Conflict remains a major driver of humanitarian need, with countries such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan facing escalating levels of displacement, food insecurity, and systemic breakdowns in health and basic services, mainly due to conflicts. The latest figures from humanitarian agencies show that in Sudan alone, over 30 million people, more than 63% of the population, are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which erupted in April 2023, has led to the forcible displacement of over 12 million people internally and across borders, representing the largest displacement crisis in the world. Despite the enormity of need, the international humanitarian response has been woefully underfunded. As of April 2025, only 10% of the $4.2 billion appeal to address what has been recognised as the most severe humanitarian emergency in the world had been met, clearly demonstrating the growing disconnect between humanitarian need and global solidarity.

In addition to the scale of the humanitarian need and the growing gap in the resources required for meeting such need, aggravating the dire humanitarian situation is the shrinking humanitarian space, on account of the disregard by conflict parties of humanitarian principles and IHL rules. Thus, in Sudan, the weaponisation of humanitarian aid, especially food, by the warring parties has compounded the suffering of people caught up in the crossfire of violence, with reports of aid blockades and starvation being used as weapons of war, in complete disregard and direct breach of international humanitarian law (IHL) rules. As a result, parts of Sudan, such as Darfur, have been designated as territories classified as having famine conditions.

The DRC presents another grim illustration, particularly of protracted humanitarian distress resulting mainly from conflicts for over two decades. The country now hosts the highest number of internally displaced people ever recorded within its borders, over 7.3 million. Conflict continues to disrupt food systems, healthcare, and shelter, with approximately 27.7 million people expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food insecurity between January and June 2025. The impacts of climate shocks add to the plight of people in the country; seasonal floods in early 2025 damaged infrastructure in Kinshasa and Equateur, affecting over 60,000 people.

South Sudan’s protracted crisis also demands urgent attention. In 2025, 9.3 million people within the country require humanitarian aid, with an additional 4.3 million South Sudanese living in displacement due to conflict, environmental shocks, and economic collapse. These intersecting drivers of vulnerability highlight the imperative for ensuring the implementation of the peace process and completing the transitional period in order to create space for a more focused policy action involving both preparedness and response to climatic distress.

In addition to these, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) 2025 report indicates that 8 of the world’s 10 most neglected humanitarian crises are located in Africa, including those in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda, and Somalia.

However, despite the scale of the humanitarian crises represented by the staggering figures, the international response has fallen drastically short, and Africa’s humanitarian financing landscape remains starkly inadequate. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over half of the global $25 billion appeal for humanitarian assistance went unmet in 2024. Within Africa, funding gaps were particularly severe. Burkina Faso, for instance, received only 27% of its appeal.

In light of this chronic underfunding, tomorrow’s session is expected to focus on financing humanitarian responses. It would follow up on the decision of the Council’s 1239^th session where Council members acknowledged chronic financing shortfalls and requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying financial shortfalls and developing practical proposals for sustainable humanitarian resource mobilisation. One of the issues for members of the PSC is to identify and institutionalise alternative and innovative financing mechanisms, including, as previously proposed, through a more robust engagement with the African private sector. This can draw on some of the promising experiences registered in this regard in 2024 with the Peace Fund’s outreach to private sector actors like Safaricom and Afreximbank, which mobilised resources for funding humanitarian infrastructure in regions emerging from conflict. However, for such sources of finance to contribute meaningfully, there is a need for the AU to develop a strategy for partnership with and mobilisation of resources from the private sector and other sources such as philanthropies. It is also necessary that the AU institutes financial rules and processes tailored to funds resourced from the private sector, including for embedding agility in the receipt and use of funds in response to pressing needs. The AU may also need to consider how to leverage the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC).

Strengthening public-private partnerships could complement state-level contributions and offer greater sustainability in meeting humanitarian obligations. The OCHA–UNDP Connecting Business Initiative (CBi), which strategically engages the private sector before, during, and after emergencies, provides a useful model in this regard, having mobilised over $132 million since its establishment in 2016 and reached more than 55 million people through crisis response.

The PSC may also wish to revisit its decision from its 1176^th session held on 29 September 2023, for the AUC to lead an all-Africa mega pledge covering areas such as food security, displacement, climate-induced disasters, and post-conflict reconstruction, and revive momentum for increased continental resource mobilisation. Yet, for any such pledging to be effective, there is a need to put in place a mechanism to track pledged commitments and ensure implementation. Such pledge monitoring mechanisms could enhance transparency and accountability of humanitarian pledges, including those made at previous high-level events for Sudan and the Horn of Africa. The Humanitarian Coordination Forum (HCF), led by the HHS Directorate in collaboration with OCHA, may play a role in this regard by monitoring donor commitments and following implementation.

The other challenge that has particularly become acute during the past few years is the lack of international attention to situations on the continent. Crisis situations, such as Sudan, did not receive even a fraction of the attention given to crises in Europe and the Middle East. A further factor is the shift of resources away from aid and towards defense spending. It is feared that the restructuring of the UN, expected to be implemented for cutting funds under the UN80 initiative, will further compound the situation, as it leads to major layoffs on the part of UN agencies critical to humanitarian action.

The weak and dwindling international attention to the protracted and overlapping crisis is further compounded by a chronic deficit in political mobilisation and coordinated diplomacy on the continent. As humanitarian needs reach record levels and global solidarity frays, the urgency for Africa to mobilise its political and institutional resources has never been greater. In this context, the AU’s role in humanitarian diplomacy remains central. Drawing on its legitimacy and political convening power, the Union is well-positioned to facilitate humanitarian access, and promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and mobilise attention and support for humanitarian emergencies.

Another issue expected to surface during tomorrow’s session is the follow-up on the progress of the operationalisation of the African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), which is set to be operational this year. Established by the decision of the 2022 Malabo Extraordinary Humanitarian Summit and consistently reaffirmed, AfHA is expected to go operational, headquartered in Uganda.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may call for the fast-tracked operationalisation and financing of the African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), as well as increased contributions to the Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF) and the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC). The PSC may call on member states to uphold their responsibilities by ensuring respect for IHL rules and ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. It may also underscore the responsibility of conflict parties not only to adhere to IHL and facilitate humanitarian access but also to cooperate with initiatives for peace, including by following through on commitments made in peace agreements. The Council may call for enhancing coordination between the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Africa Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS), launched in 2022, the Space for Early Warning in Africa (SEWA) project, launched in June 2025, national platforms, and predictive tools such as the World Food Programme’s HungerMap LIVE. Embedding these systems within AU and Regional Economic Community (REC) protocols, supported by standard operating procedures and data-sharing frameworks, can enable rapid detection of emerging crises, timely resource mobilisation, and community-centered responses. Reiterating its call for finding alternative and innovative sources of financing humanitarian action in Africa, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a strategy for partnership with the private sector and philanthropies and institutionalising the sourcing of funds for addressing the humanitarian funding shortfall in Africa.