Tomorrow (17 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1140^th session at the Heads of State and Government level to consider the deteriorating security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force. The session is expected to consider the situation within the framework of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region (PSCF Agreement). This month marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the PSCF which rekindled a sense of hope for ending the recurring cycles of conflict in eastern DRC and its impacts on the stability and development of the Great Lakes region.

Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa and Chairperson of the PSC for the month is expected to deliver opening remarks to be followed with a briefing update by Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission. Statements are also expected from João Manuel Lourenco, President of the Republic of Angola, AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation and Chairperson of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Évariste Ndayishimiye, President of the Republic of Burundi and Chairperson of the EAC. The Chairpersons of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) are also expected to make statements. As countries concerned, Félix Antoine Tshisekedi, President of the DRC and Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda will also present statements.

The last time the PSC considered the situation in eastern DRC was at its 1103^rd session convened on 31 August of the previous year, where it endorsed the deployment of EAC Regional Force to eastern DRC and called on the AU Commission to facilitate coordination among efforts being deployed by the various stakeholders in the region.

Unfortunately, peace continues to elude the eastern DRC and the deterioration of the security situation is once again stoking tensions in the region. DRC happens to be the chair of the regional oversight mechanism (ROM) which is the main body that reviews the progress on the implementation of the national and regional commitments made by signatory countries under the PSC framework. DRC is expected to hand over the chairmanship to Burundi who will host the next meeting of the ROM.

Regional diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the EAC and the ICGLR, otherwise known as the Nairobi and Luanda processes, have been trying to address the growing insecurity in the eastern DRC. However, the security situation has continued to escalate worsening the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. The M23 Movement had reportedly withdrawn from some of the territories it controlled in North Kivu as a result of these regional diplomatic efforts. With the recent resumption of intense fighting with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and other armed groups, however, M23 reportedly took control of several villages including a strategic town, Kitshanga, cutting off the road to Goma, the regional capital. In recent days, M23 is said to have moved closer to Sake, a town west of Goma.

The EAC Facilitator of the Peace Process in the eastern DRC, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, expressed deep concern about the deteriorating situation in North Kivu and called for the cessation of all hostilities and adherence to the agreements reached within the framework of the Nairobi and Luanda processes which, among other things, included the withdrawal of M23 from occupied territories, the accelerated implementation of the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilisation Program (P-DDRCS) and the resumption of consultations between the Congolese government and armed groups.

Although international attention is focused on the military activities of the M23, other armed groups operating in eastern DRC such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Coopérative pour le Développement du Congo (CODECO), the FDLR, and the Mai-Mai Group have also continued to cause havoc in the region. The ongoing fighting has resulted in massive displacement of people. The rise of hate speech and incitement to violence targeting minority communities in the eastern DRC is also causing significant alarm.

The escalating security situation has continued to aggravate the already tense relationship between the DRC and Rwanda. On 24 January, Rwanda said that it took defensive measures against a Congolese aircraft that violated its airspace, while DRC denied the accusation and characterized Rwanda’s actions as “a deliberate act of aggression”. Both Kinshasa and Kigali have ratcheted up the rhetoric and this has heightened fears of direct military confrontation between the two countries. Most recently, on 15 February, Rwanda released a statement accusing DRC soldiers of cross-border shooting. According to the press release, FARDC forces entered ungoverned territory between the two countries and started firing against Rwandan border post.

Clearly there is increasing risk of the situation plunging the two countries into full blown inter-state war with dire consequences including the danger of sacking other countries from the region into regional conflagration. Not any less worrisome is misinformation, disinformation and propagation of ethnic based hate speech and incitement of violence continues to deepen inter-ethnic and intercommunal tension and heightened risks of mass atrocities.

The EAC Heads of State and Government met in Bujumbura in an extraordinary summit on 4 February 2023 to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the eastern DRC. The Presidents of DRC and Rwanda as well as other regional leaders attended the summit which called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups. The summit also instructed the EAC chiefs of defense forces to meet and set new timelines for the withdrawal of these forces.  The chiefs of defense forces met in Nairobi based on the EAC summit decision to assess the security situation in the eastern DRC and recommend a new course of action. As the M23 continues to advance and control more territories in North Kivu, however, public sentiment in the region is changing with protests against both the EAC regional force. The Congolese government is pushing the regional force to undertake offensive operations against the M23. Kenyatta has called on countries deploying their troops as part of the regional forces to take their positions urgently. In North Kivu, he called on the regional force to interpose itself between the warring parties in areas vacated by the M23.

Kenyatta has expressed his intentions to convene a fourth round of talks as part of the Nairobi process.  He also urged all the parties to implement the outcomes of the third round of talks to build the necessary confidence in the process and called for regional and international support to ensure the success of the next round of talks. Angolan President Joao Lourenco and Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the EAC, are also reportedly planning to convene a mini-summit on 17 February in Addis Ababa ahead of the PSC Summit, which will bring together Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame as well as EAC leaders along with ICGLR to assess the implementation of the decisions made in in the context of the Nairobi and Luanda processes.

The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. The PSC meeting is expected to assess developments in the eastern DRC and express serious concerns about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the region. It may express support for the decision of the EAC extraordinary summit for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign armed groups. It may also reiterate support for the EAC regional force and its expedited deployment to carry out its mandate. The PSC may express concern about the increasing tensions between DRC and Rwanda and encourage the two countries to resolve differences through dialogue in the context of the ongoing regional initiatives. The PSC may express support to the EAC and ICGLR and commend the efforts of the Chairperson of ICGLR Angolan President Joao Lourenco and the EAC Chairperson Burundi’s President as well as the facilitator for the Nairobi process Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. It may emphasize the need for the scrupulous implementation of decisions taken within the framework of the Nairobi and Luanda processes to de-escalate the situation in the eastern DRC and ease tensions between DRC and Rwanda. The PSC may take the opportunity to reflect on the 10^th anniversary of the PSCF and call on the convening of a summit level meeting on the reinvigorating of the various mechanisms of the PSCF and for countries of the region to reaffirm their commitments and the guarantors in this regard. It may also underscore the need to reinvigorate the mechanisms under the PSCF to address the prevailing peace and security challenges and build the necessary trust and confidence between and among countries of the region. The PSC may express concern on the widespread misinformation, disinformation, ethnic based hate speech and incitement of violence and the associated risks of mass atrocities in the region and may request the AU Commission to put in place a mechanism for addressing these grave threats. It may finally call on the relevant regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECS/RMs) to convene a joint summit for ensuring harmonization and coordinated action with a view to avoid any misunderstanding and divergence of policy actions among them.

Tomorrow (31 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1103^rd session to address the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Statements will also be presented by the respective representatives of DRC, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Angola (on Luanda Peace Process and as the Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)), the Republic of Kenya (on Nairobi Process), Republic of Burundi as Chair of the East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Secretariat, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat and United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

The last time Council discussed the situation in eastern DRC was at its 1078^th session on the Great Lakes Region (GLR) which took place on 19 April 2022. An issue of central concern which featured at that session was the resurgence of the March 23 Movement (M23), a development which further aggravates the challenges to security facing eastern DRC. In addition to deliberating on the security threats imposed by M23 and other armed groups’ insurgency in eastern DRC, tomorrow’s session is expected to address the growing concern over the possibilities of regional conflict among countries neighbouring the DRC. The session is also expected to serve as an opportunity for the PSC to discuss how it can contribute to ongoing efforts and initiatives spearheaded by EAC and ICGLR to deescalate tensions among countries in the region and to effectively respond to the armed insurgency in eastern DRC.

The recent resurfacing of M23, a movement which was assumed to have been effectively defeated through the collaborative efforts of the DRC military, MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), represents the most serious security challenge to eastern DRC in recent years. Since the resumption of its military activities in March 2022, M23 has been able to advance and capture key strategic towns in Kivu and Ituri provinces. In North Kivu in particular, the M23 was able to overran the Rumangabo military base which is the largest military base of the Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC). By June 2022, a wing of M23 was able to take over the city of Bunagana along the border with Uganda. Although M23’s activities became widely apparent in March 2022, reports indicate that the movement has been infiltrating key military positions and strategic areas in North Kivu since at least November 2021.

The deteriorating insecurity in eastern DRC due to revival of M23 is also having grave humanitarian consequences. In just a few weeks of fighting and attacks by M23, over 170,000 people were reportedly displaced. According to the latest report of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “North Kivu has recorded twice as many cases of gender-based violence between January and June [2022] compared to the same period in 2021”. In Ituri province, the same report records the killing of over 60 civilians just between 30 July and 11 August 2022, due to intensified attacks. As a result of heightened insecurity, some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) delivering humanitarian assistance have also been forced to cease their activities in some parts of the region. The death toll among displaced populations has also been causing increasing concern among humanitarian actors in the region. In Ituri, over 800 deaths were recorded in the period from January to June 2022 and out of these, 715 are reported to have been sheltered in internally displace persons (IDP) camps. Having been redeployed to fight M23, a significant portion of the Congolese army has been unable to provide protection to vulnerable communities including IDPs.

In addition to worsening the insecurity in eastern DRC and its humanitarian toll, M23’s revival has also resulted in political tensions between DRC and Rwanda in particular. The tension has led to suspension of Air Rwanda flights to DRC and freezing of diplomatic relations. In June 2022, the DRC decided to close its border with Rwanda after a Congolese soldier was found shot dead in Rwandan territory. Since then, the tension between the two countries escalated with the two countries trading accusations and blames. On the one hand, DRC has been alleging Rwandan involvement in reviving the M23 while on the other hand, Rwanda blames DRC forces of firing rockets into its territory. Further to that, Rwanda also accuses DRC of supporting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed rebel group operating in eastern DRC and with links to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

Other developments during end of 2021 and into 2022 that also apparently contributed to the heightened regional suspicion include the deployment of Ugandan forces into eastern DRC to pursue the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel armed group which also operates actively in North Kivu province of eastern DRC. In December 2021, DRC allowed the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) to enter its territory to chase ADF fighters. Further to that and as part of the military agreement between DRC and Uganda, an MoU was also signed between the military chiefs of the two countries for the construction of roads linking DRC and Uganda. According to some reports, the MoU which has not been made public, allows the UPDF to provide security services for the construction of the roads that extend to DRC territories, which gives huge advantages to Uganda.

Following complaints expressed by DRC against alleged Rwandan support for M23 during the Executive Council meeting in Malabo, the AU Assembly at the Extraordinary Summit of 28 May 2022 entrusted Angola, as the chair of the ICGLR, to mediate talks between DRC and Rwanda. As a follow up to that, the Angolan President, João Lourenço facilitated talks between President Félix Tshisekedi and his counterpart Paul Kagame on 06 July 2022. The talks resulted in the adoption of the Luanda Roadmap which among other key points provides for the adoption of de-escalation measures including discussions around addressing the issue of FDLR. As a follow up to the adoption of the Luanda Roadmap, another meeting was held between the foreign ministers of the two countries on 21 July which led to the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission for monitoring implementation of the roadmap.

Prior to the Luanda process, the EAC on its part has initiated the Nairobi Process for stabilising eastern DRC, under the outgoing Chairship of Kenya. The Nairobi Process envisages two parallel tracks for stabilising the region. The first one is a political track focusing on facilitating dialogue between DRC government and armed non-State actors including M23 operating in the region. The second track is a military track proposing the deployment of a regional force to contribute to the fight against negative forces.

On the proposed military track of the Nairobi Process, the EAC plans to deploy between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers with a mandate to ‘contain, defeat and eradicate negative forces’ in the eastern DRC. While the first deployment took place during this month with Burundian troops, the deployment of other forces amid the breakdown of trust and the financing of the troops remain unclear. Two issues that the PSC is expected to address include the mandating of the force, including bringing the deployment under the ASF framework and how the AU may lend support for sourcing funds for the mission.

In terms of the role of the AU, another issue of major interest for members of the PSC is determining how the AU can support the two processes and facilitate coordination and complementarity between the Luanda and Nairobi processes. On the military track, while supporting the initiative, it is also of interest for PSC members to draw on the lessons from past experiences including from the deployment of the FIB of MONUSCO. One such lessons is the challenges of armed militias and insurgencies in eastern DRC could not be addressed through military means. This underscores the need for the primacy of political processes and also the necessity for both undertaking the military measures in strict respect to the sovereignty of the DRC and in compliance with applicable AU and UN norms, including those relating to international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights and protection of civilians.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council is expected to express grave concern over the developments in eastern DRC, particularly the resurgence of M23 and the resultant deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the region. It is also expected to express concern over the political tensions between countries in the region, particularly between DRC and Rwanda and call on both to take all necessary de-escalation measures including through good-faith engagement in mediation efforts facilitated by the AU mandated Luanda process and the relevant RECs/RMs. Council may further express its support for the Luanda and Nairobi Processes and call on all member States of the GLR to lend their support to efforts aimed at de-escalating tensions and degrading negative forces operating in the region. To enhance its role in supporting the two processes and enhancing coordination between them, the PSC may also call on the AU to establish a support mechanism that leverages existing AU processes including its liaison offices in DRC and Burundi. Council may further emphasise the importance of prioritising political solutions and implementation of military tracks in support of such political solutions. It may also stress the need to ensure respect to DRC’s sovereignty as well as standards of IHL and human rights law in the implementation of military efforts. It may further emphasise the importance of sustained and full implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the DRC and the region (PSCF), particularly its provisions on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), for sustainable resolution of conflict and insurgency in the region. Having regard to the dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC, Council may also appeal to AU member States, partners and the international community to redouble their humanitarian assistance to affected communities in the region.

Tomorrow (19 November) the PSC will hold a briefing session on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. Although DRC was the focus of the session when the monthly program of work was issued, Burundi was added following the high level regional visit that the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, undertook to DRC and Burundi.

It is expected that the Council will receive a briefing from Chergui focusing on his recent visit to the two countries. Basile Ikouebe, AU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and Head of AU Liaison Office in Burundi is expected to provide statement.

On Burundi, the briefing is expected to provide updates on the prevailing the political, security, human rights and socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Burundi. During his visit to Burundi, Chergui met with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and the Interior. He also met, on an informal basis, the First Vice-President of the Republic, Gaston Sindimwo. Chergui was unable to meet with President Pierre Kkurunziza, despite the initial agreement for the meeting.

Since the last PSC meeting held in September 2018, one notable development have been the failure of the 5th round of the EAC led Inter- Burundian dialogue that the facilitator, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, scheduled for 25 October 2018. The delegations of the government and the ruling party the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) boycotted the talks. Government spokesperson stated that they needed to receive the list of participants and the agenda for the talks, insisting that no other issues other than the roadmap towards the 2020 elections shall be discussed.

In the past rounds, the government refused to recognize and engage in talks with some of the major opposition groups. In particular, the government rejects the opposition coalition Conseil National pour le respect de l’Accord d’Arusha pour la Paix et de l’État de Droit (CNARED, or National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement and Rule of Law) claiming that they are associated with the May 2015 failed coup.

In the briefing, it would be of interest for the PSC to hear from Chergui on the outcome of the discussions he held in Bujumbura. In the light of the 19 September communiqué of the PSC, other issues on which member states would like Chergui’s reflections include the fate of the Inter-Burundian dialogue, the finalization of the long stalling conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding relating to the operation of the AU human rights observers and military experts deployed to Burundi.

On DRC, it is expected that Chergui’s briefing will be accompanied by that of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in the DRC, Ambassador Abdou Abarry. During his visit, Chergui met, among others, with the President Joseph Kabila. The visit focused on the political situation in the country focusing in particular on the preparations for the national elections. Other areas addressed include the deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC and the efforts for combating the spread of Ebola.

In the briefing to the PSC, it is expected that much of the focus would be on the preparations for the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018. There are two issues that are of major significance in this regard.

The first relates to the need and prospect for holding free and fair elections. Apart from the logistical and technical preparations that should be put in place, this would entail that
there is an even playing field and that the elections are conducted free from actions or omissions that undermine the credibility of the elections. Despite some of the positive steps notably the announcement that President Joseph Kabila will not stand for the election, concerns abound.

Confidence in the electoral process remains very low. Opposition and civil society raise major concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission. There are also concerns around the integrity of the voter roll With respect to the voting machines, there are concerns that it is susceptible for tampering, particularly if its reliable use is not adequately tested and independently verified. Major opposition parties as well as civil society organizations urge the Electoral Commission not to use the machines.

Other areas of concern, which would be of interest for the PSC, include reports of restrictions on political and civic freedoms including prohibition of public events and their adverse impact on the electoral process. There are reports of attacks against opposition groups and restriction of and heavy-handed response to protestors. Members of the opposition blame the security forces of using disproportionate force and arbitrary arrest. The resultant tension means that the country continues to witness recurring political instability.

In the light of the various issues surrounding the preparations of the elections, an issue on which PSC members would wish to get updates on the role of election observers.
Despite the challenges, there does not seem to be a call for the postponement of the national elections. In an interview to RFI on 16 November, Chergui warned that ‘delaying the elections would put us in a lot of uncertainties. It is to be recalled that the elections have already been postponed two times since 2016.

As part of the briefing, Chergui is also expected to update PSC members on the Ebola outbreak in DRC and ongoing efforts for addressing the outbreak. In this context, an issue of particular interest for the PSC is the implication of the dire security situation in eastern DRC both for the effort to address Ebola and for the planned elections.

The expected outcome is a communiqué. While on Burundi the communiqué is likely to reiterate the points raised in the communiqué of the 794th session of the PSC including on the stalling inter-Burundian dialogue and the finalizing the MoU on AU human rights observers and military experts, on DRC it is expected to highlight the need for the holding of the elections as scheduled under conditions that guarantee free and fair elections.

Tomorrow (12 July), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing session on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The meeting is expected to receive a briefing from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in the DRC, Ambassador Abdou Abarry. The Peace and Security Department will also make a statement, with the Department of Political Affairs providing update on preparations for the December 2018 elections. Representatives of the DRC, South Africa, representing the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Gabon as chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Africa 3 members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC), the UN and the European Union (EU) are also expected to make statements at the session.

The political instability and the insecurity in the DRC show no sign of improvement. Both are intertwined with the uncertainties around the elections scheduled for December 2018. The main focus of tomorrow’s briefing is the preparations for the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016. There are two issues that are of major significance in this regard.

The first relates to the need and prospect for holding free and fair elections. Apart from the logistical and technical preparations that should be put in place, this would entail that there is an even playing field and that the elections are conducted free from actions or omissions that undermine the credibility of the elections. In this respect, concerns are being expressed in respect to the treatment of opposition parties, civil society organizations and lack of respect for freedom of association and assembly. There are reports of attacks against opposition groups and restriction of and heavy-handed response to protestors. The confrontations between protestors and the government security forces is resulting in more violence further complicating the possibility of the talks between the government, the opposition and members of the civil society including the Catholic Church. Members of the opposition blame the security forces of using brutal and disproportionate force. The resultant tension means that the country continues to witness recurring political instability.

Also significant in relation to the credibility of the elections are concerns around the voter list, the use of the voting machines and the mechanisms for verification of the credible use of voting machines if they would be used for the election. Given the lack of confidence being expressed around the voter list, the major issue is whether the provisional voter list would be made available for verification and scrutiny by the electorate. Opposition and civil society also raise major concerns about the independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission.

With respect to the voting machines, there are concerns that it is susceptible for tampering, particularly if its reliable use is not adequately tested and independently verified. Major opposition parties as well as civil society organizations urge the Electoral Commission not to use the machines. Apart from urging the full implementation of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016, the Catholic Bishops congress of 15-16 February called for the international certification of the new electoral voting machines. Despite the assurance that the Prime Minster gave that the digital voting system could help the election to run smoothly and in record time, the problems recently experienced when testing the system underscore the need for certification and putting in place mechanisms able to address technical problems of the digital voting system that may derail or put in doubt the credibility of the planned elections. There is no indication that the Electoral Commission plans to heed the calls for such independent verification. The second area relates to the uncertainty around President Kabila’s plans. Apart from the loss of legitimacy of the government and protesters’ determination of putting pressure on the government for implementing the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016 on political transition, uncertainty over President Kabila’s plan to honour the constitutional term limit underline the political tension. Lambert Mende, DRC Information Minister clarified the position of the government on 5 February, saying that President Kabila will not run for re-election.

In the past two months indications have emerged that the President’s party and supporters are orchestrating efforts for extending the term of the President. However, his party, cabinet and the interest groups surrounding the government are taking actions and decision that indicate the possibility of Kablia running for another term. One of such decisions was made last month by the cabinet, which unanimously approved the creation of a ‘grand political electoral coalition’ the Common Front for Congo (FCC), naming Kabila as its ‘moral authority’. Although what the President may end up doing remains uncertain, it is possible that the courts may be requested to pronounce themselves on the question of term limits. Failing such options for overcoming term limits, other possibilities include the postponement of the elections.

The possibility of the prosecution of Moise Katumbi, former governor of Katanga Province and now an opposition with strong following will have a serious negative impact on the credibility of the judiciary and the electoral process. Jean-Pierre Bemba, former leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) was recently acquitted from charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. His release and possible entry to the political sphere and the presidential election will radically change the dynamics of the race.

Understandably members of the opposition, civil society organizations including the Catholic Church are calling for adherence to the 2016 Saint Sylvester Agreement, which bars the president from standing for election. The international and regional pressure is mounting on Kabila not to stand for the presidential elections scheduled in December 2018. At the regional level, Angola has sent clear message urging Kabila to adhere to the constitutional term limits. It remains uncertain if there could be unity of action on the part of relevant regional actors. Indications are that the government may rely on the central Africa region to dampen opposition to third term, this being a region where extension of term limits is seen to be common.

The nominations of official presidential candidates will open in less than two weeks and will stay until 8 August 2018. AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki and UN Secretary-General were scheduled to travel to DRC earlier in the week. In a sign of rejection of the role of international engagement, they were unable to undertake the joint visit due to lack of confirmation of their meeting with President Kabila.
The question of the non-extension of President Kabila’s term is not simply an issue of constitutionalism and rule of law. The other aspect of the question is the availability of workable exit strategy for the president. As such, the resolution of this crisis depends not only on the constitutional dimension of this issue which ensures compliance with the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement but also on crafting a strategy that offers realistic exist for Kabila.

Given the request of the PSC for the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a coordination mechanism bringing together regional and international actors that will facilitate policy coordination and mobilization of coherent support, tomorrow’s PSC session offers an opportunity to consider steps taken in this respect and the prospect of establishment of an international contact group.

In terms of regional dynamics the regional ramifications of the deteriorating security situation is of direct concern to DRC’s neighbors in the PSC particularly Angola, Congo, and Rwanda. One of the factors that shape the dynamics in the PSC is the divergence in the nature of the relationship between DRC and its neighbors and the interest of its various neighbors. In terms of sub-regional organizations, SADC is most active. SADC also sent a mission of Electoral Technical Committee and Political Assessment Mission. But SADC has recently abandoned its plan for opening an office in DRC and deploying a special envoy.

In the absence of a clear strategy shared by neighboring countries, SADC, UN and the AU both on the preparation of credible elections according to the electoral calendar and on workable exit for President Kabila, it is unlikely that this PSC session would go beyond reiterating existing AU positions on the resolution of the political crisis. The expected outcome of the session is a statement.

Tomorrow 13 March 2018, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Apart from the possible statement from Ambassador Smail Chergui, the African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, the PSC expects to receive a briefing from the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in the DRC, Ambassador Abdou Abarry. Others expected to make statements include the DRC and representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), UN, Africa 3 members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU).

The political situation in the country

There are at least two issues that PSC members expect to deliberate on with respect to the political situation in the country. The first concerns the rising political instability resulting from the tension between the government and opposition groups and protesters. The other relates to existing concerns regarding preparations for the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016.

With opposition groups and civil society organizations mobilizing pressure against President Laurent Kabila and the government’s authoritarian drift increasingly resorting to repression and heavy-handed security responses, the country continues to witness recurring political instability. What triggered the most recent tensions and protests in various parts of the country was the failure to respect the previously agreed upon deadline of December 2017 for the holding of the presidential election.

Nine people died and ninety eight others were injured as security forces responded with violence to the protest that the Catholic Church called on 31 December 2017. In another wave of demonstration on 21 January 2018, six people were reportedly killed, sixty-eight injured and one hundred twenty one others were arrested, triggering strong condemnation including from the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. Most recently, government crackdown on protests that the Catholic Church called after Sunday service on 25 February led to the death of two people in Kinshasa and Mbandaka. According to the UN Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), thirty seven others were injured and more than one hundred arrested.

Apart from the loss of legitimacy of the government and protesters’ determination of putting pressure on the government for implementing the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016 on political transition, uncertainty over President Kabila’s plan to honour the constitutional term limit underline the political tension. Lambert Mende, DRC Information Minister clarified the position of the government on 5 February, saying that President Kabila will not run for re-election. Despite lingering suspicions that the President could extend his term should he find an opportunity for effecting constitutional term limit, such clear statement from the government affirms commitment to the Saint Sylvester’s agreement that bars the President from standing for another election.

The question of the non-extension of President Kabila’s term is not simply an issue of constitutionalism and rule of law. The other aspect of the question is the availability of workable exit strategy for the president. As such, the resolution of this crisis depends not only on the constitutional dimension of this issue which ensures compliance with the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement but also on crafting such a strategy.

As part of the process for creating conditions for the holding of the elections in December 2018, the implementation of confidence building measures, as has been urged by the AU and the UN, would be important. In this regard the PSC session would discuss steps taken in releasing or suspending trial of members of the political opposition arrested for their political actions in the past few months and during the course of 2017. There are also expectations on the widening of the political space, respecting opposition activity and allowing the media and civil society to operate without repression.

With respect to the steps being taken to implement the new electoral calendar issued in early December 2017, until recently the government did not give firm guarantee that the general elections would be held as planned in December 2018. During the 26 January 2018 press conference he held after five years, President Kabila raised his concern that the cost of the elections would be ‘exorbitant’. In an interview that he gave to Reuters on 8 March 2018, Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala stated that ‘I confirm that in December this year the Congolse people will be brought to the ballot boxes’. While this statement is welcome, it is of interest to PSC members that the electoral commission (CENI) clarifies the details of the budget required for holding the elections and the source of funding. This is important for any discussion for external financial and logistical support to the electoral process.

It is to be recalled that DRC also blamed the delay in the elections on the challenges faced in finalizing the voter registration process. This exercise has been completed in all the 26 provinces of the country, including those that experienced major insecurity such as the Kasai region. In this regard, the PSC expects to receive updates particularly in relation to its earlier call on the government to submit, upon completion of voter registration, the bills on the convening of elections to the two houses of parliament for their timely adoption.

In terms of the operational details for convening the national elections, another area of interest relates to the impact of the electronic voting system on the timeline and conduct of the election. Apart from urging the full implementation of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016, the Catholic Bishops congress of 15-16 February called for the international certification of the new electoral voting machines. Despite the assurance that the Prime Minster gave that the digital voting system could help the election to run smoothly and in record time, the problems recently experienced when testing the system underscore the need for putting in place mechanisms able to address technical problems of the digital voting system that may derail or put in doubt the credibility of the planned elections.

Given the request of the PSC for the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a coordination mechanism bringing together regional and international actors that will facilitate policy coordination and mobilization of coherent support, tomorrow’s PSC session offers an opportunity to consider steps taken in this respect and the prospect of establishment of an international contact group. In this regard, the plan of a joint visit that the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary General are anticipated to undertake offers unique opportunity to ensure the government’s commitment for holding the elections without further postponement and within the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016. If it is undertaken following consultation with regional and international actors, this could also be the basis for exploring discussion on exploring workable exist strategy with President Kabila.

The security situation

In the context of the political uncertainties that emerged in the country following delays in holding national elections, DRC has also witnessed resurgence of rebel or militia groups and armed confrontations during the course of the past year. Both the number of armed groups and incidents of fighting have spiked. In terms of major violence the region that witnessed major violence has been the Kasai region. On 26 February, security forces repelled attack by alleged Kamuina Nsapu militants in this region, with the ensuing clash reportedly leaving one soldier and fourteen others dead. Conflict between Hema and Lendu communities escalated in Dungu area, Ituri province leaving sixty to one hundred people dead in 2018 and forcing in mid-February some 27,000 people to flee to Uganda.

While the spike in number of armed groups and armed fighting affect various parts of the country spreading at least across 10 provinces, more than 120 groups are reported to operate in the east and south east of the country. Armed groups such as Mayi Mayi Yakutumba have become increasingly active. On 15 February, the army reported killing forty eight members of armed group Mai Mai Yakutumba in South Kivu province, forcing some combatants to flee to Burundi and recapturing large areas.

In recent months, most significant incidents of fighting involved the armed group known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). This is the group that is believed to be the perpetrator of the attack on Semuliki in North Kivu that killed fifteen MONUSCO soldiers on the 8 December 2017. Despite a 12 February seizure by DRC army of the ‘grand bastion’ of ADF in Mwalika, fighting continues between DRC army and the ADF in the Mbanu-Kamango-Eringiti axis.

Inter-ethnic clashes also create further sources of insecurity in the country. In February, interethnic violence between the Lendu and Hema groups led to sixty fatalities in less than one week, causing unrest among the local population and leading to humanitarian concerns. Clashes between ethnic Hutu on one side and Nande and Hundu groups on other on 25-28 February left sixteen civilians and seven militiamen dead in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu.

The deterioration in the security situation that the above developments have caused has generated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the country. The UN has declared the country a Level three emergency, characterised as worst of the worst crisis. With an average of 5,500 people fleeing their home daily, DRC is reported to be the country most affected by conflict displacement for a second year in raw. The number of displaced people has exceeded 4.1 million people, more than in Syria. The UNHCR reported significant surge in the number of people from DRC seeking refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania.

Given that the deteriorating security situation carries regional consequences, it is of direct concern to DRC’s neighbors in the PSC particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. One of the factors that shape the dynamics in the PSC is the divergence in the nature of the relationship between DRC and its neighbors and the interest of its different neighbors. While Rwanda requested investigation into incursion on 13 February by Congolese army into its territory (during which three Congolese soldiers were killed), Uganda and DRC launched joint military operation against armed groups along their common borders. In terms of sub-regional organizations, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is most active. It has appointed former Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba as a special envoy to the DRC and dispatched various missions in 2017. Most recently on 3 February, SADC announced that it would open a liaison office in DRC. While it is clearly active, SADC is also seen as being sympathetic to President Kabila.

In the absence of a clear strategy shared by neighboring countries, SADC, UN and the AU both on the preparation of credible elections within the electoral calendar and on workable exit for President Kabila, it is unlikely that this PSC session would go beyond reiterating existing AU positions on the resolution of the political crisis. The PSC would welcome the idea of the joint mission of the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.