The situation in Goma appears stable now, except for sporadic gunshots in the city, according to UN officials. M23 continues to deepen its grip on the territories it has seized. Most notably, it is instituting its own administrative structures in those territories, marginalising the structures under the current constitutional arrangement of the DRC. This has understandably triggered fears of the fragmentation of the territory of the DRC.

M23 had declared a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire on 4 February, but it did not hold as fighting resumed in South Kivu with M23 advancing southwards and capturing Nyabibwe, a mining town on Lake Kivu 40 miles from Bukavu, the provincial capital. After a few days of lull, fighting has reportedly resumed in South Kivu. According to UN officials, M23 is targeting Kavumbu Airport, a major airport in the province, and Bukavu is likely to be next. The fighting in South Kivu appears to have created fears in Burundi which borders the province and has its forces deployed in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government.

These major changes in the battlefield conditions of the conflict involving the M23 brought about very adverse consequences to the presence of UN and regional third-party mechanisms. The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), deployed in the region since December 2023 with an offensive mandate, attempted to halt M23’s advance but were unsuccessful. Tragically, three MONUSCO peacekeepers and 19 SAMIDRC troops (14 South Africans, three Malawians and two Tanzanians) lost their lives.

Beyond the loss of peacekeepers, the very continuation of these missions has emerged to be a major issue. With the announcement of the withdrawal of troops by the troop contributing countries of SAMIDRC, the mission exists only in name. For all practical purposes, the M23’s military gains have pushed the SAMIDRC into implosion. Similarly, it remains unclear whether and how MONUSCO can pursue its current mandate under the new realities established on the ground as a result of these gains.

In light of the regional tension that followed these recent developments, there are also understandable concerns about the heightened risk of the situation degenerating into a wider regional conflict, with the loss of lives involving peacekeepers from Southern Africa and the anxiety that the threat of the fall of Bukavu into the hands of M23 triggered in Burundi. Uganda, another neighbouring country  that has its forces in eastern DRC as part of a bilateral agreement with the Congolese government, also reportedly decided to adopt an ‘offensive defence’ posture by deploying 1000 additional troops for this purpose. These dimensions of the volatile situation necessitate urgent de-escalation initiatives by the AU, building on the decisions that the PSC ministers adopted and the outcomes of the EAC-SADC summit.

The last session of the PSC held on 28 January on the situation condemned the attacks by M23 and expressed grave concerns about the escalating tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It also condemned ‘any foreign military support’ to M23, a euphemism to refer to Rwanda. It further called for the immediate withdrawal of ‘any external party’ from Congolese territory, though without explicitly referencing Rwanda, which has been implicated by UN reports for supporting the group and demanded the cessation of such support while also condemning support for the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), once again without specifying the sources of this support, and demanding its immediate cessation. The FDLR is an ethnic Hutu armed group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsis, which operates in eastern DRC and has been supported by the Congolese government, as corroborated by UN reports.

In New York, the Security Council convened on the same day to discuss the situation. Council members have had divergent views on the role of external forces, with the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) previously resisting any explicit reference to Rwanda due to concerns that it might complicate ongoing mediation efforts. However, the group softened its position after the fall of Goma. In its 28 January joint statement at the Security Council, the A3 Plus, for the first time, urged ‘the Government of Rwanda to withdraw its troops from DRC territories without preconditions and without delay, and cease its reported support for the M23.’ At that meeting, Security Council members expressed hope that regional efforts would lead to a reinvigoration of mediation processes to find a lasting solution to this longstanding and intractable conflict.

Following the AUPSC and Security Council meetings, the EAC and SADC met in an extraordinary session to discuss the situation in eastern DRC on 29 and 31 January, respectively. The EAC, among other things, strongly urged the Congolese government to engage directly with M23 and other armed groups. It is to be recalled that the EAC spearheaded a peace process focusing on facilitating dialogue between the Congolese government and a wide array of armed groups operating in eastern DRC. This process had been stuck for some time because the Congolese government was not willing to engage in direct dialogue with M23. Instead, it preferred to engage with Rwanda, which was accused of supporting the M23. The platform for this has been another regional initiative known as the Luanda process under the auspices of the Angolan President João Lourenço, who was designated by the AU to facilitate dialogue between the two countries to ease their diplomatic tensions.

There has also been a regional and international push to revive the Nairobi process, considering the evolving security situation and the need to address the issue of M23. The Congolese government’s position also seems to have shifted recently; it is now open to allowing M23 to participate in the Nairobi process. However, it remains unclear if Kinshasa would engage in direct talks with M23 while the latter remains to be in control of the territories it seized during the past few months and is seen to be undermining the constitutional administrative structure of DRC in Eastern DRC by establishing its own administrative structures.

Ahead of the EAC and SADC joint summit, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) met on 7 February in an extraordinary session in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. It condemned ‘M23 supported by Rwanda and order[s] it to immediately cease its offensive and leave the illegally occupied territories’. It also calls for ‘the immediate withdrawal of the Rwandan Defence Forces from the Congolese territory, including the normalisation of the operations of the Goma airport in order to facilitate the return of members’ of the various verification mechanisms deployed in Goma under the Luanda process. Angola withdrew these members due to the worsening security situation.

The joint EAC/SADC summit took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 8 February with the participation of several leaders from eastern and southern Africa, preceded by a preparatory ministerial meeting of the two regional bodies on 7 February.

The joint summit decided to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes and mandated the appointment of additional facilitators from other African regions to support the mediation effort. Furthermore, the joint summit called for the resumption of direct dialogue with all armed groups, including M23, under the merged process. It called for the implementation of the Concept of Operations of the harmonised plan for the neutralisation of FDLR and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures as agreed within the framework of the Luanda process.

At the UN Security Council, a draft resolution was circulated to all Council members last week. Currently, Security Council members are negotiating the draft, which, among other things, demands the M23 to stop further territorial expansion and withdraw from Goma and all other controlled areas. It also called on the Rwandan Defense Forces to cease support to the M23 and withdraw from the Congolese territory. Additionally, it expresses its intention to consider additional targeted sanctions against the leadership of M23 and its external backers.

The other issue of concern for the PSC, when the heads of state and government meet tomorrow, is how to ameliorate the dire humanitarian situation in Eastern DRC, which is one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. Apart from interrupting the operation of MONUSCO, including its peacekeeping mission, the fighting in Goma has curtailed humanitarian access and activities. Further to heightening inter-communal tension and violence, it is also forcing a large number of people into displacement. About 3 thousand people have been reportedly killed in this latest round of fighting. An estimated 178,000 people fled the surrounding areas, with 34,000 of them seeking refuge in already overcrowded camps for internally displaced persons within Goma. The worsening humanitarian situation has been compounded by the disruption of critical infrastructure and basic services. The UN Human Rights Council, after an emergency session it held on 7 February, adopted unanimously a resolution on the establishment of ‘an independent fact-finding mission on the serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’

One of the issues for the heads of state and government to address is how to institute a complete cessation of hostilities and de-escalate the mounting regional tension and the attendant risk of countries in the region being sucked into the conflict. The other issue that tomorrow’s session needs to address is how to build on and take forward the steps outlined in the communiqués of the 1256^th PSC ministerial session, the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the ECCAS meeting. Beyond the question of implementation of the outcomes of these sessions, there is also the issue of the additional urgent measures that the PSC summit may need to consider for a more effective peace process. The PSC also needs to clarify the proposed merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its call for an unconditional cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the M23 from areas it has occupied. Building on the outcome of the EAC-SADC summit, the PSC may request the AU Commission to establish the territories held by the M23 as neutral territories and the constitution of a neutral force from countries outside of EAC, SADC and ECCAS that will facilitate the neutral status of these territories pending peace talks. It may call on the DRC on its part to cooperate with the inter-Congolese peace process initiated under the Nairobi process by allowing the participation of the M23, as there is no military solution to the conflict in Eastern DRC, including the one involving the M23. The PSC may also urge a follow-up of the discussions under the Lunda Process for the neutralisation of the FDLR. The PSC may call for the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire concluded under the Launda process. It is also expected to call for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and restate its call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces operating in the DRC. The PSC may call for urgent dispatching of a high-level delegation of Heads of State and Government from countries that are not members of SADC, EAC, and ECCAS to Kinshasa and Kigali for urgent implementation of de-escalation measures. As a follow-up to the EAC-SADC summit communiqué, the PSC may propose the formation of a high-level ad hoc committee of Heads of State from outside of SADC, EAC, and ECCAS to support and reinforce the enhanced complementary resumption of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.