In December, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. Three of the sessions will focus on country- and region-specific situations, while the remaining sessions will address thematic issues. In addition to the sessions, the PSC will also hold the annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held at the ministerial level, and an informal consultation with countries in political transition and the peace and security issues affecting them. All the sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. No open session is anticipated in the PPoW.

The PSC will begin the month with the ‘12^th Annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in enhancing cooperation between the AUPSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Addressing Peace and Security issues on the Continent,’ to be held on 1 and 2 December. Convened within the framework of Article 17(3) of the PSC Protocol, this year’s edition of the high-level seminar, also known as the Oran Process, will take place in Algiers, Algeria.

The programme for this year’s high-level seminar envisages: ‘i. Global Landscape of Peace and Security in Africa: Current Dynamics, ii. AU and UN Concerted Action on Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,’ and a closed session to focus on: ‘i. Taking Stock of A3+ Activities: Lessons learned and way forward, [and] ii. AUPSC and A3+: A Stronger Voice for UNSC Reform.’ It is also expected that this 12^th High-Level Seminar will unveil the ‘Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the AUPSC and the African Members of the UNSC,’ adopted during the PSC’s 1289^th meeting held in July 2025.

On 8 December, the PSC will convene its first substantive session to consider the Situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It is expected to focus on the full operationalisation of the mission and the existential financing challenges facing it. Not only is AUSSOM facing significant shortfalls, but it is also expected to lose some $130 million from the UN logistics support package, further aggravating the dire funding woes of the mission. The session will build on its previous session held at the ministerial level in July 2025, in which the Council decided ‘to increase the ceiling level of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) by an additional 10 million USD to make it 20 million USD for 2025 to support the deployment of AUSSOM.’ In September 2025, at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM jointly organised by the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU Commission, the UN and the United Kingdom (UK) saw pledges being made by both traditional and non-traditional donors for the mission. The UK pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each pledged to commit USD 1 million. Japan and South Korea also came on board to make some contribution to AUSSOM’s funding.

On 9 December, the PSC will convene for a briefing on the ‘Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook.’ The session will feature contributions from key AU institutions, including the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and the AU Counterterrorism Centre (AUCTC). Despite the reference to ‘continental early warning, conspicuously absent from providing analysis on early warning is the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). CEWS, a statutory structure established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, was at the heart of the provision of such briefing to the PSC through horizon scanning until its demise, contrary to Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, in the context of the institutional reform that saw the merger of the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments in 2021. Since then, the PSC took decisions to rectify the situation, but this is yet to take effect. This session will also build up – and get an update – on Council’s 1298^th meeting held on August 2025, in which it tasked the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools’ as well as  ‘an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.’

On the same day, the PSC is scheduled to consider the Draft Conclusions of the 12^th High-Level Seminar.

On 11 December, the Council will have an informal consultation with countries in political transition. This meeting was initially planned for November 2025 but was eventually postponed, in part due to lack of confirmation of participation from representatives of the three central Sahel countries. This will, however, be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods. This practice was introduced following the PSC’s 14^th Retreat on its Working Methods in November 2022, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, to allow direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. The upcoming session will assess the progress made and challenges encountered in these ongoing transition processes. It will also explore how the PSC can enhance its support for the political normalisation of the affected Member States. No formal outcome is expected for this session.

The following week, on 15 December, the PSC will convene to consider the Commission’s report on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) mandate. Such a session was earlier planned by the Council in November 2025, but a decision was taken to postpone it, as Amani Africa learned, in order to address the situation together with the renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF, hence its rescheduling for this month. It is expected to provide update on implementation of previous PSC decisions including from its last 1282^nd meeting on the MNJTF held in June 2025 which endorsed and validated ‘the revised Five-Year Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Resilience and Recovery of the Boko Haram Affected areas in the Lake Chad Basin’ and requested the AU Commission ‘to enhance its support to and collaboration with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR… and continue supporting the MNJTF in its operations to consolidate and sustain the gains made thus far against the Boko Haram terrorist group.’ This session is also expected to evaluate the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the MNJTF’s efforts in countering Boko Haram and the two main splinter groups, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), who continue to pose significant threats to regional peace and security.

The final substantive meeting of the PSC for the month concerns the situation in Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are now advancing aggressively into Kordofan, with major cities such as Babnusa and El-Obeid squarely in their sights. Having defeated the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in El Fasher last month – an assault that triggered widespread atrocities, including the reported killing of at least 1,500 civilians and the displacement of tens of thousands – the RSF currently holds the battlefield momentum in Sudan’s escalating war. In October 2025, following the fall of El Fasher, the PSC held an emergency session on the situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities that ensued following the city’s fall. From the communiqué it adopted after the session, the PSC tasked the AU Commission ‘to regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, in order to put in place preventive measures and reduce the risk of recurrence; develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation; [and] develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.’ Council went further and directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee, under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, to urgently facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan. Another assignment included tasking the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. This, however, did not happen.

The meeting will also be held just weeks following Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, rejection of a ceasefire agreement proposed by the Quad. He also criticised the UAE’s involvement in the Quad, accusing it of supporting the RSF, a claim widely shared by others. For its part, the RSF recently announced an apparently unilateral 3-month humanitarian truce. The Quad mediation efforts, which have included a push from US President Donald Trump, may be one of the factors for the recent escalation in fighting as part of the push for strengthening bargaining power in the negotiations.

As per usual practice, provision is made in the footnote for the convening of Committee of Experts meetings to consider the draft report on the State of Peace and Security in Africa and the Activities of the PSC covering January to December 2025 on a date to be determined.