fact that the next round in the regional rotation for the position of the Secretary-General is for Africa, it is incumbent on Burundi, as Chairperson of the AU, to reconsider its stance and press on Sall that the most honourable path is to withdraw his candidacy. Burundi supported him to the point of leveraging its role as Chairperson. And it stumbled but not irredeemably. By reconsidering Sall’s candidacy, it can restore the erosion of its credibility as AU Chairperson and safeguard Africa’s collective interests, including the multilateral norm of regional rotation.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

Ahead of the 1 April 2026, when the states elected during the 39^th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly, including Somalia, which was elected for the first time, assume their seats in the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU is holding the induction of newly elected and returning members of the PSC in the Kingdom of Eswatini, starting today, 30 March 2026. In view of the expansion and entrenching of conflicts and crises on the continent and the need for a more effective role for the AU, a pressing issue for the newly constituted PSC is how to shift from the failing business-as-usual approach to its work and make itself fit for the peace and security needs of the continent in a time of major global shifts.

As extensively documented in, among others, the review of the PSC for 2025, the PSC did not garner a meaningful level of influence in either limiting the dynamics of conflicts on its agenda or in shaping peace processes relating to those conflict situations. As a result, the PSC and the AU are ignored or otherwise displaced. Such is the case in Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel and the DRC. For example, the six sessions that the PSC held on Sudan were of no consequence either in avoiding the de facto partition of Sudan or in contributing to the emergence of a credible civilian process that the AU is meant to lead on. Even in terms of the mechanisms it decided to institute, neither the mechanisms for investigating external interference in Sudan nor the presidential committee came into operation. In DRC, AU’s role in advancing peace got displaced, with the Luanda process giving way to the Washington DC and Doha processes.  

The declining effectiveness of the PSC mirrors a broader erosion of political commitment to continental collective security. It is also importantly a product of PSC’s work, becoming more performative than consequential, at times its engagement dominated by thematic issues and often no effective action on specific conflict situations. Poor agenda setting and the reduction of PSC activities into a routine ritual-like processes are among the factors that account for this state of affairs in which the dire conflict situations are not approached with the urgency and seriousness they deserve.

Making the PSC fit for purpose and relevant to the peace and security situation of the continent requires changing these conditions. The agenda setting of the PSC and the policy deliberation of the PSC should prioritise and deploy the limited diplomatic institutional resources exclusively for addressing existing conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones. The PSC should thus have as a standing agenda on the most critical conflict situations, such as Sudan, South Sudan, the Sahel, DRC and Somalia at least, on a quarterly if not on a monthly basis, during which the AU Commission presents reports for adapting AU engagement to the rhythm and needs of the conflict dynamics.

In the interest of optimising its very finite resources and ensuring sustained engagement on addressing these priority conflict situations with resolve and impact, the PSC should also adopt a moratorium on having thematic issues on its agenda.

Further to the foregoing, the PSC should also use its sessions for substantive deliberations rather than the ritualistic process of making formulaic statements, issuing communiques and meeting again to repeat the same cycle. It is necessary for the PSC to review its working methods on its decision-making process for making it results-oriented rather than the current focus on output, involving the adoption of a communique for every meeting. Not every PSC meeting has to result in the adoption of a communique, but it provides a platform for building consensus and negotiating on actionable decisions, deliberating on advancing implementation and undertaking strategic review. It is also necessary that PSC members focus on negotiating and adopting actionable decisions as opposed to the declaratory ones that dominate outcomes of PSC deliberations. To this end, they should negotiate on the actionable decisions required to respond to new developments, either in the conflict situation or in the peace process relating to that conflict situation. They should also use such negotiation sessions for clarifying on the financial and institutional implications of such decisions as well as on the modalities of implementation and clear assignment of responsibility for implementation and timelines for reporting back on follow-up and implementation.

Additionally, the effectiveness of the PSC is also affected by the willingness and ability of its members to shoulder the responsibilities of PSC membership as set out in Article 5, particularly its sub-paragraph 2. The current approach to PSC membership that puts a premium on rotation to the detriment of Article 5(2) criteria is undermining the effectiveness of the Council. It has limited the PSC’s normative and political weight, creating an enormous gulf between PSC decisions and their effective follow-through.

A criteria-based approach is essential to the PSC’s credibility, ensuring members demonstrate commitment, diplomatic capacity, and adherence to AU norms, preventing deliberations from becoming mere symbolism. Eroded standards have also diminished peer accountability, fostering weak enforcement, selective engagement, and inconsistent follow-through, much like past consensus-driven arrangements lacking commitment. Restoring effectiveness demands recommitment to criteria-based membership rooted in political credibility, capacity, and norm respect, bolstering authority and collective responsibility.

Not any less important for the credibility and effectiveness of the PSC is the need to align its current posture and practice with the statement of commitment it adopted during its solemn launching in 2004. Of significance in this respect is the commitment that ‘we shall ensure that the authority vested in the Peace and Security Council is fairly and proactively exercised.’ (emphasis added) The lack of alignment in recent times between the practice of the PSC and this commitment is one of the factors for the erosion of the credibility of the PSC. This has manifested itself not only in inconsistent application of AU policies and norms, such as in relation to unconstitutional changes of government, but also in the lack of fairness in the attention given in dealing with various conflict situations.

The PSC should also be proactive in its engagement with key peace and security events on the continent. This entails that the PSC operates as the first to speak on African peace and security issues and to ensure that it occupies the space for holding a leadership role. These (speaking first and holding the policy space) are necessary both for setting the agenda and exercising agency in peace and security decision-making on the continent.

All of the foregoing, however, requires the recommitment of PSC member states to the values and principles of the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. It also requires reestablishing the primacy of collective responsibility and solidarity over individual national interest in setting the program of work of the PSC and steering the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Council. Not any less important is the need for exercising a higher sense of responsibility both on the part of member states and the AU Commission, such as through making the requisite preparations for PSC sessions, upholding and ensuring respect for AU norms and principles and respecting decisions of the PSC, including in the timely submission of reports or updates.

Abdul Mohammed

I write this with a heavy heart, but also with deep gratitude for a life that gave so much to the cause of peace, justice, and human dignity.

Nicholas “Fink” Haysom was not just another senior United Nations diplomat. He belonged to a fading breed — those who approached diplomacy and peacemaking not as a profession, but as a vocation. For him, diplomacy was not about position or protocol; it was about purpose, conviction, and an enduring commitment to humanity.

He was shaped in the crucible of the anti-apartheid struggle — a defining historical experience that produced a generation of leaders who understood injustice intimately and resisted it with both moral clarity and political discipline. From that struggle, Fink carried forward a rare combination: a principled legal mind, grounded in public service, and a political sensibility anchored in justice.

I first encountered Fink during the negotiations of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement. From the outset, I found myself under his wing. His style was neither loud nor imposing. He did not dominate the room; he stabilized it. He did not rush to solutions; he cultivated them patiently, with care and respect for complexity.

What distinguished him most was his discipline of listening.

Fink listened not as a formality, but as a moral act. He understood that conflicts are not merely technical problems to be solved, but historical and human realities to be understood. He gave conflict — and those shaped by it — the respect it deserved. He was meticulous in defining the problem before attempting to resolve it, a quality that is increasingly rare in today’s fast-paced and often superficial diplomatic engagements.

I later had the privilege of working closely with him again when he succeeded Haile Menkerios as the United Nations envoy during the final and most delicate phase of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan. This was a moment without precedent in Africa — a negotiated separation of two states. The stakes were immense, the tensions acute, and the risks of failure catastrophic.

In that moment, Fink’s experience and judgment proved invaluable.

He played a supportive role not only in the negotiations themselves but also in managing the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. Under his stewardship, cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council reached a level of alignment and effectiveness that remains a benchmark in multilateral peacemaking.

He enjoyed the trust of President Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. Their relationship — forged in the shared experience of the anti-apartheid struggle — brought both political depth and personal trust to a process that required both in equal measure.

Fink was, in every sense, a diplomat’s diplomat.

But more than that, he was what I would call a people’s negotiator.

He was accessible, persuasive, and deeply grounded in the political realities of the conflicts he engaged with. He was never confined by the narrow boundaries of job descriptions. He worked tirelessly. He made time to listen. He was consistently — and quietly — the adult in the room.

In today’s landscape of mediation and diplomacy, there is a discernible deficit of such qualities.

Much of contemporary diplomacy has become procedural, transactional, and at times detached from the human realities it seeks to address. Even where technical competence exists, it is often not accompanied by the deeper attributes that defined Fink — care, moral seriousness, intellectual discipline, and a genuine commitment to the human consequences of conflict.

Fink was not an elitist negotiator. He did not practice diplomacy from a distance. His approach was people-centered. He remained constantly aware that behind every negotiation were lives at stake — communities disrupted, futures uncertain, and human dignity in peril.

He ensured that all parties remained mindful of the consequences of failure. Not through grandstanding, but through quiet, persistent reminder of what war does to people and societies.

Beyond the negotiating table, I recall with great fondness the many conversations we shared — political, reflective, and often filled with humor. There was laughter, even in the most demanding circumstances. There was ease without loss of seriousness.

Those of us who worked with him did not only grow professionally; we became better human beings.

Fink had a way of addressing those he held in regard: he would call you “comrade.”

In his usage, this was not a casual term. It was not merely a friendly gesture. It carried weight. It signified a shared commitment — to justice, to fairness, and to the collective struggle for a better world. It reflected a relationship grounded not just in familiarity, but in shared purpose.

In this, he embodied what we, as Africans, understand as Ubuntu — the idea that our humanity is bound up with one another.

He often spoke with admiration of President Mbeki’s “I Am an African” speech. And indeed, though South African by birth, Fink was, in the truest sense, a quintessential African diplomat and statesman.

As his friend in struggle observed, His life traced a seamless arc — from the struggle against apartheid, to service in democratic South Africa, to global peacemaking through the United Nations. There was no rupture, no loss of moral center. The values that defined him in struggle remained intact in power.

“This continuity is what made him rare.”

In a world where proximity to power often alters individuals, Fink remained anchored. He reminds us that leadership is not about office, but about the consistency of values across time and circumstance.

His passing invites not only reflection, but also introspection.

It compels us to ask whether the current generation of diplomats and mediators is equipped — not only technically, but morally — to meet the demands of our time. It challenges us to recover a diplomacy that is grounded in humanity, not merely in process; in substance, not only in form.

Fink did not simply practice diplomacy.

He dignified it.

His legacy will endure — in the peace processes he helped advance, in the institutions he strengthened, and in the lives he touched.

But more importantly, it endures as a standard.

A standard of what diplomacy can be at its best.

Farewell, Comrade.

May Allah grant him eternal peace, and may we find the courage to carry forward the work to which he devoted his life.

J. Kayode Fayemi *
Visiting Professor, King’s College, London, UK | Former Governor, Ekiti State, Nigeria | Former Minister of Mines & Minerals Resources Development, Nigeria

 

It is both a privilege and an urgent necessity that we gather here, under the auspices of ACCORD, to speak plainly about a relationship that has shaped our continent for centuries — and that is, right now, at a genuine inflection point.

The post-Cold War settlement — in which Africa was largely a recipient of rules written elsewhere — is visibly dismantling. A new geopolitical architecture is being assembled, and the question before us is whether Africa will help design it or merely inherit it.

Let me be direct: we have been here before. We have gathered in elegant rooms and produced eloquent communiqués. And then the world moved on, and Africa remained in the same structural position. So, the burden of this moment is not just analysis — it is commitment to action that changes the terms of engagement.

Understanding the Turning Point

Three convergent forces are reshaping the global order in ways that create genuine leverage for Africa — if we choose to use it.

First, the return of strategic competition. The West — Europe and North America — no longer operates in a unipolar comfort zone. China’s rise, Russia’s revisionism, the assertiveness of the Global South: these have reminded Western capitals that Africa’s 54 nations, 1.4 billion people, and disproportionate share of the world’s minerals are not a charity case but a strategic asset. That shift in perception matters. It means Africa now has suitors, not just donors.

Second, the resource reality. The green energy transition has placed Africa at the centre of the global economy in ways the extractive economy of the 20th century never did. Cobalt, lithium, manganese, coltan, copper — the raw materials of the clean energy future are largely concentrated on this continent. Having already surrendered the oil century with little to show for it, Africa must not repeat that mistake with the minerals of the 21st century. At least now we know that the world cannot go green without first going African!

Third — and perhaps most consequentially — is Africa’s demographic weight. By 2050, one in four people on Earth will be African. The continent’s working-age population will exceed that of China and India combined. In an ageing world, Africa is the growth engine. That is not rhetoric. That is arithmetic. And it changes the negotiating calculus entirely, particularly as it concerns the migration discourse — if we build the institutions to leverage it and retool the young ones for the inevitable change.

The Honest Reckoning: What the West Has Gotten Wrong

Let me speak about the Western side of this relationship — not to lecture, but because an honest reset requires honest diagnosis.

For too long, Africa-Europe/West relations have been organised around a paternalistic logic: development aid as generosity, conditionalities as wisdom, and African instability as a justification for continued tutelage. The frameworks have been built in Washington, Brussels, and London — and Africa has been expected to comply rather than co-design.

The trade architecture has been particularly damaging. Africa exports raw materials and imports finished goods. We are rewarded for poverty and penalised for aspiration. Every African government that has tried to add value to its own resources — to process its own ore, to refine its own oil, to manufacture its own goods — has faced trade barriers, financial headwinds, or political pressure.

The debt architecture has compounded this. African governments are charged risk premiums that bear no rational relationship to actual default rates. The cost of capital for infrastructure in Africa is three to four times what comparable projects cost in Europe. This is not a market outcome — it is a structural imposition that keeps Africa in a permanent state of fiscal vulnerability.

I want to be fair: there are genuine partners in Europe who understand this and want a different relationship. And many steps initiatives hint at a re-ordered relationship. Only last November, the EU – Africa Summit held in Luanda, Angola and Europe reaffirmed its commitment to Africa as a strategic partner. Before then, EU has come up with many strategies and plans – the Global Gateway Strategy, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (on serious concerns regarding the adverse impacts of this policy on Africa discussed during the AU-EU summit check here and here), the Critical Raw Materials Act and the various National Action Plans, to name a few. Indeed, speaking a few days ago at the annual conference of EU ambassadors in Brussels, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed that Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order and opined that radical changes are inevitable. But good intentions within a flawed architecture produce flawed outcomes. That is why structural reform, not incremental goodwill, must be the goal of any serious reset.

Africa’s Non-Negotiables

As we approach any new bargain, Africa must be clear about what is non-negotiable. Let me name five out of the many that came out of our reflection yesterday.

The first is value addition and beneficiation. Africa should no longer accept arrangements in which our resources leave our shores as raw commodities and return to us as expensive imports. Any new partnership framework must be anchored on industrialisation, local processing, and technology transfer. Our own Global Gateway must now recognise the place of an African Minerals Consortium, primarily modeled on the global south hydrocarbons consortium – OPEC and preserving the rights of mineral endowed countries to harness their endowments for inclusive growth, fair pricing negotiations, unlocking investment in exploration, promoting local community participation and supply security on a fair and equitable basis.  This is not anti-Western sentiment — it is basic economic logic that the West itself applied during its own development.

The second is sovereign debt restructuring and a fair cost of capital. The current credit rating system penalises African countries in ways that are empirically unjustified. Africa is not capital starved; Africa is capital trapped. On illicit financial flows alone, over $88 billion was trapped in 2024. And yet, when the Africa Group at the UN took the Mbeki report on illicit financial flows and capital flight to the United Nations in pursuit of the global tax reform agenda, it was European countries alongside the United States that opposed the reform of the global financial architecture. We need a fundamental reform of the Bretton Woods credit architecture, new mechanisms for development finance, and an end to the punishing premiums that make it cheaper to borrow in Paris than in Lagos.

The third is genuine technology partnership. Artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and the platform economy are already reshaping global productivity. Africa cannot be a passive consumer of technology built elsewhere and governed by rules written without us. We must replace the extractive capitalism masquerading as untrammelled artificial intelligence with data sovereignty, capacity for digital industrialisation, and a voice in the governance frameworks that will define the next technological epoch.

The fourth revolves around labour migration. True, Africa as a continent is experiencing a significant shift in migration flows, both within our continent and towards Europe. Evidently, well managed migration holds a substantial positive impact both for countries of origin as well as significant benefits to destination countries, and more importantly for global stability and security. EU and the African Union need an honest conversation and a coordinated plan on population flows and labour dynamics considering the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the world.

The fifth — and most foundational — is the right to determine our own development pathways. Africa is not asking to be left alone. We are asking to be treated as equals in designing the frameworks that govern our participation in the global economy. Development conditionalities that make aid contingent on policy choices Africa has not made must give way to genuine partnership in which African institutions lead African solutions, one that is focused on domestic resource mobilisation and not overseas development assistance.

What Africa Must Change

I would be less than honest if I placed all the responsibility on Europe and the West. Our reflection yesterday also looked inward.

The truth is that Africa’s negotiating weakness is partly self-inflicted. We arrive at global tables divided, speaking in fifty-four competing voices, making it easy for partners to play us against each other. The African Continental Free Trade Area is an extraordinary achievement on paper — but its implementation is still slow, and intra-African trade remains embarrassingly low as a share of our total trade. We cannot demand to be treated as a bloc if we do not act as one.

Our institutional capacity for strategic economic negotiation is inadequate. The European Union arrives at trade talks with battalions of economists, lawyers, and technical experts. Many African delegations are outgunned before negotiations begin. Building that institutional depth — the analytical capacity, the negotiating expertise, the legal architecture — is not optional. It is the precondition for sovereign agency.

And we must address governance. Weak rule of law, and institutional fragility are not just moral failings — they are economic costs that our people bear and that undermine our credibility at the negotiating table. The new bargain with the West is inseparable from the new bargain we must strike with our own citizens.

The Architecture of a New Bargain

What would a genuinely new bargain look like in practice?

On trade, it means a fundamental renegotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements — moving from market access frameworks that entrench Africa’s commodity dependence to industrial partnership agreements that incentivise manufacturing, value addition, and skills transfer. Europe should welcome African processed goods, not just raw materials. Europe should reform lopsided partnership agreements such as the ones signed by many coastal states that deplete our oceans, marine life, and community livelihoods, compounding the migration crisis. Europe should accept reforms to global tax rules. That is the test of genuine partnership.

On finance, it means a reformed development finance architecture in which African-led institutions like the African Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank have greater capitalisation and mandate, in which sovereign debt carries risk-adjusted pricing that reflects reality rather than perception, and in which climate finance arrives as grants and concessional lending — not additional debt for countries that contributed least to the problem.

On security, it means an end to arrangements in which African countries pay for security cooperation with political compliance. Security partnerships must be transparent, mutually accountable, and consistent with African sovereignty and the decisions of the African Union.

On governance of the global commons — AI, digital infrastructure, climate rules, pandemic response — it means Africa having a genuine seat at the design table, not just the implementation table. The G20, the IMF, the WTO: all of these must be reformed to reflect the actual weight of the Global South in the 21st century world and Europe must support reforms to the UN Security Council to ensure greater African representation. Our European friends must also eschew the notion that only European values are central to defining new partnerships. We must also acknowledge that Europe has interests, and it’s important to understand and engage these.

And on restoration of dignity, Europe must acknowledge historical atrocities against the African continent and agree on reparations – including the return of looted African assets and artifacts and genuine rebates on African diaspora remittances.

From Dialogue to Compact

Mama Graca, we joyfully celebrated your 80^th birthday last night. In your lifetime, you have seen Africa at its most oppressed and at its most liberated. You have seen what is possible when Africans refuse to accept the terms handed to them and insist on writing their own. That spirit — the spirit of agency over victimhood, of bargaining from strength rather than dependency — is what this moment demands.

Let me close with this: the turning point we face is not a gift from the changing global order. Turning points only become transformations when they are seized. They need not just the right analysis but the right institutions, the right leadership, and the right collective will.

Africa has the resources. Africa has the population. Africa has — at long last — the geopolitical leverage and the critical mineral advantage. What we need now is the strategic coherence to convert that leverage into a new bargain: one in which partnership replaces patronage, co-creation replaces conditionality, and African agency is not a talking point but a lived reality.

The generation watching us right now — the 400 million young Africans who will enter the labour market in the next decade — cannot afford for us to produce another beautiful document that changes nothing. They are watching. Let us make this turning point count.

 

* Address delivered during the high-level dialogue of African leaders organised by ACCORD and hosted by Graça Machel, Chairperson of the Board of ACCORD held on 13-14 March at Sandton Convention Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The news of Former Senegalese President, Macky Sall’s nomination as a candidate for the position of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General came as a surprise for many. One of the notable aspects of the nomination relates to the confusion on whether Sall received the support of the continental body, the African Union (AU). On 4 March 2026, one media report stated ‘[N]ow the official candidate of the African Union in a race to succeed António Guterres as UN Secretary-General, Macky Sall is currently in Paris, where he is expected to meet with the French president.’

Rather than the merit of Sall’s candidature (which is worthy of interrogation as a matter of public interest), the issue that this media report raises is the factual question of whether Sall’s candidacy was processed through the AU’s established mechanism regarding the nomination of nationals of African states as candidates for positions on international bodies. It is thus necessary to address two questions: How is Sall nominated? What are the established processes for AU endorsement of such a nomination?

It was through a letter of the Permanent Mission of Burundi to the UN in New York, dated 2 March 2026, addressed to the Presidents of the UN General Assembly and the March 2026 President of the UN Security Council, that Sall was nominated as a candidate for the UN’s top job. In the most relevant part, the letter states, ‘…my government, current Chair of the African Union, nominates His Excellency Macky Sall, former President of the Republic of Senegal, for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations.’ What this makes clear is that Sall, who is a Senegalese, is a nominee of the Government of Burundi, which happened to be the Chairperson of the AU Assembly for 2026.

It is clear from the letter that the Government of Burundi did not submit Sall’s nomination in its capacity as Chairperson of the AU. It is, however, clear that Sall made a ‘smart’ move in approaching Burundi, rather than any other country, including his own Senegal. What is significant about Burundi as the country nominating him is its current role at the AU, which undoubtedly Sall sought to leverage.

Considering the strategic importance of candidatures for positions in international organisations, both for member states and in advancing Africa’s agency, the AU has established a process and mechanism for nomination for such positions. The process ordinarily entails the submission of the nomination by the nominating member states of the AU through a Note Verbale addressed to the AU Commission. After review of the submissions within the regional groups, usually through the Permanent Representatives Committee, to avoid fragmentation through competitive bidding from several candidates from the continent, the list is submitted for further consideration to the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System, a standing subsidiary body of the Executive Council of the AU. Then, the list is presented by the Committee to the Executive Council for endorsement or for noting, as the case may be.

This is the Committee that processed the endorsement of many of the African nationals leading various international bodies, such as the WTO and the WHO. The most recent of such nominations that the Committee endorsed, which led to a successful election for the position of Director-General of UNESCO, was the candidacy of Dr Khaled El-Enany, a known Egyptologist and former Minister of Antiquities of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This Ministerial Committee presented its report during the 39^th AU Assembly, when Burundi assumed the role of chairing the AU, to the 48^th ordinary session of the Executive Council. The report contains a list of candidatures of individuals submitted by governments for endorsement, including, for example, for the post of Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for the period of 2027-2032 or for noting which is the case, for example, for the post of Director General of FAO. Conspicuously absent from the Ministerial Committee’s report list is the name of Macky Sall for the most important of post in the international system.

Not only is his name absent from the report of the Ministerial Committee, but Sall also made no attempt to have his name considered during the AU Assembly, which took place only two weeks before the submission of his name as a candidate to the UN. He was even spotted during the summit. The proximity of the time between the 39^th ordinary session of the AU Assembly and his nomination as a candidate (two weeks) raises important questions of both process and transparency around his candidacy.

Does not the approach he took undermine AU’s established process? Doesn’t it show contempt for following a process? Is such contempt also reflective of a trend on the part of Sall, who plunged Senegal into a constitutional crisis in attempting to circumvent the constitutional process ahead of Senegal’s last election? Or why seek nomination by a government, which happened to be the Chair of the AU, if not interested in following the AU process, unless the intention is to leverage the status of AU Chairperson for his candidacy?

There are reasons why processes exist and why AU’s process on candidatures for positions in international bodies matter. First, it is to provide equal opportunity for all who may seek leadership positions in international bodies. Second, such a process also provides member states of the AU the opportunity to exercise their sovereign prerogative and satisfy themselves that the best candidate receives the endorsement of the wider membership. Third, it also ensures transparency. Sall’s approach to his candidacy flies in the face of all of these important public policy reasons for the process. It unnecessarily risks creating confusion and, as a news report noted, division in the AU.

This process should apply to everyone. It applied to many statespersons previously. Sall cannot and should not be the exception, irrespective of his view of himself or the support he may have from his friends or states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, such as France, as a news report indicated.

Contrary to what Sall would like many to believe and the news report referenced above, there is no basis, even from the letter nominating him, that suggests that Sall is an official candidate of the AU. After reporting that Sall’s candidacy sparks division in the AU, the same news entity qualified him as an official candidate of the AU, while there is no official AU endorsement of Sall’s candidacy. It should be stated plainly and clearly that such a categorical report represents misinformation. The hard truth is that Macky Sall is not an official candidate of the AU!

Désiré Assogbavi

Advisor at the Open Society Foundations

Across Africa, what once appeared as isolated crises are now merging into a broader continental conflict belt stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, through Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and increasingly toward parts of coastal West Africa.

These conflicts are complex and interconnected (see here). Violent extremism, unconstitutional changes of government, transnational crime, communal tensions, and intensifying geopolitical competition are combining to reshape the continent’s security landscape, representing the ‘crystalisation of new era of insecurity’.

A Peace Architecture Designed for Another Era

Over the past two decades, the African Union has built one of the most ambitious regional security frameworks in the world, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), anchored on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), AU’s premier standing peace and security decision-making body. APSA is made up of the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund and represented the most significant step towards the realization of the longstanding quest for Pax-Africana.  Yet today’s crises look very different from those of the early 2000s.

Conflicts are now more transnational, and more intertwined with economic and environmental pressures. Security responses alone cannot address conflicts whose roots lie in governance failures, demographic pressure, economic fragility, and climate stress. It is now long overdue that the tools that are deployed for addressing twenty‑first century crises fully embrace and systematically integrate the full range of governance, institution building and development instruments as envisaged in both the PSC Protocol and the Solemn African Common Position on Defense and Security.

The decision by African leaders to convene an Extraordinary Summit on Conflicts later this year in Luanda therefore represents a critical opportunity, not just to discuss ongoing wars, but to rethink how Africa organizes and pursues its collective security.

The Structural Drivers of African Conflicts

Africa’s conflicts cannot be understood purely through a military or security lens.

Governance deficits remain central. Weak institutions, contested political transitions, and declining public trust in the state create fertile ground for instability. Youth marginalization is also reshaping political dynamics. Africa is the youngest region in the world, with roughly 60 percent of its population under the age of 25.

Economic fragility and rising debt pressures reduce governments’ capacity to invest in social stability. At the same time, climate pressures are intensifying competition over land, water, and natural resources in fragile regions.

Taken together, these drivers show that peacebuilding must link governance, development, and economic transformation. They also signify the necessity of sustained high-level collective push for the reform of international financial system.

Critical Minerals, Strategic Competition, and Conflict Risks

Another structural factor that deserves far greater attention is the growing connection between critical minerals and conflict dynamics in Africa. The global energy transition has sharply increased demand for minerals such as cobalt, lithium, manganese, graphite, rare earths, and platinum group metals, many of which are concentrated in African countries.

This surge in demand is turning parts of Africa into frontlines of global geo-strategic competition. In countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and parts of the Sahel, mineral-rich regions are increasingly exposed to armed group activity, illicit trade networks, and external geopolitical interests seeking to secure supply chains. Without strong governance frameworks, the race for these resources’ risks reinforcing patterns long associated with the ‘resource curse,’ where wealth beneath the soil fuels instability rather than prosperity.

Illicit mineral trafficking already finances armed groups in several conflict zones. In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, control of mining sites and smuggling routes continues to sustain armed movements, inter-state tensions and criminal networks. Similar risks are emerging in other regions where weak state presence, corruption, and fragile institutions intersect with rapidly rising mineral demand. For this reason, the upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Luanda should also examine the security implications of Africa’s critical mineral boom. If managed strategically, these resources could help finance development, industrialization, and economic transformation across the continent. But if governance remains weak, the global scramble for minerals could deepen local grievances, empower armed actors, and intensify geopolitical rivalry on African soil.

The challenge therefore is not simply about resource extraction. It is about building governance systems that prevent mineral wealth from becoming a driver of conflict. This includes strengthening transparency, ensuring local communities benefit from resource revenues, securing mining areas from armed exploitation, and promoting regional cooperation against illicit mineral trafficking.

In this sense, the debate on peace and security cannot be separated from Africa’s broader economic transformation agenda. How Africa governs its critical minerals may become one of the defining security questions of the next decade.

Africa in the Middle of Global Power Competition

Africa’s conflicts are increasingly shaped by external geopolitical dynamics (See here). Global powers are expanding their presence across the continent as security partners, investors, or strategic competitors.

The question is not whether Africa should work with international partners. The real question is who sets the strategic direction. Africa must remain firmly in the driver’s seat of its own conflict resolution processes.

The Need to Redefine Unconstitutional Change of Government & Adopt an effective Sanction Regime

Since 2020, Africa has experienced several military coups, concentrated largely in the Sahel. The African Union’s primary response, suspension from AU activities, has not been sufficient to deter unconstitutional changes of government.

Africa therefore needs a stronger and more credible sanctions regime including against coup administrations that return to power through self-organized elections.

Today, democracy in Africa is threatened not only by soldiers entering presidential palaces, but also by leaders quietly rewriting the rules of the game. This happens through manipulation of constitutions and the gradual capture of democratic institutions. In several countries, constitutional amendments have been used to remove or weaken presidential term limits, allowing incumbents to prolong their stay in power while maintaining the appearance of legal legitimacy. Electoral processes themselves are sometimes undermined through the politicization of electoral commissions, the misuse of state resources, or restrictions on opposition and civil society. In this context, defending constitutional order must go beyond reacting to military coups alone. The African Union and our regional economic communities must also address what could be described as ‘constitutional coups’, situations in which the letter of the law is manipulated to undermine its democratic spirit. Protecting constitutional governance therefore requires stronger norms, more credible political pressure, and a renewed commitment to democratic accountability across the continent.

Preventing Conflicts Before They Explode

Preventive diplomacy remains one of the most underutilized instruments within the African Union system (see here and here). Strengthening the political authority and operational capacity of the AU Commission (as extensively outlined in the final part of African Union floating adrift) could significantly improve the continent’s ability to prevent crises before they escalate.

Making the Extraordinary Summit Matter

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit on Peace and Security in Angola represents an important moment. But its success will depend on whether it avoids the trap of business as usual. Communities living in conflict‑affected areas, women peacebuilders, youth networks, civil society organizations, and traditional mediation structures must be included in the conversation. Across Africa, local communities possess rich traditions of mediation and reconciliation that should be integrated into continental peace strategies.

In closing

Peace and security are no longer standalone policy domains. They are deeply connected to governance legitimacy, economic resilience, and geopolitical shifts.

The upcoming Extraordinary Summit offers an opportunity to rethink how Africa organizes its collective security and rebuilds strategic agency in a fragmented world.

Africa does not need incremental adjustments. It needs bold thinking, institutional renewal, and political leadership capable of confronting the new realities of instability on the continent.