The latest offensive has further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC, with more than 200,000 people displaced since early December, reports of widespread human rights violations, including sexual violence, and a rapidly collapsing health system. In a statement issued on 11 December, the Deputy Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General warned that the escalation risks seriously undermining efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the crisis and increasing the risk of a broader regional conflagration.

The offensive also heightens the risk of regional tension, as it brings Burundi’s capital city, Bujumbura, under a very close target of attack. During the UN Security Council briefing on eastern DRC on 12 December, the representative of Burundi expressed concern over cross-border attacks, some of which he said violated Burundi’s sovereignty. He further described the 4 December attacks in Cibitoke as ‘a grave provocation,’ warning that if such attacks were to continue, ‘it would become difficult to avoid direct escalation between the two countries [Burundi and Rwanda].’

DRC and Rwanda have continued to trade accusations over the latest violence, which both sides claim constitutes a breach of the Washington Accord. On 10 December, Kigali, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, accused the DRC and Burundian armed forces of violating the ceasefire, alleging systematic bombardment of civilian villages near the Rwandan border using fighter jets and attack drones. During the 12 December Security Council briefing, Rwanda also raised concerns over what it described as atrocity indicators affecting the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu. The DRC, for its part, criticised what it described as a Rwanda Defence Forces–M23 offensive launched less than a day after the signing of the Washington Accord. It warned that continued attacks, mass displacement, and cross-border risks pose a serious threat to regional stability.

Meanwhile, language directed at Kigali has sharpened amid growing criticism of its alleged involvement in eastern DRC. In the recent UNSC briefing, a US representative expressed ‘profound disappointment’ at the renewed violence and asserted that the Rwanda Defence Forces had provided material, logistical, and training support to the M23, even fighting alongside the group in eastern DRC. The representative also levelled a serious accusation against Rwanda, stating that ‘in recent weeks, Rwanda is leading the region towards increased instability and war.’ In a subsequent post on the X platform, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the United States could take action, stating that Rwanda’s actions in eastern DRC constitute a clear violation of the Washington Accord.

In a statement issued on 11 December, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, expressed deep concern over the developments in South Kivu in eastern DRC, as well as in Cibitoke Province of Burundi. He reiterated AU’s ‘long-standing position that lasting peace in the Great Lakes region is predicated on full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,’ further condemning ‘any attempt to establish a parallel administration in eastern DRC.’ Similar language was reflected in the joint annual consultative meeting held in October between the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EU PSC).

The joint PSC and EUPSC communiqué issued after the consultative meeting reaffirmed the ‘imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel movement of M23’. The joint PSC and EU PSC communiqué also called for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). While the communiqué did not explicitly identify the forces concerned, its reference to Resolution 2773 leaves little ambiguity. That resolution calls on the Rwanda Defence Forces to cease support to the M23 and to withdraw immediately and without preconditions from DRC territory, a matter that is now governed under the Washington Accord.

Succumbing to the mounting diplomatic pressure, the M23 announced on 15 December the unilateral withdrawal of its forces from Uvira. Despite the reluctant withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, the continued presence of M23 forces in close proximity to Uvira is reported. Thus, a US official is reported as stating that the US was not satisfied due to the fact the recognition that the withdrawal was not total.

One of the issues expected to feature in tomorrow’s discussion is how the AU can reinvigorate its role in addressing the protracted conflict and decades of suffering in eastern DRC. While the AU played a critical role in facilitating dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda under the Luanda Process—including the declaration of a ceasefire in August 2024, the adoption of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and the Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Security Measures by Rwanda, and the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which also served as the basis for the US facilitated Peace Agreements— continental peace efforts have since faced setbacks, with mediation momentum shifting to Washington and Doha. At the same time, attempts to reorganise African-led efforts have so far made limited progress.

In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. A major update in this regard will be the planned High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, to be hosted by Togo, in its capacity as AU Mediator, on 17 January 2026.

The PSC may also need to accord developments in eastern DRC a level of attention commensurate with the gravity and pace of events on the ground. The PSC did not hold a session on the situation since its last meeting in February 2025, on the margins of the AU Summit. Although sessions were scheduled for 19 and 28 November, neither materialised. Without more regular engagement and closer follow-up, it will be difficult for the AU to provide strategic guidance or to play a more proactive and effective role in the peace process.

Supplementing and reinforcing the high-level meeting that Togo is expected to host, one avenue for the AU to reassert its leadership in advancing peace in relation to the conflict in Eastern DRC is to initiate and deploy initiatives for building trust between countries in the region and communities in Eastern DRC. This requires the AU to accord this file a heightened level of diplomatic attention and facilitate a more active role of the SADC-EAC facilitators in advancing confidence-building measures, including dialogue and reconciliation in Eastern DRC.

The expected outcome of the session is the adoption of a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the Washington Accord between the DRC and Rwanda in December, as well as the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in November 2025. However, the PSC is likely to strongly condemn the escalation of violence in South Kivu and the territorial expansion by the M23, including its takeover of Uvira, and the resulting deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region. Echoing the UNSC, the PSC may call on the M23 to halt and reverse all its military operations and end the establishment of parallel administration in areas it seized. The PSC may further urge all parties to respect their obligations under the Washington Accord and the Doha Agreement, and to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2773. The PSC may further express grave concern over the attacks affecting Cibitoke Province of Burundi and the resultant heightening risk of further regional escalation. The PSC may call on the various actors, including the DRC army and affiliated forces on the one hand and the M23 on the other, to unconditionally cease hostilities and abide by the commitments made under the Washington and Doha agreements. It may also call on the signatories of the Doha Framework to build on commitments made and finalise remaining agreements for ensuring implementation. It is also expected to re-emphasise the imperative of full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. With respect to continental mediation efforts, the PSC may welcome the decisions of the joint EAC–SADC Summit, including the merger of EAC–SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising an AU Mediator and the EAC–SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this context, it may also call for the activation of a joint secretariat under the AU to strengthen Africa-led peace efforts in eastern DRC. The PSC may also welcome Togo’s plan to host the High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region on 17 January 2026.