Tomorrow (15 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1317^th session to consider the situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

The session is expected to begin with opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of AUSSOM, may also brief the PSC. The Permanent Representative of Somalia is expected to deliver a statement as the concerned state, and representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) may also deliver statements.

On the situation in Somalia, major current issues include the relationship between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan, consensus on power and resources sharing, including fiscal federalism, and the constitutional review process. In terms of the review of the Constitution, the progress made thus far remains limited to the first four chapters.

During the year, the question of the implementation of one man one vote in the organisation of the upcoming elections has emerged as a major point of contention. Opposition to President Mohamud comes from two main quarters: the Federal Member States—most notably Puntland and Jubaland—whose leaders remain at odds with Villa Somalia and have both suspended relations with Mogadishu; and political opposition groups, including former presidents and prime ministers. Critics accuse the government of contemplating an extension of the president’s term and of using the move toward direct voting as a means to entrench himself in power while disrupting the informal clan-based power-sharing arrangements that underpin the current electoral model. They also question the neutrality of the Independent National Electoral and Boundaries Commission.

On 25 August 2025, the president made a significant concession by signing a political agreement with elements of the Somali Salvation Forum, the main opposition alliance—a development welcomed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The agreement’s key provision is that members of Parliament will be elected through universal suffrage, while the president will continue to be elected by Parliament. This partially reverses the provisional constitutional amendment of March 2024 and the October 2024 electoral framework agreement, both of which envisaged a directly elected presidency.

Despite this step, political discord has persisted. In October, a new political alliance—the Somali Future Council—was formed by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland together with figures from the Somali Salvation Forum, aiming to coordinate positions on political and security matters, including the 2026 elections. The alliance reportedly rejected proceeding with the election without first securing a broad national consensus. In November, another political party—the Union of National Pride—associated with influential political figure and former intelligence Chief Fahad Yasin, was launched, announcing former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon as its presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the president’s efforts to mend relations with the Jubaland leadership appear to have made little headway, despite his October 2025 visit to Kismayo.

With only five months left before Mohamud’s term expires, moving ahead with elections without agreement on a workable electoral modality risks triggering heightened tensions with serious repercussions for the country’s fragile peace and stability. In the meantime, political infighting affects not only political and institutional stability but also continues to divert government attention from the fight against al-Shabaab, reversing earlier security gains over the terrorist group.

In relation to AUSSOM, this session takes place as the UN Security Council is expected to re-authorise the Mission’s mandate later this month, informed by the joint UN–AU–Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) technical assessment of progress. In a recent appearance on Amani Africa’s Pan-Africanist Podcast, the AU Special Representative, El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, confirmed that the Mission is undergoing an adjustment and that its exit strategy is being updated in consultation with the UN and the FGS. AUSSOM’s one-year mandate under Resolution 2767 (2024) is set to expire at the end of the month. According to the Mission’s Concept of Operations (CONOPs), the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was initially scheduled for completion by the end of June 2025. However, this timeline was suspended by the PSC at its 1287th meeting, which extended the realignment phase by an additional six months. Against this backdrop, PSC members may receive an update from the Special Representative on the current status of the realignment—particularly with respect to the repatriation of Burundian troops and the deployment of Egyptian forces. It would not be completely surprising if the timeline for the realignment and the repatriation of Burundian troops is extended for a further period of at least six months.

The PSC may also follow on its previous decisions, made at its 1287th session, requesting the AU Commission to update the CONOPs with regard to the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), their logistical support and aviation requirements of the operation, and submit these new requirements to the PSC within six weeks. It is recalled that the PSC requested the Chiefs of Defence Forces of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) plus Somalia to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al Shabaab.

A major issue of concern for the PSC is the mission’s funding. During its 1287th session, the PSC not only decided to raise the ceiling of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) by an additional USD 10 million—bringing the total for 2025 to USD 20 million to support AUSSOM—but also mandated the AU Commission to engage the UN, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Somalia, and other bilateral partners to convene a resource-mobilization conference for the mission. The long-delayed and repeatedly postponed pledging conference was finally held as a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York on 25 September. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million, while Italy and Spain each were reported to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, pledges are also expected from Japan and the Republic of Korea. The total amount pledged stands at approximately USD 44 million—far below the USD 196 million required for the mission in 2025.

According to the co-chairs’ summary of the New York event, ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial.’ The largest anticipated contribution is expected from the EU, likely to be announced early next year. However, a key question remains: will the EU’s funding help close the severe 2025 budget gap and establish sustainable financing for 2026 and beyond, or will it focus primarily on future years while leaving the immediate shortfall unresolved?

The 2025 funding gap has already created an enormous strain on the mission. Troop-contributing countries have not received allowances for a year and a half. As the UN Secretary-General aptly noted during the High-Level Financing Event, this situation is ‘untenable,’ and ‘asking those who risk their lives against Al-Shabaab—and who have lost so many colleagues—to serve without pay is unacceptable.’ This level of financial pressure risks pushing TCCs to the breaking point and could ultimately threaten the mission’s viability. Currently, as the Secretary-General underscored, TCCs are ‘essentially subsidising the mission,’ an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable.

Looking ahead, and as rightly underscored by the Secretary-General, two urgent priorities should be addressed: closing the 2025 budget gap and securing predictable financing for the remainder of the mission. Without predictable funding, the AU may be compelled to reconsider its original exit timeline, currently envisaged for the end of 2029. During the high-level financing event, the Chairperson of the AU Commission stressed that AUSSOM is ‘not an open-ended mission.’ Yet, instead of exploring such other options as bilateral deployments, ad hoc coalition support and importantly, the development of an effective political strategy for the resolution of the conflict in Somalia, there seems to be a single-minded focus on finding a financing-only solution to the existential challenge facing AUSSOM.

Compounding the financial challenges, AUSSOM is expected to lose around USD 130 million from the UN logistics support package due to the liquidity crisis affecting UN peacekeeping operations. In a letter dated 10 October 2025, the UN Secretary-General instructed all peacekeeping missions funded through the peacekeeping budget to activate contingency plans reflecting a 15 per cent expenditure reduction. The UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS)—mandated for providing logistical and related support to AUSSOM—has been required to implement an even steeper 25 per cent reduction within the current fiscal year. While the AU and the UN are working on determining and mitigating the impact of this significant cut, there is little doubt that this would affect the kind of support AUSSOM receives and hence the operational efficacy of the mission. The Head of AUSSOM may also update the PSC on the implications of this reduced support and on efforts to mitigate its impact.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. On the political situation in Somalia, the PSC may welcome the signing on 25 August 2025 of the Agreement on the Revised Electoral Framework between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one political wing of the Salvation Forum. At the same time, the PSC may urge all Somali political actors to pursue inclusive political dialogue and to reach a broad-based consensus on contentious issues related to electoral and constitutional reforms ahead of the 2026 elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC may express deep concern over the significant funding shortfall facing the mission. It may also express concern over the envisaged budget cuts to UNSOS and their implications in further exacerbating the Mission’s operational challenges. The PSC may welcome the convening of the recent high-level financing event and express appreciation to partners that have contributed to the Mission. The PSC may further appeal to both traditional and non-traditional partners to increase financial support in order to close the significant 2025 budget gap, and to commit to predictable and adequate multiyear financing to enable the Mission to effectively discharge its mandate. In this regard, the PSC may encourage the AU Commission and the UN to work out modalities that ensure the least minimum impact on the operational efficacy and safety of AUSSOM in their ongoing exploration of options for mitigating the impact of the reductions to the UNSOS budget and encourage close coordination between the two for ensuring that they mobilise timely response to challenges and risks that the financial shortfall may precipitate. Concerning the operationalisation of the Mission, the PSC may commend the Burundian troops for their flexibility and other troops for their continued commitment and reiterate the need for the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM and implement the next phases of the Mission in line with the approved CONOPs. In the event of inability to find the funds to fill in the significant financial gaps of AUSSOM, the PSC may consider tasking the AU to work with the FGS and partners on developing options for alternative ways of protecting the gains made and develop a political strategy for enhanced effort on advancing national reconciliation and a sustainable path for political settlement in Somalia.