Fight against terrorism and violent extremism

Fight against terrorism and violent extremism

Date | 22 February 2024

Tomorrow (23 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1202nd session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is also expected to make a presentation.

The AU Commission Chairperson’s report on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism was last considered by the PSC at its 1182nd session held on 27 October 2023. One of the concerning trends identified in this report was the alarming geographical spread of terrorism in the continent, particularly in the Sahel region and the growing risk of expansion to the coastal sates of west Africa.  The latest report of the Chairperson to be considered by the PSC tomorrow is expected to demonstrate the continuing increase both in incidences and geographic spread of terrorism in Africa.

Heading into 2024, the threat of terrorism and violent extremism is predicted to remain one of the most pressing peace and security concerns the continent will continue to grapple with. By the end of 2023, ACSRT’s database indicated 99% increase in the number of terrorist attacks and 53% in the number of terrorist related deaths noted in the period from January to December 2023, as compared to the previous year of 2022. The database further registered 8 terrorist attacks and 43 terrorism-related deaths per day, for the same period.

Aside from the geographic spread and growing prevalence of terrorist activities, what makes the threat even more concerning is the increasing complexity it involves associated with geo-politics, involvement of external actors and local dynamics of countries affected by terrorism. As may be observed in the Chairperson’s report, there is a noted intersect between terrorist groups, some of whom are affiliated with global radical religious movements, and local militia groups engaged in armed conflict with member states. This intersection between terrorist groups and local conflict dynamics manifests in either one of two ways – a collaboration between terrorist groups and local militias, or contestations between the two actors for resources and control over territories. Needless to say, both of these dynamics entail serious challenges. In those cases where states, in their fight against terrorists, resort to the use of militias to effectively take advantage of their knowledge of local terrain and their understanding of cultural contexts, issues associated with human rights abuse and violations have also proven to become widespread.

Another important trend worth noting is the increasing shift in the perpetration of terrorist attacks, from civilians to military personnel and equipment. While civilians still continue to be the predominant primary victims of terrorist attacks in the continent, terrorist groups seem to be gradually demonstrating their capabilities to successfully orchestrate attacks against state security apparatus. According to data recorded by the ACSRT for the period from January to December 2023, ‘out of 2,952 terrorist attacks, 1,597 were against civilian targets, 1,218 were against military/security targets and installations, 89 were against International Organizations and deployments, and 48 were against Government Officials, Institutions, and Infrastructure’.

In terms of regional concentration of terrorist attacks and activities, the Sahel region continues to dominate, taking up 35% of the total attacks recorded in the course of 2023. Jihadist groups including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are the main terrorist sects that are currently active in this region. With Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the three states in the region most affected by the scourge of terrorism, currently undergoing complex political transitions and faced with serious governance crisis, the conditions are tilted in favour of these terrorist groups to further intensify their insurgency and meet their objectives of expanding their operations into coastal west African countries. Amid withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from Mali and the decision made by transition authorities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) – opting to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as an architecture of collective defence and mutual assistance mechanism – the region is experiencing major shifts and uncertainties that create a fertile environment for terrorist actors to strengthen their positions. This is further complicated by geopolitical contestations and involvement of foreign actors in the region.

The issue for the AU and the PSC in the face of such challenging dynamics is how to prioritize and enhance support and engagement in the effort to contain and ultimately overcome the terrorism menace in the central Sahelian states without being restrained by the post-coup complex transition that the countries are going through.

Following the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Lake Chad basin and the Great Lakes Region respectively registered significant increase in violent incidents related to terrorist actors. In the Horn of Africa, one of the critical developments has been the strengthening of attacks by Al-Shabaab against military and security personnel. With the deadline for final withdrawal of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) fast approaching and little indication of full readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to take on complete security responsibilities, the intensification of Al-Shabaab’s activities as demonstrated through some of its more recent attacks against local administrations and protected locations in the capital city, Mogadishu, is definitely a worrying sign.

In the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP and Boko Haram continue their insurgencies targeting particularly the north-eastern parts of Nigeria and the north of Cameroon. Trends of power struggle between these two main terrorist groups has been one of the concerning developments in the region which may interest the PSC to reflect on with an emphasis on the kind of impact such insurgent infighting will have on the already dire security situation.

The Great Lakes Region also continues to experience a spike in incidents associated with terrorist actors, mainly the Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF)/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which has allegiance to Daesh/ISIS. Majority of the terrorist attacks recorded in the region took place in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) although Uganda also experienced some attacks. According to data registered by the ACSRT, DRC accounts for the majority of the total terrorism related civilian deaths in the continent and has the highest number of civilian casualties recorded in a single country.

In addition to these region-specific trends, the PSC may also take note of the emerging concern related to the use of technological advancements for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups in the continent increasingly use technologic advancements in at least three ways. The first one of these is the use of new technologies such as cryptocurrencies to finance their activities in a manner that avoids the risk of being tracked by law enforcement. The use of cyberspace such as ‘Dark Web’ for conducting transactions including trade of drugs and weapons as well as human trafficking is another way through which terrorist groups make use of technology to fund their operations. The second use of technology for terrorist actors is the ease it creates for the dissemination of their ideology and propaganda. This enables recruitment of members and coordination of activities with speed and in an untraceable manner. Lastly, terrorist actors in the continent are increasingly using technologies such as AI and Drones for purposes of surveillance and spying. Further to infiltrating state positions, the use of Drones by terrorist groups for carrying out attacks is also an impending concern.

Despite the deployment of counter-terrorism efforts at the national and regional levels across the continent, the threat not only continues to persist but evidently intensifies over time. In addition to fortifying collaborations centred around the cross-boundary and transnational nature of the threat, it is also critical to re-examine the predominantly hard-security natured response deployed to eliminate the threat of terrorism in Africa.

In this respect, aside from receiving updates regarding counter-terrorism operations in the continent, the PSC may also reflect on bolstering the deployment and expanded use of non-military response approaches beyond the existing hard-security measures. It is expected that tomorrow’s session in this respect would build on earlier sessions to put emphasis on support for expansion of local governance structures and delivery of basic public and social services, the provision of livelihood support and humanitarian assistance and the design and implementation of development programs tailored to the conditions of areas affected by and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Not any less important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation as vehicle for both facilitating the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters and achieving political settlement of the conflict dynamics that made the emergence of such groups possible.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the continuing increase in the spread of terrorism in the continent. Noting and commending the AU Commission and the ACSRT for the ongoing efforts to support member states in their counter-terrorism efforts including through capacity-building activities, the PSC may urge member states to allocate adequate resources for the development and implementation of strategies for counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. Emphasising the major contribution of governance crisis to fuelling the threat of terrorism in Africa, the PSC may also call on member states to work towards addressing governance issues that serve as underlying root causes. The PSC may call on the ACSRT to work closely with the AUDA/NEPAD and the relevant development and infrastructure departments of the AU as well as the AU PCRD Centre for promoting the design and implementation of non-security interventions as critical measures for expanding state authority. It may also reiterate its endorsement of the use of negotiation and reconciliation processes as the means for the final settlement of conflicts involving terrorist groups. In this respect, the PSC  may request the AU Commission to develop guidelines on the use of negotiations, reconciliation and mediation for settling conflicts involving terrorist groups drawing on avenues for such possibilities from countries affected by terrorism. Having regard to the transnational nature of terrorism, the PSC may further underscore the importance of enhanced collaboration and coordination between member states as well as with Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), including through the deployment of joint operations. Taking into account the growing use of technologies for supporting and perpetrating terrorist activities, the PSC may highlight the need for undertaking a study on the effect of technological advancements on the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.


Discussion on the issue of Private Military and Defence Companies (PMDC) operating in Africa and briefing on the status of the review of the OAU/AU Convention on Mercenaries in Africa

Discussion on the issue of Private Military and Defence Companies (PMDC) operating in Africa and briefing on the status of the review of the OAU/AU Convention on Mercenaries in Africa

Date | 30 November 2023

Tomorrow (1 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1189th session at an ambassadorial level to discuss two agenda items. The first agenda item will focus on the issue of Private Military and Defence Companies (PMDC) operating in Africa and provide a briefing on the status of the review of the OAU/AU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa. The second agenda item will be dedicated to the briefing on the outcome of the 2023 Luanda Biennale.

Following the opening statement by Jainaba Jagne, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of The Gambia and Chairperson of the PSC for December and the Commissioner of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a briefing on the status of the revision of the OAU/AU Convention on Mercenaries in Africa.

The presence of Military and Defence Companies (PMDCs) and mercenaries, in Africa is not a recent occurrence. Historically, the nature and involvement of PMDCs and mercenaries in African countries have manifested in different ways, and taken on various forms in regard to their impact on the peace and security situation of the continent. It is not the first time for the PSC to discuss this subject. In its Communique of the 1159th session, the PSC expressed its concern regarding the surge of mercenaries and foreign fighters in Africa. Nonetheless, the topic of PMSCs and mercenaries has yet to be addressed as a distinct agenda item by the PSC.

The session tomorrow marks the first time the PSC will engage in a dedicated discussion on this matter. Despite not being discussed as a standalone agenda item, the involvement of PMSCs as well as mercenaries as potential exacerbators of conflict has been acknowledged by the PSC in the contexts of Libya, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d’Ivoire. In recent years, the involvement of PMDCs and mercenaries in these countries received particular attention.

According to the report of the Panel of Experts on Libya that was released in March 2021, it was alleged that the Russian Wagner Group, three United Arab Emirates Companies, and the Turkey SADAT International Defence Consultancy were involved in the conflict in Libya. Additionally, there are also other PMDCs, including South Africa’s Dyck Advisory Group as well as France’s Secopex that have been employed to fight Al-Shabaab militants in Mozambique and operated in Libya previously.

As the spread of PMDCs across the continent continues, it is believed that France’s Secopex is operating in CAR and Somalia and Russia’s Wagner presence is also not limited to Libya. Wagner has expanded its operations across the continent, including in CAR, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan and Sudan. In June 2023, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, officially confirmed that Wagner is working in CAR and Mali, with plans for continued collaboration. While Lavrov stated that Wagner members are serving as instructors in these countries, there are allegations of their involvement in nefarious activities. However, this issue extends beyond the Wagner Group. Allegations were also made on the South Africa PMDC, Dyck Advisory Group of the killing of civilians in Mozambique.

On the other hand, China’s PMDCs have a distinct focus on safeguarding Chinese investments in areas such as mines, transportation corridors, and natural gas projects. Unlike other PMDCs, Chinese PMDCs are established, trained, equipped, and employed directly by the state. However, with regard to their existence in Africa, as a result of the expanding Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects across the continent, their presence have also increased. They are reported to be found in a number of East African and Southern African countries. It is worth noting that the employment of PMDCs for investment protection purposes is not limited to China and is indeed not uncommon among companies in the extractive industries sector.

The PSC is also expected to discuss the issue in relation to thematic topics such as terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government. The concern of PMDCs may be further examined in the context of the worsening terrorism and violent extremism on the continent, which is exacerbated by the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), PMDCs, and mercenaries. In this regard, some argue that the United States’ drone legions operated by PMDCs in the Sahel and Central Africa have adverse consequences, potentially generating more terrorists than those they eliminate at the local, national, and global levels.

In the context of lack of multilateral security support and the ensuing security vacuum, there is also an emerging trend of fragile and conflict-affected countries relying on PMDCs in the face of mounting security threats facing them. Following the coup in Niger in July 2023, the military leaders sought support from Wagner out of fear of potential military intervention by ECOWAS. This shift and tendency to rely on PMDCs not only reflects on the failure of countries to build effective security systems and fragile regimes’ attempts to fend off against real or perceived threats. But it also reflects the inadequacy or failure of regional/AU as well as multilateral security support measures.

The apparent increase in the role or influence of PMDCs in a context where national authorities lack the legislative and regulatory tools for enforcing applicable standards against such bodies presents a plethora of both human and state security challenges. From a human security perspective, there are credible allegations of PMDCs engaging in human rights violations in an environment of impunity. From a state security perspective, there is a risk of these profit motivated entities being susceptible to being bought by anyone for orchestrating influence, domination and even unconstitutional change of government in the country they are deployed in. Recognizing this during the PSC discussions on the situation in Niger (1168th session) and Gabon (1172nd Session), the Council has expressed its rejection of the involvement of any foreign actors in the peace and security affairs of the continent ‘including engagements by private military companies (PMCs)’. This rejection was made in line with the OAU/AU Convention on Mercenaries in Africa. In light of the overall risk that arises from the deployment of PMDCs including their potential subversive use, the PSC may consider proposing that the review of the 1977 OAU/AU Convention on mercenaries should establish a regional framework for providing continental guarantee to member states when they opt for enlisting the support of PMDCs in legitimately defined circumstances. This will also ensure that the engagement of PMDCs is effectively regulated at continental levels and subject to the application of multilateral norms of the AU.

The Convention on mercenaries was adopted in Libreville on 3 July 1977. Although four decades have passed since its adoption, as of 30 November 2023, only thirty-two African Member States have ratified the Convention. However, due to the dynamic changes in the continent’s security situation, the emergence of various PMDCs, poriferous borders that facilitate the influx of foreign fighters, and the presence of non-state armed groups, it has become necessary to revise the convention to address current challenges. In line with this, the AU Commission was directed to revise the Convention by the 12th Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) held in Cairo, Egypt, through the declaration adopted on 19 December 2019. The AU Assembly later endorsed the direction given by the STCDSS in its decision [Assembly/AU//Dec.754(XXXIII)], which was adopted during its 33rd Ordinary Session that was held in February 2020. Additionally, the Assembly requested the Commission to speed up the conclusion of the revision of the Convention during its 16th Extraordinary Session in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.

In order to implement the decision of the Assembly, the AU Commission, specifically the Governance and Conflict Prevention Directorate of PAPS, engaged consultants to review and revise the OAU Convention on Mercenaries. The main objective was to develop a revised draft of the Convention that focuses on eliminating mercenaries in Africa taking account of the changing security dynamics on the continent, which would then be reviewed by AU policy organs.

The revision process involved various tasks, such as identifying the strengths and shortcomings of the Convention, making recommendations to address current security challenges related to mercenaries as well as PMDCs, examining the connection between weak border management and the facilitation of mercenary movement, investigating potential links between terrorism, foreign fighters, illegal exploitation of natural resources, and acts of terrorism, and identifying areas of alignment between other AU instruments and policies.

To facilitate this revision process, consultative meetings were organized, bringing together the relevant AU organs to consider and strengthen the initial draft of the revised Convention. Therefore, as one of the Policy Organs of the AU, the PSC is expected to consider the status of the revision of the Convention and make suggestions in line with the various considerations that were made in developing the revised Convention.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the growing number of Private Military and Defence Companies and their impact on the peace and stability of the continent. The PSC is also expected to express concern over the unregulated use of PMDC as an alternative military force across various member states and the associated risk of these entities being used for interfering in the internal affairs of AU member states. In this regard, the PSC may retreat its rejection of any external interference by any actor or any country outside the Continent in the peace and security affairs in Africa including through the use of private military companies in the continent in line with the 1977 OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa. The PSC may request the AU Commission to prepare a report on the various adverse impacts of the use of PMDCs in Africa including in terms of the standards and commitments contained in the AU Solemn Declaration on Common African Defence and Security Policy with recommendations on how best to address the risks and threats posed by this development for submission to the PSC. The Council may request for the submission of the revised OAU/AU Convention on Mercenaries in Africa to the Executive Council through the 16th Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security, subsequently to the AU Assembly for validation and endorsement. The PSC may propose that the review of the 1977 OAU/AU Convention on mercenaries should establish a regional framework for providing continental guarantee to member states when they opt for enlisting the support of PMDCs in legitimately defined circumstances. This will also ensure that the engagement of PMDCs is effectively regulated at continental levels and subject to the application of multilateral norms of the AU.

Briefing on the Outcome of the 2023 Luanda Biennale

The second agenda item of tomorrow’s session is dedicated to a briefing on the third edition of the Luanda Biennale. The representative of the Republic of Angola is expected to deliver a briefing.

The Luanda Biennale, also known as the Pan-African Forum for the Culture of Peace, is a biennial event that takes place in Luanda, Angola. It is part of the implementation of the “Plan of Action for a Culture of Peace in Africa/Make Peace Happen,” which was adopted in March 2013 in Luanda. The main objective of the Luanda Biennale is to facilitate knowledge exchange and dialogue on promoting a culture of peace and engaging in intergenerational conversations as effective methods of preventing violence and resolving conflicts. In this session, the PSC is expected to receive a summary of this year’s forum, which was held from November 22nd to 24th, 2023, with a focus on the theme “Education, Culture of Peace, and African Citizenship as instruments for the sustainable development of the continent.”


Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Countering Terrorism in Africa and Related Issues

Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Countering Terrorism in Africa and Related Issues

Date | 26 October 2023

Tomorrow (27 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC)  convene its 1182nd session at ambassadorial level to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on counter terrorism.

Following the opening statement by Daniel Owassa, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the Commissioner of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver remarks.  Additionally, Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Research and Study on Terrorism, is expected to give a presentation.

The report of the Chairperson aligns with the decision made by the Assembly (/AU/Dec.311 (XV)) during its 15th Ordinary Session in July 2010. The Assembly requested the Commission to provide regular reports on the progress of counterterrorism efforts and cooperation in Africa. Furthermore, the PSC, in its 249th session in November 2010, urged the AU Commission to submit reports and briefings on the state of terrorism in Africa, as well as the efforts of the AU, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and member States to combat this issue. It is worth noting that the Malabo Summit on Terrorism, held in May 2022, marked the fourth occasion where the issue of terrorism was discussed at the level of Heads of State and Government. This is not surprising considering that conflicts involving terrorist groups continues to grow from strength to strength.

As pointed out in our various research outputs including our landmark special research report, Africa has experienced major spike in not only the proliferation of conflicts involving terrorist groups but also in their impact and geographic spread. According to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Africa witnessed a staggering 400% increase in attacks and a 237% rise in deaths between 2012 and 2020. The 2023 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) further reveals that despite a slight decrease in terror attacks from 1,445 in 2021 to 1,332 in 2022, there was an 8% surge in deaths in 2022, making Africa the region with the highest increase in terrorism-related fatalities. Additionally, the ACSRT’s quarterly terrorism bulletin) reported a 12% increase in terrorism attacks during the first quarter (January – March) of 2023 compared to the same period in 2022 with 426 recorded attacks and 2,809 deaths. The ACSRT report indicates that  the attacks 226 targeted civilians and 160 targeted military forces.

The report also highlights the alarming geographical spread of terrorism, particularly in the Sahel and the West African coastal states, making the Sahel region the epicentre of terrorism in the world. As indicated in the 2023 GTI report, ‘four out of the ten most impacted countries by terrorism in 2022 were located in the Sahel region’. While Burkina Faso had the highest number of deaths in 2022, the areas near its borders with Niger, Benin, and Mali witnessed the majority of terror attacks, ‘accounting for 71% of all attacks that occurred in 2022’. The border area known as Liptako-Gourma, located between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, continues to be the most severely affected region.

Additionally, there is also encroachment of terrorism into coastal West African states from the Sahel affecting Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Ghana.

For instance, in Togo, a violent terrorist attack was carried out on 11 May, 2023 by around 60 attackers at a military outpost in Kpinkankandi, near the border with Burkina Faso. It was reported that this attack resulted in the death of eight Togolese soldiers and left 13 others injured. The GTI report further indicates that 17 attacks and 44 deaths occurred in Benin and Togo in 2022. In Ghana, the government expressed concern that an escalation of violence could benefit jihadist groups after ‘criminals’ attempted to bomb a bridge in Bawku, a northern region of Ghana bordering Burkina Faso on 9 February 2023.

Similarly, Boko Haram and its faction the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) have also expanded their activities to Southern Nigeria and neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The groups’ actions have resulted in the displacement of millions of people and a humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region. In East Africa, al-Shabaab’s operations along the Kenya-Somalia border have been reported to have significantly increased starting from June this year. Recently, on 10 September Kenyan Defence Forces’ Soldiers patrolling along Milimani-Baure Road were killed and injured during a suspected al-Shabaab attack in Lamu County’s Boni Forest.

When it comes to Central Africa, there has been a significant rise in the overall number of attacks due to the activities of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in the Great Lakes Region. In the South, the ACSTR recorded 31 attacks by  Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), the terrorist group operating in Mozambique.

The other issues that the Chairperson’s report may also highlight is the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and those returning after joining the ISIS in places such as Syria.

Given the rise in the frequency and geographical spread of terrorism, it has become clear that the overreliance on hard security response measures is not delivering the expected outcomes. If anything, it has exacerbated the situation through its adverse impacts including abuses and collateral damages it inflicts on affected communities. This necessitates that the policy repones achieves a shift towards enhancing and focusing on the use of non-security measures targeting the governance, institutional, socio-economic, environmental and development issues that create the conditions for the emergence and expansion of conflicts involving terrorist groups.

It would also be of interest in PSC’s consideration of the Chairperson’s report to discuss the  impact of the constitutional crisis ensuing from military coups particularly in the Sahel on efforts for containing the growing threat of terrorism in the region. The Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S), a subregional arrangement initially composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, is gradually losing its strength as a result of member states’ withdrawal. In May 2022, Mali decided to withdraw from the G5 Sahel, including the FC-G5S, due to disagreements among the regional group members regarding the transitional authorities in Mali assuming the rotating presidency of the organization. This withdrawal has caused a profound institutional crisis within the subregional organization, as stated by Eric Tiaré, the Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel, in his address to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since then, coup d’états have taken place in Burkina Faso and Niger, leading to an alliance between the de facto leaders of Mali and Niger as well as the interim president of Burkina Faso.

On the other side, another development worthy of interest to this session is the signing of a charter that established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on 16 September. In his press statement, Abdoulaye Diop, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasized that the main focus of the alliance ‘…is the fight against terrorism in the three countries.’

As in the past, one other issue that has increasingly received attention in the Chairperson’s recent reports is the relationship between terrorism and transnational organized criminal networks. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are known for taking advantage of such networks including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members. In areas with predominantly informal economies, limited state resources and presence, and pervasive corruption, terrorist groups find it easy to levying taxes with little opposition from locals. This is particularly observed in territories experiencing the insurgence of JNIM and ISWAP.

The consideration of the Chairperson’s report is also expected to also deliberate on how terrorist groups operating in Africa are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilize support, recruit and carry out their attacks. Organizations such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have adapted to the digital era by utilizing a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organize their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP for instance has increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). Attention should also be paid to the risk of such actors employing cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks. Additionally, it is important to address the significant reliance of these groups on small arms and light weapons.

Tomorrow’s session would also serve as an opportunity for reviewing the efforts made by the AU, its Member States, and RECs/RMs to contain the spread of and enhance concerted efforts in the face of the transnational and transregional character of the threat. As it did last time, the Chairperson’s report further emphasizes that the predominant responses have been of a military nature, and ongoing attacks have resulted in increased militarization of states’ reactions. However, it is crucial to devote more attention to comprehending the less evident covert activities, such as the collaboration between terrorists, violent extremists, and illicit actors in recruiting and mobilizing resources. In this respect, the report calls for renewed efforts and provides a list of preventive measures.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the surge in the influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) into Africa and its implications for the peace and security of the continent. Towards strengthening continental mechanisms to counter terrorism, the PSC may recall Decisions, particularly [Assembly/AU/Dec.753.XXXIII] of February 2020, and Assembly/AU/Dec.815(XXXV) of February 2022, on the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Unit within the African Standby Force (ASF). The PSC may also request member states to enhance the implementation of applicable AU instruments and Decisions, specifically the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the 50th OAU/AU Anniversary Solemn Declaration. Furthermore, the PSC is expected to stress the need for efforts to combat transnational organized crime, especially the proliferation of illicit arms, including through enhanced intelligence sharing mechanisms, border management cooperation, and control. The PSC may also reiterate its previous decision on the need to address the root causes of terrorism, including poverty and marginalization, the weak or absence of presence of the state and legitimate local governance infrastructures, which create the conditions for a breeding ground for terrorism. The PSC is also expected to emphasize the need for increased support for those affected by armed conflict, including children, youth, and women impacted by terrorism, radicalization, and insurgency. Additionally, the PSC may recognize the need to collaborate with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and AU Organs to build community resilience and promote long-term recovery through post-conflict reconstruction and development programs. Drawing on the recommendation of the report of the Chairperson, the Council may also highlight the need to mainstream counterterrorism and prevention/countering of violent extremism in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).


Updated Briefing on the development of the Common African Position on cyber security in Africa

Updated Briefing on the Development of the Common African Position on Cyber Security in Africa; Presentation of the Draft ToR of the PSC Sub Committee on Sanctions; Draft ToR of Ministerial Committee on Terrorism; and Draft Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council

Date | 23 August 2023

Tomorrow (24 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1170th Session. This session will cover a range of important topics, including a briefing on the development of the Common African Position (CAP) on cybersecurity in Africa, the presentation of the Draft Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, a Draft ToR of Ministerial Committee on Terrorism and a Draft Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The session is expected to begin with the opening remarks by Willy Nyamitwe, the Permanent Representative of Burundi and Chairperson of PSC for the month of August. This will be followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Dr. Guy Fleury-Ntwari, Legal Counsel of the AU and Director of Legal Affairs and Prof. Mohamed Helal, a member of the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL) and Special Rapporteur on the Prohibition on Intervention in the Internal and External Affairs of States, are also expected to give a presentation. In addition, Tapiwa Masunungure Zimbabwe’s Committee of Experts member, who chaired the retreat of the Committee of Experts that considered the three documents will deliver a presentation.

Tomorrow’s session on the update briefing by AUCIL is a follow-up to the decision of the 1120th session of the PSC and the request in its subsequent 1148th session. During the 1120th session, which was dedicated to the inaugural engagement of the PSC with the AUCIL, the PSC recognized the need for the development of a CAP on the application of international law on cybersecurity. It was the first time the PSC approached the issue of cyberspace for peace and security from the perspective of regulating it with the rules of international law. The session emphasized the importance of cybersecurity and the need for adequate regulation. Additionally, discussions were held on the management and regulation of cyberspace in order to prevent activities that threaten international peace and security, including the emergence of cyber-weapons and the manipulation of cyberspace for political influence.

Most importantly, during the session, the PSC acknowledged the applicability of international law to cyberspace, and called on AU Member States to adopt a CAP and emphasized the need for Africa to actively engage in the process. To this end, the Council tasked the AUCIL, in collaboration with the AU Commission, to organize consultations with relevant stakeholders on the application of international law to cyberspace. In its most recent 1148th session on cybersecurity, the PSC requested ‘the AU Commission on International Law to expeditiously complete, and submit to the Peace and Security Council, the draft statement of a Common African Position on the Application of International Law to Cyberspace.’

In response to PSC’s assignment from its 1120th session, the AUCIL collaborated with the AU Commission and organized  a series of capacity-building training sessions for AU member states. These sessions aimed to equip participants with the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively contribute to the formulation of the CAP regarding the application of international law to cyberspace.

The first session was held online on 29 and 30 March 2023, while the second session took place in Addis Ababa from 12 – 14 June 2023. The third and final part of the capacity-building program took place in New York from 19 – 21 July 2023. The program was attended by experts representing AU Member States who are responsible for following multilateral processes. The third session of the training aimed to strengthen the capacities of AU Member States in cyberspace and international law in order to empower them in multilateral processes like the Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity and the UN General Assembly’s 6th Committee. It also aimed to assist in the process of reviewing and enriching the draft CAP statement.

It is therefore expected that the PSC will receive a progress report and a presentation on the CAP statement in tomorrow’s session. It may be of interest for members of the PSC to know whether the draft statement identifying the rules of international law applicable to cyberspace being presented to the PSC was considered and reflected upon by the AUCIL and updated based on such reflection and whether it covers rules on responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The PSC may also consider whether the statement would benefit from consideration and input of the AU Special and Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs for it to receive strong support and ownership on the part of Member States and the AU broadly. The PSC may also consider how the statement can help in informing the development of a regional legal framework and strategy for promoting the rules of international law governing cyberspace for addressing threats to peace and security arising from cyberspace.

Also worth mentioning for the PSC is whether and how the draft statement took account of and built on the various decisions of the PSC relating to cyberspace and peace and security. Although the PSC has not regularized the decision of its 850th session dedicating a session on this theme on an annual basis, it has since then convened a number of sessions highlighting its increasing engagement and concern about the peace & security implications of cyberspace. Of direct relevance for tomorrow’s session, among other critical points, the 1097th session drew attention to the need for enactment of necessary legislations and regulations at national, regional and continental levels to govern issues related to cyberspace. Most recently, the PSC considered the issue of cybersecurity during its 1148th session last April under Tunisia’s Chairship of the PSC. As the PSC pointed out, its focus on this subject is informed by ‘the growing threat to peace, security and stability in the Continent emanating from the increasing cyber-attacks, malicious use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and incidents of unethical and hostile cyber-activities undertaken by both, state and non-state actors, including the targeting of government institutions and public infrastructure; the spread of misinformation and disinformation, subversive activities and interferences with national government processes, as well as the promotion of ideologies of hate and hate speech.’

In addition to the CAP statement on cybersecurity, the PSC is expected to receive a presentation on three documents. It is to be recalled that these documents were finalized during the Committee of Experts (CoE)’s retreat that was held from 18 – 22 May 2023.

One such document is the draft TOR of the PSC Committee on Sanctions. During the Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs), which was convened in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana, one of the recommendations was to reactivate the PSC Sanctions Committee. Subsequently, the PSC held a session on sanctions and enforcement capacities in the deterrence against UCGs and called for the full operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee and the development of the requisite technical capacities to ensure its effectiveness. During this 1100th session, the Council also instructed the CoE to develop the ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. It is important to note that the CoE was initially established in 2009 by the PSC’s 178th session communique, but it has never been operational. During the CoE retreat in May, the CoE identified certain issues, such as the composition of the Sub-committee and the level of its chairship that require the guidance of the PSC with respect to the Sanctions Sub-Committee.

The second document is the draft ToR of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism. One of the key outcomes of the 16th Extraordinary Summit of the AU Heads of State and Government on UCGs, which was held in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, was the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism. This committee is meant to coordinate, monitor, evaluate and follow-up on the mechanisms of the implementation of the decisions made during the summit. In this regard, it was expressed in the PSC’s 1107th session communique that the PSC looks forward to the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism. Since the decision of the Malabo Summit was for the AU Commission to prepare the ToR of the Committee, in tomorrow’s meeting the CoE may propose that the draft ToR be referred to the AU Commission for finalization and presentation to the minsters. The ToR is expected to outline the purpose, goals, scope, working arrangement and composition of the ministerial committee.

Lastly, the PSC will consider the draft manual on modalities for enhancing coordination between the PSC and the African members of the UNSC. The development of this manual is in line with the request made by the PSC during its 1056th session that considered the Conclusions of the 8th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa. The session also requested for the manual to be considered and adopted by the 9th Annual High Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa on 18 January 2023. Accordingly, the draft manual was presented to the participants of the Seminar and it was requested to circulate the draft to all AU member states for inputs before submitting it for the consideration of the PSC. Following its update during the CoE meeting last May, the representative of the CoE is expected to propose the adoption of the manual by the PSC during tomorrow’s session.

What is expected following the presentations of these three documents is that the PSC will take the required steps including the adoption of the documents and/or clearing of the documents that may require adoption at a different forum or level.

The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. It is expected that the PSC will reiterate the urgent need for a Common African Position on the application of international law on cyberspace, as well as the need for Africa to actively engage in the process. It is also expected that it will commend the work of the AUCIL in working towards appraising representatives of AU Member States of the latest developments in the field of the rules of international law applicable to cyberspace. It may also emphasize on the importance of capacity building and the need to continue such efforts. The Council may also welcome the draft CAP statement on cyberspace for peace and security. The PSC may recommend that it is presented to relevant AU bodies such as the STC on Justice and Legal Affairs for wider input and build on and reflect the relevant decisions of AU policy organs including those of the PSC. The PSC may request the AU Commission to use the statement in the development of a regional legal framework and strategy for promoting the rules of international law governing cyberspace for addressing threats to peace and security arising from cyberspace.

Additionally, the PSC may welcome the work of the CoE in developing the three documents presented to it. It may also adopt the Terms of Reference of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions with clarification of the issues presented to it for its guidance. The Draft Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council is expected to be adopted by the PSC. The PSC may also refer the Draft ToR of the Ministerial Committee on Terrorism to the AU Commission for its updating and submission for adoption by AU Ministers.


International Day on Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action

International Day on Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action

Date | 3 April 2023

Tomorrow (03 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1146th session in commemoration of international day on mine awareness and assistance in mine action, with a specific focus on impacts on peace and security in Africa.

Following opening remarks by Abdelhamid Elgharbi, Permanent Representative of Tunisia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations (UN) Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may also deliver statements at the session.

The last time the PSC convened a session under the theme ‘mine action in Africa’ was on 01 April 2022, which constituted its 1072nd meeting. The session served to emphasise the importance of developing inclusive approaches in Africa to raise awareness around the risks and dangers of landmines. Having regard to the significance of coordination and collaboration to achieve the aim of eliminating landmines from the continent, the PSC at that session underscored the need to establish a continental mechanism for mine action to coordinate member states’ efforts and requested the AU Commission to finalise the AU Mine Action and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Strategies and submit to the PSC for its consideration. Tomorrow’s meeting presents the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of these and other previous decisions of the PSC.

Although mine action efforts have demonstrated some success over the years in some parts of the continent, there has been alarming increase in the use of landmines and explosive devices in multiple African countries in recent years. In the Central African Republic (CAR) for instance, the threat of explosive devices has shown a worrying rise since 2021. According to data recorded by the UN, the years 2021 and 2022 have demonstrated a significant increase in the use of explosive devices in CAR as compared to 2020. UN’s report indicates that in 2021, 44 incidents involving explosive devices were recoded, resulting in 30 deaths and 48 injuries while in 2022, 54 incidents were recoded which killed 12 people and injured 46. The most recent data recorded as of 10 March 2023 indicates 20 incidents involving explosive devices, which have claimed the lives of 9 people. In April 2022, anti-personnel mines were also discovered in CAR for the first time. Having regard to 2020 when the UN recorded only two incidents of usage of explosive devices in CAR which resulted in no casualties, the figures recorded over the recent years are cause for serious alarm. They indicate increased exposure of civilian population to areas affected by landmines and even ongoing use of landmines in recent years. It would therefore be of interest for PSC members to call for the establishment of the factors behind these worrying trends in the use of landmines in CAR in order to take targeted measures to contain and eventually end this scourge.

Mali is another country that has been experiencing increasing threat of landmines, mainly IEDs. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), significant increase has been noted in the use of IEDs in Mali since 2017 which was initially concentrated in the central parts of the country but gradually continued to expand to other parts, particularly to the country’s western regions. In January 2023, representing one of the more recent incidents of IED explosions in the country, 16 people were killed and 25 were injured in explosions concentrated mainly in the Mopti and Ségou regions. The 2022 Landmine Monitor Report further indicates the use of antivehicle mines in Mali during the 2021-2022 reporting period. Reports from earlier years have also alluded the use of antipersonnel mines in Mali, mainly by non-state armed groups.

One of the most concerning spikes in the use of IEDs is perhaps the one currently being witnessed in Somalia. As part of its change in tactics of insurgency, Al-Shabaab has increased its focus on expanding the use of various forms of IEDs, including vehicle-borne IEDs and remotely detonated ground IEDs. In the period from January to March 2023, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data shows a 120% increase in the use of IEDs and remote explosives by Al-Shabaab in parts of Somalia, as compared to the previous reporting period of October to December 2022. In the first two weeks of March 2023 alone, remote explosions perpetrated by Al-Shabaab reportedly constituted nearly 60% of the total events of violence recorded in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions.

The use of IEDs in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, has been indicative of a more worrying trend – the possible existence of an active regional network enabling the use of external assistance in building capacity for manufacturing IEDs at insurgent bases in the region. Reports have demonstrated that IS sponsored training and financial support in late 2020 could have a direct link with the introduction of IEDs in Cabo Delgado in 2021, the same year the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) considerably increased its use of IEDs in eastern DRC and border territories of Uganda, suggesting the existence of a wider regional network connecting ADF and insurgents operating in northern Mozambique that, among others, facilitates the spread of the explosive devices into Mozambique.

Further to the security risk it imposes, the increasing use of IEDs in these countries is also a serious impediment to the provision of timely and effective humanitarian assistance to populations affected by conflict and crisis. For example, in CAR, not only are the main victims of explosive devises civilians – with nearly three quarters of the victims reported in 2022 and 2023 being civilians – but also the presence of explosives in various parts of the country has been a major deterrent limiting humanitarian access to civilian populations. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 900,000 people targeted for humanitarian assistance in 2023 are at risk of delayed or suspended aid as a result of access constraints emanating from suspected presence of explosive devices in the concerned areas.

The trends observed in these and other conflict settings in Africa signal the increasing utilisation of mines as well as growing sophistication in the means and methods of warfare particularly in terms of use of IEDs deployed by non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations. They also signify the ease with which these actors access the required resources and expertise in the manufacturing of mines, particularly IEDs. There is hence need to devote increased attention to identifying and addressing the underlying factors facilitating access to resources used in the development of explosive devices in concerned member states. Among others, this will require proper regulation of national weapons’ stockpiles to avert smuggling of state-owned explosives and materials that can be used in making new explosive devices. It further calls for the strengthening of inter-state collaboration and coordination to halt cross border trafficking of explosives and to prevent exchange of technical expertise as well as financial assistance in their development.

While drawing attention to the increasing spread of IED usage in the continent is pertinent, it also remains critical to emphasise the continuing significance of ensuring full clearance of antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) through destruction of national stockpiles in line with the 1997 Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, particularly in the context of states in post-conflict phase. According to the 2022 Landmine Monitor Report, five of the seven states parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty that are known or believed to have mine contamination in their territories but have not provided information or recognised their clearance obligations under the treaty, are African countries. A significant number of African member states are also falling behind on their obligations to ensure full landmine clearance by 2025 in line with the 2014 Maputo Action Plan. This signals to the need to strengthen mine action efforts in the continent including through enhanced mobilisation of funds for mine clearance activities at the national, regional and continental level.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the increasing spread of IEDs in Africa and their wide usage among non-state armed actors and terrorist groups. It may call for the AU Commission to work with relevant RECs and UN entities to examine the factors behind this worrying trend and to develop strategies specific to each affected country for addressing this scourge. The PSC may also call for the inclusion and expansion of counter IEDs capabilities in the AU Transition Mission in Somalia and to the support that the AU Mission to Mali and Sahel provides to Mali as well as the mobilization of capabilities for detecting and clearing landmines to the CAR and other countries specifically affected by landmines. It may also call on member states to ensure secure storage of state-owned explosives and enhanced regulation of stockpiles, including complete destruction of antipersonnel landmines. It may further underscore the importance of fortified coordination between member states in combating the cross-border transfer of explosives and in the removal of landmines from border areas. It may note the grave humanitarian cost of explosive devices, including curtailing humanitarian access to populations in need and in that respect, call on all relevant stakeholders to explore alternative approaches including air-based provision of humanitarian assistance while deploying mine action capacities to clear areas affected by mines impeding humanitarian access. The PSC may also call on states parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty to fulfil their obligations under Article 5 relating to the destruction of antipersonnel mines and urge those member states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.  It may further emphasise the importance of enhancing mine action funding to enable member states meet their clearance obligations outlined under Article 5 of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty as well as the Maputo Action Plan.


Briefing on the activities of the AFCONE and CTBTO

Briefing on the activities of the AFCONE and CTBTO

Date | 16 December 2022

Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1127th session to receive briefing on the activities of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of AFCONE and CTBTO are expected to brief the PSC. Representatives of the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may also make statement in the opening segment of the session.

The last time PSC convened to discuss updates regarding the activities of AFCONE and implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) was in March 2022, at its 1071st session. As expressed in the Communiqué of the session, recent developments geopolitical developments indicative of possible use of nuclear weapons have triggered the PSC’s concern over the impact of such developments on peace, security and humanitarian efforts, globally and in Africa in particular. One of the important outcomes of the session was the PSC’s call for joint action between relevant international and regional actors including AFCONE, IAEA, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and CTBTO in undertaking implementation efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Tomorrow’s session is expected to follow up on-going efforts including collaborations among relevant actors towards ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

One area of update the PSC may be briefed on at tomorrow’s session is the discussions of the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which took place from 1 to 26 August 2022, in New York. Although the conference came to an end without the adoption of any concreate outcome document due to Russia’s opposition to the draft tabled by the presidency, the occasion did serve to renew commitments made in the treaty to ‘prevent the spread of nuclear weapons’ and to ‘promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. Representing the AU Commission and AU States Parties to NTP, AFCONE submitted a statement to the Tenth Review Conference of NTP which among other points, emphasised the importance of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) and encouraged the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to ‘prioritize efforts towards ratification of all the applicable protocols of all the NWFZ Treaties.’

Regarding implementation of Pelindaba Treaty – one of the five global NWFZ Treaties –   AFCONE may update the PSC about ongoing efforts to ensure ratification of the treaty by all AU member States in order to boost its implementation. As indicated in Amani Africa’s previous insight on PSC’s 1071st session, 11 AU member States are yet to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty. Further to contributing towards global non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and creating conditions for sustaining peace and security, the full implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty would also significantly advance socio-economic development in Africa, through promoting cooperation on the use and application of nuclear energy in critical fields such as power generation, agriculture and various industrial endeavours. The treaty could serve as an essential step for member States to forge a common goal and establish the necessary mechanisms for advancing nuclear science and technology. As noted by the AFCONE in its reflections on the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT, the peaceful application of nuclear power and technology could ‘meaningfully contribute to the achievement of a country’s socio-economic development goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the African Union’s Agenda 2063’.

Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the CTBTO may update the PSC on the significant increase achieved in the signature and ratification of the treaty in Africa. Currently, 51 African States have signed the CTBT while 50 of these have ratified it. Within the framework of international nuclear arms control and disarmament and having regard to the fact that nuclear testing is a key step in the development of nuclear weapons, the CTBT bans the testing and explosion of nuclear weapons globally, be it above ground, under water and/or underground. The treaty is however yet to enter into force as ratification by eight States is still pending (these are China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States). The CTBT’s entry into force wold be critical both for enhancing implementation of the NPT and to contain threats and use of nuclear weapons that have currently become causes for serious concern.

In its efforts to detect nuclear explosions around the world, the CTBTO has also mobilised 38 monitoring facilities in 24 African countries within the framework of its International Monitoring System. While these have been commendable steps, it is important to ensure that better collaboration and coordination exists between the CTBTO and AFCONE in order to have a coherent approach for nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament in Africa.

In addition, while the CTBT would considerably contribute towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in Africa and the world, it is important to ensure clarity on the difference between efforts aimed at peaceful use of nuclear energy on the one hand and nuclear testing for the purposes of developing nuclear weapons on the other. As emphasised in AFCONE’s reflections on the Tenth Review Conference of NTP, it is essential to ‘guard against attempts to deny technology, especially to developing countries, under the guise of non-proliferation or nuclear security measures’ and that States Parties should ‘guard against any reinterpretation of, or restrictions on, the inalienable right of States to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear technology’.

Another critical aspect the PSC may wish to reflect on is the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. The destructive impact of nuclear weapons on human life and livelihood – including aspects related to environment, health and development – is an already well-established factor. However, recalling past experiences such as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as well as the Chernobyl nuclear incident and the devastating humanitarian impacts they entailed is critical in order to keep relevant global actors from engaging in a destructive nuclear discourse.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend AFCONE and the CTBTO for their continued efforts to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in Africa and globally. It may welcome the conclusion of the Tenth Review Conference of NPT and commend AFCONE for contributing to the review on behalf of the AU Commission and African States Parties. It may express regret however, over the lack of consensus faced in adopting an outcome document at the Tenth Review Conference, which makes it second time in a row, following the Ninth Review Conference of 2015 which also unfortunately came to an end without agreement on a substantive final declaration. The PSC may also call on AFCONE, CTBTO and IAEA to better coordinate their efforts. It may also reiterate its call to AFCONE, working in collaboration with the AU Commission and other relevant stakeholders including the IAEA, to mobilise resources and technical expertise to member States to advance and promote use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful and developmental purposes.


Development and deradicalization as levers to counter terrorism and violent extremism

Development and deradicalization as levers to counter terrorism and violent extremism

Date | 07 October 2022

Tomorrow (7 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1111th session at a ministerial level. The session is convened under the theme of ‘development and deradicalization as levers to counter terrorism and violent extremism’.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation, and Moroccan Expatriates of the Kingdom of Morocco, Nasser Bourita, is expected to preside over the session as the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October 2022. Following an opening remarks by the chairperson of the month, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will deliver statement. The Secretary-General of the Rabita Mohammadia of Ulema, Dr. Ahmed Abaddi, is also scheduled to make presentation while Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Vladimir Voronkov, is expected to deliver statement.

Tomorrow’s session becomes the 24th session of the Council dedicated to the issue of terrorism and violent extremism, making the item the most discussed thematic issue by the PSC since its operationalization in 2004. Seven of these sessions have been addressed at the ministerial or summit level, also showing the increasing high-level interest on the subject on account of the increase in incidents of terrorist attacks and its geographic expansion. Since the extraordinary summit held in Malabo in May 2022 on terrorism, the PSC met at a ministerial level on 23 September on the sidelines of the 77th session of UN General Assembly with a focus on strengthening the role of RECs/RMs in combating the scourge of terrorism.

The last time Morocco chaired the PSC, the 883rd session held at ministerial level focusing on the nexus between conflicts in general and development, it reaffirmed ‘the essence and fundamentals of human security, in line with the Common African Defense and Security Policy and the AU Policy Framework on Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), as a multidimensional notion of security encompassing socio-economic and political rights.’ As it did during that session, tomorrow’s session is also expected to emphasise ‘the need for the consideration and conception of an integrated, inclusive, holistic and multidimensional approach regarding the interdependence between peace, security and development, aiming at enabling the African Union and the RECs to respond effectively to the challenges imposed by conflict cycles in Africa’, albeit with a particular focus on addressing the scourge of terrorism.

Tomorrow’s session, among others, affords Council the opportunity to exchange views and share best experiences including from the Kingdom of Morocco, which is presented as a success story in the fight against terrorism. The first lesson is the multidimensional nature of Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy. According to Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2022 report, Morocco ranked 76th among countries impacted by terrorist threat globally, making it one of the safest countries in the world. What contributed for Morocco’s positive performance is not because the country is less targeted by terrorists, but because of its blend of counterterrorism efforts often described as ‘tri dimensional counterterrorism strategy’ —largely aimed at addressing terrorism threats through security, socio-economic development policies and religious education—adopted following the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The same report attributes Morocco’s success in fighting terrorism to the ‘country’s understanding of the threat; the interconnectedness of its counterterrorism methods; the application of combined soft and hard measures; the facilitation of information sharing practices; and the promotion of international cooperation as the sine qua non of counterterrorism’.

Indeed, unlike most previous engagements, tomorrow’s session shifts the focus away from the dominant hard security oriented policy approach towards the socio-economic and governance factors that make the emergence and expansion of terrorism and violent extremism possible. As outlined in various Amani Africa works (reports here and here), the dominance of the hard security approach to terrorism has crowded out investment in the political, development and environmental factors. Indeed, as demonstrated in our report, the year-on-year increase in the incident of terrorist attacks and the geographic spread of the threat highlight that it is not possible to win over terrorism by increasing throwing of weapons at it.

While security measures remain critical in addressing the immediate security threat posed by terrorists, it has become evident that no amount of force would fundamentally change the terrorism landscape in Africa without addressing the structural socio-economic and political deficiencies on which terrorism thrives. Amani Africa’s special report made the case that ‘the political and socioeconomic governance pathologies and the grievances and vulnerabilities that such pathologies produce on the part of the affected communities are the core conditions that open the space for the emergence and growth of terrorist groups.’ As such, ‘given the inadequacy of the security heavy approach to countering terrorism, it is of paramount significance that the PSC gives consideration for the AU and RECs to invest as much in the socio-economic, development, governance and humanitarian dimensions of the underlying and driving factors of terrorism as, if not more than, they invest in security-heavy instrument of counter terrorism’.

Taking the passing references in the various PSC outcome documents to socio-economic, political, environmental and humanitarian dimensions of terrorism and the 22 October 2021 report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission that admitted the imperative of moving ‘beyond predominantly military action to include soft approaches, by promoting inclusive good governance, accountability as well as socioeconomic developments’ a step further, our special report provided analysis on how this policy shift can be achieved. First, in territories affected by terrorism, this needs to focus on provision of life saving assistance for the displaced and those facing food insecurity and the creation of conditions including through the implementation of protection measures for the return and rehabilitation of IDPs as well as the provision of psycho-social support that is tailored to and in harmony with the traditions and practices of affected communities. Second, investing in the rehabilitation of and providing support for the expansion of existing sources of livelihoods and making them more economically and ecologically sustainable and productive. Third and fundamentally, the rolling out of legitimate local governance structures along with enabling them in the delivery of key social services including health care, access to water, education and justice. Additionally, it is of particular significance that the AU PSC in its engagement on the theme of terrorism engages bodies such as Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social (HHAS) Development, African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). In terms of deradicalisation, attention should be given to the use not only of counter-terrorism narratives and sensitization measures but also political and diplomatic instruments such as negotiation and reconciliation that provide pathways for the reintegration into and peaceful participation political and social life of society by members of society recruited into the ranks of terrorist groups.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council may reiterate its grave concern over the rising tide of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Recognizing the different factors associated with terrorism such as governance deficits, socio-economic challenges, and marginalization, Council may emphasize the need to adopt a multidimensional comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that combines security and law enforcement, socio-economic development policies, and counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs to tackle the scourge in a holistic and sustainable manner. The PSC may reiterate its request of 883rd session for the AU Commission, to ‘further enhance the collaboration and coordination between the different departments within the AU Commission and AU Specialized Agencies to support the PSC, taking into account the interdependence between peace, security and development, whilst carrying out its mandate.’ In this context, Council may emphasize the need for fully harnessing the role of African governance and developmental institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) AUDA-NEPAD, the AfDB and AU Department of HHAS in addressing the governance and socioeconomic challenges. The PSC may also call for effective implementation of the AU Policy Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and the mobilization of the role of the PCRD Centre. Finally, Council may take tomorrow’s session as an opportunity to follow up on some of its previous decisions regarding terrorism and violent extremism, notably the development of a comprehensive Continental Strategic Plan of Action on countering terrorism in Africa as well as the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism (16th extraordinary summit on terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government held in May 2022), the formation of counterterrorism unit within the African Standby Force (PSC 960th session), establishment of a Sub-Committee on Counter-terrorism (PSC 249th session), and the establishment of an AU Special Fund for Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Assembly/AU/Dec.614 (XXVII)).


Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Date | 23 September 2022

Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1107th meeting which will be a ministerial session on “strengthening regional organizations for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa: preventing and fighting terrorism and violent extremism in the continent”. The session is expected to take place in a hybrid format, with the in-person meeting to be held in New York.

The session is expected to have an open and closed segment. In the first, open segment, Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of the Republic of Ghana is expected to deliver opening statement as the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of September 2022. This will be followed with remarks by Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission and a statement by Mr. Vladimir Voronkov Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) Office of Counter-Terrorism. In the second, closed segment, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to deliver a presentation on “the impetus of a robust Continental Early Warning System in the context of implementing the May 2022 Malabo Declaration to effectively Counter Terrorism”. This will be followed by interventions from PSC member States and Executive Secretaries/Commissioners of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

While Council decided to institutionalise ‘preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism’ as a standing annual agenda item at its 957th session of 20 October 2020, the theme has featured more regularly on the agenda of the PSC over the years since at least as far back as 2010. The regularity and the level at which this item is dealt with by the PSC has shown notable rise in recent years. In 2021, Council dedicated three ministerial sessions, demonstrating the increasing recognition of the growing threat that terrorism has come to pose for increasing number of AU member states. Indeed, the ‘Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Continental Efforts in Preventing and Combating of Terrorism in Africa’ to the PSC at its 1040th ministerial session highlighted the very worrying spike in attacks and in the spread of terrorism and violent extremism as well as emerging trends in the manifestation of terrorism on the continent.

In terms of the scale of increase in the threat of terrorism, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) reported that Africa has witnessed a 400% and 237% rises in attacks and deaths respectively between 2012 and 2020. As pointed out in Amani Africa’s special report, the trend in the growing threat of terrorism witnessed in recent years and the data from the 2022 Global Terrorism Index indicate that Africa has become the epicentre of global terrorism. The region accounts for about 50% of global deaths due to terrorism while four of the ten countries globally to have experienced increase in deaths from terrorism in 2021 are also in Africa, namely Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali and Niger.

The geographic expansion of the threat of terrorism also continues to pose a serious concern. Demonstrating the expansion and spread of terrorism in the continent, Ghana, the only country along the Gulf of Guinea which has for long remained least affected by terrorism, is now feared to be target of the expansion of terrorism from the Sahel to the littoral states of West Africa. Other coastal west African States are already experiencing attacks as the terrorist groups push south wards from the Sahel, particularly via Burkina Faso. For instance, on 11 May, Togo experienced its first deadly jihadist attack perpetrated by the Al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in a town along Togo’s border with Burkina Faso, which killed 8 and wounded 13 Togolese soldiers. Côte d’Ivoire has also been experiencing recurrent cross-border attacks from neighbouring Burkina Faso perpetrated by armed groups linked to Al-Qaida. In addition to its expansion to littoral States of west Africa, the threat of terrorism has also spread to other sub-regions of the continent including the Great Lakes Region, East Africa and Southern Africa.

The terrorism menace in Africa has far reaching social, economic and political consequences that go beyond the security realm. During the past few years, it became a major factor behind the occurrence of military coups. This has been particularly the case in countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso. The humanitarian toll from terrorist attacks also continues to grow. According to the ACSRT’s 2022 Mid-Year Africa Terrorism Trends Analysis, 433 out of the 699 terrorist attacks perpetrated during the first half of 2022 were launched against civilians and out of the 5,412 deaths that were recorded during the period, 3,517 were civilian deaths. In some of the most affected countries such as Burkina Faso, the displacement rate has continued to show an unabating increase. According to the UN, over 19,000 Burkinabe citizens have fled into Côte d’Ivoire in 2021 alone, due to extremist attacks. This has been a 50% increase as compared to the previous year of 2020. In 2022, the situation has shown further deterioration with the multiplication of violent attacks in the country driving more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021. Across the wider Sahel region extending over Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, over 4.8 million people are estimated by the UN to have fled their homes due to violence including jihadist attacks and communal conflicts. In northern Mozambique, after a respite in violence between mid-July to late August, attacks have resumed displacing over 38,000 people according to the latest data.

The threat of terrorism in Africa is expanding at an alarming rate not because the investment for fighting against it and in counter terrorism operation is lacking. Indeed, indications are that the threat is expanding at an exponential rate despite the increase in counter terrorism instruments. As the AU Commission Chairperson noted in his address to the AU summit held in Malabo at the end of May, from Somalia to the Sahel and Mozambique the AU and regional bodies deployed various military operations. Analysis of the policy decisions of the AU both at the level of the AU Assembly and that of the PSC show that between 2010 and 2022, some nine hard security mechanisms have been initiated to deal with terrorism hotspots across the continent. The AU has also established key institutions such as the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and ACSRT. There has also been notable increase since 2015 in the deployment of various international multilateral and bilateral security instruments in the Sahel.

As Amani Africa’s special report highlighted and the AUC Chairperson admitted, the threat of terrorism continues to grow despite the increase in the investment in and the use of these and other hard security tools including border control, intelligence exchange, and criminal justice. One explanation, AUC Chair highlighted in his address, is the lack of adequate support to make the use of these hard security instruments effective. Indeed, as Amani Africa’s report also admits, there are gaps that limit the effectiveness of the hard security instruments that are deployed for countering terrorism on the continent. As such policy interventions, including continental and international support instruments, have to be designed and geared towards facilitating the building of not just the fighting capacity of national forces but also importantly their legitimacy and professionalism, including both in terms of strict adherence to human rights and international humanitarian law standards and protection of civilians and their skills and mindsets in assisting local communities in finding ways and means of addressing the issues facing them.

However, it would be of interest for the PSC to take note of the existence of more than enough evidence both from elsewhere in the world and most importantly from the recent experiences from Somalia to the Sahel that no amount of force irrespective of its effectiveness would constitute a recipe for success against terrorism.  Amani Africa’s special report, challenged both the diagnosis of and the policy response measures to the threat of terrorism in Africa. The dominant view about terrorism in Africa is based on a misdiagnosis of the nature of the phenomenon. There are two aspects to the misdiagnosis. The first is that it considers groups identified as terrorists to be the core of the problem. Second, it also erroneously states that these groups are mainly ideologically driven by global jihad. The report showed that terrorist groups, rather than being the core of the problem, are the symptom of the main problem. As our report put it, ‘the political and socio-economic governance pathologies’ and the grievances and vulnerabilities that such pathologies produce on the part of affected communities are the core conditions that open the space for the emergence and growth of terrorist groups.

These two aspects of the misdiagnosis also led to faulty policy responses. Rather than focusing on approaches that prioritize addressing ‘the political and socio-economic pathologies’, the responses focused on eliminating the symptom of the problem. As such, both the policy discourse on and the policy tools often deployed in response to terrorism are predominantly centred around the use of hard security instruments (namely combat operations, law enforcement measures, border control, intelligence cooperation and sharing etc). Given the inadequacy of the security heavy approach to countering terrorism, it is of paramount significance that the PSC gives consideration for the AU and RECs to invest as much in the socio-economic, development, governance and humanitarian dimensions of the underlying and driving factors of terrorism as, if not more than, they invest in security-heavy instruments of counter terrorism. This necessitates that AU and RECs/RMs expand their capacity and develop relevant instruments for initiating and supporting efforts of local communities both for deradicalization, reconciliation, inter-communal dialogue and for implementing measures for addressing the humanitarian and socio-economic needs of affected populations. Not any less important is the role of AU and RECs in supporting the development of governance and development oriented political strategy backed by full commitment of national actors as the basis for countering terrorism. In terms of the mobilization and deployment of resources as well, the AU and RECs/RMs need also to build the capacity to develop strategies for channelling resources for addressing the underlying conditions that facilitate the emergence of terrorism.

In terms of the use of AU and RECs instruments, it is also critical for the PSC that the AU and RECs/RMs bring to the centre their policy response, and add to the security-oriented instruments usually referred to in their policy decisions (such as the ACSRT, the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and AFRIPOL as well as the PSC Sub-committee on Terrorism), their governance and development structures. This means that RECs/RMs and the AU need to harness and bring to the centre of counter terrorism the role of African Governance Architecture (AGA), ACHPR, APRM, the Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), the African Development Bank etc. Similarly, the AU and RECs can also play a role in initiating and delivering targeted technical support to national security institutions with a focus on enhancing their compliance with human rights and humanitarian laws and on the use by these security institutions of civilian counter terrorism measures including community dialogue, building or rebuilding of local or community governance structures, rehabilitation of the livelihood of communities affected by or vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorism and in facilitating humanitarian assistance and psychosocial support.

Among the key decisions of the Malabo Summit was the development of a comprehensive Continental Strategic Plan of Action on countering terrorism in Africa. Considering the lessons from the experiences thus far, it is of particular significance for tomorrow’s ministerial meeting of the PSC to ensure that the strategic plan is premised on the primacy of politics and the need to invest as much in building and mobilizing relevant policy intervention tools and resources for addressing the governance and socio-economic deficits underlying the emergence and expansion of terrorism as in sustaining the military, rule of law, intelligence instruments for countering terrorism. Such a balanced approach would position the AU and RECs/RMs engagement to be more effective and successful.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council is expected to express grave concern over the growing expansion of terrorism and violent extremism in the continent. It is also expected to underscore the importance of strengthening capacity of and horizontal collaborations among various RECs/RMs in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Apart from highlighting the importance of upscaling the role of RECs in mobilizing coordination among affected countries in responding to the threat of terrorism, the PSC may underscore the importance of AU and RECs focusing their attention on developing and deploying tools for addressing the governance and development deficits that terrorist groups take advantage of. It may also emphasise the need to enhance collaborations among ad-hoc counterterrorism coalitions, RECs/RMs and relevant AU organs. Council may further highlight the importance of developing a strategy for coordination of efforts between the AU and various RECs/RMs on maintenance of peace and security. It may also follow up on the status of implementation of the decisions of the 16th Extraordinary Summit of the AU Assembly conducted in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, on 28 May 2022, particularly on the establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism and the development of a comprehensive Continental Strategic Plan of Action on countering terrorism in Africa. Council may also take note of the centrality of governance and development deficits as the cause and driver of the growing threat of terrorism and emphasise the importance of advancing the use of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and other AU governance and development instruments and mechanisms in responding to the threat of terrorism in the continent.


Briefing on Disarmament and Control of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa

Transnational Threats

Date | 18 May 2022

Tomorrow (18 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 1085th session on “Disarmament and control of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa.”

Following the opening remark by Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monon, Permanent Representative of Cameroon and the Chairperson of the PSC for May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement.

Representatives from the different Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as representatives from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the Secretariat of the Arms Trade Treaty and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) are also expected to participate at the session.

This theme for tomorrow’s session is specifically referenced in the preamble to the PSC Protocol. Most specifically, the Protocol expressed the concern ‘about the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in threatening peace and security in Africa’. Similarly, the 2004 Solemn Declaration on African Common Defense and Security Policy identifies as one of the factors that engender insecurity in Africa. Addressing the scourge of SALW also forms part of the AU Agenda of Silencing the Guns and is one of the pillars of the Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns in Africa. In terms of specific instruments, on a continental level, the AU Assembly adopted the 2013 AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as a corresponding Action Plan. At the sub-national level, there is the example of the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW applicable in 15 countries in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states.

The proliferation of and easy access to Illicit arms and weapons continues to be a major factor in fueling conflicts and making inter-communal clashes increasingly deadly. It remains to be a single critical instrument that enables terrorist groups, armed militias, criminal bandits and vigilante groups in various conflict and crisis settings on the continent. Indeed, this is one of the factors that has made the increase in the number of conflicts and the expansion of the geographic spread of such conflicts, particularly those involving armed terrorist groups. Tomorrow’s session thus provides an opportunity for the PSC to receive updates on patterns and trends in arms and ammunition inflows, illicit circulation and trafficking and gaps in control measures.

The last time the PSC convened a session on illicit proliferation and trafficking of SALW was at its 860th meeting held on 18 July 2019.  During the session, the PSC welcomed the findings of the joint mapping study conducted by the Commission and the Small Arms Survey which was launched in July 2019. The study, published under the title “Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa,” was the first-ever continental study that under the AU sought to map the problem of illicit proliferation of SALW. At the time the study was conducted, it was reported that there were forty-million of such weapons were in possession of civilians. This figure, according to the study, accounted for 80% of arms on the continent. There is little indication to show that this level of circulation of illicit weapons among the civilian population has come down.

In the context of the eruption of new conflicts and the expansion and persistence of existing conflicts as well as inter-communal violence in various parts of the continent, it is logical that the number of illicit weapons circulating on the continent has also increased. According to the 2021 Small Arms Survey research, there is an increase in smuggling and trafficking activities due to growing local demand for illicit goods and firearms. The local demand is fueled by banditry, communities’ need for self-defence, and the reliance in firearms of artisanal and small-scale gold mining operators. As a case in point, the survey specifically assessed the tri-border region, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.

The other factor for the proliferation and trafficking of illicit SALW is the challenges surrounding the availability of reliable data on stockpiles of member states and the safe keeping of those stockpiles. As the PSC noted in its 860th session the diversion of small arms and light weapons from national stockpiles is a significant factor contributing to the proliferation of SALW. There is thus the issue of auditing of stockpiles in member states and enhancing capacities for the safekeeping of stockpiles. Related to these are contingent owned equipment (COE) that are deployed for use in peace support operations. These weapons diversions are largely due to battlefield loss, mismanagement, theft, and corruption. According to reports, COE loss has occurred in at least 20 peace operations in 18 African countries. Lethal materiel lost in the past 10 years alone has included many millions of rounds of ammunition, thousands of small arms and light weapons, and likely hundreds of heavy weapons systems. Nonlethal materiel, such as unarmed vehicles and motorcycles, uniforms, communications equipment, and fuel, have also consistently been a target.

It is clear that stockpiles become a source of illicit circulation and trafficking in at least two ways. First, the lack of complete data and statistics by member states and the corruption in the armed forces mean that traffickers and armed groups pay for accessing weapons kept in such stockpiles. Second, nonstate armed groups have regularly targeted and overrun peacekeepers and national armed forces to seize lethal and nonlethal materiel. This has also become a significant source of armaments for Africa’s militant groups, fueling instability on the continent.

Illicit circulation of weapons also arises in the context of implementation of disarmament processes. Here a challenge worth mentioning is the lack of effective and complete demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), noted in the AU Solemn Declaration on Common African Defense and Security Policy. In cases where no effective framework and resources for undertaking DDR as part of peace agreements for settling conflicts are provided for, weapons in the hands of armed groups ends up being traded. Similarly, the poor implementation of DDR including the proper accounting of weapons and arms in the hands of various armed groups in the DDR process would mean that such weapons and arms remain outside of the control of formal institutions.

Furthermore, for widely differing reasons non-African states appear set to increase their supply of lethal materiel to African governments. The PSC in its several communiques including on its 1029th commemorating the 2021 Africa Amnesty Month session condemned non-African states sponsoring and promote the influx of arms into Africa, including in cases of existing armed embargoes, leading to the further escalation of existing conflicts. Indeed, unless COE control measures are strengthened, these arms flows could contribute to greater instability.

Tomorrow’s session also serves as an opportunity for follow up on previous decisions of the PSC. It is to be recalled that the PSC in its 1040th session convened on 22 October 2021, requested the Commission, working closely with Member States and RECs/RMs, to conduct a second phase of the Mapping Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The council also requested the RECs/ RMs to continue to submit reports through the AU commission, on the actions taken in line with Africa Amnesty month.

In the current global context, one aspect of the war in Ukraine that may warrant Council’s attention is also the rising risk of the use of foreign fighter and mobilisation of large number of weapons and arms finding their way in the hands of traffickers and ending up in conflict settings in Africa. In the absence of proper tracing and regulation mechanism, the large-scale mobilisation of weapons and arms in the context of this war can have an adverse impact as had been witnessed with the case of spread of weapons and foreign fighters post-Libyan conflict. It is therefore imperative for the AU to take advance note of and imagine preventive measures on how the mobilisation of such weapons and arms in Ukraine without an effective tracing mechanism in place could impact Africa by boosting illicit transfer of arms from the war in Ukraine.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The council may express deep concern over the growing Illicit flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa. The PSC may call for the AU to work with member states to launch a process for auditing of stockpiles with a view to enable states to have up to date data on the quantity and type of weapons and arms in their possession as a basis for ensuring the monitoring and safekeeping of stockpiles. The PSC may also call on member states to undertake measures that enhance the safe keeping and protection of stockpiles important measure for preventing leakages through corruption and vulnerabilities of stockpiles for attacks from armed groups. The PSC may also call for an African Strategy on the implementation of the Armed Trade Treaty at the continental levels as a means of controlling flows of weapons and arms into the continent and the trading of such weapons and arms within the continent. It also might call upon member State and the RECs to enhance cross border security and strengthening their monitoring and controlling mechanisms. Council may also urge member states to implement regional and international instrument to curb illicit flow of SALW. Further the council may reiterate its request to conduct second phase of the Mapping Study on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa. The PSC may also urge for effective integration of DDR programs in peace agreements and the proper implementation of such programs.


Briefing on Transnational Organized Crimes and Security in Africa

Transnational Threats

Date | 6 May 2022

Tomorrow (6 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1082nd session on Transnational Organized Crime and Security in Africa.

Following the opening remark by Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon and the Chairperson of the PSC for May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement.

Representatives from the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), the Secretary General of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) are also expected to brief the PSC. A representative from the AUC Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development may also deliver a statement.

Tomorrow’s session is the second meeting to be convened by the PSC after it decided on its 845th meeting held on 25th April 2019 to hold an annual session on the theme ‘Transnational Organized Crime and Peace and Security in Africa’. The PSC noted its deep concern over the rise of transnational organized crime in Africa in its several sessions including on thematic sessions that are linked to the issue including terrorism, illicit economy and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

During the 731st meeting held on 8 November 2017, the PSC underlined ‘the direct linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crime, particularly in situations where state institutions are weak and lack the necessary capacity to effectively discharge their constitutional mandates’. Among others, organized crime has become a source of finance for terrorist groups and this has contributed to the proliferation of violent extremist groups on the continent.

Similarly, on its 832nd meeting held on 14 March 2019; the PSC received a briefing from the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and its Impact on Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020. The PSC, among others, underlined the link between transnational organized crime, the proliferation of weapons and corruption, illicit financial flows, poaching and illegal exploitation of natural resources. In this regard, the PSC encouraged the Member States to redouble their efforts aimed at promoting good governance, transparency, accountability and a high level of professionalism across all sections of society, including governance of security and defense institutions.

The Organized Crime Index report by INTERPOL ENACT (Enhancing African capacity to respond more effectively to transnational organized crime) in its 2021 report concludes that the majority of Africa’s population almost two-thirds (60.9%) live in countries with high levels of organized crime. The report also stressed that the increasing threat shows no signs of slowing down. In this regard, the PSC on the 845th session, also notes with serious concern ‘over the growing threat posed by organized transnational crime, particularly its increasingly direct linkages and collusion with terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in situations where state institutions are not up to the level of organization, performance and equipment commensurate to this growing threat to peace and security in Africa’.  To tackle the crime, the PSC underscored in its several communiques that, member states have the primary responsibility to fight against transnational organized crimes and terrorism. The council in its 845th session even urges Member States to take necessary steps to domesticate all AU and international instruments regarding the fight against transnational organized crime, including money laundering notably by terrorist groups.

Along with AU member states, the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) plays a critical role in providing systematic and structured cooperation among police agencies in the continent to fight against transnational organized crime.  AFRIPOL was established as a mechanism for police cooperation for Member States of the AU. Its main objective is to establish a framework for police cooperation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels between Member States’ police institutions.

So far, AFRIPOL facilitated enhanced cooperation among the police agencies of AU Member states and 48 Member States have established their AFRIPOL National Liaison Offices as provided for in the AFRIPOL Statute. The AFRIPOL Secretariat has trained the heads of the National Liaison Offices on their roles and responsibilities. As part of the engagement with the AU Policy Organs, the AFRIPOL Secretariat also briefed the PSC at its 845th meeting. The PSC, among others, commended the efforts by AFRIPOL to build and strengthen the capacities of the police agencies of the Member States, and underscored the need to further enhance the capacity of national justice systems, cooperation between and among border police and financial intelligence units, as well as to involve civil society and local communities in efforts aimed at preventing and combating terrorism and organized transnational crime.

However, despite AU institutions and member states effort to fight against Transnational Organized Crimes in Africa, the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic has had profound impacts on the intensification of transnational organized crime in the continent. Institutional responses to stop the spread of the pandemic caused extensive losses for legitimate businesses and, despite lockdowns and restrictions on movement, actors involved in organized crimes were able to adapt more effectively than legal entities. According to ENACT report, organized crime groups in Africa have adapted their modus operandi to the new COVID-19 realities, finding new routes for illicit trafficking and making more use of cargo shipments. Correspondingly, the report noted the surge in illicit trade with fake COVID-19 cures and vaccines or falsified medicines. In this regard, the INTERPOL report has also underlined the pandemic has made illicit medication markets in Africa even more attractive to organized crime groups. This concerning emerging trend would be of interest to PSC members.

It is also worth to note the interlinkage between active conflict and the upsurge of transnational Organized crime in the continent. According to ENACT assessment, countries scoring highest for organized crime often experience conflict or some form of violence, insurrection, terrorist activity or civil unrest. Conflict also diverts much needed resources from projects that contribute towards social cohesion and also from enhancing security infrastructure that is able to contain organized crime and various security threats.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The Council may express deep concern over the growing rate of transnational organized crime in the continent and its relationship to the rise and expansion of terrorism in the continent. It may underline the need to strengthen member states’ capacities of their national security institutions. It may also call upon member States’ Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to enhance collaborations in securing and managing borders to combat transnational organized crimes. The Council is expected to urge Member States to ratify and sign existing AU and other relevant international instruments on the prevention and combat of terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization and organized transnational crime. The PSC may also stress the need to strengthen the capacity of the specialized agencies including CISSA and AFRIPOL to fulfil their mandates effectively and to enhance their horizontal cooperation to create more synergy.