Emergency ministerial meeting on the current escalation of the conflict in Eastern DRC
Date | 27 January 2025
Tomorrow (28 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene an emergency ministerial level session on the conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The session is convened following a letter sent from the DRC requesting for the PSC to convene urgent meeting on the deteriorating security situation in Eastern DRC. The meeting is scheduled for 4 pm East African Time.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Kacou Houadja Leon Adom, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union for the Month of January 2025. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a presentation on recent developments and the current escalation of the conflict. Apart from the DRC, which is a member of the PSC and will address the PSC as a country concerned, it is anticipated that Rwanda will also deliver a statement as a country concerned. The PSC will also hear statements from the representatives of Angola, in its capacity as the Chairperson of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Tanzania, in its capacity as Chairperson of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Organ, Kenya, in its capacity as Chairperson of the East African Economic Community (EAC). Additionally, PSC is also expected to receive an update from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
Tomorrow’s session comes against the background of the escalation and expansion of fighting involving the M23 armed group. After opening a new front in South Kivu and capturing the town of Masis in North Kivu province early in the month, the M23 made further advances. The rebel group captured Kalehe on 19 January and Minova on 21 January. During the past three days, it encircled the capital of North Kivu, Goma. The fighting escalated following the killing of the Governor of North Kivu and the seizure by the M23 of the strategic town of Sake, 27 kilometres from Goma, on 23 January. The UN reported that the flareup of fighting has led to, among other humanitarian consequences, the displacement of over 400,000 people.

The fighting during the past few days, centred around the surroundings of Goma, was heavy. After encircling Goma and closing its airspace, on Sunday, the rebel group issued an ultimatum to the DRC Army (FARDC) demanding their surrender by 3:00 am, following which it ‘will proceed to occupy the city of Goma.’ On Monday morning, Goma fell into the hands of the M23. It is reported that some Congolese forces have continued to put up some resistance, while hundreds of FARDC soldiers surrendered to UN peacekeepers. Dozens of other Congolese soldiers also reportedly fled to Rwanda. MONUSCO staff and their families also crossed into Rubavu and have since arrived in Kigali by busses carrying them.
Since the fall of Goma, tensions have escalated on the border. Rwanda reported that bomb shells launched from the DRC led to the killing of 5 and injured 35 others on the outskirts of Rubavu town, prompting the closure of civilian activities, including schools and shops in Rubavu near the border. Reporters from Goma also indicated hearing drones and mortars/artillery coming from Rwanda. These are worrying signs of risk of the situation escalating into a direct confrontation between the two countries.
Ahead of the fall of Goma, heavy fighting took place as SAMIDRC and MONUSCO, along with FARDC, sought to halt the advance of the M23 toward Goma. It was as part of its Operation Springbok launched in November 2023 that MONUSCO engaged in attempting to forestall the M23’s march for seizing Goma. While the UN reported earlier that two MONUSCO peacekeepers have died, and nine others sustained injuries during the latest offensive, which started on 23 January, Urugua also reported the death of one of its soldiers. Three Malawian soldiers were also killed. SAMIDRC also sustained the loss of life of its personnel. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) announced that it lost nine soldiers in the latest offensive, with seven of them serving under SAMIDRC and two others under MONUSCO. The statement from SANDF that ‘the South African contingent and its counterparts were able to halt the advancement of the rebel group towards Goma’ did not last long, as Goma fell into the hands of M23 two days later.
The current escalation that accelerated in the course of this month followed the collapse of the summit-level meeting of the Luanda Process under which the DRC and Rwanda have held a series of ministerial talks, whose outcomes include the signing of a ceasefire that came into effect in August 2024. The summit, involving a face-to-face meeting between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda under the facilitation of Angola’s President Jaoa Manuel Lorenço on 15 December 2024, was postponed ‘at the request of one of the parties at the last minute’, according to a statement by Angola’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While DRC’s President Tshisekedi travelled to Luanda in anticipation of the summit talks, his counterpart Rwanda’s Kagame canceled his travel at the last minute as he told journalists during his press briefing on 9 January. The postponement of the tripartite summit was attributed to the divergent views registered regarding the resolution of the M23 issue during the ministerial meeting held on 14 December ahead of the summit. In a letter it sent to the UN Security Council on 17 December accusing Rwanda of causing delay by insisting on direct negotiations with M23, DRC stated that it has no objections to the participation of the M23 in the Nairobi process, the EAC-led peace process headed by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. Rwanda rejected the accusation in a counter letter it sent on 19 December, stating that the issue of the M23 has been included by the facilitator in the draft agreement presented to the two countries in August 2024.
It is to be recalled that the M23 was defeated after it seized Goma for a week in 2012 but resurfaced again three years ago. Since the resumption of its overt military activities in March 2022, M23 has been able to advance and capture key strategic towns in Kivu and Ituri provinces. Although M23’s activities became widely apparent in March 2022, reports indicate that the movement has been infiltrating key military positions and strategic areas in North Kivu since at least November 2021. In May 2022, during the 16th Extraordinary Summit of the AU, the AU Assembly designated Angola’s President Lorenço to be the facilitator for talks between Rwanda and DRC. While it has registered some gains, including avoiding the descent of the two countries into direct war and a ceasefire signed in July 2024, it ran into a deadlock in December 2024, as highlighted above.
Rwanda’s disaffection with the Luanda process was also implicitly revealed during a press conference that President Kagame held on 9 January. He told journalists that ‘we have processes and leaders leading these processes’ and ‘what becomes more important is the appearance, camera appearance, it is being seen there to be signing something and that becomes an end itself,’ underscoring that what matters is the substance and addressing the problems. At the same time, he stated that the process has to continue, but ‘it cannot be business as usual’ putting process above the results, despite the fact that Turkïye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reportedly offered to mediate between DRC and Rwanda after a meeting with his Rwandan counterpart who was on an official visit in Turkïye.
The panic and state of fear that the fall of Goma gave rise to prompted a flurry of diplomatic reactions and activities from various quarters. Angola’s President Lourenço issued a statement on 24 January, expressing deep concern over the deterioration of the security situation and strongly condemning the ‘irresponsible actions of the M23 and its supporters who endanger all efforts and progress achieved in the Luanda process’. The following day, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, issued a statement expressing deep concern and calling for ‘strict observance of the ceasefire agreed between the parties and the immediate cessation of all hostilities.’ DRC expressed its indignation at the description in Mahamat’s statement of the M23 as a ‘politico-military opposition’. On that same day 25 January, the SADC Secretariat issued a statement expressing concern and condemning the recent attack on SAMIDRC by the M23. The UN Secretary-Genera, in a 23 January statement, condemned the renewed offensive by the M23, including the capture of Sake and called on the group to stop its offensive, withdraw from all occupied areas and abide by the 31 July 2024 ceasefire agreement signed between DRC and Rwanda under Angola’s facilitation. He further stated, ‘he is troubled by the most recent report of the Group of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1533, concerning the presence of Rwandan troops on Congolese soil and continued support to the M23.’
As the M23 advance toward Goma persisted despite attempts to halt it, the UN Security Council (UNSC) emergency session, which was initially scheduled for Monday 27 January, was moved to Sunday, 26 January. During her briefing to the UNSC, Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO ‘called on Rwanda to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory and end support for M23 and on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ‘make significant efforts’ to neutralise the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR.’ The three African members of the UNSC (A3 plus), in a joint statement delivered by Sierra Leone during the briefing, stated that the ‘resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] must be political, not military, while underscoring that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be respected ‘by all States and non-State actors alike’. While the interventions from various UNSC members also asserted the imperative for respecting DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and urged the withdrawal of support for M23, Rwanda’s representative told the UNSC that ‘the current crisis could have been averted had the DRC Government demonstrated a genuine commitment to peace.’ The UNSC subsequently issued a press statement, which, among others, condemned ‘the ongoing flagrant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, including the presence in the Eastern DRC of external Forces’ and ‘demanded that these forces withdraw immediately and that the M23 put an end to the establishment of parallel administrations in the DRC territory .’
As the PSC convenes tomorrow, it faces the heavy and diverse ramifications of this dire situation. There are concerns that the current situation may push the DRC and Rwanda into full-blown direct conflict. Additionally, there are also understandable concerns about the heightened risk of the situation degenerating into a wider regional conflict, with the loss of lives involving peacekeepers from Southern Africa and the reported presence of forces from Burundi fighting on the side of DRC. These developments necessitate urgent de-escalation initiatives by the AU and regional bodies. Apart from interrupting the operation of the UN, including its peacekeeping mission, the fighting in Goma has curtailed humanitarian access and activities. Further to heightening inter-communal tension and violence, it is also forcing a large number of people into displacement.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to condemn the violation of the ceasefire agreement signed under the Luanda Process and the recent escalation of fighting involving the M23. It may accordingly reiterate its call for unconditional cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the M23 from areas it has occupied. It may also urge for the follow up of the discussions under the Lunda Process for the neutralisation of the FDLR. The PSC may call for the establishment of a joint mechanism of the quadripartite framework for the monitoring of the ceasefire that came into effect in August 2024. It is also expected to call for respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and restate its call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces operating in DRC. It may also welcome the statement of the UN Security Council and urge all actors to adhere to the demands of the statement. It PSC may urge Rwanda and DRC to refrain from actions that further aggravate the situation and accelerate risk of direct confrontation. Following the A3, the PSC may affirm that there is no military solution to the conflict and a political solution on the basis of the Luanda Process is the only viable option for its full resolution. The PSC may call for urgent dispatching of a high-level delegation of Heads of State and Government drawn from AU, EAC and SADC to Kinshasa and Kigali for urgent implementation of de-escalation measures and facilitating the return of the parties to the Luanda Process. The PSC may also urge restoration of calm, protection of people fleeing the affected areas and provision of humanitarian access.