Tomorrow (25 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1233^rd session in New York, on the margins of the 79^th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This ministerial-level meeting will address the theme ‘New Security Threats in Africa and the Future of the PSC’, as one of two agenda items.

Lejeune Mbellla Mbella, Minister of External Relations of Cameroon and PSC Chairperson for September, will preside over the session. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission is scheduled to deliver opening remarks, with Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security expected to provide an overview on the theme of this particular agenda. It is also envisaged that a representative of the UN will make a statement.

As a theme crafted as part of the 20-year anniversary of the PSC, tomorrow’s session builds on the discussions from the high-level colloquium held on 25 May 2024 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to mark the 20th anniversary of the PSC. It is to be recalled that this event, chaired by Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan, culminated in the adoption of the Dar es Salaam Declaration, which outlined key peace and security challenges facing the continent and proposed actions to address them. According to the concept note, the objective of tomorrow’s session is to ‘exchange views on the future of the PSC,’ ‘to re-commit to bolstering intervention in all the countries in conflict and collectively explore policy approaches for proactively addressing emerging complex threats.’

Twenty years after its operationalisation, the PSC is facing a new wave of security threats, while older challenges such as inter-state tensions, military coups, and internal armed conflicts are resurfacing with renewed intensity. Africa, particularly the Sahel region, has become a global epicentre of terrorism, witnessing not only a surge in attacks and fatalities but also an alarming geographic expansion of extremist activities. Meanwhile, emerging security threats—from new technologies and pandemics to climate change and increased foreign interference in African conflicts—are reshaping the security landscape, posing serious challenges to a peace and security architecture originally designed to address issues like civil wars and inter-state conflicts.

The prominence of new security dynamics in Africa poses significant challenges to the PSC and its peace and security architecture. Africa’s security landscape has evolved dramatically since the establishment of the AU and the creation of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 20 years ago. Initially, inter-state conflicts and civil wars dominated, with little anticipation of asymmetric warfare involving terrorist groups becoming primary security concerns. Consequently, many AU tools, like those of the United Nations, such as mediation and peace support operations, were primarily tailored for addressing civil war scenarios. Notably, the current framework for the deployment of the African Standby Force (ASF), a key element of APSA designed for rapid crisis response across the continent, did not envisage non-conventional and asymmetric warfare involving terrorist groups as the main target of its development and preparations for deployment.

The rise of asymmetric warfare, coupled with the lack of preparedness of APSA structures for a speedy response to the emergence of such threats as the major conditions undermining peace and security in Africa and the resultant vacuum this produced, have led to the emergence of ‘improvised’ security responses, characterised by the proliferation of ad hoc security arrangements and regional deployments such as MNJTF, G5 Sahel Joint Force, SAMIM, and SAMIDRC. This growing reliance on ad hoc security arrangements has led to the increasing marginalisation of the AU and the PSC. Additionally, it also risks fragmenting the collective security system anchored on the APSA, as more peace operations are undertaken outside, and without the application, of the APSA norms and policies.

Other security threats such as emerging technologies, public health emergencies, and climate change, also present unchartered challenges that existing continental security frameworks or peace and security tools struggle to address. The current security architectures are ill-equipped to manage or keep pace with such complex, rapidly evolving threats.

Meanwhile, the rise of geopolitical rivalries on the international stage has intensified foreign involvement by both old and emerging powers in conflicts in Africa, further complicating their resolution. This growing interference by foreign powers is not only shaping conflict dynamics and political behaviour but also undermining the agency of regional and continental policymakers in addressing conflicts and political crises.

These changing dynamics demand that the AU’s peace and security architecture adapt to remain relevant and fit for purpose. While instruments like the PSC Protocol and the AU Constitutive Act may not be perfect, effective responses to these new security threats in Africa neither depends on nor requires perfecting them. As the experience of the UN with respect to the UN Charter illustrates, the focus should be on updating and adapting the existing peace and security tools, approaches and processes as well as harnessing the role of development, financial and technological instruments to make them fit for the continent’s emerging realities and challenges.

Tomorrow’s session presents the opportunity for PSC Members to deliberate on the necessary shifts in light of the changing security dynamics and their implications for the APSA.

One key area for reflection is the need to prioritise conflict prevention over conflict management and resolution. Despite the cost-effectiveness of prevention and the emphasis on its prevention mandate in the PSC Protocol, the PSC has often taken a reactive approach, engaging in crisis management only after situations have escalated into full-blown security crises. While the rhetoric and normative recognition of the importance of conflict prevention are well established, the PSC’s actions have not consistently reflected this commitment. Its track record in anticipating and preventing crises before they fully erupt leaves much to be desired. The continental early warning system should be strengthened by addressing the technical, operational and political limitations, including through the restoration of a dedicated division for conflict prevention and early warning and bridging the gap between early warning and early response.

In light of the deteriorating security situation in Africa, coupled with the rising global geopolitical tension and a weakened multilateral system, AU should also reinvigorate its robust diplomacy as the primary tool for maintaining the continent’s security challenges and navigating complex political transitions. Apart from its role in reducing polarisation and establishing common ground between rival powers as highlighted in UN Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace, in the African context, the effective functioning of the PSC and the APSA and for the mobilisation of collective action for peace and security depend on mobilisation of consensus and the political will of member states for supporting such collective action. Reinvigorating diplomacy is a strategic imperative for the AU to contain the tide of these new and increasingly serious threats to peace and security. This requires the reaffirmation of the commitment of member states to AU instruments and to work collectively and for the AU Commission to enhance close working relationship with and the trust of member states on the basis of the obligations that member states assumed under AU instruments.

While the primacy of politics and diplomacy in addressing conflicts on the continent is imperative, Peace Support Operations (PSOs) involving peace enforcement mandate also remain key component of the AU’s conflict management toolkit. However, even in this context, there is a need to shift from a security-heavy approach to a comprehensive strategy that underpins the primacy of politics, particularly in addressing the scourge of terrorism in the continent. Over the years, a noticeable trend in the PSC approach to the surge in conflicts has been an increased emphasis on hard security measures. While security measures are undoubtedly critical in addressing the immediate threat posed by terrorists and in creating an enabling environment for non-military measures, it has become evident, as established in the Amani Africa report (EN & FR), that no amount of force alone will fundamentally alter the terrorism landscape in Africa. What is required is a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that moves beyond a security-first approach, placing greater emphasis on a human security-centered political strategy. This approach should address the structural causes of terrorism, such as marginalisation, governance deficits, and socioeconomic grievances. Equally important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation to facilitate the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters, alongside efforts to achieve political settlements that tackle the underlying conflict dynamics enabling the rise of terrorist groups.

Indeed, the evolving nature of conflicts and shifting peace and security dynamics in Africa call for a ‘reconceptualisation’ of the AU’s approach to PSOs. A key element of this shift involves viewing military operations as one part of a broader, comprehensive strategy that goes beyond purely military solutions and encompasses non-military approaches that address the root causes of conflict and violence. Given the complexity and fluidity of conflict situations on the continent, PSOs should also incorporate a combination of peace enforcement, stabilisation, and peacebuilding capacities with a clear exit strategy. These need to be complemented with the introduction of PCRD instruments including the expansion of legitimate local governance structures that deliver services and the use of livelihood support and development tools.

Regarding emerging technologies and climate change, it is imperative to develop a system within the continental early warning system to track and report risks and threats to peace and security posed by these emerging security threats to facilitate timely response. Strengthening institutional capacities, legal and policy frameworks, and enhancing collaboration with relevant stakeholders including Member States, RECs/RMs and international partners also remain important to mitigate security risks of emerging technologies. The rise in the impact of these unconventional security threats necessitates the introduction of new tools and approaches that emphasise non-security instruments including livelihood-supporting interventions, socio-economic and development instruments, adaptation measures as well as the systems and infrastructure as well as the institutional guardrails for containing the threat posed by new technology including AI.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to highlight the various emerging security threats and how they are changing the security dynamics in the continent and impacting AU’s peace and security architecture. In taking the agenda forward, the PSC may consider tasking the AU Commission, in collaboration with key stakeholders, to articulate a ‘New Agenda for Peace in Africa, drawing inspiration from the UN’s ‘New Agenda for Peace’. This initiative would take a comprehensive look at the evolving nature of security threats and shifting dynamics, identifying the necessary adjustments to the peace and security architecture in response to these challenges. Such a move would mark a significant step in advancing the role of the PSC and the APSA in view of these new security threats and changing peace and security environment.