Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations
Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations
Date | 22 September 2023
Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1175th meeting at a ministerial level to deliberate on financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The meeting will be held in the margins of the 78th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York, USA.
Cameroon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lejeune Mbella Mbella, chairperson of the PSC for the month of September, is expected to open the session. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the AU Commission Chairperson, will make a statement. Donald Kaberuka, the AU High-Representative for the Peace Find and Financing of the AU, is also expected to address the session. On the part of the UN, it is envisaged that Jean-pierre Lacroix, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, and Rosemary A. DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will make statement as well. The representatives of the African Members in the UN Security Council (A3), namely Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique and the incoming two African members of the UN Security Council, Algeria and Sierra Leone, will also be present for this ministerial session.
The last time that the PSC met to discuss the issue of financing AU PSOs was on 12 May of this year during its 1153rd session, which was held at the ministerial level. In that session, the PSC authorized the A3 to ‘resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UNSC resolution on financing AU-led PSOs.’ This set the negotiation process towards the adoption of UNSC resolution in motion, a process that was put on hold after the request of the PSC in September 2019 to suspend the negotiation over the draft resolution put forward by South Africa. (For more details see Amani Africa’s 10 May 2023 Special Research Report).
From our consultations, Ghana – who is spearheading the agenda of adopting a framework resolution on financing AU PSOs – has developed a draft resolution to start the negotiation process in the UNSC. It is anticipated that the draft resolution may be circulated sometime in October with the hope to table the resolution for voting in December during Ecuador’s Presidency. Tomorrow’s session thus offers an opportunity for the PSC to provide substantive and concrete guidance on how to proceed with the negotiation particularly on the remaining delicate issues in the coming months.
The renewed interest in and the window of opportunity towards the adoption of the long pending resolution is a result of various developments both at the level of the AU and the UN as well as changes in the peace and security dynamics and the dynamics in the UNSC. The AU Commission prepared what it called ‘African consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities’, which the AU Assembly considered and adopted in February 2023 at its 36th ordinary session. This Consensus Paper not only presented the advances that the AU made in strengthening its various institutional, normative and regulatory processes but it also clarified AU’s position on burden sharing.
On the part of the UN, following the presidential statement of August 2022 under Chinese presidency of the UNSC which requested UN Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolutions 2320 and 2378, and recommendations to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources, the Secretary-General released the report on 1 May and presented to the UNSC during its 25 May 2023 session. The dynamics within the UNSC today is more favorable for the adoption of a resolution on financing than it was before as the statements delivered by UNSC members during the 25 May briefing clearly attest. Considering that a major factor for the collapse of the process for the adoption of a resolution in December 2018 was a US threat to veto the resolution, a notable positive development is US’s statement expressing more positive and supportive stance towards the adoption of the resolution.
Further to that, while the nature of the peace and security context increasingly demands the use of instruments that go beyond those applicable to UN peacekeeping and hence putting UN peace operations on the continent under increasing pressure, there is no appetite in the UN for deploying UN peacekeeping. Additionally, the recent geopolitical shifts that increasingly acknowledge Africa as a key global actor can find meaningful institutional expression through, among others, the decision to use UN assessed contribution for AU PSOs.
In the context of the last attempt for the adoption of a UNSC resolution during 2018/2019 and following the suspension of the process in September 2019, the issues requiring further engagement have been identified. Broadly speaking, four issues emerged as requiring further engagement between the AU and the UN to pave the way for the adoption of a UNSC resolution: the question of burden-sharing, compliance frameworks for human rights and international humanitarian law, fiduciary standards of financial arrangements and reporting, and oversight and command and control of the missions. (For more details on the history of the negotiation and the controversial issues, see Amani Africa’s 10 May 2023 Special Research Report).
Despite the favorable political dynamics within the UNSC, the negotiation over the draft resolution will not be easy. The 25 May 2023 UNSC briefing reveals that support on the part of UNSC members including some of the P5 remains uneven. In that regard, it is worth noting that the representative of the UK, during the 25 May briefing, stressed the need for the AU to ‘openly and clearly establish how it intends to share the financial burden’, and further warning that ‘any scope for misinterpretation will result in new initiatives being stalled’. Together with the issues that others like Brazil, Albania and Japan raised, further compromise and agreement may be required on some of these sticking issues.
During tomorrow’s session, it is expected that the PSC, apart from reiterating the progress made in enhancing ownership and burden sharing through the AU Peace Fund, may highlight the need for giving due recognition to the unaccounted aspects of the financial burden that AU member states bear in mobilizing and deploying troops who pay with their lives and limbs. It may further reaffirm the position of the Consensus Paper that the AU would cover the costs relating to the preparatory stages of the deployment of PSOs supported by UN assessed contributions. Considering the expectation on the part of some members of the UNSC for further commitment for financial burden sharing, the PSC may indicate in the context of the clear commitment that the AU demonstrated in recent years that instead of making unrealistic commitment for a specific percentage for all PSOs that may be funded through UN assessed contributions that further financial contribution is considered at the time of the planning and negotiation of the deployment of each PSO.
Tomorrow’s session will also serve as an opportunity for the PSC to also express its support for the financing model for accessing UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs as articulated both in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s May 2023 report. With respect to oversight and command and control, the PSC may also welcome the proposed formula in the Secretary-General’s report as the basis for formulating the provisions in the resolution while affirming the importance of the development of joint AU-UN planning guidelines.
The PSC should take lessons from the 2018/19 negotiation process to avoid the risk of another failure. First, it is imperative to ensure the cohesion of the A3 members and that they are able to speak in one voice on controversial issues throughout the negotiation process. In that regard, an interesting development is PSC’s suspension of Gabon – a member of the A3 – after the 20 August military coup. It remains to be seen whether the sanction will affect Gabon’s relations with other A3 members, as well as the PSC while engaging on the file. Second, building a broader consensus with the UNSC members is also crucial. One immediate available avenue to that end is the upcoming 17th annual joint consultative meeting between the PSC and the UNSC, which is scheduled to take place from 5 to 6 October in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. PSC may commend the efforts of the A3, and request them to fast track the finalization of the draft resolution and the negotiation on the same in order to seize the current window of opportunity for the adoption of the resolution before the end of the year. The PSC may emphasize the need for a sustained engagement between the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the negotiation process; and to that end, it may request a regular briefing from the A3 until the successful completion of the negotiation process. The PSC may affirm AU-led PSOs authorized by the UNSC and funded through UN assessed contribution as being part of the range of tools that the UN deploys for maintenance of international peace and security. The PSC may also welcome the proposals contained in the Secretary-General’s May 2023 report notably with respect to monitoring and reporting, joint and consultative decision-making. It may commend the progress made by the AU for achieving ownership and burden sharing and signal that specific financial contribution by the AU for a PSO funded by UN assessed contribution is dealt with on a case-by-case basis. It may also express the need for the UNSC to recognize the important contribution of AU PSOs for international peace and security, hence for the realization of the primary responsibility of the UNSC.
Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa
Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa
Date | 12 May 2023
Tomorrow (12 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1153rd session at a ministerial level to discuss the issue of financing AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.
Uganda’s minister of Foreign Affairs, Odongo Jeje Abubakhar, Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, is expected to open the session followed by remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), as well as remarks from Mohammed El-Amine Souef, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is expected to address the PSC and provide overview of the Secretary-General’s report released early this month. The representative of the European Union (EU) could be also among the speakers.
The session on financing AU PSOs comes in the context of a new momentum for the resumption of negotiation on a framework UNSC resolution on financing of AU-led PSOs that has stalled since 2019. In February of this year, the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly adopted what the AU referred to as ‘African consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities.’ On 1 May, the UN Secretary-General officially released the report on the Implementation of UNSC resolutions 2320(2016) and 2378(2017), which is scheduled to be considered by the UNSC on 25 May. These two documents set the stage for starting the negotiation on a UNSC framework resolution that secures concrete commitment from the Council on the use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs.
Happening at the ministerial level, tomorrow’s session presents the PSC the opportunity to provide strategic guidance on how to take forward the agenda of financing within the UNSC and the respective roles and responsibilities of the various AU actors in that regard. It could also serve as a platform for the PSC to create awareness and shared understanding on some of the key issues highlighted in the two documents and those areas that may require further engagement and negotiated compromise.
There are around four issues, which all received attention in the two documents and are expected to required further engagement. The first of this has to do with burden sharing. This relates to the percentage of the budget of AU-led PSO supported by UN funding that the AU contributes to. One of the issues in this regard was the clarification needed on contribution of 25 % of PSOs budget. The Consensus Paper stated that the 25% of AU’s budget would be dedicated to supporting ‘priority initiatives of the AU in support of peace and security efforts on the continent.’ From the 25% of the Union’s annual budget that is committed to the overall peace and security work of the AU, the budget for PSOs is expected to cover the preparation stage of AU led PSOs.
During the session, member states may also raise the question of various unaccounted costs that they absorb when deploying for PSOs. As highlighted in Amani Africa’s latest report, there may also be a need for the AU to commit to a percentage of the financial burden of the PSOs that will be supported by UN assessed contributions. The PSC may thus need to consider how to provide further clarification that specifies the percentage of the cost of the peace operations that AU’s contribution constitutes even if this would be a percentage that is symbolic of AU’s willingness for burden sharing.
On the financing model, the Consensus Paper proposed three financing options. The first model is the establishment of AU-UN Hybrid mission based on the UNAMID experience. The second model is what the Consensus Paper described as an ‘Enhanced UN Logistics Support Package (LSP)’ – a financing option that has been tested in Somalia since 2009 to support AMISOM/ATMIS but with the support additionally covering monthly stipends to the police and military components as well as death and disability compensation (AMISOM/ATMIS plus model). While these two converge with the two financing options supported by the Secretary-General’s report, the Consensus Paper additionally envisaged that sub-regional peace support operations also benefit from UN assessed contributions. The Secretary-General’s report does not close the door for such operations but requires that such operations are brought under AU decision-making and financial management frameworks.
The other area is the question of decision-making, oversight and command and control, which does not seem to be sufficiently reflected in the consensus paper. Previous negotiations on the matter highlighted the disagreement between AU and UN over who provides the strategic and political guidance to the AU-led PSOs that are primarily funded through UN assessed contributions. The view on the part of the AU is that its deployment of PSOs using UN assessed contributions should not be seen as just a sub-contracting by the UN of its peace operations responsibility to the AU. As such it expects to exercise a level of control over the PSOs it deploys under UNSC authorization and UN assessed contributions support. The Secretary-General’s paper provides a diagram of the decision-making process and acknowledges the authority of the AU. What the scope of this control by AU would be clear when negotiating the language in the draft resolution.
The other issue related to the strengthening of human rights compliance and financial transparency and accountability mechanisms. Both the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s repot provide updates on the progress made in this respect by the AU meeting the expectations set in the two UNSC 2016 and 2017 resolutions. It is expected that the PSC will welcome the Secretary-General’s report and call on the UNSC to heed the call of the Secretary-General and adopt the resolution on financing of AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions.
In terms of next steps, it would also be of interest for PSC on the process and arrangements that should be put in place for sustained consultation and close coordination. The various consultations would understandably need to be organized in a way that addresses the specific areas of concern of various role players. The PSC may in this respect welcome the roadmap that the A3 have prepared. It may also call for creating a dedicated standing coordination arrangement to ensure close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC, the A3, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to UN and the wider Africa Group in New York throughout the negotiation process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects AU’s position.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to reiterate the key aspects of the consensus paper, including AU’s understanding of the 25% commitment, the different financing options outlined; progress made in addressing some of the concerns raised in previous negotiation on the matter. PSC may welcome the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of UNSC resolutions 2320 and 2378 and may endorse the strong call of the Secretary-General for the UNSC to adopt a resolution on use of assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations authorized by the UNSC. The PSC may also authorize the A3 to resuscitate the negotiations on the resolution on the basis of the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s report, which was developed in close coordination with the AU Commission. For ensuring close & sustained consultation and ensure that the various AU actors speak with one voice, the PSC may call for the establishment of a standing consultation and coordination arrangement dedicated to this file and for the duration of the negotiations. At the level of the PSC, it may decide to have this agenda to be a regular item of the monthly program of work of the PSC every month until the conclusion of the negotiations on the draft resolution and establish a committee made up of three to five members involving Ghana as a state with membership in both the PSC and the UNSC. Considering that the negotiation over the resolution is also political as the Secretary-General’s report underscored and the strategic significance of this file, the PSC may call for the AU Commission and member states to be seized of, provide leadership and take active part throughout the negotiation process at the highest levels.
Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 21 July, 2021
Tomorrow (21 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to brief the council on the progress and state of development of the common position.
The AU Assembly in its decision of its 14th extraordinary summit requested the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing peace support operations in Africa, to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in championing and mobilizing support within the UNSC for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the Continent.
It is also to be recalled that the PSC at its 881st session held in September 2019 took a view that ‘a better articulated and African owned common position’ before a draft resolution on financing of AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions is tabled for consideration by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This decision was taken against the background of issues that emerged as the A3 members of the UNSC were seeking during 2018 and 2019 to secure a UNSC resolution authorizing in principle under agreed upon conditions the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led UNSC authorized peace support operations on a case-by-case basis.
The A3 spearheaded by Ethiopia initiated a draft resolution on financing to be adopted in December 2018 under the Cote d’Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council. However, the US threatened to Veto the resolution. Following the introduction of a so- called compromise text proposed by France to accommodate the US, the vote on the A3 draft resolution was postponed (Please refer to the Amani insight on this issue). South Africa, who initially brought the issue of financing to the Security Council in its previous membership, made the issue one of the priorities of its tenure during 2019-2020. After holding consultations on the matter including a visit by the Permanent Representatives of the A3 to Washington, D.C. to engage with the United States, including the Congress, White House and the Department of State, South Africa introduced a new and slightly updated text from the initial A3 draft and the so-called compromise draft.
When the PSC finally reviewed the matter, it felt that the latest updated draft did not adequately reflect AU interests. The PSC opted for deferring the consideration of the draft text by the UNSC pending the holding of adequate consultation at the level of the AU leading towards a common position. This aims at providing greater clarity on various issues, including on the implementation of the 75/25 formula and on the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and its role for burden sharing. The common African position elaborated by the Commission is expected to explain some of these issues in order to ensure greater understanding and consensus within the AU and help the discussion in the UNSC move forward.
During tomorrow’s session Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye, who revived the process for the adoption of the common position, is expected to provide update to the PSC on steps taken towards the elaboration of the common position and the orientation of the common position that will be the basis for resuscitating the discussion on A3 sponsored resolution on financing AU peace operation through UN assessed contributions. The common position is expected to take stock of and build on the various efforts undertaken both at the level of the UN and the AU.
It is worth noting that the issue of predictable and reliable financing has been one of the longstanding subjects in the AU-UN relationships on peace and security in Africa. In 2008, the UN Panel led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on the subject recommended in its report the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations- authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. This was further reinforced by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, which recommended the use of United Nations-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.
On the part of the AU, the Policy Organs had adopted milestone decisions in 2015 and 2016 on financing of the AU and the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund. Accordingly, the A3 were called upon to champion the financing of AU led peace support operations. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 2320 (2016), facilitated by Senegal, which stressed ‘the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.’ The subsequent resolution 2378 (2017), whose adoption was facilitated by Ethiopia, expressed the UNSC’s intention to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN-assessed contributions ‘on a case-by-case basis.’
One of the factors for the delay in adopting the common position related to the factors that impeded progress in the UNSC. In 2018, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia proposed a joint draft resolution which tried to secure a clear commitment from the Council to decide in principle to finance AU led peace support operations. The draft text had received wider support within the UNSC and the broader UN membership. However, the US under Trump administration was not willing and ready to accommodate the AU request and, in fact, threatened to exercise its veto power if the African members decide to go ahead and table the draft text for a vote.
With the Biden administration in the US and its renewed multilateral engagement, there appears to be a new window of opportunity to revive the financing issue. Both Chairperson Moussa Faki and UNSG Antonio Guterres are also expected to exert reinvigorated efforts to enhance the AU-UN partnership in their new mandate by, among others, ensuring progress on the financing issue. This will certainly unleash the potential of the partnership across the whole spectrum of peace operations. Furthermore, the EU leadership seems to be much more committed and determined to enhance its partnership with the AU and may likely pull its weight behind the AU if there is readiness to resuscitate the discussion on this issue.
This said, however, it should also be understood that the discussion on this issue would not be easy. COVID-19 has had its own impact on the discussion on peacekeeping. Increasing financial pressures, among other reasons, is forcing the UN to downsize and/or draw down peacekeeping missions in recent years. Some experts are anticipating that the tendency in the future could possibly be to prioritise affordable alternatives, such as observer missions and civilian special political missions.
Even though the Biden administration could be favorably disposed to the discussion on the issue, there is a need for serious discussion to reach a shared understanding on the way forward. This necessitates engaging the Biden administration in earnest, including the state department, National Security Council and the department of defense. It is also important for the AU to engage Congress and canvass the necessary support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations building on willingness of some congressmen to support the idea of financing AU led peace support operation as part of enhancing the role of the US.
The development of a common African position is indeed a step in the right direction and it is expected to facilitate a clear decision by AU, which will then pave the way for the A3 to resuscitate the file and try to secure a concrete commitment on the issue from the UNSC. The process will definitely take time and the necessary preparatory work for laying the ground work needs to be developed. The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat need to follow up on the implementation of their Joint Declaration of 6 December 2018, and work towards making tangible progress on some of the agreed issues as they relate to the financing issue, including the full operationalisation of the peace fund, reporting, oversight and accountability.
Most importantly, there is need to learn the right lessons from the experiences of 2018 and 2019. Ensuring greater clarity on the implementation of the AU Peace fund and demonstrating concrete commitment in sharing the burden would be vital. The full operationalization of the African Standby Force would go a long way in demonstrating AU’s commitment to shoulder responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa. It would be absolutely important that the AU common position is accompanied by a solid roadmap with clear time lines for holding consultations and mobilizing support from all the relevant interlocutors on this file while ensuring close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects the common position.
While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to provide input both on what is expected to be contained in the common position and the timeline for finalising the drafting for fulfilling the request of the AU Assembly, particularly the decision of its 14th extraordinary session held on 6 December 2020.
Common African Position on the 2020 Review of the UN Peace building Architecture
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 22 September, 2020
Tomorrow (22 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 948th session to consider the report of the AU Commission Chairperson on the ‘Common African Position (CAP) on the 2020 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Towards an Enhanced Global Peacebuilding System.’ The meeting is expected to take place through VTC.
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, is expected to brief the PSC and introduce the Chairperson’s report. Fatima K Mohammed, Head of the Permanente Observer Mission of the AU to the UN, is also expected to deliver a briefing on the review process and the development of the CAP.
The CAP is prepared in line with the 899th ministerial session of the PSC held in Luanda in December 2019 which requested the AUC ‘…to evolve a draft common African position ahead of the review conference of the UN Peace building Architecture to take place in 2020, for consideration by the PSC.’ The purpose of the CAP is to ensure that African contributions to the 2020 Review of the UN Peace building Architecture are articulated in a comprehensive document that guide African Member States during the inter-governmental negotiation process.
The last review of the UN peace building architecture was undertaken in 2015. This current review is taking place in the context of the twin resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016) of the UN General Assembly that call for a comprehensive review of UN peace building at its 74th session. The resolutions further underlined the importance of improving partnership and cooperation between the AU and the UN in peace building. To this effect the resolutions urge the Peace building Commission (PBC) to hold regular exchanges of views, joint initiatives, and information-sharing between the Peace building Support Office and the AU Commission.
This cooperation has also materialized through the annual interaction between the PSC and PBC, which was first held in October 2016. This interaction has regularly been held since then in subsequent years. During the most recent interaction held in November 2019, PSC’s 893rd session urged the AUC and the PBC to work in close cooperation with the countries concerned, to promote national priorities by enhancing national ownership, leadership and full participation in the peace building activities and development projects, as well as conflict prevention and addressing root causes of conflicts.
The cooperation between the AU and UN on peacebuilding has been strengthened through overarching frameworks including the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, in 2017, and the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in 2018.
In line with the decision of the twin UNGA resolutions, in October 2019, the UN Secretary-General launched the process for the five-year review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. To this end the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in partnership with the African Group developed the CAP. The position paper also benefited from inputs from a wide range of stakeholders including the department of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, Gender Women and Development, the Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security as well as the AU Missions in South Sudan and Sudan. The document was also developed based on consultations with the African Caucus on Peacebuilding at the UN in New York, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and African civil society organisations, as well as think tanks including Amani Africa.
The CAP identifies a number of key priority areas drawing on AU policy frameworks on peacebuilding namely the AU PCRD Policy of 2006 and the AU Transitional Justice Policy of 2019 as well as based on best practices from previous peacebuilding efforts. Towards informing the review process, the areas that the CAP highlights as priority areas include financing, conflict prevention, governance, transitional justice, combating terrorism as well as partnership. Additionally, it also covers crosscutting thematic issues related to women, peace and security and youth.
In addition to existing policy instruments, the issues captured in the CAP are also linked with the political leadership of the PSC and the technical input of AU Commission structures including the Cairo based PCRD center. With respect to PSC’s role three issues may be of interest for PSC members. The first is the active participation of national stakeholders in the conception, planning and implementation of peace building support. The second is the existence of a political strategy on which peace building support is to be anchored.
Finally, it would also be of interest for PSC members to get details how the CAP envisages both strategic level synergy between the PSC and the PBC in deciding on and regularly following up peace building intervention and the technical level collaboration between the AU and the UN. If the PSC is to play its political leadership role, it is necessary for the PSC to have the countries on the Peace building Commission on its agenda.
The CAP is also expected to include salient features to enhance cooperation among actors that support peacebuilding efforts. In this regard, the three components it highlights to inform and guide inter-institutional cooperation include: ‘assistance in the design of national peacebuilding framework; financial support for peacebuilding; and mechanism for periodic consultation, joint monitoring, review and reporting on progress in implementation of peacebuilding process’. The harmonization of support and partnership in these critical areas and national ownership highly determine the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts.
The AU may also utilize this opportunity to advance strategic matters relating to increasing its ownership of PCRD efforts in Africa; a more synergized partnership between AU, RECs/RMs and the UN as well as the operationalization of the peacebuilding efforts at the field level.
Between 2007-2020 African countries have received approximately 82.7% of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which is a demonstration of the PBC’s priority and commitment in the continent. Given that Africa, as a region, is the biggest recipient of the funding it is essential that relevant national and continental actors take active part in informing the peacebuilding efforts of the PBC, which will have effect on a number of countries. In this respect, it would be of interest for PSC members to receive clarification on the strategy to be used for ensuring that African member states participate actively in the negotiation process speaking with one voice.
It is also to be recalled that currently there are about four African countries on the agenda of PBC, namely, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia. Hence, tomorrow’s session also serves to review the experiences from these countries for enhancing the cooperation between the AU and PBC in particular country contexts.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underline the importance of the global peacebuilding architecture for consolidating peace, particularly working in close coordination with AU’s PCRD. It may endorse the key recommendations towards effective peacebuilding efforts, which are articulated in the CAP with particular emphasis on the need for peacebuilding to be anchored on a political strategy for ensuring national ownership and full participation of national actors. For the PSC to play a more active role in providing strategic guidance and political support, it may request that the countries on the agenda of the PBC are also included on the agenda of the PSC and that the AU Commission together with the UN provide regular briefing and update on the post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in those countries. The PSC may also urge the AUC for continued support to member states in ensuring that key recommendations of the CAP are well captured in the UN review process. It may call for a more coordinated and continuous effort between the AU office in New York and the AUC to ensure a coherent messaging on the basis of the CAP and to effectively inform the review process. It may also call on African member states to actively participate in the review process based on the CAP and speak with one voice. The PSC may also make reference to its annual interaction session with UNPBC as a key platform to further deepen the strategic cooperation on peacebuilding.
PSC session to discuss the implementation of AU Assembly Decisions
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 21 April, 2020
Tomorrow (21 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a discussion on the implementation of the decisions of the 33rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU relating to peace and security. Although it was initially envisaged to take place via VTC, it is now expected to be conducted on the basis of email exchanges and the silence procedure.
It is to be recalled that the 33rd AU summit held in February 2020, has made a number of decisions related to peace and security after deliberating on the report of the PSC, the outcome of the 12th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS) and the report on the implementation of AU Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns. Moreover, the AU Assembly has also adopted specific decisions on Libya and the Sahel following a PSC summit level meeting that was held at the margins of the summit.
It is envisaged that the PSC will be guided for the purposes of this session by the Matrix of the Summit Decisions which summarize the various outcomes that require follow up by the PSC, member states and relevant AU Commission departments. However, given the major changes since the February Summit due to COVID19 and measures taken to mitigate the spread, the discussion is expected to prioritize from the decisions that require follow up during this period and for which alternative options of implementation is feasible.
The Assembly made decisions in relation to crises situations as well as thematic issues. In the context of the African Standby Force (ASF), the Assembly has tasked the PSC to consider the establishment of a Special Unit within the ASF that serves to combat terrorism and to present its conclusions at the Ordinary Session in February 2021. Although Egypt has proposed to host an Extraordinary Summit dedicated to this matter, this may be reconsidered given the current restrictions on physical meeting and to identify an alternative means to follow up on this.
The other thematic issue featured in the Assembly is on efforts towards child protection. The Assembly has requested the AU Commission to integrate child protection into Silencing the Guns campaign and the 2020 theme of the AU, as well as to develop a comprehensive policy on child protection in AU peace support operations. The Assembly further reiterated previous decision, which has also been echoed by the PSC, on the appointment of a special envoy for children in armed conflict.
Issues related to terrorism and violent extremism formed a major peace and security agenda of the 33rd AU summit. In this context, the Assembly decided to organize an Extraordinary Summit focusing on the challenges of terrorism and violent extremism to galvanize support and immediate action to assist countries, which are facing the severe effects of terrorism. To this end the Assembly tasked the AU Commission, in coordination with the Chairperson of the Union, to undertake preparation for the convening of the Summit.
Although this was meant to take place in May 2020, given the current context the PSC may reflect on other mechanisms to pursue the agenda. One possible option is to have a VTC heads of state and government level PSC session on the theme followed by a similar remote summit level meeting of the Bureau of the AU Assembly.
The second set of decisions adopted by the Assembly emanate from the 12th STCDSS which mainly looked at three major issues that may need further follow up by the PSC. The first decision is on the extension of the implementation timeline of the African Union Master Roadmap (AUMR) on Silencing the Guns beyond December 2020 to provide more time for member states and other stakeholders to implement objectives set in the roadmap. More particularly, the Assembly called on for more strengthened implementation and reporting on the economic, social, environmental and legal aspects of the master roadmap. In this respect Kenya as a country that offered to host a meeting on the review of the implementation of the AUMR may provide further input on the matter.
The current situation of COVID19 and the restrictions on physical meetings will have direct impact on the implementation of AUMR, which is ending in December 2020. Many of the activities, which are time bound and planned to take place this year in line with the 2020 theme are expected to be postponed. The PSC may however undertake preparation to produce the comprehensive Report on the Status of the Implementation of the AUMR, which the Assembly has requested the Council to submit at the January/February 2021 Summit.
The second agenda item considered at the STCDSS is on the AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations (PSO).
The Assembly has requested the AUC to gather further inputs on the doctrine to be presented at the upcoming STCDSS in 2020. Although it remains uncertain whether such meeting would be possible, the PSC may request member states and RECs/RMs to send their input on the doctrine to the AU Commission.
The third decision is around Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The Assembly has given the responsibility to the AU Commission to conduct a second phase of the Mapping Study on SALW focusing more on illicit weapons flows more particularly linked to terrorist activities. Furthermore, it has requested the PSC to work closely with the UN Security Council to address the challenges around the proliferation and flow of SALW and violation of arms embargos. As a major driver of conflict in the Sahel and Libya, among others, this deserves a robust and sustained engagement and follow up both at the level of the PSC and the AU Commission.
Another major area, which the PSC may deliberate on in tomorrow’s session, is around early warning and conflict prevention. The Assembly has requested the PSC in collaboration with other AU Organs and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanism (RMs) Policy Organs, to establish a format to engage on strengthening efforts on early warning and early response issues. Hence the Assembly has requested the PSC and the RECs/RMs to initiate the process at the upcoming annual Consultative Meeting on Peace and Security in May 2020. In the light of the potential of COVID19 and the response measures to have dire peace and security consequences on the continent, a focus on early warning and response has acquired heightened importance.
The Assembly has also made a reference to a PSC decision on the authorization the immediate deployment of an AU Mission Against Ebola in DRC (MAEC). The PSC may follow up on the fate of this mission taking in consideration and assessing the ongoing developments of COVID19 and the capacity of the AU as well as the recent reports of a resurgence of the Ebola outbreak in the DRC.
Two regions received a particular attention by the PSC during the 33rd ordinary session: the Sahel region and Libya. The most notable aspect of the deliberation on the Sahel is expected to be the initiative for deploying 3000 AU troops to the Sahel region in support of the efforts of the countries in the region. It is to be recalled that the AUC has taken steps towards mobilizing support towards the deployment of these troops however this also requires the prompt direction by the PSC on the nature and scope of the mandate as well as its coordination with existing peace support operations.
On Libya, three major decisions are expected to feature in the Matrix. One is in relation to dispatching a joint AU-UN military and security reconnaissance mission to Libya. Although due to the current freezing of activities this particular process may not be conducted, this period however offers the PSC to review and make the necessary adjustment to this plan. The second point, which was raised in the decision, is around the establishment of Libya contact group. The contact group, which held its first meeting in March under the leadership of the Chair of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, is a key platform to consolidate AU’s role in the Libyan peace process.
The third concerns the elevation to the level of mission of the current AU Liaison Office in Libya, and to equip it with the necessary political, diplomatic and military capacity, with a view to ensuring greater contribution and participation of the AU in the efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Libya. The AU has strongly urged for its active role in finding a sustainable peace in Libya. While AU’s push for such role has as yet to win support in the UN Security Council, the elevation of its office together with the contact group could strengthen its influence in the Libya peace process.
The outcome of the session was unknown during the production of this ‘Insight’. Given major changes that have taken place since the 33rd Ordinary Session, particularly in relation to developments of COVID19 the PSC may prioritize decisions and activities that may be implemented within the set limits on meetings and travel. The PSC may task the AU Commission to present proposals on adjustments to and modalities for follow up of the decisions in the context of COVID19. In relation to both the Sahel region and Libya the PSC may express concern over the ongoing fighting in the midst of COVID19. The Council may exert further political pressure on belligerent parties to adhere to the global call on cessation of hostilities. In terms of early warning and response, which has become more pressing in the context of COVID19 and pending the possibility of convening a meeting on this subject with AU organs and RECs/RMs, the PSC may urge the AU Commission working with RECs/RMs to initiate assessment of risks for peace and security with a view to help member states facing major risks of instability and violence due to COVID19 initiate mitigating measures for preventing conflicts. It could also request that AU regional and liaison offices, PSC authorized or mandated missions expand their focus to cover the peace and security impacts of COVID19, while ensuring the safety and security of their personnel.
Ministerial session on ‘National Reconciliation, Restoration of Peace, Security and Rebuilding of Cohesion in Africa’
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 05 December, 2019
Tomorrow (5 December 2019) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is scheduled to hold a ministerial session under the theme ‘National Reconciliation, Restoration of Peace, Security and Rebuilding of Cohesion in Africa’.
Apart from members of the PSC, non‐PSC AU member states including Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali and Niger are also expected to participate at the ministerial meeting.
This theme was inscribed into the program of the month for December on the initiative of Angola. The session is also slated to take place in the capital Luanda. This is illustrative of the increasing regional and continental role Angola has come to play. It is to be recalled that in September Luanda played host to a major continental conference on the promotion of the culture of peace.
Indicating the significance of this session for Angola, the President of Angola, João Lourenço, is expected to open the session. Angola’s experience with national reconciliation, restoration of peace, security and rebuilding of cohesion in the aftermath of the long civil war and the divisions it sowed is expected to be highlighted.
The ministerial session is expected to provide a platform to discuss and share the experience of participating states in national reconciliation and in building inclusive and stable societies. A number of issues would be of interest for PSC members. One such issue is to identify what kind of reconciliation processes – national reconciliation commission, national dialogue or national consultations – that member states deployed in the search for national reconciliation and the institutional and policy measures they developed for inclusion, representation, or sharing of power for achieving inclusive structures of government and fostering national cohesion.
Another and critical issue is how to muster decisive political leadership and the will to make difficult compromises as a means of building trust and achieving national reconciliation. As the challenges in South Sudan or Mali show, this more than anything else is the key ingredient for the success of initiatives for national reconciliation and rebuilding of cohesion.
The timing of the theme of this session is of particular importance as it coincides with commencement of the 2020 AU theme of the year focusing on Silencing the Guns in Africa as 2019 gets concluded in a few weeks’ time. Within this context, tomorrow’s session is expected to draw out the particular contribution of its thematic focus towards the making progress to meet the ambition of silencing the guns in Africa. In this respect and as part of the effort to silence the guns, an important consideration is the need to paying a more central attention to the inclusion and promotion of arrangements for national reconciliation, restoration of peace, security and rebuilding of national cohesion in peace processes for resolving existing conflicts or as part of the initiative for restoring peace, security and rebuilding cohesion in emerging crisis situations such as in Cameroon or contested political transitions such as Ethiopia.
Indeed, national reconciliation and rebuilding of cohesion are crucial at all stages of the conflict cycle from prevention to post‐conflict reconstruction and development. Such initiatives are important for countries having peace processes for resolving existing conflicts such as the Central African Republic or South Sudan or Mali and for countries in a post‐conflict phase such as Cote d’Ivoire. Initiatives for national reconciliation and rebuilding of cohesion are also important for conflict prevention in countries with relative peace and stability. This is illustrated for example by recent experiences of some AU member states such as the Building of Bridges Initiative of Kenya and the provision, as part of the on‐going transition facing contestations, for a national reconciliation commission in Ethiopia.
In all these different settings, some of the issues for the PSC and its member states include the role to be played by the AU and how to support initiatives for national reconciliation, restoration of peace, security and rebuilding of cohesion. The AU, including through the PSC, has on various occasions called for the ratification of various AU instruments. There are however gaps on how to give them domestic legislative, institutional and policy expression and translate them into forms of inclusive and representative political and socio‐economic governance structures.
This is not the first time that the PSC convenes a session on subject related to the theme of tomorrow’s session. Its 347th, 383rd, 409th, 525th, 672nd and 726th sessions also focused on a related theme. Indeed, the first time the PSC held ministerial level session on a related theme was at its 393rd session. That session was held in Algiers, Algeria, on 29 June 2013 under the theme ‘National Reconciliation: A Crucial Factor for Security, Stability and Development in Africa’. Apart from highlighting what it called elements for conducting national reconciliation, the communique of this 383rd ministerial session underscored that ‘national reconciliation is an imperative for overcoming divisions arising from conflict and restoring social cohesion, in order to ensure lasting stability and progress’.
The communique of the 409th session of the PSC recommended to the AU Assembly to declare ‘2014‐2024 as a decade of reconciliation in Africa with a view to consolidating peace, stability and sustainable development on the continent’, leading to the AU Assembly decision of 31 January 2014 declaring ‘2014–2024 as the Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa’. Although it has not been implemented, one of the important pronouncements of the 525th press statement of the PSC was the decision to make the theme a standing thematic agenda of the PSC to be reflected in the annual indicative calendar.
The Press Statement of the last PSC session on this theme at the 726th session of the PSC emphasized the importance of comprehensive transitional justice and reconciliation process, as being key to effectively preventing relapses and laying a strong foundation for sustainable peace in countries emerging from violent conflicts. Affirming the critical importance of national ownership, it also underscored ‘the importance of building and further enhancing the capacity of local, national and regional justice systems, including peace committees, peacebuilding ministries and national reconciliation commissions, as well as community and traditional justice systems.’ It also reiterated previous calls for expediating the process of the development and adoption of AU transitional justice policy instrument.
The review of the previous sessions highlights that at least two elements were lacking. First, although these previous sessions benefited from the 2006 AU Policy on Post‐Conflict Reconstruction and Development, when these previous sessions were held the AU transitional justice policy did not exist. Second, the mechanism for following up the measures required to advance this thematic agenda. Tomorrow’s session takes place in a different context. First, it is convened after the adoption of the AU Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP), which was adopted by the AU Assembly in February 2019. Apart from consolidating the key messages of previous PSC sessions on this theme and bringing them into a coherent framework, this Policy presents, drawing from the rich and diverse national reconciliation, justice and peace‐making experiences of the continent, the principles, guidelines, mechanisms and benchmarks for the implementation of national transitional justice processes including national reconciliation and truth seeking. For its implementation, the AUTJP is complemented, as highlighted in the preface to the policy that AU Chairperson Mousa Faki Mahamat wrote, by the Study of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC would underscore national reconciliation, restoration of peace, security and rebuilding of national cohesion to be indispensable for achieving progress in Africa’s quest for Silencing the Guns and should receive particular attention during the 2020 theme of the year. The PSC is also expected to call for the implementation of previous decisions on the theme particularly the decision of its 525th for making the theme of the session a standing agenda item of the PSC. The PSC could also welcome the adoption by the AU Assembly of the AUTJP and urge member states to use the Policy in pursuing national reconciliation, restoration of peace, security and rebuilding of cohesion. The PSC could also call on the AU Commission and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in collaboration with member states to support the implementation of the AUTJP in peace processes, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and national reconciliation initiatives and report to it on existing and emerging national initiatives.
Briefing on Sustainable financing of African Peace & Security Agenda under the UN Charter
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 19 September, 2019
Tomorrow (19 September 2019) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session to consider the draft UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution initiated in August 2019 on sustainable financing for African Peace and Security Agenda in the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It is expected that the Committee of Experts, a subsidiary body of the PSC, is expected to present the outcome of its review of the draft resolution to the Council.
In December 2018, the African three non‐permanent members of the UNSC (the A3) presented a draft resolution on financing of African Peace and Security Agenda for vote by the UNSC. The draft resolution initiated by Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea & Ethiopia had gone through rigorous negotiation process with other members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC). After negotiations were concluded, the draft was put in blue on 8 December by Cote d’Ivoire, the President of the UNSC for December 2018, on the request the A3 and voting was initially scheduled for 10 December.
In a press release of 14 December 2018, the PSC underlining that ‘the tabling of this resolution represents a watershed moment and an expression of the international community’s commitment to strengthening the global peace and security architecture and its capacity to address today’s complex security challenges’, endorsed it as ‘timely and balanced’. Following an apparent indication by the US to veto the draft if the vote went ahead as planned, the 10 December vote was postponed for a week after France requested to engage the US further to avoid the veto and bring the US to the consensus.
In the meantime, the A3 continued mobilizing support for the resolution. Following a briefing by the A3 on 18 December and taking into account the 14 December press release of the AU PSC, the African Group in New York after deliberation on the draft decided to put its full weight behind the A3 efforts and called on all members of the group to co‐sponsor the draft resolution. Beyond the Africa group, the draft also received support from other members of the UN with a total of 87 UN member states co‐sponsoring it.
The postponement of the 10 December vote and the engagement with the US did not yield the kind of compromise that the A3 deemed to be consistent with the core fundamentals of the draft resolution. Accordingly, a vote on the draft resolution was scheduled for 19 December. However, unofficial communications received from the AU advised that every effort be made to avoid the veto. In the meantime, a compromise text by France started to circulate. The result was that the A3 postponed the vote once again to 21 December. Two complicating factors also surfaced. First, an informal message from the AU advising to accept the so‐called compromise text emerged. It was followed by a note verbal from the AU Commission Chairperson holding that ‘the best course of action is to build on the compromise proposals in the past few days,’ hence opting for the compromise text by France instead of the original A3 draft. Second, the cohesion of the A3 suffered a blow when Cote d’Ivore requested the UN Secretariat to put the so‐called compromise proposal in blue for a vote.
In an email it sent out to the UN members co‐sponsored the original A3 text, the Office of the Permanente Representative of Ethiopia raised serious reservations on the ‘compromise text’. It observed that ‘the new text introduced significant amendments and new languages in its operative paragraphs (see OP9, OP16, OP 17, OP 18, OP 19, OP 26, OP 28 and OP 30) which is fundamentally different from the original A3 text’. It also pointed out that ‘[m]ost of the members of the Security Council had no knowledge of the new resolution. Neither did it pass through any negotiation process nor did it also go through the silence procedure’.
Following a meeting on 21 December at the level of Permanent Representatives, the A3 once again decided to postpone the vote on the draft resolution pending a clear guidance from the AUPSC, which mandated the A3 to champion the common African position on the financing issue. The Africa Group also met in an emergency session and endorsed the A3 decision. The report of the Africa Group meeting was communicated to the AUC.
On 24 December 2018, the PSC discussed the matter under ‘any other business’ and requested the AU Commission to submit to it a report. Although the report was planned to be presented to the Council in early 2019, this did not happen. Yet, at the level of the AU, the call on the UNSC for adopting the resolution has continued. In February 2019 the AU High Representative on Silencing the Guns by 2020 urged the ‘Security Council to respond positively to the African Union’s long‐standing and legitimate calls for the funding of African peace support operations through United Nations assessed contributions.’
In New York, another effort for following up the process for securing a resolution has been initiated under South Africa, which joined the A3 in January 2019 taking over from Ethiopia. After consultations with A3 members including Ethiopia, the two drafts that were put in blue in December 2018 were withdrawn. In August 2019, South Africa in consultation with the A3 introduced a new draft. While negotiations on this text has started, the draft was also submitted to the PSC for its guidance in anticipation of a consensus being achieved on this draft for its potential consideration for vote under South Africa’s presidency in October 2019.
It was against the background of the foregoing that tomorrow’s agenda was put in the program of work of the PSC for September. It was not for the first time that the PSC would discuss this tomorrow. On Monday 16 September, the PSC also discussed this agenda after receiving a briefing from the troika of the PSC (the previous, the current, and incoming chairs of the PSC) on their videoconference meeting that they had with the A3 the previous week. After the meeting, the PSC tasked the Committee of Experts to review the two draft resolutions that the A3 proposed in December 2018 and the latest one from August 2019 in order to make proposal to the PSC on the next steps.
The August 2019 draft reflected recent developments since the December 2018 Draft. For example, draft preambular paragraph 17 welcomed ‘the joint Declaration of the Secretary‐General of the United Nations and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 6th December 2018’ and preambular paragraph 19 and 20 welcoming work undertaken by the UN Secretariat and the AU in developing and adopting relevant compliance standards. In terms of the operative paragraphs, the August 2019 draft no longer contains the text from the compromise draft postponing the adoption of a framework resolution for another time. Yet, despite keeping the key paragraph ‘deciding in principle that United Nations assessed contributions can be provided, with decisions to be taken on a case‐by‐case basis … to support future African Union‐led peace support operations’, the August 2019 draft has carried much of the new text that was introduced in the compromise draft that France proposed and the A3 and the Africa Group rejected.
The Committee of Experts reviewed the two drafts during their 17th meeting held on 17 September. There is strong view in the PSC that the position of the PSC of 14 December 2018 endorsing the A3 draft needs to be maintained. In this respect, there are concerns that the August 2019 draft with the text from the compromise draft including that which reduced the role of the AU ‘to operational details’ would seriously undermine the mandate of the PSC as provided for in the PSC Protocol. In their report to the PSC tomorrow, the Committee of Experts would also highlight other aspects of the draft that are deemed to mark major departure from the December 2018 draft including the language ‘utilized’, the reporting arrangements and the formulation of the reference to AU’s decision committing to raise 25% of funds for peace and security.
It is therefore expected that the Committee of Experts would advise that the draft resolution should not be submitted to the UNSC for adoption in October 2019. The Committee is also expected to propose that further negotiations are held on the draft focusing on those aspects of the draft resolution that are feared to curtail the mandate of the PSC provided for in its Protocol and seriously limit the scope of flexibility and strategic level political role of the AU in general.
In terms of taking this process forward, there is a need for ensuring that the momentum is not lost. Central to keeping the momentum that has been achieved thus far is engaging the US not only with a view to avoid its use of veto but also importantly achieve, based on further negotiations on the draft, a new more balanced formulation. In this respect, consideration should be given to recalibrate the approach utilized thus far. There is in particular a need for elevating the engagement of the US administration not only at the level of the US Delegation in New York but also at the level of Congress, the State Department and the White House. The opportunity that the UN General Assembly (UNGA) presents for engaging the US administration particularly at most senior levels of the State Department and the White House by the AU PSC ministers and Heads of State and Government including South Africa’s President, as the incoming president of the UNSC leading on the negotiation in the UNSC on the draft resolution, is worth exploring. Similarly, as part of the preparation for the 13th Annual Consultative Meeting of the PSC and the UNSC scheduled for October, consideration should be given to engage, including based on proposed text jointly formulated by the AU Commission and the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), the permanent five members of the UNSC in general and the US in particular for avoiding a stalemate in the negotiation process.
While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, depending on the depth of the deliberations and the guidance that the PSC may wish to give on next steps, it may adopt a communique. Such a communique could envisage that the matter is discussed with the A3 both on the side‐lines of the UNGA and during the upcoming visit of the Committee of Experts to New York to discuss preparations for the Annual Consultative Meeting. In the light of the existence of major concerns over the current draft, it could also urge for further negotiations in the interest of keeping the momentum of the process with a more sustained and elevated engagement. It could also task as part of the negotiation process proposed texts for bridging the gap and achieving a more balanced draft are initiated in consultation with the A3.
Consideration and adoption of the conclusions of the Cairo Retreat of the PSC
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 16 September, 2019
Tomorrow (16 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold a session at 10am for the consideration and adoption of the conclusions of the Cairo Retreat of the PSC.
Previously, this agenda was included in the provisional program of works of the PSC for the months of February and April 2019. Tomorrow’s session could bring to a close this postponement in the adoption of the Cairo Retreat conclusions. The Secretariat of the PSC is expected to present the conclusions of the retreat.
It is to be recalled that the Cairo Retreat was held from 29 to 31 October 2018. The retreat was held in pursuit of the decision of the AU Assembly on the Reform of the AU, particularly the dimension of the reform that concerned the PSC. In this respect, the Assembly directed that ‘the Peace and Security Council (PSC) should be reformed to ensure that it meets the ambition foreseen in its Protocol, by strengthening its working methods and its role in conflict prevention and crisis management’. It was as a follow up of its meeting of 25 April 2018 during which the PSC deliberated on the issue of the reform that the PSC convened the Cairo retreat. During the April 2018 meeting, the PSC concluded that the specific details of the PSC reform are to be drawn from the conclusions of the various retreats of the PSC on its working methods held between 2007 to 2017 and the PSC related chapters of the APSA study that the PSD conducted – ‘Study on the Implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture from 2002 to 2018’.
The draft conclusions drawn up based on the various presentations and the extensive deliberations during the retreat have four parts. The first part is the introduction highlighting brief background of the retreat and summarizing the inputs that served as basis for the deliberations. During the retreat in Cairo the PSC received presentations on ‘a) African Peace and Security Architecture, b) the African Governance Architecture, c) consolidation and enhancement of the working methods of the Peace and Security Council: Rationalization and streamlining, and d) reform of the PSC within the context of the implementation of the AU Assembly decision 635 (Assembly/AU/Dec.635 (XXVIII) on the AU Institutional Reforms’.
The second part of the conclusions present the ‘Achievements of the Peace and Security Council’ since its operationalization in 2004. In this regard, apart from noting its operationalization as well-organized and better prepared AU Organ, in terms of implementation of its mandate the PSC highlighted, among its achievements, the ‘deployment of the various peace support operations and missions in some areas of the Continent affected by conflicts… AMISOM, AMIS, AFISMA, MISCA, LRA, MNJTF,G5 Sahel’ and ‘Seizure and consideration of important thematic issues of relevance to the promotion of peace, security, and stability, as well as development, in Africa.’ In terms of organization of its work, the conclusions highlighted ‘[e]laboration of detailed and predictable provisional monthly programmes of work and the Indicative Annual Programme of Work of the PSC’, ‘[s]treamlining and strengthening the role and work of the African members of the UN Security Council’ and Mobilizing within the AU system for a predictable and sustainable budget for the activities of the PSC and its subsidiary bodies.’
The third part covers ‘[r]ecommendations on enhancing the effectiveness of the Peace and Security Council’. It is this part of the conclusions that identified the areas for the reform of the PSC. At a general level, it is important to note that the retreat ‘stressed the continued relevance of the PSC Protocol to address the evolving challenges and threats to peace and security in the Continent’ and rightly ‘agreed that there is no need to review the PSC Protocol, but to focus on strengthening the PSC in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as enhancing its working methods’.
In terms of conflict prevention, the retreat conclusions identified thirteen (13) areas. The major areas for action include ‘[s]trengthening coordination between the PSC and all the supporting APSA and AGA pillars’, ‘[e]stablishing a trigger mechanism and indicators to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls for an early action by the PSC. In this context, the Commission should elaborate the mechanism and indicators for consideration by the PSC. (within the context of operationalization of the CEWS)’ and the ‘need for regular meetings/briefings between the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Commissioner for Peace and Security on peace and security matters in Africa, in line with Article 10 of the PSC Protocol.’
On crisis management, eight (8) areas have been identified. Of these the ones that are of particular significance include, ‘full operationalization of the ASF and its Rapid Deployment Capability, ‘[a]ccelerating the establishment of the institutional and regulatory infrastructure of the AU Peace Fund’, and ‘[e]mpowering the PSC for it to be able to institute individual punitive measures against peace spoiler/obstructionist to realization/restoration of peace in conflict situations’ (i.e. to impose sanctions).
The conclusions identified 15 areas for improvement on its working methods. The major areas worth noting include the ‘imperative for PSC Members to deploy the adequate capacity in terms of Human Resources and equipment, to ensure full and effective participation in the work of the PSC’, ‘[i]mperative for provision for all necessary information on a given conflict/crisis to enable the PSC to take informed decision. To this effect, the PSC agreed to accord itself adequate time to discuss issues on its agenda’, the ‘[n]eed to mainstream voting in the decision-making of the PSC, where and when issues under consideration so necessitate,’ and to ensure that the ‘national interest of the Chairperson of the PSC of the month’ does not ‘interfere or undermine the collective work of the PSC’.
While some of the areas identified in the conclusions have been taken over by developments since the retreat most notably the convening of the PSC meeting with the RECs/RMs policy organs to discuss and agree on modalities for coordination of peace efforts and the elaboration of a manual on PSC working methods based on the outcome documents of the 10 retreats the PSC held since 2007, it would be of interest for PSC members how other aspects of the conclusions particularly those relating to conflict prevention and crisis management would be followed up. From the areas of reform on working methods identified during the Cairo retreat, those requiring further follow up include the decision-making approach of the PSC particularly the introduction of voting, the adoption of a framework for a sanctions regime and modalities for coordination between the PSC and UN Security Council (UNSC) including the African three non-permanent members of the UNSC (A3).
It is not expected that there would be a formal outcome document by way of a communique or press statement. The adoption of the conclusions of the retreat may however lead to the incorporation into the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC that was finalized and adopted at the Rabat retreat of the PSC held on 24-26 June 2019.
State of foreign military presence in Africa
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 14 August, 2019
Tomorrow (14 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session to assess the state of foreign military presence in Africa and its implications on the implementation of African Common Defense and Security Policy.
The AU Peace and Security Department is expected to brief the Council. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) is also best placed to provide further inputs.
In recent years increasing concerns have been expressed over the surge in the establishment of foreign military presence in various parts of the continent. In its communique of its 776th session held in May 2018, the PSC expressed deep concern ‘over the potential negative effects of the presence of foreign military bases in some volatile parts of the continent to the future security and stability of Africa’.
The 19th meeting of the Panel of the Wise in November 2018 went further. It not only reiterated the concern about the ‘increasing militarization of parts of the continent, in particular the Sahel and the Horn of Africa regions’ but importantly ‘the increase in uncoordinated external interventions which undermines the efficacy of African‐led solutions to violent conflicts on the continent.’ In this respect, the Panel underscored that considerable attention should be devoted to understanding the dynamics of external involvement on the continent’s security landscape.
The trend in the militarization of parts of the continent is backed by data. Over the past three decades, the continent has witnessed the heavy military presence of multiple regional and international security actors. Particularly in the Horn of Africa region, the number of actors with military presence from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia has increased exponentially. Moreover, the increased volatility and complex security challenges in the Sahel and West Africa regions have also led to the expanded role of foreign security actors.
France has had a military presence in Djibouti since the late 1800. After Djibouti achieved independence in 1977, France retained several military facilities. In recent decades, in the Horn region, foreign military presence was first established for purposes of countering violent extremism and terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 11 September 2001. Since 2001, the Government of Djibouti leased Camp Lemonnier to the USA and ever since the US has made continuous investment to transform it into a permanent facility. Similarly, the US has also established presence in other countries in the Horn for its operation against al‐Shabab. Surveillance sites in South Sudan, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo have also been established aiming, among others, at capturing Joseph Kony.
China’s first major security step in relation to military presence in Africa came in 2008 when it launched an anti‐piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. China has since maintained a permanent naval anti‐piracy presence in the Horn of Africa region and recently it launched its 32nd convoy fleet to the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters. In a landmark development, China established a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) base in Djibouti in August 2017. While presented as a logistics support base and aiming at supporting China’s peacekeeping operations in Africa and its participation in the fight of international piracy off the coast of Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, the facility has been instrumental in the protection of China’s growing overseas assets and represents China’s plan to project power.
The UK similarly has deployed a number of military personnel at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, for a closer cooperation with the US forces in the region.
Increased presence from emerging actors particularly the Gulf States has witnessed sharp increase starting from 2015‐2016. Saudi Arabia has significantly increased its presence in the region, particularly following the civil war in Yemen and has maintained a significant naval presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. After strained relationship with Djibouti, the UAE has directed its ties to Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland.
The UAE has also targeted Somaliland by working on the military base in Berbera to strengthen its military capacity in the conflict in Yemen while also providing security for Somaliland’s coastal waters and coastline. Turkey has also opened a military training centre in Mogadishu in 2017 to train recruits for the Somali National Army.
Russia has become the latest power to emerge on the African security scene. In 2018, it has established presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) to equip and advise the CAR military. In apparent indication of long‐term presence, Bangui and Moscow signed a military cooperation pact.
The rivalry and competition among foreign powers has worsened already volatile security situation in the continent. In addition to the GCC crisis, the perceived rivalry between the US and China has further intensified the military presence. The US Africa Strategy has openly stated its intention of countering China and Russia’s influence in the continent.
These competing military engagements particularly among global powers will have a number of implications for the implementation of the African Common Defense and Security Policy.
One of the principal objectives of the policy is ‘to ensure collective responses to both internal and external threats to Africa… in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act’. The current security landscape and involvement of foreign power complicate the establishment of any collective security response by African states.
While there is recognition that individual member states have the sovereign prerogative for allowing their territories to be used by foreign militaries, there remain concerns about the extent to which such military presence is channeled for enhancing the collective security of the continent. Some of the bilateral engagements of member states are seen as being not fully coherent with existing continental commitments and mechanisms established by the AU. Rather there is seems to be fragmentation and ad‐hoc engagement with foreign powers, leading to fragmentation of the engagement of AU member states. Moreover, there is also a tendency of building closer ties with foreign power than with neighboring states in the security front. It is feared that this tends to fuel tension among neighboring countries.
IGAD during its 46th ministerial meeting cognizant of the changing geopolitics in the region, adopted ‘a collective approach to challenges in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by strengthening regional cooperation, and establish a regional platform for IGAD Member States with a view to promote dialogue’ and agreed ‘to harmonize and develop a common position to protect the security and economic interests of the region’.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may take note of the increased level of unregulated presence of foreign militaries in Africa and destabilizing effects of antagonism and rivalry among powers on the peace and security of the continent. The PSC may urge member state for their immediate action in considering the continental and regional standards, particularly the Common African Defense and Security Policy, when engaging foreign security actors. The PSC may call on member states to work towards common security and intensify regional cooperation to effectively respond to any threat emanating from foreign power competition. As part of the effort to limit the pitfalls of foreign military presence, the PSC may task the AU Commission to present to it a report on the scope of foreign military presence, its adverse impacts and ways and means by which member states may coordinate with the AU on the role of foreign militaries in their territories.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Financing and other Broader Concerns
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.